COAL
BY GEORGE S. RICE AND FRANK F. GROUT
USES OF COAL
Coal is among the most important of all minerals. It furnishes power
and heat, and its distillation yields a great number of useful
materials, such as gas for lighting and fuel, explosives, ammonia,
aniline dyes, etc. Coke, which is bituminous coal with the more
volatile constituents removed by distillation, is used for smelting
metallic ores; and thus the contiguity of fields of high-grade coking
coal and of iron ore determined the location of the centers of steel
industry, which are the very main-springs of our modern machine-made
civilization. Near such coal districts, other manufactures of all kinds
naturally developed, the coal being cheaply available for power and
constituting practically the only source of power in regions where
cheap hydro-electric power is not available. About 66 per cent. of the
coal mined goes to the production of power, including transportation;
about 12 per cent. to coking and the by-products; and about 22 per
cent. to the heating of buildings.
Commercial coal is of three varieties: (1) anthracite (Pennsylvania
anthracite is popularly termed hard coal), and semi-anthracite
containing a high percentage of fixed carbon and a relatively low
percentage of the volatile constituents (3 to 12 per cent.); (2)
bituminous (ambiguously termed “soft coal” in the United States),
containing less fixed carbon and more volatile matter (12 to 40 per
cent.); and (3) lignite, containing a still smaller proportion of
fixed carbon and a large proportion of water. Of the bituminous coals,
some coke satisfactorily, but many do not, so that good coking coals
are highly prized. Anthracite, because it makes no smoke, is in great
demand for house heating; whereas bituminous coal is chiefly used for
power production, including locomotive and steamship firing. Lignites
as a rule are used only where the better grades of coal are not
available.
Coal was first used for heating before steam power came into use, and
iron was smelted with charcoal instead of with coke as at present.
Ship bunkering calls for the best grades of bituminous coal, low in
ash and preferably high in fixed carbon, because the use of low-grade
coals would require carrying larger amounts, leaving less space for
cargo. However, no country that has enough coal to bunker ships, need
be dependent on foreign supplies; the low grade of coal would simply
reduce efficiency and thus increase expense.
=Substitutes.=--The proportion of coal used for power, as distinct
from that used for heat and coal products, is increasing, and is now
two-thirds of the total. As a source of power there is really no
complete substitute for coal. All the great industrial nations, like
England, Germany and the United States, have developed their industries
on the basis of large coal supplies. Some countries make large use of
hydro-electric power, but for most it is an insufficient substitute.
Wood and other fuels are rarely sufficient to maintain an industry
built up on a supply of coal. Oil is being successfully substituted in
some industries, notably in shipping, but the importance of coaling
stations will no doubt persist.
CHANGES IN PRACTICE
The technique of coal mining in many districts, and the development of
heat, power and coal products are not far advanced. Wasteful methods
are used, mostly as a result of competition and lack of co-operation
and organization among producers. Economies are being advocated,
however. Labor-saving machinery has been installed in many mines. A
number of power plants have been erected near the mine mouth and the
power distributed electrically, thus eliminating freight charges on
coal. Central heating and power plants that can burn coal efficiently
will no doubt be more popular and numerous in a few years. Government
control and legislation may be expected to hasten the changes. In
Europe the technique of coal mining, except in undercutting machinery,
is further advanced than in the United States, as regards mining _all_
the coal and in supporting the surface.
Improvements in coking ovens may soon make possible the manufacture
of some sort of coke from almost any bituminous coal. While all coke
may not be satisfactory for modern blast-furnace practice, any future
lack of coke will probably be offset by the development of electric
smelting, so the seriousness of the metallurgical need is doubtful. The
proportion of by-product coke ovens, which make for cheaper coke by
providing for other marketable products, is increasing.
GEOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION
Coals are found in the sedimentary deposits of several geological eras:
Paleozoic, Mesozoic, and Tertiary. The Paleozoic era, embracing the
Carboniferous period, is by far the most important as regards quality
and availability of its coal resources; but the lower-grade and chiefly
lignitic coals of the Mesozoic and Tertiary are of great importance
locally, and there are enormous reserves that exceed in quantity the
generally higher-grade coals of the earlier periods.
The geologic distribution of coal is described in “The Coal Resources
of the World,” the most important and comprehensive compilation on coal
reserves ever made, which was undertaken by the Executive Committee of
the Twelfth International Geologic Congress, held in Canada in 1913. As
the compilation was made with the assistance of geological surveys and
mining geologists of the several countries of the world, it is cited in
this paper as authoritative on geologic distribution and resources.
The geographic distribution of the chief coal fields of the world is
shown in Plate II.
In _North America_ the most important coals in the Central and Eastern
part are of Paleozoic age, but in the Rocky Mountain region vast
quantities of coal occur in the Cretaceous (Mesozoic) strata. In the
Gulf province and in the Northern Great Plains province of the United
States, which extends into Canada, are coals of Triassic (Mesozoic) age
that are relatively unimportant at present.
In beds of the Eocene period of the Tertiary era are large deposits
of brown lignite locally converted by mountain-building forces into
bituminous and semi-bituminous coal, and also a little anthracite under
difficult mining conditions. Such locally altered beds are found in the
State of Washington, in British Columbia, and in Alaska.
The limited coal resources of _South America_, in those deposits east
of the Andes and in southern and eastern Brazil, are of Paleozoic age.
Small areas of Tertiary coals are found in southern Argentina and in
Chile.
Key to Plate II.
World’s Coal Reserves as of 1916--Coal Fields in Solid Black.
1. Countries possessing coal reserves of the first magnitude
(4,000,000 million to 1,000,000 million tons): The United States
(3,527,000 million), Canada (1,234,000 million), and China (1,500,000
million).
2. Countries possessing coal reserves of the second degree of
magnitude (500,000 million to 100,000 million): The British Isles
(189,533 million), Germany (before the war) (423,356 million),
Siberia (173,879 million), and Australia (165,572 million).
3. Countries possessing coal reserves of the third degree of
magnitude (80,000 million to 16,000 million tons): France (before
the war) (17,583 million), Alaska (16,293 million), Colombia (27,000
million), Austria-Hungary (before the war) (55,553 million), Russia
in Europe (before the war) (60,106 million), India (79,001 million),
Indo-China (20,000 million) and South Africa (56,200 million).
4. Countries possessing coal reserves of the fourth degree of
magnitude (16,000 million to 6,000 million tons): Spain (8,768
million), Japan (7,970 million), Belgium (11,000 million),
Spitzbergen (8,750 million).
5. Countries possessing coal reserves, but of inferior magnitude
(less than 4,000 million tons): Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru,
Ecuador, Venezuela, Greenland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Italy,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Roumania, Asia Minor, Persia, Arabia,
various islands of Malaysia and various countries in Africa. Coal
fields shown in black--country not shaded.
[Illustration: PLATE II.--Geographical distribution of the coal
deposits of the world, and relative reserves. By F. F. Grout.]
In _Europe_ the principal coal deposits occur in the Carboniferous
system, either in the upper or the lower part. The Lower Carboniferous
is the principal series in which coals occur in Scotland, whereas the
most important coals in England and in Wales lie in Upper Carboniferous
rocks. In northern France, in Belgium, and in Westphalia, Germany, the
middle Carboniferous measures contain the most important reserves.
Mesozoic coals are found in northern Australia and in central France.
The lignites or brown coals of middle Europe are locally very important
in Germany; those of Austria are found in numerous small but thick
deposits of the Tertiary age.
[Illustration: FIG. 3.--Coal output of the chief coal-producing
countries, 1880-1916.]
The principal coal resources of _Africa_ are in the southern part
of the continent and are chiefly in deposits whose ages range from
Carboniferous to Triassic.
In _Asia_ the coal fields are not well defined. There are coal basins
of note in India and China. In China important coals are found in the
Upper Carboniferous. Coals of the Lower Carboniferous are found east
of the Urals and also in Turkestan. In Japan the Mesozoic coals are
important. Tertiary coals are widely distributed in Asia but are not
high-grade nor of importance.
It may be safely stated that geological reconnoissance has covered
the world so well that further development is not likely to disclose
coal resources of great magnitude not now known with more or less
exactitude. Estimates of resources of some regions will undoubtedly be
revised many times, especially those of reserves in the middle portion
of Africa, in South America, and China.
