ANAXAGORAS OF KLAZOMENAI
[Sidenote: Date.]
120. All that Apollodoros tells us with regard to the date of Anaxagoras
seems to rest upon the authority of Demetrios Phalereus, who said of
him, in the _Register of Archons_, that he began to study philosophy, at
the age of twenty, in the archonship of Kallias or Kalliades at Athens
(480-79 B.C.).[647] This date was probably derived from a calculation
based upon the philosopher’s age at the time of his trial, which
Demetrios had every opportunity of learning from sources no longer
extant. Apollodoros inferred that Anaxagoras was born in Ol. LXX.
(500-496 B.C.), and he adds that he died at the age of seventy-two in
Ol. LXXXVIII. 1 (428-27 B.C.).[648] He doubtless thought it natural that
he should not survive Perikles, and still more natural that he should
die the year Plato was born.[649] We have a further statement, of
doubtful origin, but probably due to Demetrios also, that Anaxagoras
lived at Athens for thirty years. This may be a genuine tradition;[650]
and if so, we get from about 462 to 432 B.C. as the time he lived there.
Footnote 647:
Diog. ii. 7 (R. P. 148), with the perfectly certain emendation
referred to _ib._ 148 c. The Athens of 480 B.C. would hardly be a
suitable place to “begin philosophising”! For the variation in the
archon’s name, see Jacoby, p. 244, n. 1.
Footnote 648:
We must read ὀγδοηκοστῆς with Meursius to make the figures come right.
Footnote 649:
On the statements of Apollodoros, see Jacoby, pp. 244 sqq.
Footnote 650:
Diog., _loc. cit._ In any case, it is not a mere calculation of
Apollodoros’s; for he would certainly have made Anaxagoras forty years
old at the date of his arrival in Athens, and this would give _at
most_ twenty-eight years for his residence there. The trial cannot
have been later than 432 B.C., and may have been earlier.
There can be no doubt that these dates are very nearly right. Aristotle
tells us[651] that Anaxagoras was older than Empedokles, who was born
about 490 B.C. (§ 98); and Theophrastos said[652] that Empedokles was
born “not long after Anaxagoras.” Demokritos, too, said that he himself
was a young man in the old age of Anaxagoras, and he must have been born
about 460 B.C.[653]
Footnote 651:
Arist. Met. Α, 3. 984 a 11 (R. P. 150 a).
Footnote 652:
_Phys. Op._ fr. 3 (_Dox._ p. 477), _ap._ Simpl. _Phys._ p. 25, 19 (R.
P. 162 e).
Footnote 653:
Diog. ix. 41 (R. P. 187). On the date of Demokritos, see Chap. IX. §
171.
[Sidenote: Early life.]
121. Anaxagoras was born at Klazomenai, and Theophrastos tells us that
his father’s name was Hegesiboulos.[654] The names of both father and
son have an aristocratic sound, and we may assume they belonged to a
family which had won distinction in the State. Nor need we reject the
tradition that Anaxagoras neglected his possessions to follow
science.[655] It is certain, at any rate, that in the fourth century he
was already regarded as the type of the man who leads the “theoretic
life.”[656] Of course the story of his contempt for worldly goods was
seized on later by the historical novelist and tricked out with the
usual apophthegms. These do not concern us here.
Footnote 654:
_Phys. Op._ fr. 4 (_Dox._ p. 478), repeated by the doxographers.
Footnote 655:
Plato, _Hipp. ma._ 283 a, τοὐναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ φασὶ συμβῆναι ἢ
ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ παλλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι
πάντα· οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι. Cf. Plut. _Per._ 16.
Footnote 656:
Arist. _Eth. Nic._ Κ, 9. 1179 a 13. Cf. _Eth. Eud._ Α, 4. 1215 b 6 and
15, 1216 a 10.
One incident belonging to the early manhood of Anaxagoras is recorded,
namely, his observation of the huge meteoric stone which fell into the
Aigospotamos in 468-67 B.C.[657] Our authorities tell us that he
predicted this phenomenon, which is plainly absurd. But we shall see
reason to believe that it may have occasioned one of his most striking
departures from the earlier cosmology, and led to his adoption of the
very view for which he was condemned at Athens. At all events, the fall
of the stone made a profound impression at the time, and it was still
shown to tourists in the days of Pliny and Plutarch.[658]
Footnote 657:
Diog. ii. 10 (R. P. 149 a). Pliny, _N.H._ ii. 149, gives the date as
Ol. LXXVIII. 2; and Eusebios gives it under Ol. LXXVIII. 3. But cf.
_Marm. Par. 57_, ἀφ’ οὗ ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ὁ λίθος ἔπεσε ... ἔτη ΗΗΠ,
ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Θεαγενίδου, which is 468-67 B.C. The text of Diog.
ii. 11 is corrupt. For suggested restorations, see Jacoby, p. 244, n.
2; and Diels, _Vors._ p. 294, 28.
Footnote 658:
Pliny, _loc. cit._, “qui lapis etiam nunc ostenditur magnitudine vehis
colore adusto.” Cf. Plut. _Lys._ 12, καὶ δείκνυται ... ἔτι νῦν.
[Sidenote: Relation to the Ionic school.]
122. The doxographers speak of Anaxagoras as the pupil of
Anaximenes.[659] This is, of course, out of the question; Anaximenes
most probably died before Anaxagoras was born. But it is not enough to
say that the statement arose from the fact that the name of Anaxagoras
followed that of Anaximenes in the _Successions_. That is true, no
doubt; but it is not the whole truth. We have its original source in a
fragment of Theophrastos himself, which states that Anaxagoras had been
“an associate of the philosophy of Anaximenes.”[660] Now this expression
has a very distinct meaning if we accept the view as to “schools” of
science set forth in the Introduction (§ XIV.). It means that the old
Ionic school survived the destruction of Miletos in 494 B.C., and
continued to flourish in the other cities of Asia. It means, further,
that it produced no man of distinction after its third great
representative, and that “the philosophy of Anaximenes” was still taught
by whoever was now at the head of the society.
Footnote 659:
Cicero, _de nat. D._ i. 26 (after Philodemos), “Anaxagoras qui accepit
ab Anaximene disciplinam (_i.e._ διήκουσε)”; Diog. i. 13 (R. P. 4) and
ii. 6; Strabo, xiv. p. 645, Κλαζομένιος δ’ ἦν ἀνὴρ ἐπιφανὴς Ἀναξαγόρας
ὁ φυσικός Ἀναξιμένους ὁμιλητής; Euseb. _P.E._ p. 504; [Galen] _Hist.
