Hostile Embarkations to the South.—Arnold in Command.—Necessitous
State of the Country.—Washington urges a Foreign Loan.—Mission of
Colonel Laurens to France to seek Aid in Men and Money.—Grievances
of the Pennsylvania Line.—Mutiny.—Negotiations with the
Mutineers.—Articles of Accommodation.—Policy doubted by
Washington.—Rigorous Course adopted by him with other
Malcontents.—Successful.—Ratification of the Articles of
Confederation of the States.
The occurrences recorded in the last few chapters made Washington
apprehend a design on the part of the enemy to carry the stress of war
into the Southern States. Conscious that he was the man to whom all
looked in time of emergency, and who was, in a manner, responsible for
the general course of military affairs, he deeply felt the actual
impotency of his position.
In a letter to Franklin, who was minister-plenipotentiary at the court
of Versailles, he strongly expresses his chagrin. “Disappointed of the
second division of French troops, but more especially in the expected
naval superiority, which was the pivot upon which everything turned, we
have been compelled to spend an inactive campaign, after a flattering
prospect at the opening of it, and vigorous struggles to make it a
decisive one on our part. Latterly, we have been obliged to become
spectators of a succession of detachments from the army at New York in
aid of Lord Cornwallis, while our naval weakness, and the political
dissolution of a great part of our army, put it out of our power to
counteract them at the southward or to take advantage of them here.”
The last of these detachments to the South took place on the 20th of
December, but was not destined, as Washington had supposed, for
Carolina. Sir Henry Clinton had received information that the troops
already mentioned as being under General Leslie in the Chesapeake, had,
by orders from Cornwallis, sailed for Charleston, to reinforce his
lordship; and this detachment was to take their place in Virginia. It
was composed of British, German, and refugee troops, about seventeen
hundred strong, and was commanded by Benedict Arnold, now a
brigadier-general in His Majesty’s service. Sir Henry Clinton, who
distrusted the fidelity of the man he had corrupted, sent with him
colonels Dundas and Simcoe, experienced officers, by whose advice he was
to be guided in every important measure. He was to make an incursion
into Virginia, destroy the public magazines, assemble and arm the
loyalists, and hold himself ready to coöperate with Lord Cornwallis. He
embarked his troops in a fleet of small vessels, and departed on his
enterprise animated by the rancorous spirit of a renegade, and prepared,
as he vaunted, to give the Americans a blow “that would make the whole
continent shake.” We shall speak of his expedition hereafter.
As Washington beheld one hostile armament after another winging its way
to the South, and received applications from that quarter for
assistance, which he had not the means to furnish, it became painfully
apparent to him, that the efforts to carry on the war had exceeded the
natural capabilities of the country. Its widely diffused population and
the composition and temper of some of its people, rendered it difficult
to draw together its resources. Commerce was almost extinct; there was
not sufficient natural wealth on which to found a revenue; paper
currency had depreciated through want of funds for its redemption, until
it was nearly worthless. The mode of supplying the army by assessing a
proportion of the productions of the earth, had proved ineffectual,
oppressive, and productive of an alarming opposition. Domestic loans
yielded but trifling assistance. The patience of the army was nearly
exhausted; the people were dissatisfied with the mode of supporting the
war, and there was reason to apprehend, that, under the pressure of
impositions of a new and odious kind, they might imagine they had only
exchanged one kind of tyranny for another.
We give but a few of many considerations which Washington was
continually urging upon the attention of Congress in his full and
perspicuous manner; the end of which was to enforce his opinion that a
foreign loan was indispensably necessary to a continuance of the war.
