BOOK I

[Transcriber's Note:

Typographical errors in the original have been corrected and noted

using the notation ** .

Macrons, breves, umlauts etc have been removed from the body of the text

since they were very obtrusive and made reading difficult. However, they

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* * * * *

EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY

EDITED BY ERNEST RHYS

CLASSICAL

CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES

TRANSLATED BY W. A. MACDEVITT

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THOMAS DE QUINCEY

THIS IS NO. 702 OF _EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY_. THE PUBLISHERS WILL BE PLEASED

TO SEND FREELY TO ALL APPLICANTS A LIST OF THE PUBLISHED AND PROJECTED

VOLUMES ARRANGED UNDER THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS:

* * * * *

TRAVEL--SCIENCE--FICTION

THEOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY

HISTORY--CLASSICAL

FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

ESSAYS--ORATORY

POETRY & DRAMA

BIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE

ROMANCE

* * * * *

THE ORDINARY EDITION IS BOUND IN CLOTH WITH GILT DESIGN AND COLOURED

TOP. THERE IS ALSO A LIBRARY EDITION IN REINFORCED CLOTH

THE SAGES OF OLD LIVE AGAIN IN US

GLANVILL

"DE BELLO GALLICO" & OTHER COMMENTARIES:

OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR

FIRST PUBLISHED IN THIS EDITION, 1915

REPRINTED 1923, 1929

INTRODUCTION

BY THOMAS DE QUINCEY

The character of the First Caesar has perhaps never been worse

appreciated than by him who in one sense described it best; that is,

with most force and eloquence wherever he really _did_ comprehend it.

This was Lucan, who has nowhere exhibited more brilliant rhetoric, nor

wandered more from the truth, than in the contrasted portraits of Caesar

and Pompey. The famous line, _"Nil actum reputans si quid superesset

agendum,"_ is a fine feature of the real character, finely expressed.

But, if it had been Lucan's purpose (as possibly, with a view to

Pompey's benefit, in some respects it was) utterly and extravagantly to

falsify the character of the great Dictator, by no single trait could he

more effectually have fulfilled that purpose, nor in fewer words, than

by this expressive passage, _"Gaudensque viam fecisse ruina."_ Such a

trait would be almost extravagant applied even to Marius, who (though in

many respects a perfect model of Roman grandeur, massy, columnar,

imperturbable, and more perhaps than any one man recorded in History

capable of justifying the bold illustration of that character in Horace,

"_Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae_") had, however,

a ferocity in his character, and a touch of the devil in him, very

rarely united with the same tranquil intrepidity. But, for Caesar, the

all-accomplished statesman, the splendid orator, the man of elegant

habits and polished taste, the patron of the fine arts in a degree

transcending all example of his own or the previous age, and as a man of

general literature so much beyond his contemporaries, except Cicero,

that he looked down even upon the brilliant Sylla as an illiterate

person--to class such a man with the race of furious destroyers exulting

in the desolations they spread is to err not by an individual trait, but

by the whole genus. The Attilas and the Tamerlanes, who rejoice in

avowing themselves the scourges of God, and the special instruments of

his wrath, have no one feature of affinity to the polished and humane

Caesar, and would as little have comprehended his character as he could

have respected theirs. Even Cato, the unworthy hero of Lucan, might have

suggested to him a little more truth in this instance, by a celebrated

remark which he made on the characteristic distinction of Caesar, in

comparison with other revolutionary disturbers; for, said he, whereas

others had attempted the overthrow of the state in a continued paroxysm

of fury, and in a state of mind resembling the lunacy of intoxication,

Caesar, on the contrary, among that whole class of civil disturbers, was

the only one who had come to the task in a temper of sobriety and

moderation _(unum accessisse sobrium ad rempublicam delendam)_....

Great as Caesar was by the benefit of his original nature, there can be

no doubt that he, like others, owed something to circumstances; and

perhaps amongst those which were most favourable to the premature

development of great self-dependence we must reckon the early death of

his father. It is, or it is not, according to the nature of men, an

advantage to be orphaned at as early age. Perhaps utter orphanage is

rarely or never such: but to lose a father betimes may, under

appropriate circumstances, profit a strong mind greatly. To Caesar it

was a prodigious benefit that he lost his father when not much more than

fifteen. Perhaps it was an advantage also to his father that he died

thus early. Had he stayed a year longer, he might have seen himself

despised, baffled, and made ridiculous. For where, let us ask, in any

age, was the father capable of adequately sustaining that relation to

the unique Caius Julius--to him, in the appropriate language of

Shakespeare

"The foremost man of all this world?"

And, in this fine and Caesarean line, "this world" is to be understood

not of the order of co-existences merely,` but also of the order of

successions; he was the foremost man not only of his contemporaries, but

also, within his own intellectual class, of men generally--of all that

ever should come after him, or should sit on thrones under the

denominations of Czars, Kesars, or Caesars of the Bosphorus and the

Danube; of all in every age that should inherit his supremacy of mind,

or should subject to themselves the generations of ordinary men by

qualities analogous to his. Of this infinite superiority some part must

be ascribed to his early emancipation from paternal control. There are

very many cases in which, simply from considerations of sex, a female

cannot stand forward as the head of a family, or as its suitable

representative. If they are even ladies paramount, and in situations of

command, they are also women. The staff of authority does not annihilate

their sex; and scruples of female delicacy interfere for ever to unnerve

and emasculate in their hands the sceptre however otherwise potent.

Hence we see, in noble families, the merest boys put forward to

represent the family dignity, as fitter supporters of that burden than

their mature mothers. And of Caesar's mother, though little is recorded,

and that little incidentally, this much at least we learn--that, if she

looked down upon him with maternal pride and delight, she looked up to

him with female ambition as the re-edifier of her husband's honours,--

looked with reverence as to a column of the Roman grandeur and with fear

and feminine anxieties as to one whose aspiring spirit carried him but

too prematurely into the fields of adventurous strife. One slight and

evanescent sketch of the relations which subsisted between Caesar and

his mother, caught from the wrecks of time, is preserved both by

Plutarch and Suetonius. We see in the early dawn the young patrician

standing upon the steps of his patrimonial portico, his mother with her

arms wreathed about his neck, looking up to his noble countenance,

sometimes drawing auguries of hope from features so fitted for command,

sometimes boding an early blight to promises so dangerously magnificent.

That she had something of her son's aspiring character, or that he

presumed so much in a mother of his, we learn from the few words which

survive of their conversation. He addressed to her no language that

could tranquillise her fears. On the contrary, to any but a Roman mother

his valedictory words, taken in connexion with the known determination

of his character, were of a nature to consummate her depression, as they

tended to confirm the very worst of her fears. He was then going to

stand his chance in a popular electioneering contest for an office of

the highest dignity, and to launch himself upon the storms of the Campus

Martius. At that period, besides other and more ordinary dangers, the

bands of gladiators, kept in the pay of the more ambitious or turbulent

amongst the Roman nobles, gave a popular tone of ferocity and of

personal risk to the course of such contests; and, either to forestall

the victory of an antagonist, or to avenge their own defeat, it was not

at all impossible that a body of incensed competitors might intercept

his final triumph by assassination. For this danger, however, he had no

leisure in his thoughts of consolation; the sole danger which _he_

contemplated, or supposed his mother to contemplate, was the danger of

defeat, and for that he reserved his consolations. He bade her fear

nothing; for that his determination was to return with victory, and with

the ensigns of the dignity he sought, or to return a corpse.