Phil._ 3; Augustine, _de Civ. Dei_, viii. 2.
Footnote 660:
_Phys. Op._ fr. 4 (_Dox._ p. 478), Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν γὰρ Ἡγησιβούλου
Κλαζομένιος κοινωνήσας τῆς Ἀναξιμένους φιλοσοφίας κ.τ.λ. In his fifth
edition (p. 973, n. 2) Zeller adopts the view given in the text, and
confirms it by comparing the very similar statement as to Leukippos,
κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τὴς φιλοσοφίας. See below, Chap. IX. § 172.
At this point, it may be well to indicate briefly the conclusions to
which we shall come in the next few chapters with regard to the
development of philosophy during the first half of the fifth century
B.C. We shall find that, while the old Ionic school was still capable of
training great men, it was now powerless to keep them. Anaxagoras went
his own way; Melissos and Leukippos, though they still retained enough
of the old views to bear witness to the source of their inspiration,
were too strongly influenced by the Eleatic dialectic to remain content
with the theories of Anaximenes. It was left to second-rate minds like
Diogenes to champion the orthodox system, while third-rate minds like
Hippon of Samos even went back to the cruder theory of Thales. The
details of this anticipatory sketch will become clearer as we go on; for
the present, it is only necessary to call the reader’s attention to the
fact that the old Ionic Philosophy now forms a sort of background to our
story, just as Orphic and Pythagorean religious ideas have done in the
preceding chapters.
[Sidenote: Anaxagoras at Athens.]
123. Anaxagoras was the first philosopher to take up his abode at
Athens. We are not to suppose, however, that he was attracted thither by
anything in the character of the Athenians. No doubt Athens had now
become the political centre of the Hellenic world; but it had not yet
produced a single scientific man. On the contrary, the temper of the
citizen body was and remained hostile to free inquiry of any kind.
Sokrates, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle fell victims in different degrees to
the bigotry of the democracy, though, of course, their offence was
political rather than religious. They were condemned not as heretics,
but as innovators in the _state_ religion. Still, as a recent historian
observes, “Athens in its flourishing period was far from being a place
for free inquiry to thrive unchecked.”[661] It is this, no doubt, that
has been in the minds of those writers who have represented philosophy
as something un-Greek. It was in reality thoroughly Greek, though it was
thoroughly un-Athenian.
Footnote 661:
Holm, _Gr. Gesch._ ii. 334. The whole chapter is well worth reading in
this connexion.
It seems most reasonable to suppose that Perikles himself brought
Anaxagoras to Athens, just as he brought everything else he could. Holm
has shown with much skill how the aim of that great statesman was, so to
say, to Ionise his fellow-citizens, to impart to them something of the
flexibility and openness of mind which characterised their kinsmen
across the sea. It is possible that it was Aspasia of Miletos who
introduced the Ionian philosopher to the Periklean circle, of which he
was henceforth a chief ornament. The Athenians in derision gave him the
nickname of Nous.[662]
Footnote 662:
Plut. _Per._ 4 (R. P. 148 c). I follow Zeller, p. 975, n. 1 (Eng.
trans. ii. p. 327, n. 4), in regarding the sobriquet as derisive.
The close relation in which Anaxagoras stood to Perikles is placed
beyond the reach of doubt by the testimony of Plato. In the
_Phaedrus_[663] he makes Sokrates say: “For all arts that are great,
there is need of talk and discussion on the parts of natural science
that deal with things on high; for that seems to be the source which
inspires high-mindedness and effectiveness in every direction. Perikles
added this very acquirement to his original gifts. He fell in, it seems,
with Anaxagoras, who was a scientific man; and, satiating himself with
the theory of things on high, and having attained to a knowledge of the
true nature of intellect and folly, which were just what the discourses
of Anaxagoras were mainly about, he drew from that source whatever was
of a nature to further him in the art of speech.”
Footnote 663:
270 a (R. P. 148 c).
A more difficult question is the alleged relation of Euripides to
Anaxagoras. The oldest authority for it is Alexander of Aitolia, poet
and librarian, who lived at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphos (_c._ 280
B.C.). He referred to Euripides as the “nursling of brave
Anaxagoras.”[664] A great deal of ingenuity has been expended in trying
to find the system of Anaxagoras in the choruses of Euripides; but, it
must now be admitted, without result.[665] The famous fragment on the
blessedness of the scientific life might just as well refer to any other
cosmologist as to Anaxagoras, and indeed suggests more naturally a
thinker of a more primitive type.[666] On the other hand, there is one
fragment which distinctly expounds the central thought of Anaxagoras,
and could hardly be referred to any one else.[667] We may conclude,
then, that Euripides knew the philosopher and his views, but it is not
safe to go further.
Footnote 664:
Gell. xv. 20, “Alexander autem Aetolus hos de Euripide versus
composuit”; ὁ δ’ Ἀναξαγόρου τρόφιμος χαιοῦ (so Valckenaer for ἀρχαίου)
κ.τ.λ.
Footnote 665:
The question was first raised by Valckenaer (_Diatribe_, p. 26). Cf.
also Wilamowitz, _Analecta Euripidea_, pp. 162 sqq.
Footnote 666:
See Introd. p. 12, _n._ 14. The fragment is quoted R. P. 148 c. The
words ἀθανάτου φύσεως and κόσμον ἀγήρω carry us back rather to the
older Milesians.
Footnote 667:
R. P. 150 b.
[Sidenote: The trial.]
124. Shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the enemies
of Perikles began a series of attacks upon him through his friends.[668]
Pheidias was the first to suffer, and Anaxagoras was the next. That he
was an object of special hatred to the religious party need not surprise
us, even though the charge made against him does not suggest that he
went out of his way to hurt their susceptibilities. The details of the
trial are somewhat obscure, but we can make out a few points. The first
step taken was the introduction of a psephism by Diopeithes—the same
whom Aristophanes laughs at in _The Birds_[669]—enacting that an
impeachment should be brought against those who did not practise
religion, and taught theories about “the things on high.”[670] What
happened at the actual trial is very differently related. Our
authorities give hopelessly conflicting accounts.[671] It is no use
attempting to reconcile these; it is enough to insist upon what is
certain. Now we know from Plato what the accusation was.[672] It was
that Anaxagoras taught the sun was a red-hot stone, and the moon earth;
and we shall see that he certainly did hold these views (§ 133). For the
rest, the most plausible account is that he was got out of prison and
sent away by Perikles.[673] We know that such things were possible at
Athens.
