MOVEMENTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF JUNE 17--BATTLE OF THE
MINE--A LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED--VARIOUS MOVEMENTS OF
THE REGIMENT--DEATH OF MAJOR CHIPMAN--BATTLE OF BLICK’S
HOUSE--POPLAR GROVE CHURCH--A RECONNOISSANCE--COLONEL BARNES
LEAVES THE ARMY.
On the day following the 17th of June, the regiment, with the other
troops of the First Division, retired a short distance to the rear
to rest, and overcome as much as possible the bewildering and
disorganizing influences of the battle. It was usual to grant this poor
privilege to troops that had been severely engaged, the amount of rest
given them depending upon the severity of their losses and the strength
of the reserve forces, or, in other words, the means of the commanding
general to supply their places at the front with fresh troops. The
extended nature of our lines in front of Petersburg, and the activity
of the enemy, required the presence of a vast army there, and the
strength of our army at that time did not afford a large reserve, hence
the regiment enjoyed but a brief respite from duty.
During the night of the 20th, the division moved forward to the front
line, relieving a division of the Second Corps.
June 21. Same place, skirmishing.
June 22. The enemy made a sortie on the division skirmish line, but
were repulsed.
June 23. Severe skirmishing in the night; the weather very warm and
oppressive.
June 24. Same place; the Brigade moved to the extreme front line.
June 25. Severe skirmishing all night; the regiment was in line of
battle till near daylight.
June 26 and 27. Same place.
June 28. This day the regiment was ordered to deploy near General
Ledlie’s headquarters, and advance through the woods to drive up
stragglers. About three hundred of these faithless soldiers were found
hiding in the forest, fifty of whom were arrested by our men, the
rest making their escape. The Tenth Corps advanced their picket line
at night, which caused considerable skirmishing, but after awhile
everything became quiet; the regiment moved to the rear during the
night.
July 1. The enemy threw several mortar-shell directly into the
regimental camp, but no one was injured.
July 2. The regiment had orders to move to the vicinity of brigade
headquarters, to act as provost guard of the division. Major Charles
Chipman was detached from the regiment and assigned to the command of
the Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery. This was a large regiment,
then acting as infantry; its Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, and three
Majors were absent, the first two officers by reason of wounds. It
was regarded as a great compliment to Major Chipman, that he should
have been selected from among the many able officers of the corps and
division to take the command of this excellent regiment; but it was a
well-deserved mark of respect. The men were kept busy nearly all day
throwing up a line of works to protect them from the enemy’s bullets;
the weather was extremely warm, and the earth hard and difficult to
work with the shovel.
July 3. The men were kept at work on the entrenchments nearly all day,
which was equally as warm as the preceding one. During the day a patrol
was sent out from the regiment, and arrested seventy Federal soldiers,
who were found without proper passes; toward night the enemy opened
a severe artillery and musketry fire upon our whole line, making it
dangerous for a man to show his head above the breastworks.
July 4. A part of the regiment were at work shovelling, while a detail
was made for patrol duty; eighty-nine more stragglers were apprehended
and sent back to their respective regiments. The enemy seemed to be
engaged in observing the anniversary of American Independence, and
allowed our army to do the same. The officers of the Twenty-ninth had a
modest little celebration of the day on their own account.
We have given enough of the daily experiences of the soldiers on the
front line to enable the general reader to understand the nature of
the life which troops thus situated, led. But we have another purpose
in occasionally adopting the diary form of narrative. These dates form
so many initial points in the history of the regiment, and lead its
members on to the recollection of a great variety of incidents, not of
sufficient importance to chronicle, but of peculiar importance to them
personally.
On the 21st, there were some indications of a battle; the Second
Brigade, of which the Twenty-ninth was a member, was ordered up
during the night to the support of General Willcox’s division. On the
following day, the Brigade, Colonel Barnes in temporary command, was
reviewed, and highly complimented. General William F. Bartlett arrived
and assumed command of the First Brigade, and Colonel Marshall of
the Fourteenth New York (H. A. Vols.) having also reported for duty,
was assigned to the command of the Second Brigade. The regiment was
transferred to the First Brigade.
July 24. The regiment again went to the front line.