COAL PRODUCTION OF THE WORLD IN 1913
As the great World War began on July 31, 1914, the last normal
production figures were for 1913. The following table of the world’s
production of coal for the years 1911-1914 is from “Mineral Resources”
of the U. S. Geological Survey, the compilation being credited by Mr.
Lesher, of the Survey, to Mr. Wm. G. Gray, statistician of the American
Iron and Steel Institute, and Prof. G. A. Roush, editor of “Mineral
Industry.”
The output (1880-1916) of the chief coal-producing countries of the
world is shown graphically in Figure 3.
TABLE 4.--THE WORLD’S PRODUCTION OF COAL (IN SHORT TONS)
-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------
Country | 1911 | 1912 | 1913 | 1914
-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------
United States| 496,371,126| 534,466,580| 569,960,219| 513,525,477
Great Britain| 304,518,927| 291,666,299| 321,922,130| 297,698,617
Germany | 259,223,763| 281,979,467| 305,714,664| 270,594,952
Austria- | | | |
Hungary | 54,960,298| 56,954,579| 59,647,957|
France | 43,242,778| 45,534,448| 45,108,544|
Russia | 29,361,764| 33,775,754| 35,500,674|
Belgium | 25,411,917| 25,322,851| 25,196,869|
Japan | 19,436,536| 21,648,902| 23,988,292| 21,700,572
India | 13,494,573| 16,471,100| 18,163,856|
China | 16,534,500| 16,534,500|[5]15,432,200|
Canada | 11,323,388| 14,512,829| 15,115,089| 13,597,982
New South | | | |
Wales | 9,374,596| 10,897,134| 11,663,865| 11,644,476
Transvaal | 4,343,680| [6]8,119,288| 5,225,036|
Spain | 4,316,245| 4,559,453| 4,731,647|
Natal | 2,679,551| See note 6| 2,898,726|
New Zealand | 2,315,390| 2,438,929| 2,115,834|
Holland | 1,628,097| 1,901,902| 2,064,608|
Chile | 1,277,191| 1,470,917| 1,362,334|
Queensland | 998,556| 1,010,426| 1,162,497| 1,180,825
Mexico | [5]1,400,000| 982,396| |
Bosnia and | | | |
Herzegovina | 848,510| 940,174| 927,244|
Turkey | 799,168| 909,293| |
Italy | 614,132| 731,720| 772,802|
Victoria | 732,328| 664,334| 668,524|
Orange Free | | | |
State (Orange| | | |
River Colony)| 482,690| | 609,973|
Dutch East | | | |
Indies | [5]600,000| 622,669| 453,136|
Indo-China | [5]460,000| 471,259| |
Serbia | 335,495| 335,000| |
Sweden | 343,707| 397,149| 401,199|
Western | | | |
Australia | [5]300,000| 330,488| 351,687|
Peru | [5]300,000| 307,461| 301,970|
Formosa | 280,999| 306,941| |
Bulgaria | 270,410| 324,511| |
Rhodesia | 212,529| 216,140| 237,728|
Roumania | 266,784| | |
Cape Colony | | | |
(Cape of Good| | | |
Hope) | 89,023| See note 6| 67,481|
Korea | 138,508| | |
Tasmania | [5]70,000| 59,987| 61,648| 68,130
British | | | |
Borneo | [5]100,000| | 49,762|
Spitzbergen | 44,092| | |
Brazil | 16,535| | |
Portugal | [5]10,000| 16,938| 27,053|
Venezuela | [5]10,000| [5]12,000| 13,355|
Switzerland | 8,267| | |
Philippine | | | |
Islands | [5]2,000| 2,998| |
Unspecified | [5]1,016,947| | |
-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------
Total |1,309,565,000|1,377,000,000|1,478,000,000|1,346,000,000
| [7] | [7] | [7] |
-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------
[5] Estimated.
[6] Transvaal included Natal and Cape of Good Hope.
[7] Approximate.
TABLE 5.--RESERVES
Total coal reserves in millions of metric tons have been estimated, by
continents, as follows:
Continent Millions of tons
North America 5,073,000
Asia 1,280,000
Europe 784,000
Australia and Oceania 170,000
Africa 58,000
South America 32,000
The countries on pre-war basis having the greatest reserves are as
follows:
Country Millions of tons
United States (half lignite) 3,527,000
Canada (three-fourths lignite) 1,234,000
China 996,000 to 1,500,000
British Isles 190,000
Siberia (largely lignite) 173,000
Germany (including Upper Silesia and the Saar) 423,000
New South Wales 118,000
India 79,000
Russia including Dombrova field (Poland) 60,000
Austria (chiefly in Bohemia, Silesia and Galicia) 54,000
France 17,600
[Illustration: FIG. 4.--Coal reserves of chief producing countries,
according to “Coal Resources of the World,” in millions of metric tons.
Squares are to scale: lines showing relative production are not on same
scale as squares.]
The reserves of the principal productive coal fields are graphically
shown in Figure 4.
The distribution of the coal deposits of the world and the estimated
reserves in these deposits are shown in Plate II.
GENERAL WORLD SITUATION
The districts with coal for export have been chiefly the British Isles,
United States and Germany; there might be included also New South
Wales, British South Africa, Japan, French Indo-China, Canada, New
Zealand and Spitzbergen. China, with her large reserves, may become an
exporter in the future; or, if her industries develop, may find use for
her coal at home.
Anthracite of good grade is found in large amounts in Pennsylvania and
South Wales only. Poorer supplies are known in Germany, France, Italy,
Indo-China, and also in the states of Colorado and New Mexico.
Coking coals in large amounts are found in the eastern United States,
Germany and the United Kingdom and are coked extensively. Smaller
amounts of coke are made in France, Belgium and old Austria. Relatively
very small amounts are made in Canada, Chile, New South Wales, Japan
and Spain.
The coal reserve of a country bears no direct relation to its present
production, for the latter, which has to be developed in competition
with other countries, depends upon relative facility of transportation
and proximity of iron-ore deposits, which render steel making and other
industries economically feasible.
_Great Britain_ is particularly favored through the possession of
high-grade coal immediately adjacent to coast ports, as in the North
of England, Scotland and Wales. Hence Great Britain became a great
exporter of coal. First, coal for heating purposes traveled by sea
from Newcastle to London; next coal was carried to European ports, and
finally to all parts of the world. The possession of easily worked iron
deposits in the north of England and the discovery that iron could
be smelted with coke rapidly accelerated the development of the coal
industry in Great Britain, so that by the middle of the nineteenth
century Great Britain had a commanding lead.
No other country possesses high-grade coal in such quantity immediately
adjacent to the coast, and this fact has enabled Great Britain to
remain the great exporter. The average length of haul of export coal,
from mine to ship, is less than 20 miles. In Germany coal for ocean
export must be hauled 118 miles to 168 miles; in the United States
from 150 to 375 miles, except for Washington coals, which are within
40 miles of tidewater, but are small in quantity and of indifferent
quality.
After the war with France in 1871, when _Germany_ annexed Alsace
and Lorraine, the coal industry of the German Empire developed
with tremendous rapidity, largely through the discovery--from the
investigations of Thomas, of Great Britain--of a method of utilizing
the high-phosphorus iron ores of German and French Lorraine, and the
nearness of these iron-ore deposits to the high-grade bituminous coals
of Westphalia. The coal industry was also developed by fostering the
export trade with adjacent countries, which have small coal resources
or none, this trade nearly all going by rail.
However, the long rail haul and the correspondingly high cost of mining
have retarded the ocean export business of Germany, in spite of the
fostering care of the government. With the transfer of practically all
its iron deposits and its important Lorraine potash deposits, as well
as the ownership of its Saar coal mines, to France, and the possible
loss of its Upper Silesian coal and zinc deposits to Poland, the
balance of commercial prosperity, as well, may be handed over.
No other countries except the United States, Canada, Australia and
China have reserves for extensive export trade. In _Canada_ the coals
are mostly inland, and those near the coast, as on Vancouver Island and
in Nova Scotia, are limited in quantity and difficult to mine, so that
export business is perforce restricted.
