_Instructions to Sir Hudson Lowe--Sum allowed for the Ex-Emperor's
Expenses--Napoleon's proposal to defray his own Expenses--Sale of
his Plate--made in order to produce a false impression: he had at
that time a large sum of Money in his strong-box--Wooden-House
constructed in London, and transported to St. Helena--Interview
between Sir H. Lowe and Napoleon--Delays in the Erection of the
House--The Regulation that a British Officer should attend Napoleon
in his Rides--Communication with Europe carried on by the Inmates of
Longwood--Regulation respecting Napoleon's Intercourse with the
Inhabitants of St. Helena--General Reflections on the Disputes
between him and Sir H. Lowe._
[Sidenote: LOWE'S INSTRUCTIONS.]
Before entering upon such brief inquiry as our bounds will permit, into
the conduct of the new governor towards Napoleon, it may be necessary to
show what were his, Sir Hudson Lowe's, instructions from the English
Government on the subject of the custody of the Ex-Emperor:--
"_Downing Street, 12th September, 1816._
"You will observe, that the desire of his Majesty's Government is,
to allow every indulgence to General Buonaparte, which may be
compatible with the entire security of his person. That he should
not by any means escape, or hold communication with any person
whatsoever, excepting through your agency, must be your unremitted
care; and those points being made sure, every resource and
amusement, which may serve to reconcile Buonaparte to his
confinement, may be permitted."
A few weeks later, the Secretary of State wrote to Sir Hudson Lowe a
letter to the same purpose with the former, 26th October, 1816:--
"With respect to General Buonaparte himself, I deem it unnecessary
to give you any farther instructions. I am confident that your own
disposition will prompt you to anticipate the wishes of his Royal
Highness the Prince Regent, and make every allowance for the effect
which so sudden a change of situation cannot fail to produce on a
person of his irritable temper. You will, however, not permit your
forbearance or generosity towards him to interfere with any
regulations which may have been established for preventing his
escape, or which you may hereafter consider necessary for the better
security of his person."
The just and honourable principle avowed by Government is obvious. But
it was an extraordinary and most delicate tax upon Sir Hudson Lowe,
which enjoined him to keep fast prisoner an individual, who, of all
others, was likely to be most impatient of restraint, and, at the same
time, to treat him with such delicacy as might disguise his situation
from himself, if it could not reconcile him to it. If Sir Hudson failed
in doing so, he may be allowed to plead, that it was in a case in which
few could have succeeded. Accordingly, Napoleon's complaints against the
governor were bitter and clamorous.
[Sidenote: HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES.]
The first point of complaint on the part of the family at Longwood,
respected the allowance assigned by the British Government for their
support, which they alleged to be insufficient to their wants. This was
not a point on which Napoleon thought it proper to express his feelings
in his own person. _His_ attention was apparently fixed upon obtaining
concessions in certain points of etiquette, which might take him from
under the condition in which he was most unwilling to allow himself to
be placed, in the rank, namely, of a prisoner of war. The theme, of the
inadequacy of the allowance, was not, however, left untouched, as those
concerned were well aware that there was no subject of grievance which
would come more home to the people of England than one which turned upon
a deficiency either in the quantity or quality of the food supplied to
the exiles. Montholon's letter was clamant on the subject; and Santini
intimated, that the Emperor must sometimes have gone without a meal
altogether, had he (Santini) not been successful with his gun.
The true state of the case was this:--The British Government had
determined that Napoleon's table should be provided for at the rate of a
general of the first rank, together with his military family. The
expense of such an establishment was, by the regulations furnished to
Sir Hudson Lowe, dated 15th April, and 22d November, 1816, supposed to
reach to £8000 a-year, with permission, however, to extend it as far as
£12,000, should he think it necessary. The expense could not, in Sir
Hudson Lowe's opinion, be kept within £8000; and indeed it was instantly
extended by him to £12,000, paid in monthly instalments to the purveyor,
Mr. Balcombe, by whom it was expended in support of the establishment at
Longwood. If, however, even £12,000, the sum fixed as a probable
ultimatum, should, in the governor's opinion, be found, from dearth,
high price of provisions, or otherwise, practically insufficient to meet
and answer the expense of a general's family, calculated on a liberal
scale, Sir Hudson Lowe had liberty from Government to extend the
purveyor's allowance without limitation. But if, on the other hand, the
French should desire to add to their housekeeping any thing which the
governor should think superfluous, in reference to the rank assigned to
the principal person, they were themselves to be at the charge of such
extraordinary expenditure.
It is apprehended that the British Government could not be expected to
do more for Napoleon's liberal maintenance, than to give the governor an
unlimited order to provide for it, upon the scale applicable to the rank
of a general officer of the first rate. But yet the result, as the
matter was managed, was not so honourable to Great Britain, as the
intentions of the Government really designed. The fact is, that virtues
as well as vices have their day of fashion in England; and at the
conclusion of the peace, when the nation were cloyed with victory, men
began, like epicures after a feast, to wrangle about the reckoning.
Every one felt the influence of the _Quart d'heure de Rabelais_. It
ascended into the Houses of Parliament, and economy was the general
theme of the day. There can be no doubt that a judicious restriction
upon expenditure is the only permanent source of national wealth; but,
like all other virtues, parsimony may be carried to an extreme, and
there are situations in which it has all the meanness of avarice. The
waste of a few pounds of meat, of a hundred billets of wood, of a few
bottles of wine, ought not to have been made the shadow of a question
between Britain and Napoleon; and it would have been better to have
winked at and given way to the prodigality of a family, which had no
motives of economy on their own part, than to be called upon to discuss
such petty domestic details in the great council of the nation, sitting
as judges betwixt England and her prisoner. A brief answer to those who
might in that case have charged the government with prodigality, might
have been found in referring the censors to the immense sums saved by
the detention of Napoleon in St. Helena. It is something of a different
scale of expense, which is requisite to maintain a score of persons even
in the most extravagant manner, and to support an army of three hundred
thousand men.
