Οὔπω
τὰν Διὸς ἁρμονίαν
θνατῶν παρεξίασι βουλαί.
—ÆSCH. _Prom._ V. 548.
Never do counsels of mortal men thwart the ordered purpose of
Zeus.
I
What was to be the Irish policy? The Crimes Act would expire in August,
and the state of parties in parliament and of sections within the cabinet,
together with the approach of the general election, made the question
whether that Act should be renewed, and if so on what terms, an issue of
crucial importance. There were good grounds for suspecting that tories
were even then intimating to the Irish that if Lord Salisbury should come
into office, they would drop coercion, just as the liberals had dropped it
when they came into office in 1880, and like them would rely upon the
ordinary law. On May 15 Mr. Gladstone announced in terms necessarily
vague, because the new bill was not settled, that they proposed to
continue what he described as certain clauses of a valuable and equitable
description in the existing Coercion Act.
No parliamentary situation could be more tempting to an astute opposition.
The signs that the cabinet was not united were unmistakable. The leader of
the little group of four clever men below the gangway on the tory side
gave signs that he espied an opportunity. This was one of the occasions
that disclosed the intrepidity of Lord Randolph Churchill. He made a
speech after Mr. Gladstone’s announcement of a (M74) renewal of portions
of the Crimes Act, not in his place but at a tory club. He declared
himself profoundly shocked that so grave an announcement should have been
taken as a matter of course. It was really a terrible piece of news.
Ireland must be in an awful state, or else the radical members of the
cabinet would never have assented to such unanswerable evidence that the
liberal party could not govern Ireland without resort to that arbitrary
force which their greatest orators had so often declared to be no remedy.
It did not much matter whether the demand was for large powers or for
small. Why not put some kind thoughts towards England in Irish minds, by
using the last days of this unlucky parliament to abrogate all that harsh
legislation which is so odious to England, and which undoubtedly abridges
the freedom and insults the dignity of a sensitive and imaginative race?
The tory party should be careful beyond measure not to be committed to any
act or policy which should unnecessarily wound or injure the feelings of
our brothers on the other side of the channel of St. George.(121)
The key to an operation that should at once, with the aid of the
disaffected liberals and the Irish, turn out Mr. Gladstone and secure the
English elections, was an understanding with Mr. Parnell. The price of
such an understanding was to drop coercion, and that price the tory
leaders resolved to pay. The manœuvre was delicate. If too plainly
disclosed, it might outrage some of the tory rank and file who would
loathe an Irish alliance, and it was likely, moreover, to deter some of
the disaffected liberals from joining in any motion for Mr. Gladstone’s
overthrow. Lord Salisbury and his friends considered the subject with
“immense deliberation some weeks before the fall of the government.” They
came to the conclusion that in the absence of official information, they
could see nothing to warrant a government in applying for a renewal of
exceptional powers. That conclusion they profess to have kept sacredly in
their own bosoms. Why they should give immense deliberation to a decision
that in their view must be worthless without official information, and
that was to remain for an indefinite time in mysterious darkness, was
never explained when this secret decision some months later was revealed
to the public.(122) If there was no intention of making the decision known
to the Irishmen, the purpose of so unusual a proceeding would be
inscrutable. Was it made known to them? Mr. McCarthy, at the time acting
for his leader, has described circumstantially how the Irish were
endeavouring to obtain a pledge against coercion; how two members of the
tory party, one of them its recognised whip, came to him in succession
declaring that they came straight from Lord Salisbury with certain
propositions; how he found the assurance unsatisfactory, and asked each of
these gentlemen in turn on different nights to go back to Lord Salisbury,
and put further questions to him; and how each of them professed to have
gone back to Lord Salisbury, to have conferred with him, and to have
brought back his personal assurance.(123) On the other hand, it has been
uniformly denied by the tory leaders that there was ever any compact
whatever with the Irishmen at this moment. We are not called upon here to
decide in a conflict of testimony which turns, after all, upon words so
notoriously slippery as pledge, compact, or understanding. It is enough to
mark what is not denied, that Lord Salisbury and his confidential friends
had resolved, subject to official information, to drop coercion, and that
the only visible reason why they should form the resolution at that
particular moment was its probable effect upon Mr. Parnell.
