CHAPTER IV.

PALMERSTON FOREIGN SECRETARY, NOVEMBER, 1830, TO NOVEMBER, 1834.

We here begin the record of that portion of Lord Palmerston’s life which

is of truth important to the English reader. In years, his life was more

than half over. He was already forty-five, and had been in office for

more than twenty years; but had he then died, he would have passed away

as one of those unimportant statesmen whom, though they may do good work

for their country, it is not worth their country’s while to remember.

But though he was forty-five, Lord Palmerston’s period of importance was

yet to begin, and to be continued during thirty-five additional years of

uninterrupted labour.

Lord Dalling, in the short preface which he has prefixed to his

unfinished life of Lord Palmerston, speaks as follows of the condition

of England at this time in reference to the political state of Europe.

“That period begins with a certain struggle against the resistance of

the northern Cabinets to any change in the affairs of Europe; and a

struggle at the same time against that reactionary spirit sprung from

the Revolution of 1830 in France, which wished to change everything.”

The writer means to imply that England was anxious to stand between the

despotism of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and the democratic

tendencies of France. In this he describes accurately the position which

Lord Palmerston took as the exponent of English foreign politics, and

which from the first to the last he maintained with a consistency which

it has been given to few men to achieve, whose concern in the matter has

lasted so long, and whose influence has been so great. Throughout his

career it was his object to repress the personal power of the occupants

of thrones; but at the same time so to repress that power as to give no

inch of standing ground to demagogues. If that be true, it must be

acknowledged that whether his attempts were good or evil, they were made

in strict accordance with established English principles. And it will

probably be admitted by most who may read these pages, that the efforts

were good. That they were pre-eminently successful, it will be my duty

to endeavour to show. That in making these efforts Lord Palmerston fell

into various errors of manner, that he was frequently led away by human

frailty, and often puffed up by pride and a spirit of personal success,

is no doubt true. And it is true also that he seldom rose to any

specially exalted view of human nature. He saw all things from a

common-sense point of view, with what we may call mundane eyes. But we

are not sure that such a point of view and such eyes are not the most

useful for a British statesman. And of Lord Palmerston, it may be said

that his followers would always know what political teaching they were

expected to follow. He was not gifted with that fine insight into

matters which enables a man to discern to-day something better than what

he saw yesterday. Such still advancing improvement in sight is within

the capacity only of the highest genius. But as an English politician

can work only by the means of others, and needs many followers, the

followers should see as quickly as he does, and if they be left in the

dark they will not follow long. Lord Palmerston left none in the dark,

and was therefore successful to the last by means of the true following

of an attached party who always knew their man, and were sure that they

never would be led whither they did not wish to go.

“As soon as Lord Grey was commissioned by the King to form an

administration, he sent for me.” These are the concluding words of that

autobiography, of which mention has been made. Lord Grey sent for him,

and he became Foreign Minister.

Writing to his brother on the 22nd of December, 1830, Lord Palmerston

says; “I’ve been ever since my appointment like a man who has been

plumped into a mill race, scarcely able by all his kicking and plunging

to keep his head above water.” We can understand that the kicking and

plunging must have been very violent. The question had already arisen

whether Belgium should or should not be made a kingdom of itself, with a

king and constitution of its own. By the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 it had

been decreed that for certain purposes which were in themselves no doubt

wise, Belgium and Holland should be one. The United Provinces would be

strong enough to form a barrier against the encroachments of France, and

the balance of power in Europe and the maintenance of liberty might be

so maintained. But the governing power had been left with the Dutch, and

it was felt that the Dutch had oppressed the Belgians. The King of

Holland had, as a temporary measure, assumed the power of appointing the

judges in the two lands, and was unwilling to abandon it. He had then

been assisted by the judges in depriving the Press of its liberty. And

the Dutch had insisted that their language should be used in all public

documents and all trials, although the Belgians had a language of their

own, the Flemish language, and although French was the language of

society, of the Courts and shops. And in all matters affecting religion

and education, a strong bias was shown in favour of Protestant Holland

over Catholic Belgium.

