Calmette wrote that he suppressed the end of it because that referred
to a subject which had nothing to do with fiscal questions. The name
of the person to whom it was written was also suppressed, but every
one in Paris knew very soon that the letter had been written to Madame
Gueydan-Dupré, who afterwards—five years after the letter’s date,
when she was divorced—became the wife of Monsieur Caillaux. When
the letter was written in these intimate terms Madame Gueydan-Dupré,
whom Monsieur Caillaux addressed with the familiar “tu” which means
so much in French, his note to whom he signed “Ton Jo,” was the wife
of another man. When that letter was published, the woman, to whom it
had been written thirteen years before, had been the wife of Monsieur
Joseph Caillaux for five years and had ceased to be his wife, had been
divorced from him for two years.
It is easy to imagine the feelings of the present Madame Caillaux, of
the successor of Madame Gueydan in Monsieur Caillaux’s affections, when
she saw this letter reproduced in facsimile on the front page of the
_Figaro_, and realized that all France was reading between the lines.
It can have mattered very little to her that Monsieur Calmette had
suppressed the last few lines of this letter. The mere fact that the
first part of it was published, that in his article he made it clear
that he knew how it had begun and ended, and made clear to others to
whom it had been written, was all-sufficient for the woman who now
bears Monsieur Caillaux’s name. That woman knew that there had been
other letters in existence. She knew that Monsieur Caillaux had written
letters to her which had been at one time in the possession of the
woman to whom this “Ton Jo” letter was addressed, and these letters
contained, as she well knew, the same mixture of love and politics as
the document published on that Friday, March 14.
Her own married life before she became Monsieur Caillaux’s wife had
not been happy. She knew and dreaded the power and the will to injure
of a woman scorned. She knew of course of the dramatic scene which had
occurred before she married Monsieur Caillaux, between her husband and
his first wife, Madame Gueydan. She knew that the letters which she
dreaded had been destroyed on that occasion, but she knew, too, that
their destruction had been obtained at the price of a reconciliation
between Monsieur Caillaux and his first wife, and she knew, no woman
better, that Monsieur Caillaux had not kept to the spirit of the
bargain, had obtained a divorce from his first wife, shortly after the
destruction of these letters, and immediately after his divorce had
become her own husband. She was not sure that there were no copies of
the letters in existence.
One shudders to visualize that interview between husband and wife on
the morning of Friday, March 13. One can realize the fears which were
expressed, the mud of past years which was stirred. And that morning,
we may be fairly certain, the first thought of desperation was born
in Madame Caillaux’s brain. Can you not see this woman thinking,
pondering, murmuring to herself, “This must be stopped”? Can you not
see her snatching at her copy of the _Figaro_ next morning, skipping
with an impatient shrug of the shoulders her husband’s _communiqué_ to
the Agence Havas, and reading down the page with anxious eyes to see
whether the revelation of the letters which she feared would follow?
One shudders at the mental picture of the lives of Monsieur and of
Madame Caillaux, of this man and this woman, during the days which
followed the publication of the “Ton Jo” letter. And when she saw, on
Monday, March 16, that Monsieur Calmette had not stopped his campaign
against her husband although three days before, on the 13th, he had
said “My task is finished” one can realize her anguish—the anguish of
fear.
VIII
AGADIR
In almost every newspaper article which I have read on the Caillaux
drama one sentence has invariably amused me. “The question of Agadir,”
we read, in French and English papers both, “is too fresh in the
reader’s mind for any exhaustive reference to it here to be necessary.”
But memories are short in these fast-living days, and though the
history of Agadir is recent history, no story of the Caillaux drama can
be complete without recalling it at length. For one of the accusations
against Monsieur Caillaux as a politician which the _Figaro_ made
constantly is that Monsieur Caillaux made mistake on mistake, and was
misled by his hatred of the Ministers who had been instrumental in the
original and comparative settlement of the Moroccan difficulties, to do
grave wrong to France over the Agadir matter.
