I have not been at all clear in my own mind as to when, and to what
extent, Massachusetts should raise her voice in this convention. She
has heard the voice of Virginia, expressed through her resolutions, in
this crisis of our country's history. Massachusetts hesitated, not
because she was unwilling to respond to the call of Virginia, but
because she thought her honor touched by the manner of that call and
the circumstances attending it. She had taken part in the election of
the 6th of November. She knew the result. It accorded well with her
wishes. She knew that the government whose political head for the
next four years was then chosen was based upon a Constitution which she
supposed still had an existence. She saw that State after State had
left that government,--seceded is the word used,--had gone out from
this great confederacy, and that they were defying the Constitution and
the Union.
Charge after charge has been vaguely made against the North. It is
attempted here to put the North on trial. I have listened with grave
attention to the gentleman from Virginia to-day; but I have heard no
specification of these charges. Massachusetts hesitated, I say: she
has her own opinion of the Government and the Union. I know
Massachusetts; I have been into every one of her more than three
hundred towns; I have seen and conversed with her men and her women;
and I know there is not a man within her borders who would not to-day
gladly lay down his life for the preservation of the Union.
Massachusetts has made war upon slavery wherever she had the right to
do it; but, much as she _abhors_ the institution, she would sacrifice
everything rather than assail it where she has not the right to assail
it.
Can it be denied, gentlemen, that we have elected a President in a
legal and constitutional way? It cannot be denied; and yet you tell
us, in tones that cannot be misunderstood, that, as a precedent
condition of his inauguration, we must give you these guarantees.
Massachusetts hesitated, not because her blood was not stirred, but
because she insisted that the government and the inauguration should go
in the manner that would have been observed had Mr. Lincoln been
defeated. She felt that she was touched in a tender point when invited
here under such circumstances.
It is true, and I confess it frankly, that there are a few men at the
North who have not yielded that support to the grand idea upon which
this confederated Union stands that they should have yielded; who have
been disposed to infringe upon, to attack certain rights which the
entire North, with these exceptions, accords to you. But are you of
the South free from the like imputations? The John Brown invasion was
never justified at the North. If, in the excitement of the time, there
were those to be found who did not denounce it as gentlemen think they
should, it was because they knew it was a matter wholly outside the
Constitution,--that it was a crime to which Virginia would give
adequate punishment.
Gentlemen, I believe--yes, I know--that the people of the North are as
true to the government and the Union of the States now as our fathers
were when they stood shoulder to shoulder upon the field, fighting for
the principles upon which that Union rests. If I thought the time had
come when it would be fit or proper to consider amendments to the
Constitution at all, I believe that we should have no trouble with you,
except upon this question of slavery in the Territories. You cannot
demand of us at the North anything that we will not grant, unless it
involves a sacrifice of our principles. These we shall not sacrifice;
these you must not ask us to abandon. I believe, further,--and I
speak in all frankness, for I wish to delude no one,--if the
Constitution and the Union cannot be preserved and effectually
maintained without these new guarantees for slavery, then the Union is
not worth preserving.
The people of the North have always submitted to the decisions of the
properly constituted powers. This obedience has been unpleasant
enough when they thought those powers were exercised for sectional
purposes; but it has always been implicitly yielded. I am ready, even
now, to go home and say that, by the decision of the Supreme Court,
slavery exists in all the Territories of the United States. We submit
to the decision, and accept its consequences. But, in view of all the
circumstances attending that decision, was it quite fair, was it quite
generous, for the gentleman from Maryland to say that under it, by the
adoption of these propositions, the South was giving up everything, the
North giving up nothing? Does he suppose the South is yielding the
point in relation to any territory which, by any probability, would
become slave territory? Something more than the decision of the
Supreme Court is necessary to establish slavery anywhere. The decision
may give the _right_ to establish it: other influences must control
the question of its actual establishment.