One change that seems likely is a rapid increase in output of coal
in _China_. The resources are enormous, the reserves of the higher
classes of coal being surpassed by those of no country but the United
States. The ambitious and aggressive Japanese, with their strategic
neighboring location, have given every indication that they will take
advantage of an opportunity to develop such a resource. It may be a
question how soon Chinese coal will be developed, but great changes are
inevitable when development begins. Some of the coal fields are so near
the coast and have coals of such good quality as to permit an extensive
development of export business in the Orient.
_Australia_, particularly in Queensland and New South Wales, has coal
resources that are considerable, in comparison with the needs of the
small population. In New South Wales the coals are excellent and are
adjacent or close to harbors, so that the coal is extensively supplied
for bunkerage and export trade to the South Pacific and has become a
large factor in the ocean trade of that part of the world.
A large factor in the coal trade of the Pacific Ocean is the carrying
of coal as return cargo. This is also important in South American
trade. South Africa during the war sent considerable coal to the
western Mediterranean, but its coal cannot be a large factor in ocean
trade in normal times.
Of all the continents South America is the poorest in coal resources.
There is coal in _Brazil_ and _Chile_ and other South American
countries, but it is difficult to reach and the fields so far known
do not give promise of being able to take care of the needs of the
countries in which they occur. The total annual production of South
America is less than two million tons, mostly from Chile. It is
probable that for the next generation South America will continue to
import coal as it has in the past, to the extent of 15 million tons or
more per annum, although developments in Brazil are now promising for
that country’s future supply. For estimates of reserves, see Table 5.
=Summary.=--By way of summary, it may be said that the United States
leads the world in coal resources; moreover, its resources are most
immediately available, because of their shallow depth and general
undisturbed (geologic) condition and their accessibility through
railway systems. This is particularly true in the Appalachian region,
which contains by far the best coal, is the nearest to the coast, and
hence is the most available for ocean trade. On the other hand, the
average haul to export points, as already noted, is far greater than
that of Great Britain and greater than that of Westphalia; but to
offset this the coal has been and can be mined more cheaply than in
either Westphalia or Great Britain. The resources of Upper Silesia are
large, and the coal is easily mined, but the output will all be needed
for central Europe. As regards both quality and quantity, Pennsylvania
anthracite is unique; nevertheless, the home needs will continue to
be a brake on extensive exports. United States steam and coking coals
available for shipment average a little poorer than the corresponding
coals of Great Britain, but are superior to the German coals.
The total resources of Great Britain, possible, actual, and probable,
are only 190,000 million tons, as contrasted with 423,000 million tons
in the old German Empire and 3,838,000 million tons in the United
States.
=Probable Future Production.=--The possible depletion of coal resources
is of course important in considering the future, but it can be safely
stated that in none of the principal fields now being mined are the
resources so depleted that the output therefrom will be reduced for
another generation at least.
Of the great coal-producing countries, Great Britain, with its
increasing rate of production, most nearly approaches the point of
ultimate depletion, but that point has been variously placed at one
hundred to several hundred years in the future, much depending upon
whether with better methods of use the output will continue to increase
at the same rate as in the past. Meantime, certain areas in Great
Britain with shallower coal beds will be depleted much sooner and the
remaining coal will become more and more difficult to get, because of
the increasing depth of mining, which in turn will cause a continually
increasing cost.
Although the exhaustion of coal is a distant prospect, there are clear
signs of the approaching exhaustion of certain grades of coal. It has
been estimated that the output of American anthracite will seriously
decline in 60 to 100 years. Probably this will result in a change in
practice, the use of coke, and other methods of house heating. If the
rate of production continues to increase, high-grade American steam
coal, New River and similar grades, will probably be exhausted in a
little over 150 years. American coking coal of the best Connellsville
quality is of equally short duration. British coal of similar high
grade may last longer than American, as the production rate is less
rapid, even though the total American coal should last much longer than
the British.
POLITICAL CONTROL
In several countries state ownership of coal mines is established;
as, for example, in parts of Prussia, Australia, Chile and Bulgaria.
In others the undeveloped coal lands are still largely owned by the
government, as in Alaska and the western United States. In some
countries the government retains control of all mineral rights, simply
leasing the property and granting a mining concession. Many governments
have a department or administration of mines. In every country, of
course, in an emergency, the sovereign state would exercise control of
coal resources as fully as was necessary. Where the state owns mines,
and favors organization, as in Germany, the more drastic regulation of
war time is easily effected. It is quite possible that coal may in time
be generally considered a public utility.
In England a movement toward nationalization of mines, with miners as
well as the government having a hand in the control, seems to be making
progress.
England’s colonies excel all others in extent of coal resources.
There is coal in Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa,
Rhodesia, Newfoundland, South Nigeria and British North Borneo--the
total being many times greater than that in the British Isles. The
colonies and possessions of France, Denmark, Portugal, United States
and Japan have relatively small amounts of coal.
Coal resources, along with other raw materials, have been influenced by
some trade treaties. However, no permanent advantage in commerce has
been secured to any nation by a trade treaty. Nearly all such treaties
are made for short periods and renewed. If not satisfactory to one
party they are soon corrected. Various informal or tacit agreements
might be mentioned. When shipping was scarce during the war, England
and the United States divided the coal business of South America
according to the requirements of ship economy. Germany made agreements
to send coal to Austria-Hungary and Switzerland during the period of
the war. England had agreements with France, Spain, Portugal and Italy,
these agreements changing with conditions, about supplies of English
coal.
COMMERCIAL CONTROL
Although the ownership of mines in most countries is nominally open to
citizens and aliens alike, exceptions and restrictions tend to keep
the control in the hands of citizens. For example, it is impossible
for foreigners to control any mining company in Japan. Concessions
in Holland and the Dutch colonies are limited to Dutch subjects and
in Bolivia to Bolivian citizens. The legislation suggested since the
outbreak of the World War may develop a similar condition in the
possessions of Great Britain and those of her allies.
In peace the relations of two countries may be largely determined by
the ownership of property; owners of property in a foreign country may
strongly influence the policy of the two governments toward each other.
In emergencies, the political and the commercial control are put to the
test, and there results either a deadlock or the victory of one over
the other.
An important commercial relation exercising political influence is
the incorporation of companies under the laws of different countries.
Mining companies in China, like the Kailan Mining Administration,
organize at Hong Kong to obtain British protection and are thus subject
to British control, in spite of the fact that Belgian money finances
the company. Some companies organized in Japan may also own Chinese
coal mines.
As relatively few regions of the world have coal in excess of their
own needs, the larger number are dependent on imports. If a country
with coal controls also steamship lines, it may completely control the
coal situation in the importing country. England, with about half the
total world’s shipping and a good supply of seaport coal, has been in a
position to dominate coal exports, even to handling the excess American
coal. During the last three or four years the scarcity of shipping
has given increased importance to American and Japanese shipping, but
the English still exert a strong influence. Their docks and storage
facilities are the best, and their ships are still numerous.
Railroad shipping rights over the National Lines in _Mexico_ give a
certain amount of control over the coal industry. The National Lines
are state owned and have a special agreement giving trackage rights to
two companies, the American Smelting and Refining Co., and the Peñoles
Company, of German ownership. Since the Mexican railway service has
been disturbed, the German company has been operating with cars and
engines of its own. It has many coke ovens and large coal reserves,
and has been the chief competitor of the American company in Mexican
metallurgy.
No patent is likely to limit coal industries, except as regards the
by-products of coke. Before the war, coal-tar products were largely
developed by Germans, who patented their processes in many countries,
but offered no such protection to foreign inventions by patents in
Germany. They limited production chiefly to their German plants, and
exported about $50,000,000 worth a year.
During the war, these patents in the United States were taken over by
the Alien Property Custodian, and the American industries that sprung
up in consequence may be permanently protected. Other allied countries
took the same steps to free themselves from German control, which has
retarded the development of the by-product coke industry in non-German
countries.
In _Germany_ the large mining companies generally own the coal rights.
The only government that has mined coal on a commercial scale and
for commercial purposes is Germany, and even there the government
production covered only a small part of the total output of the German
Empire. Mines of the Saar coal field and a group of mines in the Upper
Silesian field owned by the Prussian government have been the only
extensive state-operated mines of the world, and now, under the terms
of the Treaty of Peace, the ownership of the Saar mines will pass to
France. (The details are given on p. 39).