His hatred of his parliamentary opponents, it was said at the time,
was very nearly instrumental in creating serious international
complications. Further imprudence was shown by his endeavour to
palliate the effect of his first ill-considered act, and he was finally
forced to consent to concessions on behalf of France which France need
not have made at all if Monsieur Caillaux had been more prudent from
the beginning.
This, stripped of all vituperation, is the accusation which Monsieur
Caillaux has to answer before the tribunal of history. Let us look
into it. In order to do so we must go back to the Act of Algeciras.
It will be remembered that the Act of Algeciras gave France the right
of policing Morocco because of its neighbourhood to Algiers. Three
years after the Act of Algeciras French troops were in occupation
of certain portions of Moroccan territory, and the jingo party, the
Pan-Germanists, in Germany were protesting with heat against this
military occupation.
The peace party in Germany, however, had other views. There was a
feeling that an understanding on the basis of the act of Algeciras
between France and Germany might lead to a weakening of the Entente
between France and Great Britain, and be useful economically to German
enterprise.
On February 8, 1909, when Monsieur Clemenceau was at the head of the
French Government with Monsieur Stephen Pichon as his Foreign Minister,
Germany recognized, more freely than it had recognized before, the
interests of France in Morocco for the maintenance of order, and
promised collaboration economically. A secret letter changed hands,
confirming this agreement, and admitting that Germany should remain
disinterested in the politics of Morocco. In this same letter it was
admitted also that the economic interests of France in Morocco were
more important than the economic interests of Germany. The importance
of this letter rested of course on the fact that it practically
entailed the suppression of immediate friction between the two
countries.
The Clemenceau Cabinet worked hard to carry the good work further
still, so that the spirit of this Franco-German understanding should be
extended to the Congo. The French representative of the bondholders of
the Moroccan debt, Monsieur Guiot, who had been in the French Foreign
Office, paid a visit to Berlin, and the result of his negotiations with
the German Foreign Office in the Wilhelmstrasse was a memorandum dated
June 2, 1909, by which it was decided to create a Franco-German Company
for the purpose of exploiting certain concessions. On June 5 the French
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Pichon, took counsel with the
French Colonial Minister, Monsieur Milliés-Lacroix, on the advantages
and disadvantages of this Franco-German collaboration.
At the end of July 1909, the Clemenceau Cabinet fell. Monsieur Briand
became Prime Minister and retained Monsieur Pichon at the Quai d’Orsay,
but Monsieur Clemenceau dropped out of the Cabinet and Monsieur
Caillaux was no longer Minister of Finance.
It is not too much to say that the Clemenceau-Caillaux alliance dates
from this little upheaval in French internal politics, and it was at
this point that Monsieur Caillaux’s enmity to Monsieur Briand and
Monsieur Pichon first led him astray.
On August 2, 1909, the N’Goko Sanga Company, in reply to a letter
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs offered to give up, against a
substantial indemnity, a portion of the territory for which it held
concessions. A commission was formed to discuss terms, but it was not
till April 29, 1910, that the amount of the indemnity was definitely
stated. The indemnity was to be F2,393,000 or £95,720.
On February 17, 1910, after the French and German Governments had
signified in October of the year before their approval of the
provisional agreement between Monsieur Guiot and the Wilhelmstrasse,
the Moroccan Company of Public Works was formed. It had a capital of
F2,000,000, fifty per cent. of which was in French hands, twenty-six
per cent. in German hands, and the remaining twenty-four per cent. in
the hands of the other Powers who had signed the Act of Algeciras. Then
parliamentary politics in France had their say in the matter, and the
Radicals, Socialists and Radical-Socialists in France, with Monsieur
Caillaux in the foreground of debate, made use of the question of the
N’Goko Sanga indemnity as a weapon in Parliament against Monsieur
Briand.
