CHAPTER VII.

PALMERSTON FOREIGN SECRETARY, JULY, 1846, TO DECEMBER, 1850.

We now come to Lord Palmerston’s third period at the Foreign Office,

which lasted from July, 1846, to December, 1851, but which we shall find

it better to divide into three chapters than to comprise it in one,

because it includes the romantic affair of Don Pacifico, which, by the

attempts made and the success achieved, will deserve a chapter to

itself. The _coup d’état_ and his dismissal will demand a third. We will

therefore take Lord Palmerston’s life at the Foreign Office down to the

year 1850, when the great Don Pacifico debate took place. There were in

the meantime various circumstances, all at the moment of intense

national interest, with which he was either specially concerned as

Foreign Secretary, or much concerned as a leading Cabinet Minister. The

chief among these were the Spanish marriages, Lord Minto’s mission to

Italy, the French Revolution and escape to England of Louis Philippe,

the first war between Austria and Sardinia, the French occupation of

Rome, and the wars in Hungary. With the minor operations of his official

life it is impossible for us here to deal.

When he got back to office, there had arisen a question as to the

expulsion of the Jesuits from certain Swiss cantons; but I do not know

that the English reader will care much now about the Jesuits in

Switzerland. Nor are we specially anxious as to the civil war which was

then carried on in Portugal. But the knot in European politics known as

the Spanish marriages had then an importance, and has since achieved

results, which make it necessary that we should not altogether pass it

over in any record, however short, of Lord Palmerston’s life. But for

those Spanish marriages Louis Philippe’s heirs might still have sat upon

the throne of France, and the name of king would not be altogether

disgraced in the realm over which Henry IV. had ruled. No prophecy shall

be ventured upon here as to the future of the French nation; but it is,

I think, notorious to the world at large that the last blow given to the

Bourbon family, in the opinion of Frenchmen, came from the Spanish

marriages.

I cannot but here remark that, strong, abiding, and consistent as was

Lord Palmerston’s conduct in reference to these transactions, and

assuredly as the disgrace would have been prevented could it have been

staved off by our English Minister, he does not seem to speak of the

foul political arrangements which were contemplated and carried out,

with that disgust which they must have engendered in the mind of every

honest and high-minded gentleman. But here we must remember that Lord

Palmerston, as English Foreign Secretary, accustomed as he was to speak

his mind freely, could not speak out quite plainly; and that of all that

he did say we probably do not possess the whole. But the consequence is

that up to this date men speak of the Spanish marriages as having been

tolerable in politics though bad in morals, and as projects which should

consign the inventors to no perdition, because they dealt, not with

private, but with public matters. To us it has seemed that the evil

intended, and in a great degree consummated, was of such a nature as to

deserve all the stigma which a private iniquity could bear. The Spanish

marriages are withdrawn from the comparatively easy regions of national

conscience by the intensity of private desire for aggrandisement, by the

private nature of the precautions taken, and by the private evil

accomplished.

Now, I must tell the story with as little matter of annoyance as may be

possible. It has already been told in Lord Palmerston’s life, and so

often before and since, that there can be no other reason for silence

but the abomination of the tale to be told. It is, however, impossible

to produce aright a memoir of Lord Palmerston’s life without telling it.

When kings and their councillors do amiss it is by no means the least of

the evil done that their doings must be made public and explained.

It had become to be important to us and other nations that the thrones

of France and Spain should be kept distinct, so that no French prince

might come to sit upon the throne of Spain. As there were now two

Spanish princesses,--Isabella, who was the Queen, and her sister, who at

the moment was her heir,--Louis Philippe was required to engage, and did

distinctly bind himself, that no son of his should marry Isabella, and

also that no son of his should marry the sister till the Queen should

have become a mother. Having bound himself by this undertaking the

King’s first endeavour was, to use an English phrase, to drive a coach

and horses through it. He determined that a son of his, or at any rate a

grandchild, should sit upon the throne of Spain, and presuming, as we

must surmise, that he found his opportunity in the comparative weakness

of Lord Aberdeen, he set to work to make such arrangements as might be

practicable. Palmerston had declared in 1836, when Isabella was about

five years old, that it would be so. “The fact is that he,”--Louis

Philippe,--“is as ambitious as Louis XIV., and wants to put one of his

sons on the throne of Spain as husband to the young Queen.” But since

then the young lady had grown to what in Spain is a marriageable age,

and the young Prince who was to become the link between the thrones was

twenty-two.