It can be understood that here in England feelings on this subject

should run strong, and that the entire weight of the opposition to the

new Government should be enlisted on the side of Protestant Holland. The

Treaty of Vienna had been partly their work, and Lord Palmerston, who

was now the Whig Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had co-operated

as Tory Secretary at War in the work which he was now anxious to

dissolve. As regards the Treaty of Vienna, this division of Holland and

Belgium was, no doubt, a breach of that compact; but a treaty can be

only binding when taken as a whole, and this breach of it was justified

by the breach of one of its terms made by the King of Holland in

assuming to himself powers which had been expressly taken out of his

hands by the Treaty. This, however, was understood much less accurately

by those out of office than by those in, and Lord Palmerston no doubt

became more hot in his own defence the more he was attacked by his

opponents.

We have his correspondence respecting the affairs of Belgium with Lord

Granville, our Ambassador at Paris, and it is interesting to see how

speedily and how warmly he takes up the Belgian question. An Englishman

reading this should of course remember that Lord Palmerston was an

English Minister, filled with English convictions at the moment, and

that he (the reader) will of course only get the English view. But the

letters do leave the impression that the English Minister only wanted

what was just; and our history tells us that his views have been carried

out, and that the measure, as directed by him, has been pre-eminently

successful. But there is from the very first a tone of superiority in

them which, though they were addressed to our own Ambassador, must have

been offensive to French Ministers as they trickled through to their

ears. Talleyrand, who was the French Ambassador in London, had asked

that, as part of the arrangement, “Luxembourg might be given to France.”

But Palmerston would not hear of it, and he then writes to Lord

Granville; “It may not be amiss for you to hint, upon any fitting

occasion, that though we are anxious to cultivate the best understanding

with France, and to be on terms of the most intimate friendship with

her, yet that it is only on the supposition that she contents herself

with the finest territory in Europe, and does not mean to open a new

chapter of encroachment and conquest.” Then we are told that, when the

Luxembourg question had been given up, Talleyrand “fights like a dragon”

for two Belgian fortresses,--Philippeville and Marienburg. “We had no

power,” says Palmerston, “to give what belongs to Belgium and not to us,

and we could not, under the pretence of settling the quarrel between

Holland and Belgium, proceed to plunder one of the parties, and that,

too, for the benefit of one of the mediators.” Talleyrand has asked

questions about some increased force to our navy. “You may as well

mention this conversation to Sebastiani, and take that opportunity of

asking again about the Toulon ships. It is no harm, however, that the

French should think that we are a little upon the alert with respect to

our navy.” Then there is the question, Who shall be the new King of

Belgium? as to which our Minister had at first wished that a son of the

King of Holland should be named. Louis Philippe wished that one of his

sons should have the new throne. But Lord Palmerston will not hear of

it. “I must say that if the choice falls on Nemours, and the King of the

French accepts, it will be a proof that the policy of France is like an

infection clinging to the walls of the dwelling, and breaking out in

every successive occupant.” “We are reluctant even to think of war; but

if ever we are to make another effort, this is a legitimate occasion;

and we find we could not submit to the placing of the Duc de Nemours on

the throne of Belgium without danger to the safety, and a sacrifice of

the honour of the country.” “If they are straightforward in their

intentions, why cannot they be so in their proceedings? Why such endless

intrigues and plots, and such change of plans, all tending to the same

object.” Then there comes a letter, purposely written and sent in an

unusual way, that it may certainly be read by Sebastiani. For it was

sent through the French Foreign Office, and not by our own messengers;

as to which Lord Granville observes that it will have the desired

effect. “Sebastiani should really be made to understand that he must

have the goodness to keep his temper, or, when it fails him, let him go

to vent his ill-humour upon some other quarter, and not bestow it upon

England. We are not used to being accused of making people dupes.” What

was Sebastiani’s personal nature, we do not know. This may have made him

keep his temper. But it must surely have taught him to think that our

Minister was very uncivil, as he of course knew well why the letter had

been sent through the French Foreign Office.