On the other hand, the government exercised a quiet but real control
over the whole German coal industry. Through its ownership of the
Koenigen Louise mines it acted as a member of the Upper Silesian coal
syndicate. Formerly, through its ownership of the Saar mines, it was
also a member of the Westphalian coal syndicate, but whether a member
or not it practically approved the syndicate operations and the fixing
of prices in advance; also, it co-operated with the syndicate in
hauling the latter’s coal over state-owned railway systems. In certain
undeveloped coal fields in Germany, the northern extension of the
Westphalian field, the Prussian government retains most of the coal
rights.
The Rhenish Westphalian coal syndicate is a classic example of a great
interlocking trade combination. Capitalized at $571,000, it covered an
enormous capitalization of individual members. The mines have votes in
proportion to production, which in turn is limited for certain periods.
Prices are fixed and coal is marketed for the syndicate as a unit, but
other affairs are left to the companies. The syndicate as a whole is
a member of a transporting and exporting combine, and disposes of its
product through a combine of coal dealers. The several minor combines
interlock and are practically merged in a larger organization, the
Kohlen Kontor. Thus the combination had exceptional power to study
the various problems of the industry, and became very powerful. It
maintains a research department and an explosion testing gallery near
Dortmund. In several countries German companies through the control of
advertising contracts have been able to influence the editorial policy
of the leading newspapers, even during the war. Over half of the German
coal mined before and during the war was syndicate coal. All of the
600 other German cartels have not been as moderate in their action and
regulations as the coal syndicate. When the coal syndicate, however,
at one time, found it could not supply its German market with coal, it
is reported to have bought inferior British coal for its customers,
so that they would not themselves get good British coal and refuse to
return to the German supply.
Efforts were made by the cartel to absorb and control foreign coal
trade, where political and financial reasons served to render this
advisable, and therefore these efforts were out of all proportion to
the intrinsic value of the trade. When it was planned to capture such
a trade, the German-invented “dumping” system was used, coal being
sold cheaper abroad than it could be sold or produced at home, the
difference being met by export bonuses. This German dumping became so
serious in some countries, as Canada, New Zealand and South Africa,
that special import duties were imposed to counteract it. When
desirable, the syndicate purchased collieries abroad, including even a
South Yorkshire plant in England, the Heraclea collieries, in Turkey,
and many mines in Australia.
In _Great Britain_ is a powerful coal combine, the Cambria, closely
allied with great shipping concerns. An important trade asset in this
organization, like that in the German cartel, is a banking connection
by which the combine can offer long-term credit.
Coal syndicates are mentioned in Belgium. Some sort of central
organization interested in coal is known in Italy, Russia,
Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Greece, Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador.
THE SITUATION IN FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES
_France_ has a modified form of ownership of coal resources: this was
vested formerly in the Crown and now in the Republic. The government
gives concessions for mining the mineral and charges a royalty. The
mineral is not considered to be owned by the surface owner or by
the original surface owner, as is the case in all other important
countries. The concessions granted are liberal and for large areas.
The royalty or rental is small and is now paid on the basis of so much
per superficial unit of area (hectare) in the concession, but the
chief returns received by the public are through a percentage of the
net earnings, that is, earnings available for dividends. Under the
conditions prevailing in France the system seems eminently fair, and
the undertakings have been profitable both to the operators and to the
country. The books of the company are open to inspection by government
officials, and the annual reports are published in detail. The system
virtually makes the government a partner in the business.
In _Great Britain_ most of the coal ownership is vested in entailed
estates, and the royalties are a shilling a ton and upwards.
Both private and government ownership exist in the _United States_.
Throughout the greater part of the country the large operating
companies own the coal rights, although in the anthracite district of
Pennsylvania the fortunate owners of the surface, or their assigns,
receive large royalties, 25 to 50 cents a ton. In the Middle West most
of the operators have bought the coal rights from the surface owners.
When leased, the royalty is relatively small, 2 to 6¹⁄₄ cents a ton.
Operators in the Rocky Mountains generally own the coal they mine.
The government has sold the coal rights, but the state school lands
of Colorado and Wyoming have generally been leased at royalties of
about 10 cents a ton. In Oklahoma the Five Civilized Tribes have until
recently, under government control, leased their lands and coal rights
at about 10 cents per ton, but these rights are now being sold.
In the State of Washington a considerable amount of the bituminous coal
district now opened is owned by the Northern Pacific Railway, which
secured these lands as grants when the railroad was constructed. The
royalty is about 15 to 25 cents a ton.
In Alaska in the Matanuska and Bering River bituminous fields, and
in the Nenana lignite field, the government has offered the coal
for leasing purposes at 2 cents a ton for the first period, under
restrictions providing for conservation of coal and reasonable prices
to consumers. Some units have been taken up in the Matanuska and Bering
River fields, but, as the measures are badly contorted and the coal
beds difficult to trace, progress has been slow and production has
scarcely begun. Temporarily, the Alaskan Railway Commission is working
some mines at Chickaloon and Eska Creek, to obtain a supply of coal
pending the development of other mines by lessees. Congress, in opening
the coal lands in the Matanuska and Bering River fields for leasing,
has reserved tracts of not exceeding 7,680 acres and 5,120 acres
respectively for the use of the Navy.
The United States still owns large areas of coal and lignite lands in
the western states. Most of these lands are remote from railroads and
difficult of access, but they contain enormous reserves. At present,
outside of Alaska, only one mine, the Gebo mine, Gebo, Wyoming, is
leased by the government, but extension of a leasing system similar to
that of Alaska has been recently effected.
In the United States the anthracite industry is well organized, and its
railroad connections make it notably efficient and powerful. Bituminous
coal, on the other hand, is so widely distributed on both public and
private lands that no private organization has attempted to control
the industry. Such control has always been opposed by Congress and the
general public.
Except during the war, neither Great Britain nor the United States has
attempted any control over commercial mining and the sale of coal.
Each country created a fuel administration, and the coal was shipped
under government instructions and paid for at prices fixed by the
fuel administration. In the United States this government control has
practically disappeared with the war, but in England the Coal Control
has so far been continued, and the tendency is for the government to
retain for the present a strong guiding hand on the various “key”
industries. Certainly, in the final analysis, coal mining is a public
utility and should be supervised and adjusted by the government
accordingly, allowing free latitude for private initiative.
Of the important coal-producing countries, only the German Empire,
more or less openly, has fostered in peace times the coal industry and
to some extent controlled it. In France there was only an indirect
control, through the control by the government of the concessions and
taxation of revenues and through tacit knowledge of the operations
of the French coal syndicate, which ostensibly at least obtains and
disseminates information and conducts mine safety investigations. In
the United States, Great Britain, and other countries free competition
has been permitted. Free competition does not seem serious in countries
like France, where the supply of coal is limited, but it has had more
or less serious financial effects where the supply of coal has been
very large. In Germany before the formation of the syndicates the coal
mining industry had periods of overproduction and serious financial
depression; and at other, rarer, periods there was great prosperity.
In Great Britain there have been similar times of depression and
prosperity, but generally the business has been profitable.
In the United States, except in the anthracite district, where for
more than twenty years the operations have been in the hands of
comparatively few companies, depression and prosperity have alternated
rapidly. The statistics obtained by the census show that the average
profits of the bituminous industry prior to 1917 were smaller than
those of any other great industry, and this has had an unfortunate
effect on the best development of the coal resources. The companies
generally have had little or no surplus to develop properly in the
lean years; hence they have mined only the best or thickest coal, and
in short periods of great prosperity many mines not directly owned by
the railroads and steel companies have been worked so as to lead to
“squeezes” and great loss of coal. Moreover, these conditions have
also been unfortunate for labor; in times of prosperity too many new
mines were opened, because of the tremendous and easily accessible
resources, and in times of depression the number of days the miners
worked has been so reduced that their monthly or yearly earnings have
been low enough to make their living a hard one. The average number of
days worked per year from 1901 to 1915 was 213. Some system of limited
control of trade combinations by the government would appear to be
highly advantageous for both the operators and the miners, and should
insure a steady supply of coal to the consumers and steady prices with
reasonable profits.
As regards trade relations between the United States and other
countries concerning fuel supplies, except for a possible agreement on
non-subsidy of the coal-carrying shipping, any attempt at a general
agreement on so vital a necessity as coal seems unwise, except for
non-duplication of elaborate coal storage and rehandling plants in
ports requiring small tonnages, and preventing ruinous competition
by systematic “dumping” of surplus coal to drive a competitor out of
business.