But although such disputes arose, we think, from the governor mistaking
the meaning of the British ministers, and descending, if he really did
so, to details about the quality of salt or sugar to be used in the
kitchen at Longwood, there is no reason to entertain the belief that the
prisoners had any actual restriction to complain of, though it might not
always happen that articles of the first quality could be procured at
St. Helena so easily as at Paris. The East India Company sent out the
supplies to the purveyor, and they consisted of every luxury which could
be imagined; so that delicacies very unusual in St. Helena could, during
Napoleon's residence, be obtained there for any one who chose to be at
the expense. The wine was (generally speaking) excellent in quality, and
of the first price;[243] and although there was rather too much said and
thought about the quantity consumed, yet it was furnished, as we shall
hereafter see, in a quantity far beyond the limits of ordinary
conviviality. Indeed, though the French officers, while hunting for
grievances, made complaints of their treatment at table, and circulated,
in such books as that of Santini, the grossest scandal on that subject,
yet when called on as men of honour to give their opinion, they did
justice to the governor in this respect.
In a letter of General Bertrand to the governor, he expresses himself
thus:--"Be assured that we are well persuaded of the good intentions of
the governor, to supply us with every thing necessary, and that as to
provisions there will never be any complaints, or if there are, they
will be made against the government, not against the governor, upon whom
the matter does not depend." He adds, "that such were the sentiments of
the Emperor. That indeed they had been under some difficulties when the
plate was broken up, but that ever since then they had been well
supplied, and had no complaint whatever to make." Such is the evidence
of Count Bertrand, when deliberately writing to the governor through his
military secretary.
But we have also the opinion of the Ex-Emperor himself, transmitted by
Dr. O'Meara, who was at that time, as already noticed, in the habit of
sending to the governor such scraps of information as he heard in
conversation at Longwood:
"_5th June, 1817._
"He (Buonaparte) observed that Santini's was a foolish production,
exaggerated, full of _coglionerie_, and some lies: Truths there were
in it, but exaggerated. That there never had existed that actual
want described by him; that there had been enough to eat supplied,
but not enough to keep a proper table; that there had been enough of
wine for them; that there certainly had been sometimes a deficiency
of necessary articles, but that this might be accounted for by
accidents; that he believed frequent purchases had been made, at the
camp, of bread and other provisions, which might also have
occasionally arisen from the same cause. He added, he was convinced
some Englishman had written it, and not Santini."
There is something to the same purpose in Dr. O'Meara's printed
book,[244] but not so particular. What makes Napoleon's confutation of
Santini's work the more amusing, is, that according to General
Gourgaud's communication to the British Government, Napoleon was himself
the author of the whole, or greater part, of the work in question. The
difference between the prisoner and governor, so far as it really
existed, may have had its rise in the original dispute; for a table,
which suited the rank of a general, must have been considerably inferior
to one kept for an emperor; and while the former was what the governor
was directed to maintain, the latter was what Napoleon conceived himself
entitled to expect.
The permission given to Buonaparte, and which indeed could not be well
refused, to purchase from his own funds what additional articles he
desired beyond those supplied by the British Government, afforded
peculiar facilities to the French, which they did not fail to make use
of. Napoleon's money had been temporarily taken into custody when he
left the Bellerophon, with a view to prevent his having the means of
facilitating his escape by bribery. The permitting him to draw upon the
Continent for money, would have been in a great measure restoring to him
the golden key before which prison-gates give way, and also tending to
afford him the means of secret correspondence with those friends abroad,
who might aid him to arrange a scheme of flight.
Indeed, the advantages of this species of correspondence were of such
evident importance, that Napoleon, through General Montholon, made the
following proposal, which was sent to Lord Bathurst by the governor, 8th
September, 1816:--
"The Emperor," he said, "was desirous to enter into arrangements for
paying the _whole_ of his expenses, providing any house here, or in
England, or on the continent of Europe, to be fixed on with the
governor's consent, or even at his own choice, were appointed to
transact his money-matters; under assurance from him, General
Buonaparte, that all letters sent through his hands would be solely
on pecuniary affairs. But provided always, that such letters should
pass _sealed and unopened_ to their direction."
It is probable that Napoleon concluded, from the ferment which was at
that time taking place in Parliament on the subject of economy, that the
English nation was on the point of bankruptcy, and did not doubt that an
offer, which promised to relieve them of £12,000 a-year, would be
eagerly caught at by Sir Hudson Lowe, or the British Ministry. But the
governor saw the peril of a measure, which, in its immediate and direct
tendency, went to place funds to any amount at the command of the
Ex-Emperor, and might, more indirectly, lead the way to private
correspondence of every kind. Napoleon, indeed, had offered to plight
his word, that the communication should not be used for any other than
pecuniary purposes; but Sir Hudson liked not the security. On his part,
the governor tendered a proposal, that the letters to the bankers should
be visible only to himself, and to Lord Bathurst, the secretary for the
colonial department, and pledged his word that they would observe the
most inviolable secrecy on the subject of the contents; but this
arrangement did not answer Napoleon's purposes, and the arrangement was
altogether dropped.
It was about the same time that Sir Hudson Lowe was desirous to keep the
expense of the establishment within £12,000. A conference on this
subject was held betwixt General Montholon, who took charge of the
department of the household, and Major Gorrequer, belonging to Sir
Hudson's staff, who acted on the part of the governor. It appears that
Sir Hudson had either misapprehended the instructions of the government,
and deemed himself rigidly bound to limit the expenses of Longwood
within £12,000 yearly, not adverting that he had an option to extend it
beyond that sum; or else that he considered the surplus above £1000 per
month, to consist of such articles of extra expenditure as the French
might, in a free interpretation of his instructions, be required to pay
for themselves, as being beyond the limits of a general-officer's table,
provided upon the most liberal plan. General Montholon stated, that the
family could not be provided, even after many reductions, at a cheaper
rate than £15,194, and that this was the _minimum of minimums_, the
least possible sum. He offered, that the Emperor would draw for the sum
wanted, providing he was permitted to send a sealed letter to the
banking-house. This, Major Gorrequer said, could not be allowed. Count
Montholon then declared, that as the Emperor was not permitted by the
British Government to have access to his funds in Europe, he had no
other means left than to dispose of his property here; and that if the
Emperor was obliged to defray those expenses of the establishment, which
went beyond the allowance made by Britain, he must dispose of his plate.