July 26. Ordered to the rear.
July 27. Orders were received to be in readiness to move at any moment.
July 28. The entire First Brigade moved to the front line.
It seems necessary to pause here and state certain facts closely
associated with the thrilling events of which we must directly speak.
In the various assaults made upon the enemy’s lines on the 16th, 17th,
and 18th of June, the Ninth Corps obtained an advanced position,
“beyond a deep cut in the railroad, within about one hundred and
twenty-five yards of the enemy’s lines. Just in rear of that advanced
position was a deep hollow,” ... where any work could be carried on
without the knowledge of the enemy. In the course of a few days after
this ground had been taken by the corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry
Pleasants of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers waited on General
Potter, who commanded one of the divisions of the Ninth Corps, and
suggested to him, that in his opinion a mine could be run under one
of the enemy’s batteries, by which means it could be blown up, and a
breach thus made in the enemy’s lines. General Potter seems to have
thought favorably of the plan, and in turn suggested it to General
Burnside, by whom it was fully approved.
On the 25th of June, Colonel Pleasants commenced the work of
excavation, employing none but members of his own command, which then
numbered about four hundred. This project was not looked upon with
any favor by General Meade, and nearly every application made to
headquarters for the tools and materials necessary for the carrying
on of the work was wholly disregarded. Colonel Pleasants says in his
testimony before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War,
“Whenever I made application, I could not get anything, although
General Burnside was very favorable to it. The most important thing
was to ascertain how far I had to mine, because if I went short of or
went beyond the proper place, the explosion would have no practical
effect. Therefore, I wanted an accurate instrument with which to make
the necessary triangulations. I had to make them on the farthest
front line, where the enemy’s sharpshooters could reach me. I could
not get the instrument I wanted, although there was one at army
headquarters; and General Burnside had to send to Washington and get
an old-fashioned theodolite, which was given to me.” Not having been
supplied with wheelbarrows with which to remove the earth, he was
compelled to use common cracker-boxes, with pieces of hickory nailed
on them for handles. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, the worthy
and energetic Colonel and his no less worthy officers and men kept at
their work night and day. To remove all chance of discovery by the
enemy of what was going on in his camp, Colonel Pleasants had the
fresh earth brought from the mine covered with bushes and the boughs
of trees. The mine was completed July 23, and consisted of one main
gallery 510-9/10 feet in length, with two lateral galleries, the left
being thirty-seven feet long, and the right thirty-eight feet. The
two galleries ran directly under the enemy’s works, a part of which
consisted of a six-gun battery, with a garrison of about two hundred
men. As this work had been carried on within the lines of the Ninth
Corps, General Burnside had naturally enough assumed not only the
responsibility of it, but had matured plans for the explosion of the
mine and the assault upon the enemy’s works, that was immediately to
follow. The plan that had been adopted by Burnside, was to explode the
mine just before daylight in the morning, “or at about five o’clock in
the afternoon; mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of
my first line in columns of division, ‘double columns closed in mass,’
the head of each brigade resting on the front line; and as soon as the
explosion has taken place, move them forward, with instructions for the
division to take half distance as soon as the leading regiment of the
two brigades passes through the gap in the enemy’s line by the right
companies ‘on the right into line wheel,’ the left companies ‘on the
right into line,’ and proceed at once down the enemy’s works as rapidly
as possible; and the leading regiment of the left brigade to execute
the reverse movement to the left, running up the enemy’s line; the
remainder of the columns to move directly towards the crest in front
as rapidly as possible, diverging in such a way as to enable them to
deploy into column of regiments, the right column making as nearly as
possible for Cemetery Hill; these columns to be followed by the other
divisions of the corps as soon as they can be thrown in.”[51]
The reasons given for the selection of the colored division to lead the
assault, were, that they had been less exposed to the hardships of the
campaign than any of the white divisions, the latter having been kept
on the front line ever since the commencement of the campaign. Beside
this, the colored division had for several weeks been drilled with
great care for this special duty.