Footnote 668:
Both Ephoros (represented by Diod. xii. 38) and the source of Plut.
_Per._ 32 made these attacks immediately precede the war. This may,
however, be pragmatic; they perhaps occurred earlier.
Footnote 669:
_Birds_, 988. Aristophanes had no respect for orthodoxy when combined
with democratic opinions.
Footnote 670:
Plut. _Per._ 32 (R. P. 148), where some of the original words have
been preserved. The phrase τὰ θεῖα and the word μετάρσια are archaisms
from the ψήφισμα.
Footnote 671:
These accounts are repeated by Diog. ii. 12-14. It is worth while to
put the statements of Satyros and Sotion side by side in order to show
the unsatisfactory character of the biographical tradition:—
│ _Sotion._ │ _Satyros._
_Accuser._ │Kleon. │Thoukydides s. of Melesias.
_Charge._ │Calling the sun a red-hot │Impiety and Medism.
│mass. │
_Sentence._ │Fined five talents. │Sentenced to death in absence.
Hermippos represents Anaxagoras as already in prison under sentence of
death when Perikles shamed the people into letting him off. Lastly,
Hieronymos says he never was condemned at all. Perikles brought him
into court thin and wasted by disease, and the judges acquitted him
out of compassion! The Medism alleged by Satyros no doubt comes from
Stesimbrotos, who made Anaxagoras the friend of Themistokles instead
of Perikles. This, too, explains the accuser’s name (Busolt, _Gr.
Gesch._ p. 306, n. 3).
Footnote 672:
_Apol._ 26 d.
Footnote 673:
Plut. _Nic._ 23 (R. P. 148 c). Cf. _Per._ 32 (R. P. 148).
Driven from his adopted home, Anaxagoras naturally went back to Ionia,
where at least he would be free to teach what he pleased. He settled at
Lampsakos, and we shall see reason to believe that he founded a school
there.[674] Probably he did not live long after his exile. The
Lampsakenes erected an altar to his memory in their market-place,
dedicated to Mind and Truth; and the anniversary of his death was long
kept as a holiday for school-children, it was said at his own
request.[675]
Footnote 674:
See the account of Archelaos in Chap. X. § 191.
Footnote 675:
The oldest authority for the honours paid to Anaxagoras is Alkidamas,
the pupil of Gorgias, who said these were still kept up in his own
time. Arist. _Rhet._ Β, 23. 1398 b 15.
[Sidenote: Writings.]
125. Diogenes includes Anaxagoras in his list of philosophers who left
only a single book, and he has also preserved the accepted criticism of
it, namely, that it was written “in a lofty and agreeable style.”[676]
There is no evidence of any weight to set against this testimony, which
comes ultimately from the librarians of Alexandria.[677] The story that
Anaxagoras wrote a treatise on perspective as applied to scene-painting
is most improbable;[678] and the statement that he composed a
mathematical work dealing with the quadrature of the circle is due to
misunderstanding of an expression in Plutarch.[679] We learn from the
passage in the _Apology_, referred to above, that the works of
Anaxagoras could be bought at Athens for a single drachma; and that the
book was of some length may be gathered from the way in which Plato goes
on to speak of it.[680] In the sixth century A.D. Simplicius had access
to a copy, doubtless in the library of the Academy;[681] and it is to
him we owe the preservation of all our fragments, with one or two very
doubtful exceptions. Unfortunately his quotations seem to be confined to
the First Book, that dealing with general principles, so that we are
left somewhat in the dark with regard to the treatment of details. This
is the more unfortunate, as it was Anaxagoras who first gave the true
theory of the moon’s light and, therefore, the true theory of eclipses.
Footnote 676:
Diog. i. 16; ii. 6 (R. P. 5; 153).
Footnote 677:
Schaubach (_An. Claz. Fragm._ p. 57) fabricated a work entitled τὸ
πρὸς Λεχίνεον out of the pseudo-Aristotelian _de plantis_, 817 a 27.
But the Latin version of Alfred, which is the original of the Greek,
has simply _et ideo dicit lechineon_; and this appears to be due to a
failure to make out the Arabic text from which the Latin version was
derived. Cf. Meyer, _Gesch. d. Bot._ i. 60.
Footnote 678:
It comes from Vitruvius, vii. pr. 11. A forger, seeking to decorate
his production with a great name, would think naturally of the
philosopher who was said to have taught Euripides.
Footnote 679:
Plut. _de Exilio_, 607 f. The words merely mean that he used to draw
mathematical figures relating to the quadrature of the circle on the
prison floor.
Footnote 680:
_Apol._ 26 d-e. The expression βιβλία perhaps implies that it filled
more than one roll.
Footnote 681:
Simplicius also speaks of βιβλία.
[Sidenote: The Fragments.]
126. I give the fragments according to the text and arrangement of
Diels, who has made some of them completely intelligible for the first
time.
(1) All things were together infinite both in number and in smallness;
for the small too was infinite. And, when all things were together,
none of them could be distinguished for their smallness. For air and
aether prevailed over all things, being both of them infinite; for
amongst all things these are the greatest both in quantity and
size.[682] R. P. 151.
(2) For air and aether are separated off from the mass that surrounds
the world, and the surrounding mass is infinite in quantity. R. P.
_ib._
(3) Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a
smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being
cut.[683] But there is also always something greater than what is
great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with
itself, each thing is both great and small. R. P. 159 a.
(4) And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are
contained many things and of all sorts in the things that are uniting,
seeds of all things, with all sorts of shapes and colours and savours
(R. P. _ib._), and that men have been formed in them, and the other
animals that have life, and that these men have inhabited cities and
cultivated fields as with us; and that they have a sun and a moon and
the rest as with us; and that their earth brings forth for them many
things of all kinds of which they gather the best together into their
dwellings, and use them (R. P. 160 b). Thus much have I said with
regard to separating off, to show that it will not be only with us
that things are separated off, but elsewhere too.
But before they were separated off, when all things were together, not
even was any colour distinguishable; for the mixture of all things
prevented it—of the moist and the dry, and the warm and the cold, and
the light and the dark, and of much earth that was in it, and of a
multitude of innumerable seeds in no way like each other. For none of
the other things either is like any other. And these things being so,
we must hold that all things are in the whole. R. P. 151.[684]
(5) And those things having been thus decided, we must know that all
of them are neither more nor less; for it is not possible for them to
be more than all, and all are always equal. R. P. 151.
