CHARLES I. NAVY--_continued_.
Considering the failure of his foreign policy and the inglorious fiasco
of the first ship-money fleet, it might be supposed that Charles would
pause in the unusual method he had adopted of wringing money from
the country for empty displays. While the Earl of Lindsey was still
cruising at sea, and before the issue of the second ship-money writs,
he knew that his schemes had miscarried. He was left drifting about
without any definite policy, but still clinging to the plan of the
restoration of his nephew to the Palatinate as the one thing before
him. He was equally ready to ally himself with France against Spain, or
with Spain against France, whichever would be most likely to aid him in
realising that object;[520] and as he had neither money nor troops to
attract a Continental alliance, his only pawn lay in the navy. In the
summer of 1635, while Selden was busy in the Temple at his book, it was
resolved to equip a fleet far more formidable than Lindsey’s for the
following year. Coventry made his speech to the Judges in June, and in
August the second writs for ship-money were sent out. In this case, as
is well known, they were addressed not only to the coast towns but to
the whole of England, with consequences notorious in English history.
The number of ships it was at first intended to set out was forty-five,
totalling 21,850 tons, and with 8650 men, the estimated cost being
£218,000.[521] At the beginning of December the Admiralty considered
what number should be set out in the spring; and by an Order of the
King in Council on December 27th, it was decreed that twenty-four
should be prepared “for guarding the narrow seas,” while ten other
ships should be got ready as a second fleet to reinforce the first, or
to take its place later.[522]
The second ship-money fleet was placed under the command of the Earl
of Northumberland, an able, accomplished, and high-spirited young
nobleman, much better fitted than Lindsey was for the office of
Admiral. This fleet is usually said to have been the most powerful ever
set out by England up to that time.[523] According to Northumberland’s
Journal, it consisted of twenty-seven vessels, all of which were
king’s ships, except three which had been fitted out by London. Sir
John Pennington was appointed Vice-Admiral and Sir Henry Mervin,
Rear-Admiral.[524]
But what was to be done with the fleet? That was a question put by
Windebank in the autumn of the previous year. The king had remitted
to the Foreign Committee two inquiries: what answer he should make to
the French ambassador concerning “a nearer conjunction” with France;
and whether he should declare his neutrality. Windebank argued against
either a French alliance or a declaration of neutrality. Against the
former proposition he urged four reasons, one being that the French
“had challenged a joint sovereignty on the sea with his Majesty”;
and against the latter that the French and Hollanders would besiege
Dunkirk or some part of Flanders, and the king would have to sit still
and suffer it to be lost, or break his neutrality. “Besides,” said
Windebank, clinching his arguments, “what was to be done with the
fleet next year if his Majesty declared his neutrality? it must lie
still and do nothing.”[525] Apparently the problem of what was to be
done with the fleet was not quite solved until the February following,
though there had been several tolerably clear indications that one part
of its duty at least would be the suppression of unlicensed fishing on
the British coasts. Selden’s _Mare Clausum_ was issued from the press
in December 1635, and it was with great satisfaction that Charles
welcomed it (see p. 368). The idea of playing the more distinguished
_rôle_ of Lord of the Sea was not therefore likely to be abandoned
because Lindsey’s fleet had been able to do nothing.
At the same time Charles thought he might get some money as well as
honour by means of his fleet, and he submitted two propositions to the
Lords of the Admiralty for their consideration in employing the fleet
“for his honour and profit”: first, in “wafting and securing” foreign
merchant vessels passing through his seas; second, in protecting all
such fishermen as should fish under his license upon his seas and
coasts. With reference to the latter suggestion, Sir Henry Marten
delivered an elaborate opinion to the Admiralty. He recited how King
James, after long and mature deliberation, had satisfied himself
and resolved that the fishing “in his seas and upon the coasts of
his dominions, did justly appertain unto him as a right incident to
his crowns,” and had issued a proclamation declaring his title and
forbidding unlicensed fishing by foreigners. He also explained that the
United Provinces had then sent over commissioners who alleged continued
custom and present possession of the fishings, “mentioning withall
some treaties that had been heretofore between the Kings of England
and the Dukes of Burgundy” in favour of their liberty of fishing.
After hearing Sir Henry, the Admiralty expressed a unanimous opinion
that “the right and royalty of that fishing upon your Majesty’s coasts
doth undoubtedly belong unto your Majesty by inheritance, so as you
may justly prohibit or license all strangers at your royal will and
pleasure.” They further declared that by reason of his strength at sea,
the time was then most fitting to put his claim into execution; and
they recommended that the States’ ambassador should be informed that
the king had not relinquished his right to the “royal fishing,” but
was “resolved to defend it as the hereditary right and possession of
any other of his dominions.” This intimation was to be wrapped up in
sophistries, lest the Dutch should think the king challenged it at a
time when they had most need of his favour and grace. James had offered
them a bare license for liberty to fish; Charles was to offer them
safety and security as well, and the depredations which the Dunkirk
privateers had committed on the herring-busses were to be used as an
impressive argument to convince them of the benefits they would receive
from his protection. The privateers had driven them from the fishing,
even in sight of English harbours, by which the king was prejudiced
both in honour and interest; but if they accepted his licenses he might
feel justified in drawing his sword in their defence, in spite of any
league or treaty. If, however, the Hollanders should be so wanting in
discretion as to refuse the royal licenses, the Lords of the Admiralty
were “all clear of opinion that his Majesty should renew and publish
the like proclamation to that of the King his father, and prosecute
the settling of that his right as a thing so highly concerning him in
honour, dominion and profit.”
As to the second proposition, the convoying of foreign merchant
vessels, the Admiralty were more guarded in their opinion. They all
agreed that the king was entitled to have profit by it, but not by
way of a general imposition on all ships passing through his seas,
as Charles, fresh from the perusal of _Mare Clausum_, apparently had
proposed. That, they said, would doubtless “draw a just complaint and
clamour” from the neighbouring princes and their subjects. The best
course, they thought, was for a tribute to be taken from such vessels
as desired convoy, in proportion to the value of the ship and the
length of the waftage. The King of England was thus to hire out his
ships of war when any foreign vessels were willing to pay for their
employment.[526]
The instructions to the Earl of Northumberland were issued by the
Admiralty on 7th April, and they were substantially the same as those
given to Lindsey in the previous year. In the clause referring to
hostilities in the presence of the king’s ships, the phrase, “in any
part of the Narrow Seas,” in Lindsey’s instructions, was replaced by
the words “in any part of his Majesty’s seas,”--an alteration of some
importance in view of Coke’s description of the extent of them; and the
same change was made in the title of his instructions.[527] The king
also gave the Earl private and verbal commands, particularly as to the
operations to be conducted against the Dutch herring-busses.
The fleet mustered in the Downs, the Earl embarking in the _Triumph_
on 14th May. Leaving some of the ships to convoy merchant vessels and
guard the Straits of Dover, he hoisted sails on the 20th, and stood
away westwards in search of the French fleet. It was known that a large
number of ships had been equipped by France and lay at Rochelle; and
Pennington had reported at the end of February that twenty-four States’
men-of-war were at Amsterdam, ready to come out and join the French,
and that they were to wear French colours. It was believed that the
intention of the allies was to lay siege to and blockade Dunkirk, and
Northumberland was ordered to keep a watch on them and to force them
to strike. On leaving the Downs he passed over to the French coast,
sailing along it within sight of Calais, Boulogne, and Dieppe, and
then stood over for the English coast. On 26th May he was at Portland;
thence he passed westwards to the Lizard, and cruised between it and
Ushant and within sight of the French coast till 11th June, when the
fleet put into Plymouth. During all this time they got no glimpse of
the fleet for which they were seeking, but they had frequent reports
from passing vessels that it was at the Isle de Rhé, and numbered
between forty and fifty sail, most of which were small and unprepared
to put to sea. Within ten days of leaving the Downs, Northumberland had
apparently satisfied himself that they would see nothing of the French
that summer; he thereupon reminded the Admiralty that the fishing
season was approaching, and requested to know the king’s pleasure as to
whether he should go northwards. On the 14th, the Admiralty informed
him that as the season for fishing began about the 20th June, he was
to repair to the northwards as soon as his other business would permit.
Northumberland received this letter at Plymouth on the 22nd, together
with other information that the French fleet had passed towards
Dunkirk. He thereupon hurried eastwards, arriving at the Downs on 24th
June, and finding that the report as to the movement of the French
fleet was false, prepared for the campaign against the Dutch fishermen.
