_Various attempts to organise a defence for the Bourbons
fail--Buonaparte, again reinstated on the throne of France, is
desirous of continuing the peace with the Allies--but no answer is
returned to his letters--Treaty of Vienna--Grievances alleged by
Buonaparte in justification of the step he had taken--Debates in the
British House of Commons, on the renewal of War--Murat occupies Rome
with 50,000 men--his Proclamation summoning all Italians to
arms--He advances against the Austrians--is repulsed at
Occhio-Bello--defeated at Tolentino--flies to Naples, and thence, in
disguise, to France--where Napoleon refuses to receive him._
When Paris was lost, the bow of the Bourbons was effectually broken; and
the attempts of individuals of the family to make a stand against the
evil hour, was honourable indeed to their own gallantry, but of no
advantage to their cause.
The Duke d'Angoulême placed himself at the head of a considerable body
of troops, raised by the town of Marseilles, and the royalists of
Provence. But being surrounded by General Gilly, he was obliged to lay
down his arms, on condition of amnesty to his followers, and free
permission to himself to leave France. General Grouchy refused to
confirm this capitulation, till Buonaparte's pleasure was known. But the
restored Emperor, not displeased, it may be, to make a display of
generosity, permitted the Duke d'Angoulême to depart by sea from Cette,
only requiring his interference with Louis XVIII. for returning the
crown jewels which the King had removed with him to Ghent.[108]
The Duke of Bourbon had retired to La Vendée to raise the warlike
royalists of that faithful province. But it had been previously occupied
by soldiers attached to Buonaparte, so judiciously posted as to render
an insurrection impossible; and the duke found himself obliged to escape
by sea from Nantes.
[Sidenote: DUCHESS D'ANGOULÊME.]
The Duchess d'Angoulême, the only remaining daughter of Louis XVI.,
whose childhood and youth had suffered with patient firmness such storms
of adversity, showed on this trying occasion that she had the active as
well as passive courage becoming the descendant of a long line of
princes. She threw herself into Bourdeaux, where the loyalty of Count
Lynch, the mayor, and of the citizens in general, promised her
determined aid, and the princess herself stood forth amongst them, like
one of those heroic women of the age of chivalry, whose looks and words
were able in moments of peril to give double edge to men's swords, and
double constancy to their hearts. But unhappily there was a considerable
garrison of troops of the line in Bourdeaux, who had caught the general
spirit of revolt. General Clausel also advanced on the city with a force
of the same description. The duchess made a last effort, assembled
around her the officers, and laid their duty before them in the most
touching and pathetic manner. But when she saw their coldness, and heard
their faltering excuses, she turned from them in disdain:--"You fear,"
she said--"I pity you, and release you from your oaths." She embarked on
board an English frigate, and Bourdeaux opened its gates to Clausel, and
declared for the Emperor. Thus, notwithstanding the return of Napoleon
was far from being acceptable to the French universally, or even
generally, all open opposition to his government ceased, and he was
acknowledged as Emperor within about twenty days after he landed on the
beach at Cannes, with a thousand followers.[109]
But though he was thus replaced on the throne, Napoleon's seat was by no
means secure, unless he could prevail upon the confederated sovereigns
of Europe to acknowledge him in the capacity of which their united arms
had so lately deprived him. It is true, he had indirectly promised war
to his soldiers, by stigmatizing the cessions made by the Bourbons of
what he called the territory of France. It is true, also, that then, and
till his death's-day, he continued to entertain the rooted idea that
Belgium, a possession which France had acquired within twenty years, was
an integral portion of that kingdom. It is true, Antwerp and the five
hundred sail of the line which were to be built there, continued through
his whole life to be the very Delilah of his imagination. The cause of
future war was, therefore, blazing in his bosom. But yet at present he
felt it necessary for his interest to assure the people of France, that
his return to the empire would not disturb the treaty of Paris, though
it had given the Low Countries to Holland. He spared no device to spread
reports of a pacific tendency.
From the commencement of his march, it was affirmed by his creatures
that he brought with him a treaty concluded with all the powers of
Europe for twenty years. It was repeatedly averred, that Maria Louisa
and her son were on the point of arriving in France, dismissed by her
father as a pledge of reconciliation; and when she did not appear, it
was insinuated that she was detained by the Emperor Francis, as a pledge
that Buonaparte should observe his promise of giving the French a free
constitution. To such bare-faced assertions he was reduced, rather than
admit that his return was to be the signal for renewing hostilities with
all Europe.