His earnest counsels and entreaties were at length successful in
determining Congress to seek aid both in men and money from
abroad. Accordingly, on the 28th of December they commissioned
Lieutenant-colonel John Laurens, special minister at the court of
Versailles, to apply for such aid. The situation he had held, as
aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, had given him an
opportunity of observing the course of affairs, and acquainting
himself with the wants and resources of the country; and he was
instructed to confer with Washington, previous to his departure,
as to the objects of his mission. Not content with impressing him
verbally with his policy, Washington gave him a letter of
instructions for his government, and to be used as occasion might
require. In this he advised him to solicit a loan sufficiently
large to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of finance,
to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations; next
to a loan of money, a naval force was to be desired, sufficient to
maintain a constant superiority on the American coast; also
additional succor in troops. In a word, a means of coöperation by
sea and land, with purse and sword, competent by a decided effort
to attain, once for all, the great objects of the alliance, the
liberty and independence of the United States.
He was to show, at the same time, the ample means possessed by the
nation to repay the loan, from its comparative freedom from debt, and
its vast and valuable tracts of unsettled lands, the variety and
fertility of its climates and soils, and its advantages of every kind
for a lucrative commerce, and rapid increase of population and
prosperity.
Scarce had Colonel Laurens been appointed to this mission, when a
painful occurrence proved the urgent necessity of the required aid.
In the arrangement for winter-quarters, the Pennsylvania line,
consisting of six regiments, was hutted near Morristown. These troops
had experienced the hardships and privations common to the whole army.
General Wayne, who commanded them, had a soldier’s sympathy in the
sufferings of his men, and speaks of them in feeling language: “Poorly
clothed, badly fed, and worse paid,” writes he, “some of them not having
received a paper dollar for near twelve months; exposed to winter’s
piercing cold, to drifting snows and chilling blasts, with no protection
but old worn-out coats, tattered linen overalls, and but one blanket
between three men. In this situation the enemy begin to work upon their
passions, and have found means to circulate some proclamations among
them.... The officers in general, as well as myself, find it necessary
to stand for hours every day exposed to wind and weather among the poor
naked fellows, while they are working at their huts and redoubts, often
assisting with our own hands, in order to produce a conviction to their
minds that we share, and more than share, every vicissitude in common
with them: sometimes asking to participate their bread and water. The
good effect of this conduct is very conspicuous, and prevents their
murmuring in public; but the delicate mind and eye of humanity are hurt,
very much hurt, at their visible distress and private complainings.”
How strongly are here depicted the trials to which the soldiers of the
Revolution were continually subjected. But the Pennsylvania line had an
additional grievance peculiar to themselves. Many of them had enlisted
to serve “for three years, or during war,” that is to say, for less than
three years should the war cease in less time. When, however, having
served for three years, they sought their discharge, the officers, loth
to lose such experienced soldiers, interpreted the terms of enlistment
to mean three years, or to the end of the war, should it continue for a
longer time.
This chicanery naturally produced great exasperation. It was heightened
by the conduct of a deputation from Pennsylvania, which, while it left
veteran troops unpaid, distributed gold by handfuls among raw six-month
levies, whose time was expiring, as bounties on their reënlisting for
the war.
The first day of the New Year arrived. The men were excited by an extra
allowance of ardent spirits. In the evening, at a preconcerted signal, a
great part of the Pennsylvania line, non-commissioned officers included,
turned out under arms, declaring their intention to march to
Philadelphia, and demand redress from Congress. Wayne endeavored to
pacify them; they were no longer to be pacified by words. He cocked his
pistol; in an instant their bayonets were at his breast. “We love, we
respect you,” cried they, “but you are a dead man if you fire. Do not
mistake us; we are not going to the enemy; were they now to come out,
you would see us fight under your orders with as much resolution and
alacrity as ever.”[53]
Their threat was not an idle one. In an attempt to suppress the mutiny
there was a bloody affray, in which numbers were wounded on both sides,
among whom were several officers. One captain was killed.
Three regiments which had taken no part in the mutiny were paraded under
their officers. The mutineers compelled them to join their ranks. Their
number being increased to about thirteen hundred, they seized upon six
field-pieces, and set out in the night for Philadelphia under command of
their sergeants.