I am opposed, further, to any restrictions on the acquisition of
territory. They are unnecessary. The time may come when they would
be troublesome. We may want the Canadas. The time may come when the
Canadas may wish to unite with us. Shall we tie up our hands so that
we cannot receive them, or make it forever your interest to oppose
their annexation? Such a restriction would be, by the common consent
of the people, disregarded.
There are seven States out of the Union already. They have organized
what they claim is an independent government. They are not to be
coerced back, you say. Are the prospects very favorable that they will
return of their own accord? But _they_ will annex territory. They are
already looking to Mexico. If left to themselves, they would annex her
and all her neighbors, and we should lose our highway to the Pacific
coast. They would acquire it, and to us it would be lost forever.
The North will consider well before she consents to this, before she
even permits it. Ever since 1820, we have pursued, in this respect,
a uniform policy. The North will hesitate long, before, by accepting
the condition you propose, she deprives the nation of the valuable
privilege, the unquestionable right, of acquiring new territory in an
honorable way.
I have tried to look upon these propositions of the majority of the
committee as true measures of pacification. I have listened patiently
to all that has been said in their favor. But I am still unconvinced,
or, rather, I am convinced that they will do nothing for the Union.
They will prove totally inadequate; may perhaps be positively
mischievous. The North, the free States, will not adopt them,--will
not consent to these new endorsements of an institution which they do
not like, which the believe to the injurious to the interests of the
republic; and if they did adopt them, as they could only do by a
sacrifice of principles which you should not expect, the South would
not be satisfied: the slave States would not fail to find pretexts
for a course of action upon which I think they have already determined.
I see in these propositions anything but true measures of pacification.
But the North will never consent to the separation of the States. If
the South persist in the course on which she has entered, we shall
march our armies to the Gulf of Mexico, or you will march yours to the
Great Lakes. There can be no peaceful separation. There is one way
by which war may be avoided, and the Union preserved. It is a plain
and a constitutional way. If the slave States will abandon the design
which we must infer from the remarks of the gentleman from Virginia
they have already formed, will faithfully abide by their constitutional
obligations, and remain in the union until their rights are in _fact_
invaded, all will be well. But, if they take the responsibility of
involving the country in a civil war, of breaking up the government
which our fathers founded and our people love, but one course remains
to those who are true to that government. They must and will defend it
at every sacrifice--if necessary, to the sacrifice of their lives.
At the close of the session, and upon the request of my associates upon
the commission, I wrote a report to Governor Andrew, which was signed
by all the members of the delegation. Governor Andrew submitted the
report, with his approval, to the Legislature the 25th day of March.
The character of the convention, and something of the condition of the
country may be gathered from the following extracts from the report:
"The resolutions of the State of Virginia were passed on the 19th of
January; and it was expected that within sixteen days thereafter the
representatives of this vast country would assemble for the purpose of
devising, maturing, and recommending alterations in the Constitution of
the Republic. As a necessary consequence, the people were not
consulted in any of the States. In several, the commissioners were
appointed by the executive of each without even an opportunity to
confer with the Legislature; in others, the consent of the
representative body was secured, but in no instance were the people
themselves consulted. The measures proposed were comparatively new;
the important ones were innovations upon the established principles of
the Government, and none of them had ever been submitted to public
scrutiny. They related to the institution of slavery; and the
experience of the country justifies the assertion that any proposition
for additional securities to slavery under the flag of the nation,
must be fully discussed and well understood before its adoption, or it
will yield a fearful harvest of woe in dissentions and controversies
among the people. Nor could the undersigned have justified the act to
themselves, if they had concurred in asking Congress to propose
amendments to the Constitution unless they were prepared also to
advocate the adoption of the amendments by the people.
"It is due to truth to say that the Convention did not possess all the
desirable characteristics of a deliberative assembly. It was in some
degree disqualified for the performance of the important task assigned
to it, by the circumstances of its constitution, to which reference has
been already made. Moreover, there were members who claimed that
certain concessions must be granted that the progress of the secession
movement might be arrested; and on the other hand there were men who
either doubted or denied the wisdom of such concessions.