The Channel cruise of Northumberland’s fleet was thus as barren of
result as had been Lindsey’s in the year before. He fell in with a
few Dunkirk privateers, far too nimble to be caught up by the “great
unwieldy” English ships. When in Portland Road, a glimpse was got
of eight large ships at a great distance, which were thought to be
States’ men-of-war. Northumberland stood towards them, but as soon as
they perceived the movement they tacked about and were speedily out
of sight. “They are so well built and fitted for sailing,” remarked
the Earl, “that I can never come near when they have a mind to avoid,
unless by chance.” It has indeed been well said that whether Charles
was sovereign of the seas or not, he could not build ships that would
sail.[528] For the same reason the English vessels were unable to find
the “Turkish” pirates, which, when the Earl put into Plymouth, came
out of the Irish seas, and carried off about thirty English fishermen
into captivity. During Northumberland’s cruise, Captain Carteret with
six ships was busily employed in convoying such trading vessels “as
desired it” from the English coast to Dunkirk or Ostend, “taking an
acknowledgment in money of strangers.”[529]
But if Northumberland was foiled by the Fabian tactics of Richelieu, as
they had foiled Lindsey, with regard to the striking of the flag, he
succeeded in forcing the Dutch fishermen to take the king’s license,
a policy which Charles had contemplated long before even the first
ship-money fleet was equipped. We have already seen how the Scottish
burghs in the course of the negotiations about the Fishery Society,
repeatedly insisted that the unwelcome Hollander should be driven
from their seas (see pp. 227, 234). As early indeed as 1630 rumours
were rife in Paris that a fleet of fifteen English ships, under the
command of Sir Kenelm Digby, was to be equipped for this purpose;[530]
and there were signs from other quarters of what was impending. In
1634 Sir Nicholas Halse addressed a treatise to the king on Dutch
trade and fisheries, like those so profusely bestowed on James, in
which he drew a lively picture of the ills which arose from their
predominance. The yearly profit derived by the Hollanders from their
fishing in the British seas he placed at £6,000,000 sterling, which
enabled them to maintain their wars; and yet they were so ungrateful
as to say that England would never be well governed until they had
the governing of it. He recommended that the Hollanders should be
licensed to enjoy half the fishings, a course which he said would make
Charles the most powerful sovereign in Christendom,--superlatives
and hyperbole never being stinted in such forecastings.[531] Then
a very influential body, the Merchant Adventurers, exasperated by
certain measures taken by Holland and the States-General with respect
to their staple at Amsterdam, petitioned the Council to retaliate,
and among their retributory suggestions was the prohibition of the
Hollanders from fishing on the British coasts or drying their nets on
the English shore.[532] It would appear indeed that originally one of
the principal ostensible objects of the fleet of 1635 was to force
licenses on the Dutch. Thus Nicholas, the Secretary to the Admiralty,
who was not in the secret of the Spanish negotiations, in a memorandum
drawn up in that year, suggested that the duties of the fleet should
be the suppression of piracy about the mouth of the Straits, and the
establishment of the king’s rights to the fishings in the eastern and
northern seas.[533]
The course upon which Charles had now embarked in reference to
foreign fishermen was a revival of the policy of the “assize-herring”
of James. No foreigner was to be allowed to fish in the British seas
without obtaining, and paying for, a license from the king. James,
as we have seen, demanded his right in a pettifogging way, sending a
scarcely-armed and half-dismantled pinnace among the busses, with a
lawyer on board, to ask the tribute in fair and gentle words, and if
refused “to take out instruments upon the said refusal.” Charles sent
his Admiral with a powerful fleet, and with instructions to force the
fishermen to take the licenses in spite of all opposition. The first
step was to issue a formal proclamation like that issued by James in
1609, forbidding unlicensed fishing by foreigners. The opinion of the
Lords of the Admiralty and their legal adviser (to whom appertained
the jurisdiction of the fisheries) being emphatically in favour of the
king’s claims, the draft proclamation was drawn up and submitted to
them on 3rd May.[534] It was approved, and published to the world on
May 10th, four days before Northumberland joined the fleet.
In this proclamation Charles recited the provisions contained in
the earlier one of 1609, “since which time,” he said, “neither Our
said father nor Our Self have made any considerable execution of the
said Proclamation, but have with much patience expected a voluntary
conformity of our neighbours and allies to so just and reasonable
prohibitions and directions as are contained in the same.” But finding
by experience that all the inconveniences which occasioned the previous
proclamation had rather increased than abated, being “very sensible
of the premises, and well knowing how far we are obliged in honour
and conscience to maintain the rights of our Crown, especially of so
great consequence,” he thought it necessary, by the advice of his
Privy Council, “to renew the aforesaid restraint of fishing upon our
aforesaid coasts and seas, without license first obtained from Us, and
by these presents to make public declaration that Our resolution is (at
times convenient) to keep such a competent strength of shipping upon
Our Seas, as may (by God’s blessing) be sufficient, both to hinder such
further encroachments upon Our regalities, and assist and protect those
our good friends and allies, who shall henceforth, by virtue of our
license (to be first obtained) endeavour to take the benefit of fishing
upon our coasts and seas, in the places accustomed.”[535]
In connection with the proclamation several hundred licenses were
prepared, the precise form of which appears to have occasioned some
trouble.[536] The duty of drawing them up had been remitted in April
to Nicholas and Sir Henry Marten, and on June 14th a hundred of
them were sent to Deal Castle for the Earl of Northumberland, with
instructions from the Lords of the Admiralty. The king, they said, had
told them he had already verbally given the Earl directions to charge
the busses which took the licenses at the rate of twelvepence a ton;
with respect to such as might refuse to accept the license, he was “to
take order that they may not fish in the said seas; and in case they
shall fish without license, he is to send their vessels and fish into
some of his Majesty’s ports till further order.” The Admiralty left
to his own discretion what ships he should take with him, but they
said he would require the bigger ships to repel such force as he might
encounter, and the smaller ships to apprehend the fisher-boats.
The fleet remained at the Downs, victualling, taking in stores, and
waiting for pilots acquainted with the northern coasts, from 24th June
to 19th July. The masters of the ships were unwilling to risk the
large vessels among “the sands and flats” of the east coast, or where
there were no good harbours; and they were all of opinion that if they
went at all, they ought to leave before 12th July, in order to fall in
with the herring fleet north of Buchan Ness. In any case they declined
to go unless pilots were provided, and these had to be obtained from
the Cinque Ports and Yarmouth. There was obviously much reluctance in
the fleet to go on this expedition. The objections and difficulties
were brought to the notice of the king, but Charles stood firm, and
expressed his “pleasure” that the northern voyage should be undertaken;
and Northumberland before leaving wrote to Windebank to assure him
that the fleet would decide the business they had in hand, for either
the Dutch would take the licenses and pay the acknowledgment, or else
the fleet “would put an end to that work.” There could be no doubt of
success, because the men, he assured Windebank, were full of resolution
to do the king’s service and gain credit to themselves. At the same
time, he asked for further instructions with regard to his stay among
the busses--those he had received, he said, being like oracles.[537]
On July 19 the English fleet weighed anchor and shaped its course
northwards in its expedition against the Dutch herring-boats. It
consisted of sixteen ships, one Whelp, and a frigate; and both
Vice-Admiral Sir John Pennington and Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Mervin
accompanied the Earl. Contrary winds compelled them to come again to
anchor, but on the 22nd a fair breeze carried them to the north of
Cromer, on the Norfolk coast. On Sunday, 24th, when at Tynemouth,
the Admiral called all his captains together and gave them precise
instructions in the event of their meeting with any considerable
opposition from the States’ men-of-war guarding the busses. On the
25th, 26th, and 27th, foul and misty weather caused them to ride at
anchor ten leagues off the coast. About noon on the 28th they descried
sixteen sail of herring-busses accompanied by one man-of-war; and
immediately the Dutch skippers observed the English fleet they made
off “with all the sails they could pack on.” Northumberland’s unwieldy
ships started in pursuit--“but in vain,” wrote the Earl, “for none
of our ships could come near them.” The States’ man-of-war was less
fortunate or more courageous. It was from the first far astern of the
busses, and it was soon overtaken by the _Swan_--which, it may be
noted, was a Dunkirk privateer that had been captured and converted
into an English warship. Northumberland kept the Dutch captain on
board his own ship, the _Triumph_, all night, expecting, as he said,
that the busses would not go far without him--for of course they were
liable to be swooped upon by the privateers. But the fishermen now
feared the Dunkirkers less than they feared the English fleet, and
the Earl’s ruse failed. After dark he sent off four ships to try to
surprise them at their nets, but “they plied away all night without
making any stop.”[538] They were well aware of the mission of the
fleet, but they had no mind either for the license or the protection of
the King of England. Next day Northumberland, finding that the busses
“trusted only to their good sailing” and did not return, and that the
convoying men-of-war were not likely to be able to oppose him,--two
or three “very meane ships only able to defend them from the Dunkirk
frigates” accompanying each fleet of busses,--and hearing, moreover,
that the principal fishing was past and most of the busses gone home,
resolved to divide his fleet into three squadrons, the better to meet
in with those which remained. Sir John Pennington was sent to the north
as far as Buchan Ness, and Sir H. Mervin to the south as low down as
Flamborough Head, each with instructions to use his best endeavours to
get the Dutchmen to take the king’s licenses, while the Earl himself
plied “to and again” between them. Next day--Saturday, 30th July--being
misty and calm, Northumberland’s squadron lay at anchor. About noon
they espied four or five sail at a distance, and as there was not a
breath of wind, the boats were ordered to take the frigate in tow and
go towards them; but a breeze soon springing up, all the ships weighed
anchor and stood after them. On getting up to them they proved to be a
Hollander man-of-war and a few busses; but the fog was so great that
they were unable that night to get more than three of the busses,
the skippers of which, as well as the commander of the man-of-war,
were brought on board the _Triumph_. On Sunday four other busses were
captured, and having been manned with English sailors and threats made
that their nets would be taken from them, they at last consented to
receive licenses and pay the acknowledgment, and Northumberland sent
them away “very well satisfied.”[539]
[Illustration: Fig. 10.--_Dutch Herring-busses under sail._ After Van
der Meulen.]
On August 1 the Admiral stood into the Firth of Forth and despatched
to Edinburgh a missive for the Court, telling the good news. Then
the squadron from the 2nd to the 8th of August beat off and on the
coast, going as far north as Aberdeen (5th August) and reaching twenty
to thirty leagues off without seeing any busses. It then turned
southwards, and on the 9th gave chase to two men-of-war guarding a
fleet of busses, the latter, as before, making all haste away. The
Dutch men-of-war coming up to the English squadron, no doubt to inquire
and protest, were promptly manned with English sailors and sent in
hot haste after the busses that had fled. “Yet,” said the Earl, “with
all the wayes we could use, we gott not above 20 of them, though wee
spent divers shott to make them come in.”[540] On the same afternoon
Pennington’s squadron came up from the northwards, where they had
succeeded in distributing only three licenses; and on this day three of
the ships were sent back to port by reason of “divers desertes,” which
made them unfit to keep the sea longer.[541]
[Illustration: Fig. 11.--_Dutch Herring-busses hauling their nets, with
convoying ship-of-war._ After Van der Meulen.]