(6) And since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in
amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is
it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of
everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they
cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves; but they must be
now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. And in all
things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the
greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off.
(7) ... So that we cannot know the number of the things that are
separated off, either in word or deed.
(8) The things that are in one world are not divided nor cut off from
one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold nor the
cold from the warm. R. P. 155 e.
(9) ... as these things revolve and are separated out by the force and
swiftness. And the swiftness makes the force. Their swiftness is not
like the swiftness of any of the things that are now among men, but in
every way many times as swift.
(10) How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is
not flesh? R. P. 155 f, n. 1.
(11) In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and
there are some things in which there is Nous also. R. P. 160 b.
(12) All other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous
is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone,
itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with
anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with
any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been
said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would
hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way
that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all
things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and
the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both
greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole
revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began
to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now
extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And
all the things that are mingled together and separated off and
distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things
that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that
are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun
and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. And
this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated
off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark,
and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many
things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished
from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the
greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but
each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it
has most in it R. P. 155.
(13) And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place
from all that was moved, and so far as Nous set in motion all was
separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the
revolution caused them to be separated much more.
(14) And Nous, which ever is, is certainly there, where everything
else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united with it
and separated off from it.[685]
(15) The dense and the moist and the cold and the dark came together
where the earth is now, while the rare and the warm and the dry (and
the bright) went out towards the further part of the aether.[686] R.
P. 156.
(16) From these as they are separated off earth is solidified; for
from mists water is separated off, and from water earth. From the
earth stones are solidified by the cold, and these rush outwards more
than water. R. P. 156.
(17) The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into
being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away,
but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they would
be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away
separation. R. P. 150.
(18) It is the sun that puts brightness into the moon.
(19) We call rainbow the reflexion of the sun in the clouds. Now it is
a sign of storm; for the water that flows round the cloud causes wind
or pours down in rain.
(20) With the rise of the Dogstar men begin the harvest; with its
setting they begin to till the fields. It is hidden for forty days and
nights.
(21) From the weakness of our senses we are not able to judge the
truth.
(21_a_) What appears is a vision of the unseen.
(21_b_) (We can make use of the lower animals) because we use our own
experience and memory and wisdom and art.
(22) What is called “birds’ milk” is the white of the egg.
Footnote 682:
Simplicius tells us that this fragment was at the beginning of Book I.
The familiar sentence quoted by Diog. ii. 6 (R. P. 153) is not a
fragment of Anaxagoras, but a summary, like the πάντα ῥεῖ ascribed to
Herakleitos (Chap. III. p. 162).
Footnote 683:
Zeller’s τομῇ still seems to me a convincing correction of the MS. τὸ
μή, which Diels retains.
Footnote 684:
I had already pointed out in the first edition that Simplicius quotes
this three times as a continuous fragment, and that we are not
entitled to break it up. Diels now prints it as a single passage.
Footnote 685:
Simplicius gives fr. 14 thus (p. 157, 5): ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὅσα ἐστί τε κάρτα
καὶ νῦν ἐστιν. Diels now reads ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὃς ἀ<εί> ἐστί, τὸ κάρτα καὶ
νῦν ἐστιν. The correspondence of ἀεὶ ... καὶ νῦν is strongly in favour
of this.
Footnote 686:
On the text of fr. 15, see R. P. 156 a. I have followed Schorn in
adding καὶ τὸ λαμπρόν from Hippolytos.
[Sidenote: Anaxagoras and his predecessors.]
127. The system of Anaxagoras, like that of Empedokles, aimed at
reconciling the Eleatic doctrine that corporeal substance is
unchangeable with the existence of a world which everywhere presents the
appearance of coming into being and passing away. The conclusions of
Parmenides are frankly accepted and restated. Nothing can be added to
all things; for there cannot be more than all, and all is always equal
(fr. 5). Nor can anything pass away. What men commonly call coming into
being and passing away is really mixture and separation (fr. 17).
This last fragment reads almost like a prose paraphrase of Empedokles
(fr. 9); and it is in every way probable that Anaxagoras derived his
theory of mixture from his younger contemporary, whose poem was most
likely published before his own treatise.[687] We have seen how
Empedokles sought to save the world of appearance by maintaining that
the opposites—hot and cold, moist and dry—were _things_, each one of
which was real in the Parmenidean sense. Anaxagoras regarded this as
inadequate. Everything changes into everything else,[688] the things of
which the world is made are not “cut off with a hatchet” (fr. 8) in this
way. On the contrary, the true formula must be: _There is a portion of
everything in everything_ (fr. 11).
Footnote 687:
This is doubtless the meaning of the words τοῖς ἔργοις ὕστερος in
Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 12 (R. P. 150 a); though ἔργα certainly does
not mean “writings” or _opera omnia_, but simply “achievements.” The
other possible interpretations are “more advanced in his views” and
“inferior in his teaching” (Zeller, p. 1023, n. 2).
Footnote 688:
Arist. _Phys._ Α, 4. 187 b 1 (R. P. 155 a).
[Sidenote: “Everything in everything.”]
128. A part of the argument by which Anaxagoras sought to prove this
point has been preserved in a corrupt form by Aetios, and Diels has
recovered some of the original words from the scholiast on St. Gregory
Nazianzene. “We use a simple nourishment,” he said, “when we eat the
fruit of Demeter or drink water. But how can hair be made of what is not
hair, or flesh of what is not flesh?” (fr. 10).[689] That is just the
sort of question the early Milesians must have asked, only the
physiological interest has now definitely replaced the meteorological.
We shall find a similar train of reasoning in Diogenes of Apollonia (fr.
2).
Footnote 689:
Aet. i. 3, 5 (_Dox._ p. 279). See R. P. 155 f and n. 1. I read καρπὸν
with Usener.
The statement that there is a portion of everything in everything, is
not to be understood as referring simply to the original mixture of
things before the formation of the worlds (fr. 1). On the contrary, even
now “all things are together,” and everything, however small and however
great, has an equal number of “portions” (fr. 6). A smaller particle of
matter could only contain a smaller number of portions, if one of those
portions ceased to be; but if anything _is_, in the full Parmenidean
sense, it is impossible that mere division should make it cease to be
(fr. 3). Matter is infinitely divisible; for there is no least thing,
any more than there is a greatest. But however great or small a body may
be, it contains just the same number of “portions,” that is, a portion
of everything.