When the time came to put into execution this novel plan of dislodging
the enemy from his works, General Meade, as he had a right to do, by
reason of his rank, assumed the entire direction of the movement,
wholly changing several of Burnside’s plans, and directed, among other
things, that one of the white divisions, instead of the colored,
should lead the assault; “and the order of assault was also changed,
in respect to sweeping down the enemy’s lines to the right and left
of the crater by the leading regiments of the assaulting column.”
These instructions were not communicated to General Burnside till the
afternoon of the 29th of July, at which time General Meade issued
his battle order. There were reasons equally strong for assigning
each one of the three white divisions of the Ninth Corps to the
important service of leading the assault; and to leave no ground of
complaint, and avoid the appearance of being needlessly arbitrary,
General Burnside determined to decide this question by the drawing of
lots. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 29th of July, the several
division commanders were summoned to headquarters for the purpose above
indicated. The lot fell upon General Ledlie’s division, of which the
Twenty-ninth Regiment was a member.
The mine was charged, and by the order of Meade, it was to be sprung
at half-past three in the morning of the 30th; and as soon as this was
done, the assaulting column was “to move rapidly upon the breach, seize
the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgment there.” Major-General Ord
was to support the right of this column, and Major-General Warren the
left.
During the night of the 29th, the division moved into position at the
extreme front, so as to be ready to make a rapid and sudden movement
towards the enemy’s lines. At a little before five o’clock in the
morning of the 30th, the mine exploded; and the regiment was in a
position to witness the whole of this memorable scene. First, there
was heard a deep, prolonged rumble, like the sound of distant thunder,
then the whole surface of the ground for many yards in the immediate
vicinity of the galleries of the mine began suddenly to heave and
swell, like the troubled waters of the sea. The Confederate line,
which up to this moment had been silent, was now thoroughly aroused;
and their men lining the breastworks, were seen peering over the
parapets, filled with wonder and alarm at the terrible sounds that were
issuing from the earth. In front of Ledlie’s division, directly under
a Confederate work, the ground seemed to swell into a little hill, and
presently there burst from its summit a huge volume of smoke and flame.
Eight tons of powder had exploded directly under a six-gun battery of
the enemy and its garrison of two hundred men. Large masses of earth,
guns, caissons, tents, and human bodies filled the air. The first
explosion was quickly followed by others of lesser magnitude, but it
was all over in a few minutes. As soon as the explosion occurred, a
heavy cannonading began on our side, which has been said by some to
exceed in intensity that at Malvern Hill or Gettysburg. It will be
observed from the foregoing statement, that the mine was not fired
at the time designated in the order of General Meade. The match was
applied promptly at the hour named, but owing to a defective fuse, the
process of firing was not then accomplished; the fuse was in short
pieces, spliced together, and “ceased to burn at one of the points of
junction. The additional precaution had been taken to lay the fuse in
a train of powder, but the powder had become damp by being so long
laid, some thirty or more hours, and that also failed to ignite.” For
awhile it was supposed by our officers that the experiment was destined
to be a failure; but after waiting nearly an hour, Lieutenant Jacob
Doubty of Company K, and Sergeant Henry Rees of Company F, Forty-eighth
Pennsylvania Regiment, volunteered to enter the mine and determine by
actual inspection the cause of the failure; and while in the mine,
relighted the fuse, producing its final explosion at 4.42, A.
M. The great bravery of this deed secured for Sergeant Rees a
promotion to second lieutenant, and both were prominently mentioned in
the report of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War.
In the course of ten minutes after the final explosion, the division
of General Ledlie charged. The explosion produced a crater from one
hundred and fifty to two hundred feet in length, about sixty feet in
width, and thirty feet deep; the bottom and sides of which were covered
with a loose, light sand, furnishing scarcely a foothold, and for this
reason, as well as that of the narrowness of the place, it was with
great difficulty that the troops could pass through it. From these
causes, as might well be supposed, the division lost its organization
as soon as it entered the narrow gorge, and the confusion which ensued
was soon heightened by the enemy opening fire upon them from a battery
upon the right, and another upon the left, and before long from a
battery directly in their front, upon Cemetery Hill. Another division
was thrown forward with the same results as the first; the men taking
“shelter in the crater of the mine and the lines of the enemy adjacent
thereto.” The Third Division followed in the same hopeless task,
and finally the Fourth (colored) Division, under a very heavy fire,
passing in confusion the white troops already in the crater, and then
re-forming, charging the hill in front, but without success, breaking
in great disorder to the rear.
