Dissolution of the Combined Armies.—Washington at Eltham.—Death of
John Parke Custis.—Washington at Mount Vernon.—Correspondence about
the Next Campaign.—Lafayette sails for France.—Washington stimulates
Congress to Military Preparations.—Project to surprise and carry off
Prince William Henry from New York.—The Case of Captain Asgill.
Washington would have followed up the reduction of Yorktown by a
combined operation against Charleston, and addressed a letter to the
Count de Grasse on the subject, but the count alleged in reply that the
orders of his court, ulterior projects, and his engagements with the
Spaniards, rendered it impossible to remain the necessary time for the
operation.
The prosecution of the Southern war, therefore, upon the broad scale
which Washington had contemplated, had to be relinquished; for without
shipping and a convoy, the troops and everything necessary for a siege
would have to be transported by land with immense trouble, expense, and
delay; while the enemy, by means of their fleets, could reinforce or
withdraw the garrison at pleasure.
Under these circumstances, Washington had to content himself, for the
present, with detaching two thousand Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia continental troops, under General St. Clair for the support of
General Greene, trusting that with this aid, he would be able to command
the interior of South Carolina, and confine the enemy to the town of
Charleston.
A dissolution of the combined forces now took place. The Marquis St.
Simon embarked his troops on the last of October, and the Count de
Grasse made sail on the 4th of November, taking with him two beautiful
horses which Washington had presented to him in token of cordial regard.
Lafayette, seeing there was no probability of further active service in
the present year, resolved to return to France on a visit to his family,
and, with Washington’s approbation, set out for Philadelphia to obtain
leave of absence from Congress.
The British prisoners were marched to Winchester in Virginia, and
Frederickstown in Maryland, and Lord Cornwallis and his principal
officers sailed for New York on parole.
The main part of the American army embarked for the Head of Elk, and
returned northward under the command of General Lincoln, to be cantoned
for the winter in the Jerseys and on the Hudson, so as to be ready for
operations against New York, or elsewhere, in the next year’s campaign.
The French army were to remain for the winter, in Virginia, and the
Count de Rochambeau established his head-quarters at Williamsburg.
Having attended in person to the distribution of ordnance and stores,
the departure of prisoners, and the embarkation of the troops under
Lincoln, Washington left Yorktown on the 5th of November, and arrived
the same day at Eltham, the seat of his friend Colonel Bassett. He
arrived just in time to receive the last breath of John Parke Custis,
the son of Mrs. Washington, as he had, several years previously,
rendered tender and pious offices at the death-bed of his sister, Miss
Custis. The deceased had been an object of Washington’s care from
childhood, and been cherished by him with paternal affection. Formed
under his guidance and instructions, he had been fitted to take a part
in the public concerns of his country, and had acquitted himself with
credit as a member of the Virginia Legislature. He was but twenty-eight
years old at the time of his death, and left a widow and four young
children. It was an unexpected event, and the dying scene was rendered
peculiarly affecting from the presence of the mother and wife of the
deceased. Washington remained several days at Eltham to comfort them in
their afflictions. As a consolation to Mrs. Washington in her
bereavement, he adopted the two youngest children of the deceased, a boy
and girl, who thenceforth formed a part of his immediate family.
From Eltham, Washington proceeded to Mount Vernon; but public cares gave
him little leisure to attend to his private concerns. We have seen how
repeatedly his steady mind had been exercised in the darkest times of
the revolutionary struggle, in buoying up the public heart when sinking
into despondency. He had now an opposite task to perform, to guard
against an overweening confidence inspired by the recent triumph. In a
letter to General Greene, he writes: “I shall remain but a few days
here, and shall proceed to Philadelphia, when I shall attempt to
stimulate Congress to the best improvement of our late success, by
taking the most vigorous and effectual measures to be ready for an early
and decisive campaign the next year. My greatest fear is, that Congress,
viewing this stroke in too important a point of light, may think our
work too nearly closed, and will fall into a state of languor and
relaxation. To prevent this error, I shall employ every means in my
power, and if, unhappily, we sink into that fatal mistake, no part of
the blame shall be mine.”
In a letter written at the same time to Lafayette, who, having obtained
from Congress an indefinite leave of absence, was about to sail, he
says: “I owe it to your friendship and to my affectionate regard for
you, my dear marquis, not to let you leave this country, without
carrying with you fresh marks of my attachment to you, and new
expressions of the high sense I entertain of your military conduct, and
other important services in the course of the last campaign.” In reply
to inquiries which the marquis had made respecting the operations of the
coming year, he declares that everything must depend absolutely for
success upon the naval force to be employed in these seas and the time
of its appearance. “No land force,” writes he, “can act decisively
unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority; nor can more than
negative advantages be expected without it. For proof of this we have
only to recur to the instances of the ease and facility with which the
British shifted their ground, as advantages were to be obtained at
either extremity of the continent, and to their late heavy loss the
moment they failed in their naval superiority.... A doubt did not exist,
nor does it at this moment, in any man’s mind, of the total extirpation
of the British force in the Carolinas and Georgia, if the Count de
Grasse could have extended his coöperation two months longer.”