[Sidenote: The portions.]
129. What are these “things” of which everything contains a portion? It
once was usual to represent the theory of Anaxagoras as if he had said
that wheat, for instance, contained small particles of flesh, blood,
bones, and the like; but we have just seen that matter is infinitely
divisible (fr. 3), and that there are as many “portions” in the smallest
particle as in the greatest (fr. 6). This is fatal to the old view. If
everything were made up of minute particles of everything else, we could
certainly arrive at a point where everything was “unmixed,” if only we
carried division far enough.
This difficulty can only be solved in one way.[690] In fr. 8 the
examples given of things which are not “cut off from one another with a
hatchet” are the hot and the cold; and elsewhere (frs. 4, 15), mention
is made of the other traditional “opposites.” Aristotle says that, if we
suppose the first principles to be infinite, they may either be one in
kind, as with Demokritos, or opposite.[691] Simplicius, following
Porphyry and Themistios, refers the latter view to Anaxagoras;[692] and
Aristotle himself implies that the opposites of Anaxagoras had as much
right to be called first principles as the “homoeomeries.”[693]
Footnote 690:
See Tannery, _Science hellène_, pp. 283 sqq. I still think that
Tannery’s interpretation is substantially right, though his statement
of it requires some modification.
Footnote 691:
Arist. _Phys._ Α, 2. 184 b 21, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἔν,
σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.
Footnote 692:
_Phys._ p. 44, 1. He goes on to refer to θερμότητας ... καὶ ψυχρότητας
ξηρότητάς τε καὶ ὑγρότητας μανότητάς τε καὶ πυκνότητας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
κατὰ ποιότητα ἐναντιότητας. He observes, however, that Alexander
rejected this interpretation and took διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας
closely together as both referring to Demokritos.
Footnote 693:
_Phys._ Α, 4. 187 a 25, τὸν μὲν (Ἀναξαγόραν) ἄπειρα ποιεῖν τά τε
ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τἀναντία. Aristotle’s own theory only differs from this
in so far as he makes ὕλη prior to the ἐναντία.
It is of those opposites, then, and not of the different forms of
matter, that everything contains a portion. Every particle, however
large or however small, contains every one of those opposite qualities.
That which is hot is also to a certain extent cold. Even snow,
Anaxagoras affirmed, was black;[694] that is, even the white contains a
certain portion of the opposite quality. It is enough to indicate the
connexion of this with the views of Herakleitos (§ 80).[695]
Footnote 694:
Sext. _Pyrrh._ i. 33 (R. P. 161 b).
Footnote 695:
The connexion was already noted by the eclectic Herakleitean to whom I
attribute Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3-4 (see above, Chap. III. p. 167, _n._
383). Cf. the words ἔχει δὲ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ
ὑγρόν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν· ἔνι
γὰρ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν.
[Sidenote: Seeds.]
130. The difference, then, between the theory of Anaxagoras and that of
Empedokles is this. Empedokles had taught that, if you divide the
various things which make up this world, and in particular the parts of
the body, such as flesh, bones, and the like, far enough, you come to
the four “roots” or elements, which are, accordingly, the ultimate
reality. Anaxagoras held that, however far you may divide any of these
things—and they are infinitely divisible—you never come to a part so
small that it does not contain portions of all the opposites. The
smallest portion of bone is still bone. On the other hand, everything
can pass into everything else just because the “seeds,” as he called
them, of each form of matter contain a portion of everything, that is,
of all the opposites, though in different proportions. If we are to use
the word “element” at all, it is these seeds that are the elements in
the system of Anaxagoras.
Aristotle expresses this by saying that Anaxagoras regards the ὁμοιομερῆ
as στοιχεῖα.[696] We have seen that the term στοιχεῖον is of later date
than Anaxagoras, and it is natural to suppose that the word ὁμοιομερῆ is
also only Aristotle’s name for the “seeds.” In his own system, the
ὁμοιομερῆ are intermediate between the elements (στοιχεῖα), of which
they are composed, and the organs (ὄργανα), which are composed of them.
The heart cannot be divided into hearts, but the parts of flesh are
flesh. That being so, Aristotle’s statement is quite intelligible from
his own point of view, but there is no reason for supposing that
Anaxagoras expressed himself in that particular way. All we are entitled
to infer is that he said the “seeds,” which he had substituted for the
“roots” of Empedokles, were not the opposites in a state of separation,
but each contained a portion of them all. If Anaxagoras had used the
term “homoeomeries”[697] himself, it would be strange that Simplicius
should quote no fragment containing it.
Footnote 696:
Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Α, 1, 314 a 18, ὁ μὲν γὰρ (Anaxagoras) τὰ
ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὀστοῦν καὶ σάρκα καὶ μυελόν, καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ὧν ἑκάστῳ συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἐστίν. This was, of course,
repeated by Theophrastos and the doxographers; but it is to be noted
that Aetios, supposing as he does that Anaxagoras himself used the
term, gives it an entirely wrong meaning. He says that the
ὁμοιομέρειαι were so called from the likeness of the particles of the
τροφή to those of the body (_Dox._ 279 a 21; R. P. 155 f). Lucretius,
i. 830 sqq. (R. P. 150 a) has a similar account of the matter, derived
from Epicurean sources. Obviously, it cannot be reconciled with what
Aristotle says.
Footnote 697:
It is more likely that we have a trace of the terminology of
Anaxagoras himself in Περὶ διαίτης, 3, μέρεα μερέων, ὅλα ὅλων.
The difference between the two systems may also be regarded from another
point of view. Anaxagoras was not obliged by his theory to regard the
elements of Empedokles as primary, a view to which there were obvious
objections, especially in the case of earth. He explained them in quite
another way. Though everything has a portion of everything in it, things
appear to be that of which there is most in them (fr. 12 _sub fin._). We
may say, then, that Air is that in which there is most cold, Fire that
in which there is most heat, and so on, without giving up the view that
there is a portion of cold in the fire and a portion of heat in the
air.[698] The great masses which Empedokles had taken for elements are
really vast collections of all manner of “seeds.” Each of them is, in
fact, a πανσπερμία.[699]
Footnote 698:
Cf. above, p. 305.