Of all the continents, South America has the smallest coal resources.
Although there is coal in _Brazil_ and _Chile_ and other South American
countries, it is difficult to reach, and the fields so far known do not
give promise of being able to take care of the needs of the countries
in which they occur.
=The Coal Situation as Affected by the War.=--Immediately after the
opening of the war in Europe, July 31, 1914, the German military forces
attacked and advanced in the east through Russian Poland, promptly
securing the important Dombrova field, which is an extension of the
Upper Silesian coal fields. The German forces also advanced in the west
through the Belgian coal fields and thence through the extension of
these fields in northern France, at the same time seizing the important
Briey iron-ore deposits north of Verdun.
The economic effect of these advances was of enormous importance in
securing all the productive coal mines of Belgium, the most productive
coal mines of Russia, and most of the coal fields of northern France.
The French coal and iron mines seized produced one-half of the coal
output of France (20 million tons out of 40 million tons), and 95 per
cent. (20 million tons) of the output of iron ore. Necessarily under
these conditions France had to rely upon England and the United States
to meet the military and economic need for iron, leaning chiefly upon
Great Britain for the necessary supply of coal. Great Britain during
the war continued to supply coal to Italy; also to Spain and other
neutral nations.
The armistice ended Germany’s occupation of the coal fields of Belgium
and northern France. On the other hand, the French took charge of the
important Saar coal field, and the Allies occupied German territory
reaching to the Rhine and beyond the Rhine at certain bridgeheads, this
occupation including the supervision of the mines in the coal and brown
lignite basins near Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne and the western margin
of the Westphalian basin on the left bank of the Rhine.
The treaty of peace gives to the French the important iron resources
of former German Lorraine, which together with imports from French
Lorraine were the chief sources of iron ore for German iron works, and
the ownership of the Saar coal mines.
The terms under which the Saar mines are transferred, and the future
government of the district, are indicated in the following extracts
from the treaty:
“As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north
of France, and as part payment towards the total reparation due from
Germany for the damages resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France
in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation,
unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal
mines situated in the Saar basin.”
This is exclusive of that part of the Saar basin in Lorraine which
belonged to France prior to 1870, and which now reverts to France with
some minor rectifications of boundary. The treaty further specifies,
“all the deposits of coal situated within the Saar basin will become
the complete and absolute property of the French state. * * * The right
of ownership of the French state will apply not only to the deposits
which are free and for which concessions have not yet been granted, but
also to the deposits for which concessions have already been granted,
whoever may be the present proprietors, irrespective of whether they
belong to the Prussian state, to the Bavarian state, to other states or
bodies, to companies or to individuals. * * * The value of the property
thus ceded to the French state will be determined by the Reparation
Commission. * * * This value shall be credited to Germany in part
payment of the amount due for reparation. It will be for Germany to
indemnify the proprietors or parties concerned, whoever they may be.”
As concerns the government of the territory of the Saar, at the
termination of a period of fifteen years, the population will be called
upon to indicate their desires, and then, “The League of Nations
shall decide on the sovereignty under which the territory is to be
placed, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed
by the voting.” In the meantime, the territory will be governed by
a commission of five members chosen by the Council of the League of
Nations.
In addition to turning over the ownership of the mines and minerals in
the Saar basin, Germany accords the following options for the delivery
of coal to the undermentioned signatories of the present treaty:
“Germany undertakes to deliver to France seven million tons of coal
per year for ten years (it is understood that this is to provide fuel
for the Alsace Lorraine territory ceded back to France). In addition,
Germany undertakes to deliver to France annually for a period not
exceeding ten years, an amount of coal equal to the difference
between the annual production before the war of the coal mines of
the Nord and Pas de Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and
the production of the mines of the same area during the years in
question; such delivery not to exceed twenty million tons in any one
year of the first five years, and eight million tons in any one year
of the succeeding five years. It is understood that due diligence
will be exercised in the restoration of the destroyed mines in the
Nord and the Pas de Calais.”
Besides furnishing France with coal, “Germany undertakes to deliver
to Belgium eight million tons of coal annually for ten years;” and
to Italy from four and one-half to eight and one-half million tons
annually; and also to Luxemburg, “a quantity of coal equal to the
pre-war annual consumption of German coal in Luxemburg.”
The prices to be paid for coal under these options shall be as follows:
“(_a_) For overland delivery, including delivery by barge, the German
pithead price to German nationals, plus the freight to French,
Belgian, Italian or Luxemburg frontiers, provided that the pithead
price does not exceed the pithead price of British coal for export.
In the case of Belgian bunker coal, the price shall not exceed the
Dutch bunker price. Railroad and barge tariffs shall not be higher
than the lowest similar rates paid in Germany.
“(_b_) For sea delivery, the German export price f.o.b. German ports,
or the British export price f.o.b. British ports, whichever may be
lower.
“The allied and associated governments interested may demand the
delivery, in place of coal, of metallurgical coke in the proportion
of 3 tons of coke to 4 tons of coal.”
Germany undertakes to deliver to France during each of the three years
following the coming into force of this treaty,
Benzol 35,000 tons
Coal tar 50,000 tons
Sulphate of ammonia 30,000 tons
The price paid for coke and for the articles referred to shall be the
same as the price paid by German nationals under the same conditions of
shipment.
The ownership of the Saar mines is a most welcome addition to the coal
resources of France; and the Saar basin, as it is capable of further
development, may in the future make France more nearly self-sustaining
as regards coal production.
The requirement of furnishing coal to France during the rehabilitation
of the French mines wrecked by the Germans is a most equitable
arrangement. Germany at first, owing to the drop in the output of the
Westphalian fields, claimed not to be able to furnish coal, but this
situation will no doubt right itself in time, especially as France
holds the whip hand through control of the iron ores necessary for the
great iron and steel plants of the Rhine district. In the meantime it
is hoped Great Britain, with the assistance of the United States, will
be able to supply the deficiency in the coal requirements.
The problems connected with the Russian coal fields are complicated,
but at least the Dombrova coal field would seem to be in the hands of
the new Poland, and this carries coal resources estimated at 2,525
million tons, with an output before the war probably exceeding 7
million metric tons per annum.
According to the terms of the peace treaty, a plebiscite will determine
the political control of the Upper Silesian coal fields.
=Probable Changes in Coal Trade.=--In the ocean coal trade of the world
the greatest change likely is that the United States will more largely
supply South America, its coal being substituted for that of Great
Britain. The ocean distance is markedly in favor of the United States,
particularly on the west coast of South America by vessels passing
through the Canal. With the increased shipping facilities of the United
States, there is every reason to believe exports of coal to South
America will be equally shared between the United States and Great
Britain.
At the present time, it is evident that the British coal-mining
industry is in a bad way, and publicists are expressing serious alarm
at the possible loss of the greater part of the export trade and the
curtailment of home industries through a great decrease in production
accompanied by a rapid increase in cost.
In 1913 Great Britain produced 287,000,000 long tons, and exported
77,000,000 long tons of coal. During the war, owing to the large
number of miners entering the military service, the output greatly
declined, but was expected to recover rapidly with the signing of the
armistice and the return of the miners. But labor unrest, resulting in
strikes and absenteeism, kept the output down, and on July 16, 1919,
the so-called Sankey award went into effect. This award shortened
the miners’ working day from eight to seven hours, exclusive of the
time taken in hoisting and lowering, but inclusive of the time taken
in reaching the working place. Rates were raised so that the miner
received more in a day with the seven-hour day than formerly with
the eight-hour day, and the Controller raised the price of coal six
shillings a ton to offset the increased cost.
Sir Richard Redland, chief inspector of mines, predicted that the
output for 1919 would be 230,000,000 tons, and for 1920, 217,000,000
tons, or a reduction of 70,000,000 tons from the output of 1913.
Presumably, in the course of time, by using additional shifts, Great
Britain may recover its former output, though manifestly at greatly
increased cost; so that unless the cost in the United States goes up
correspondingly, there is every probability that this country will be
able to compete successfully in export business, not only in South
America, but also in Mediterranean ports.
At the present time, demands for coal are reaching the United States
not only from those parts of the world, but also from Scandinavia,
Switzerland, Denmark, and The Netherlands. On account of nearness,
however, Great Britain should be able to take care of the fuel
requirements of northern Europe.