II
Let us now return to the ministerial camp. There the whig wing of the
cabinet, adhering to Lord Spencer, were for a modified renewal of the
Coercion Act, with the balm of a land purchase bill and a limited
extension of self-government in local areas. The radical wing were averse
to coercion, and averse to a purchase bill, but they were willing to yield
a milder form of coercion, on condition that the cabinet would agree not
merely to small measures of self-government in local areas, but to the
erection of a (M75) central board clothed with important administrative
functions for the whole of Ireland. In the House of Commons it was certain
that a fairly strong radical contingent would resist coercion in any
degree, and a liberal below the gangway, who had not been long in
parliament but who had been in the press a strong opponent of the coercion
policy of 1881, at once gave notice that if proposals were made for the
renewal of exceptional law, he should move their rejection. Mr. Gladstone
had also to inform the Queen that in what is considered the whig or
moderate section of the House there had been recent indications of great
dislike to special legislation, even of a mild character, for Ireland.
These proceedings are all of capital importance in an eventful year, and
bear pretty directly upon the better known crisis of the year following.
A memorandum by Mr. Gladstone of a conversation between himself and Lord
Granville (May 6) will best show his own attitude at this opening of a
momentous controversy:—
... I told him [Granville] I had given no pledge or indication of
my future conduct to Mr. Chamberlain, who, however, knew my
opinions to be strong in favour of some plan for a Central Board
of Local Government in Ireland on something of an elective
basis.... Under the circumstances, while the duty of the hour
evidently was to study the means of possible accommodation, the
present aspect of affairs was that of a probable split,
_independently_ of the question what course I might individually
pursue. My opinions, I said, were very strong and inveterate. I
did not calculate upon Parnell and his friends, nor upon Manning
and his bishops. Nor was I under any obligation to follow or act
with Chamberlain. But independently of all questions of party, of
support, and of success, I looked upon the extension of a strong
measure of local government like this to Ireland, now that the
question is effectually revived by the Crimes Act, as invaluable
itself, and as the only hopeful means of securing crown and state
from an ignominious surrender in the next parliament after a
mischievous and painful struggle. (I did not advert to the
difficulties which will in this session be experienced in carrying
on a great battle for the Crimes Act.) My difficulty would lie not
in my pledges or declarations (though these, of a public
character, are serious), but in my opinions.
Under these circumstances, I said, I take into view the freedom of
my own position. My engagements to my colleagues are fulfilled;
the great Russian question is probably settled; if we stand firm
on the Soudan, we are now released from that embarrassment; and
the Egyptian question, if the financial convention be safe, no
longer presents any very serious difficulties. I am entitled to
lay down my office as having done my work.
Consequently the very last thing I should contemplate is opening
the Irish difficulty in connection with my resignation, should I
resign. It would come antecedently to any parliamentary treatment
of that problem. If thereafter the secession of some members
should break up the cabinet, it would leave behind it an excellent
record at home and abroad. Lord Granville, while ready to resign
his office, was not much consoled by this presentation of the
case.
Late in the month (May 23) Mr. Gladstone wrote a long letter to the Queen,
giving her “some idea of the shades of opinion existing in the cabinet
with reference to legislation for Ireland.” He thought it desirable to
supply an outline of this kind, because the subject was sure to recur
after a short time, and was “likely to exercise a most important influence
in the coming parliament on the course of affairs.” The two points on
which there was considerable divergence of view were the expiry of the
Crimes Act, and the concession of local government. The Irish viceroy was
ready to drop a large portion of what Mr. Gladstone called coercive
provisions, while retaining provisions special to Ireland, but favouring
the efficiency of the law. Other ministers were doubtful whether any
special legislation was needed for Irish criminal law. Then on the point
whether the new bill should be for two years or one, some, including Mr.
Gladstone and Lord Spencer, were for the longer term, others, including
Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke, for the shorter. At last the whole
cabinet agreed to two years. Next for local government,—some held that a
liberal move in this region (M76) would possibly obviate all need for
special criminal legislation, and would at any rate take the sting out of
it. To this “vastly important subject” the prime minister presumed to draw
the Queen’s special attention, as involving great and far-reaching
questions. He did not, he said, regard the differences of leaning in the
cabinet upon these matters with either surprise or dismay. Such
difficulties were due to inherent difficulties in the matters themselves,
and were to be expected from the action of independent and energetic minds
in affairs so complex.
There were two main opinions. One favoured the erection of a system of
representative county government in Ireland. The other view was that
besides the county boards, there should be in addition a central board for
all Ireland, essentially municipal and not political; in the main
executive and administrative, but also with a power to make bye-laws,
raise funds, and pledge public credit in such modes as parliament should
provide. The central board would take over education, primary, in part
intermediate, and perhaps even higher; poor law and sanitary
administration; and public works. The whole charge of justice, police, and
prisons would remain with the executive. This board would not be directly
elective by the whole Irish people; it would be chosen by the
representative county boards. Property, moreover, should have a
representation upon it distinct from numbers. This plan, “first made known
to Mr. Gladstone by Mr. Chamberlain,” would, he believed, be supported by
six out of the eight Commons ministers. But a larger number of ministers
were not prepared to agree to any plan involving the principle of an
elective central board as the policy of the cabinet. On account of this
preliminary bar, the particular provisions of the policy of a central
board were not discussed.