Footnote 699:
Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Α, 1. 314 a 29. The word πανσπερμία was used by
Demokritos (Arist. _de An._ 404 a 8; R. P. 200), and it occurs in the
Περὶ διαίτης (_loc. cit._). It seems natural to suppose that it was
used by Anaxagoras himself, as he used the term σπέρματα. Much
difficulty has been caused by the apparent inclusion of Water and Fire
among the ὁμοιομερῆ in Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 11 (R. P. 150 a).
Bonitz understands the words καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ to mean “as we have
just seen that Fire and Water do in the system of Empedokles.” In any
case, καθάπερ goes closely with οὕτω, and the general sense is that
Anaxagoras applies to the ὁμοιομερῆ what is really true of the
στοιχεῖα. It would be better to delete the comma after πῦρ and add one
after φησι, for συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον is explanatory of οὕτω
... καθάπερ. In the next sentence, I read ἁπλῶς for ἄλλως with Zeller
(_Arch._ ii. p. 261). See also Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 3. 302 b 1 (R. P.
150 a), where the matter is very clearly put.
[Sidenote: “All things together.”]
131. From all this it follows that, when “all things were together,” and
when the different seeds of things were mixed together in infinitely
small particles (fr. 1), the appearance presented would be that of one
of what had hitherto been regarded as the primary substances. As a
matter of fact, they did present the appearance of “air and aether”; for
the qualities (things) which belong to these prevail in quantity over
all other things in the universe, and everything is most obviously that
of which it has most in it (fr. 12 _sub fin._). Here, then, Anaxagoras
attaches himself to Anaximenes. The primary condition of things, before
the formation of the worlds, is much the same in both; only, with
Anaxagoras, the original mass is no longer the primary substance, but a
mixture of innumerable seeds divided into infinitely small parts.
This mass is infinite, like the air of Anaximenes, and it supports
itself, since there is nothing surrounding it.[700] Further, the “seeds”
of all things which it contains are infinite in number (fr. 1). But, as
the innumerable seeds may be divided into those in which the portions of
cold, moist, dense, and dark prevail, and those which have most of the
warm, dry, rare, and light in them, we may say that the original mass
was a mixture of infinite Air and of infinite Fire. The seeds of Air, of
course, contain “portions” of the “things” that predominate in Fire, and
_vice versa_; but we regard everything as being that of which it has
most in it. Lastly, there is no void in this mixture, an addition to the
theory made necessary by the arguments of Parmenides. It is, however,
worthy of note that Anaxagoras added an experimental proof of this to
the purely dialectical one of the Eleatics. He used the _klepsydra_
experiment as Empedokles had done (fr. 100), and also showed the
corporeal nature of air by means of inflated skins.[701]
Footnote 700:
Arist. _Phys._ Γ, 5. 205 b 1 (R. P. 154 a).
Footnote 701:
_Phys._ Ζ, 6. 213 a 22 (R. P. 159). We have a full discussion of the
experiments with the _klepsydra_ in _Probl._ 914 b 9 sqq., a passage
which we have already used to illustrate Empedokles, fr. 100. See
above, p. 253, _n._ 565.
[Sidenote: Nous.]
132. Like Empedokles, Anaxagoras required some external cause to produce
motion in the mixture. Body, Parmenides had shown, would never move
itself, as the Milesians had supposed. Anaxagoras called the cause of
motion by the name of Nous. It was this which made Aristotle say that he
“stood out like a sober man from the random talkers that had preceded
him,”[702] and he has often been credited with the introduction of the
spiritual into philosophy. The disappointment expressed both by Plato
and Aristotle as to the way in which Anaxagoras worked out the theory
should, however, make us pause to reflect before accepting too exalted a
view of it. Plato[703] makes Sokrates say: “I once heard a man reading a
book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, and saying it was Mind that ordered the
world and was the cause of all things. I was delighted to hear of this
cause, and I thought he really was right.... But my extravagant
expectations were all dashed to the ground when I went on and found that
the man made no use of Mind at all. He ascribed no causal power whatever
to it in the ordering of things, but to airs, and aethers, and waters,
and a host of other strange things.” Aristotle, probably with this
passage in mind, says:[704] “Anaxagoras uses Mind as a _deus ex machina_
to account for the formation of the world; and whenever he is at a loss
to explain why anything necessarily is, he drags it in. But in other
cases he makes anything rather than Mind the cause.” These utterances
may well suggest that the Nous of Anaxagoras did not really stand on a
higher level than the Love and Strife of Empedokles, and this will only
be confirmed when we look at what he himself has to say about it.
Footnote 702:
Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 b 15 (R. P. 152).
Footnote 703:
Plato, _Phd._ 97 b 8 (R. P. 155 d).
Footnote 704:
Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. 985 a 18 (R. P. 155 d).
In the first place, Nous is unmixed (fr. 12), and does not, like other
things, contain a portion of everything. This would hardly be worth
saying of an immaterial mind; no one would suppose that to be hot or
cold. The result of its being unmixed is that it “has power over”
everything, that is to say, in the language of Anaxagoras, it causes
things to move.[705] Herakleitos had said as much of Fire, and
Empedokles of Strife. Further, it is the “thinnest” of all things, so
that it can penetrate everywhere, and it would be meaningless to say
that the immaterial is “thinner” than the material. It is true that Nous
also “knows all things”; but so, perhaps, did the Fire of
Herakleitos,[706] and certainly the Air of Diogenes.[707] Zeller holds,
indeed, that Anaxagoras meant to speak of something incorporeal; but he
admits that he did not succeed in doing so,[708] and that is
historically the important point. Nous is certainly imagined as
occupying space; for we hear of greater and smaller parts of it (fr.
12).
Footnote 705:
Arist. _Phys._ Θ, 5. 256 b 24, διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν
νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων καὶ ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν
ποιεῖ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὢν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγῆς
ὤν. This is only quoted for the meaning of κρατεῖν. Of course, the
words ἀκίνητος ὤν are not meant to be historical, and still less is
the interpretation in _de An._ Γ, 4. 429 a 18. Diogenes of Apollonia
(fr. 5) couples ὑπὸ τούτου πάντα κυβερνᾶσθαι (the old Milesian word)
with πάντων κρατεῖν.
Footnote 706:
If we retain the MS. εἰδέναι in fr. 1. In any case, the name τὸ σοφόν
implies as much.
Footnote 707:
See fr. 3, 5.
Footnote 708:
Zeller, p. 993.