In the Pacific, it is not probable that either the State of Washington
or the Territory of Alaska will produce coal in such quantity and at
such a price that the output can be a general factor in the Pacific
Coast trade. The demands of Alaska, Washington, and adjoining states
will absorb the local production; and California will continue to
import in ballast more or less coal from Vancouver Island, British
Columbia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia.
The immediate changes in Asia are more likely to be in the development
of mines in the interior of China and in India to supply domestic
needs rather than extensive exports, although, as before stated, it is
possible that China will gradually get into the Pacific Coast markets.
POSITION OF LEADING COMMERCIAL NATIONS
=United States.=--The United States has the best coal reserve of
any country--about 3,527,000 million out of a total world reserve
of 7,900,000 million tons--and good reserves of each of the several
classes of coal. For many years there will be no danger of a shortage
except for anthracite, good coking coal and the highest grades of steam
coal, which are now actively mined. About 600,000,000 tons a year, or
nearly 40 per cent. of the annual output of the world, is mined in the
United States.
In contrast with the reserves and production, the exports in 1913 were
only about 12 per cent. of the exports of coal from all countries;
and a large part of the American exports goes to Canada by rail. Of
sea-borne coal, the United States sent out only 4 per cent. This
small proportion of international trade is due to the distance of our
coal from seaports, the lack of organization and related shipping
organizations; and, further, to the relative independence of the United
States, which, from most countries, requires only a small amount of
import as a return cargo for coal-carrying ships. We use our coal at
home, but the advantage of exporting a considerable quantity of coal
for its effects on increasing trade relationships with other countries
is now becoming evident.
Correlated with the large supply and small export of coal is the
remarkable development of home industries using our own coal. From the
curves of production (shown in Figure 3) it seems that within a century
the United States will surpass all Europe in coal production. As our
industries have kept pace with coal production, our consumption of coal
is indicated roughly by the production curve. Hence it seems that the
United States is likely to be a center of manufacturing and wealth; and
with this will come an equally certain continual increase in population
and power.
The second great world supply of coal is likely to be that of China.
To be sure, European production is large, but it will be divided among
several powers. The main part of the world’s power and industry for
the next century is so definitely located by the coal deposits (and
by associated iron in most cases) that the part the United States
should take in the world’s program is clear. Every precaution should be
observed to have the Chinese resources controlled by powers that will
not abuse them to make the world “unsafe for democracy.”
The war opened several foreign markets, especially in South America, to
United States coal. Some of these markets may be permanent, but Welsh
coal is still likely to dominate sea-borne trade. The United States
has coaling stations as far away as Manila and the Samoan Islands, but
little coal reaches them from this country. American coal supplies our
government coaling stations in Alaska; Hawaii; our home ports, both
Atlantic and Pacific; Cuba; Porto Rico; Nicaraguan ports; Panama Canal
ports; Mazatlan, Mexico; and some South American ports. No attempt
seems to have been made to establish strategic ports around the world,
such as may be needed if the present increase in American shipping is
to be maintained under the American flag.
No foreign control has been influential in mining or handling coal
in the United States. The ownership of coal mines by aliens has been
possible, but apparently has not become important.
American coal resources are so great that no single organization,
foreign or domestic, has been able to dominate the situation. The
lack of a strong trade combination made it possible (in 1916) for
a combination of British shippers to fix the price of bunker coal
in Atlantic ports, so that the mines got even less for it than for
industrial coal. This was the result of competitive bids, and the lack
of organization here, but it is expected that organization will develop
now.
Since the war began the development of industries based on coal tar has
been remarkable. There are signs, however, of an unhealthy competition
in this country, and the government should be careful that internal
squabbles do not open the door for German control again.
=England.=--The British Isles have only one-fortieth of the total
world’s supply of coal, but this is of better than average quality.
High-grade steam coal is abundant and there is a fair supply of coking
coal. The annual production, 300 million tons, is about one-fifth the
world’s production, and is second only to that of the United States.
England before the war exported about one-fourth of the production,
overseas exports from England being six times as much as from any other
country in the world. Coal has constituted about three-fourths of all
English exports. The coal mines are near seaports, and ocean freight
rates are low, because the demand for imports gives return cargoes to
England from all parts of the world. There are large supplies of coal
also in the colonies, especially India, Australia and South Africa.
The coal business and shipping of Great Britain grew up together. About
one-fourth of the coal shipped goes for bunkering. In 1916 England
owned 40 per cent. of the world’s shipping and exported nearly 70 per
cent. of the world’s sea-borne coal. The maintenance of the shipping
requires bunkering ports all around the world. Coal from Wales and
British colonies was sufficient to supply them all, and they constitute
by far the most strategic system that any country possesses.
England, Gibraltar, Greece, Malta, Suez, Port Said, Aden, Maskat,
Colombo, Singapore, Bombay, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Sydney, Fiji Islands,
Vancouver, Valparaiso, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Halifax, Newfoundland, St.
Helena, Bermuda, Cape Town and Durban, and others encircle the globe.
France, Japan, Holland and the United States have each a few stations,
but no such comprehensive system. The German proposals of terms of
peace (during the war) recognized the importance of these stations by
specifying that England should give up Aden, Malta and similar ports.
Trade arrangements between Great Britain and other countries have been
such as to grant “most favored nation” treatment to both parties, even
with Germany, where no formal treaty was in force. The free-trade
policy of England is well established, and on that basis England’s
commercial growth has been very great. Studies since the war began
show that Germany took advantage of the freedom in British countries
and the protection at home. For example, German capital controlled
some collieries in South Yorkshire, through Mr. Stinnes, one of the
largest components of the German Kohlen Kontor. This organization had
branches in Newcastle, Cardiff, Glasgow, Hull, and many foreign ports.
The French also had purchased an English colliery before the war, the
Stonehall colliery, at Lydden, near Dover.
The Australian colonies and probably others found that German
financiers owned and controlled most of the mines when war broke out.
It took some time to destroy this influence. Early in the war, British
sentiment seemed to call for action against all such German commercial
aggression, and at an Allied Economic Conference at Paris in June,
1916, plans were suggested for protection by tariff and exclusion of
alien ownership in allied countries. More recently it seems that the
British plan is to keep British certain key industries at all hazards
and at any expense, but not to abandon free trade or in any way
decrease the amount of trading done.
Commercial control of the Welsh steam-coal export trade is largely
in the hands of the Cambria Coal Combine, but in the trade there are
several other large combinations. The anthracite industry of England is
not as well organized as that of America.
Commercial control of coal exported from Wales is largely in the hands
of the large combinations of British shippers, in agreement with the
Cambria. Even when the war interfered with shipping, it is estimated
that two-thirds of the South American coal trade was in British control.
Many instances of British financial control of coal in countries other
than British colonies have not been noted. British capital is invested
in a few mines in Siberia and there are extensive holdings in China.
=Germany.=--The reserves of coal in Germany before the war were greater
than those in England, counting possible reserves, and of fair quality.
Germany formerly controlled 70 per cent. of the coal on the Continent.
Austrian coal was controlled, and the coal of Spitzbergen has been
claimed, though now in British and Norwegian control.
Although the most important deposits of coking coal of the Continent
are in Westphalia, those of Belgium and northern France are very
important to a general control of the coal situation. It cannot be
assumed that these important coal fields were seized by the Germans
for other reasons, or that the Germans included coal and iron by
accident. In 1911 the Rhenish Westphalian _Zeitung_ advised that French
Lorraine and Luxemburg should be dominated as thoroughly as Westphalia
was. In 1915 the six greatest associations of business men in Germany
petitioned the Chancellor to consider the control of the coal (and
iron) of northern France as a military as well as economic necessity.
The annual production of coal in Germany before the war was about
one-fifth of the world’s total output, closely approaching the
production of Great Britain. In the first years of the war the coal
output declined somewhat. In coal exports, Germany has been second only
to the British Isles, but no country exports by sea one-sixth as much
as Great Britain. Before the war Germany had established some fourteen
“Kohlen depots” abroad and had a large amount of shipping. These
bunkering ports were taken by the Allies.