In consequence of this, the summer of 1910 did not bring with it any
definite advance in the Franco-German understanding which had appeared
to be so full of promise. In November 1910, after the strike of railway
men had weakened the authority of the French Government somewhat,
the N’Goko Sanga question came up in Parliament once more, and the
Franco-German understanding on Moroccan affairs and the affairs of the
Congo became enveloped in an immense haze of words. By February 1911
the German negotiators began to show impatience, although on or about
the 15th of the month the Imperial Government had, to all practical
intent, agreed to allow, to a Franco-German company, concessions in
the German Cameroons. A fortnight after that, on February 28, 1911,
Monsieur Briand and his Cabinet were forced to resign. On March 3,
Monsieur Monis became Prime Minister of France, and Monsieur Caillaux
was his Minister of Finance. The Monis Cabinet found itself weighted
with immense responsibility. The situation in Morocco was extremely
difficult, and the French Government found itself on the horns of a
dilemma. On the one side were the promises made and the engagements
formed by the Governments in France which had preceded Monsieur Monis,
owing to which the Monis Cabinet was obliged, if it wished to remain
true to the policy on which it had gained power, to break with the line
of conduct followed by former French Cabinets in relation to Germany
for two years. On the other side was the very real danger of breaking,
without any other reason than that of internal politics, with the
pacific policy of the last twenty-four months.
The internal troubles in Morocco, making French military action a
necessity, put the French Government in the awkward position of giving
Germany the appearance of a real grievance by the military steps which
had to be taken, and the Pan-Germanists of course jumped at the pretext
for accusing France of laying forcible hands, or attempting to lay
forcible hands on Morocco in spite of all past treaties and agreements
and without ensuring to Germany the share which had been promised her
in 1909.
I would ask the reader of this book who has had the strength of will to
struggle with the tortuous paths of Franco-German difficulties which
led to the Agadir climax, to memorize this situation for the sake of
a clearer comprehension of what follows. On the one side two years of
Anglo-French negotiations which promised comparative peace for the
future; on the other, the sudden breaking off of all negotiations
and apparent disregard on the part of France for everything which
had smoothed over the situation before. The fact that the change of
policy had become a necessity owing to Cabinet changes in France and
the promises made by members of the new Cabinet to their constituents
could not be offered as a reason. At the best they could be offered as
an excuse, and it was this necessity of making excuses which enabled
the German Government to voice the claim for compensation which was
to result in a territorial loss which France will never forgive the
Ministers who were responsible, and which will make it difficult for
either of them to take leading parts in France’s government again for
many years to come.
The first thing which the Monis Cabinet did was to bulldose (it seems
the only word to use) the question of the Franco-German understandings
in Congo and Cameroon. This measure was taken in spite of warnings in
high quarters in France. President Fallières is known to have been
against the measure and to have expressed his views as forcibly as the
French Constitution allowed him to express them, and Monsieur Conty,
the director of political affairs in the French Foreign Office, was
distinctly adverse to the measure as well. Monsieur Conty knew that
for twenty years past, one of the principal pre-occupations of the
German Government was the African question, and he knew that the German
colonial party was very warmly supported by the Pan-Germanists, and had
considerable influence with the Kaiser himself.
On these grounds in a note which he handed to Monsieur Cruppi, Monsieur
Conty (who is now in 1914 the French Minister at Pekin) pointed out the
wire-pulling powers of the German interests in the Cameroon and Congo
companies, and warned the French Government that there was grave danger
to peace in ignoring their claims. He pointed out that while the
Kaiser was known to be pacific and conciliatory at the time, he might
be forced by the Pan-German and colonial interests to demonstrate again
as he had demonstrated once before at Tangier, and that the result was
almost bound to be France’s abandonment to Germany of advantages which
she might, by a show of generosity now, keep secure.
How right Monsieur Conty was Monsieur Caillaux himself was obliged to
admit nearly a year later when in the Senate he said: “I do not deny
that the rupture of the Franco-German partnership in Cameroon and the
Congo had diplomatic consequences.” Unfortunately at this time (March
1911) the principal pre-occupation of the Monis Cabinet was its desire
to break away from the policy of the Cabinet of Monsieur Briand to
which, logically, it should have adhered.