The truth probably is that Anaxagoras substituted Nous for the Love and
Strife of Empedokles, because he wished to retain the old Ionic doctrine
of a substance that “knows” all things, and to identify this with the
new theory of a substance that “moves” all things. Perhaps, too, it was
his increased interest in physiological as distinguished from purely
cosmological matters that led him to speak of Mind rather than Soul. The
former word certainly suggests design more clearly than the latter. But,
in any case, the originality of Anaxagoras lies far more in the theory
of matter than in that of Nous.
[Sidenote: Formation of the worlds.]
133. The formation of a world starts with a rotatory motion which Nous
imparts to a portion of the mixed mass in which “all things are
together” (fr. 13), and this rotatory motion gradually extends over a
wider and wider space. Its rapidity (fr. 9) produced a separation of the
rare and the dense, the cold and the hot, the dark and the light, the
moist and the dry (fr. 15). This separation produces two great masses,
the one consisting of the rare, hot, light, and dry, called the
“Aether”; the other, in which the opposite qualities predominate, called
“Air” (fr. 1). Of these the Aether or Fire[709] took the outside while
the Air occupied the centre (fr. 15).
Footnote 709:
Note that Anaxagoras says “air” where Empedokles usually said
“aether,” and that “aether” is with him equivalent to fire. Cf. Arist.
_de Caelo_, Γ, 3. 302 b 4, τὸ γὰρ πῦρ καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα προσαγορεύει
ταὐτό; and _ib._ Α, 3. 270 b 24, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ καταχρῆται τῷ ὀνόματι
τούτῳ οὐ καλῶς· ὀνομάζει γὰρ αἰθέρα ἀντὶ πυρός.
The next stage is the separation of the air into clouds, water, earth,
and stones (fr. 16). In this Anaxagoras follows Anaximenes closely. In
his account of the origin of the heavenly bodies, however, he showed
himself more original. We read at the end of fr. 16 that stones “rush
outwards more than water,” and we learn from the doxographers that the
heavenly bodies were explained as stones torn from the earth by the
rapidity of its revolution and made red-hot by the speed of their own
motion.[710] Perhaps the fall of the meteoric stone at Aigospotamoi had
something to do with the origin of this theory. It may also be observed
that, while in the earlier stages of the world-formation we are guided
chiefly by the analogy of water rotating with light and heavy bodies
floating in it, we are here reminded rather of a sling.
Footnote 710:
Aet. ii. 13, 3 (_Dox._ p. 341; R. P. 157 c).
[Sidenote: Innumerable worlds.]
134. That Anaxagoras adopted the ordinary Ionian theory of innumerable
worlds is perfectly clear from fr. 4, which we have no right to regard
as other than continuous.[711] The words “that it was not only with us
that things were separated off, but elsewhere too” can only mean that
Nous has caused a rotatory movement in more parts of the boundless
mixture than one. Aetios certainly includes Anaxagoras among those who
held there was only one world; but this testimony cannot be considered
of the same weight as that of the fragments.[712] Zeller’s reference of
the words “elsewhere, as with us” to the moon is very improbable. Is it
likely that any one would say that the inhabitants of the moon “have a
sun and moon as with us”?[713]
Footnote 711:
See above, p. 300, _n._ 684.
Footnote 712:
Aet. ii. 1, 3. See above, Chap. I. p. 63.
Footnote 713:
Further, it can be proved that this passage (fr. 4) occurred quite
near the beginning of the work. Cf. Simpl. _Phys._ p. 34, 28, μετ’
ὀλίγα τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ φυσέως, p. 156, 1, καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα
(after fr. 2), which itself occurred, μετ’ ὀλίγον (after fr. 1), which
was the beginning of the book. A reference to other “worlds” would be
quite in place here, but not a reference to the moon.
135. The cosmology of Anaxagoras is clearly based upon that of
Anaximenes, as will be obvious from a comparison of the following
passage of Hippolytos[714] with the quotations given in Chap. I. (§
29):—
(3) The earth is flat in shape, and remains suspended because of its
size and because there is no vacuum.[715] For this reason the air is
very strong, and supports the earth which is borne up by it.
(4) Of the moisture on the surface of the earth, the sea arose from
the waters in the earth (for when these were evaporated the remainder
turned salt),[716] and from the rivers which flow into it.
(5) Rivers take their being both from the rains and from the waters in
the earth; for the earth is hollow and has waters in its cavities. And
the Nile rises in summer owing to the water that comes down from the
snows in Ethiopia.[717]
(6) The sun and the moon and all the stars are fiery stones carried
round by the rotation of the aether. Under the stars are the sun and
moon, and also certain bodies which revolve with them, but are
invisible to us.
(7) We do not feel the heat of the stars because of the greatness of
their distance from the earth; and, further, they are not so warm as
the sun, because they occupy a colder region. The moon is below the
sun, and nearer us.
(8) The sun surpasses the Peloponnesos in size. The moon has not a
light of her own, but gets it from the sun. The course of the stars
goes under the earth.
(9) The moon is eclipsed by the earth screening the sun’s light from
it, and sometimes, too, by the bodies below the moon coming before it.
The sun is eclipsed at the new moon, when the moon screens it from us.
Both the sun and the moon turn in their courses owing to the repulsion
of the air. The moon turns frequently, because it cannot prevail over
the cold.
(10) Anaxagoras was the first to determine what concerns the eclipses
and the illumination of the sun and moon. And he said the moon was of
earth, and had plains and ravines in it. The Milky Way was the
reflexion of the light of the stars that were not illuminated by the
sun. Shooting stars were sparks, as it were, which leapt out owing to
the motion of the heavenly vault.
(11) Winds arose when the air was rarefied by the sun, and when things
were burned and made their way to the vault of heaven and were carried
off. Thunder and lightning were produced by heat striking upon clouds.
(12) Earthquakes were caused by the air above striking on that beneath
the earth; for the movement of the latter caused the earth which
floats on it to rock.
Footnote 714:
_Ref._ i. 8, 3 (_Dox._ p. 562).
Footnote 715:
This is an addition to the older view occasioned by the Eleatic denial
of the void.
Footnote 716:
The text here is very corrupt, but the general sense can be got from
Aet. iii. 16. 2.
Footnote 717:
The MS. reading is ἐν τοῖς ἄρκτοις, for which Diels adopts Fredrichs’
ἐν τοῖς ἀνταρκτικοῖς. I have thought it safer to translate the ἐν τῇ
Αἰθιοπίᾳ which Aetios gives (iv. 1, 3). This view is mentioned and
rejected by Herodotos (ii. 22). Seneca (_N. Q._ iv. 2, 17) points out
that it was adopted by Aischylos (_Suppl._ 559, fr. 300, Nauck),
Sophokles (fr. 797), and Euripides (_Hel._ 3, fr. 228).
