_Causes which justify the English Government in the measure of
Napoleon's Banishment--Napoleon's wish to retire to England, in
order that, being near France, he might again interfere in her
affairs--Reasons for withholding from him the title of Emperor--Sir
George Cockburn's Instructions--Temporary Accommodation at
Briars--Napoleon removes to Longwood--Precautions taken for the safe
custody of the Prisoner._
We are now to touch upon the arguments which seem to justify the
Administration of England in the strict course which they adopted
towards Napoleon Buonaparte, in restraining his person, and abating the
privileges of rank which he tenaciously claimed. And here we are led to
observe the change produced in men's feelings within the space of only
twelve years. In 1816, when the present author, however inadequate to
the task, attempted to treat of the same subject,[208] there existed a
considerable party in Britain who were of opinion that the British
government would best have discharged their duty to France and Europe,
by delivering up Napoleon to Louis XVIII.'s government, to be treated as
he himself had treated the Duke d'Enghien. It would be at this time of
day needless to throw away argument upon the subject, or to show that
Napoleon was at least entitled to security of life, by his surrender to
the British flag.
As needless would it be to go over the frequently repeated ground, which
proves so clearly that in other respects the transaction with Captain
Maitland amounted to an unconditional surrender. Napoleon had considered
every plan of escape by force or address, and none had seemed to him to
present such chance of a favourable result, as that which upon full
consideration he adopted. A surrender to England ensured his life, and
gave him the hope of taking further advantages from the generosity of
the British nation; for an unconditional surrender, as it secures
nothing, so it excludes nothing. General Bertrand, when on board the
Northumberland, said that Napoleon had been much influenced in taking
the step he had done by the Abbé Siêyes, who had strongly advised him to
proceed at once to England, in preference to taking any other course,
which proves that his resolution must of course have been formed long
before he ever saw Captain Maitland. Even M. Las Cases, when closely
examined, comes to the same result; for he admits that he never hoped
that Napoleon would be considered as a free man, or receive passports
for America; but only that he would be kept in custody under milder
restrictions than were inflicted upon him. But as he made no stipulation
of any kind concerning the nature of these restrictions, they must of
course have been left to the option of the conquering party. The
question, therefore, betwixt Napoleon and the British nation, was not
one of _justice_, which has a right to its due, though the consequence
should be destruction to the party by which it is to be rendered, but
one of generosity and clemency, feelings which can only be wisely
indulged with reference to the safety of those who act upon them.
Napoleon being thus a prisoner surrendered at discretion, became
subjected to the common laws of war, which authorise belligerent powers
to shut up prisoners of war in places of confinement, from which it is
only usual to except such whose honour may be accounted as a sufficient
guarantee for their good faith, or whose power of doing injury is so
small that it might be accounted contemptible. But Buonaparte was
neither in the one situation nor the other. His power was great; the
temptation to use it strong; and the confidence to be placed in his
resolution or promise to resist such temptation, very slight indeed.
There is an unauthorised report, that Lord Castlereagh, at the time of
the treaty of Fontainbleau, asked Caulaincourt, why Napoleon did not
choose to ask refuge in England, rather than accept the almost
ridiculous title of Emperor of Elba. We doubt much if Lord Castlereagh
did this. But if, either upon such a hint, or upon his own free motion,
Napoleon had chosen in 1814, to repose his confidence in the British
nation; or even had he fallen into our hands by chance of war, England
ought certainly, on so extraordinary an occasion, to have behaved with
magnanimity; and perhaps ought either to have permitted Napoleon to
reside as an individual within her dominions, or suffered him to have
departed to America. It might then have been urged (though cautious
persons might even then hesitate,) that the pledged word of a soldier,
who had been so lately a sovereign, ought to be received as a guarantee
for his observance of treaty. Nay, it might then have been held, that
the talents and activity of a single individual, supposing them as great
as human powers can be carried, would not have enabled him, however
desirous, to have again disturbed the peace of Europe. There would have
been a natural desire, therefore, to grant so remarkable a person that
liberty which a generous nation might have been willing to conceive
would not, and could not, be abused. But the experiment of Elba gave too
ample proof at once how little reliance was to be placed in Napoleon's
engagement, and how much danger was to be apprehended from him, even
when his fortunes were apparently at the lowest ebb. His breach of the
treaty of Fontainbleau altered entirely his relations with England and
with Europe; and placed him in the condition of one whose word could not
be trusted, and whose personal freedom was inconsistent with the
liberties of Europe. The experiment of trusting to his parole had been
tried and failed. The wise may be deceived once; only fools are twice
cheated in the same manner.