Meantime, Napoleon hesitated not to offer to the allied ministers his
willingness to acquiesce in the treaty of Paris; although, according to
his uniform reasoning, it involved the humiliation and disgrace of
France. He sent a letter to each of the sovereigns, expressing his
desire to make peace on the same principles which had been arranged with
the Bourbons. To these letters no answers were returned. The decision of
the allies had already been adopted.
[Sidenote: DECLARATION AND TREATY OF VIENNA.]
The Congress at Vienna happened fortunately not to be dissolved, when
the news of Buonaparte's escape from Elba was laid before them by
Talleyrand, on the 11th March. The astonishing, as well as the sublime,
approaches to the ludicrous, and it is a curious physiological fact,
that the first news of an event which threatened to abolish all their
labours, seemed so like a trick in a pantomime, that laughter was the
first emotion it excited from almost every one. The merry mood did not
last long; for the jest was neither a sound nor safe one. It was
necessary for the Congress, by an unequivocal declaration, to express
their sentiments, upon this extraordinary occasion. This declaration
appeared on the 13th March, and after giving an account of the fact,
bore the following denunciation:--
"By thus breaking the convention which had established him in the
island of Elba, Buonaparte destroys the only legal title on which
his existence depended; and, by appearing again in France with
projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the
protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe, that
there can be neither peace nor truce with him.
"The powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Buonaparte has
placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and
that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he
has rendered himself liable to public vengeance. They declare at the
same time, that, firmly resolved to maintain entire the treaty of
Paris of the 30th of May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by
that treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall
hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will
employ all their means, and will unite all their efforts, that the
general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant
purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled; and to provide
against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world
into the disorders of revolution."[110]
This manifesto was instantly followed by a treaty betwixt Great Britain,
Austria, Prussia, and Russia, renewing and confirming the league entered
into at Chaumont. The first article declared the resolution of the high
contracting parties to maintain and enforce the treaty of Paris, which
excluded Buonaparte from the throne of France, and to enforce the decree
of outlawry issued against him as above mentioned. 2. Each of the
contracting parties agreed to keep constantly in the field an army of
150,000 men complete, with the due proportion of cavalry and artillery.
3. They agreed not to lay down their arms but by common consent, until
either the purpose of the war should have been attained, or Buonaparte
should be rendered incapable of disturbing the peace of Europe. After
other subordinate articles, the 7th provided, that the other powers of
Europe should be invited to accede to the treaty; and the 8th, that the
King of France should be particularly called upon to become a party to
it. A separate article provided, that the King of Great Britain should
have the option of furnishing his contingent in men, or of paying,
instead, at the rate of L.30 sterling per annum for each cavalry
soldier, and L.20 per annum for each infantry soldier, which should be
wanting to make up his complement. To this treaty a declaration was
subjoined, when it was ratified by the Prince Regent, referring to the
eighth article of the treaty, and declaring that it should not be
understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war, with
the view of forcibly imposing on France any particular government. The
other contracting powers agreed to accept of the accession of his Royal
Highness, under this explanation and limitation.[111]
The treaty of Vienna may be considered in a double point of view, first,
upon principle, and, secondly, as to its mode of expression; and it was
commented upon in both respects in the British House of Commons. The
expediency of the war was denied by several of the Opposition members,
on account of the exhausted state of Great Britain, but they generally
admitted that the escape of Buonaparte gave a just cause for the
declaration of hostilities. The great statesman and jurisconsult, whom
we have already quoted, delivered an opinion for himself, and those with
whom he acted, couched in the most positive terms.