This proposal was too rashly assented to by Sir Hudson Lowe, whose
instructions of 22d November empowered him to have prevented a
circumstance so glaringly calculated to accredit all that had ever been
said or written respecting the mean and sordid manner in which the late
Emperor of France was treated. Napoleon had an opportunity, at the
sacrifice of a parcel of old silver plate, to amuse his own moments of
languor, by laughing at and turning into ridicule the inconsistent
qualities of the English nation--at one time sending him a house and
furniture to the value of £60,000 or £70,000; at another, obliging him
to sell his plate, and discharge his servants; and all for the sake of a
few bottles of wine, or pounds of meat. Sir Hudson Lowe ought not to
have exposed his country to such a charge; and, even if his instructions
seemed inexplicit on the subject, he ought, on his own interpretation of
them, to have paid the extra expense, without giving room to such
general scandal as was sure to arise from Napoleon's disposing of his
plate.
But if the governor took too narrow a view of his duty upon this
occasion, what are we to say of the poor conduct of Napoleon, who, while
he had specie in his strong-box to have defrayed three times the sum
wanted to defray the alleged balance, yet preferred making the paltry
sale alluded to, that he might appear before Europe _in formâ pauperis_,
and set up a claim to compassion as a man driven to such extremity as to
be obliged to part with the plate from his table, in order to be enabled
to cover it with the necessary food! He was well aware that little
compassion would have been paid to him, had he been possessed of ready
money sufficient to supply any deficiencies in the tolerably ample
allowance paid by England; and that it was only the idea of his poverty,
proved, as it seemed, by a step, which even private individuals only
take in a case of necessity, which made his case appear strong and
clamant. The feeling of compassion must have given place to one of a
very different kind, had the actual circumstances of the case been fully
and fairly known.
The communications of General Gourgaud, upon parting with Sir Hudson
Lowe, put the governor in possession of the curious fact, that the
breaking up of the plate[245] was a mere trick, resorted to on account
of the impression it was calculated to produce in England and Europe;
for that at the time they had at Longwood plenty of money. Sir Hudson
Lowe conjectured, that General Gourgaud alluded to the sale of some
stock belonging to Las Cases, the value of which that devoted adherent
had placed at Napoleon's disposal; but General Gourgaud replied, "No,
no; before that transaction they had received 240,000 francs, chiefly in
Spanish doubloons." He further said, that it was Prince Eugene who
lodged the money in the hands of the bankers. In London, General
Gourgaud made the same communication. We copy the words in which it is
reported by Sir Hudson Lowe to Lord Bathurst:--
"General Gourgaud stated himself to have been aware of General
Buonaparte having received a considerable sum of money in Spanish
doubloons, viz. £10,000, at the very time he disposed of his plate;
but, on being pressed by me as to the persons privy to that
transaction, he contented himself with assuring me, that the mode of
its transmission was one purely accidental; that it could never
again occur; and that, such being the case, he trusted that I should
not press a discovery, which, while it betrayed its author, could
have no effect, either as it regarded the punishment of the
offenders, or the prevention of a similar act in future. The actual
possession of money was, moreover, not likely, in his view of the
subject, to afford any additional means of corrupting the fidelity
of those whom it might be advisable to seduce; as it was well known,
that any draught, whatever might be its amount, drawn by General
Buonaparte on Prince Eugene, or on certain other members of his
family, would be scrupulously honoured."
He further stated, that it was Napoleon's policy to make a _moyen_, a
fund for execution of his plans, by placing sums of money at his,
General Gourgaud's command, and that he had sustained ill-treatment on
the part of Napoleon, and much importunity on that of Bertrand, because
he declined lending himself to facilitate secret correspondence.
Whatever sympathy Buonaparte may claim for his other distresses at St.
Helena, it was made plain from this important disclosure, that want of
funds could be none of them; and it is no less so, that the trick of
selling the plate can now prove nothing, excepting that Napoleon's
system was a deceptive one; and that evidence of any sort, arising
either from his word or actions, is to be received with caution, when
there is an apparent point to be carried by it.
[Sidenote: INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GOVERNOR.]
When Sir Hudson Lowe's report reached England, that the excess of the
expenditure at Longwood, about twelve thousand pounds, had been defrayed
by Napoleon himself, it did not meet the approbation of the Ministry;
who again laid before the governor the distinction which he was to draw
betwixt expenses necessary to maintain the table and household of a
general officer, and such as might be of a nature different from, and
exceeding those attendant on the household of a person of that rank;
which last, and those alone, the French might be called on to defray.
The order is dated 24th Oct. 1817.
"As I observe from the statement contained in your despatch, No. 84,
that the expense of General Buonaparte's establishment exceeds
£12,000 per annum, and that the excess beyond that sum has, up to
the date of that despatch, been defrayed from his own funds, I deem
it necessary again to call your attention to that part of my
despatch, No. 15, of the 22d November last, in which, in limiting
the expense to £12,000 a-year, I still left you at liberty to incur
a farther expenditure, should you consider it to be necessary for
the comfort of General Buonaparte; and to repeat, that, _if you
should consider the sum of £12,000 a-year not to be adequate to
maintain such an establishment as would be requisite for a general
officer of distinction, you will have no difficulty in making what
you deem to be a requisite addition_. But, on the other hand, if the
expenses which General Buonaparte has himself defrayed are beyond
what, on a liberal construction, might be proper for a general
officer of distinction, you will permit them, as heretofore, to be
defrayed from his own funds."
These positive and reiterated instructions serve to show that there was
never a wish on the part of Britain to deal harshly, or even closely
with Napoleon; as the avowals of General Gourgaud prove, on the other
hand, that if the governor was too rigid on the subject of expense, the
prisoner possessed means sufficient to have saved him from any possible
consequences of self-denial, which might have accrued from being
compelled to live at so low a rate as twelve thousand pounds a-year.