Passing to the southward of the Firth of Forth on 10th August, the
English squadron, before the day broke on the 11th, had the good
luck to sail into a great fleet of about two hundred busses, which
were guarded by five States’ men-of-war. To thirty-five of these
fishing-boats Rear-Admiral Mervin, whose squadron was found here, had
given licenses on the previous day, and Northumberland now distributed
about a hundred more amongst them, and left the _Convertive_, the
_Bonaventure_, and the _Fifth Whelp_ to act as a guard to them on
behalf of the King of England, with spare licenses for any other busses
that might require them. Next day Northumberland disposed of a few
more licenses and came to anchor, lest the ships should damage the
long drifting-nets of the fishermen. But a heavy gale coming on and
threatening to increase, the Admiral fired a warning gun and weighed
at break of day on the 13th: so furious was the wind and sea that two
of the vessels broke loose, and others had the greatest difficulty in
getting up their anchors, and the English fleet was dispersed. The
_Triumph_ made for Scarborough, where it was joined during the next few
days by the rest of the fleet, and then they all left for the Downs.
On the morning of the 20th they descried twenty sail of good ships,
and on filling sails and standing to them they found they were Dutch
men-of-war, under Van Dorp, who, as we shall see, had been sent by the
States-General to protect the busses and prevent the acceptance of
the English licenses. The Dutch ships, as the Earl carefully recorded
in his Journal, “tooke in all their flaggs, strucke their topsails,
and every ship one after another saluted us with their guns, which
we answered.” Van Dorp went on board the _Triumph_ to explain to the
English Admiral the reason of the presence there of the Hollander
squadron, and when they departed they again saluted. On 22nd August the
English fleet cast anchor in the Downs, and Van Dorp, having arrived
too late to carry out the instructions of his Government, returned to
the Flemish coast.[542]
From the foregoing narrative it is clear that the Dutch fishermen
evaded as much as they could the acceptance of the king’s licenses.
They endeavoured to escape when escape was possible, and only
yielded when they were threatened with the loss of their nets and
the interruption of their fishing; and it would have shown little
wisdom for the few small men-of-war guarding them to have attempted
resistance to a force so superior. Northumberland, however, in his
report, while explaining that from the lateness of the season they had
encountered fewer busses than they expected, said that “those we could
come to speak with, when they were made to understand the business,
have been very willing to take licenses, and are most desirous of the
King’s protection.” About two hundred licenses, he stated, had been
distributed among the busses, and others were left with the ships he
had appointed as their guard.[543]
As was to be expected, the revival in England of the policy of James as
to unlicensed fishing by foreigners on the British coasts occasioned
serious concern in the United Provinces. Since Charles came to the
throne the Dutch had been careful to repress as much as they could
any cause of further complaints from Scotland. In 1628, when they
were informed of the continued “insolencies” of their fishermen, the
States-General renewed their previous edict (see p. 179), and gave
instructions that extracts from it should be sent to the Chancellor
of Scotland; and they issued peremptory orders to the captains of the
convoying ships and the masters of the busses and others to obey it
strictly.[544] When the Fishery Society was instituted, the States were
kept advised by their ambassador in London of its progress and of the
measures proposed to be taken at the Hebrides and on the east coast;
and although they soon perceived that they had very little to fear from
it in the sphere of commercial competition, they rightly suspected
that the project foreshadowed the revival of exclusive claims to the
fishery, such as had given them so much trouble under James.[545] We
have noted also how anxiety was aroused in Holland over the equipment
of Lindsey’s fleet, and that Joachimi, their ambassador, had got wind
of the intention to send some of the ships northwards among the busses.
But the proclamation of 10th May as to “restraint of fishing” removed
any lingering doubts they had of the king’s intentions, especially as
it appeared so soon after the publication of _Mare Clausum_. At that
time the policy of the Dutch was earnestly directed towards detaching
England from the side of Spain and bringing her into line with France
and the Republic, and a special ambassador, Van Beveren, was sent
over to the English Court to help Joachimi in bringing this about.
He arrived in London in March 1636, and in April Coke and Windebank
explained to him that the intention of the king in setting forth the
fleet was to preserve and maintain his sovereignty and hereditary
right over the sea, as well as to furnish convoys for the protection
of traffic; and further, that no one could be allowed to fish in the
British seas without express license from the king, and the rendering
of a proper acknowledgment for the liberty. They told him that the
Dutch fishermen would find the king’s protection against the Dunkirk
privateers both advantageous and profitable. On asking for a statement
in writing of the king’s claims, the Dutch ambassadors were coldly
referred to Selden’s _Mare Clausum_.
In notifying the States-General of this conversation, Van Beveren
asked for prompt and precise instructions how to deal with what he
described as an important, dangerous, and far-reaching business. He
was told by De Seneterre, the French ambassador, that he had received
a similar notification, and that he had expressed the opinion that
it was inopportune to raise at that time a prickly question that had
been sleeping for five-and-twenty years, and which was equivalent to a
tacit declaration of war against the United Provinces. At an interview
which Van Beveren had with Charles on April 25th, he explained that the
main object of his coming was to arrange for open and combined action
against Spain and help to the young Elector to recover the Palatinate;
but the king in a few words put the proposed alliance aside, and began
to speak of the herring fishery. The States-General, always anxious
to burk discussion of this matter, had postponed giving Van Beveren
definite instructions about it, in the hope and expectation that it
would be submerged in the more important business of the alliance.[546]
There were other circumstances which led them to think the king would
not press his claim to the fishery. One was that the publication of the
proclamation for restraint of fishing had been delayed, and even its
promulgation denied. It seems, indeed, that the opinions of Charles as
to his policy on this question were constantly fluctuating, and that
he could scarcely make up his mind as to what it were best for him to
do. Both the young Elector, his nephew, whom Van Beveren had gained
over to his views, and his sister, the Elector’s mother and Queen of
Bohemia, were against any interference with the Dutch fishermen at that
time. It was doubtless with some knowledge of the state of affairs,
that the Earl of Northumberland inquired in May if the king was still
desirous that he should go north against the busses. But in June all
scruples had vanished: the instructions were sent to Northumberland
and the proclamation was widely disseminated. In the States of Holland
the king’s edict was discussed at the beginning of June, and it was
remitted to a committee, with Joachimi (then in Holland) and the Prince
of Orange, for consideration, and to report as to what measures should
be taken to protect the interests of the fishermen. The States finally
resolved to do two things--first, to endeavour by all diplomatic means
to get the proposed action of the king delayed, and second, to equip a
strong fleet to protect the fishermen by force lest diplomacy failed.
In these anxious days Van Beveren kept a tireless eye on the English
fleet lying in the Downs, and reported to the States-General from time
to time anything he learned of its movements or the rumours he heard
concerning it.[547] Twelve days before it sailed for the north, he
informed them that the general opinion was that it would return to the
westwards to look for the French fleet. A few days later he discovered
its real destination, and at once demanded an audience of the king.
Charles received him very courteously at Windsor on the 17th July;
assured him that he would treat the Dutch “as friends”; and explained
that the measures to be taken by the fleet were of a peaceful nature,
and were intended to benefit the fishermen by extending to them the
protection of England against the Dunkirk privateers, from whom they
had suffered so much in the previous year. The payment of a small
acknowledgment would in reality, he said, be very profitable to them.
Van Beveren had accordingly to content himself as well as he could with
these assurances. He received the condolences of the French ambassador,
with whom he had frequent interviews, and who pointed out to him that
the circumstances of the time were such that the wisest course would
be to deprive the king of every pretext for open hostility. If the
matter could only be prolonged under the pretence of negotiations
until peace was concluded with Spain, then indeed France--ay, and even
Spain too, he added--would join with the States in bringing the King
of England speedily to reason. When Northumberland actually departed
for the north, Van Beveren immediately informed the States-General of
the important fact; but it was not long until the king was able to
tell him that the fishermen had accepted the licenses and paid the
acknowledgment “with good contentment.”[548]
The ambassador’s reports, and still more the accounts which soon poured
in from the busses and the convoys of their treatment by the English
fleet, raised a storm of indignation in the United Provinces. Captain
Ruyter sent on, for visual inspection, the safe-conduct or passport
which the Earl of Northumberland had forced upon him; and Joost
Bouwensz, and some of the other skippers who had taken the licenses,
were loud in their complaints. The unheard-of proceeding was discussed
in every seaport town.
The ordinary ambassador, Joachimi, then in Holland, was hurried back to
England--at such a pace, indeed, that two of the horses in his carriage
dropped dead in one day from exhaustion as he sped Londonwards. He was
to express to the king the regret of their High Mightinesses that he
should send his powerful “armada” among the poor herring fishermen, who
had been so much scared and frightened that many had withdrawn from
the fishing altogether and returned home; and the king was to be urged
to suspend further action until the matter had been considered by
commissioners to be appointed by both sides.[549] In his audience with
Charles, Joachimi avoided the long juridical arguments which used to
tire the patience of King James. He laid stress on the close connection
of the fishery question, so dear to the United Provinces, and the
restoration of the Palatinate, in which the States might be able to
afford valuable aid; expatiated on the long and close friendship that
had existed between England and the Netherlands; and depicted in moving
terms the poverty and hard life of the poor fishermen. But it was all
in vain. Charles declared that to ask him to abdicate his sovereignty
of the sea was as absurd as if Spain should ask him to give up Ireland;
and he added--probably with the knowledge that the States-General
had commissioned Graswinckel to answer Selden (see p. 375)--that the
publication of books in France, Spain, and the Netherlands, contesting
his rights, made it necessary for him to vindicate his sovereignty with
all the more strength. The same attitude was maintained in a formal
paper handed to Joachimi a little later, in reply to his proposals
and representations. In this Charles announced his firm intention to
control the fisheries in his own seas. He would only permit foreigners
to fish there if they accepted his license and “acknowledged” his
right, that is, paid tribute. The request for a conference of
commissioners to consider the question was rejected. The king could
not with honour, it was said, listen to such a proposal. His right
had already been publicly confirmed before the whole world, and was
sustained and recognised by all the great kings in performing homage
to the fleet at sea, as well as by the Dutch themselves, who were very
glad of the protection afforded to them.[550] Joachimi had to return to
The Hague without having accomplished anything.