"The circumstances were extraordinary. Within the preceding ninety
days the integrity of the Union had been assailed by the attempt of
six States to overthrow its authority; seven other States were
disaffected, and some of them had assumed a menacing and even hostile
attitude. The political disturbances had been associated with or
followed by financial distress.
"The Convention was then a body of men without a recognized and
ascertained constituency, called together in an exigency and without
preparation, and invited to initiate measures for the amendment of the
Constitution in most important particulars, and all at a moment when
the public mind was swayed by fears and alarms such as have never
before been experienced by the American people.
"In these circumstances the undersigned thought it inexpedient to
propose amendments to the Constitution, believing that so important an
act should not be initiated and accomplished without the greatest
deliberation and care. Nor could the undersigned satisfy themselves
that any or all of the proposed amendments would even tend, in any
considerable degree, to the preservation of the Union. Although
inquiries were repeatedly made, no assurance was given that any
proposition of amendment would secure the return of the seceded States;
and it was admitted that several of the border States would ultimately
unite with the Gulf States, either within or without the limits of the
Union, as might be dictated by events yet in the future. Indeed, no
proposition was in any degree acceptable to the majority of delegates
from the border slave States that did not provide for the extension of
slavery to the Territories, and its protection and security therein."
XXV
THE OPENING OF THE WAR
When the call was made for seventy-five thousand men, the Sixth
Regiment of Massachusetts was one of the first to respond. On the
night of the 16th of April some, if not all, of the regiment, were
quartered in Boston. I called upon Company B, of Groton, then in the
hall over the Williams Market. I found that they understood that the
movement meant war and duty. One of the men said to me:
"Some of us will never see Massachusetts again."
After the affair in Baltimore on the 19th of April, Governor Andrew
asked me to go to Washington with despatches for Mr. Lincoln and
General Scott. The message was communicated to me through Mr. John M.
Forbes. In his letter of request and appointment Governor Andrew said:
"We need your information, influence and acquaintance with the Cabinet,
and knowledge of Eastern public sentiment, to leave immediately for
Washington. Hope you will proceed at once and open and preserve
communication between you and myself." This letter was dated April 22.
Under the same date the Governor wrote to President Lincoln:
"Ex-Governor Boutwell has been appointed Agent of the commonwealth to
proceed to Washington to confer with you in regard to the forts in
Massachusetts and the militia." I was instructed also to see General
Wool in New York. I received a package of letters, the contents of
which were disclosed to me, one hundred dollars in gold, and a small
revolver loaded.* I took with me a young man named Augustus Bixby,
who then lived in Groton, but who had seen something of the world,
and was not daunted by the uncertainties of life. He was afterwards
a cavalry officer. During the war I one day read in the papers that
Bixby had been promoted for gallantry in an affair in the Shenandoah
Valley. Within a few days after I met him in Washington on a crutch,
or walking with the help of a cane. He had been wounded in the
contest. I said:
"Bixby, what did you do?" He replied:
"I don't know, except I sailed in."
At New York I telegraphed Vice-President Hamlin, then in Maine, that
he should come as far South as New York, that he might be in a
situation to act in case of the death or capture of Mr. Lincoln, of
whom we then knew nothing. At New York, April 24, I telegraphed
Governor Andrew:
"General Wool and Vice-President Hamlin are in favor of your taking the
responsibility of sending two regiments to take charge of the forts,
and to furnish and arm three vessels for the protection of the coast.
You can exercise the power, under the circumstance, better than anybody
else." The same day I sent this dispatch: "Send without delay a
steamer with provisions for General Butler's command at Annapolis."
At Perryville, at the mouth of the Susquehanna, I sent Bixby with the
despatches by the first boat to Annapolis, with instructions to make
his way to Washington at the earliest moment. I followed in the next
boat. Upon my arrival at General Butler's headquarters, I learned that
Bixby had left on foot. As the troops were at work in re-laying the
track, there was no danger. Indeed, the small squads of men who had
burned bridges and torn up tracks disappeared with the arrival of
troops. At nine o'clock in the evening, a train, the first train,
carrying the New York Sixty-ninth Regiment, left for Annapolis
Junction, at which place we arrived at one o'clock in the morning.