Fearing the enemy might take advantage of this outbreak, Wayne detached
a Jersey brigade to Chatham, and ordered the militia to be called out
there. Alarm fires were kindled upon the hills; alarm guns boomed from
post to post; the country was soon on the alert.
Wayne was not “Mad Anthony” on the present occasion. All his measures
were taken with judgment and forecast. He sent provisions after the
mutineers, lest they should supply their wants from the country people
by force. Two officers of rank spurred to Philadelphia, to apprise
Congress of the approach of the insurgents, and put it upon its guard.
Wayne sent a dispatch with news of the outbreak to Washington; he then
mounted his horse, and accompanied by Colonels Butler and Stewart, two
officers popular with the troops, set off after the mutineers, either to
bring them to a halt, or to keep with them, and seek every occasion to
exert a favorable influence over them.
Washington received Wayne’s letter at his head-quarters at New Windsor
on the 3d of January. His first impulse was to set out at once for the
insurgent camp. Second thoughts showed the impolicy of such a move.
Before he could overtake the mutineers, they would either have returned
to their duty, or their affair would be in the hands of Congress. How
far, too, could his own troops be left with safety, distressed as they
were for clothing and provisions? Beside, the navigation of the Hudson
was still open; should any disaffection appear in the neighboring
garrison of West Point the British might send up an expedition from New
York to take advantage of it. Under these circumstances, he determined
to continue at New Windsor.
He wrote to Wayne, however, approving of his intention to keep with the
troops, and improve every favorable interval of passion. His letter
breathes that paternal spirit with which he watched over the army; and
that admirable moderation mingled with discipline with which he managed
and moulded their wayward moods. “Opposition,” said he, “as it did not
succeed in the first instance, cannot be effectual while the men remain
together, but will keep alive resentment, and may tempt them to turn
about and go in a body to the enemy; who, by their emissaries, will use
every argument and means in their power to persuade them that it is
their only asylum; which if they find their passage stopped at the
Delaware, and hear that the Jersey militia are collecting in their rear,
they may think but too probable. I would, therefore, recommend it to you
to cross the Delaware with them, draw from them what they conceive to be
their principal grievances, and promise faithfully to represent to
Congress and to the State the substance of them, and endeavor to obtain
a redress. If they could be stopped at Bristol or Germantown, the
better. I look upon it, that if you can bring them to a negotiation,
matters may be afterwards accommodated; but that an attempt to reduce
them by force will either drive them to the enemy, or dissipate them in
such a manner that they will never be recovered.”
How clearly one reads in this letter that temperate and magnanimous
spirit which moved over the troubled waters of the Revolution, allayed
the fury of the storms, and controlled everything into place.
Having visited the Highland posts of the Hudson, and satisfied himself
of the fidelity of the garrisons, Washington ordered a detachment of
eleven hundred men to be ready to march at a moment’s warning. General
Knox, also, was dispatched by him to the Eastern States, to represent to
their governments the alarming crisis produced by a long neglect of the
subsistence of the army and to urge them to send on immediately money,
clothing, and other supplies for their respective lines.
In the mean time, as Washington had apprehended, Sir Henry Clinton
received intelligence at New York of the mutiny, and hastened to profit
by it. Emissaries were dispatched to the camp of the mutineers holding
out offers of pardon, protection, and ample pay, if they would return to
their allegiance to the crown. On the 4th of January, although the rain
poured in torrents, troops and cannon were hurried on board of vessels
of every description, and transported to Staten Island, Sir Henry
accompanying them. There they were to be held in readiness, either to
land at Amboy in the Jerseys, should the revolters be drawn in that
direction, or to make a dash at West Point, should the departure of
Washington leave that post assailable.
General Wayne and his companions, colonels Butler and Stewart, had
overtaken the insurgent troops on the 3d of January, at Middlebrook.
They were proceeding in military form, under the control of a
self-constituted board of sergeants whose orders were implicitly obeyed.