By another channel influence was brought to bear on the king to induce
him to suspend the campaign against the Dutch fishermen. Elizabeth,
the widowed Queen of Bohemia and the sister of Charles, resided at The
Hague, patiently waiting for some lucky turn in the wheel of fortune
which might replace her son in possession of the Palatinate. She
was led to believe that the States would aid in this project, and in
her correspondence with Sir Thomas Roe and Archbishop Laud she often
murmured gently against her brother’s policy. When Joachimi was hustled
back to London, she wrote to Roe that the Dutch were in great alarm
about the herring-busses, and she breathed the wish that “all might
be laid aside at that time” when they had so much need of the States;
“the king,” she said, “might do it upon that consideration, and keep
his claim still good, to take it up again when he would.”[551] Roe
argued on the other side. He thought it would show wisdom on the
part of Holland, and be greatly to her advantage, if, avoiding an
open breach with England, she acknowledged the right of the king and
accepted his protection for her fishermen. In this way the States
would reap all the advantages they already had, and be relieved of
the expense of maintaining a fleet to protect the busses. The king,
he felt sure, could not now recede “without weakening or blemishing
his right, or his power, to all posterity”; he was prepared to guard
the Dutch fishermen and to fight for them as his own subjects; and
as for the “acknowledgment,” that would be really only a small thing
and would not burden the fishing--which would never be thought of. “I
doe confidently affirme to your Majesty,” continued Roe, “that this
affair of ye king is a safetye, an honour, an happines, and utilitye
to them, and will, if they know how to use it as a medicine, heale all
ulcerations and discontents that have beene bred, or aggravated, by
enemies of our mutuall and necessarye amitye.... Therefore I beseech
your Majestie to inform the Prince of Orange clearely, there is noe
other way, if they desire to reconcile, and to oblige the king at once;
and if our amity be to them of any value, lett them beginn to doe right
and honour to his Majestie,”--and they would get more than they hoped
for in other things. At all events, he said, Joachimi had failed to get
any satisfaction of his request to have the “execution” on the second
fishing suspended, for a new command had been sent to the Admiral to
visit the busses again.[552]
This was indeed the case. Northumberland’s success had gratified the
king, and yet it was felt it had fallen short of what it might have
been if they only had got among the busses in time. It was therefore
resolved to send the fleet among the Dutch fishermen who came to the
Yarmouth fishing in September and October, and to continue the process
of forcing licenses upon them. The Earl of Northumberland left the
Downs for Yarmouth on 16th September, taking with him eight ships and
a pinnace; another ship was to follow later. He felt that his task at
Yarmouth would be more difficult than his first had been. Then, the
only advantage the busses had was their good sailing; now they would
have others owing to the season and the place--shoal waters; and if
they avoided the king’s ships, he said, as they did in the north, it
would be impossible to bring any numbers of them into “conformity.” He
also requested fresh licenses, because some words in those he had would
require to be blotted out, which “would not be so handsome to be seen
abroad.”[553]
The weather being stormy, they had to anchor one night off the
North Foreland and the next off Lowestoft, reaching Yarmouth Roads
on the 18th, where they lay for a few days getting pilots and
gathering information about the Dutch fishermen. Hearing that some
Holland men-of-war were cruising outside, the Earl guessed that the
herring-boats would not be far off, and the wind being fair, the
fleet weighed anchor on the morning of the 22nd and stood out to sea.
When clear of the sands they again anchored, and the ketch was sent
out during the night to discover the whereabouts of the busses, but
without success. Next day the fleet stood off farther to sea, but
failed to see or to hear anything of the Hollanders, and being joined
by a ninth ship, the _Swallow_, the fleet lay at anchor in “blowing
weather” about ten leagues from the coast until Monday, September 26.
Two of the ships, the _James_ and the _Nonsuch_, had been driven out
of sight by the gale; two, the pinnace and the _Fortune_ pinck, had
to run nearer shore for fear of foundering; and the Admiral sent the
two London ships, the _Jonas_ and the _Neptune_, into port, because
they were insufficiently victualled. On this day news was brought from
Yarmouth, received from a Scottish ship which had arrived from Zealand,
that the Dutch had forbidden any more busses to go to the fishing that
year, and the Earl advised Windebank to this effect.[554] The rumour,
however, was false, for on the 28th a fleet of fifty sail of busses and
two or three men-of-war was descried to windward, but Northumberland
was able to speak to only three of them that “wanted licenses.” On the
next day, as they were following the busses that “would not come near
them,” they caught sight of another fleet of about sixty sail, with
three men-of-war, and the English ships went amongst them and cast
anchor, and made the convoyers anchor also; “then,” said the Earl, “all
the busses of both fleets came about us; most of them had formerly
taken licenses, and such as were unprovided were then furnished by us.”
Next day, finding no more of the herring-boats “that wanted licenses,”
the English squadron weighed anchor and shortly afterwards perceived
a third large fleet of busses, guarded this time by ten men-of-war.
To this fleet they gave chase, plying up to windward all night, and
on October 1, as the wind prevented the boats being sent out, they
anchored in sight of them. All Sunday it also “overblew,” but as the
weather grew calmer at night the squadron again got under way, and by
daybreak was among the busses, which were, no doubt, busily engaged in
hauling their nets. Northumberland stayed amongst them until October
5, the ships’ boats being kept occupied each day in distributing the
licenses; but they “found it a very troublesome business,” as the
busses dispersed, and it became difficult to distinguish those that
had taken licenses from those that had not. The weather growing misty
and unsettled, and the Admiral being “out of all hope to give out any
more licenses,” the squadron quitted the herring fleet and made for
Yarmouth, where the Earl landed on October 9 and journeyed to the
Court. Altogether, at the Yarmouth fishing, more than 200 licenses
were distributed among over 400 busses which were present, and no
opposition was offered by any of the fifteen men-of-war which were
guarding them. “The unwillingnesse of the busses to come neere us,”
wrote Northumberland to the Admiralty, “hath found us intertainement
for 8 dayes together in following them, but now we have left verie few
of them unprovided of his Majesty’s licenses.”[555]
Thus ended the campaign against the Dutch herring-boats, from which, as
we have seen, Charles desired to reap profit as well as honour. So far
as the profit went, it did not amount to much. Appended to the official
journal of the voyage of the fleet is a statement of the sums received
for convoying shipping,--which, in accordance with the advice of the
Admiralty, was voluntary,--and also of the “acknowledgment money”
taken from the fishing-busses. The former amounted to £999, nearly
all of which was earned by the convoying of merchantmen and small
traders to Dunkirk and Ostend.[556] Small as the amount was, it greatly
exceeded what was exacted from the Dutch busses for king’s license and
protection, the total being £501, 15s. 2d., collected in a variety of
coins.[557] The detailed schedule is as follows:--
“In Rix Dollo^{rs} 878 163 10 08
In halfe Crownes 145 018 02 06
In pieces of 3^s 40 006 00 00
In Kunnings Dollo^{rs} 100 025 00 00
In Ryalls of 8 134½ 029 02 10
English money 018 12 08
English Gold 119 13 00
Dutch and Scotch Angells 015 15 00
Hungare Duckats 7 002 09 00
Dutch and French money 001 05 00
Dutch shillings 066 00 00
Double Stivers 030 00 06
Single Stivers 005 06 00
In Silver 000 18 00
------------
501 15 02”
[Illustration: Fig. 12.--_Facsimile of the official account of the
monies received from the Dutch herring fishermen for the king’s
licenses._]
There is probably no circumstance connected with the English claims
to the sovereignty of the seas that has been more frequently
misrepresented by historians, pamphleteers, and writers on
international law than the operations of Northumberland’s fleet, and
in particular the amount paid by the Dutch herring fishermen for the
king’s licenses; and so far as appears, the account given here is the
first that is authentic and correct. Although Northumberland’s Journal
is preserved among the national records, only one author seems to have
quoted from it, namely, Evelyn, and he deliberately misrepresented it.
Under the hands of various authors the sum of money gradually became
swelled to £30,000, or even to £100,000, and it was represented as a
rent paid by the Dutch for permission to fish, and played an important
part in all later controversies and negotiations.[558]
The doings of Northumberland’s fleet at the Yarmouth fishing caused
increased excitement in Holland. Van Beveren knowing, as he said, that
the English ships had not gone northwards “to catch flies,” immediately
sent intelligence of its departure to Admiral Van Dorp, so that he
might extend his protection to the Dutch fishermen. Early in August the
Admiral had been expressly instructed to guard the fishermen “from the
Spanish and all others inclined to molest them”; and he had a fleet
of fifty-seven sail under his command for this purpose.[559] But Van
Dorp was too late. As we have seen, he met the Earl of Northumberland
on the 20th August returning triumphantly to the Downs. On asking the
English Admiral why he was among the busses, he was politely told
“to protect the fishermen,” and when Northumberland asked the reason
of the presence of the Dutch fleet, he received the same answer, “to
protect the fishermen.” It was a perplexing position for Van Dorp.
