II

First it is clear that a reform of logic based upon the restoration of

knowing to its connections with other acts will begin with a chapter

containing an account of these other operations and the general

character of this connection.[13] Logical theory has been truncated. It

has tried to begin and end in the middle, with the result that it has

ended in the air. Logic presents the curious anachronism of a science

which attempts to deal with its subject-matter apart from what it comes

from and what comes from it.

The objection that such a chapter on the conditions and genesis of the

operations of knowing belongs to psychology, only shows how firmly fixed

is the discontinuity we are trying to escape. As we have seen, the

original motive for leaving this account of genesis to psychology was

that the act of knowing was supposed to originate in a purely psychical

mind. Such an origin was of course embarrassing to logic, which aimed

to be scientific. The old opposition between origin and validity was due

to the kind of origin assumed and the kind of validity necessitated by

the origin. One may well be excused for evading the question of how

ideas, originated in a purely psychical mind, can, in Kant's phrase,

"have objective validity," by throwing out the question of origin

altogether. Whatever difficulties remain for validity after this

expulsion could not be greater than those of the task of combining the

objective validity of ideas with their subjective origin.

The whole of this chapter on the connection between logical and

non-logical operations cannot be written here. But its central point

would be that these other acts with which the act of knowing must have

continuity are just the operations of our unreflective conduct. Note

that it is "unreflective," not "unconscious," nor yet merely

"instinctive" conduct. It is our perceptive, remembering, imagining,

desiring, loving, hating conduct. Note also that we do not say

"psychical" or "physical," nor "psycho-physical" conduct. These terms

stand for certain distinctions in logical conduct,[14] and we are here

concerned with the character of non-logical conduct which is to be

distinguished from, and yet kept in closest continuity with, logical

conduct.

If, here, the metaphysical logician should ask: "Are you not in this

assumption of a world of reflective and unreflective conduct and

affection, and of a world of beings in interaction, begging a whole

system of metaphysics?" the reply is that if it is a metaphysics bad

for logic, it will keep turning up in the course of logical theory as a

constant source of trouble. On the other hand, if logic encounters grave

difficulties when it attempts to get on without it, its assumption, for

the purposes of logic, has all the justification possible.

Again it will be urged that this alleged non-logical conduct, in so far

as it involves perception, memory, and anticipation, is already

cognitive and logical; or if the act of knowing is to be entirely

excluded from logic, then, in so far as what is left involves objective

"terms and relations," it, also, is already logical. And it may be

thought strange that a logic based upon the restoration of continuity

between the act of knowing and other acts should here be insisting on

distinction and separation. The point is fundamental; and must be

disposed of before we go on. First, we must observe that the unity

secured by making all conscious conduct logical turns out, on

examination, to be more nominal than real. As we have already seen, this

attempt at a complete logicizing of all conduct is forced at once to

introduce the distinction of "explicit" and "implicit," of "conscious

and unconscious" or "subconscious" logic. Some cynics have found that

this suggests dividing triangles into explicit and implicit triangles,

or into triangles and sub-triangles.

Doubtless the attempt to make all perceptions, memories, and

anticipations, and even instincts and habits, into implicit or

subconscious inference is an awkward effort to restore the continuity of

logical and non-logical conduct. Its awkwardness consists in attempting

to secure this continuity by the method of subsumptive identity, instead

of finding it in a transitive continuity of function;--instead of seeing

that perception, memory, and anticipation _become_ logical processes

when they are employed in a process of inquiry, whose purpose is to

relieve the difficulties into which these operations in their function

as direct stimuli have fallen. Logical conduct is constituted by the

cooeperation of these processes for the improvement of their further

operation. To regard perception, memory, and imagination as implicit

forms or as sub-species of logical operation is much like conceiving the

movements of our fingers and arms as implicit or imperfect species of

painting, or swimming.

Moreover, this doctrine of universal logicism teaches that when that

which is perfect is come, imperfection shall be done away. This should

mean that when painting becomes completely "explicit" and perfect,

fingers and hands shall disappear. Perfect painting will be the pure

essence of painting. And this interpretation is not strained; for this

logic expressly teaches that in the perfected real system all temporal

elements are unessential to logical operations. They are, of course,

_psychologically_ necessary for finite beings, who can never have

perfectly logical experiences. But, from the standpoint of a completely

logicized experience, all finite, temporal processes are accidents, not

essentials, of logical operations.