The King of the French did not see his way to break the engagement by

running counter to its first clause. He could not marry his son to the

young Queen. He might marry his son to the Queen’s sister, as soon as

that sister had a child. But that clause he did manage to break; and on

the day on which the Queen was married, the Duke de Montpensier was

married to the Princess. This was wrong, and false, and

mischievous,--likely to lead to quarrels and wars, and unlikely to lead

to increased power and dominion for any king or prince. But it was a

trick within the compass of certain kings and certain ministers, and was

not unroyal in all its bearings. Louis Philippe, however, was not

contented with this. He went farther, and selected the Prince who was to

marry the Queen. There was a Prince, unfortunate, as the minds of men

go, but hitherto not disgraced,--a poor man who could never become the

father of children. He it was whom Louis Philippe selected, with the

assistance and guidance of Guizot, in the absolute ignorance, I do not

hesitate to say, of Lord Aberdeen.

Such were the Spanish marriages. The fruits of them, as might have been

guessed, were disastrous. The Queen, at any rate, had children, on whose

royal birth no slur was openly thrown. The Duke de Montpensier lives as

an unknown nobleman in a foreign land, to whose name there clings

something of the flavour of his father’s deeds. M. Guizot, who was the

great Minister of the day, a man of high intellect, of thoughtful

habits, of religious feeling, and a Protestant, tarnished his name for

ever. And Louis Philippe ran from France as an exile, taking refuge in

England under the name of Mr. Smith. And here he died! The marriages

were perpetrated! But with what results to all who were concerned in

them! It may be doubted whether any meaner crime was ever committed in

the name of policy, or one of which the end was more befitting, or

better deserved.

The effect which this produced in Europe took eighteen months to show

itself. The marriages were solemnized in the autumn of 1846, and Louis

Philippe came to England and took up his abode at Claremont in the

spring of 1848. All his fine machinations had been blown like

soap-bubbles into air! The result of the marriages upon English feeling,

and upon Lord Palmerston, who was the one Englishman more concerned than

others, was that of distinct alienation. It afforded matter but for few

speeches in the House of Commons, and not much for private

correspondence, as it was done in secret, and the wickedness of the

arrangements could only creep out by slow degrees. Men at the time used

to whisper to each other that it was so, and men who received the

whisper declined to believe the story in all its foul enormity. Now it

has become a matter of history, and there is no ordinary reader who does

not know of what nature were the Spanish marriages. But Guizot is said

at the time to have become so lost to all decent feeling, so warped and

stung by the constant interference which he had received from Lord

Palmerston, as to have boasted that the political arrangement made was

the one great thing which France had herself achieved, unaided, since

1830!

It effected the entire break-up of the concert which had existed between

the great Powers of Europe, and clearly led to all the revolutions and

disturbances of 1848. England and France were severed, and by their

division Austria, Prussia and Russia were encouraged to expect to have

their way. A further appropriation of Poland was intended, and was

effected; but we find Palmerston endeavouring to prevent it. He writes

to Lord Normanby on the 19th of November, 1846; “I have prepared an

answer about Cracow, which I shall send off to Vienna without waiting

for Guizot.” “Guizot will make a show of resistance; but the fact is,

that, even if France and England had been on good terms, they have no

means of action on the spot in question, and could only have prevented

the thing by a threat of war, which, however, the three Powers would

have known we should never utter for the sake of Cracow. The measure is

an abominable shame, and executed by the most hollow pretences and the

most groundless assertions.”