His instructions were to guard the busses from molestation, but they
contained no article which covered the case as it now presented itself,
and to attack the English squadron under the circumstances would have
been foolish. He therefore sailed back to the coast of Flanders to
watch the Spanish ships. He returned to the English coast in September,
and on the very day that Northumberland left the Downs for Yarmouth the
Dutch fleet was actually lying at that port. Van Dorp again missed both
the English squadron and the herring-busses, and resumed “plying to
and again” between Dover and Calais.[560] The States-General were much
incensed at this failure of their Admiral to prevent the distribution
of the licenses. As they well knew, it furnished Charles with a
precedent, and with the argument that the Dutch fishermen desired his
protection and were willing to accept and pay for his licenses. When a
suitable opportunity occurred in the following year, they forced Van
Dorp to resign his office.[561]
As the herring-fishing was now over for the year, the States had time
to consider what they ought to do in the following season if Charles
persisted in his attempts. On two occasions it was resolved to issue
an edict forbidding the fishermen to accept licenses from any foreign
prince;[562] and this would certainly have been done had Charles
adhered to his policy. But the States naturally hesitated, until it
should be absolutely necessary, to take a step which would at once have
placed them in direct antagonism to England in the eyes of the whole
world, and the publication of the edict was from time to time delayed.
This cautious conduct served their purpose much better, for before
the fishing season of 1637 arrived, the kaleidoscope of Charles’s
foreign relations had taken another turn, and he was anxious to avoid
further trouble with the Dutch. The Earl of Arundel, who had been
sent to Vienna on one of the king’s wild-goose missions, to negotiate
a treaty with the Emperor for the restoration of the Palatinate,
returned unsuccessful to England at the close of the year. He came back
full of bitterness at the perfidy of Spain, and persistently urged a
French alliance, even if it should lead to war with the former Power.
The strenuous arguments of Arundel, as well as the treatment of his
mission, caused Charles to turn again to France, the ally of the Dutch
Republic; and Richelieu promptly proposed an alliance against Spain and
the Emperor, one result of which would have been to range England and
the States on the same side in a maritime war.[563]
At such a conjuncture the promulgation of the edict of the
States-General would have been unfortunate, and Arundel requested
George Goring, who had gone to The Hague, to see the Prince of Orange
in order to get it suppressed. But the Prince of Orange, while anxious
enough to avoid further trouble with England, desired, before he
consented, to receive an assurance that the king would cease from
molesting the Dutch fishermen in the ensuing season. The Queen of
Bohemia urged the same course. She “humbly besought” her royal brother
to suspend further execution of his right, which, she said, he might
take up again when he would, without any prejudice, “as the king,
our father, did.” Charles was loth to give an assurance so wounding
to his vanity, and so opposed to what he conceived to be a chief
prerogative of his crown. In the autumn Sir Thomas Roe had declared
that the difficulty in the way for the benefit of the Prince Elector
arose from the fishery dispute, and that upon nothing was the will
of the king more firmly bent: if the Dutch did not yield, he feared
“another procedure” next season. Even in February, Archbishop Laud told
Elizabeth that the king was “so set to maintain the dominion of the
sea” that he durst not speak to him any more about it. At the same time
he gave a broad hint that nothing further would be attempted against
the Dutch fishermen in the approaching season. He much wondered,
he said, that the Prince of Orange and the States should trouble
themselves to gain an overt concession from his Majesty to leave their
fishing that year, since it was “more than manifest” there would
be so much other work for his navy that the business of the fishing
must needs fall asleep of itself. He would advise a silence on all
hands in regard to it, and not to interrupt “business with moving a
question about that which would necessarily do itself (_sic_) without
questioning.” Sir Thomas Roe also sent the queen assurances in the same
sense. The king, he said, would never retract his declaration of the
dominion of the sea, but “only for this year, and at the request of
the Prince (her son) and in contemplation of concurrence expected with
him, he will not trouble their fishing.” These assurances seemed so far
satisfactory to the States that the edicts were suppressed. They would
be well content, they informed Elizabeth, if the king “forgot it and
spoke no more of it,” which she told them she was confident he would
not, having things of greater importance on hand.[564]
The young Elector, Prince Charles Louis, took a considerable part
in the conversion of the king; or rather, he was made use of by the
Dutch ambassador for this purpose. When Van Beveren first arrived in
London, he let it be known that the States were desirous of doing
something for the Prince; but his hint was not then taken up, since
hopes were entertained that Arundel’s mission to Vienna would make
other aid unnecessary.[565] Arundel was recalled in September; it was
known that his mission had failed, and early in October Van Beveren saw
his opportunity. Through a trustworthy friend[566] the suggestion was
made to the Elector that if some arrangement could be come to about
the fishery question, negotiations might be begun for a treaty between
the States and England relating to the recovery of the Palatinate.
The ambassador learned that the Prince had already taken steps in the
same direction. Through the intermediary of Laud, the proposal had
been made to Charles that the Dutch, instead of paying license-money
for liberty to fish in the British seas, should place at the disposal
of the Elector some ships and soldiers, the king’s proclamation for
restraint of fishing being meanwhile suspended. Charles would not
agree to this. The ambassador, he said, had offered assistance when he
arrived without any hope of an equivalent on his part, and he could
not give up his claim to an acknowledgment of his rights. Van Beveren,
on the other hand, informed his confidant that it was a question of
principle with the States, and that it would be better to break off all
negotiations if the “acknowledgment” was insisted on. Nevertheless,
these private negotiations continued, and finally a draft treaty was
prepared embodying two proposals. The first agreed well enough with
Van Beveren’s instructions. It was to the effect that a fleet should
be equipped to which England should contribute thirty ships and 8000
men, and the States fifteen ships and 4000 men; and France was to be
asked to furnish the same force as England. The combined fleet was to
attack Spain by sea and effect a landing. The second proposal related
to the fishery, and it provided that while these operations were going
on, the Dutch herring fishermen would be allowed to fish freely and
in security, as they had always done from the time of Queen Elizabeth
and King James, approaching the coasts near enough to carry on their
fishing profitably, and to dry their nets on shore, without the king
interfering with them in any way.[567]
This proposition, at first sight apparently favourable to the States,
was rejected by Van Beveren. Although it got rid of the difficulty for
the time, the question was sure to be raised at a later period when the
naval and military operations were concluded; its acceptance would,
moreover, be equivalent to a tacit acknowledgment that the king had the
right to exclude them from the fishery. The ambassador was afraid of a
precedent which bargained as a _quid pro quo_ for what was claimed as a
right; and the negotiations went no further.
But Charles, although unwilling to risk the success of the treaty with
France, from which great things were expected, by openly insisting
upon the acceptance of his licenses by the Dutch fishermen, was
reluctant to abandon his policy. From the readiness with which the
fishermen had taken the licenses after they “understood” them (as
Northumberland reported), he was apparently led to believe that they
really desired his protection, and that the only obstacle in his way
was the opposition of the States’ Government. He therefore decided that
instead of trying--or at least before trying--to enforce the licenses
by means of the fleet in the ensuing summer, the attempt might be made
secretly to induce the fishermen to accept them in Holland before they
left for the fishing. Boswell, the English ambassador at The Hague,
was instructed to try what could be done in this way, and so anxious
was Charles for such acknowledgment of his sovereignty of the sea as
acceptance of the licenses implied, that the ambassador was authorised
to reinforce his persuasion by bribing those who were most influential
among the fishermen. The fishermen, according to Boswell, were not
averse to the proposal, but they very naturally wished to know, first
of all, how the licenses of the King of England would protect them
from the Dunkirk privateers. If the Government at Brussels would
acknowledge the validity of the licenses, or if the Cardinal Infant
agreed to back them with passports of his own, the offer, they said,
would be worth considering; but they could scarcely depend on the
protection of the English fleet alone. As a sign that they were in
earnest, they offered to place £2000 at Boswell’s disposal if he could
get the matter settled in this way. This sum, with the king’s approval,
was forwarded to the English representative at Brussels, to be used in
gaining over the Spanish authorities.[568] The Dutch fishermen were a
practical race of men. They cared little for abstract questions about
the sovereignty of the sea. But they suffered much from the Dunkirk
privateers, and the burden of maintaining convoys was a heavy one.
Any reasonable scheme which promised to free them from the attacks of
their relentless enemy at small cost was bound to be attractive. That
the proposal was seriously considered was also shown by a spontaneous
application made to the Secretary of the English Admiralty on behalf
of the fishermen of Schiedam. The agent in London, Mr Brames, who
supplied them with lampreys for bait, wrote to Nicholas for a copy
of the license granted in the previous year, with a statement of the
rates charged. If the fishermen were pleased with the license and
the price, they would, he said, come themselves for them. Charles
instructed Nicholas to give the information wanted, but only “as from
himself.”[569]
An unexpected obstacle intervened to prevent the plan being carried
out. Gerbier, the British agent at Brussels, chiefly by bribing
the mistress of the Cardinal Infant, had secured a promise that
the passports would be granted; but the Spanish Admiral absolutely
refused to be bound by them. He declared he would not spare a single
herring-boat, even if the Cardinal went down on his knees to him.
He would pay attention to no passport that did not come direct from
Madrid.[570] Thereupon the Dutch fishermen refused to have anything to
do with the licenses which had been sent to Boswell “under the King’s
hand and signet.”[571]
Still, the peculiar resources of Charles were not exhausted. He might
yet, he thought, be able to distribute the licenses among the fishermen
when they came to fish off the British coast, without employing his
fleet for the purpose, or running the risk of war with the Republic.
The third ship-money fleet had assembled in the Downs in April and
May; it consisted of twenty-eight ships, of which nine were merchant
vessels, and the Earl of Northumberland was again appointed Admiral,
his instructions, dated 15th April, being identical with those of
the previous year.[572] The state of the negotiations with France,
and other causes, prevented the king from renewing his enterprise
against either the French for the honour of the flag or the Dutch in
connection with the fishery. The fleet, therefore, to the wonder and
discontentment of the officers, was kept for the most part lying at
anchor, ships being occasionally detached for special purposes.