All this, however, was for the moment retrospective and historic, because
a fortnight before the letter was written, the policy of the central
board, of which Mr. Gladstone so decisively approved, had been killed. A
committee of the cabinet was appointed to consider it; some remained
stubbornly opposed; as the discussion went on, some changed their minds
and, having resisted, at last inclined to acquiesce. Ministers were aware
from the correspondence of one of them with an eminent third person, that
Mr. Parnell approved the scheme, and in consideration of it would even not
oppose a very limited Crimes bill. This, however, was no temptation to all
of them; perhaps it had the contrary effect. When it came to the full
cabinet, it could not be carried. All the peers except Lord Granville were
against it. All the Commoners except Lord Hartington were for it. As the
cabinet broke up (May 9), the prime minister said to one colleague, “Ah,
they will rue this day”; and to another, “Within six years, if it please
God to spare their lives, they will be repenting in sackcloth and ashes.”
Later in the day he wrote to one of them, “The division of opinion in the
cabinet on the subject of local government with a central board for
Ireland was so marked, and if I may use the expression, so diametrical,
that I dismissed the subject from my mind, and sorrowfully accepted the
negative of what was either a majority, or a moiety of the entire
cabinet.”
This decision, more profoundly critical than anybody excepting Mr.
Gladstone and perhaps Mr. Chamberlain seemed to be aware, left all
existing difficulties as acute as ever. In the middle of May things looked
very black. The scheme for a central board was dead, though, wrote Mr.
Gladstone to the viceroy, “for the present only. _It will quickly rise
again, as I think, perhaps in larger dimensions._” Some members of the
cabinet, he knew not how many, would resign rather than demand from
parliament, without a Central Board bill, the new Coercion Act. If such
resignations took place, how was a Coercion bill to be fought through the
House, when some liberals had already declared that they would resist it?
On May 15 drafts not only of a Coercion bill, but of a bill for land
purchase, came before the cabinet. Much objection was taken to land
purchase, especially by the two radical leaders, and it was agreed to
forego such a bill for the present session. The viceroy gravely lamented
this decision, and Mr. Gladstone entered into communication with Mr. (M77)
Chamberlain and Sir C. Dilke. From them he understood that their main
anxiety sprang from a fear lest the future handling of local government
should be prejudiced by premature disposal of the question of land
purchase, but that in the main they thought the question of local
government would not be prejudiced if the purchase bill only provided
funds for a year. Under this impression and with a full belief that he was
giving effect to the real desire of his colleagues in general to meet the
views of Lord Spencer, and finding the prospects of such a bill
favourable, Mr. Gladstone proceeded (May 20) to give notice of its
introduction. Mr. Chamberlain and Sir C. Dilke took this to be a reversal
of the position to which they had agreed, and would not assent to land
purchase unless definitely coupled with assurances as to local government.
They immediately resigned. The misapprehension was explained, and though
the resignations were not formally withdrawn, they were suspended. But the
two radical leaders did not conceal their view of the general state of the
case, and in very direct terms told Mr. Gladstone that they differed so
completely on the questions that were to occupy parliament for the rest of
the session, as to feel the continuance of the government of doubtful
advantage to the country. In Mr. Chamberlain’s words, written to the prime
minister at the time of the misunderstanding (May 21)—
I feel there has been a serious misapprehension on both sides with
respect to the Land Purchase bill, and I take blame to myself if I
did not express myself with sufficient clearness.... I doubt very
much if it is wise or was right to cover over the serious
differences of principle that have lately disclosed themselves in
the cabinet. I think it is now certain that they will cause a
split in the new parliament, and it seems hardly fair to the
constituencies that this should only be admitted, after they have
discharged their function and are unable to influence the result.