In January, 1847, the Queen protested, in her speech from the throne,

against this new Polish outrage. Lord Palmerston was evidently nettled

to think that he could not interfere so as to prevent it. It was but

another scar on the Treaty of Vienna, and he could do nothing. Soon

afterwards a French political officer of high standing had been

condemned for corruption, and had endeavoured, or pretended to

endeavour, to commit suicide. “In either way, these things must be a

blow to Guizot and the Philippine system.” The Philippine system was to

Palmerston unutterably damnable. It was sly, fraudulent, false,

extremely courteous, and thoroughly un-English. But it was secret,

clever, and at this moment seemed to be triumphant. It was above all

things opposed to Palmerston. We can conceive nothing more bitter than

the hatred which at this time raged between the two statesmen. And in

speaking of it, we should by no means endeavour to wash Lord Palmerston

quite white. It may have been that had the “suaviter in modo” been more

customary with him, the “fortiter in re” might have been more apparent.

Being an older politician, and, we may say, a much wiser one, he had

thought to dominate the Frenchman; but the Frenchman knew himself to

possess a brighter intellect, a more brilliant style of eloquence, and,

in erudition, to be the greater man. We will concede it to him,--that he

was so. But Lord Palmerston possessed two virtues by means of which his

name will go down to posterity altogether unsullied. He was brave, and

he was honest.

We now come to Lord Minto’s mission to Italy, which had been, we

presume, arranged between Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell. Pio

Nono, the late Pope, had been elected in 1846, and Lord Minto started

for Italy in November, 1846. We still remember how decided was the

Liberalism of the new Pope, when he first filled St. Peter’s chair,--an

almost impossible condition for a Pope, and one which he soon vacated.

But Lord Minto went to assist him in his Liberalism, to give him such

aid as might be possible for an English Liberal Lord, and to find out in

return what the new pope could do for England in keeping quiet seditious

Irish bishops. “You will be at Rome,” said Lord Palmerston, “not as a

minister accredited to the Pope, but as an authentic organ of the

British Government, enabled to explain its views and to declare its

sentiments upon events which are now passing in Italy.” “Her Majesty’s

Government are deeply impressed with the conviction that it is wise for

Sovereigns and their Governments to pursue, in the administration of

their affairs, a system of progressive improvement; to apply remedies to

such evils as, upon examination, they may find to exist, and to

re-model, from time to time, the ancient institutions of their

country,--so as to render them more suitable to the gradual growth of

intelligence, and to the increasing diffusion of political knowledge;

and Her Majesty’s Government consider it to be an undeniable truth, that

if an independent Sovereign, in the exercise of his deliberate judgment,

shall think fit to make within his dominions such improvements in the

laws and institutions of his country as he may think conducive to the

welfare of his people, no other Government can have any right to attempt

to restrain or to interfere with such an employment of one of the

inherent attributes of independent sovereignty.”

We cannot but observe here the way in which Lord Palmerston lays down

the law for the governance of the nations generally. No doubt he was

right in what he said; but he said it with the air of some superior

being, whose word is to go for more than the words of other mortals.

Lord Minto does not go at once to Rome, but stays awhile at Turin,

where the Austrians have shown a desire to interfere with Charles

Albert, the father of Victor Emanuel. It is to be hoped that the

Ambassador Extraordinary knew the phraseology of the hunting-field as

well as did his correspondent. If so, he would understand when he was

told that, “As to the Austrians they have been headed, and will not

break cover towards Italy.” Then Palmerston explains that, for having

stopped the Austrians, the Pope ought to do him a good turn, in

silencing a meddlesome bishop or two. Alas, that an opinion so absurd

should ever have been held in regard to Pio Nono! “We wish to make the

Pope the plain, and simple, and reasonable request that he will exert

his authority over the Irish priesthood, to induce them to abstain from

meddling in politics, but, on the contrary, to confine themselves to

their spiritual duties.” “I shall be able to send you by the next

messenger, a memorandum about the letter which has recently been

received by McHale, from Rome, upon the subject of the Irish colleges.