It may be pleaded and admitted for Napoleon, that he had, to instigate
his returning from Elba, as strong a temptation as earth could hold out
to an ambitious spirit like his own--the prospect of an extraordinary
enterprise, with the imperial throne for its reward. It may be also
allowed, that the Bourbons, delaying to pay his stipulated revenue,
afforded him, so far as they were concerned, a certain degree of
provocation. But all this would only argue against his being again
trusted within the reach of such temptation. While France was in a state
of such turmoil and vexation, with the remains of a disaffected army
fermenting amid a fickle population--while the king (in order to make
good his stipulated payments to the allies) was obliged to impose heavy
taxes, and to raise them with some severity, many opportunities might
arise, in which Napoleon, either complaining of some petty injuries of
his own, or invited by the discontented state of the French nation,
might renew his memorable attempt of 28th February. It was the business
of the British Ministry to prevent all hazard of this. It was but on the
20th April before, that they were called upon by the Opposition to
account to the House of Commons for not taking proper precautions to
prevent Buonaparte's escape from Elba.[209] For what then would they
have rendered themselves responsible, had they placed him in
circumstances which admitted of a second escape?--at least for the full
extent of all the confusion and bloodshed to which such an event must
necessarily have given rise. The justice, as well as the necessity of
the case, warranted the abridgement of Buonaparte's liberty, the extent
of which had been made, by his surrender, dependent upon the will of
Britain.
In deducing this conclusion, we have avoided having any recourse to the
argument _ad hominem_. We have not mentioned the dungeon of Toussaint,
on the frontier of the Alps, or the detention of Ferdinand, a confiding
and circumvented ally, in the chateau of Valençay. We have not adverted
to the instances of honours and appointments bestowed on officers who
had broken their parole of honour, by escaping from England, yet were
received in the Tuileries with favour and preferments. Neither have we
alluded to the great state maxim, which erected political necessity, or
expediency, into a power superior to moral law. Were Britain to
vindicate her actions by such instances as the above, it would be
reversing the blessed rule, acting towards our enemy, not according as
we would have _desired_ he should have done, but as he actually _had_
done in regard to us, and observing a crooked and criminal line of
policy, because our adversary had set us the example.
But Buonaparte's former actions must necessarily have been considered,
so far as to ascertain what confidence was to be reposed in his personal
character; and if that was found marked by gross instances of breach of
faith to others, Ministers would surely have been inexcusable had they
placed him in a situation where his fidelity was what the nation had
principally to depend on for tranquillity. The fact seems to be admitted
by Las Cases, that while he proposed to retire to England, it was with
the hope of again meddling in French affairs.[210] The example of Sir
Niel Campbell had shown how little restraint the mere presence of a
commissioner would have had over this extraordinary man; and his
resurrection after leaving Elba, had distinctly demonstrated that
nothing was to be trusted to the second political death which he
proposed to submit to as a recluse in England.
It has, however, been urged, that if the character of the times and his
own rendered it an act of stern necessity to take from Napoleon his
personal freedom, his captivity ought to have been at least accompanied
with all marks of honourable distinction; and that it was unnecessarily
cruel to hurt the feelings of his followers and his own, by refusing him
the Imperial title and personal observances, which he had enjoyed in his
prosperity, and of which he was tenacious in adversity.
It will be agreed on all hands, that if any thing could have been done
consistent with the main exigencies of the case, to save Napoleon a
single pang in his unfortunate situation, that measure should have been
resorted to. But there could be no reason why Britain, in compassionate
courtesy, should give to her prisoner a title which she had refused to
him _de jure_, even while he wielded the empire of France _de facto_;
and there were arguments, to be hereafter stated, which weighed
powerfully against granting such an indulgence.