The subject of the residence of Napoleon continued to furnish great
subjects of complaint and commotion. We have recorded our opinion, that,
from the beginning, Plantation-house, as the best residence in the
island, ought to have been set apart for his use. If, however, this was
objected to, the building a new house from the foundation, even with the
indifferent means which the island affords, would have been far more
respectable, and perhaps as economical, as constructing a great wooden
frame in London, and transporting it to St. Helena, where it arrived,
with the furniture destined for it, in May, 1816. It was not, however, a
complete _parapluie_ house, as such structures have been called, but
only the materials for constructing such a one; capable of being erected
separately, or, at Napoleon's choice, of being employed for making large
and commodious additions to the mansion which he already occupied. It
became a matter of courtesy to inquire whether it would best answer
Napoleon's idea of convenience that an entirely new edifice should be
constructed, or whether that end would be better attained by suffering
the former building to remain, and constructing the new one in the form
of an addition to it. We have recounted an interview betwixt Napoleon
and the governor, in the words of the former, as delivered to O'Meara.
The present we give as furnished by Sir Hudson, in a despatch to Lord
Bathurst, dated 17th May, 1816:--
[Sidenote: INTERVIEW WITH SIR H. LOWE.]
"It becoming necessary to come to some decision in respect to the
house and furniture which had been sent from England for the
accommodation of General Buonaparte and his followers, I resolved on
waiting upon him, communicating to him the arrival of the various
materials, and asking his sentiments with respect to their
appropriation, before I made any disposition of them. I previously
called on General Bertrand, to ask if he thought General Buonaparte
would be at leisure to receive me; and on his reply, which was in
the affirmative, I proceeded to Longwood-house, where, having met
Count Las Cases, I begged he would be the bearer of my message to
the general, acquainting him with my being there, if his convenience
admitted of being visited by me. I received a reply, saying, 'The
Emperor would see me.'
"I passed through his outer dining-room into his drawing-room. He
was alone, standing with his hat under his arm, in the manner in
which he usually presents himself when he assumes his imperial
dignity. He remained silent, expecting I would address him. Finding
him not disposed to commence, I began in the following words:--'Sir,
you will probably have seen by our English newspapers, as well,
perhaps, as heard through other channels, of the intention of the
British Government to send out hither for your accommodation the
materials for the construction of a house, with every necessary
furniture. These articles have now for the first time arrived. In
the meantime, Government has received information of the building
prepared for your reception at this place, and I have instructions
for appropriating the articles as may seem best, whether for making
a new building, or adding to the conveniences of your present one.
Before making any disposition on the subject, I waited to know
whether you had any desires to communicate to me regarding it.' He
stood as before, and made no reply.
"Observing his silence continue, I again commenced by saying, 'I
have conceived, sir, that possibly the addition of two or three good
rooms (_deux ou trois salons_) to your present house, with other
improvements to it, might add to your convenience in less time than
by constructing a new building.' He then commenced, but spoke with
such rapidity, such intemperance, and so much warmth, that it is
difficult to repeat every word he used. Without apparently having
lent an ear to what I said, he began--'I do not at all understand
the conduct of your government towards me. Do they desire to kill
me? And do you come here to be my executioner, as well as my
gaoler?--Posterity will judge of the manner in which I have been
treated. The misfortunes which I suffer will recoil upon your
nation. No, sir; never will I suffer any person to enter into the
interior of my house, or penetrate into my bed-chamber, as you have
given orders. When I heard of your arrival in this island, I
believed that, as being an officer of the army, you would be
possessed of a more polite character than an admiral, who is a
navy-officer, and might have more harsh manners. I have no reason to
complain of his heart. But you, sir--in what manner do you treat me?
It is an insult to invite me to dinner by the name of General
Buonaparte. I am not General Buonaparte--I am the Emperor Napoleon.
I ask you again--have you come hither to be my gaoler--my hangman?'
Whilst speaking in this manner, his right arm moved backward and
forward; his person stood fixed; his eyes and countenance exhibiting
every thing which could be supposed in a person who meant to
intimidate or irritate.
"I suffered him to proceed throughout, not without a strong feeling
of restraint on myself, until he was really out of breath, when, on
his stopping, I said, 'Sir, I am not come here to be insulted, but
to treat of an affair which regards you more than me. If you are not
disposed to talk upon the subject'----
"'I have no intention to insult you, sir,' he replied; 'but in what
sort of manner have you treated me? is it in a soldierlike fashion?'
"I answered, 'Sir, I am a soldier according to the fashion of my own
country, to do my duty to her accordingly, and not according to the
fashion of foreigners. Besides, if you conceive you have any reason
to complain of me, you have only to put your accusation upon paper,
and I will send it to England by the first opportunity.'
"'To what good purpose?' he said; 'my complaints will not be more
public there than here.'
"'I will cause them be published,' I answered, 'in all the gazettes
of the continent, if you desire it. I do my duty, and every thing
else is indifferent to me.'
"Then, adverting for the first time to the matter which had brought
me to him, he said, 'Your government has made me no official
communication of the arrival of this house. Is it to be constructed
where I please, or where you may fix it to be?'
"'I am now come, sir, for the express purpose of announcing it to
you. I have no difficulty in replying to the other point: If there
is any particular spot, which you might have thought of to erect it
upon, I will examine it, and have it erected there, if I see no
objection to it. If I see any objection to it, I will acquaint you
with it. It was to combine this matter in some degree of concert
with you that I am now come.'
"'Then you had better speak to the grand maréchal about it, and
settle it with him.'
"'I prefer, sir, addressing you upon it. I find so many
_mésintelligences_ happen, when I adopt the medium of other persons
(particularly as in the instance of the orders which you mention I
had given for forcing an entrance into your private apartments,)
that I find it more satisfactory to address yourself.'
"He made no particular reply to this, walked about for a moment, and
then, working himself up apparently to say something which he
thought would appal me with extraordinary surprise or dread, he
said--'Do you wish me, sir, to tell you the truth? Yes, sir, I ask
you if you desire me to tell you the truth? I believe that you have
received orders to kill me--yes, to kill me--yes, sir, I believe
that you have received orders to stick at nothing--nothing.' He then
looked at me, as if expecting a reply. My answer was--'You were
pleased to remark, sir, in our last interview, that you had
miscalculated the spirit of the English people. Give me leave to
say, you at present calculate as erroneously the spirit of an
English soldier.'
"Our interview here terminated; and, as if neither of us had any
thing more to say, we mutually separated."