Early indeed did Caesar's trials commence; and it is probable, that, had

not the death of his father, by throwing him prematurely upon his own

resources, prematurely developed the masculine features of his

character, forcing him whilst yet a boy under the discipline of civil

conflict and the yoke of practical life, even _his_ energies might have

been insufficient to sustain them. His age is not exactly ascertained;

but it is past a doubt that he had not reached his twentieth year when

he had the hardihood to engage in a struggle with Sylla, then Dictator,

and exercising the immoderate powers of that office with the licence and

the severity which History has made so memorable. He had neither any

distinct grounds of hope, nor any eminent example at that time, to

countenance him in this struggle--which yet he pushed on in the most

uncompromising style, and to the utmost verge of defiance. The subject

of the contest gives it a further interest. It was the youthful wife of

the youthful Caesar who stood under the shadow of the great Dictator's

displeasure; not personally, but politically, on account of her

connexions: and her it was, Cornelia, the daughter of a man who had been

four times consul, that Caesar was required to divorce: but he spurned

the haughty mandate, and carried his determination to a triumphant

issue, notwithstanding his life was at stake, and at one time saved only

by shifting his place of concealment every night; and this young lady it

was who afterwards became the mother of his only daughter. Both mother

and daughter, it is remarkable, perished prematurely, and at critical

periods of Caesar's life; for it is probable enough that these

irreparable wounds to Caesar's domestic affections threw him with more

exclusiveness of devotion upon the fascinations of glory and ambition

than might have happened under a happier condition of his private life.

That Caesar should have escaped destruction in this unequal contest with

an enemy then wielding the whole thunders of the state, is somewhat

surprising; and historians have sought their solution of the mystery in

the powerful intercessions of the vestal virgins, and several others of

high rank amongst the connexions of his great house. These may have done

something; but it is due to Sylla, who had a sympathy with everything

truly noble, to suppose him struck with powerful admiration for the

audacity of the young patrician, standing out in such severe solitude

among so many examples of timid concession; and that to this magnanimous

feeling in the Dictator much of the indulgence which he showed may have

been really due. In fact, according to some accounts, it was not Sylla,

but the creatures of Sylla (_adjutores_), who pursued Caesar. We know,

at all events, that Sylla formed a right estimate of Caesar's character,

and that, from the complexion of his conduct in this one instance, he

drew that famous prophecy of his future destiny; bidding his friends

beware of that slipshod boy, "for that in him lay couchant many a

Marius." A grander testimony to the awe which Caesar inspired, or from

one who knew better the qualities of that Cyclopean man by whose scale

he measured the patrician boy, cannot be imagined.

It is not our intention, or consistent with our plan, to pursue this

great man through the whole circumstances of his romantic career; though

it is certain that many parts of his life require investigation much

keener than has ever been applied to them, and that many might be placed

in a new light. Indeed, the whole of this most momentous section of

ancient history ought to be recomposed with the critical scepticism of a

Niebuhr, and the same comprehensive collation, resting, if possible, on

the felicitous interpretation of authorities. In reality it is the hinge

upon which turned the future destiny of the whole earth, and, having

therefore a common relation to all modern nations whatsoever, should

naturally have been cultivated with the zeal which belongs to a personal

concern. In general, the anecdotes which express most vividly the

grandeur of character in the first Caesar are those which illustrate his

defiance of danger in extremity: the prodigious energy and rapidity of

his decisions and motions in the field (looking to which it was that

Cicero called him [Greek: teras] or portentous revelation); the skill

with which he penetrated the designs of his enemies, and the electric

speed with which he met disasters with remedy and reparation, or, where

that was impossible, with relief; the extraordinary presence of mind

which he showed in turning adverse omens to his own advantage, as when,

upon stumbling in coming on shore (which was esteemed a capital omen of

evil), he transfigured as it were in one instant its whole meaning by

exclaiming, "Thus, and by this contact with the earth, do I take

possession of thee, O Africa!" in that way giving to an accident the

semblance of a symbolic purpose. Equally conspicuous was the grandeur of

fortitude with which he faced the whole extent of a calamity when

palliation could do no good, "non negando, minuendove, sed insuper

amplificando, _ementiendoque_"; as when, upon finding his soldiery

alarmed at the approach of Juba, with forces really great, but

exaggerated by their terrors, he addressed them in a military harangue

to the following effect:--"Know that within a few days the king will

come up with us, bringing with him sixty thousand legionaries, thirty

thousand cavalry, one hundred thousand light troops, besides three

hundred elephants. Such being the case, let me hear no more of

conjectures and opinions, for you have now my warrant for the fact,

whose information is past doubting. Therefore, be satisfied; otherwise,

I will put every man of you on board some crazy old fleet, and whistle

you down the tide--no matter under what winds, no matter towards what

shore." Finally, we might seek for _characteristic_ anecdotes of Caesar

in his unexampled liberalities and contempt of money.

Upon this last topic it is the just remark of Casaubon that some

instances of Caesar's munificence have been thought apocryphal, or to

rest upon false readings, simply from ignorance of the heroic scale upon

which the Roman splendours of that age proceeded. A forum which Caesar

built out of the products of his last campaign, by way of a present to

the Roman people, cost him--for the ground merely on which it stood--

nearly eight hundred thousand pounds. To the citizens of Rome he

presented, in one _congiary_, about two guineas and a half a head. To

his army, in one _donation_, upon the termination of the Civil War, he

gave a sum which allowed about two hundred pounds a man to the infantry,

and four hundred to the cavalry. It is true that the legionary troops

were then much reduced by the sword of the enemy, and by the tremendous

hardships of their last campaigns. In this, however, he did perhaps no

more than repay a debt. For it is an instance of military attachment,

beyond all that Wallenstein or any commander, the most beloved amongst

his troops, has ever experienced, that, on the breaking out of the Civil

War, not only did the centurions of every legion severally maintain a

horse soldier, but even the privates volunteered to serve without pay,

and (what might seem impossible) without their daily rations. This was

accomplished by subscriptions amongst themselves, the more opulent

undertaking for the maintenance of the needy. Their disinterested love

for Caesar appeared in another and more difficult illustration: it was a

traditionary anecdote in Rome that the majority of those amongst

Caesar's troops who had the misfortune to fall into the enemy's hands

refused to accept their lives under the condition of serving against

_him_.