Other attempts are made by the French to get other morsels of territory

into their hands, and a strong French feeling is roused in Belgium,

which troubles Lord Palmerston almost as much as the French overtures

made for direct French objects. A Regent, in the interests of France,

was appointed during the vacancy of the throne, of whom Palmerston

refuses to take any notice. “The greater part of our difficulties with

the Belgians have arisen from the double diplomacy, double dealing

infirmity of purpose, and want of principle in the French Government.” A

M. D’Arschot is sent to England as a diplomate, but Lord Palmerston

refuses to see him officially. “I shall be happy to receive M. D’Arschot

at my house as an individual; I cannot ask him to the office.” Then he

goes on. “The moment we give France a cabbage garden or a vineyard, we

lose all our vantage-ground of principle; and it becomes then a mere

question of degree or the relative value of the different things which,

one after the other, she will demand.” And he lays down a general

principle, by which it will be found that he always acted. “You don’t

stave off war or stop demands by yielding to urgent demands, however

small, from fear of war. The maxim of giving way to have an easy life

will, if you follow it, lead to your having a life without a moment’s

ease.”

At length the question as to what king should be chosen was settled by

the election of Leopold to the throne of Belgium,--altogether with the

good-will of Palmerston, though a Dutch Prince had been his first

choice, as has been already said. But this had been done without the

assent of the King of Holland; and Dutch troops marched into Belgium on

one side, and French troops on the other to support Belgium. The French

obtained some success, and immediately there arose the renewal of French

encroachments. “As to the fortresses,” says Lord Palmerston, still

writing to Lord Granville, “if they expected that we were to sign a

treaty with them for the destruction of those fortresses, I would tell

him that I would never put my hand to such a treaty, even if the

Government agreed to it.” “One thing is certain,--the French must go out

of Belgium, or we have a general war, and war in a given number of

days.” “I told him we never would agree to mix up the two questions, the

departure of the French troops, and the question of the fortresses. I

asked him whether his Government wished that people hereafter should

believe the French Government or its word.” “I have seldom seen a

stronger feeling than that of the Cabinet about the question of the

fortresses.” “But let us stave off all these nibblings,” he says in

reference to a demand expressed by Prussia that Philippeville and

Marienburg should be given up to France. “If once these great Powers

begin to taste blood, they will never be satisfied with one bite, but

will speedily devour their victim.”

At last the Belgian question was settled, and a kingdom was formed,

which has since remained, respected by all men, and the strongest in its

circumstances among the lesser nations of the earth. To name Belgium, is

to speak of good faith and constitutional well-being. The love for it

which England bears was strongly evinced during the German and French

war in 1870, when Bernal Osborne asked a question in the House of

Commons as to the part which England would take if either party carried

their armies over the frontier into Belgium. The French at that moment

had been driven up into a corner at Sedan, and were compelled either to

surrender or to trespass on the Belgian territory. But the question

asked in the House of Commons, and the answer given, sufficed for the

purpose; and no armed Frenchman and no armed German trod upon the soil

which had become the Kingdom of Belgium.

Lord Palmerston had no doubt done his work well in helping the

arrangement. He was disinterested throughout on the part of England, and

wise, and honest, and very brave. He had allowed no foreign diplomate to

hoodwink him. England, looking back at his conduct, has reason to be

proud of him. But there can be no doubt that he did make himself very

offensive to his French colleagues in the arrangements, and took upon

himself to speak, as though he were the only honest man concerned in the

work. Whether it was essential to his purpose that he should do so must

now be a matter of opinion; but there can be no doubt that he made

himself odious to Louis Philippe and the French Ministers, who must have

looked upon him as an English bear altogether unacquainted with

diplomatic courtesies. Such I think must have been the opinion held by

Louis Philippe to the end. For in these years of his life it seems to

have been Palmerston’s business to have thwarted Louis Philippe in all

his politics.