Sir Hudson received a letter in reply to his account of this strange and
violent scene, in which his forbearance and firmness are approved of.
But we quote it, chiefly because it marks the intention of the British
Government with respect to Buonaparte, and shows the consideration which
they had for his peculiar condition, and the extent of forbearance which
it was their desire should be extended towards him by the governor of
St. Helena:
"There is a wide distinction between the conduct which you ought to
hold towards General Buonaparte, and towards those who have chosen
to follow his fortunes, by accompanying him to St. Helena.
"It would be a want of generosity not to make great allowance for
the intemperate language into which the former may at times be
betrayed. The height from whence he has been precipitated, and all
the circumstances which have attended his fall, are sufficient to
overset a mind less irritable than his; and it is to be apprehended
that he can find little consolation in his reflections, either in
the means by which he obtained his power, or his manner of
exercising it. So long, therefore, as his violence is confined to
words, it must be borne with--always understanding, and giving him
to understand, that any wilful transgression, on his part, of the
rules which you may think it necessary to prescribe for the security
of his person, will place you under the necessity of adopting a
system of restraint, which it will be most painful to you to
inflict.
"With respect to his followers, they stand in a very different
situation; they cannot be too frequently reminded, that their
continuance in the island is an act of indulgence on the part of the
British Government; and you will inform them that you have received
strict instructions to remove them from the person of General
Buonaparte, and to transport them out of the island, if they shall
not conduct themselves with that respect which your situation
demands, and with that strict attention to your regulations which is
the indispensable condition on which their residence in the island
is permitted."
[Sidenote: LONGWOOD.]
The stormy dispute, which took place on the 16th May, 1816,[246] left
every thing unsettled with respect to the house; and indeed it may be
conjectured, without injustice, that Napoleon preferred the old and
inconvenient mansion, with the right to complain of it as a grievance,
to the new and commodious one, the possession of which must have shut
his lips upon one fertile subject of misrepresentation. Repeated and
equally nugatory discussions on the subject took place during the course
of two or three years, all which time Napoleon complained of the want
of the promised house, and the governor, on his side, alleged, there was
no getting Napoleon to express a fixed opinion on the situation or the
plan, or to say whether he would prefer a thorough repair of the old
house, occupying M. Bertrand's apartments in the mean while, until the
work should be accomplished. Sometimes Napoleon spoke of changing the
situation of the house, but he never, according to Sir Hudson Lowe's
averment, intimated any specific wish upon that subject, nor would
condescend to say distinctly in what place it should be erected.
Napoleon on his part maintained that he was confined for three years in
an unhealthy barn, during which time the governor was perpetually
talking about a house which had never been commenced. While the blame is
thus reciprocally retorted, the impartial historian can only say, that
had Sir Hudson Lowe delayed willingly the building of the house, he must
have exposed himself to severe censure from his government in
consequence, since his despatches were daily urging the task. There was
nothing which the governor could place against this serious risk, except
the malicious purpose of distressing Napoleon. On the other hand, in
submitting to indifferent accommodation, rather than communicate with a
man whom he seemed to hold in abhorrence, Napoleon only acted upon his
general system, of which this was a part, and sacrificed his
convenience, as he afterwards did his health, rather than bend his mind
to comply with the regulations of his place of captivity. Mr. Ellis, an
unprejudiced witness, declares that the original house seemed to him
commodious and well furnished.
The fate of the new house was singular enough. It was at last erected,
and is said to be a large and comfortable edifice. But it happened, that
the plan directed the building to be surrounded, as is common in
England, with something like a sunk ditch, surrounded by cast-iron
railing of an ornamental character. No sooner had Napoleon seen these
preparations, than the idea of a fortification and a dungeon entered
into his head; nor was it possible to convince him that the rails and
sunk fence were not intended as additional means of securing his person.
When Sir Hudson Lowe learned the objection which had been started, he
ordered the ground to be levelled, and the palisade removed. But before
this was accomplished, Napoleon's health was too much broken to permit
of his being removed, so that he died under the same roof which received
him after his temporary residence at Briars.
Another subject of complaint, which Napoleon greatly insisted upon, was,
that the governor of St. Helena had not been placed there merely as a
ministerial person, to see duly executed the instructions which he
should receive from Britain, but as a legislator, himself possessing and
exercising the power to alter the regulations under which his prisoner
was to be confined, to recall them, to suspend them, and finally, to
replace them. To this it must be answered, that in such a situation,
where the governor, holding so important a charge, was at so great a
distance from the original source of his power, some discretionary
authority must necessarily be lodged in him, since cases must occur
where he was to act on the event as it arose, and it was indispensable
that he should possess the power to do so. It must also be remembered,
that different constructions might possibly be given to the instructions
from the Secretary of State; and it would, in that case, have been
equally anomalous and inconvenient should the governor not have had it
in his power to adopt that explanation which circumstances demanded, and
not less so if he had been obliged to litigate the point with his
prisoner, and, as a mere ministerial person must have done, wait till a
commentary on the disputed article should arrive from England.
It is a different question, and on which we are far from having so clear
an opinion, whether Sir Hudson Lowe, in every case, exercised this high
privilege with sound discretion. It would be unjust to condemn him
unheard, who has never fairly been put upon his defence, and the
evidence against whom is, we must again say, of a very suspicious
nature. Still it appears, that alterations of the existing regulations
were, as far as we have information, more frequent than necessity, the
best if not the only apology for varying the manner of such proceedings,
seems to have authorised.
For example, one of the heaviest of Napoleon's complaints is made
against the restriction of the limits within which he might take
exercise without the company of a British officer, which, instead of
extending to twelve miles in circumference, were contracted to
two-thirds of that space. Every thing in this world is relative, and we
can conceive the loss of one-third of his exercising ground to have
been, at this moment, a more sincere subject of distress to Napoleon,
than the loss of a kingdom while he yet governed Europe. The apology
alleged for this was the disposition which Napoleon seemed to show to
cultivate the acquaintance of the inhabitants of St. Helena, more than
it was advisable that he should have the opportunity of doing. We can
easily conceive this to be true; for not only might Napoleon be
disposed, from policy, to make friends among the better classes by his
irresistible conciliation of manners, and of the lower class by
familiarity and largesses; but he must also be supposed, with the
feelings natural to humanity in distress, to seek some little variety
from the monotony of existence, some little resumption of connexion with
the human race, from which, his few followers excepted, he was in a
manner excluded. But this aptitude to mingle with such society as chance
threw within his reach, in his very limited range, might perhaps have
been indulged without the possibility of his making any bad use of it,
especially since no one could enter these grounds without passes and
orders. The limits were shortly after restored by Sir Hudson Lowe to
their original extent, Napoleon having declared that unless this were
the case, he would not consent to take exercise, or observe the usual
means of keeping himself in health.