All this confirms in the most striking way the statement of
Theophrastos, that Anaxagoras had belonged to the school of Anaximenes.
The flat earth floating on the air, the dark bodies below the moon, the
explanation of the solstices and the “turnings” of the moon by the
resistance of air, the explanations given of wind and of thunder and
lightning, are all derived from the earlier inquirer.
[Sidenote: Biology.]
136. “There is a portion of everything in everything except Nous, and
there are some things in which there is Nous also” (fr. 11). In these
words Anaxagoras laid down the distinction between animate and inanimate
things. He tells us that it is the same Nous that “has power over,” that
is, sets in motion, all things that have life, both the greater and the
smaller (fr. 12). The Nous in living creatures is the same in all (fr.
12), and from this it followed that the different grades of intelligence
which we observe in the animal and vegetable worlds depend entirely on
the structure of the body. The Nous was the same, but it had more
opportunities in one body than another. Man was the wisest of animals,
not because he had a better sort of Nous, but simply because he had
hands.[718] This view is quite in accordance with the previous
development of thought upon the subject. Parmenides, in the Second Part
of his poem (fr. 16), had already made the thought of men depend upon
the constitution of their limbs.
As all Nous is the same, we are not surprised to find that plants were
regarded as living creatures. If we may trust the pseudo-Aristotelian
_Treatise on Plants_[719] so far, Anaxagoras argued that they must feel
pleasure and pain in connexion with their growth and with the fall of
their leaves. Plutarch says[720] that he called plants “animals fixed in
the earth.”
Footnote 718:
Arist. _de Part. An._ Δ, 10. 687 a 7 (R. P. 160 b).
Footnote 719:
[Arist.] _de plant._ Α, 1. 815 a 15 (R. P. 160).
Footnote 720:
Plut. _Q.N._ 1 (R. P. 160), ζῷον ... ἐγγεῖον.
Both plants and animals originated in the first instance from the
πανσπερμία. Plants first arose when the seeds of them which the air
contained were brought down by the rain-water,[721] and animals
originated in a similar way.[722] Like Anaximander, Anaxagoras held that
animals first arose in the moist element.[723]
Footnote 721:
Theophr. _Hist. Plant._ iii. 1, 4 (R. P. 160).
Footnote 722:
Irenaeus, _adv. Haer._ ii. 14, 2 (R. P. 160 a).
Footnote 723:
Hipp. _Ref._ i. 8, 12 (_Dox._ p. 563).
137. In these scanty notices we seem to see traces of a polemical
attitude towards Empedokles, and the same may be observed in what we are
told of the theory of perception adopted by Anaxagoras, especially in
the view that perception is of contraries.[724] The account which
Theophrastos gives of this[725] is as follows:—
But Anaxagoras says that perception is produced by opposites; for like
things cannot be affected by like. He attempts to give a detailed
enumeration of the particular senses. We see by means of the image in
the pupil; but no image is cast upon what is of the same colour, but
only on what is different. With most living creatures things are of a
different colour to the pupil by day, though with some this is so by
night, and these are accordingly keen-sighted at that time. Speaking
generally, however, night is more of the same colour with the eyes
than day. And an image is cast on the pupil by day, because light is a
concomitant cause of the image, and because the prevailing colour
casts an image more readily upon its opposite.[726]
It is in the same way that touch and taste discern their objects. That
which is just as warm or just as cold as we are neither warms us nor
cools us by its contact; and, in the same way, we do not apprehend the
sweet and the sour by means of themselves. We know cold by warm, fresh
by salt, and sweet by sour, in virtue of our deficiency in each; for
all these are in us to begin with. And we smell and hear in the same
manner; the former by means of the accompanying respiration, the
latter by the sound penetrating to the brain, for the bone which
surrounds this is hollow, and it is upon it that the sound falls.[727]
And all sensation implies pain, a view which would seem to be the
consequence of the first assumption, for all unlike things produce
pain by their contact. And this pain is made perceptible by the long
continuance or by the excess of a sensation. Brilliant colours and
excessive noises produce pain, and we cannot dwell long on the same
things. The larger animals are the more sensitive, and, generally,
sensation is proportionate to the size of the organs of sense. Those
animals which have large, pure, and bright eyes, see large objects and
from a great distance, and contrariwise.[728]
And it is the same with hearing. Large animals can hear great and
distant sounds, while less sounds pass unperceived; small animals
perceive small sounds and those near at hand.[729] It is the same too
with smell. Rarefied air has more smell; for, when air is heated and
rarefied, it smells. A large animal when it breathes draws in the
condensed air along with the rarefied, while a small one draws in the
rarefied by itself; so the large one perceives more. For smell is
better perceived when it is near than when it is far by reason of its
being more condensed, while when dispersed it is weak. But, roughly
speaking, large animals do not perceive a rarefied smell, nor small
animals a condensed one.[730]
Footnote 724:
Beare, p. 37.
Footnote 725:
Theophr. _de Sensu_, 27 sqq. (_Dox._ p. 507).
Footnote 726:
Beare, p. 38.
Footnote 727:
Beare, p. 208.
Footnote 728:
_Ibid._ p. 209.
Footnote 729:
_Ibid._ p. 103.
Footnote 730:
_Ibid._ p. 137.
This theory marks in some respects an advance upon that of Empedokles.
It was a happy thought of Anaxagoras to make sensation depend upon
irritation by opposites, and to connect it with pain. Many modern
theories are based upon a similar idea.
That Anaxagoras regarded the senses as incapable of reaching the truth
of things is shown by the fragments preserved by Sextus. But we must
not, for all that, turn him into a sceptic. The saying preserved by
Aristotle[731] that “things are as we suppose them to be,” has no value
at all as evidence. It comes from some collection of apophthegms, not
from the treatise of Anaxagoras himself; and it had, as likely as not, a
moral application. He did say (fr. 21) that “the weakness of our senses
prevents our discerning the truth,” but this meant simply that we do not
see the “portions” of everything which are in everything; for instance,
the portions of black which are in the white. Our senses simply show us
the portions that prevail. He also said that the things which are seen
give us the power of seeing the invisible, which is the very opposite of
scepticism (fr. 21_a_).
Footnote 731:
_Met._ Δ, 5. 1009 b 25 (R. P. 161 a).