On 3rd July, Windebank wrote to the Earl of Northumberland telling
him of the failure of the secret treaty with the Cardinal Infant, and
saying that it was the intention of the Hollanders, who had refused
the king’s licenses sent to Boswell, to fish in his Majesty’s seas as
heretofore, many of the busses having already left Holland under strong
convoys. By the king’s commands he sent him about 200 licenses, “and
withal his pleasure is,” said Windebank, “that you dispatch immediately
one of the merchant ships under your charge (being not willing to
employ any of his own until it appear what the success will be) toward
the north with these licenses, with order to make offer of them to
the fishers, and if they accept them to distribute them at the same
rates they were taken the last year. And if such as take them,” he
continued, “desire to be safe-conducted in their return, your Lordship
is to assure them his Majesty will take them into his protection, and
cause some of his fleet to accompany them homewards for their defence.”
But if the fishermen refused to take the licenses, then the Earl was
to notify the fact to the king, who would “take further resolution.”
Sir William Boswell, added the Secretary, had been informed of the
king’s intentions, and told to assure the fishermen willing to take
the licenses of his Majesty’s protection. The Cardinal Infant and
the Spanish Ministers had also been informed, and did not well relish
it.[573]
This despatch, sent by express messenger, appears to have somewhat
surprised the Earl. His clear intelligence must have told him that a
tortuous and fatuous proceeding of this kind could only end by making
the king ridiculous. He apparently wished Charles to reconsider the
matter, and asked for further directions. Ignoring part of Windebank’s
letter, he inquired how Captain Fielding, whom he intended to send,
should behave himself if the fishermen proved obstinate and refused the
licenses; and he pointed out that if they accepted them and the king
resolved they should be convoyed home, it would need a large number of
ships, as the busses returned in small fleets.[574] Windebank two days
later repeated the instruction that, if they refused, the fact was to
be immediately notified, when the king would take further resolution.
“The truth is,” he said, “his Majesty in this present conjuncture is
not willing to proceed so roundly with them as he hath done heretofore,
and therefore thinks fit to hold this way of inviting them fairly to
acknowledge his right without sending his whole fleet, which would be a
manifest engagement and obligation to him in honour to perfect the work
upon any conditions, and notwithstanding any opposition whatsoever,
and might be of dangerous consequence, and destructive to the present
condition of his affairs. And therefore he chooses rather to attempt it
with as little noise as may be, that if the business take not in this
way it may receive the less blow, and in case of their refusal he may
have time deliberately to consider what resolution to settle.”[575]
At this time Charles was very anxious to be on good terms with the
States. Van Beveren, the special Dutch ambassador, who was returning
home, was very cordially received by him on taking his leave on 16th
July. The king then insisted on the States entering the alliance, and
he expressed his pleasure at the courtesies which had been shown to
the Prince Elector. Besides the usual gifts on such occasions, Van
Beveren tells us he sent him a few days later a handsome diamond
ring.[576] But even if Charles had been moved by no special desire
to conciliate the Republic, the preparations which were being made
in Holland to guard the fishermen from molestation might have given
pause to the attempt to repeat the operations of the year before. The
Dutch Government were perfectly aware of Boswell’s intrigues about
the licenses, and they put little faith in the assurances received
through the Queen of Bohemia. They resolved to err on the safe side by
equipping a powerful fleet to protect the busses. In April and May,
Pennington reported to the Admiralty that Van Dorp (not yet cashiered)
was cruising between the Downs and Dunkirk with twenty sail of stout
men-of-war, and that he heard that six French warships were bound for
the north to aid in guarding the fishermen.[577]
Fielding departed on his mission in the _Unicorn_, one of the ships
furnished by London, and on the morning of 18th July he came among the
busses fishing off Buchan Ness, Aberdeenshire. They numbered between
six and seven hundred, and were convoyed by twenty-three men-of-war.
Fielding, according to his account, “found the busses very willing” to
take the licenses, and two did so. Then one of the Dutch warships came
up and lay by him, and the captain asked him to speak to his Admiral
before sending for the busses; “but it blew hard that day and the next,
so that no boat could pass.” On the 20th he spoke with the Admiral of
South Holland and the Commander of North Holland, and explained his
mission; but they would not then give their answer. On the following
day all the commanders of North and South Holland and of Zealand, with
three other captains, told him “that they durst not let his boat pass
among the busses to give out his Majesty’s licenses before they had
orders from their Masters.” This was their answer, but they declined to
give it in writing. The _Unicorn_ then made sail for England to report
the rebuff.[578]
The result of his manœuvre was mortifying to the king. Fielding,
sailor-like, did not conceal the outcome of his mission in diplomatic
reserve. The story soon spread throughout the fleet, and occasioned
both hilarity and indignation. When Fielding left, Pennington expressed
the opinion to his friend Nicholas that the attempt would fail and
would bring greater inconveniences in its train. On his return,
Northumberland said it would have been much better if the king had
absolutely forborne his request to the Dutch than have demanded it
in the manner he did. After the successful campaign of the year
before, Charles was now practically warned off his own seas, “as he
is pleased,” said Pennington, “to call them.”[579] It was a pitiful
position for the Sovereign of the Seas, with a great armada lying idle
at the Downs and his bombastic declarations still echoing in the ears
of Europe.
As soon as it was known at Court that the story had got out, Windebank
was commanded to take such measures as he could to contradict it. To
duplicity was added mendacity. Fielding in his report had described an
occurrence he witnessed on returning along the coast to Scarborough.
Thirteen Dunkirkers had attacked a Dutch man-of-war, and as the
_Unicorn_ came upon the scene the latter sank, and the English captain
unsuccessfully endeavoured to save the drowning men. Windebank seized
upon this incident. He wrote to Captain Fogg, who was in command of
the ships in the Downs in the absence of the Admiral, that the report
spread about that the Hollanders had refused his Majesty’s licenses to
fish in his seas was “utterly mistaken.” Fielding had not been sent
to offer licenses to the busses, but to tender the king’s protection.
His Majesty, hearing “that the Dunkirkers had prepared a great
strength to intercept them in their return from the fishing,” had sent
Fielding, “in love to them,” to give them notice of it, and to offer
them safe-conduct. “This,” said Windebank, “you are publicly to advow
whensoever there shall be occasion, and to cry down the other discourse
as scandalous and derogatory to his Majesty’s honour.”[580] Similar
directions were sent to the Earl of Northumberland.
At the beginning of August 1637, Charles, conscious of the ridicule
that would ensue if the third ship-money fleet lay at anchor all the
year, and yet having nothing for it to do, sent it to the west--“to
make one turn in an honourable procession, to continue the boundaries
of our master’s dominion in the sea,” as Roe, with gentle sarcasm,
described it. It got as far as the Land’s End, and returned to the
Downs on 5th September, having “scarce seen a ship stirring on the sea,
except the poor fishers that dwell upon the shore.”[581] Windebank
told Northumberland that the king was “very sensible” of the story
which was being told about the licenses, and that he had been specially
commanded to give the refutation of it in charge of the Earl, “and
that you should do it in the same way that I have directed him (Fogg),
namely, that his being sent to the busses was to give them notice
of the forces prepared by the Dunkirkers to intercept them in their
return, and to offer them his Majesty’s protection, but no licenses;
that of the licenses to be cried down and the other to be advowed
and reported through the whole fleet.” Fielding was to be admonished
to be more reserved in future “in such great services,” and in the
meantime to “make reparation by divulging this and suppressing the
former report.”[582] Captain Fogg readily agreed to suppress “the false
report,” as he called it; but what Northumberland’s answer was does not
appear. He seems to have received the king’s commands only on returning
to the Downs, and he left the _Triumph_ a few days thereafter. What he
thought is not doubtful: he was getting disgusted at his employment.
“No man,” he wrote to Roe, “was ever more desirous of a charge than I
am to be quit of mine, being in a condition where I see I can neither
do service nor gain credit.”[583]
There is clear evidence indeed that by this time the naval officers, as
well as the people generally, were becoming tired of the king’s great
pretensions and small performance. Even Pennington, a simple, loyal,
unimaginative man, always ready to obey orders, had begun to joke, as
we have seen, at the king’s seas, “as he is pleased to call them.”
Throughout the country discontent was deepening. The opposition to the
collection of ship-money was growing formidable, and the declaration
of the Judges in favour of the king’s right to levy it only postponed
the inevitable for a little.[584] In his letter to the Judges, Charles
based his case on the necessity of maintaining his sovereignty of the
sea. The honour and safety of the realm of England, he said, “was
and is now more neerely concerned then in late former tymes, as well
by divers councells and attempts to take from Us the dominion of the
seas (of which we are sole Lord, and rightfull owner and proprietour,
and the losse whereof would bee of greatest danger and perill to this
kingdome and other our Domynions) as many other waies.”[585]
[Illustration: Fig. 13.--_The “Sovereign of the Seas.”_ After
Vandevelde.]
The king’s dominion on the sea was rapidly waning. Fielding’s ignoble
mission was the last attempt that fate permitted Charles to make in
actively asserting it. The shadow of the coming revolution was already
upon him. The trial of Hampden for refusing to pay the ship-money
focussed the attention of England, and it was followed by complaints
of other grievances arising from the personal government of the king.