Monsieur Caillaux was credited at the time with one of those famous
epigrammatic outbursts of his which have done him harm on various
occasions, when, as this one must be, they are quoted against him. “We
really can’t have Briand’s policy mounted in diamonds and wear it as a
scarfpin,” Monsieur Caillaux is reported to have said. The epigram,
whether he made it or not—and I believe that he did make it—expresses
very neatly—far too neatly—the chief motive which underlay the policy
of the Monis Cabinet at that time, and which was the main cause of that
Cabinet’s stubborn opposition to the advice of Monsieur Conty and the
advice of the President of the Republic himself.
On March 29, in spite of an eloquent and perfectly constitutional
warning from Monsieur Fallières at a Cabinet Council, the Colonial
Minister in the Monis Cabinet, Monsieur Messimy, was instructed
to declare the consortium in Cameroon and the Congo arrangement
impossible. He made this declaration before the Budget committee at the
end of March and to the Chamber of Deputies on April 4. On April 3,
the French Government learned of serious trouble in Morocco. Several
tribes were rising, and military intervention became inevitable. German
irritation was growing. The German object, or at all events one of
Germany’s main objects, in the discussions and negotiations which began
in 1909 and broke off so suddenly and so dangerously in 1911 had been
to ensure a German share in the public works which were becoming
needful in Morocco. Germany had received as the price of a concession
to France an assurance that this share would be granted. In the
secret letter, which I have mentioned already, Germany admitted
the pre-eminence of French interests in Morocco, and approved the
constitution of a society of public works in which the German share of
capital was to be much smaller than the French share.
When the Monis-Caillaux-Cruppi Cabinet took the reins in France,
the German Government asked the French Government to intervene
semi-officially so that the promised interests of the German
shareholders should be properly protected. The French Government
refused. Such intervention would be equivalent, it was explained, to
admitting privilege or monopoly, and such an admission was against all
Radical principles.
The German Government, with great patience, pointed out that what was
really required was some sort of a guarantee that a French tender
should not be accepted to the prejudice of the German share of the
concessions. The question was one which lent itself to much discussion,
many words, long correspondence and wearisome delays, and presently
the question of the railways complicated it still further. In the
secret letter of 1909 it had been stipulated that the directors of the
Moroccan railways should be French. The German Government now claimed
that this clause should be taken to mean that _only the directors_ of
the railway lines should be Frenchmen and that a large proportion of
the subordinate railway servants should be German. Here again Monsieur
Caillaux’s unfortunate propensity for epigram did not forsake him.
“We can’t have German stationmasters in spiked helmets in the railway
stations of Morocco,” he said.
The French Government made no counter-proposal with regard to the
management of the Moroccan railways, and the Berlin Government remained
silent on the question. This silence gave all thinking men considerable
grounds for uneasiness. It was felt that a very thinly veiled
antagonism on all questions of detail was making itself very apparent
at the Wilhelmstrasse. There was no definite decision made with regard
to Moroccan mining rights either, and it was just about this time that
the claims and concessions of the Mannesmann Brothers began to be
spoken of.
The situation became quite critical, and there is no doubt that
the critical trend of the situation was due very largely to the
determination of the Monis Government not to “have Monsieur Briand’s
policy mounted as a scarfpin.” If Monsieur Cruppi and his colleagues
had been able to approve the convention with Germany for N’Goko Sanga
and the Congo which Monsieur Pichon had prepared, there would have been
no excuse for the remark which was made soon afterwards to the French
Ambassador in Berlin by Herr von Kiderlen Waechter. “When the railway
question fell through I saw that you had made your minds up not to work
in concert with us in any matter whatsoever.”
Things were going from bad to worse in Morocco itself, and French
troops had to be sent on the road to Fez. On April 3, 1911, the French
Government ordered French troops to co-operate with the Sultan in the
chastisement of rebel bands. On April 17 (President Fallières had left
for Tunis on the 15th), the French Government placed 2400 men at the
disposal of General Moinier. On April 23, a column was sent to the
suburbs of Fez and on May 21 the French tricolour floated beneath the
walls of the Moroccan capital.
The German Government said nothing, but a rumble of popular displeasure
was heard all over Germany. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter and the German
Chancellor received in stony silence the communication made by the
French Ambassador in Berlin, Monsieur Jules Cambon, that it had been
necessary to send French troops to Fez to protect French subjects and
to preserve order. German official newspapers announced, unofficially
but obviously on official inspiration, that Germany was about to resume
her freedom of action.