III
Still the prime minister altogether declined, in his own phrase, to lose
heart, and new compromises were invented. Meanwhile he cheerfully went for
the Whitsuntide recess to Hawarden, and dived into Lechler’s _Wycliffe_,
Walpole’s _George III._, Conrad on German Union, Cooper on the Atonement,
and so forth. Among other guests at Hawarden came Lord Wolverton, “with
much conversation; we opened rather a new view as to my retirement.” What
the new view was we do not know, but the conversation was resumed and
again resumed, until the unwelcome day (June 4) for return to Downing
Street. Before returning, however, Mr. Gladstone set forth his view of the
internal crisis in a letter to Lord Hartington:—
_To Lord Hartington._
_May 30, 1885._—I am sorry but not surprised that your rather
remarkable strength should have given way under the pressure of
labour or anxiety or both. Almost the whole period of this
ministry, particularly the year and a half since the defeat of
Hicks, and most particularly of all, the four months since the
morning when you deciphered the Khartoum telegram at Holker, have
been without example in my experience, as to the gravity and
diversity of difficulties which they have presented. What I hope
is that they will not discourage you, or any of our colleagues, in
your anticipations of the future. It appears to me that there is
not one of them, viewed in the gross, which has been due to our
own action. By viewing in the gross, I mean taking the Egyptian
question as one. When we subdivide between Egypt proper and the
Soudan, I find what seem to me two grave errors in our management
of the Soudan business: the first our _landing_ at Suakin, the
second the mission of Gordon, or rather the choice of Gordon for
that mission. But it sometimes happens that the errors gravest in
their consequences are also the most pardonable. And these errors
were surely pardonable enough in themselves, without relying on
the fact that they were approved by the public opinion of the day
and by the opposition. Plenty of other and worse errors have been
urged upon us which we have refused or avoided. I do not remember
a single good measure recommended by opponents, which we have
declined to adopt (or indeed any good measure which they have
recommended at all). We certainly have worked hard. I believe that
according to the measure of human infirmity, we have done fairly
well, but the duties we have had to discharge have been duties, I
mean in Egypt and the Soudan, which it was impossible to discharge
with the ordinary measure of credit and satisfaction, which were
beyond human strength, and which it was very unwise of our
predecessors to saddle upon the country.
At this moment we have but two great _desiderata_: the Egyptian
Convention and the Afghan settlement (the evacuation of the Soudan
being in principle a thing done). Were these accomplished, we
should have attained for the empire at home and abroad a position
in most respects unusually satisfactory, and both of them _ought_
to be near accomplishment. With the Egyptian Convention fairly at
work, I should consider the Egyptian question as within a few
comparatively easy stages of satisfactory solution.
Now as regards the immediate subject. What if Chamberlain and
Dilke, as you seem to anticipate, raise the question of a
prospective declaration about local government in Ireland as a
condition of their remaining in the cabinet? I consider that
question as disposed of for the present (much against my will),
and I do not see that any of us, having accepted the decision, can
attempt to disturb it. Moreover, their ground will be very weak
and narrow; for their actual reason of going, if they go, will be
the really small question arising upon the Land Purchase bill.
I think they will commit a great error if they take this course.
It will be straining at the gnat. No doubt it will weaken the
party at the election, but I entertain no fear of the immediate
effect. Their error will, however, in my view go beyond this.
Forgive me if I now speak with great frankness on a matter, one of
few, in which I agree with them, and not with you. I am firmly
convinced that on local government for Ireland they hold a winning
position; which by resignation now they will greatly compromise.
You will all, I am convinced, have to give what they recommend; at
the least what they recommend.
There are two differences between them and me on this subject.
First as to the matter; I go rather further than they do; for I
would undoubtedly make a _beginning_ with the Irish police.
Secondly as to the _ground_; here I differ seriously. I do not
reckon with any confidence upon Manning or Parnell; I have never
looked much in Irish matters at negotiation or the conciliation of
leaders. I look at the question in itself, and I am deeply
convinced that the measure in itself will (especially if
accompanied with similar measures elsewhere, _e.g._ in Scotland)
be good for the country and the empire; I do not say unmixedly
good, but with advantages enormously outweighing any drawbacks.
Apart from these differences, and taking their point of view, I
think they ought to endeavour to fight the election with you; and
in the _new state of affairs_ which will be presented after the
dissolution, try and see what effect may be produced upon your
mind, and on other minds, when you have to look at the matter
_cominus_ and not _eminus_, as actual, and not as hypothetical. I
gave Chamberlain a brief hint of these speculations when
endeavouring to work upon him; otherwise I have not mentioned them
to any one.
IV
On the day of his return to London from Hawarden Mr. Gladstone had an
interview with the two ministers with whom on the merits he was most
disposed to agree, though he differed strongly from them as to tactics.