The injunction requiring that Buonaparte should daily be seen by an
orderly officer, was, under Sir Hudson Lowe's authority, as it had been
under that of Sir George Cockburn, the subject of Buonaparte's most
violent opposition. He affected to apprehend that it was to be enforced
by positive violence, and carried this so far as to load fire-arms, with
the idea of resisting by force any attempt of an orderly officer to
insist upon performing this part of his duty. He alludes resentfully to
the circumstance in his angry interview with Sir Hudson Lowe upon the
16th May, 1816. Yet, of all unpleasant regulations to which a prisoner
is subjected by his captivity, that appears the least objectionable,
which, assuring us from space to space that the person of the prisoner
is secure, enables us, in the interval, to leave him a much greater
share of personal freedom than otherwise could be permitted, because the
shortness of each interval does not allow him time to use it in escape.
Nevertheless, Sir Hudson Lowe, as already hinted, was content in this
case to yield to the violent threats of Napoleon, and rather suffer the
duty to be exercised imperfectly and by chance, than run the risk of his
prisoner perishing in the affray which his obstinacy threatened. Perhaps
the governor may be in this case rather censured as having given up a
point impressed upon him by his original instructions, than blamed for
executing them too strictly against the remarkable person who was his
prisoner. We cannot but repeat the opinion we have been led to form,
that, could Buonaparte's bodily presence have been exactly ascertained
from time to time, his rambles through the whole of the island might
have been permitted, even without the presence of a military officer.
This regulation was another circumstance, of which Napoleon most heavily
complained. He regarded the company of such attendant as a mark of his
defeat and imprisonment, and resolved, therefore, rather to submit to
remain within the limits of the grounds of Longwood, narrow as they
were, than, by stirring without them, to expose himself to the necessity
of admitting the company of this odious guardian. It may be thought,
that in thus judging, Napoleon did not adopt the most philosophical or
even the wisest opinion. Misfortune in war is no disgrace; and to be
prisoner, has been the lot before now both of kings and emperors. The
orderly officers, also, who were ready to accompany Napoleon in his
ride, might be often men of information and accomplishment; and their
society and conversation could not but have added some variety to days
so little diversified as those spent by Napoleon.
The prisoner, however, was incapable of deriving amusement from any such
source. It might be as well expected that the occupant of a dungeon
should amuse himself with botanizing in the ditches which moat it
round. Napoleon could not forget what he had been and what he was, and
plainly confessed by his conduct that he was contented rather to die,
than to appear in public wearing the badge of his fate, like one who was
sitting down resigned to it.
While so averse to this regulation, Napoleon had not taken the proper
mode of escaping from its influence. Sir George Cockburn, upon his
remonstrance after his first arrival, had granted to him a dispensation
from the attendance of an orderly officer, at least in his immediate
company or vicinity. This privilege was suddenly withdrawn while the
admiral was yet upon the island, and both Napoleon and the various St.
Helena authors, Las Cases in particular, make the most bitter complaints
on the tantalizing conduct of Sir George Cockburn, who gave an
indulgence, as it would seem, only with the cruel view of recalling it
the next morning. The truth is here told, but not the whole truth.
Napoleon had engaged to the admiral, that, in consideration of this
indulgence, he would not enter into any intercourse with any of the
inhabitants whom he might meet during the time of his excursion. He
chose to break through his promise the very first time that he rode out
alone, or only with his suite; and hence Sir George Cockburn,
considering faith as broken with him, recalled the permission
altogether. It was not, therefore, with a good grace, that Napoleon
complained of the want of inclination on the part of the governor, to
restore an indulgence to him, which he had almost instantly made a use
of that was contrary to his express engagement. The truth is, that the
Ex-Emperor had his own peculiar manner of viewing his own case. He
considered every degree of leniency, which was at any time exercised, as
a restoration of some small portion of that liberty, of which he
conceived himself to be deprived illegally and tyrannically; and
scrupled no more to employ what he got in endeavouring to attain a
farther degree of freedom, than the prisoner whose hand is extricated
from fetters would hesitate to employ it in freeing his feet. There can
be no doubt, that if by means of such a privilege as riding without the
attendance of an officer, he could have arranged or facilitated any mode
of final escape, he would not have hesitated to use it to that effect.
But, on the other hand, such being his way of thinking, and hardly
disguised, it put the governor strongly on his guard against granting
any relaxation of the vigilance necessary for effectually confining him.
Indulgences of this nature are, so far as they go, a species of
confidence reposed in the captive by the humanity of his keeper, and
cannot, in perfect good faith, be used to purposes, which must lead to
the disgrace, or perhaps the ruin, of the party who grants them. If,
therefore, Napoleon showed himself determined to hold a closer and more
frequent intercourse with the natives of St. Helena, and the strangers
who visited the island, than Sir Hudson Lowe approved, it only remained
for the latter to take care that such interviews should not occur
without a witness, by adhering to the restrictions, which required that
a British officer should attend upon the more distant excursions of the
hard-ruled captive.
[Sidenote: GOURGAUD--LONGWOOD.]
It is to be remarked, that this intercourse with the inhabitants, and
others who visited St. Helena, was no imaginary danger, but actually
existed to a considerable extent, and for purposes calculated to alarm
Sir Hudson Lowe's watchfulness, and to transgress in a most material
respect his instructions from government. The disclosures of General
Gourgaud are on these points decisive.