At this time there was question (it was about the end of April) of a
railway from the German Cameroons to the Belgian Congo. The line would
of course, as a glance at the map shows, have to run through the French
Congo. For the moment it looked as though there was a loophole for
agreement which might lead to others, in this German line across French
territory. This hope disappeared however, and in May 1911 the Agadir
_coup_ was decided on. Germany realized that the only way of obtaining
“compensation” was a threat. The _Panther_ went to Agadir. The French
Ambassador had a conversation with the German Secretary of State at
Kissingen. The German Press was howling. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter
answered Monsieur Jules Cambon’s question as to what Germany wanted,
in these words: “See what you can give us in the Congo.” A few days
later the Monis Cabinet fell, the Caillaux Cabinet came into power,
and the _Panther_ and the _Berlin_ arrived off Agadir. The question of
compensation had become acute.
At the beginning of July 1911, English opinion was favourable to
Germany’s desires. The Potsdam agreement had soothed Russian fears in
the East, France’s march on Fez had excited Spain and made her uneasy,
and Italy was beginning to cast greedy eyes on Tripoli. There was
very little protest internationally, at first at all events, when the
_Panther_ and the _Berlin_ went to Agadir. Monsieur de Selves, the
French Foreign Minister, left Paris for Holland on July 3. On July 4,
Monsieur Caillaux, who as Prime Minister took over the Foreign Office
while Monsieur de Selves was away, instructed Monsieur Paul Cambon
to advise the British Government that France would make no immediate
retort to the threat of Germany off Agadir. Monsieur Caillaux gave
these instructions in direct opposition to the opinion of Monsieur de
Selves which he expressed very clearly in a long telegram from Holland
to Paris.
In spite of this telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
Monsieur Caillaux telegraphed to Monsieur Paul Cambon as follows:
“The German Government has invited us to enter into conversation with
regard to Moroccan affairs. We must therefore ask the German Government
first of all to explain the object of this conversation. According to
the reply of the German Government it will be time, after it has been
made, for us to decide whether we should make a naval demonstration in
the southern waters of Morocco. I beg you therefore to avoid advising
the British Government of any intention for the moment on our part of
sending warships either to Agadir or to Mogador.”
The British Cabinet had been asked by Monsieur Paul Cambon, on the
instructions of Monsieur de Selves, as to England’s intentions, but
before a reply was given Monsieur Caillaux’s telegram had arrived.
The Russian Government remained passive. Germany realized that her
bluff would not be called. On July 7 Monsieur de Selves returned from
Holland, and Herr von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris made the
first suggestion of “compensation.” France, in principle, was not
averse to compensation of a kind. If it was to be a question of the
Congo she asked Germany to explain what she wanted.
There was no objection in Paris to a rectification of the Cameroon
frontier line, but France wanted to know what Germany was prepared
to do in exchange in Morocco. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter on July 30
suggested that an agreement which should follow the lines of the 1909
understanding might be possible. Monsieur de Selves immediately asked,
through Monsieur Jules Cambon, for a written note explaining and
setting forth this suggestion. It was not till July 15 that the French
Government knew what the German demands really were, and decided that
on such lines as the cession of all Gabon and all the Congo between the
ocean and the Sanga it was quite useless to continue talking. English
opinion became uneasy at Germany’s demands.
Lord Morley wrote in the _Times_ on July 19, “If we do not learn by
other means what is going on at Agadir, public opinion may be that we
ought to go and see for ourselves.”
Belgian opinion became alarmed at the menace to the Belgian Congo.
On July 21, Sir Edward Grey spoke very clearly and Mr. Lloyd George
declared the same evening that war was better than peace with
humiliation. He added that the safety of Great Britain’s commerce
overseas was no question of party, and that the national honour was
at stake. England to a man showed that it was prepared to back France
against the German demands. The Franco-British Entente Cordiale, which
had been asleep for a fortnight, became more wideawake than ever. Mr.
Asquith described the situation as “extremely difficult.”