In connexion with this subject of his extraordinary munificence, there

is one aspect of Caesar's life which has suffered much from the

misrepresentations of historians, and that is--the vast pecuniary

embarrassments under which he laboured, until the profits of war had

turned the scale even more prodigiously in his favour. At one time of

his life, when appointed to a foreign office, so numerous and so

clamorous were his creditors that he could not have left Rome on his

public duties had not Crassus come forward with assistance in money, or

by guarantees, to the amount of nearly two hundred thousand pounds. And

at another he was accustomed to amuse himself with computing how much

money it would require to make him worth exactly nothing (_i.e._ simply

to clear him of debts); this, by one account, amounted to upwards of two

millions sterling. Now, the error of historians has been to represent

these debts as the original ground of his ambition and his revolutionary

projects, as though the desperate condition of his private affairs had

suggested a civil war to his calculations as the best or only mode of

redressing it. Such a policy would have resembled the last desperate

resource of an unprincipled gambler, who, on seeing his final game at

chess, and the accumulated stakes depending upon it, all on the brink of

irretrievable sacrifice, dexterously upsets the chess-board, or

extinguishes the lights. But Julius, the one sole patriot of Rome, could

find no advantage to his plans in darkness or in confusion. Honestly

supported, he would have crushed the oligarchies of Rome by crushing in

its lairs that venal and hunger-bitten democracy which made oligarchy

and its machineries resistless. Caesar's debts, far from being

stimulants and exciting causes of his political ambition, stood in an

inverse relation to the ambition; they were its results, and represented

its natural costs, being contracted from first to last in the service of

his political intrigues, for raising and maintaining a powerful body of

partisans, both in Rome and elsewhere. Whosoever indeed will take the

trouble to investigate the progress of Caesar's ambition, from such

materials as even yet remain, may satisfy himself that the scheme of

revolutionizing the Republic, and placing himself at its head, was no

growth of accident or circumstances; above all, that it did not arise

upon any so petty and indirect a suggestion as that of his debts; but

that his debts were in their very first origin purely ministerial to his

wise, indispensable, and patriotic ambition; and that his revolutionary

plans were at all periods of his life a direct and foremost object, but

in no case bottomed upon casual impulses. In this there was not only

patriotism, but in fact the one sole mode of patriotism which could have

prospered, or could have found a field of action.

Chatter not, sublime reader, commonplaces of scoundrel moralists against

ambition. In some cases ambition is a hopeful virtue; in others (as in

the Rome of our resplendent Julius) ambition was the virtue by which any

other could flourish. It had become evident to everybody that Rome,

under its present constitution, must fall; and the sole question was--by

whom? Even Pompey, not by nature of an aspiring turn, and prompted to

his ambitious course undoubtedly by circumstances and, the friends who

besieged him, was in the habit of saying, "Sylla potuit: ego non

potero?" _Sylla found it possible: shall I find it not so?_ Possible to

do what? To overthrow the political system of the Republic. This had

silently collapsed into an order of things so vicious, growing also so

hopelessly worse, that all honest patriots invoked a purifying

revolution, even though bought at the heavy price of a tyranny, rather

than face the chaos of murderous distractions to which the tide of feuds

and frenzies was violently tending.

Such a revolution at such a price was not less Pompey's object than

Caesar's. In a case, therefore, where no benefit of choice was allowed

to Rome as respected the thing, but only as respected the person, Caesar

had the same right to enter the arena in the character of combatant as

could belong to any one of his rivals. And that he _did_ enter that

arena constructively, and by secret design, from his very earliest

manhood, may be gathered from this--that he suffered no openings towards

a revolution, provided they had any hope in them, to escape his

participation. It is familiarly known that he was engaged pretty deeply

in the conspiracy of Catiline, and that he incurred considerable risk on

that occasion; but it is less known that he was a party to at least two

other conspiracies. There was even a fourth, meditated by Crassus, which

Caesar so far encouraged as to undertake a journey to Rome from a very

distant quarter merely with a view to such chances as it might offer to

him; but, as it did not, upon examination, seem to him a very promising

scheme, he judged it best to look coldly upon it, or not to embark in it

by any personal co-operation. Upon these and other facts we build our

inference--that the scheme of a revolution was the one great purpose of

Caesar from his first entrance upon public life. Nor does it appear that

he cared much by whom it was undertaken, provided only there seemed to

be any sufficient resources for carrying it through, and for sustaining

the first collision with the regular forces of the existing oligarchies,

taking or _not_ taking the shape of triumvirates. He relied, it seems,

on his own personal superiority for raising him to the head of affairs

eventually, let who would take the nominal lead at first.

To the same result, it will be found, tended the vast stream of Caesar's

liberalities. From the senator downwards to the lowest _faex Romuli_, he

had a hired body of dependents, both in and out of Rome, equal in

numbers to a nation. In the provinces, and in distant kingdoms, he

pursued the same schemes. Everywhere he had a body of mercenary

partisans; kings even are known to have taken his pay. And it is

remarkable that even in his character of commander-in-chief, where the

number of legions allowed to him for the accomplishment of his Gaulish

mission raised him for a number of years above all fear of coercion or

control, he persevered steadily in the same plan of providing for the

distant day when he might need assistance, not _from_ the state, but

_against_ the state. For, amongst the private anecdotes which came to

light under the researches made into his history after his death, was

this--that, soon after his first entrance upon his government in Gaul,

he had raised, equipped, disciplined, and maintained, from his own

private funds, a legion amounting, possibly, to six or seven thousand

men, who were bound to no sacrament of military obedience to the state,

nor owed fealty to any auspices except those of Caesar. This legion,

from the fashion of their crested helmets, which resembled the heads of

a small aspiring bird, received the popular name of the _Alauda_ (or

Lark) legion. And very singular it was that Cato, or Marcellus, or some

amongst those enemies of Caesar who watched his conduct during the

period of his Gaulish command with the vigilance of rancorous malice,

should not have come to the knowledge of this fact; in which case we may

be sure that it would have been denounced to the Senate.

Such, then, for its purpose and its uniform motive, was the sagacious

munificence of Caesar. Apart from this motive, and considered in and for

itself, and simply with a reference to the splendid forms which it often

assumed, this munificence would furnish the materials for a volume. The

public entertainments of Caesar, his spectacles and shows, his

naumachiae, and the pomps of his unrivalled triumphs (the closing

triumphs of the Republic), were severally the finest of their kind which

had then been brought forward. Sea-fights were exhibited upon the

grandest scale, according to every known variety of nautical equipment

and mode of conflict, upon a vast lake formed artificially for that

express purpose. Mimic land-fights were conducted, in which all the

circumstances of real war were so faithfully rehearsed that even

elephants "indorsed with towers," twenty on each side, took part in the

combat. Dramas were represented in every known language (_per omnium

linguarum histriones_). And hence (that is, from the conciliatory

feeling thus expressed towards the various tribes of foreigners resident

in Rome) some have derived an explanation of what is else a mysterious

circumstance amongst the ceremonial observances at Caesar's funeral--

that all people of foreign nations then residing at Rome distinguished

themselves by the conspicuous share which they took in the public

mourning; and that, beyond all other foreigners, the Jews for night

after night kept watch and ward about the Emperor's grave. Never before,

according to traditions which lasted through several generations in

Rome, had there been so vast a conflux of the human race congregated to

any one centre, on any one attraction of business or of pleasure, as to

Rome on occasion of these triumphal spectacles exhibited by Caesar.

In our days, the greatest occasional gatherings of the human race are in

India, especially at the great fair of the _Hurdwar_ on the Ganges in

northern Hindustan: a confluence of some millions is sometimes seen at

that spot, brought together under the mixed influences of devotion and

commercial business, but very soon dispersed as rapidly as they had been

convoked. Some such spectacle of nations crowding upon nations, and some

such Babylonian confusion of dresses, complexions, languages, and

jargons, was then witnessed at Rome. Accommodations within doors, and

under roofs of houses, or roofs of temples, was altogether impossible.