But, during the period in which the Kingdom of Belgium was being formed,

the English Reform Bill was passed, a measure of such vital importance

to England as almost, in English eyes, to obliterate these first

struggles of Belgian infancy. But Lord Palmerston, true to his theory of

political life, took but little heed of the Reform Bill. He did speak on

the subject, as it was essential that he should do so; and explained

how it had come to pass with him, as with others, that he had grown

wiser as he had grown older. It was necessary that one, who had come

into power among Lord Liverpool’s Tories, should defend his vote by such

an argument. But there is nothing to make us think that his heart was

with the Reformers. Indeed, as long as he remained at the Foreign Office

his heart was with foreign affairs. And though, as a member of a

Cabinet, he was bound to support that Cabinet’s measures, I should doubt

whether he asked many questions on the subject. His heart was then in

Belgium, and in the Quadruple Alliance for establishing free

institutions in Spain and Portugal, and afterwards in creating the

kingdom of Greece, and in endeavouring to stop the abominable iniquities

of Louis Philippe in reference to the Spanish marriages. But he

supported the Reform Bill, and in consequence of his doing so,--or in

consequence, rather, of his belonging to a Whig Ministry,--he lost his

seat for the University of Cambridge, and, at the general election 1832,

was returned to Parliament by South Hampshire, his own county.

Allusion has been made to the pride which Lord Palmerston took in the

Quadruple Alliance. The Quadruple Alliance was a compact made between

England, France, Spain, and Portugal, for preserving the thrones of

Spain and Portugal on behalf of Isabella and Maria, and defending the

two Princesses from the machinations of their uncles, Don Carlos and Don

Miguel. That the two Princesses were the legitimate heirs to the thrones

need not now, specially in England, be more than stated. But the

collateral object was to ensure freedom under the rule of the two

Queens, instead of despotism, with all its bitterness, under the two

Kings. That at least was Lord Palmerston’s object; though, when we come

to the story of the Spanish marriages, we shall find that Louis Philippe

had a further object of his own. For some account of the kind of misery

to be looked for under Don Miguel, to whom Palmerston was specially

hostile, I may refer my readers to an article in the _Edinburgh Review_

of September, 1831, on the condition of Portugal.

In looking back at Lord Palmerston’s career, and the entire success of

his political life, we have to own that it was due to the teaching, or

rather to the genius, of Mr. Canning. He had fallen into Mr. Canning’s

hands, and though without that fine intellect which would have enabled

him to imitate the lessons which he had so learned, he was quick enough

to perceive their merit, and wise enough to follow them, whether he were

called Whig or Tory. Canning died, and in carrying out his lessons

Palmerston had become a member of Lord Grey’s Cabinet. It was not much

to him whether men called him Whig or Tory. But he saw the wisdom of

going still on; and whether he were Member for the University which

demanded a Tory to represent it, or for his own county, which afterwards

in turn again repudiated him, or for the borough of Tiverton, where he

could be one or the other, he remained always true to the precepts of

the school which he had adopted. “A Tory Government,” he says, writing

to his brother, in June, 1833, “is an utter impossibility in the present

state of the public feeling; the country would not stand it.” Then he

goes on to speak of what he and the Cabinet had just done for the

abolition of slavery. “To be sure, we give the West Indians a tolerably

good compensation. I really believe that the twenty millions which are

to be voted for them are about the whole value of all the estates at

the present market price; so that they will receive nearly the value of

their estates, and keep their estates into the bargain. I must say it is

a splendid instance of generosity and justice, unexampled in the history

of the world, to see a nation (for it is the national will, and not

merely the resolve of the Government or the Parliament) emancipate seven

hundred and fifty thousand slaves, and pay twenty millions sterling to

their owners as compensation for the loss they will sustain. People

sometimes are greatly generous at the expense of others, but it is not

often that men are found to pay so high a price for the luxury of doing

a noble action.”

“Some persons on the Continent want to have it supposed that the English

are so bent upon economy and retrenchment that no provocation or injury

would rouse them to incur the expense of another war. This vote of so

large a sum for the satisfaction of a principle ought to show those

persons that it would not be safe to rely too much upon their

calculation.” In this he takes great pride to himself; but it is a pride

in the glory of his country; and it is exhibited in private letters in

which an absence of reticence is not unbecoming.

Some time previous to this he had shown the same determined spirit.