A sergeant-major, who had formerly deserted from the British army, had
the general command.
Conferences were held by Wayne with sergeants delegated from each
regiment. They appeared to be satisfied with the mode and promises of
redress held out to them: but the main body of the mutineers persisted
in revolt, and proceeded on the next day to Princeton. Wayne hoped they
might continue further on, and would gladly have seen them across the
Delaware, beyond the influence of the enemy; but their leaders clung to
Princeton, lest in further movements they might not be able to keep
their followers together. Their proceedings continued to be orderly;
military forms were still observed; they obeyed their leaders, behaved
well to the people of the country, and committed no excesses.
General Wayne and colonels Butler and Stewart remained with them in an
equivocal position, popular, but without authority, and almost in
durance. The insurgents professed themselves still ready to march under
them against the enemy, but would permit none other of their former
officers to come among them. The Marquis de Lafayette, General St.
Clair, and Colonel Laurens, the newly-appointed minister to France,
arrived at the camp and were admitted; but afterwards were ordered away
at a short notice.
The news of the revolt caused great consternation in Philadelphia. A
committee of Congress set off to meet the insurgents, accompanied by
Reed, the president of Pennsylvania, and one or two other officers, and
escorted by a city troop of horse. The committee halted at Trenton,
whence President Reed wrote to Wayne requesting a personal interview at
four o’clock in the afternoon, at four miles’ distance from Princeton.
Wayne was moreover told to inform the troops, that he (Reed) would be
there to receive any propositions from them, and redress any injuries
they might have sustained; but that after the indignities they had
offered to the marquis and General St. Clair, he could not venture to
put himself in their power.
Wayne, knowing that the letter was intended for his troops more than for
himself, read it publicly on the parade. It had a good effect upon the
sergeants and many of the men. The idea that the president of their
State should have to leave the seat of government and stoop to treat
with them, touched their sectional pride and their home feelings. They
gathered round the horseman who had brought the letter, and inquired
anxiously whether President Reed was unkindly disposed towards them;
intimating privately their dislike to the business in which they were
engaged.
Still, it was not thought prudent for President Reed to trust himself
within their camp. Wayne promised to meet him on the following day
(7th), though it seemed uncertain whether he was master of himself, or
whether he was not a kind of prisoner. Tidings had just been received of
the movements of Sir Henry Clinton, and of tempting overtures he
intended to make, and it was feared the men might listen to them. Three
of the light horse were sent in the direction of Amboy to keep a
look-out for any landing of the enemy.
At this critical juncture, two of Sir Henry’s emissaries arrived in the
camp, and delivered to the leaders of the malcontents, a paper
containing his seductive proposals and promises. The mutineers, though
openly arrayed in arms against their government, spurned at the idea of
turning “Arnolds,” as they termed it. The emissaries were seized and
conducted to General Wayne, who placed them in confinement, promising
that they should be liberated, should the pending negotiation fail.
This incident had a great effect in inspiring hope of the ultimate
loyalty of the troops; and the favorable representations of the temper
of the men, made by General Wayne in a personal interview, determined
President Reed to venture among them. The consequences of their
desertion to the enemy were too alarming to be risked. “I have but one
life to lose,” said he, “and my country has the first claim to it.”[54]
As he approached Princeton with his suite, he found guards regularly
posted, who turned out and saluted him in military style. The whole line
was drawn out under arms near the college, and the artillery on the
point of firing a salute. He prevented it, lest it should alarm the
country. It was a hard task for him to ride along the line as if
reviewing troops regularly organized; but the crisis required some
sacrifice of the kind. The sergeants were all in the places of their
respective officers, and saluted the president as he passed; never were
mutineers more orderly and decorous.
The propositions now offered to the troops were: To discharge all those
who had enlisted indefinitely for three years or during the war; the
fact to be inquired into by three commissioners appointed by the
executive—where the original enlistment could not be produced in
evidence, the oath of the soldier to suffice.