This is an unkind and most mischievous measure, and was little to be

expected at the hands of the Pope at the very moment we were stepping

out of our way to be of use to him. It is an ungrateful return.” And a

little further on he writes to his correspondent; “You may confidently

assure the Papal authorities that at present in Ireland, misconduct is

the rule, and good conduct the exception, in the Catholic priests.”

Of course it would be so, human nature being the same with Roman

Catholics as with Protestants. Had we paid the priests, as we paid, and

still pay, the parsons, out of the funds collected by the Government,

the priests would have worked for the Government. To expect that they

should do so under other circumstances is to dream of a Utopia. But to

imagine that assistance could be got from the Pope to induce the priests

to do so, was beyond any Utopian dream. There was a notion afloat at the

time that the Pope should send an ambassador to London to carry out the

liberal views with which he was supposed to have been imbued. But to

this Lord Palmerston will give no assent. “As for the idea that we could

manage the Irish priests by means of a Roman priest in London, I am

convinced that the presence of such a man would only have given the

Irish priests an additional means of managing us.” Lord Minto writes

back word that “The Pope is a most amiable, agreeable, and honest man,

and sincerely pious to boot, which is much for a Pope; but he is not

made to drive the State coach.”

The honesty and piety of Pio Nono must be judged from his whole career.

Certainly Lord Minto could not teach him the political state of Europe.

“As to the poor Pope,” says Lord Palmerston, writing back to Lord Minto,

“I live in daily dread of some misadventure having befallen him. Events

have gone too fast for such a slow sailer as he is.” Then he speaks of

the deposition of Guizot’s ministry in Paris--for Guizot had been

deposed. “What has been happening in Italy ought to have been a warning

to Guizot. What has now happened to Guizot ought to be a warning to

Italy. Guizot thought that by a packed Parliament and a

corruptly-obtained majority, he could control the will of the nation,

and the result has been that the will of the Crown has been controlled

by an armed popular force. People have long gone on crying up Louis

Philippe as the wisest of men. I always have thought him one of the most

cunning, and therefore not one of the wisest. Recent events have shown

that he must rank among the cunning, who outwit themselves; and not

among the wise, who master events by foresight and prudence. This

surrender of the King of the Barricades to the commons of the National

Guard is, however, a curious example of political and poetical justice.”

This was in 1848, when all Europe was on the stir. “Was there ever such

a scene of confusion as now prevails almost all over Europe? Fortunate,

however, has it been for Italy that you crossed the Alps last autumn. If

the Italian sovereigns had not been urged by you to move on, while their

impatient subjects were kept back, there would by this time have been

nothing but Republics from the Alps to Sicily.” Then he ventures on a

prophecy which has become absolutely true in later years. “We have just

heard of the entrance of Sardinian troops into Lombardy to help the

Milanese. Northern Italy will henceforth be Italian, and the Austrian

frontier will be at the Tyrol. This will be no real loss to Austria.”

His dislike to Austria and Metternich is only second to his hatred for

Louis Philippe and Guizot. France itself he did not hate, or even

dislike--or, rather, liked as well as he could any country except

England. He says that Austria after such losses may, if well governed,

become a powerful State. But he adds: “The question is, Has she any men

capable of making any State a powerful one by good government.”

There had in the meantime sprung up a revolution in Sicily against

Naples, and Lord Minto had gone on to Naples, and into the Sicilian

waters, attempting to put it down. But it was not put down till 1849,

when the seditious efforts of the previous year were nearly quelled

throughout Europe. So Lord Minto returned home, having not apparently

done much, but having brought with him more correct views of the

Italian people than English Ministers had hitherto possessed.

Early in 1848 there came upon France that thorough disturbance of all

things which has never yet quite rectified itself. Indeed, it may be

said that there has been nearly a century of disturbance, during which,

however, France has grown wonderfully in wealth and intelligence. But in

1830 France had once more re-established herself, and the Citizen King

was put upon his throne as a thing of permanence and a just mixture of

monarchical principles with democratic ideas. It must be acknowledged of

Louis Philippe, as also of Napoleon III., that France did grow rich

under him. But in both cases the riches came “post hoc” and not “propter

hoc.” According to our thinking, neither the one ruler nor the other

could have benefited his people much, because neither of them was simple

in his way of ruling. Louis Napoleon was yet to come, but Louis Philippe

had now brought himself and his administration to an end.