The place of Napoleon's confinement, also, has been the subject of
severe censure; but the question is entirely dependent upon the right of
confining him at all. If that is denied, there needs no further
argument; for a place of confinement, to be effectual, must connect
several circumstances of safety and seclusion, each in its degree
aggravating the sufferings of the person confined, and inflicting pain
which ought only to be the portion of a legal prisoner. But if it be
granted that a person so formidable as Napoleon should be debarred from
the power of making a second avatar on the earth, there is perhaps no
place in the world where so ample a degree of security could have been
reconciled with the same degree of personal freedom to the captive, as
St. Helena.
The healthfulness of the climate of that island will be best proved by
the contents of a report annexed to a return made on 20th March, 1821,
by Dr. Thomas Shortt, physician to the forces; from which it appears,
that among the troops then stationed in St. Helena, constantly employed
in ordinary or on fatigue duty, and always exposed to the atmosphere,
the proportion of sick was only as one man to forty-two, even including
casualties, and those sent to the hospital after punishment. This
extraordinary degree of health, superior to that of most places in the
world, Dr. Shortt imputes to the circumstance of the island being placed
in the way of the trade-winds, where the continued steady breeze carries
off the superfluous heat, and with it such effluvia noxious to the human
constitution, as it may have generated. The same cause, bringing with it
a succession of vapours from the ocean, affords a cloudy curtain to
intercept the sun's rays, and prevents the occurrence of those violent
and rapid forms of disease, which present themselves throughout the
tropics in general. Checked perspiration is noticed as an occasional
cause of disease, but which, if properly treated, is only fatal to those
whose constitutions have been previously exhausted by long residence in
a hot climate. It should also be observed, that the climate of the
island is remarkably steady, not varying upon an average more than
twenty degrees in the course of the year; which equality of temperature
is another great cause of the general healthfulness.[211] The atmosphere
is warm indeed; but, as Napoleon was himself born in a hot climate, and
was stated to be afraid of the cold even of Britain, that could hardly
in his case be considered as a disadvantageous circumstance.
In respect to Napoleon's personal treatment, Sir George Cockburn
proceeded on his arrival to arrange this upon the system recommended by
his final instructions, which run thus:
"In committing so important a trust to British officers, the Prince
Regent is sensible that it is not necessary to impress upon them his
anxious desire that no greater measure of severity with respect to
confinement or restriction be imposed, than what is deemed necessary
for the faithful discharge of that duty, which the admiral, as well
as the Governor of St. Helena must ever keep in mind--the perfect
security of General Buonaparte's person. Whatever, consistent with
this great object, can be allowed in the shape of indulgence, his
royal highness is confident will be willingly shown to the general;
and he relies on Sir George Cockburn's known zeal and energy of
character, that he will not allow himself to be betrayed into any
improvident relaxation of his duty."[212]
It was in the spirit of these instructions that Sir George Cockburn
acted, in selecting a place of residence for his important prisoner,
while, at the same time, he consulted Napoleon's wishes as much as the
case could possibly admit.
The accommodation upon the island was by no means such as could be
desired in the circumstances. There were only three houses of a public
character, which were in any degree adapted for such a guest. Two, the
town residences of the governor and lieutenant-governor of the island,
were unfit for the habitation of Napoleon, because they were within
James' Town, a situation which, for obvious reasons, was not advisable.
The third was Plantation-house, a villa in the country, belonging to the
governor, which was the best dwelling in the island. The British
Administration had prohibited the selection of this house for the
residence of the late Imperial captive. We differ from their opinion in
this particular, because the very best accommodation was due to fallen
greatness; and, in his circumstances, Napoleon, with every respect to
the authority of the governor, ought to have been the last person on the
island subjected to inconvenience. We have little doubt that it would
have been so arranged, but for the disposition of the late French
Emperor and his followers to use every point of deference, or
complaisance, exercised towards them, as an argument for pushing their
pretensions farther. Thus the civility showed by Admiral Hotham and
Captain Maitland, in manning the yards as Napoleon passed from one
vessel to the other, was pleaded upon as a proof that his free and regal
condition was acknowledged by these officers; and, no doubt, the
assigning for his use the best house in the island, might, according to
the same mode of logic, have been assumed to imply that Napoleon had no
superior in St. Helena. Still there were means of repelling this spirit
of encroachment, if it had shown itself; and we think it would have been
better to risk the consequences indicated, and to have assigned
Plantation-house for his residence, as that which was at least the best
accommodation which the island afforded. Some circumstances about the
locality, it is believed, had excited doubts whether the house could be
completely guarded. But this, at any rate, was a question which had been
considered at home, where, perhaps the actual state of the island was
less perfectly understood; and Sir George Cockburn, fettered by his
instructions, had no choice in the matter.