This was the state of things about four hours after the explosion;
namely, 8.45, A. M. At half-past nine o’clock in the forenoon,
General Burnside received orders from General Meade to immediately
withdraw his troops, and informing him that he had likewise ordered
the cessation of all offensive movements on the right and left. As the
order could not be executed at once without exposing the troops to
even greater losses than those which they had already suffered, the
order to withdraw was so far modified as to allow General Burnside to
exercise his judgment as to the time when it should be attempted. Here
the troops remained till nearly three o’clock in the afternoon, under
a galling fire, shielding themselves as best they could, but suffering
intensely in the meantime from the heat of the sun and choking thirst.
At about this time, Generals Hartranft and Griffin directed their
men to withdraw; and almost simultaneously with this movement, the
enemy again charged, capturing nearly all the wounded lying in the
crater, and some who were not. Those who escaped were obliged to run
a race with balls and bayonets, and many who attempted it, fell dead
or wounded before reaching our entrenchments. The loss sustained by
our army during that day’s operations amounted to between four and
five thousand in killed, wounded, and missing. This loss included
twenty-three commanders of regiments,--four killed, fifteen wounded,
and four missing; and two commanders of brigades,--General William F.
Bartlett, who was disabled by the destruction of his artificial leg,
and Colonel E. G. Marshall, were taken prisoners.
The losses sustained by the regiment were as follows:--
KILLED.
Sergeant EBENEZER FISK, Company G.
Corporal PRESTON O. SMITH, Company F.
Private WILLIAM S. COLLINS, Company B.
WOUNDED.
Captain CHARLES D. BROWNE, Company C.
Sergeants GEORGE TOWNSEND, Company F, and HENRY
CAMPBELL, Company G.
Corporal SAMUEL C. WRIGHT, Company E (very badly in
the head, and reported as dead).
Privates CHARLES F. BOSWORTH, Company F; LEMUEL
CHAPIN, Company G; and JACOB H. DOW, Company H.
CAPTURED.
First Sergeant JOHN SHANNON, Company E.
Corporal THOMAS W. D. DEANE, Company G.
Privates GEORGE THOMAS, Company A; BENJAMIN B.
BROWN, Company B; DANIEL WHITMORE, Company G; and
JOHN MOORE, Jr., Company K.
Corporal Wright was promoted to Sergeant after this battle for his
brave and meritorious conduct manifested during the engagement.
Probably no event of the war excited so much discussion, and called
forth so much bitterness of feeling among the officers of our army,
as did this. The conduct of the First Division and its commander has
been made the subject of the severest criticism. Henry Coppee, A. M.,
who wrote a book entitled “General Grant and his Campaigns,” in giving
an account of this affair, uses this language: “But the attack must
be instantaneous. What delays it? Ten minutes pass before Ledlie’s
division, which had been selected by lot to lead the charge, has moved;
when it does, led by the gallant General Bartlett, instead of complying
with the order, it halts in the crater.” In another part of his book,
he says: “The storming party was then thus organized. Ledlie’s division
of white troops was to lead the assault, charge through the crater,
and then seize the enemy’s works on Cemetery Hill.” As these and other
statements, to which reference will be made, reflect great discredit
upon the division, the author has deemed it important to quote from
a carefully-written paper in his possession, prepared by one of the
field-officers of the division, who took an active part in the battle.
“It will be seen that Coppee states that Ledlie’s division was
‘to charge through the crater and seize the rebel works on
Cemetery Hill,’ but that, instead of complying with the order,
the division ‘halts in the crater.’ Ledlie’s division had no
such order. It was not a part of the plan of the battle for
that division to advance after reaching the crater. The orders
issued to the division were distinctly, ‘_not to advance_.’
General Bartlett’s First Brigade consisted of seven regiments.