Myriads encamped along the streets, and along the high-roads, fields, or

gardens. Myriads lay stretched on the ground, without even the slight

protection of tents, in a vast circuit about the city. Multitudes of

men, even senators, and others of the highest rank, were trampled to

death in the crowds. And the whole family of man might seem at that time

to be converged at the bidding of the dead Dictator. But these, or any

other themes connected with the public life of Caesar, we notice only in

those circumstances which have been overlooked, or partially

represented, by historians. Let us now, in conclusion, bring forward,

from the obscurity in which they have hitherto lurked, the anecdotes

which describe the habits of his private life, his tastes, and personal

peculiarities.

In person, he was tall, fair, gracile, and of limbs distinguished for

their elegant proportions. His eyes were black and piercing. These

circumstances continued to be long remembered, and no doubt were

constantly recalled to the eyes of all persons in the imperial palaces

by pictures, busts, and statues; for we find the same description of his

personal appearance three centuries afterwards in a work of the Emperor

Julian's. He was a most accomplished horseman, and a master

(_peritissimus_) in the use of arms. But, notwithstanding his skill and

horsemanship, it seems that, when he accompanied his army on marches, he

walked oftener than he rode; no doubt, with a view to the benefit of his

example, and to express that sympathy with his soldiers which gained him

their hearts so entirely. On other occasions, when travelling apart from

his army, he seems more frequently to have ridden in a carriage than on

horseback. His purpose, in this preference, must have been with a view

to the transport of luggage. The carriage which he generally used was a

_rheda_, a sort of gig, or rather curricle; for it was a _four_-wheeled

carriage, and adapted (as we find from the imperial regulations for the

public carriages, etc.) to the conveyance of about half a ton. The mere

personal baggage which Caesar carried with him was probably

considerable; for he was a man of elegant habits, and in all parts of

his life sedulously attentive to elegance of personal appearance. The

length of journeys which he accomplished within a given time appears

even to us at this day, and might well therefore appear to his

contemporaries, truly astonishing. A distance of one hundred miles was

no extraordinary day's journey for him in a _rheda_, such as we have

described it. So refined were his habits, and so constant his demand for

the luxurious accommodations of polished life as it then existed in

Rome, that he is said to have carried with him, as indispensable parts

of his personal baggage, the little ivory lozenges, squares and circles

or ovals, with other costly materials, wanted for the tessellated

flooring of his tent. Habits such as these will easily account for his

travelling in a carriage rather than on horseback.

The courtesy and obliging disposition of Caesar were notorious; and both

were illustrated in some anecdotes which survived for generations in

Rome. Dining on one occasion, as an invited guest, at a table where the

servants had inadvertently, for salad-oil, furnished some sort of coarse

lamp-oil, Caesar would not allow the rest of the company to point out

the mistake to their host, for fear of shocking him too much by exposing

what might have been construed into inhospitality. At another time,

whilst halting at a little _cabaret_, when one of his retinue was

suddenly taken ill, Caesar resigned to his use the sole bed which the

house afforded. Incidents as trifling as these express the urbanity of

Caesar's nature; and hence one is the more surprised to find the

alienation of the Senate charged, in no trifling degree, upon a gross

and most culpable failure in point of courtesy. Caesar, it is alleged--

but might we presume to call upon antiquity for its authority?--

neglected to rise from his seat, on their approaching him with an

address of congratulation. It is said, and we can believe it, that he

gave deeper offence by this one defect in a matter of ceremonial

observance than by all his substantial attacks upon their privileges.

What we find it difficult to believe is not that result from that

offence--this is no more than we should all anticipate--not _that_, but

the possibility of the offence itself, from one so little arrogant as

Caesar, and so entirely a man of the world. He was told of the disgust

which he had given; and we are bound to believe his apology, in which he

charged it upon sickness, that would not at the moment allow him to

maintain a standing attitude. Certainly the whole tenor of his life was

not courteous only, but kind, and to his enemies merciful in a degree

which implied so much more magnanimity than men in general could

understand that by many it was put down to the account of weakness.

Weakness, however, there was none in Caius Caesar; and, that there might

be none, it was fortunate that conspiracy should have cut him off in the

full vigour of his faculties, in the very meridian of his glory, and on

the brink of completing a series of gigantic achievements. Amongst these

are numbered:--a digest of the entire body of laws, even then become

unwieldy and oppressive; the establishment of vast and comprehensive

public libraries, Greek as well as Latin; the chastisement of Dacia

(that needed a cow-hiding for insolence as much as Affghanistan from us

in 1840); the conquest of Parthia; and the cutting a ship canal through

the Isthmus of Corinth. The reformation of the Calendar he had already

accomplished. And of all his projects it may be said that they were

equally patriotic in their purpose and colossal in their proportions.

As an orator, Caesar's merit was so eminent that, according to the

general belief, had he found time to cultivate this department of civil

exertion, the received supremacy of Cicero would have been made

questionable, or the honour would have been divided. Cicero himself was

of that opinion, and on different occasions applied the epithet

_splendidus_ to Caesar, as though in some exclusive sense, or with some

peculiar emphasis, due to him. His taste was much simpler, chaster, and

less inclined to the _florid_ and Asiatic, than that of Cicero. So far

he would, in that condition of the Roman culture and feeling, have been

less acceptable to the public; but, on the other hand, he would have

compensated this disadvantage by much more of natural and Demosthenic

fervour.

In literature, the merits of Caesar are familiar to most readers. Under

the modest title of _Commentaries_, he meant to offer the records of his

Gallic and British campaigns, simply as notes, or memoranda, afterwards

to be worked up by regular historians; but, as Cicero observes, their

merit was such in the eyes of the discerning that all judicious writers

shrank from the attempt to alter them. In another instance of his

literary labours he showed a very just sense of true dignity. Rightly

conceiving that everything patriotic was dignified, and that to

illustrate or polish his native language was a service of real and

paramount patriotism, he composed a work on the grammar and orthoepy of

the Latin language. Cicero and himself were the only Romans of

distinction in that age who applied themselves with true patriotism to

the task of purifying and ennobling their mother tongue. Both were aware

of a transcendent value in the Grecian literature as it then stood; but

that splendour did not depress their hopes of raising their own to

something of the same level. As respected the natural wealth of the two

languages, it was the private opinion of Cicero that the Latin had the

advantage; and, if Caesar did not accompany him to that length--which,

perhaps, under some limitations he ought to have done--he yet felt that

it was but the more necessary to draw forth any special or exceptional

advantage which it really had.

Was Caesar, upon the whole, the greatest of men? We restrict the

question, of course, to the classes of men great in _action_: great by

the extent of their influence over their social contemporaries; great by

throwing open avenues to extended powers that previously had been

closed; great by making obstacles once vast to become trivial, or prizes

that once were trivial to be glorified by expansion. I (said Augustus

Caesar) found Rome built of brick; but I left it built of marble. Well,

my man, we reply, for a wondrously little chap, you did what in

Westmoreland they call a good _darroch_ (day's work); and, if _navvies_

had been wanted in those days, you should have had our vote to a

certainty. But Caius Julius, even under such a limitation of the

comparison, did a thing as much transcending this as it was greater to

project Rome across the Alps and the Pyrenees,--expanding the grand

Republic into crowning provinces of 1. France (_Gallia_), 2. Belgium, 3.