[Sidenote: LONGWOOD--BRIARS.]
Besides Plantation-house, there was another residence situated in the
country, and occupied by the lieutenant-governor, called Longwood,
which, after all the different estates and residences in the island had
been examined, was chosen by Sir George Cockburn as the future residence
of Napoleon. It lies detached from the generally inhabited places of the
island, consequently none were likely to frequent its neighbourhood,
unless those who came there on business. It was also distant from those
points which were most accessible to boats, which, until they should be
sufficiently defended, it was not desirable to expose to the observation
of Napoleon or his military companions. At Longwood, too, there was an
extent of level ground, capable of being observed and secured by
sentinels, presenting a space adapted for exercise, whether on horseback
or in a carriage; and the situation, being high, was more cool than the
confined valleys of the neighbourhood. The house itself was equal in
accommodation (though that is not saying much) to any on the island,
Plantation-house excepted.
To conclude, it was approved of by Napoleon, who visited it personally,
and expressed himself so much satisfied, that it was difficult to
prevail on him to leave the place. Immediate preparations were therefore
made, for making such additions as should render the residence, if not
such a one as could be wished, at least as commodious as the
circumstances admitted. Indeed it was hoped, by assistance of
artificers, and frames to be sent from England, to improve it to any
extent required. In the meanwhile, until the repairs immediately
necessary could be made at Longwood, General Bertrand, and the rest of
Napoleon's suite, were quartered in a furnished house in James' Town,
while he himself, at his own request, took up his abode at Briars, a
small house or cottage, romantically situated, a little way from the
town, in which he could only have one spare room for his own
accommodation. Sir George Cockburn would have persuaded him rather to
take up his temporary abode in the town, where the best house in the
place was provided for him. Napoleon declined this proposal, pleading
his natural aversion to expose himself to the public gaze. Besides the
solitude, the pleasing landscape, agreeable especially to those whose
persons have been lately confined to a ship, and whose eyes have long
wandered over the waste of ocean, determined the Ex-Emperor in favour of
Briars.
Whilst dwelling at Briars, Napoleon limited himself more than was
necessary; for, taking exception at the sentinels, who were visible from
the windows of the house, and objecting more reasonably to the resort of
visitors, he sequestered himself in a small pavilion, consisting of one
good room, and two small attic apartments, which stood about twenty
yards from the house. Of course his freedom, unless when accompanied by
a British field-officer, was limited to the small garden of the cottage,
the rest of the precincts being watched by sentinels. Sir George
Cockburn felt for the situation of his prisoner, and endeavoured to
hurry forward the improvements at Longwood, in order that Napoleon
might remove thither. He employed for this purpose the ship-carpenters
of the squadron, and all the artificers the island could afford; "and
Longwood," says Dr. O'Meara, "for nearly two months, exhibited as busy a
scene as had ever been witnessed, during the war, in any of his
Majesty's dock-yards, whilst a fleet was fitting out under the personal
direction of some of our best naval commanders. The admiral,
indefatigable in his exertions, was frequently seen to arrive at
Longwood shortly after sunrise, stimulating by his presence the St.
Helena workmen, who, in general lazy and indolent, beheld with
astonishment the despatch and activity of a man-of-war succeed to the
characteristic idleness, which until then they had been accustomed both
to witness and to practise."[213]
During the Ex-Emperor's residence at Briars, he remained much secluded
from society, spent his mornings in the garden, and in the evening
played at whist for sugar-plums, with Mr. Balcombe, the proprietor, and
the members of his family. The Count Las Cases, who seems, among those
of his retinue, to have possessed the most various and extensive
information, was naturally selected as the chief, if not the only
companion of his studies and recreations in the morning.[214] On such
occasions he was usually gentle, accessible, and captivating in his
manners.