Resignations were still only suspended, yet the prospects of compromise
were hopeful. At a cabinet held on the following day (June 5) it was
agreed that he should in the course of a week give notice of a bill to
take the place of the expiring Crimes Act. The point left open was whether
the operative provisions of such an Act—agreed on some time before—should
not be brought into operation without some special act of the executive
government, by proclamation, order in council, or otherwise. Local
government was still left open. Lord Spencer crossed over from Ireland on
the night of June 7, and the cabinet met next day. All differences were
narrowed down to the point whether the enactments against intimidation
should be inoperative unless and until the lord lieutenant should waken
them into life by proclamation. As it happened, intimidation had been for
a considerable time upon the increase—from which it might be inferred
either, on the one side, that coercion failed in its object, or, on the
other, that more coercion was still indispensable. The precise state in
which matters were left at the eleventh hour before the crisis, now
swiftly advancing, (M78) was set out by Mr. Gladstone in a letter written
by him to the Queen in the autumn (October 5), when he was no longer her
Majesty’s minister:—
_To the Queen._
... He has perceived that in various quarters misapprehension
prevails as to the point at which the deliberations of the late
cabinet on the question of any renewal of, or substitution for,
the Crimes Act in Ireland had arrived when their financial defeat
on the 8th of June caused the tender of their resignation.
Mr. Gladstone prays your Majesty’s gracious permission to remove
this misapprehension by simply stating that which occurred in the
cabinet at its latest meetings, with reference to this particular
question. Substantially it would be a repetition, or little more
(and without any mention of names), of his latest reports to your
Majesty, to the effect—
1. That the cabinet had long before arrived at the conclusion that
the coercion clauses of the Act, properly so called, might be
safely abandoned.
2. With regard to the other clauses, which might be generally
described as procedure clauses, they intended as a rule to advise,
not their absolute re-enactment, but that the viceroy should be
empowered to bring them into action, together or separately, as
and when he might see cause.
3. But that, with respect to the intimidation or boycotting
provisions, it still remained for consideration whether they
should thus be left subject to executive discretion, or whether,
as the offence had not ceased, they should, as an effective
instrument of repression, remain in direct and full operation.
It is worth noticing here as a signal instance of Mr. Gladstone’s
tenacious and indomitable will after his defeat, that in a communication
to the Queen four days later (June 12), he stated that the single
outstanding point of difference on the Crimes bill was probably in a fair
way of settlement, but that even if the dissent of the radical members of
the cabinet had become operative, it was his firm intention to make new
arrangements for filling the vacant offices and carrying on the
government. The overthrow came in a different way. The deliberations thus
summarised had been held under the shadow of a possibility, mentioned to
the Queen in the report of this last cabinet, of a coalition between the
tories and the Irish nationalists, in order to put an end to the existence
of the government on their budget. This cloud at last burst, though Mr.
Gladstone at any rate with his usual invincible adherence to the salutary
rule never to bid good morrow to the devil until you meet him, did not
strongly believe in the risk. The diary sheds no light on the state of his
expectations:—
_June 6._... Read Amiel’s _Journal Intime_. Queen’s birthday
dinner, 39; went very well. Much conversation with the Prince of
Wales, who was handy and pleasant even beyond his wont. Also had
some speech of his son, who was on my left. _June 7, Trinity
Sunday._—Chapel Royal at noon and 5.30. Wrote.... Saw Lord
Granville; ditto _cum_ Kimberley. Read Amiel. Edersheim on Old
Testament. _June 8._—Wrote, etc.... Pitiless rain. Cabinet,
2-3-¾.... Spoke on budget. Beaten by 264:252. Adjourned the House.
This is a considerable event.
The amendment that led to this “considerable event” was moved by Sir
Michael Hicks Beach. The two points raised by the fatal motion were,
first, the increased duty on beer and spirits without a corresponding
increase on wine; and, second, the increase of the duty on real property
while no relief was given to rates. The fiscal issue is not material. What
was ominous was the alliance that brought about the result.
The defeat of the Gladstone government was the first success of a
combination between tories and Irish, that proved of cardinal importance
to policies and parties for several critical months to come. By a
coincidence that cut too deep to be mere accident, divisions in the
Gladstone cabinet found their counterpart in insurrection among the tory
opposition. The same general forces of the hour, working through the
energy, ambition, and initiative of individuals, produced the same effect
in each of the two parties; the radical programme of Mr. Chamberlain was
matched by the (M79) tory democracy of Lord Randolph Churchill; each saw
that the final transfer of power from the ten-pound householder to
artisans and labourers would rouse new social demands; each was aware that
Ireland was the electoral pivot of the day, and while one of them was
wrestling with those whom he stigmatised as whigs, the other by dexterity
and resolution overthrew his leaders as “the old gang.”