The only light upon the train was the headlight, and we moved only
the length of the train at each inspection of the road. I made a
pillow of my small valise, and a bed of my blanket, and camped on the
floor of one of the small houses at Annapolis Junction. In the morning
I found Colonel Butterfield of the New York Twelfth and Colonel Scott,
a nephew of General Scott, who assumed the direction of affairs. He
afterwards joined the rebels. I observed also that our encampment was
commanded by hills on the north and east, and Colonel Butterfield
informed me that the picket line was a long way inside the base of the
hills. At about six o'clock in the evening, a train with troops and
three civilians was made ready for Washington. The American flag was
displayed at many of the houses on the line of the road.
I arrived in Washington the 27th day of April. I annex a copy of a
letter that I wrote to Governor Andrew the day following:
WASHINGTON, April 28, 1861.
To His Excellency Governor Andrew.
Sir:--I arrived in Washington to-day, after a journey of forty-eight
hours from Philadelphia by Annapolis. There have been no mails from
the North for a week; and you may easily understand that the mighty
public sentiment of the Free States is not yet fully appreciated here.
The President and Cabinet are gaining confidence; and the measures of
the Administration will no longer be limited to the defence of the
capital. Secretary Welles has already sent orders to Captain Hudson
to purchase six steamers, with instructions to consult you in regard
to the matter. I regret that the Secretary was not ready to put the
matter into the hands of commissioners, who would have acted
efficiently and promptly.
Mr. Welles will accept, as a part of the quota, such vessels as may
have been purchased by Mr. Forbes.
Senator Grimes of Iowa will probably give Mr. Crowninshield an order
for arms. The United States Government may do the same; but no
definite action has yet been taken.
Martial law will be proclaimed here to-morrow. Colonel Mansfield will
be appointed general, and assigned to this district. He is one of the
most efficient officers in the country.
Baltimore is to be closed in from Havre-de-Grace, from the Relay House,
from the Carlisle line, and by an efficient naval force. She will be
reduced to unconditional submission. The passage of the troops through
Maryland has had a great moral effect. The people are changing rapidly
in the country places. Many instances of a popular revolution, in
towns through which troops have passed or been stationed, have come to
my knowledge. I came to Washington with the Twelfth New York Regiment;
and from Annapolis Junction there were cheers from three fourths of the
houses by the wayside.
Everything appears well at Annapolis, where General Butler commands in
person. There is a large body of troops, the people are gradually
gaining confidence in the army and the Government, and the regulations
seem to be effective. General Butler is popular with the officers whom
I met. He has taken command of the highlands that command the town and
the encampment. All sorts of rumors are spread among the troops
concerning an attack upon the Annapolis Station; but the place can be
defended under any conceivable circumstances. I am sorry to say, that
everything is in confusion at Annapolis Junction, and a moderate force
might, in a single night, break off the connection of this city with
the North. Each colonel, as he moves towards Washington, commands for
twelve or twenty-four hours. My own belief, however, is, that Maryland
will never see two thousand men together as a military organization
in opposition to the Government.
I presume that your Excellency has means of obtaining information
concerning the condition of Massachusetts men, morally and physically;
but, as I am here, I shall try to obtain and transmit any information
that seems important. I may say now, that the Eighth Regiment is
quartered in the rotunda of the Capitol; and a military man, not of
Massachusetts, says, that they are already suffering from the cold
and dampness of the place. He advises tents and out-door encampment.
I repeat what is every hour and in my hearing, that Massachusetts
has taken her place at the head of the column in support of the
Government; and our regiments are everywhere esteemed as noble examples
of citizen soldiers. I, for one, feel anxious that everything that is
proper should be done.
I have written this communication in great haste; and I have only time
to subscribe myself your Excellency's obedient servant.