There had been a great demand for reforms in Paris and the King had

expressed himself strongly. “I never will consent to reform,” he had

exclaimed. “Reform is another word for the advent of the Opposition.”

“Tell your master not to mind having popular assemblies,” is quoted by

Lord Normanby as said by Louis Philippe to some foreign ambassador. “Let

them only learn to manage things as I manage mine.” The dismissal of

Guizot, the Minister, was demanded among other things. Guizot had stood

high for personal integrity;--and we believe that he was perfectly

honest; but he got into various troubles in which he consented to the

expenditure of public money to satisfy the rapacity of others; and,

though he was honest himself, he seems to have dealt easily with

dishonesty in his subordinates. But Louis Philippe felt that to lose

Guizot was to own himself beaten, and clung to his Minister. Then came

the proposition for a popular banquet, and the stopping of the banquet

by the police, but with permission given for a procession; and then the

stopping of the procession; and then the catastrophe. Louis Philippe,

with his family, ran away, and in a few days appeared as Mr. Smith on

the coast of Sussex, at Newhaven.

On the 26th of February Lord Palmerston thus writes to Lord Normanby;

“What extraordinary and marvellous events you give me an account of. It

is like the five acts of a play, and has not taken up much more time.

Strange that a king who owed his crown to a revolution, brought about by

royal blindness and obstinacy, should have lost it by exactly the same

means, and he a man who had gone through all the vicissitudes of human

existence, from the condition of a schoolmaster to the pomp of a throne;

and still further that his overthrow should have been assisted by a

Minister deeply read in the records of history, and whose mind was not

merely stored with the chronology of historical facts, but had extracted

from their mass the lessons of events and the philosophy of their

causes.” And then he gives instructions as to what shall be done by the

English Ambassador in Paris. “Our principles of action are to

acknowledge whatever rule may be established with apparent prospect of

permanency, but none other.” “We will engage to prevent the rest of

Europe from meddling with France, which, indeed, we are quite sure they

have no intention of doing. The French rulers must engage to prevent

France from assailing any part of the rest of Europe.” Then he goes on

to lay down rules for different emergencies. What shall be done if the

Revolution endeavours to protect itself by using the army for foreign

conquest? But his heart beats warmly for his own child. “We cannot sit

quiet and see Belgium overrun and Antwerp become a French port.” “If

they will look to the stipulations of the treaty finally concluded

between the five Powers, Belgium, and the Netherlands, they will see

that there are in it guarantees which would have a very awkward bearing

upon any attempt by France to annex Belgium to its territory.” He

expresses his own feelings on the whole matter; “I grieve at the

prospect of a Republic in France, for I fear it must lead to war in

Europe and fresh agitation in England. Large Republics seem to be

essentially and inherently aggressive, and the aggressions of the French

will be resisted by the rest of Europe, and that is war; while, on the

other hand, the example of universal suffrage in France will set our

non-voting population agog, and will create a demand for an inconvenient

extension of the franchise, ballot, and other mischievous things.

However, for the present, ‘Vive Lamartine!’” Lamartine was the

provisional President of the New Republic, and while he remained in

office did behave with a better grace than could have been expected from

a man so abnormally situated.