To give immediate certificates for the deficit in their pay caused by
the depreciation of the currency, and the arrearages to be settled as
soon as circumstances would permit.
To furnish them immediately with certain specified articles of clothing
which were most wanted.
These propositions proving satisfactory, the troops set out for Trenton,
where the negotiation was concluded.
Most of the artillerists and many of the infantry obtained their
discharges; some on their oaths, others on account of the vague terms
under which they had been enlisted; forty days furlough was given to the
rest, and thus, for a time, the whole insurgent force was dissolved.
The two spies who had tampered with the fidelity of the troops, were
tried by a court-martial, found guilty, and hanged at the cross-roads
near Trenton. A reward of fifty guineas each, was offered to two
sergeants who had arrested and delivered them up. They declined
accepting it, saying they had merely acted by order of the board of
sergeants. The hundred guineas were then offered to the board. Their
reply is worthy of record. “It was not,” said they, “for the sake or
through any expectation of reward, but for the love of our country, that
we sent the spies immediately to General Wayne; we therefore do not
consider ourselves entitled to any other reward but the love of our
country, and do jointly agree to accept of no other.”
The accommodation entered into with the mutineers of the Pennsylvania
line appeared to Washington of doubtful policy, and likely to have a
pernicious effect on the whole army. His apprehensions were soon
justified by events. On the night of the 20th of January, a part of the
Jersey troops, stationed at Pompton, rose in arms claiming the same
terms just yielded to the Pennsylvanians. For a time, it was feared the
revolt would spread throughout the line.
Sir Henry Clinton was again on the alert. Troops were sent to Staten
Island to be ready to cross into the Jerseys, and an emissary was
dispatched to tempt the mutineers with seductive offers.
In this instance, Washington adopted a more rigorous course than in the
other. The present insurgents were not so formidable in point of numbers
as the Pennsylvanians; the greater part of them, also, were foreigners,
for whom he felt less sympathy than for native troops. He was convinced,
too, of the fidelity of the troops under his immediate command, who were
from the Eastern States. A detachment from the Massachusetts line was
sent under Major-general Howe, who was instructed to compel the
mutineers to unconditional submission; to grant them no terms while in
arms, or in a state of resistance; and on their surrender, instantly to
execute a few of the most active and incendiary leaders. “You will also
try,” added he, “to avail yourself of the services of the militia,
representing to them how dangerous to civil liberty, is the precedent of
armed soldiers dictating to their country.”
His orders were punctually obeyed, and were crowned with complete
success. Howe had the good fortune, after a tedious night march, to
surprise the mutineers napping in their huts just at daybreak. Five
minutes only were allowed them to parade without their arms and give up
the ringleaders. This was instantly complied with, and two of them were
executed on the spot. Thus the mutiny was quelled, the officers resumed
their command, and all things were restored to order.[55]
Thus terminated an insurrection, which, for a time, had spread alarm
among the friends of American liberty, and excited the highest hopes of
its foes. The circumstances connected with it had ultimately a
beneficial effect in strengthening the confidence of those friends, by
proving that, however the Americans might quarrel with their own
government, nothing could again rally them under the royal standard.
A great cause of satisfaction to Washington was the ratification of the
articles of confederation between the States, which took place not long
after this agitating juncture. A set of articles had been submitted to
Congress by Dr. Franklin, as far back as 1775. A form had been prepared
and digested by a committee in 1776, and agreed upon, with some
modifications, in 1777, but had ever since remained in abeyance, in
consequence of objections made by individual States. The confederation
was now complete, and Washington, in a letter to the President of
Congress, congratulated him and the body over which he presided, on an
event long wished for, and which he hoped would have the happiest
effects upon the politics of this country, and be of essential service
to our cause in Europe.
It was, after all, an instrument far less efficacious than its advocates
had anticipated; but it served an important purpose in binding the
States together as a nation, and keeping them from falling asunder into
individual powers, after the pressure of external danger should cease to
operate.
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