The exertions of Sir George Cockburn, struggling with every difficulty
which want of building materials, means of transport, and every thing
which facilitates such operations, could possibly interpose, at length
enabled him to accomplish the transmutation of Longwood into such a
dwelling-house, as, though it was far below the former dignity of its
possessor, might sufficiently accommodate a captive of the rank at which
Napoleon was rated by the British Government.[215]
[Sidenote: LONGWOOD.]
On the 9th December, Longwood received Napoleon and part of his
household; the Count and Countess of Montholon and their children; the
Count Las Cases and his son. General Gourgaud, Doctor O'Meara, who had
been received as his medical attendant, and such other of Napoleon's
attendants as could not be lodged within the house, were, for the time,
accommodated with tents; and the Count and Countess Bertrand were lodged
in a small cottage at a place called Hut's-gate, just on the verge of
what might be called the privileged grounds of Longwood, whilst a new
house was building for their reception. Upon the whole, as it is
scarcely denied, on the one hand, that every effort was made to render
Longwood-house as commodious for the prisoner as time and means could
possibly permit, so, on the other, it must in fairness be considered,
that the delay, however inevitable, must have been painfully felt by the
Ex-Emperor, confined to his hut at Briars; and that the house at
Longwood, when finished as well as it could be in the circumstances, was
far inferior in accommodation to that which every Englishman would have
desired that the distinguished prisoner should have enjoyed whilst in
English custody.
It had been proposed to remedy the deficiencies of Longwood by
constructing a habitation of wood upon a suitable scale, and sending it
out in pieces from England, to be put together on the spot; the only
mode, as the island can scarce be said to afford any building-materials,
by which the desired object of Napoleon's fitting accommodation could,
it was thought, be duly attained. Circumstances, however, prevented this
plan from being attempted to be carried into execution for several
months; and a series of unhappy disputes betwixt the governor and his
prisoner added years of delay; which leads us again to express our
regret that Plantation-house had not been at once assigned to Napoleon
for his residence.
We have already said, that around the house of Longwood lay the largest
extent of open ground in the neighbourhood, fit for exercise either on
foot or upon horseback. A space of twelve miles in circumference was
traced off, within which Napoleon might take exercise without being
attended by any one. A chain of sentinels surrounded this domain to
prevent his passing, unless accompanied by a British officer. If he
inclined to extend his excursions, he might go to any part of the
island, providing the officer was in attendance, and near enough to
observe his motions. Such an orderly officer was always in readiness to
attend him when required. Within the limited space already mentioned,
there were two camps, that of the 53d regiment at Deadwood, about a mile
from Longwood; another at Hut's-gate, where an officer's guard was
mounted, that being the principal access to Longwood.
We are now to consider the means resorted to for the safe custody of
this important prisoner. The old poet has said, that "every island is a
prison;"[216] but, in point of difficulty of escape, there is none
which can compare with St. Helena; which was no doubt the chief reason
for its being selected as the place of Napoleon's detention.
Dr. O'Meara, no friendly witness, informs us that the guards, with
attention at once to Napoleon's feelings, and the security of his
person, were posted in the following manner:
"A subaltern's guard was posted at the entrance of Longwood, about
six hundred paces from the houses, and a cordon of sentinels and
picquets was placed round the limits. At nine o'clock the sentinels
were drawn in and stationed in communication with each other,
surrounding the house in such positions, that no person could come
in or go out without being seen and scrutinized by them. At the
entrance of the house double sentinels were placed, and patrols were
continually passing backward and forward. After nine, Napoleon was
not at liberty to leave the house, unless in company with a field
officer; and no person whatever was allowed to pass without the
counter-sign. This state of affairs continued until daylight in the
morning. Every landing-place in the island, and, indeed, every place
which presented the semblance of one, was furnished with a picquet,
and sentinels were even placed upon every goat-path leading to the
sea: though in truth the obstacles presented by nature, in almost
all the paths in that direction, would, of themselves, have proved
insurmountable to so unwieldy a person as Napoleon."[217]
The precautions taken by Sir George Cockburn, to avail himself of the
natural character and peculiarities of the island, and to prevent the
possibility of its new inhabitant making his escape by sea, were so
strict, as, even without the assistance of a more immediate guard upon
his person, seemed to exclude the possibility, not only of an escape,
but even an attempt to communicate with the prisoners from the
sea-coast.