“Here is a pretty to do at Paris,” he says a few days later on in a

letter to Lord Ponsonby at Vienna. “It is plain that, for the present at

least, we shall have a Republic in France. How long it may last is

another question. But for the present the only chance for tranquillity

and order in France, and for peace in Europe, is to give support to

Lamartine. I am convinced this French Government will not be aggressive

if left alone. But if the Austrian Government does not mitigate its

system of coercion in Lombardy and grant liberal institutions, they will

have a revolt there.” Our British difficulty at the moment arose chiefly

from the advantage endeavoured to be taken by the Irish of the French

revolutionary spirit. When all Europe was in revolt Ireland, of course,

would not remain calm. Smith O’Brien with various deputations was at

once in Paris. “I have written to you,” says Lord Palmerston to Lord

Normanby, “an official despatch about M. De Lamartine’s allocutions to

Irish despatches and his direct allusions therein to our internal

affairs, such as Catholic Emancipation, Irish agitation, Repeal of the

Union, and other matters, with which no foreign Government had any right

to meddle. I wish you to convey to him, in terms as civil as you can

use, that these speeches, and especially that to which my despatch

refers, have given great offence in this country.” It does not appear to

have occurred to him how often he himself was interfering in the foreign

affairs of other countries. But Lamartine seems to have taken the

observations in good part. “Pray tell Lamartine,” he says, “how very

much obliged we feel for his handsome and friendly conduct about the

Irish deputations.”

The amount of business which fell on to his shoulders at this time may

be well imagined, and yet he was now sixty-four years old. “As to your

not always getting letters from me by every messenger who passes through

Paris, never wonder at that, nor think it extraordinary.” This is still

to Lord Normanby. “Wonder rather when I am able to find time at all. I

am sure you would if you saw the avalanches of despatches from every

part of the world which come down upon me daily, and which must be read,

and if you witnessed the number of interviews which I cannot avoid

giving every day of the week. Every post sends me a lamenting minister

throwing himself and his country upon England for help, which I am

obliged to tell him we cannot afford him. But Belgium is a case by

itself, and both France and England are bound by treaty engagements in

regard to that country, which it is most desirable for the repose of

France and England that no events should call into active operation.”

Then he sends word to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg as to what may

there be expected of England in reference to certain Polish difficulties

which have cropped up. “We, the Government, will never do anything

underhand or ungentlemanlike in these matters. I wish we could hope that

the Emperor might of his own accord settle the Polish question in some

satisfactory manner.” Then there is an allusion to the one burlesque

English incident which graced the Revolution. “I conclude that he”--he

is Lamartine--“has escaped one danger by the refusal to naturalize

Brougham; for it is evident that our ex-Chancellor meant, if he got

himself elected, to have put up for being President of the Republic.”

In 1848, as a part of the European disturbance, the Chartist rows came

up in London, affording the most signal evidence that up to that time at

least the spirit of democratic enmity to order was not at work in

England. Nor, according to such evidence as we possess, is it so

now,--though at this moment, 1882, it is rampant in Ireland. The

question was one with which Lord Palmerston had not much immediate

concern. But, alluding to his branch of politics, he writes with his

usual vivacity. “The foreigners did not show; but the constables,

regular and special, had sworn to make an example of any whiskered and

bearded rioters whom they might meet with, and I am convinced would have

mashed them to a jelly.”

Then he interested himself very strongly in the attempt which was made

in 1848 to banish the Austrians from the North of Italy. “Things have

gone much too far to admit of the possibility of any future connection

between the Italians and Austria.” And again, “I certainly agree with

you and your Austrian friend that Austria would be much better out of

Italy than in it. Italy can never now be a useful possession for

Austria.” And again, “On the whole, the conclusion to which I should

come is, that the cheapest, best, and wisest thing which Austria can do,

is to give up her Italian possessions quietly and at once, and to direct

her attention and energy to organizing the remainder of her coast

territories, and to cement them together, and to develop their abundant

resources;”--to induce the Austrians to abandon their Austrian

possessions as a matter of pure policy. “But to do this there ought to

be some able men at the head of affairs, and our doubt is whether there

are any such now in office. First and foremost, what is the animal

_implumis bipes_, called Emperor? A perfect nullity; next thing to an

idiot.” Then he discusses the practicability of an abdication, or rather

two abdications, with a wisdom and foresight to which events have given

their ample testimony. Francis Joseph, the Emperor of to-day, was, after

a while, elected in place of his uncle, and has since reigned, through

many troubles, with good sense and moderation.