The popular tumult in Edinburgh in the summer about the new Liturgy
had as a sequence the National Covenant and insurrection. Charles
found another use for his fleet than the enforcement of his sovereignty
of the sea in the expedition to Scotland to subdue his rebellious
subjects; and the British seas, even the King’s Chambers, were soon
again the scenes of flagrant acts in violation of his authority. By a
strange irony it was at this time that the king’s “Great Ship,” the
famous _Sovereign of the Seas_, whose praises were sung by Thomas
Heywood, the dramatist, was launched at Woolwich. Its construction had
been under consideration for several years; it was begun in January
1636 and launched early in October 1637. Charles took a keen personal
interest in his great ship, and supervised its details. He selected a
scutcheon and motto to be engraved on each of its 102 brass guns--the
rose and crown, sceptre and trident, and anchor and cable, with the
inscription, _Carolus Edgari sceptrum stabilivit aquarum_--Charles
established the dominion of Edgar over the seas; and on the “beak-head”
sat the effigy of King Edgar, trampling on seven kings.[586] As its
name implied, it was meant to be a symbol as well as an instrument of
the king’s sovereignty of the seas; and it was symbolical of it in
a sense undreamt of by Charles. It was costly, highly decorated and
begilt, but useless until it was cut down and made serviceable under
the Commonwealth. He inserted it in the list of ships to serve in the
fleet that assembled in the Downs in 1638, but it was not ready to
join.
This fleet consisted of twenty-four king’s ships and seven merchant
vessels, and, owing to the illness of the Earl of Northumberland, it
was placed under the command of Sir John Pennington.[587] It did still
less than the fleet of the previous year. Two ships were sent to the
westwards on an alarm that “Turkish” pirates were in the Channel; it
convoyed two vessels laden with gunpowder into Dunkirk, notwithstanding
the blockade by the Dutch, and returned to the Downs; and two ships
were despatched to the north to intercept supplies of arms and
munitions of war from Rotterdam and Bremen to the Scots. There was not
even the “one turn in an honourable procession” to the westwards as in
the previous year, and the fleet rode idly at its anchorage.
The question of the “homage of the flag” had by this time also fallen
somewhat into the background. In the two preceding years it had been
enforced with much zeal. In 1636, when Northumberland’s fleet was
among the herring-busses, Captain Carteret, in the _Happy Entrance_,
forced a Spanish fleet of twenty-six sail to strike to him off Calais,
though they tried their best to avoid it. A Dunkirker was also made
to strike and “lie by the lee” off Nieuport by Captain Slingsby. But
the French still refused to lower their flag when on the other side
of the Narrow Sea. Sir Henry Mervin, on meeting two French men-of-war
off Gravelines with their colours in the main-top, fired some twenty
shots at them without causing them to strike. In the Mediterranean the
French retaliated. An English vessel on the coast of Barbary was forced
to lower its flag to French ships of war, and because the captain
refused to go on board them when requested, the ship was attacked and
captured. In the following year Captain Straddling of the _Dreadnought_
used drastic measures against some Hollander merchant-ships. Falling
in with four of them off the Lizard, homeward bound from Brazil, with
their flags abroad, he commanded them to strike. One refused till many
shots were fired, excusing himself afterwards by saying he thought the
English ships were Dunkirkers. Straddling took him into custody, and
lodged him in Plymouth fort “to answer his insolence and contempt of
his Majesty’s regality in these seas,” and he remained a prisoner there
for a fortnight before he was released by order of the Admiralty.[588]
But in 1638 there were few incidents of this kind, probably because of
the fleet lying at anchor so long, though it may be supposed that the
general condition of public affairs did not whet the zeal of the naval
officers.
It was not long before advantage was taken abroad of Charles’s troubles
in Scotland. In the early part of 1638 Pennington reported that there
were many Hollander, French, and Dunkirk ships at sea, and that they
were pillaging English vessels;[589] but the king was unable to protect
even the herring-busses of the Fishery Society that he had taken under
his peculiar care. The Dunkirkers, emboldened by immunity, took four
of them in 1639, and then daringly anchored in the Downs. The Dutch
men-of-war became bold, and then insolent. They began by protecting a
Calais vessel that had rifled an English ship, their Admiral refusing
to surrender her. Soon their fleets visited the English coasts in
menacing strength, and although they “performed their duty” in the
matter of the flag, they insisted on their right to stop and search
English vessels, even in the King’s Chambers. “The Hollanders’ ships,”
wrote Northumberland’s secretary to Pennington in June 1639, “begin
to be very bold in our seas, and lie about Portland with fifty sail,
examining and searching all English ships and others which pass
by them, so that in effect they command where the King challenges
sovereignty.” The English merchants, he said, made great complaint that
their trade was likely to be destroyed; they were “much perplexed, and
called to mind tonnage and poundage, for which his Majesty was pleased
to promise thirty sail of his ships to secure trade in the Narrow
Sea.”[590]
The truth was that English ships had been engaged in transporting
Spanish troops and bullion to Dunkirk, and that the Dutch were merely
exercising their rights as belligerents. Their action was nevertheless
a plain flouting of the high pretensions of the king, and it was
the more disagreeable because Charles had now again veered round to
the side of Spain. He was much moved at the “insolencies” of the
Hollanders, which “concerned his honour” and “put his sovereignty in
hazard”; and the Earl of Northumberland, who had been created Lord High
Admiral in the preceding year, also expressed himself as much afflicted
that such affronts were put on the nation in his time. It was, said
Windebank, a very high disorder that any of the king’s neighbours
should presume to lie with a fleet in his Majesty’s Channel, near his
ports, and where he justly claimed sovereignty, and arrest and search
English ships, taking out of them “such persons, being passengers, as
they please”; “especially”--and this no doubt was a potent reason of
the king’s displeasure--“since the merchants and others took occasion
by such pretences of interruption of their trade to make difficulty to
pay their ship-money, which his Majesty is resolved to maintain.” The
king therefore commanded Pennington to put a stop to these affronts and
to preserve the sovereignty of the narrow seas, so “that trade may be
free and open, as well to his Majesty’s subjects as to others in league
and amity with his Majesty, and that peace be kept and the merchants
secured according to his Majesty’s proclamations and declarations
published heretofore to that effect.”[591]
It was one thing to indite imperious commands in London as to the
necessity of maintaining the king’s sovereignty of the seas; it was
quite another thing to carry them out in the Channel in the presence of
a powerful Dutch fleet under the new Admiral, Maarten Harpentz Tromp.
Pennington, conscious of his impotency, tried at first to justify, or
at least to extenuate, the action of the Dutch men-of-war. They only
took out of the English ships the Spanish soldiers, he said, who were
being carried to Flanders; they were most civil and courteous while
doing so; in reality, it was the English captains who had committed the
greater insolency. At all events, before attempting any reparation, it
would be only prudent to have an overmastering force, lest greater loss
and dishonour should happen, because, he said, the Dutch were in great
strength, and it was reported that the French fleet was about to put
to sea. Pennington was nevertheless ordered to prevent the affronts
as best he could. He then said he would do his best; but he had only
four ships available, and he asked for express orders how far he should
proceed if he were resisted with overmastering strength.[592]
But the question of the right of search was for the moment relegated
to diplomatic channels, and before anything could be done, either by
peaceful agreement or by Pennington’s ships, another event put an end
to it, and dissipated the king’s dreams of the dominion of the seas.
The battle of the Downs was fought between the Dutch and the Spaniards
on 11th October 1639, in spite of Charles’s express prohibition, and
in spite of his helpless fleet. So glaring a violation of one of the
King’s Chambers within three years of the appearance of Selden’s
_Mare Clausum_--an injury which he was as unable to prevent as to
redress--proclaimed to Europe that he was no longer sovereign over the
sea that was incontestably his own.
At the end of August a large Spanish fleet, consisting of some thirty
great galleons and thirty-six transports with troops for Flanders, set
sail from Corunna. On 6th September it was attacked in the Channel
by a Dutch squadron of seventeen ships, and a running fight was kept
up, the Spaniards passing eastwards off the English coast. Tromp,
engaged in blockading Dunkirk, heard the cannonading, and on the 8th
he joined the Dutch squadron with fifteen sail, when a fierce battle
took place in the Straits of Dover.[593] The Spanish Admiral, Don
Antonio de Oquendo, having expended all his powder, took refuge with
his shattered galleons in the Downs on 9th September, whither Tromp
followed him. Great anxiety was felt in London, first of all lest the
powerful foreign fleets should refuse to strike to the small English
squadron under Sir John Pennington, and then lest they should begin
hostilities in the King’s Chamber. On the former point doubts were soon
set at rest. Tromp at once took in his flag in the presence of the
English ships, a “civility” with which Charles was pleased. So also
did the proud Spaniard, but only after preliminary refusal and demur;
and Pennington’s insistence that the standard of Spain should be
lowered was made a subject of complaint at Madrid.[594] Anxiety on the
second point was protracted, and it was not diminished by the reports
that were received that the French fleet was coming to reinforce
their allies the Dutch. Pennington, in the most emphatic manner, had
forbidden hostilities within the King’s Chambers, and he assigned the
northern part of the anchorage to the Spaniards and the southern part
to the Dutch. For several weeks the belligerent squadrons remained in
the Downs facing one another. The Spanish Admiral, a few days after his
arrival, succeeded under cover of night in despatching to Dunkirk some
of his smaller vessels laden with soldiers. Tromp and Oquendo appealed
to Charles through their respective ambassadors, “and then ensued an
auction, the strangest in the annals of diplomacy, in which Charles’s
protection was offered as a prize to the highest bidder.”[595] On the
one hand, he demanded £150,000 from Spain, and better treatment in the
business of the Palatinate, as the price of securing the safety of the
Spanish fleet.[596] On the other hand, he declared himself ready to
abandon the Spaniards to Tromp, if France would come under a binding
promise to place Charles Louis at the head of the army which had been
commanded by Bernard of Weimar--as a means, of course, to recover the
Palatinate.[597]
While waiting the highest bid from one or the other, the king’s
commands regarding the fleet were puzzling and contradictory.