That officer "had no difficulty in avowing, that there has always
existed a free and uninterrupted communication betwixt the
inhabitants of Longwood and the country, without the knowledge or
intervention of the governor; and that this has been made use of,
not only for the purpose of receiving and transmitting letters, but
for that of transmitting pamphlets, money, and other articles, of
which the party in Longwood might from time to time have been in
want; and that the correspondence was for the most part carried on
direct with Great Britain. That the persons employed in it were
those Englishmen who from time to time visit St. Helena, to all of
whom the attendants and servants of Buonaparte have free access, and
who, generally speaking, are willing, many of them without reward,
and others for very small pecuniary considerations, to convey to
Europe any letter or packet intrusted to their charge. It would
appear also, that the captains and others on board the merchant
ships touching at the island, whether belonging to the East India
Company, or to other persons, are considered at Longwood as being
peculiarly open to the seduction of Buonaparte's talents; so much
so, that the inhabitants of Longwood have regarded it as a matter of
small difficulty to procure a passage on board one of these ships
for General Buonaparte, if escape should be at any time his object."
In corroboration of what is above stated, of the free communication
betwixt St. Helena and Europe, occurs the whimsical story told by Dr.
Antommarchi, of a number of copies of Dr. O'Meara's book being smuggled
ashore at St. Helena, under the disguise of tracts distributed by a
religious society. Another instance is mentioned by Count Las Cases,
who, when removed from Longwood, and debarred from personally
communicating with his master, felt considerable difficulty in
discovering a mode of conveying to him a diamond necklace of great
value, which had been intrusted to his keeping, and which Napoleon might
want after his departure. He addressed at hazard the first
decent-looking person he saw going to Longwood, and conjured him in the
most pathetic manner, to take charge of the packet. The stranger
slackened his pace without speaking, and pointed to his coat-pocket. Las
Cases dropt in the packet; and the jewels, thus consigned to the faith
of an unknown person, reached their owner in safety.[247]
It is honourable to humanity, that distress of almost any kind, but
especially that which affects the imagination by exciting the memory of
fallen greatness, should find assistants even among those who were
enemies to that greatness when in prosperity.
But it was the duty of the governor to take heed, that neither
overstrained notions of romantic compassion and generosity, nor the
temptation of worse motives, should lead to any combination which might
frustrate his diligence; and Napoleon having at once avarice and the
excess of generosity to solicit in his favour, the governor naturally
secluded him as much as he could from those individuals who might be
liable to be gained over to his interest by such powerful seductions.
Upon the 7th January, 1818, the Government of Britain intimated their
approbation of the enlargement of Napoleon's bounds of exercise to the
ordinary limits which had been for a time restricted; and, in order to
preserve for him the opportunity of keeping up society with such of the
people of the island as he might desire to receive on business, or as
visitors, the following regulation was adopted:--
"Respecting the intercourse with the inhabitants, I see no material
objection to the placing it upon the footing recently suggested by
Count Bertrand, as it is one which he represents would be more
consonant to General Buonaparte's wishes. The count's proposition
is, that a list of a given number of persons, resident in the
island, should be made out who shall be at once admitted to Longwood
on the general's own invitation, without a previous application
being made to your excellency on each invitation. You will,
therefore, consider yourself at liberty to accede to the suggestions
of Count Bertrand; and you will for this purpose direct him to
present to you for your approbation, a list of persons, not
exceeding fifty in number, resident in the island, who may be
admitted to Longwood at reasonable hours, without any other pass
than the invitation of General Buonaparte, it being understood that
they are on each occasion to deliver in the invitation as a voucher,
with their names, at the barrier. In giving your approbation to the
list, you will, as far as is consistent with your duty, consult the
wishes of General Buonaparte; but you will let it be clearly
understood, that you reserve to yourself a discretionary power of
erasing from the list, at any time, any of those individuals, to
whom you may have found it inexpedient to continue such
extraordinary facility of access; and you will take special care,
that a report be always made to you by the orderly officer, of the
several persons admitted to Longwood upon General Buonaparte's
invitation."
We have touched upon these various subjects of grievance, not as being
the only causes of dispute, or rather of violent discord, which existed
betwixt the Ex-Emperor of France and the governor of St. Helena, for
there were many others. It is not in our purpose, however, nor even in
our power, to give a detailed or exact history of these particular
quarrels, but merely to mark--as our duty, in this a very painful one,
demands--what was the character and general scope of the debate which
was so violently conducted on both sides. Of course it follows, that a
species of open war having been declared betwixt the parties, every one
of the various points of discussion which must necessarily have arisen
betwixt Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon, or through their respective
attendants and followers, was turned into matter of offence on the one
side or the other, and as such warmly contested. It is thus, that, when
two armies approach each other, the most peaceful situations and
positions lose their ordinary character, and become the subjects of
attack and defence. Every circumstance, whether of business or of
etiquette, which occurred at St. Helena, was certain to occasion some
dispute betwixt Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe, the progress and
termination of which seldom passed without an aggravation of mutual
hostilities. It is beneath the dignity of history to trace these
_tracasseries_; and beyond possibility, unless for one present on the
spot, and possessed of all the minute information attending each subject
of quarrel, to judge which had the right or the wrong.
It would be, indeed, easy for us, standing aloof and remote from these
agitating struggles, to pass a sweeping condemnation on the one party or
the other, or perhaps upon each of them; and to show that reason and
temper on either side would have led to a very different course of
proceeding on both, had it been permitted by those human infirmities to
which, unhappily, those who have power or pretensions are more liable
than the common class, who never possessed the one, and make no claim to
the other.
Neither would it be difficult for us to conceive a governor of St.