We may add here that Congress, after resolutions highly complimentary to
the marquis, had, through the secretary of foreign affairs, recommended
to the ministers plenipotentiary of the United States, resident in
Europe, to confer with the marquis, and avail themselves of his
information relative to the situation of national affairs, which
information the various heads of departments were instructed to furnish
him; and he was furthermore made the bearer of a letter to his
sovereign, recommending him in the strongest terms to the royal
consideration. Much was anticipated from the generous zeal of Lafayette,
and the influence he would be able to exercise in France, in favor of
the American cause.
Towards the end of November, Washington was in Philadelphia, where
Congress received him with distinguished honors. He lost no time in
enforcing the policy respecting the ensuing campaign, which he had set
forth in his letters to General Greene and the marquis. His views were
met by the military committee of Congress, with which he was in frequent
consultation, and by the secretaries of war, finance, and public
affairs, who attended their conferences. Under his impulse and personal
supervision, the military arrangements for 1782 were made with unusual
dispatch. On the 10th of December resolutions were passed in Congress
for requisitions of men and money from the several States; and
Washington backed those requisitions by letters to the respective
governors, urging prompt compliance. Strenuous exertions, too, were made
by Dr. Franklin, then minister in France, to secure a continuance of
efficient aid from that power; and a loan of six millions had been
promised by the king after hearing of the capitulation of Yorktown.
The persuasion that peace was at hand was, however, too prevalent for
the public to be roused to new sacrifices and toils to maintain what was
considered the mere shadow of a war. The States were slow in furnishing
a small part of their respective quotas of troops, and still slower in
answering to the requisitions for money.
After remaining four months in Philadelphia, Washington set out in March
to rejoin the army at Newburg on the Hudson. He was at Morristown in the
Jerseys on the 28th, when a bold project was submitted to him by Colonel
Matthias Ogden, of the Jersey line. Prince William Henry,[98] son of the
king of England, who was serving as a midshipman in the fleet of Admiral
Digby, was at that time in New York with the admiral, an object of great
attention to the army, and the tory part of the inhabitants. The project
of Colonel Ogden was to surprise the prince and the admiral at their
quarters in the city, and bring them off prisoners. He was to be aided
in the enterprise by a captain, a subaltern, three sergeants, and
thirty-six men. They were to embark from the Jersey shore on a rainy
night in four whale-boats, well manned, and rowed with muffled oars, and
were to land in New York at half-past nine, at a wharf not far from the
quarters of the prince and admiral, which were in Hanover Square. Part
of the men were to guard the boats, while Colonel Ogden with a strong
party was to proceed to the house, force the doors if necessary, and
capture the prince and admiral. In returning to the boats, part of the
men, armed with guns and bayonets, were to precede the prisoners, and
part to follow at half a gunshot distance, to give front to the enemy
until all were embarked.
The plan was approved by Washington, but Colonel Ogden was charged to be
careful that no insult or indignity be offered to the prince or admiral,
should they be captured. They were, on the contrary, to be treated with
all possible respect, and conveyed without delay to Congress.
How far an attempt was made to carry this plan into operation, is not
known. An exaggerated alarm seems to have been awakened by extravagant
reports circulated in New York, as appears by the following citation
from a paper or letter dated April 23d, and transmitted by Washington to
Ogden:—
“Great seem to be their apprehensions here. About a fortnight ago a
number of flat-boats were discovered by a sentinel from the bank of the
river (Hudson), which are said to have been intended to fire the
suburbs, and in the height of the conflagration to make a descent on the
lower part of the city, and wrest from our embraces his Excellency Sir
Henry Clinton, Prince William Henry, and several other illustrious
personages—since which, great precautions have been taken for the
security of those gentlemen, by augmenting the guards, and to render
their persons as little exposed as possible.”
These precautions very probably disconcerted the project of Colonel
Ogden, of which we find no other traces.
In a recent letter to General Greene, Washington had expressed himself
strongly on the subject of retaliation. “Of all laws it is the most
difficult to execute, where you have not the transgressor himself in
your possession. Humanity will ever interfere, and plead strongly
against the sacrifice of an innocent person for the guilt of another.”
It was but three or four months after this writing, that his judgment
and feelings were put to the proof in this respect. We have had occasion
to notice the marauds of the New York refugees in the Jerseys. One of
their number by the name of Philip White had been captured by the Jersey
people, and killed in attempting to escape from those who were
conducting him to Monmouth jail. His partisans in New York determined on
a signal revenge. Captain Joseph Huddy, an ardent whig, who had been
captured when bravely defending a block-house in Monmouth County, and
carried captive to New York; was now drawn forth from prison, conducted
into the Jerseys by a party of refugees, headed by a captain Lippencott,
and hanged on the heights of Middletown with a label affixed to his
breast, bearing the inscription, “Up goes Huddy for Philip White.”