Smith, Northumberland’s secretary, who carried on a confidential
correspondence with Pennington, wrote to him that the king, when the
difficult situation of the English fleet was explained to him and he
was asked for explicit instructions as to how the Admiral should act,
“would not give any express declaration.” “I earnestly pressed his
Lordship [the Earl of Northumberland] to prevail with his Majesty,”
he said, “that you might have some justifiable instructions how you
should demean yourself.... To all this he told me that he had often
pressed his Majesty to declare his resolution, but never could get
any.” Smith privately advised Pennington to make a show of assisting
the Spaniards if there was a fight, but not to run himself or the
king’s ships into danger where there was no hope of victory and “the
only expectation was hard blows and hazard.”[598]
Desperate efforts were hurriedly made to strengthen the English fleet.
Ten additional ships were being got ready, and Northumberland intended
to take command himself as soon as they reached the Downs, but of the
3000 men which the Admiralty were “labouring” to procure for them,
only 300 could be obtained; they did not join Pennington till some
days after the battle. Pennington had been ordered to press into his
service all English ships he could lay his hands on, and to employ them
“in any warlike manner against any that shall presume to affront his
Majesty, or derogate from his sovereignty in these parts.”[599] Ten
vessels were thus pressed; but it was impossible to find seamen to man
them properly, and by command of the king some of them were dispensed
with. In presence of the powerful States’ fleet, to say nothing of the
Spaniards, Pennington’s instructions to the masters of the merchantmen
must have sounded somewhat ironical. If either of the “great fleets,”
he said, should presume to attempt anything in the King’s Chambers
“contrary to the laws and customs of nations and to the dishonour of
our king and kingdom, you are to fall upon the assailants, and to do
your best to take, sink, or destroy them.” Moreover, if any ships of
the hostile fleets assembled, “or any others that may come,” should
put out a flag, they were to cause them to be taken in; if refused,
they were to do their best to sink the offending ship.[600] The “any
others” meant the French, who were expected daily in the Downs, and
whose arrival there was regarded with apprehension. The general opinion
was that they would refuse to strike when they came, and, in that
event, what would happen? “That,” said Smith, “will set us all in
combustion, for then we must _strike_ them, although peradventure to
our own prejudice. But this punctilio of honour,” added the secretary
to the Lord High Admiral, with prophetic instinct, “will one day cause
more blood to be drawn than ere it will bring profit or honour to our
king.”[601]
Meanwhile Tromp and his resolute men were getting impatient. Since they
had cooped up the hated Spaniard in the English roadstead, they had
been reinforced from Holland, so that the Dutch fleet was soon in the
overwhelming strength of a hundred sail. Tromp also knew that Charles
had arranged (for a substantial consideration) to supply the Spanish
Admiral with gunpowder, of which he stood in dire need, and that thirty
Dunkirk sloops had succeeded in joining Oquendo. Above all, he had in
his pocket the express orders, just issued by the States-General, “to
destroy the Spanish fleet, without paying any regard to the harbours,
roads, or bays of the kingdom where it might be found.”[602] He
promptly seized an opportunity to carry out his orders. Information
reached London on 8th and 9th October that the Dutch were preparing to
attack. Commands were at once sent to warn them to desist, and they
were informed that the king was going to fix a short period for the
departure of both fleets; and this message was conveyed to the Dutch
Admiral. On the evening of the 10th, the gunpowder for the Spanish
fleet came alongside, and the accidental discharge of a gun on one
of the Spanish ships killed a Dutch sailor. This was enough. Before
the fog lifted next morning Tromp’s fleet was under sail; the roar of
cannon announced that the attack had begun; and within a few hours the
Spanish galleons were driven ashore, burnt, sunk, or in flight for
Flanders, with Tromp in hot pursuit. The English Admiral acted on the
prudent advice which had been given to him by Smith. He made a show
of resenting the violation of the King’s Chambers by firing at the
Dutch. In Madrid it was afterwards said he had fired his guns into
the air, but Pennington himself tells us that (although he affected
to believe the Spaniards had begun the combat) he “chased and shot at
the Hollanders” until they were all beyond the South Foreland; but the
Hollanders took no notice of him. On the morning of the battle Tromp
sent a letter to Pennington which was more than tinged with irony.
Since the Spaniards, he said, had infringed the conditions fixed by
firing at him first, the English Admiral should assist him in fighting
them, “according to his Majesty’s orders.” At all events he--Tromp--was
resolved, by instructions from his masters, to fall upon his enemies,
and to defend themselves “against those that shall resist them.” The
Dutch would rather die as soldiers, he said, “with his Majesty’s leave
in clearing his Majesty’s Road,” than fail to carry out their orders;
and he hoped that this would be “acceptable to his Majesty, but if his
Majesty should take any distaste we hope he will graciously forgive us.”
After pursuing the remnant of the Spanish fleet to Dunkirk, the Dutch
Admiral returned triumphant to the Downs, and saluted the English
squadron by striking his flag and firing nineteen guns,--“as a token,”
says an ironical observer, “that his Majesty was Sovereign of these
his seas!”[603] Tromp indeed, in those years, was most punctiliously
respectful to this symbol of the king’s sovereignty. Even during the
height of the battle, when he was violating not merely the sovereignty
claimed by Charles but the well-understood Law of Nations, he kept his
flag down until he was a good way off from the Downs,--a circumstance
which Pennington reported with satisfaction. Had the Dutch Admiral
shown the same willingness to strike to the flag of the Commonwealth
when he encountered Blake thirteen years later, the war that followed
might, perhaps, have been averted, or at least postponed.
Charles was very naturally highly incensed at this open flouting
of his authority. It was an ugly blot on the lustre of his ancient
prerogative, and a painful proof of the contempt in which his
much-vaunted naval power was held by the Dutch Republic, and--what
perhaps he felt quite as much at the time--it robbed him of all chance
of blackmailing Spain. When that Power was asked to pay the great
sum above mentioned, the Cardinal Infant put the proposal aside,
considering that it was the king’s own interest to protect the Spanish
fleet; and when Tromp’s precipitation broke in on the negotiations,
it was decided to withhold any payment at all until it was seen how
Charles would resent the injury done to Spain.[604] At first he
resolved to punish the affront. Pennington was ordered to cause the
Dutch fleet, which had returned to the Downs, and was suspected of
meditating further “insolency” by falling upon the stranded galleons,
to immediately quit the road. The king, he was told, had made up his
mind not to allow them the liberty of his ports or roads “until he
shall have received satisfaction for the insolency already committed.”
If they refused to leave, Pennington, immediately the other ten ships
had reinforced him, was to drive them out with all his power and
strength, or answer the contrary at his uttermost peril. Before these
orders could be executed, Tromp voluntarily departed.[605] Copies of
the letter to Pennington were sent to Brussels and Madrid to show
the Spaniards that the king was full of resolution. They were told
he was very sensible of the affront and insolence of the Hollanders,
and “would make such demonstration of it, and demand and expect such
reparation as in honour he is obliged.” But he was quite unable to
carry out his good intention. It was in vain that he was urged from
Madrid to take strong measures against the Dutch; to seize their
property; even to invade Normandy as a punishment to their ally.[606]
He had no fleet and no money to enable him to cope with the Dutch
Republic, even if the condition of home affairs had permitted the
attempt. On the contrary, to such a level had he fallen by his stubborn
ineptitude that the English Minister at The Hague was ordered to avoid
even a remonstrance about Tromp’s high-handed action in the Downs. If
the States-General mentioned the matter to him, he was to say that he
had received no instructions, “and so to refuse any conference on that
particular.”[607]
The Dutch Government had expected that Charles would raise loud
complaints, and they decided to take a bold attitude. On the day that
they received news of Tromp’s victory the proposal was made to send
over an ambassador, and Aerssen Van Sommelsdijck, who was chosen for
the mission, reached London early in November. There was to be no
attempt made on this occasion to appease the king with soft phrases and
show of submission. Aerssen was to complain of the action which England
had for a long time taken in favouring the Spaniards. The violation
of the King’s Chamber was to be passed over, and the battle in the
Downs represented as having been merely a continuation of the first
fight in the Channel, which forced the Spaniards to take refuge in
the English roadstead. But the pains taken by the States-General were
hardly necessary. Charles in his perplexity did not know to which side
to lean. He received the Dutch ambassador in a very friendly way, and
began to speak again of an alliance with the Republic.[608] In another
direction he was flouted by the Dutch. On the 1st October, while the
belligerent fleets were at anchor in the Downs, his representative at
the conference at Hamburg proposed that if the Republic joined the
projected alliance with France, Charles would grant them liberty to
carry on their herring fishery in the narrow seas. At the very time
that Tromp was battering the Spanish galleons in the King’s Chamber,
the States-General were engaged in passing the resolution “that they
did not intend to ask for the right of fishing in the North Sea from
any one.”[609]
A year later, the Long Parliament began its sittings at Westminster,
and Charles was rapidly stripped of sovereign power within his own
kingdom. The Dutch, conscious that they and not the King of England
were the real masters of the sea, became overbearing in their conduct.
More than ever their fishermen indulged in the bad treatment of British
subjects, which this country was unable to prevent. But their triumph
was short-lived. A decade later they were smitten by the heavy hand
of Cromwell, who resumed the sovereignty of the sea. It is to the
period beginning about this time that the Dutch trace the decadence
which set in in their great fisheries as well as the decline of their
trade. It is, however, a satisfaction to think that the part played
by this country in causing the misfortunes of Holland--a country to
which civilisation is indebted for immense advances, both material
and intellectual--was comparatively small. From about the middle of
the seventeenth century to the peace of Utrecht, in 1713, the Dutch
Republic was involved in almost constant wars with its Continental
neighbours, and the herring-fishery and the trade in general suffered
severely, and never afterwards regained the prosperity they formerly
enjoyed.