"From the various signal-posts on the island," continues the account
of Dr. O'Meara, "ships are frequently discovered at twenty-four
leagues' distance, and always long before they can approach the
shore. Two ships of war continually cruised, one to windward, and
the other to leeward, to whom signals were made, as soon as a vessel
was discovered, from the posts on shore. Every ship, except a
British man-of-war, was accompanied down to the road by one of the
cruisers, who remained with her until she was either permitted to
anchor, or was sent away. No foreign vessels were allowed to anchor,
unless under circumstances of great distress; in which case, no
person from them was permitted to land, and an officer and party
from one of the ships of war was sent on board to take charge of
them as long as they remained, as well as in order to prevent any
improper communication. Every fishing-boat belonging to the island
was numbered, and anchored every evening at sunset, under the
superintendence of a lieutenant in the navy. No boats, excepting
guard-boats from the ships of war, which pulled about the island all
night, were allowed to be down after sunset. The orderly officer was
also instructed to ascertain the actual presence of Napoleon twice
in the twenty-four hours, which was done with as much delicacy as
possible. In fact, every human precaution to prevent escape, short
of actually incarcerating or enchaining him, was adopted by Sir
George Cockburn."[218]
FOOTNOTES:
[207] "Before Napoleon stepped into the boat, he sent for the captain of
the Northumberland and took leave of him, desiring him, at the same
time, to convey his thanks to the officers and crew."--LAS CASES, tom. i.,
p. 243.
[208] See the Edinburgh Annual Register for 1815.
[209] Mr. Abercrombie's motion respecting the escape of Buonaparte from
Elba.--_Parl. Debates_, vol. xxx., p. 716.
[210] This, to be sure, according to Las Cases, was only in order to
carry through those great schemes of establishing the peace, the honour,
and the union of the country. He had hoped to the last, it seems, in the
critical moment, "That, at the sight of the public danger, the eyes of
the people of France would be opened; that they would return to him, and
enable him to save the country of France. It was this which made him
prolong the time at Malmaison; it was this which induced him to tarry
yet longer at Rochefort. If he is now at St. Helena, he owes it to that
sentiment. It is a train of thought from which he could never be
separated. Yet more lately, when there was no other resource than to
accept the hospitality of the Bellerophon, perhaps it was not without a
species of satisfaction that he found himself irresistibly drawn on by
the course of events towards England, since being there was being near
France. He knew well that he would not be free, but he hoped to make his
opinion heard; and then how many chances would open themselves to the
new direction which he wished to inspire."--_Journal_, tom. i., p. 334.
We cannot understand the meaning of this, unless it implies that
Napoleon, while retiring into England, on condition of abstaining from
politics, entertained hopes of regaining his ascendency in French
affairs, by and through the influence which he expected to exercise over
those of Britain.--S.
[211] See Appendix, No. III.
[212] Extract of a despatch from Earl Bathurst, addressed to the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated 30th July 1815.
[213] Voice, &c., vol. i., p. 14.
[214] "_Briars, Oct. 28-31._ We had nearly arrived at the end of the
campaign of Italy. The Emperor, however, did not yet find that he had
sufficient occupation. Employment was his only resource, and the
interest which his first dictations had assumed furnished an additional
motive for proceeding with them. The campaign of Egypt was now about to
be commenced. The Emperor had frequently talked of employing the grand
mareschal on this subject. I suggested, that he should set us all to
work at the same time, and proceed at once with the campaigns of Italy
and Egypt--the history of the Consulate--the return from Elba, &c. The
idea pleased the Emperor; and, from that time, one or two of his suite
came regularly every day to write by his dictations, the transcript of
which they brought to him next morning."--LAS CASES, tom. i., p. 286.
[215] The suite of apartments, destined for his own peculiar use,
consisted of a saloon, an eating-room, a library, a small study, and a
sleeping apartment. This was a strange contrast with the palaces which
Napoleon had lately inhabited; but it was preferable, in the same
proportion, to the Tower of the Temple, and the dungeons of
Vincennes.--S.
[216]
"Every island is a prison,
Strongly guarded by the sea;
Kings and princes, for that reason,
Prisoners are, as well as we."
RITSON'S _Songs_, vol. ii., p. 105.
[217] Voice from St. Helena, vol. i., p. 21.
[218] Voice from St. Helena, vol. i., p. 22.