The fact that the processes of perception, memory, and anticipation are

transformed in their logical operation into sensations and universals,

terms, and relations, and, as such, become the subject-matter of logical

theory, does not mean that they have lost their mediating character, and

have become merely objects of logical contemplation at large. Sensations

or sense-data, and ideas, terms and relations, are the subject-matter of

logical theory for the reason that they sometimes succeed and sometimes

fail in their logical operations. And it is the business of logical

theory to diagnose the conditions of this success and failure. If, in

writing, my pen becomes defective and is made an object of inquiry, it

does not therefore lose all its character as a pen and become merely an

object at large. It is _as_ an instrument of writing that it is

investigated. So, sense-data, universals, terms, and relations as

subject-matter of logic are investigated in their character _as_

mediators of the ambiguities and conflicts, of non-logical experience.

If the operations of habit, instinct, perceptions, memory, and

anticipation _become_ logical, when, instead of operating as direct

stimuli, they are employed in a process of inquiry, we must next ask:

(1) under what conditions do they pass over into this process of

inquiry? (2) what modifications of operation do they undergo, what new

forms do they take, and what new results do they produce in their

logical operations?

If the act of inquiry be not superimposed, it must arise out of some

specific condition in the course of non-logical conduct. Once more, if

the alarm be sounded at this proposal to find the origin of logical in

non-logical operations it must be summarily answered by asking if the

one who raises the cry finds it impossible to imagine that one who is

not hungry, or angry, or patriotic, or wise may become so. Non-logical

conduct is not the abstract formal contradictory of logical conduct any

more than present satiety or foolishness is the contradictory of later

hunger or wisdom, or than anger at one person contradicts cordiality to

another, or to the same person, later. The old bogie of the logical

irrelevance of origin was due to the inability to conceive continuity

except in the form of identity in which there was no place for the

notion of _growth_.

The conditions under which non-logical conduct _becomes_ logical are

familiar to those who have followed the doctrines of experimental logic

as expounded in the discussions of the past few years. The

transformation begins at the point where non-logical processes instead

of operating as direct unambiguous stimuli and response become ambiguous

with consequent inhibition of conduct. But again this does not mean that

at this juncture the non-logical processes quit the field and give place

to a totally new faculty and process called reason. They stay on the

job. But there is a change in the job, which now is to get rid of this

ambiguity. This modification of the task requires, of course,

corresponding modification and adaptation of these operations. They take

on the form of sensations and universals, terms and relations, data and

hypotheses. This modification of function and form constitutes "reason"

or, better, reasoning.

Here some one will ask, "Whence comes this ambiguity? How can a mere

perception or memory as such be ambiguous? Must it not be ambiguous to,

or for, something, or some one?" The point is well taken. But it should

not be taken to imply that the ambiguity is for a merely onlooking,

beholding psychical mind--especially when the perception is itself

regarded as an act of beholding. Nor are we any better off if we suppose

the beholding mind to be equipped with a faculty of reason in the form

of the principle of "contradiction." For this throws no light on the

origin and meaning of ambiguity. And if we seek to make all perceptions

as such ambiguous and contradictory, in order to make room for, and

justify, the operations of reason, other difficulties at once beset us.

When we attempt to remove this specific ambiguity of perceptive conduct

we shall be forced, before we are through, to appeal back to perception,

which we have condemned as inherently contradictory, both for data and

for verification.

However, the insistence that perception must be ambiguous to, or for,

something beyond itself is well grounded. And this was recognized in the

statement that it is equivocal as a stimulus in conduct. There need be

no mystery as to how such equivocation arises. That there is such a

thing as a conduct at all means that there are certain beings who have

acquired definite ways of responding to one another. It is important to

observe that these forms of interaction--instinct and habit, perception,

memory, etc.--are not to be located in either of the interacting beings

but are functions of both. The conception of these operations as the

private functions of an organism is the forerunner of the

epistemological predicament. It results in a conception of knowing as

wholly the act of a knower apart from the known. This is the beginning

of epistemology.