Holland (_Batavia_), 4. England (_Britannia_), 5. Savoy (_Allobroges_),

6. Switzerland (_Helvetia_), 7. Spain (_Hispania_),--than to decorate a

street or to found an amphitheatre. Dr. Beattie once observed that, if

that question as to the greatest man in action upon the rolls of History

were left to be collected from the suffrages already expressed in books

and scattered throughout the literature of all nations, the scale would

be found to have turned prodigiously in Caesar's favour as against any

single competitor; and there is no doubt whatsoever that even amongst

his own countrymen, and his own contemporaries, the same verdict would

have been returned, had it been collected upon the famous principle of

Themistocles, that he should be reputed the first whom the greatest

number of rival voices had pronounced to be the second.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

_Works_: Latin folio, Rome, 1469; Venice, 1471; Florence, 1514; London,

1585. De Bello Gallico, Esslingen (?), 1473. Translations by John

Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester (John Rastell), of Julius Caesar's

Commentaries-"newly translated into Englyshe ... as much as concerneth

thys realme of England"--1530 folio; by Arthur Goldinge, The Eyght

Bookes of C. Julius Caesar, London, 1563, 1565, 1578, 1590; by Chapman,

London, 1604 folio; by Clem. Edmonds, London, 1609; the same, with

Hirtius, 1655, 1670, 1695 folio with commendatory verses by Camden,

Daniel, and Ben Johnson (_sic_). Works: Translated by W. Duncan, 1753,

1755; by M. Bladen, 8th ed., 1770; MacDevitt, Bohn's Library, 1848. De

Bello Gallico, translated by R. Mongan, Dublin, 1850; by J.B. Owgan and

C.W. Bateman, 1882. Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic War, translated

by T. Rice Holmes, London, 1908 (see also Holmes' Caesar's Conquest of

Gaul, 1911). Caesar's Gallic War, translated by Rev. F.P. Long, Oxford,

1911; Books IV. and V. translated by C.H. Prichard, Cambridge, 1912. For

Latin text of De Bello Gallico see Bell's Illustrated Classical Series;

Dent's Temple Series of Classical Texts, 1902; Macmillan and Co., 1905;

and Blackie's Latin Texts, 1905-7.

* * * * *

CONTENTS

THE WAR IN GAUL

THE CIVIL WAR

THE COMMENTARIES OF

CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR

THE WAR IN GAUL

BOOK I

I.--All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae

inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are

called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. All these differ from each other

in language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gauls

from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the

Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are

farthest from the civilisation and refinement of [our] Province, and

merchants least frequently resort to them and import those things which

tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans,

who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war;

for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in

valour, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when

they either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wage

war on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been said that

the Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone: it is bounded

by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae: it

borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the

river Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgae rise from the

extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine;

and look towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from

the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the

ocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun and

the north star.

II.--Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and

wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls, incited

by lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and

persuaded the people to go forth from their territories with all their

possessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelled

all in valour, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he

the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii are confined on

every side by the nature of their situation; on one side by the Rhine, a

very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from

the Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain which is

[situated] between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake

of Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the

Helvetii. From these circumstances it resulted that they could range

less widely, and could less easily make war upon their neighbours; for

which reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected with great

regret. They thought, that considering the extent of their population,

and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits,

although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles.

III.--Induced by these considerations, and influenced by the authority

of Orgetorix, they determined to provide such things as were necessary

for their expedition--to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts

of burden and waggons--to make their sowings as large as possible, so

that on their march plenty of corn might be in store--and to establish

peace and friendship with the neighbouring states. They reckoned that a

term of two years would be sufficient for them to execute their designs;

they fix by decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is

chosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the office

of ambassador to the states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, the

son of Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed

the sovereignty among the people for many years, and had been styled

"_friend_" by the senate of the Roman people), to seize upon the

sovereignty in his own state, which his father had held before him, and

he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus,

who at that time possessed the chief authority in the state, and was

exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt the same, and gives him

his daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to accomplish their

attempts was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself would

obtain the government of his own state; that there was no doubt that the

Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them

that he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire the

sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge and

oath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized the

sovereignty, they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant

nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul.

IV.--When this scheme was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they,

according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in

chains; it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire should

await him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his

cause, Orgetorix drew together from all quarters to the court all his

vassals to the number of ten thousand persons; and led together to the

same place, and all his dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a

great number; by means of these he rescued himself from [the necessity

of] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was

endeavouring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were

mustering a large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died; and

there is not wanting a suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his having

committed suicide.

V.--After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which

they had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories. When

they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking,

they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve--to their

villages about four hundred--and to the private dwellings that remained;

they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them;

that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more

ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forth

from home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground. They

persuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, their

neighbours, to adopt the same plan, and after burning down their towns

and villages, to set out with them: and they admit to their party and

unite to themselves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt on the other

side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Norican territory, and

assaulted Noreia.

VI.--There were in all two routes by which they could go forth from

their country--one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between

Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one waggon at a time

could be led; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, so

that a very few might easily intercept them); the other, through our

Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flows

between the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who

had lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. The

furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of

the Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the

Helvetii. They thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges,

because they did not seem as yet well-affected towards the Roman people,

or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territories.

Having provided everything for the expedition, they appoint a day on

which they should all meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was the

fifth before the kalends of April [_i.e._ the 28th of March], in the

consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B.C. 58].

VII.--When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make

their route through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city,

and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and

arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great a

number of soldiers as possible, as there was in all only one legion in

Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the

Helvetii are apprised of his arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors,

the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy Numeius and

Verudoctius held the chief place), to say "that it was their intention

to march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had"

[according to their own representations] "no other route:--that they

requested they might be allowed to do so with his consent." Caesar,

inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had

been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the

Helvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted; nor

was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of

marching through the Province were given them, would abstain from

outrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until

the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished] should assemble, he

replied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to deliberate; if

they wanted anything, they might return on the day before the ides of

April [on April 12th].

VIII.--Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the soldiers

who had assembled from the Province, he carries along for nineteen

[Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height of

sixteen feet, and a trench, from the lake of Geneva, which flows into

the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of the

Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, he

distributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he

may the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross over

against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the

ambassadors came, and they returned to him, he says that he cannot,

consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, grant

any one a passage through the Province; and he gives them to understand

that, if they should attempt to use violence, he would oppose them. The

Helvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried if they could force a passage

(some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous rafts constructed for

the purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of the

river was least, sometimes by day, but more frequently by night), but

being kept at bay by the strength of our works, and by the concourse of

the soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt.

IX.--There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on

account of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent of

the Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they send

ambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession they

might obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity

and liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly

to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughter

of Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for a

revolution, and wished to have as many states as possible attached to

him by his kindness towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair,

and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through

their territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to each

other--the Sequani not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march--the

Helvetii, to pass without mischief and outrage.

X.--It-is again told Caesar that the Helvetii intend to march through

the country of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories of the

Santones, which are not far distant from those boundaries of the

Tolosates, which [viz. Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. If

this took place, he saw that it would be attended with great danger to

the Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, bordering

upon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these reasons he

appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to the command of the

fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forced

marches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quarters

three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five

legions marches rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps into

Further Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges,

having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct the

army in their march. After having routed these in several battles, he

arrives in the territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province on

the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the Hither

Province; thence he leads his army into the country of the Allobroges,

and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the first

beyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone.