An example of German industrial penetration is furnished by the case
of Kiau Chau, China. In 1899 the Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft was
formed in Berlin with headquarters at Tsingtao. It acquired exclusive
rights for 5 years to search for minerals in a zone 10 miles each
side of the railway and to acquire claims. Chinese mines were not to
be allowed to adopt modern methods and compete, unless they bought
German material and employed German men. The mines that were developed
produced good steamship coal and good enough coke, so that a blast
furnace was planned. The Germans lost their control when war broke out,
and these rights have passed, under the terms of the peace treaty, to
Japan. German capital that had been invested some years ago in the
Chung Hsing Coal Co. was bought out in 1908.
=France.=--Before the war France was fifth in the list of world’s coal
producers, but for many years needed more coal than she produced.
Possibly enough coal could have been mined in France by greater
developments, but to import it was cheaper. French capital was invested
in some foreign coal deposits. A company of French control owned the
Stonehall colliery, near Dover. Before the war a French company was
one of the largest operators in Turkey and was steadily acquiring new
mines. A French company owned an important colliery in the Dombrova
field, now part of Poland.
France has maintained government coaling stations for shipping in
Indo-China, Tahiti, Society Islands, Martinique, and Madagascar; but
no attempt is made to supply them wholly with French coal, or to be
independent of other coaling stations.
=Italy.=--Italy has a poor supply of low-grade coal, and the normal
production is insignificant. Imports have been large, those from Great
Britain amounting in 1914 to 10,000,000 tons.
=Russia.=--Russia has several important coal fields. The production
was 31,000,000 tons in 1915 and 23,000,000 in 1916, so that Russia,
including the province of Ukraine, has ranked fifth or sixth among the
world’s producers. If the demand for coal develops under the stimulus
of industrial stability, the output will all be consumed in Russia.
About two-thirds of the production has been raised in the Donetz basin.
Half of this is coking coal.
=Japan.=--Japan has on the main island, Hondo, enough coal to permit
considerable exports. Supplies in Korea and Formosa are less abundant.
In all Japan’s coal there is very little of good coking quality.
When the war reduced the amount of British shipping in the North
Pacific, Japanese ships supplied Japanese coal to a number of new
coaling stations, and the British may find it difficult to regain their
former prominence in bunkering there. Japanese coal now gets as far
west also as Colombo, Ceylon.
Japanese law specifies Japanese control of the policy of mining
companies, though some foreign financial interests are allowed. Japan
controls a part of the coal produced in China, and by presenting
insistent demands is increasing her control in that country. If given a
free hand, Japan is in a position to exercise industrial and military
control in Asia almost as thoroughly as the United States can in
America. English and Belgian interests have some Chinese coal, and thus
are about the only real competition at present with Japanese control.
=China.=--Outside the United States, China has the largest coal
reserves of any country in the world. The coal varies in quality and
grade; some of it is excellent, but the production has reached only
about 18,000,000 tons a year. Some districts export and others import
coal. The country could easily be independent if there were internal
means of distribution. There might even be large exports if production
began in advance of other industrial development. Coking coal is
available only in certain areas, mostly in the south.
The largest and best-equipped producer is the Kailan Mining
Administration, operating British and Chinese properties. The ownership
of the company is mostly in Belgian hands, but the incorporation is
under Hong Kong law, so that the company is under British control.
The chief producers in China are:
TABLE 6.--CHIEF PRODUCERS OF COAL IN CHINA
----------------------------+-----------+----------------------------
Company |Tons a year|Control
----------------------------+-----------+----------------------------
Kailan Mining Administration| 3,000,000 |British and Chinese
Funshun Collieries | 2,000,000 |Owned by the South Manchuria
| |Railway Co. (Japanese)
Pingshieng Collieries | 1,000,000 |Chinese
Pekin Syndicate | 500,000 |British
Pingshihu | 300,000 |Japanese
Lincheng | 800,000 |Belgian
----------------------------+-----------+----------------------------
The Mining Company of Shantung, producing 400,000 tons a year, formerly
owned by the Germans, is now run by the Japanese military organization.
Thus only one of the large producers is under Chinese control, though
many smaller mines are worked by Chinese. The Chinese law designed to
prevent foreign control of this sort is not effective. It requires that
the share of a mining industry held by foreigners shall not be over
one-half; but if a foreign company owns half the shares and finances
the Chinese half by a loan, the foreign control may be complete. There
is a further control of mining, through the ownership of railways. All
the larger producers must ship coal by rail, and foreign nations are
allowed to finance railways. The difficulty of a government exercising
adequate political and commercial control when it grants concessions in
this way is evident.
General mining affairs in China are supervised by a Bureau of Mining
Affairs. Any specific enterprise is controlled by a commissioner
of finance in each province. It is questionable, however, whether
governmental control will be strong enough to overbalance commercial
and financial control, and diplomatic pressure from outside. Those
companies incorporated under Hong Kong law can count on British
protection. Japanese demands on China have been very insistent, and
it is said that about a third of the production of the country is now
controlled by Japan.
As a whole, China seems to take a small part in the control of her own
coal. The opportunity for other powers to get financial, and, through
that, industrial favors may be involved in the problem of financing the
central government.
TABLE 7.--PRODUCTION, EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR 1913[8]
Millions of metric tons
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Country |Kind of coal|Production|Exports|Imports|Remarks (1919)
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
United |Anthracite | 85 | 4.1 | ... |Resources greater
States |Bituminous | 432 | 18.0 | 1.4 |than those of any
|Coke | 42 | 1.0 | 0.1 |other country; can
|Bunker coal | ... | (7.7) | ... |easily increase
| | | | |ocean exports with
| | | | |more shipping
| | | | |available. Present
| | | | |exports chiefly to
| | | | |Canada. Value of
| | | | |coal-tar products
| | | | |imported in 1913,
| | | | |$10,962,000.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Great |Anthracite | 5 | | ... |Chief coal-exporting
Britain |Bituminous | 282 | 73.4 | ... |country; before war
|Coke | 20.5 | 1.2 | ... |had virtual monopoly
|Briquettes | ... | 2.1 | ... |of ocean exports.
|Bunker coal | |(21.0) | ... |Export control
| | | | |imperiled by
| | | | |shortage from labor
| | | | |conditions.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
German |Bituminous | 191 | 34.6 | 10.5 |Coal needed for
Empire |Lignite | 87 | ... | 7 |Central Europe.
|Coke | 32 | 6.4 | 0.6 |Exports by rail and
|Coal | | | |canal. Distance from
|Briquettes | 5.8 | 2.3 | 0.3 |seaports prevents
|Lignite | | | |oversea exports.
|Briquettes | 21.4 | 0.9 | 0.1 |Westphalia has
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+largest coking coal
Saar |Bituminous | 17.0 | | |resources in Europe.
District |Coke | 2.0 | | |Ownership of Saar
(Included| | | | |mines transferred to
under | | | | |France by Treaty of
German | | | | |Peace.
Empire, | | | | |
above) | | | | |
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Upper |Bituminous | 49.1 | | |Nationality of Upper
Silesia |Lignite | 2.3 | ... | ... |Silesia to be
(Included|Coke | 3.1 | ... | ... |determined by
under | | | | |plebiscite; coal
German | | | | |production vital to
Empire, | | | | |eastern Germany,
above) | | | | |Poland and Austria.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Austria- |Bituminous | 17.6 | 0.7 | 13.7 |Austria, already
Hungary |Lignite | 36.4 | 7.0 | ... |deficient in
| | | | |bituminous coal,
| | | | |under the Peace
| | | | |Treaty loses
| | | | |practically all coal
| | | | |fields to Poland and
| | | | |Czecho-Slovakia.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Austria |Bituminous | 16.3 | ... | ... |Hungary always
(Included|Lignite | 27.4 | ... | ... |lacked enough
under |Coke | 2.6 | ... | ... |bituminous coal, and
Austria- | | | | |under any political
Hungary, | | | | |control must
above) | | | | |continue to import
| | | | |coal from Upper
| | | | |Silesia.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Hungary |Bituminous | 1.3 | | |
(Included|Lignite | 9.0 | | |
under |Coke | 0.2 | | |
Austria- | | | | |
Hungary, | | | | |
above) | | | | |
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
France |Bituminous | 40.0 | 1.3 | 18.7 |France consumed in
|Lignite | 0.8 | ... | ... |1913 (millions of
|Coke | 4.0 | 0.2 | 3.0 |tons)
|Briquettes | 3.7 | 0.1 | 1.1 |Coal 51.2
| | | | |Coke 6.9
| | | | |Briquettes 4.8
| | | | | ----
| | | | | 62.9
| | | | |
| | | | |Deficit 21 millions
| | | | |tons in 1913.