“How can an empire stand in these days without an emperor at its head?

And by an emperor, I mean a man endowed with intellectual faculties

suited to his high station.” And again, “I fear that his next brother is

little better than he is; but could not the son of that brother be

called to the succession?” But it is remarkable that this is all written

to our ambassador at Vienna, and is written as advice to be given to an

Austrian Minister. “Pray then, tell Wessemberg from me, but in the

strictest confidence, that I would entreat of him and his colleagues to

consider, for the salvation of their country, whether some arrangement

could not be made by which the Emperor might abdicate.” Can we imagine

any foreign minister recommending to an English statesman the abdication

of a British sovereign? In this case, no doubt, the abdication had been

previously discussed; but still the audacity, necessary for such advice

from an Englishman, was very great. Fighting, however, in the meantime,

was going on, and Radetsky, on the part of Austria, was victorious at

Milan. France and England joined to assist Sardinia by their moral

weight, and an armistice was concluded.

But Palmerston will not give up his points. “The real fact is that the

Austrians have no business in Italy at all, and have no real right to be

there.” This he writes to Lord Ponsonby at Vienna, and says very evil

things of the Austrian mode of governing. “The only Austrians have been

the troops, and the civil officers. She has governed it as you govern a

garrison town, and her rule has always been hateful.” Then he expresses

his strong resentment against attempts which have been made from Vienna,

or which he thinks have been made, to influence the English Court. “I

quite understand the drift and meaning of Prince Windischgrätz’s message

to our Queen; but pray make the Camarilla understand that, in a

constitutional country like England, these things cannot answer; and

that a foreign Government, which places its reliance upon working upon

the Court against the Government of this country, is sure to be

disappointed.” But in his strong feeling against Austria and in favour

of Italy, in his passionate dislike to the Austrian mode of government,

and his strong love for that which he believed would be the Italian mode

of government in Italy, he runs into some absurdities which are

contradicted in the same letter. “Providence,” he says, “meant mankind

to be divided into separate nations, and for this purpose countries have

been founded by natural barriers, and races of men have been

distinguished by separate languages, habits, manners, dispositions, and

characters.” Then he goes on; “North of the Alps, we wish her”--that is

Austria--“all the prosperity and success in the world;” though the

Austrian and the Hungarian are also distinguished by separate language,

habits, and manners. But for the moment the contest was brought to an

end by the victory of Austria, and ten years had to pass by before Lord

Palmerston saw all his hopes for Italy realized by the unification of

the country under the Sardinian crown.

Before the close of the Session in 1849 Mr. Disraeli brought on a vote

of want of confidence in the Government. Lord Palmerston writes thus to

his brother; “After all the trumpetings of attacks that were to demolish

first one and then another member of the Government--first me, then

Grey, then Charles Wood--we have come triumphantly out of all debates

and divisions, and end the Session, stronger than we began it. Our

division this morning, on Disraeli’s motion ‘On the State of the

Nation,’ was 296 to 156--a majority of 140.” And in the House of Lords,

Lord Brougham fared no better. “Sicily, Lombardy and Rome will be the

main topics on which Brougham, Stanley and Aberdeen--the three witches

who have filled the cauldron--will dilate.” France had at this time

“occupied” Rome. “The questions which will naturally be asked are; In

what character has the French army taken possession of Rome? Is it as

conquerors of a city to be added to France? Of course not; that answer

is easily given. Is it, then, as friends of the Pope, or as friends of

the Roman people?” It was a question which would naturally be asked. But

the French had taken possession of Rome to guard it equally from the

Pope and from the people. The above was written on the 16th July, 1849.

On the previous 24th of November the Pope had escaped from Rome in

disguise, and had got as far as Gaeta on his way to Majorca. He did not

go further on that journey, and there we may leave him, remarking that

it was less than thirty months since he had received as a reforming Pope

professions of universal affection from the Roman people.

Lord Palmerston feels himself compelled to ask hypothetical questions of

the French Government, and to put hypothetical answers into its mouth.