Helena, in the abstract, who, treating the reviling and reproaches with
which he was on all occasions loaded by Buonaparte, as the idle chidings
of a storm, which must howl around whatever it meets in its course,
would, with patience and equanimity, have suffered the tempest to expend
its rage, and die away in weakness, the sooner that it found itself
unresisted. We can conceive such a person wrapping himself up in his own
virtue, and, while he discharged to his country the duty she had
intrusted to him, striving, at the same time, by such acts of indulgence
as might be the more gratifying because the less expected, or perhaps
merited, to melt down the sullenness which the hardship of his situation
naturally imposed on the prisoner. We can even conceive that a man of
such rare temper might have found means, in some happy moment, of
re-establishing a tolerable and ostensible good understanding, if not a
heartfelt cordiality, which, could it have existed, would so much have
lessened the vexations and troubles, both of the captive and of the
governor. All this is very easily conceived. But in order to form the
idea of such a man, we must suppose him, in the case in question,
stoically impassive to insults of the grossest kind, insults poured on
him before he had done any thing which could deserve them, and expressed
in a manner which plainly intimated the determination of Napoleon to
place himself at once on the most hostile terms with him. This must have
required the most uncommon share of calmness and candour. It is more
natural that such a functionary as the governor of St. Helena--feeling
the impulse of ill usage from a quarter where no regular satisfaction
could be had--if he did not use the power which he held for the time, to
the actual annoyance and vexation of the party by whom he had been
deliberately insulted, should be apt at least to become indifferent how
much, or how little, his prisoner was affected by the measures which he
adopted, and to go forward with the necessary means of confining the
person, without being so solicitous as he might otherwise have been, to
spare the feelings. An officer, termed to his face a liar, a brigand, an
assassin, a robber, a hangman, has few terms to keep with him by whom he
has been loaded with such unworthy epithets; and who, in using them, may
be considered as having declared mortal war, and disclaimed the
courtesy, while he defied the power, of the person to whom he addressed
them.
In the same manner, judging with the coolness of a third party, we
should be inclined to say, that the immediate attendants and followers
of Napoleon might have here served their master more effectually, by
endeavouring to accommodate the subjects of dispute with Sir Hudson
Lowe, than by aggravating and carrying them still farther by their own
subordinate discussions with the governor and his aides-de-camp, and
thus heating their master's passions by their own. But while that was
the line of conduct to be desired, it is impossible to deny that another
was more naturally to be expected. Generals Bertrand, Montholon, and
Gourgaud, were all soldiers of high reputation, who rising to fame under
Napoleon's eye, had seen their own laurels flourish along with his. In
the hour of adversity, they had most laudably and honourably followed
him, and were now sharing with him the years of solitude and exile. It
was not, therefore, to be wondered at, that they, wearied of their own
restrained and solitary condition, enraged, too, at every thing which
appeared to add to the calamitous condition of their fallen master,
should be more disposed to increase the angry spirit which manifested
itself on both sides, than, by interposing their mediation, to endeavour
to compose jars which might well render Napoleon's state more irritable
and uncomfortable, but could not, in any point of view, tend to his
comfort, peace, or even respectability.
But perhaps we might have been best entitled to hope, from the high part
which Napoleon had played in the world, from the extent of his genius,
and the natural pride arising from the consciousness of talent, some
indifference towards objects of mere form and ceremony, some confidence
in the genuine character of his own natural elevation, and a noble
contempt of the change which fortune could make on circumstances around
him. We might have hoped that one whose mental superiority over the rest
of his species was so undeniable, would have been the last to seek with
eagerness to retain the frippery and feathers of which the wind of
adverse fortune had stripped him, or to be tenacious of that etiquette,
which now, if yielded to him at all, could only have been given by
compassion. We might have thought the conqueror in so many bloody
conflicts, would, even upon provocation, have thought it beneath him to
enter on a war of words with the governor of an islet in the Atlantic,
where foul language could be the only weapon on either side, and held it
a yet greater derogation, so far to lay aside his high character, as to
be the first to engage in so ignoble a conflict. It might, we should
have supposed, have been anticipated by such a person, not only that
calm and patient endurance of inevitable misfortunes is the noblest
means of surmounting them, but that, even with a view to his liberty,
such conduct would have been most advisable, because most politic. The
people of Europe, and especially of Britain, would have been much sooner
apt to unite in the wish to see him removed from confinement, had he
borne himself with philosophical calmness, than seeing him, as they did,
still evincing within his narrow sphere the restless and intriguing
temper which had so long disturbed the world, and which now showed
itself so engrained in his constitution, as to lead him on to the
unworthy species of warfare which we have just described. But the
loftiest and proudest beings of mere humanity are like the image which
the Assyrian monarch beheld in his dream--blended of various metals,
uniting that which is vile with those which are most precious; that
which is frail, weak, and unsubstantial, with what is most perdurable
and strong. Napoleon, like many an emperor and hero before him, sunk
under his own passions after having vanquished nations; and became, in
his exile, the prey of petty spleen, which racked him almost to frenzy,
and induced him to hazard his health, or perhaps even to throw away his
life, rather than submit with dignified patience to that which his
misfortunes had rendered unavoidable.
FOOTNOTES:
[243] The claret, for example, was that of Carbonel, at £6 per dozen
without duty. Each domestic of superior rank was allowed a bottle of
this wine, which is as choice, as dear certainly, as could be brought to
the table of sovereigns. The labourers and soldiers had each, daily, a
bottle of Teneriffe wine of excellent quality.--S.
[244] Voice, &c., vol. ii., p. 76.
[245] "Sept. 19.--The Emperor examined a large basket-full of broken
plate, which was to be sent next day to the town. This was to be for the
future the indispensable complement for our monthly subsistence, in
consequence of the late reductions of the governor. When the moment had
come for breaking up this plate, the servants could not, without the
greatest reluctance, bring themselves to apply the hammer to these
objects of their veneration. This act upset all their ideas; it was to
them a sacrilege, a desolation! Some of them shed tears on the
occasion!!"--LAS CASES, tom. iii., p. 184.
[246] "As I was waiting in the antechamber with the military secretary,
I could hear, from the Emperor's tone of voice, that he was irritated.
The audience was a very long, and a very clamorous one. On the
governor's departure, I went to the garden, whither the Emperor had sent
for me. 'Well, Las Cases,' said he, 'we have had a violent scene. I have
been thrown quite out of temper! They have now sent me worse than a
gaoler! Sir Hudson Lowe is a downright executioner; I received him
to-day with my stormy countenance, my head inclined, and my ears pricked
up. We looked most furiously at each other. My anger must have been
powerfully excited, for I felt a vibration in the calf of my left leg.
This is always a sure sign with me; and I have not felt it for a long
time before.'"--LAS CASES, tom. ii., p. 286.
[247] Las Cases, tom. i., p. 61.