XI.--The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the

narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the

territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, as

they could not defend themselves and their possessions against them,

send ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had

at all times so well deserved of the Roman people, that their fields

ought not to have been laid waste--their children carried off into

slavery--their towns stormed, almost within sight of our army. At the

same time the Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui, apprise

Caesar that it was not easy for them, now that their fields had been

devastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: the

Allobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions on the other side

of the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar and assure him that

they had nothing remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar,

induced by these circumstances, decides that he ought not to wait until

the Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies, should

arrive among the Santones.

XII.--There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through the

territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible

slowness, that it cannot be determined by the eye in which direction it

flows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined

together. When Caesar was informed by spies that the Helvetii had

already conveyed three parts of their forces across that river, but that

the fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he set out

from the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came up

with that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attacking them,

encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great

part of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealed

themselves in the nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] was

called the Tigurine; for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four

cantons. This single canton having left their country, within the

recollection of our fathers, had slain Lucius Cassius the consul, and

had made his army pass under the yoke [B.C. 107]. Thus, whether by

chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of the

Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman

people was the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not only

the public, but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini had

slain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius

Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as

Cassius himself.

XIII.--This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with the

remaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across

the Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by his

sudden arrival, when they found that he had effected in one day what

they themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty,

namely, the crossing of the river, send ambassadors to him; at the head

of which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in

the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar:--that, "if the

Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that

part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be;

but if he should persist in persecuting them with war, that he ought to

remember both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the

characteristic valour of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one

canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossed the river

could not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on that

account to ascribe very much to his own valour, or despise them; that

they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to rely more on

valour than on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring it to

pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name,

from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their army

or transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity]."

XIV.--To these words Caesar thus replied:--that "on that very account he

felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstances

which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more

indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to

the Roman people: for if they had been conscious of having done any

wrong it would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but for

that very reason had they been deceived, because neither were they aware

that any offence had been given by them, on account of which they should

be afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid without

cause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, could

he also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had

against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in

that they had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That

as to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their

being astonished that they had so long committed their outrages with

impunity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal

gods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish to punish for their

guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order that

they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circumstances.

Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given him by

them in order that he may be assured they will do what they promise, and

provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages which

they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the

Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them." Divico replied, that

"the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors that they were

accustomed to receive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the Roman

people were witness." Having given this reply, he withdrew.

XV.--On the following day they move their camp from that place; Caesar

does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four

thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and

from the Aedui and their allies), to observe towards what parts the

enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the

enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a

disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated

with this battle because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so

large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from

their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained

his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent

the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about

fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six

miles between the enemy's rear and our van.

XVI.--Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn

which they had promised in the name of their state; for, in consequence

of the coldness (Gaul being, as before said, situated towards the

north), not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was not

in store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder: besides he was

unable to use the corn which he had conveyed in ships up the river

Saone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire, had

diverted their march from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from day

to day, and saying that it was being "collected--brought in--on the

road." When he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day was

close at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers,--

having called together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in

his camp, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was invested with the

chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style the Vergobretus, and who is

elected annually, and has power of life and death over his countrymen),

he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted by them on so

urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at hand, and when

[corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, particularly

as, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken the

war; much more bitterly, therefore, does he complain of his being

forsaken.

XVII.--Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what

he had hitherto kept secret:--that "there are some whose influence with

the people is very great, who, though private men, have more power than

the magistrates themselves: that these by seditious and violent language

are deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they ought

to supply; [by telling them] that, if they cannot any longer retain the

supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government of Gauls

than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should

overpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aedui

together with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men [said he] are our

plans, and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that

they could not be restrained by _him_: nay more, he was well aware that,

though compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at

how great a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silent

as long as he could."

XVIII.--Caesar perceived that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the

brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling that

these matters should be discussed while so many were present, he

speedily dismisses the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from him

when alone, about those things which he had said in the meeting. He

[Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar] makes

inquiries on the same points privately of others, and discovers that it

is all true; that "Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring,

in great favour with the people on account of his liberality, a man

eager for a revolution: that for a great many years he has been in the

habit of contracting for the customs and all the other taxes of the

Aedui at a small cost, because when _he_ bids, no one dares to bid

against him. By these means he has both increased his own private

property and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintains

constantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a great

number of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among the

neighbouring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of

strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the

Bituriges to a man the most noble and most influential there; that he

has himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii, and has given his

sister by the mother's side and his female relations in marriage into

other states; that he favours and wishes well to the Helvetii on account

of this connection; and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his own

account, because by their arrival his power was weakened, and his

brother, Divitiacus, restored to his former position of influence and

dignity: that, if anything should happen to the Romans, he entertains

the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii,

but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not only

of royalty but even of that influence which he already has." Caesar

discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful cavalry engagement

which had taken place a few days before, that the commencement of that

flight had been made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in

command of the cavalry which the Aedui had sent for aid to Caesar); that

by their flight the rest of the cavalry was dismayed.

XIX.--After learning these circumstances, since to these suspicions the

most unequivocal facts were added, viz., that he had led the Helvetii

through the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided that

hostages should be mutually given; that he had done all these things,

not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's,

but even without their [the Aedui] knowing anything of it themselves;

that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the

Aedui; he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason why he

should either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing

[however] stood in the way of all this--that he had learned by

experience his brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Roman

people, his great affection towards him, his distinguished faithfulness,

justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by the punishment of

this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, before

he attempted anything, he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and

when the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn, converses with him

through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of Gaul, an

intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence in

everything; at the same time he reminds him of what was said about

Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, and

shows what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own

presence; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence to his

feelings, he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] after

trying the case, or else order the [Aeduan] state to do so.

XX.-Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many

tears, that "he would not pass any very severe sentence upon his

brother; saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true, and that

nobody suffered more pain on that account than he himself did; for when

he himself could effect a very great deal by his influence at home and

in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on account of his

youth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which power and

strength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus]

popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced

both by fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if anything very

severe from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no one would think that

it had been done without his consent, since he himself held such a place

in Caesar's friendship; from which circumstance it would arise that the

affections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him." As he was

with tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takes

his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end of

entreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great that he

forgives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, at

his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in his

brother; he points out what he censures in him; he lays before him what

he of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns him

for the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that he

pardons the past, for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies

over Dumnorix that he may be able to know what he does, and with whom he

communicates.

XXI.--Being on the same day informed by his scouts that the enemy had

encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, he

sent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of

what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back that it was

easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant

with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain

with two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the road; he

explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens

to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all

the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very

experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius

Sulla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with

the scouts.

XXII.--At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the

possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a

mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascertained

from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been

discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him--

says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by

Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by

the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next

hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been

ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own

forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy

might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken

possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from

battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned

through spies that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and

that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with

fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that

day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp

three miles from theirs.

XXIII.--The next day (as there remained in all only two days' space [to

the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not

more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-stored

town of the Aedui) he thought that he ought to provide for a

supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced

rapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some

deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain of the Gallic horse. The

Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with

terror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before,

though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined

battle; or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut off

from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began

to pursue and to annoy our men in the rear.

XXIV.--Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next

hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He

himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of

his four veteran legions in such a manner that he placed above him on

the very summit the two legions which he had lately levied in Hither

Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain

should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be

brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those

who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, having followed with

all their waggons, collected their baggage into one place: they

themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx,

advanced up to our front line in very close order.