Writing to our Minister in Spain in March, 1831, he says, “It is well

known that every river on the coast of Africa, where slaves are

obtained, still swarms with slave ships, bearing openly the flag of

Spain; while vessel after vessel sails for that coast from the Havannah,

returns laden with these slaves, of whom even the number on board is

probably known, lands them unmolested at the back of the island of Cuba,

re-enters the port of the Havannah in ballast, and is again fitted up,

rapidly and without impediment, for a fresh expedition in this

prohibited traffic.”

In 1834 the Slave Commissioner, at Sierra Leone, writes to him on the

subject. “The traffic under the Portuguese flag, which for years past

had been almost unheard of, appears now to be carried on to as great an

extent as it was before Brazil ceased to belong to Portugal.” In the

same year Mr. Macleay, our British Commissioner at the Havannah,

complains to him on the same subject,--of the trade as carried on under

the new Captain-General of Cuba. From this we may see that our Foreign

Minister found ample matters on which to write to the servants of other

Crowns so as to make himself enemies. It is not to be doubted but that

he did write with all the pertinacity of purpose which is apt to be

odious to people who entertain opinions opposed to those who exercise

it.

The above references have been taken from the _Quarterly Review_ of

December, 1835. If we turn to the July number of the _Edinburgh Review_

for 1836, we shall find him and the slave trade spoken of in the same

spirit; but the tone is so hearty that I will venture to quote the

passage:--“Every Power in Europe has acknowledged that a solemn

obligation is upon them to contribute to the abolition of the accursed

traffic in our fellow creatures. Each also admits that their formal

declaration to that effect, made more than twenty years ago, has to this

hour been fruitless, and the pledges then given to use every means in

the power of each to effect it, still unredeemed. The frivolous pretexts

which have been advanced by some for not adopting the only means which

experience has shown to be effectual, require only to be refuted, and

the object to be sincerely and heartily pursued by us, and complete

success cannot be far distant. We have abundant evidence before us that

no exertions will be wanting on the part of Lord Palmerston. His urgent

remonstrances and representations have been poured into every country of

the civilized world. His tone has been firm and decisive when our slave

treaties have been infringed. He has used argument and persuasion where

as yet there had been no obligation. After a careful perusal of the

documents before us, we hesitate not to say that his zealous,

consistent, and able advocacy of this great cause, while it tends to

raise his country high among nations for enlightened humanity and for

moral worth, will constitute, next to the preservation of peace, his

worthiest title to a lasting reputation.”

His work is incessant, and he can hardly allow himself a few days of

holiday when the Session is over. “I may then manage to get down to

Broadlands for a week, and I long for a little rest.” At the end of the

year he joins a shooting party, but is not able “to get out of town for

more than four days at a time. I had three days shooting at Woburn last

week, and pretty good sport. An official party, Grey, Brougham,

Lansdowne (now combatants), Althorp, Melbourne, Ripon, Graham, John

Russell, Auckland, Ellice, myself, young Ellice and Lord Charles

Russell, were the sharpshooters.” We see from the names above given,

that he had now fallen entirely among the Whigs; for Sir James Graham

was then a Whig. “I must say that this reformed House of Commons is

growing to be wonderfully like its predecessors; impatient of fools,

intolerant of blackguards.” It is much the same thing at present, though

now the blackguards have to be tolerated. Then he speaks exultingly of

the Quadruple Alliance between England, France, Spain and Portugal for

the expulsion of Carlos and Miguel. He speaks almost boastingly of his

own power. “I carried it through the Cabinet by a _coup de main_, taking

them by surprise, and not leaving them time to make objections.” This is

the spirit in which he looks at all his own doings as Minister for

Foreign Affairs, and though we may be angry at the boasting, we cannot

but acknowledge that it was this spirit which kept him up. Then we have

him for a week down in Hampshire among his race-horses. But his papers

follow him. “I was a week at Broadlands entirely by myself, working all

day, and almost every day, at F. O. boxes and Holmes’s accounts for the

last three years, which I had not before been able to look at; they were

all right, however.” After this he tells us of that wicked Thresher who

only provided sixteen pheasants for five guns to kill in Yew Tree. After

that he speaks again of the Quadruple Alliance, and again exults. “This

treaty was a capital hit, and all my own doing.” Mr. Ashley, however,

adds that “this treaty was a full completion of Mr. Canning’s policy.”

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