But to whatever extent interacting beings have acquired definite and

specific ways of behavior toward one another it is equally plain--the

theory of external relations notwithstanding--that in this process of

interaction these ways of behavior, of stimulus and response, undergo

modification. If the world consisted of two interacting beings, it is

conceivable that the modifications of behavior might occur in such close

continuity of relation to each of the interacting beings that the

adjustment would be very continuous, and there might be little or no

ambiguity and conflict. But in a world where any two interacting beings

have innumerable interactions with innumerable other beings and in all

these interactions modifications are effected, it is to be expected that

changes in the behavior of each or both will occur, so marked that they

are bound to result in breaks in the continuity of stimulus and

response--even to the point of tragedy. However, the tragedy is seldom

so great that the ambiguity extends to the whole field of conduct.

Except in extreme pathological cases (and in epistemology), complete

skepticism and aboulia do not occur. Ambiguity always falls within a

field or direction of conduct, and though it may extend much further,

and must extend some further than the point at which equivocation

occurs, yet it is never ubiquitous. An ambiguity concerning the action

of gravitation is no less specific than one regarding color or sound;

indeed, the one may be found to involve the other.

Logical conduct is, then, conduct which aims to remove ambiguity and

inhibition in unreflective conduct. The instruments of its operation are

forged from the processes of unreflective conduct by such modification

and adaptation as is required to enable them to accomplish this end.

Since these logical operations sometimes fail and sometimes succeed they

become the subject-matter of logical theory. But the technique of this

second involution of reflection is not supplied by some new and unique

entity. It also is derived from modifications of previous operations of

both reflective and non-reflective conduct.

While emphasizing the continuity between non-logical and logical

operations, we must keep in mind that their distinction is of equal

importance. Confusion at this point is fatal. A case in point is the

confusion between non-logical and logical observation. The results of

non-logical observation, e.g., looking and listening, are direct stimuli

to further conduct. But the purpose and result of _logical_ observation

are to secure data, not as direct stimuli to immediate conduct but as

stimuli to the construction or verification of hypotheses which are the

responses of the _logical_ operation of imagination to the data.

Hypotheses are anticipatory. But they differ from non-logical

anticipation in that they are tentatively, experimentally, i.e.,

logically anticipatory. The non-logical operations of memory and

anticipation lack just this tentative, experimental character. When we

confuse the logical and non-logical operations of these processes the

result is either that logical processes will merely repeat non-logical

operations in which case we have inference that is tautologous and

trifling; or the non-logical will attempt to perform logical operations,

and our inference is miraculous. If we seek to escape by an appeal to

habit, as in empiricism, or to an objective universal, as in idealism

and neo-realism, we are merely disguising, not removing the miracle.

It may be thought that this confusion would be most likely to occur in a

theory which teaches that non-logical processes are carried over into

logical operations. But this overlooks the fact that the theory

recognizes at the same time that these non-logical operations undergo

modification and adaptation to the demands of the logical enterprise. On

the other hand, those who make all perceptions, memory, and

anticipation, not to speak of habit and instinct, logical, have no basis

for the distinction between logical and non-logical results; while those

who refuse to give the operations of perception, memory, etc., any place

in logic can make no connections between logical and non-logical

conduct. Nor are they able to distinguish in a specific case truth from

error.

In all logics that fail to make this connection and distinction between

logical and non-logical operations there is no criterion for data. If

ultimate simplicity is demanded of the data, there is no standard for

simplicity except the _minimum sensibile_ or the _minimum intelligibile_

which have recently been resurrected. On the other hand, where

simplicity is waived, as in the logic of objective idealism, there is

still no criterion of logical adequacy. But if we understand by

_logical_ data not anything that happens to be given, but something

_sought_ as material for an hypothesis, i.e., a proposed solution

(proposition) of an ambiguous object of conduct and affection, then

whatever results of observation meet this requirement are logical data.

And whenever data are found from which an hypothesis is constructed that

succeeds in abolishing the ambiguity, they are simple, adequate, and

true data.