| | | | |Addition of Saar
| | | | |production
| | | | |(17,000,000 tons)
| | | | |will not cancel the
| | | | |deficit, as the
| | | | |needs of the local
| | | | |district and those
| | | | |of former German
| | | | |Lorraine will absorb
| | | | |that or more. Mines
| | | | |wrecked by Germany
| | | | |produced 20,000,000
| | | | |tons; Germany to
| | | | |supply equivalent
| | | | |amount until mines
| | | | |rehabilitated.
| | | | |France must continue
| | | | |indefinitely to
| | | | |import coal and
| | | | |coke.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Russia |Bituminous | | | |Russia, with poorly
(Included|chiefly | 32.3 | ... | 8.1 |developed fields and
in above |Bituminous | | | |great future needs,
is the |(Some brown | | | |has imported from
Dombrova |coal) | 7.0 | | |Great Britain and
field of | | | | |Germany; through
Poland) | | | | |loss of the Dombrova
| | | | |field (extension of
| | | | |Upper Silesian
| | | | |basin) needs more
| | | | |coal than can
| | | | |produce and is
| | | | |unlikely ever to be
| | | | |an exporting
| | | | |country.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
Belgium |Bituminous | 22.8 | 4.9 | 8.9 |Belgium has high-
|Coke | 3.5 | 1.1 | 0.4 |grade steam coals
|Briquettes | 2.6 | 0.6 | 1.1 |and some coking
| | | | |coal; beds are deep
| | | | |and difficult to
| | | | |mine. Its exports to
| | | | |Holland and France
| | | | |probably will in
| | | | |future continue to
| | | | |be exceeded by
| | | | |imports from
| | | | |Westphalia and Great
| | | | |Britain.
---------+------------+----------+-------+-------+--------------------
[8] Compiled by George S. Rice.
TABLE 8.--COUNTRIES IN EUROPE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON IMPORTS OF FUEL.
PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS, 1913[9]
Millions of metric tons
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
| Kind | | |
Country | of coal |Production|Imports|Remarks (1919)
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
Holland |Bituminous| 2.0 | 12.0 |Holland, in the small
| | | |Limbourg basin, has an
| | | |extension of the Aix-la-
| | | |Chapelle basin of Germany.
| | | |The output is increasing,
| | | |but as the basin is small
| | | |Holland will import from
| | | |Westphalia, Belgium and
| | | |Great Britain or America.
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
Italy |Anthracite| 0.7 | 10. |Italy has insignificant and
|and | | |poor resources in thin
|Lignite | | |anthracite beds and in
| | | |lignite deposits; has
| | | |depended on Great Britain
| | | |for imports, but now the
| | | |United States is furnishing
| | | |some coal. Water-power
| | | |developments are large;
| | | |opportunity for further
| | | |development.
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
Spain |Bituminous| 4.3 | 3.6 |Spain has a number of small
| | | |coal basins. It must
| | | |continue to import.
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
Sweden |Bituminous| 0.4 | 4.8 |Sweden has a few thin impure
| | | |beds, but has relied on
| | | |imports from Great Britain.
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
Norway | | | 2.3 |Norway has no coal resources
| | | |and has imported coal from
| | | |Great Britain.
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
Switzer- | | | 1.6 |Switzerland has no coal
land | | | |worthy of mention; it has
| | | |relied on imports from
| | | |Westphalia. Since the
| | | |armistice, Switzerland has
| | | |imported coal from the
| | | |United States, but this
| | | |movement is abnormal.
-----------+----------+----------+-------+----------------------------
[9] Compiled by George S. Rice.
=Conclusions.=--As regards political control, three great national
or race factors loom in the future of the coal industry and in the
development of wealth and power: the European, dominated by England;
the American, by the United States; and the Asiatic, by Japan. The
efforts of England during the war temporarily prostrated her, and
diminished the grip of her export coal and bunkering trade, but
conditions late in 1919 indicated that recovery might be rapid. The
immediate growth in the mining of coal for use at home, with consequent
progress in steel and other industries, however, will be greatest in
the United States, because of our gigantic resources. In the East,
however, are indications of a development of China’s coal and the
growth of attendant industries on a scale which may in time outstrip
those of any country except America, and transfer the bulk of wealth
and power to the two great civilizations, on either side of the
Pacific--the newest, that of America, and the oldest, that of China
and Japan. The war and the settlements after the war proved an unmixed
benefit and opportunity to Japan, and enabled her so to strengthen
herself in China and Korea that she is not only the preponderating
power in the East, but may claim a sphere of influence and a wide
protectorate for Asia, far more effective than the American Monroe
Doctrine.
Having regard to national internal economy and external and internal
effectiveness, the United States will clearly neglect the main function
of government if it fails to exercise an effective supervision and
regulation of the coal industry. This industry is national; every
citizen has an interest in it, and a right to expect its administration
for the highest benefit of all.
TABLE 9.--PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF FUEL OF SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN
1913[10]
Millions of metric tons
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Country |Production|Imports|Remarks (1919)
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Argentina | | 4.0 |Argentina has no coal resources.
| | |Imports chiefly from Great Britain;
| | |Cardiff coal.
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Brazil | | 2.2 |Brazil has coal, but it is inaccessible
| | |for transportation.
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Chile | 1.23 | 0.6 |Chile has some coal, but does not mine
| | |enough high-grade coal for its needs;
| | |has imported from Great Britain.
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Colombia | | |Colombia has some undeveloped coal
| | |resources; has imported a little coal
| | |from time to time from the United
| | |States.
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Peru | 0.28 | 0.02 |Peru has small coal resources and mines
| | |a little coal, practically enough for
| | |its needs.
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Uruguay | | 0.8 |Uruguay has no coal resources and
| | |imported some in the past, chiefly from
| | |Great Britain.
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
Total South| | |
America | 1.51 | 7.6 |
-----------+----------+-------+---------------------------------------
[10] Compiled by George S. Rice.
TABLE 10.--1913 PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND IMPORTS OF COAL OF PRINCIPAL
COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND AUSTRALIA[11]
Millions of metric tons
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
| Kind | | | |
Country | of coal |Production|Exports|Imports|Remarks (1919)
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
Japan |Bituminous| 21.8 | 3.5 | |Japan does not have
| | | | |large coal resources
| | | | |and coal is not of
| | | | |high grade, but
| | | | |deposits are
| | | | |advantageously located
| | | | |for exporting.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
India | | 16.5 | | |India has considerable
| | | | |good coal, but this
| | | | |will be needed for
| | | | |domestic purposes and
| | | | |bunkering.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
China |Bituminous| 14.0 | | about |Coal is imported from
| | | | 2.0 |Japan, but China has
| | | | |great coal resources,
| | | | |and these are being
| | | | |developed by Japanese,
| | | | |British and American
| | | | |capital. Germany had
| | | | |large interests, which
| | | | |have reverted, it is
| | | | |understood, to Japan.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
Indo- | | | | |Indo-China has some
China | | 0.4 | | |coal, both anthracite
| | | | |and lignite.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
Siberia | | | | |Little is known of the
| | | | |coal resources of
| | | | |Siberia. There are
| | | | |many indications of
| | | | |lignite deposits.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
New | | | | |New South Wales has
South | | | | |large resources of
Wales | | 10.5 | 6.0 | |good coal. One-half of
| | | | |the 6 million tons
| | | | |exported goes to other
| | | | |Australian states; the
| | | | |other half to Pacific
| | | | |ports.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
New | | | | |New Zealand has small
Zealand | | 1.9 | | |coal basins, but they
| | | | |are close to the sea,
| | | | |permitting ready
| | | | |export.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
Queens- | | 1.1 | | |Queensland, Victoria,
land | | | | |and Western Australia
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+have considerable coal
Victoria | | 0.6 | | |resources, but not of
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+grade or quality to be
Western | | | | |a factor in export
Australia| | 0.3 | | |trade.
---------+----------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------
[11] Compiled by George S. Rice.