On the afternoon of the 29th of July, the seven regimental
commanders assembled at brigade headquarters by direction of
the General, and were then informed by him that the mine was
to be fired the next morning; that Ledlie’s division had been
selected by lot to lead the assault; that the division was
to move forward immediately after the explosion and occupy
the enemy’s front line of works; that the division would be
promptly followed by another division of the corps, which
would move beyond, ‘over the heads of Ledlie’s division, to be
followed by the remaining divisions of the corps.’”
This statement comes, not only from a reliable source, but is very
reasonable upon its face. In the nature of things, the leading division
would necessarily be badly cut up in carrying out its part of the
work; and after having secured the front line, it was reasonable to
suppose--and, under the circumstances, its regimental officers were
justified in supposing--that the other divisions in the corps would
follow and finish the work. The other divisions, with the exception of
the Fourth, followed, but they did not advance beyond the lines of the
First Division. Remaining in the crater, they added to the confusion,
and finally rendered any movement impossible.
Another historian, if such he may be called, has said that the assault
upon the enemy’s lines “_failed because it was led by the worst
division in the army_.” This writer could not have been familiar with
the record of the brave men whose courage he thus flippantly assails.
Among the troops of this division were the Twenty-first, Twenty-ninth,
Thirty-fifth, Fifty-sixth, Fifty-seventh, and Fifty-ninth Massachusetts
regiments, Third Maryland, an old and excellent regiment, and the One
Hundredth Pennsylvania. The Twenty-first regiment entered the service
as early as August, 1861. It fought with Burnside in North Carolina,
was engaged in the second battle of Bull Run, Chantilly, Antietam,
and Fredericksburg, and afterwards in East Tennessee. Its record is
a very bright one. The Twenty-ninth regiment had served in nearly
every department, and contained the oldest three years’ troops from
New England. The Thirty-fifth regiment had been in the service since
August, 1862, and was engaged at South Mountain and Antietam before
it had been a month in the service, in both of which actions it had
behaved with signal bravery. The Fifty-sixth, Fifty-seventh, and
Fifty-ninth regiments, though they had not been long in the service,
were composed chiefly of veteran soldiers. The many silent mounds
scattered all the way from the Wilderness to the James, beneath which
repose their dead, tell more eloquently the story of their bravery and
devotion, than can any words of praise. The One Hundredth Pennsylvania
was a most superior regiment, and was the equal of any in the army.
Many of the field-officers of the division were most gallant soldiers,
while General Bartlett was without his superior in our army for courage
and daring. To speak of such regiments and such officers as these
as being _the worst in our army_, is wholly unjustifiable, and not
susceptible of palliation or excuse.
The Committee of Congress, which made a patient examination into this
unfortunate affair, closed their report with these words:--
“... Your Committee must say, that, in their opinion, the cause
of the disastrous result of the assault of the 30th of July
last, is mainly attributable to the fact, that the plans and
suggestions of the general who had devoted his attention for so
long a time to the subject, who had carried out to a successful
completion the project of mining the enemy’s works, and who
had carefully selected and drilled his troops for the purpose
of securing whatever advantages might be attainable from the
explosion of the mine, should have been so entirely disregarded
by a general who had evinced no faith in the successful
prosecution of the work, had aided it by no countenance or open
approval, and had assumed the entire direction and control only
when it was completed, and the time had come for reaping any
advantages that might be derived from it.”[52]
The Committee, in the same report, pay a most deserved tribute to the
white troops of the Ninth Corps, and speak as follows:--
“They are not behind any troops in the service in those
qualities which have placed our volunteer troops before the
world as equal, if not superior, to any known to modern
warfare. The services performed by the Ninth Corps on many a
well-fought battle-field, not only in this campaign, but in
others, have been such as to prove that they are second to none
in the service. Your Committee believe that any other troops
exposed to the same influences, under the same circumstances,
and for the same length of time, would have been similarly
affected. No one, upon a careful consideration of all the
circumstances, can be surprised that those influences should
have produced the effects they did upon them.”[53]
If loss of life is any evidence of the bravery of a corps in battle,
that of the Ninth on this occasion would seem to speak most eloquently
in this regard. Its entire loss in killed was 52 officers and 376 men;
wounded, 105 officers, 1,556 men; missing, many of whom were killed, 87
officers, 1,652 men.