XXV.--Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then

those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away

with the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle. His

soldiers, hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke

the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a charge on them

with drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting,

that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the

(Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point

of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with

their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many,

after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the

buckler from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected. At

length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and as there was

in the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselves

thither. When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing

up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's

line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our

men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them;

upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who had betaken themselves to the

mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans

having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions; the first

and second line to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off

the field; the third to receive those who were just arriving.

XXVI.--Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful

success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the

one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the

mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and waggons. For during

the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh

hour [_i.e._ 12 (noon)--1 P.M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy

with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till

late in the night, for they had set waggons in the way as a rampart, and

from the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came

on, and some from between the waggons and the wheels kept darting their

lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight

had lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage and

camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken.

After that battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who

marched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a march

discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the

Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our men, having stopped for three

days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of

the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and

messengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assist

them with corn or with anything else; for that if they should assist

them, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After the

three days' interval he began to follow them himself with all his

forces.

XXVII.--The Helvetii, compelled by the want of everything, sent

ambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him in the way

and had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tone

had with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to await

his arrival, in the place where they then were, they obeyed his

commands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, their

arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst those things are

being sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6000

men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by

fear, lest, after delivering up their arms, they should suffer

punishment, or else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed

that, amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered themselves,

_their_ flight might either be concealed or entirely overlooked, having

at night-fall departed out of the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to the

Rhine and the territories of the Germans.

XXVIII.--But when Caesar discovered this, he commanded those through

whose territories they had gone, to seek them, out and to bring them

back again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and considered

them, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he admitted all the

rest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, and

deserters. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi to

return to their territories from which they had come, and as there was

at home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all the

productions of the earth having been destroyed, he commanded the

Allobroges to let them have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them

to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt. This he did,

chiefly on this account, because he was unwilling that the country, from

which the Helvetii had departed, should be untenanted, lest the Germans,

who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should, on account of the

excellence of the lands, cross over from their own territories into

those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province of Gaul

and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui, that they

might settle the Boii, in their own (_i.e._ in the Aeduan) territories,

as these were known to be of distinguished valour to whom they gave

lands, and whom they afterwards admitted to the same state of rights and

freedom as themselves.

XXIX.--In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek

characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been

drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their

country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the

old men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was:-

Of the _Helvetii_ [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii] 263,000

Of the _Tulingi_ 36,000

Of the _Latobrigi_ 14,000

Of the _Rauraci_ 23,000

Of the _Boii_ 32,000

-------

The sum of all amounted to 368,000

Out of these, such as could bear arms [amounted] to about 92,000. When

the _census_ of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had

commanded, the number was found to be 110,000.

XXX.--When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from

almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to

congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although

he had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs done

by them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less

to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the

Helvetii, while their affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their

country with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, and

seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance,

that spot for an abode which they should judge to be the most convenient

and most productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states as

tributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an

assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with

Caesar's permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with the

general consent, they wished to ask of him. This request having been

granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained by an oath

with each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations]

except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the general

assembly.

XXXI.--When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who

had before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be

allowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety of

themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw

themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged

and earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed

than that they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch

as they saw that, if a disclosure were made, they should be put to the

greatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him:--

"That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood

at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these had

been violently struggling with one another for the superiority for many

years, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by the

Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [_i.e._ of the

Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild and

savage men had become enamoured of the lands and the refinement and the

abundance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now as

many as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that with these the Aedui and their

dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms, that they had been routed

and had sustained a great calamity--had lost all their nobility, all

their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and

calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in Gaul, both

from their own valour and from the Roman people's hospitality and

friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their

state as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath,

that they would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid

from the Roman people, nor refuse to be for ever under their sway and

empire. That he was the only one out of all the state of the Aedui who

could not be prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children as

hostages. On that account he had fled from his state and had gone to the

senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither by oath nor

hostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than the

vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, had settled

in their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, which

was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart

from another third part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of

the Harudes had come to him, for whom room and settlements must be

provided. The consequence would be, that in a few years they would all

be driven from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross

the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with the land

of the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put on a

level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner

did he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which took place at

Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to demand

as hostages the children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on them

every kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod or

pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and that

his commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid in

Caesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that

the Helvetii had done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek

another dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, and

try whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be

disclosed to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that he

would inflict the most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in

his possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either by his own

influence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or by name of

the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number of

Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from

the outrages of Ariovistus."

XXXII.--When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were

present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar.

Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none

of those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down,

gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this

conduct, he inquired of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, but

silently continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedly

inquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the same

Divitiacus the Aeduan answered, that--"the lot of the Sequani was more

wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because

they alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; and

shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he

were present; for, to the rest, despite of everything, there was an

opportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be endured by the

Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories, and whose

towns were all in his power."

XXXIII.--Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered the minds of

the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be an

object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus,

induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to his

oppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed the assembly;

and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to think

that this affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially

as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the

senate "brethren" and "kinsmen," were held in the thraldom and dominion

of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus

and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman

people he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That,

moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the

Rhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw

[would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and judged that wild and

savage men would not be likely to restrain themselves, after they had

possessed themselves of all Gaul, from going forth into the province and

thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before

them), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole barrier that] separated

the Sequani from our province. Against which events he thought he ought

to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus, for his part,

had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance that he was felt to be

quite insufferable.

XXXIV.--He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to

demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference between

the two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him on state-business and

matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy

Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of anything from

Caesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted anything

from him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go

without an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of,

nor could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army together

to one place; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange what business

either Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he

had conquered in war.

XXXV.--When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadors

to him a second time with this message "Since, after having been treated

with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as he had in his

consulship [B.C. 59] been styled 'king and friend' by the senate), he

makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman people, [viz.]

that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not think that it

concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of mutual

interest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that he

do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul;

in the next place, that he restore the hostages which he has from the

Aedui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his

consent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the

Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would

accordingly do this," [Caesar says] that "he himself and the Roman

people will entertain a perpetual feeling of favour and friendship

towards him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain [his desires], that

he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso

[B.C. 61] the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the

administration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so

consistently with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui and

the other friends of the Roman people) will not overlook the wrongs of

the Aedui."

XXXVI.--To this Ariovistus replied, that "the right of war was, that

they who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in

what manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont to

govern the nations which they had conquered, not according to the

dictation of any other, but according to their own discretion. If he for

his part did not dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in which

they were to exercise their right, he ought not to be obstructed by the

Roman people in his right; that the Aedui, inasmuch as they had tried

the fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been conquered, had

become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, in

that by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to him;

that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should not

make war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided by

that which had been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if they

did _not_ continue to do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers'

would avail them nought. As to Caesar's threatening him that be would

not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said] that no one had ever

entered into a contest with _him_ [Ariovistus] without utter ruin to

himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would feel

what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond all

others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof,

could achieve by their valour."

XXXVII.--At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar,

ambassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui to

complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul,

were ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchase

peace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri,

[to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks

of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas

and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things,

Caesar thought that he ought to use all despatch, lest, if this new band

of Suevi should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus]

might be less easily withstood. Having, therefore, as quickly as he

could, provided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced

marches.

XXXVIII.--When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to

him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on

Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced

three days' journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought

to take the greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there was

in that town a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for

war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to afford a

great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs

almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it with

a pair of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining

space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in

such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank

on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this

[mountain], and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by

forced marches by night and day, and, after having seized the town,

stations a garrison there.