The neighboring country cried out for retaliation. Washington submitted
the matter, with all the evidence furnished, to a board of general and
field officers. It was unanimously determined that the offender should
be demanded for execution, and, if not given up, that retaliation should
be exercised on a British prisoner of equal rank. Washington accordingly
sent proofs to Sir Henry Clinton of what he stigmatized as a murder, and
demanded that Captain Lippencott, or the officer who commanded the
execution of Captain Huddy, should be given up; or if that officer
should be inferior in rank, so many of the perpetrators as would,
according to the tariff of exchange, be an equivalent. “To do this,”
said he, “will mark the justice of your Excellency’s character. In
failure of it, I shall hold myself justifiable in the eyes of God and
man, for the measure to which I will resort.”
Sir Henry declined a compliance, but stated that he had ordered a strict
inquiry into the circumstances of Captain Huddy’s death, and would bring
the perpetrators of it to immediate trial.
Washington about the same time received the copy of a resolution of
Congress approving of his firm and judicious conduct, in his application
to the British general at New York, and promising to support him “in his
fixed purpose of exemplary retaliation.”
He accordingly ordered a selection to be made by lot, for the above
purpose, from among the British officers, prisoners at Lancaster in
Pennsylvania. To enhance the painful nature of the case, the lot fell
upon Captain Charles Asgill, of the Guards, a youth only nineteen years
of age, of an amiable character and high hopes and expectations, being
only son and heir of Sir Charles Asgill, a wealthy baronet.
The youth bore his lot with firmness, but his fellow prisoners were
incensed at Sir Henry Clinton for exposing him to such a fate by
refusing to deliver up the culprit. One of their number, a son of the
Earl of Ludlow, solicited permission from Washington to proceed to New
York and lay the case before Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded in
command to Sir Henry Clinton. In granting it, Washington intimated that,
though deeply affected by the unhappy fate to which Captain Asgill was
subjected, and devoutly wishing that his life might be spared, there was
but one alternative that could save him, of which the British commander
must be aware.
The matter remained for some time in suspense. Washington had ordered
that Captain Asgill should be treated “with every tender attention and
politeness (consistent with his present situation), which his rank,
fortune, and connections, together with his unfortunate state,
demanded,” and the captain himself acknowledged in writing the feeling
and attentive manner in which those commands were executed. But on the
question of retaliation Washington remained firm.
Lippencott was at length tried by a court-martial, but, after a long
sitting, acquitted, it appearing that he had acted under the verbal
orders of Governor Franklin, president of the board of associated
loyalists. The British commander reprobated the death of Captain Huddy,
and broke up the board.
These circumstances changed in some degree the ground upon which
Washington was proceeding. He laid the whole matter before Congress,
admitted Captain Asgill on parole at Morristown, and subsequently
intimated to the secretary of war his private opinion in favor of his
release, with permission to go to his friends in Europe.
In the mean time Lady Asgill, the mother of the youth, had written a
pathetic letter to the Count de Vergennes, the French minister of state,
imploring his intercession in behalf of her son. The letter was shown to
the king and queen, and by their direction the count wrote to Washington
soliciting the liberation of Asgill. Washington, as has been shown, had
already suggested his release, and was annoyed at the delay of Congress
in the matter. He now referred to that body the communication from the
count, and urged a favorable decision. To his great relief, he received
their directions to set Captain Asgill at liberty.
This, like the case of the unfortunate André, was one of the painful and
trying predicaments in which a strict sense of public duty obliged
Washington to do violence to his natural impulses, and he declares in
one of his letters, that the situation of Captain Asgill often filled
him with the keenest anguish. “I felt for him on many accounts; and not
the least when, viewing him as a man of honor and sentiment, I
considered how unfortunate it was for him that a wretch who possessed
neither, should be the means of causing him a single pang or a
disagreeable sensation.”
NOTE.
While these pages are going through the press, we have before us an
instance of that conscientious regard for justice which governed
Washington’s conduct.
A favorite aide-de-camp, Colonel Samuel B. Webb, who had been wounded
in the battles of Bunker’s Hill and White Plains, was captured in
December, 1777, when commanding a Connecticut regiment, and
accompanying General Parsons in a descent upon Long Island. He was
then but 24 years of age, and the youngest colonel in the army.
Presuming upon the favor of General Washington, who had pronounced him
one of the most accomplished gentlemen in the service, he wrote to
him, reporting his capture, and begging most strenuously for an
immediate exchange. He received a prompt, but disappointing reply.
Washington lamented his unfortunate condition. “It would give me
pleasure,” said he, “to render you any services in my power, but it is
impossible for me to comply with your request, without violating the
principles of justice, and incurring a charge of partiality.”
In fact, several officers of Colonel Webb’s rank had been a long time
in durance, and it was a rule with Washington that those first
captured should be first released. To this rule he inflexibly adhered,
however his feelings might plead for its infringement. Colonel Webb,
in consequence, was not exchanged until the present year; when
Washington, still on principles of justice, gave him the brevet rank
of Brigadier-general and the command of the light infantry.
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