On the evening after the mine affair, Colonel Barnes took command of
the First Brigade, General Bartlett having been captured; and on the
following day, the regiment moved to the rear, taking up its former
position, Captain Willard D. Tripp being assigned to the command, and
retaining it till the 14th of September.
The regiment was greatly reduced in numbers at this time, having
scarcely men enough to form a full company; yet, during a large part
of the time that followed, it was required to perform the same kind
and amount of duty as other and larger regiments, being one day at the
front in the rifle-pits, exposed to the deadly fire of the enemy’s
sharpshooters, and the next in the rear, doing fatigue duty, and both
night and day, whether at the rear or the front, under almost constant
fire from the enemy’s lines.
Late in the afternoon of the 7th of August, the enemy opened a furious
fire upon our entrenchments. The fire was particularly heavy on that
part of our lines occupied by the Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery,
which was still commanded by Major Chipman. Great confusion ensued, and
the troops were ordered to form in line of battle. The faithful Major,
who was never missing in time of peril, hastened from his quarters to
attend personally to the formation of his regiment; but while engaged
in the performance of this duty, he was mortally wounded by the
fragment of a large mortar-shell which exploded near him. From this
time till eleven o’clock the next forenoon, he lingered, apparently
unconscious, when life became extinct. His body was carefully embalmed
and sent to his home in Sandwich, Mass., for burial, where it was
received by a heart-broken wife and children, and many sorrowing
neighbors and friends.
Major Charles Chipman was a true man and most gallant soldier. He
possessed some advantage over the most of his fellow-officers in the
Twenty-ninth Regiment, at the outset, by having had, during his earlier
life, the benefits of the strict discipline and thorough training of
the regular army, in which he had served as a Sergeant; at one time
under Colonel Gardner, who, during the war, commanded the Confederate
forces at Port Hudson. The esteem in which Major Chipman was held by
his comrades found a fitting expression at a reunion of the survivors
of the regiment, held at Plymouth, Mass., on the 14th of May, 1873,
when the fine oil-portrait of this officer, which had constituted
a part of the collection in the “Gallery of Fallen Heroes,” having
been purchased by Sergeant Samuel C. Wright, was re-purchased by the
Association, and by it presented to his widow and children, together
with a kind and highly-appropriate letter from the President of the
Association, as a token of the love and regard of his comrades.
During the night of the 14th of August, 1864, the Ninth Corps was
relieved by the Eighteenth, and on the 15th, the Ninth moved to the
left and relieved the Fifth Corps, the latter having moved out towards
the Weldon Railroad. While remaining here (some five days), the
regiment with its brigade was placed on the front line as skirmishers.
There were no trenches or works of any kind, and the men were
considerably exposed.
On the 19th, the whole division moved to the left to connect with
the Fifth Corps, which was in position on the Weldon road. While the
division was on the march, in the midst of a blinding rain-storm, the
enemy dashed out of the woods at a place called Blick’s House, and
began a fierce assault upon the right flank. For a short time it looked
as though all would be lost. The fierceness of the assault, and the
unfavorable situation of our troops, threatened a serious disaster. But
our men had been too long accustomed to such scenes to be disconcerted
or alarmed. The line was quickly formed, though under a terrible fire,
and the enemy routed at every point. It was a great victory, apart
from the good fighting of the men. The enemy were engaged in a secret,
well-planned movement to cut off the Fifth Corps from the main body of
our army; but the division, by its gallantry, wholly frustrated their
plans.
Great praise was awarded the division for its conduct on this occasion.
General Julius White, a fine officer, was in command, and manifested
great skill in handling his troops. Colonel Joseph H. Barnes, who
commanded the First Brigade in this battle, by his good conduct, earned
promotion to Brevet Brigadier-General.[54]
An incident of the battle worthy of mention, is, the regiment captured
one of the enemy’s captains, who fought the battalion at Great Bethel,
June 10, 1861.
The regiment did not escape this battle without some loss. Sergeant
Curtis S. Rand, Company A; Privates John B. Smithers, Company B; David
A. Hoxie, Company D; William McGill and Edwin C. Bemis, Company H; and
First Lieutenant George D. Williams, Company F, were wounded. Sergeant
Rand had been a wagon-master during the most of his term; just before
this battle, he requested permission to go into the ranks, saying that
he was desirous of performing active service. Poor fellow! his wounds
proved mortal, and he died a few days after the battle.