No scientist, not even the mathematician, in the specific investigations

of his field, seeks for ultimate and irreducible data at large. And if

he found them he could not use them. It is only in his metaphysical

personality that he longs for such data. The data which the scientist in

any specific inquiry seeks are the data which suggest a solution of the

question in which the investigation starts. When these data are found

they are the "irreducibles" of that problem. But they are relative to

the question and answer of the investigation. Their simplicity consists

in the fact that they are the data from which a conclusion can be made.

The term "simple data" is tautologous. That one is in need of data more

"simple" means that one is in need of new data from which an hypothesis

can be formed.

It is true that the actual working elements with which the scientist

operates are always complex in the sense that they are always something

more than elements in any specific investigation. They have other

connections and alliances. And this complexity is at once the despair

and the hope of the scientist; his despair, because he cannot be sure

when these other connections will interfere with the allegiance of his

elements to his particular undertaking; his hope, because when these

alliances are revealed they often make the elements more efficient or

exhibit capacities which will make them elements in some other

undertaking for which elements have not been found. A general resolves

his army into so many marching, eating, shooting units; but these

elements are something more than marching, shooting units. They are

husbands and fathers, brothers and lovers, protestants and catholics,

artists and artisans, etc. And the militarist can never be sure at what

point these other activities--I do not say merely external

relationships--may upset his calculations. If he could find units whose

whole and sole nature is to march and shoot, his problem would be, in

some respects, simpler, though in others more complex. As it is, he is

constantly required to ask how far these other functions will support

and at what point they will rebel at the marching and shooting.

Such, in principle, is the situation in every scientific inquiry. When

the failure of the old elements occurs it is common to say that

"simpler" elements are needed. And doubtless in his perplexity the

scientist may long for elements which have no entangling alliances,

whose sole nature and character is to be elements. But what in fact he

actually seeks in every specific investigation are elements whose nature

and functions _will not interfere_ with their serving as units in the

enterprise in hand. But from some other standpoint these new elements

may be vastly more complex than the old, as is the case with the modern

as compared with the ancient atom. When the elements are secured which

operate successfully, the non-interfering connections can be ignored and

the elements can be treated as if they did not have them,--as if they

were metaphysically simple. But there is no criterion for metaphysical

simplicity except operative simplicity. To be simple is to serve as an

element, and to serve as an element is to be simple.

It is scarcely necessary in view of the foregoing to add that the data

of science are not "sense-data," if by sense-data be meant data which

are the result of the operations of sense organs alone. Data are as much

or more the result of operations, first, of the motor system of the

scientist's own organism, and second, of all of the machinery of his

laboratory which he calls to his aid. Whether named after the way they

are obtained, or after the way they are used, data are quite as much

"motor" as "sense." Nor, on the other hand, are there any purely

intellectual data--not even for the mathematician. Some mathematicians

may insist that their symbols and diagrams are merely stimuli to the

platonic operation of pure and given universals. But until mathematics

can get on without these symbols or any substitutes the intuitionist in

mathematics will continue to have his say.

Wherever the discontinuity between logical operations and their acts

persists, all the difficulties with data have their correlative

difficulties with hypotheses. In Mill's logic the account of the origin

of hypotheses oscillates between the view that they are happy guesses

of a mind composed of states of consciousness, and the view that they

are "found in the facts" or are "impressed on the mind by the facts."

The miracle of relevancy required in the first position drives the

theory to the second. And the tautologous, useless nature of the

hypothesis in the second forces the theory back to the first view. In

this predicament, little wonder Mill finds that the easiest way out is

to make hypotheses "auxiliary" and not indigenous to inference. But this

exclusion of hypotheses as essential leaves his account of inference to

oscillate between the association of particulars of nominalism and

scholastic formalism, from both of which Mill, with the dignified zeal

of a prophet, set out to rescue logic.

Mill's rejection of hypotheses formed by a mind whose operations have no

discoverable continuity with the operations of things, or by things

whose actions are independent of the operations of ideas, is forever

sound. But his acceptance of the discontinuity between the acts of

knowing and the operation of things, and the conclusion that these two

conceptions of the origin and nature of hypotheses are the only

alternatives, were the source of most of his difficulties.