We can see that he is in truth jealous that there is a European pie in

which he is not allowed to have a finger. But there is not a word in

what he says in which an ordinary Englishman does not sympathize. “There

are mutually repellent properties between a reasoning people and an

elective priestly Government.” “The Roman people will ere long reply by

saying; We are no longer Papists; take your Pope and give him as

sovereign to those who are Papists still. The Reformation in Europe was

as much a movement to shake off political oppression as it was to give

freedom to religious conscience, and similar causes are apt to produce

similar effects.” Then there has come an attack upon him as Foreign

Minister from Lord Aberdeen, whom he takes an opportunity of “paying

off,” as he calls it. He does pay him off--with great severity, with

good thorough-going abuse, which is, however, altogether parliamentary.

The entire speech is too long to be given here with the necessary

explanations. But he winds up as follows; “I will only say that the

conduct of such men is an example of antiquated imbecility.” The “such

men” is, of course, Lord Aberdeen. The next day, no doubt, he would have

been on excellent terms with Lord Aberdeen had he met him.

Then, still in 1849, there is a difficulty as to the amount of

assistance to be given to Turkey in holding her own against Austria and

Russia. The Hungarian conflict had come on, in which Hungary had

endeavoured to maintain her own kingdom and her own government, as

separated from that of Austria. The Hungarians were willing that the

Emperor of Austria should be King of Hungary, but refused to assent to

any other joining of the two countries. Here again Palmerston had not

his fingers very deep in the pie. How far he may have been restrained by

colleagues in his Cabinet, we do not know; but we do remember how, when

Austria was hard pressed by her rebels, she was assisted by Russia; and

we do know, also, how ungratefully Austria behaved on the occasion. But

when the Hungarians were beaten, some of their leaders, and Kossuth

among them, escaped into Turkey. Then Russia and Austria demanded the

extradition of these rebels, and the Sultan was encouraged to withhold

them by Sir Stratford Canning, who now first comes forward as the great

friend of the Porte.

Lord Palmerston also warmly takes the part of the Turks, and will not

allow the men to be surrendered. It is this affair which gives the chief

interest to the autumn of 1849. He writes on the matter very hotly to

Lord Ponsonby. “As to working upon their feelings of generosity and

gentlemanlikeness”--the feelings of the Austrians--“that is out of the

question, because such feelings exist not in a set of officials who have

been trained up in the school of Metternich, and the men in whose minds

such inborn feelings have not been crushed by Court and office power,

have been studiously excluded from public affairs, and can only blush in

private for the disgrace which such things throw upon their country. But

I do hope that you will not fail constantly to bear in mind the country

and the Government which you represent, and that you will maintain the

dignity and honour of England by expressing openly and decidedly the

disgust which such proceedings excite in the public mind in this

country.” It is evident that he had heard something of which he does not

approve in Lord Ponsonby’s mode of thinking. “The remedy against these

various dangers, which are rapidly undermining the Austrian Empire,

would be generous conciliation; but instead of that, the Austrian

Government knows no method of administration but what consists in

flogging, imprisoning, and shooting. The Austrians know no argument but

force.” The two fleets (the English and the French) were moved up to

the Dardanelles. “In this affair we are trying to catch two great fish,

and we must wind the reel very gently and dexterously, not to break the

line.” This he says to Sir Stratford Canning. He declares to Brunnow,

“That our sending our squadron up the Mediterranean was, for the Sultan,

like holding a bottle of salts to the nose of a lady who had been

frightened.” Of course he has his way, and Turkey is not allowed to give

up the Hungarians, though he ascertains in the course of the

correspondence that Lord Ponsonby, his own ambassador at Vienna, is

opposed to the instructions which he receives. But he reprimands him at

last with severity. “I write you this, and desire you to do your best;

though I hear from many quarters that you oppose instead of furthering

the policy of your Government, and that you openly declare that you

disapprove of our course. No diplomatist ought to hold such language as

long as he holds his appointment.”

Lord Palmerston · 第 7 / 14 章