From this time till the 21st, everything remained in the same condition
as at the close of the battle, except that our troops had entrenched
themselves, the Ninth Corps “occupying the line extending from the
Fifth Corps on the Weldon Railroad to the left of the Second Corps,
near the Jerusalem plank road.”
The enemy had manifested great uneasiness ever since this ground
had been occupied by our troops, and had more than once threatened
an attack. On the 21st, he made a spirited assault upon our works,
charging up to the breastworks several times in quick succession, but
was repulsed with great slaughter. The regiment, though exposed to a
severe enfilading fire, was not actively engaged in this battle.
The great losses sustained by the First Division, in the various
battles in which it had engaged, rendered a reorganization of the
corps necessary. The troops of this division were accordingly, on the
first of September, merged with those of the Second and Third. The
Twenty-ninth, Fifty-seventh, and Fifty-ninth Massachusetts Regiments,
Third Maryland, One Hundredth Pennsylvania, and Fourteenth New York
composed the Third Brigade of the First Division.
On the 10th of September, eighty-three recruits from Massachusetts
reached our regiment.
On the 14th, Colonel Barnes was relieved from the command of the
Brigade by the arrival of Colonel McLaughlin of the Fifty-seventh
Regiment, and again assumed command of the Twenty-ninth Regiment,
relieving Captain Willard D. Tripp, who had been in command since the
battle of July 30.
On the 24th of September, an order was issued from the headquarters
of the Ninth Corps, directing Brigadier-General Hartranft, commanding
First Division, to garrison Fort Howard with one hundred and fifty
men. On the same day, General Hartranft designated the “Twenty-ninth
Regiment Massachusetts Veteran Volunteer Infantry ... as a permanent
garrison to be placed in Fort Howard,” and Colonel N. B. McLaughlin,
commanding the Third Brigade, was directed to “see that the camp of the
regiment is placed in the immediate vicinity of the fort.”
For a period of nearly two weeks, the regiment was happily exempt from
the hardships of the field; but the necessities of the service finally
required its presence at the front, and on the 5th of October, it was
ordered out of the fort, and on the same day rejoined its brigade on
the front line at Poplar Grove Church.
On the 8th of October, there was a reconnoissance in force on the left
of the army by the First Division, but the regiment, though engaged in
the movement, was not under fire.
On the 9th, Colonel Barnes was mustered out of the service, very
much against the wishes of his superior officers, who had learned to
appreciate his many excellent soldierly qualities. But his motives for
leaving the army were of the most honorable character. His commission
as Captain bore date of the 27th of April, 1861. He had been in the
service of the United States since the 18th of May, 1861. During a
large part of this time, he had had the actual and responsible command
of the regiment, and for much of the time that of a brigade.
In taking leave of this excellent officer, who was so long and so
honorably connected with the regiment, we deem it but an act of simple
justice to him and his comrades as well, to quote some of the kind
words spoken of him by several officers of the Ninth Corps. In 1864,
General N. B. McLaughlin said of him: “During his term of service,
Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes commanded his regiment nearby two-thirds
of the time, and commanded a brigade for nearly two months in the
present campaign. I consider him a cool, reliable officer, courageous,
and of good judgment and conduct, both in action and in camp, a fine
disciplinarian, and capable of commanding either a regiment or brigade.”
Major-General Orlando B. Willcox said: “I consider Colonel Barnes
a man of great coolness and gallantry, of considerable experience
as a regimental and brigade commander, and every way qualified.”
Major-General Parke, commanding the corps, also expressed his high
appreciation of this officer in the following language: “I consider
Colonel Barnes a most excellent soldier, and a very efficient
commander. He is eminently qualified for command.”
The soldiers of the Twenty-ninth, though they sometimes fretted over
the stern discipline of this officer, both loved and respected him.
The same qualities that made him a good soldier have made him a good
and useful citizen, and in the important civil office which he now
holds, he displays the same good judgment and strong sense of duty
which marked his career in the army.