XXXIX.--Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn

and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the

Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge

stature, of incredible valour and practice in arms, that ofttimes they,

on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the

fierceness of their eyes)--so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole

army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree.

This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the

rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of

friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging,

some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary

for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be

allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order

that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither

compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but

hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with

their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally

throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these

men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both

soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command

of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to

be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but

feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which

lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be

brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar that when he

gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the

soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in

consequence of their fear.

XL.--When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and

summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely

reprimanded them, "particularly for supposing that it belonged to them

to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching,

or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship,

had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why

should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He

for his part was persuaded that, when his demands were known and the

fairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the

Roman people's favour. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he

should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of?--or why

should they despair either of their own valour or of his zeal? Of that

enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on

the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was

regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself.

It had been made lately, too, in Italy; during the rebellion of the

slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they had

received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might

be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it,--inasmuch

as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed,

they had afterwards vanquished, when well armed and flushed with

success. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in

frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in

theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet cannot have been

a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls

disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when

the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war,

Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the

marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly

upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all

directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than

valour. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage

and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby

our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a

pretence about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of the

roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their

general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things

were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to

furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to

the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its

being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or

advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew that in the

case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either

upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or,

that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly

proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole

life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would

therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a

more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the

fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a

sense of honour and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them.

But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the

tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his

praetorian cohort."--This legion Caesar had both greatly favoured, and

in it, on account of its valour, placed the greatest confidence.

XLI.-Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in

a surprising, manner, and the highest ardour and eagerness for

prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first

to return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having

expressed this most favourable opinion of them; and assured him that

they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions

endeavoured, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the

principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they

had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination

of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having

accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by

Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, [he

found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead

his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he

had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his

march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only

four and twenty miles distant from ours.

XLII.--Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends

ambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a

conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since

he [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now

do it without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began to

think that he was now returning to a rational state of mind, as he

spontaneously proffered that which he had previously refused to him when

requesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own

and the Roman people's great favours towards him, the issue would be

that he would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made

known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference.

Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them,

Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with

him to the conference, [saying] that "he was afraid of being ensnared by

him through treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry;

that he would not come on any other condition." Caesar, as he neither

wished that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be

set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided

that it would be most expedient to take away from the Gallic cavalry all

their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth

legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence; in order that he

might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any

need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the

tenth legion said, not without a touch of humour, "that Caesar did more

for them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion

in place of his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into

horse."

XLIII.--There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of

considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both

camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference.

Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] on

horseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also

took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that

they should confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they

should bring with them ten men each to the conference. When they were

come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his

own and the senate's favours towards him [Ariovistus], "in that he had

been styled king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate--

in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance

he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been

bestowed in consideration of important personal services; that he,

although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the

request, had obtained these honours through the kindness and munificence

of himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and how

just were the grounds of connexion that existed between themselves [the

Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate had been passed in

their favour, and how frequent and how honourable; how from time

immemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even

[said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was the

custom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies and

friends should lose none of their property, but be advanced in

influence, dignity, and honour: who then could endure that what they had

brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people, should be torn

from them?" He then made the same demands which he had commissioned the

ambassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon

the Aedui or their allies, that he should restore the hostages; that, if

he could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, he

should at all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine.

XLIV.--Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar; but

expatiated largely on his own virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhine

not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls;

that he had not left home and kindred without great expectations and

great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls

themselves; that the hostages had been given by their own good-will;

that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed

to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but

the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and

had encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed and

beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second

trial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy

peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free-will

they had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman people

ought to prove to him an ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; and

that he sought it with that expectation. But if through the Roman people

the tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be

seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people

no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host of

Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing

himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in

that he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not make

war, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the

Roman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the

frontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?

--why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains?--that this was his province

of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, if

he were to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that we

were unjust to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's saying

that the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not so

uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in

the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to

the Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggles

which the Aedui had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He

must feel suspicious that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the

reason for his keeping an army in Gaul; was keeping it with the view of

crushing him. And that unless he depart, and withdraw his army from

these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; and

that, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would please

many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance

of that from themselves through their messengers, and could purchase the

favour and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he

would depart and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he would

recompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whatever

wars he wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him."

XLV.--Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]: "why he

could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman

people's practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies,

nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the

Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by

Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and

had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And

if the most ancient period was to be regarded--then was the sovereignty

of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the senate was

to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had

conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws."

XLVI.--While these things are being transacted in the conference, it was

announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching

nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones and

weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to

his men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon

upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry

would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think

proper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said

that they had been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference.

When it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what

haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had

ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack

upon our men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater

alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.

XLVII.--Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state

"that he wished to treat with him about those things which had been

begun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded"; [and

to beg] that "he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or,

if he were not willing to do that, that he would send one of his

[officers] as an ambassador to him." There did not appear to Caesar any

good reason for holding a conference; and the more so as the day before

the Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our men. He

thought he should not without great danger send to him as ambassador one

of his [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed

[therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of

C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and

accomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of the

city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on

account of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by

long practice, now spoke fluently; and because in his case the Germans

would have no motive for committing violence; and [as his colleague] M.

Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned

them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But when

Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence

of his army, "Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose of

acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast

them into chains.

XLVIII.--The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill

six miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces past

Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design--that

he might cut off Caesar from, the corn and provisions which might be

conveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive days

from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put them

in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in

battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this

time kept his army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The

method of battle in which the Germans had practised themselves was this.

There were 6000 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one

of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own

protection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in their

engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushed

forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from

his horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advance

farther: than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great, from

practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of the

horses, they could keep pace with their speed.

XLIX.--Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he

might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient

position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped,

at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three

lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to

be under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant

from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus

sent light troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry;

which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in their

fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered

two lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. The

camp being fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of the

auxiliaries; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp.

L.--The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces

from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew

up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting.

When he found that they did not even then come out [from their

entrenchments], he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last

Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle

was vigorously maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset,

after many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back

his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore

Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he discovered this to be the

reason--that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to

pronounce from lots and divination whether it were expedient that the

battle should be engaged in or not; that they had said, "that it was not

the will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in

battle before the new moon."

LI.--The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard

for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the

enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the

number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that

[thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He

himself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp

of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces

out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the

Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and

surrounded their whole army with their chariots and waggons, that no

hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who,

with dishevelled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went

forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

LII.--Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that

every one might have them as witnesses of his valour. He himself began

the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that

part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the

signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the

enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for

casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins,

they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to

their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our

swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the

phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the

enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left

wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the

right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P.

Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry--as he was more

disengaged than those who were employed in the fight--sent the third

line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

LIII.--Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned

their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river

Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying

on their strength, endeavoured to swim over, or, finding boats, procured

their safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting with a small

vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all

the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom

he had brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister of

king Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither

for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their

two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus,

as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triple

chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the

enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less

pleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rank

in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued

from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune had

not diminished aught of the joy and exultation [of that day] by his

destruction. He [Procillus] said that in his own presence the lots had

been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be

put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time: that by the

favour of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found and

brought back to him [Caesar].

LIV.--This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who

had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when the

Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed,

slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important

wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the

Sequani, a little earlier than the season of the year required. He

appointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out in person for

Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.