"Some insinuations," said Sir James Mackintosh, "had been thrown
out, of differences of opinion on his side of the house, respecting
the evils of this escape. He utterly denied them. All agreed in
lamenting the occurrence which rendered the renewal of war so
probable, not to say certain. All his friends, with whose sentiments
he was acquainted, were of opinion, that, in the theory of public
law, the assumption of power by Napoleon had given to the allies a
just cause of war against France. It was perfectly obvious, that the
abdication of Napoleon, and his perpetual renunciation of the
supreme authority, was a condition, and the most important
condition, on which the allies had granted peace to France. The
convention of Fontainbleau, and the treaty of Paris, were equally
parts of the great compact which re-established friendship between
France and Europe. In consideration of the safer and more
inoffensive state of France when separated from her terrible leader,
confederated Europe had granted moderate and favourable terms of
peace. As soon as France had violated this important condition, by
again submitting to the authority of Napoleon, the allies were
doubtless released from their part of the compact, and re-entered
into their belligerent rights."[112]
[Sidenote: ALLEGED GRIEVANCES.]
The provocations pleaded by Buonaparte (which seem to have been entirely
fanciful, so far as respects any design on his freedom,) were, first,
the separation from his family. But this was a question with Austria
exclusively; for what power was to compel the Emperor Francis to restore
his daughter, after the fate of war had flung her again under his
paternal protection? Napoleon's feelings in his situation were extremely
natural, but those of the Emperor cannot be blamed, who considered his
daughter's honour and happiness as interested in separating her from a
man, who was capable of attempting to redeem his broken fortunes by the
most desperate means. Much would depend upon the inclination of the
illustrious person herself; but even if some degree of paternal
restraint had been exerted, could Napoleon really feel himself justified
in renewing a sort of Trojan war with all the powers in Europe, in order
to recover his wife, or think, because he was separated from her society
by a flinty-hearted father, that he was therefore warranted in invading
and subduing the kingdom of France? The second article of provocation,
and we admit it as a just one, was, that Napoleon was left to
necessities to which he ought not to have been subjected, by France
withholding his pension till the year should elapse. This was a ground
of complaint, and a deep one; but against whom? Surely not against the
allies, unless Buonaparte had called upon them to make good their
treaty; and had stated, that France had failed to make good those
obligations, for which he had their guarantee. England, who was only an
accessory to the treaty, had nevertheless already interfered in
Buonaparte's behalf, and there can be no doubt that redress would have
been granted by the contracting parties, who could not in decency avoid
enforcing a treaty, which had been of their own forming. That this
guarantee gave Napoleon a right to appeal and to complain, cannot be
denied; but that it gave him a right to proceed by violence, without any
expostulation previously made, is contrary to all ideas of the law of
nations, which enacts, that no aggression can constitute a legitimate
cause of war, until redress has been refused. This, however, is all mere
legal argument. Buonaparte did NOT invade France, because she was
deficient in paying his pension. He invaded her, because he saw a strong
prospect of regaining the throne; nor do we believe that millions of
gold would have prevailed on him to forego the opportunity.
His more available ground of defence, however, was, that he was recalled
by the general voice of the nation of France; but the whole facts of the
case contradicted this statement. His league with the Revolutionists was
made reluctantly on their part, nor did that party form any very
considerable portion of the nation. "His election," according to
Grattan, "was a military election; and when the army disposed of the
civil government, it was the march of a military chief over a conquered
nation. The nation did not rise to assist Louis, or resist Buonaparte,
because the nation could not rise against the army. The mind of France,
as well as her constitution, had completely lost, for the present, the
power of resistance. They passively yielded to superior force."[113]
In short, the opinion of the House of Commons was so unanimous on the
disastrous consequences of Napoleon's quitting Elba, that the minority
brought charges against Ministers for not having provided more effectual
means to prevent his escape. To these charges it was replied, that
Britain was not his keeper; that it was impossible to maintain a line of
blockade around Elba; and if it had been otherwise, that Britain had no
right to interfere with Buonaparte's motions, so far as concerned short
expeditions unconnected with the purpose of escape; although it was
avowed, that if a British vessel had detected him in the act of going to
France with an armed force, for the purpose of invasion, the right of
stopping his progress would have been exercised at every hazard. Still
it was urged, they had no title either to establish a police upon the
island, the object of which should be to watch its acknowledged Emperor,
or to maintain a naval force around it, to apprehend him in case he
should attempt an escape. Both would have been in direct contradiction
of the treaty of Fontainbleau, to which Britain had acceded, though she
was not of the contracting parties.[114]
The style of the declaration of the allies was more generally censured
in the British Parliament than its warlike tone. It was contended that,
by declaring Napoleon an outlaw, it invoked against him the daggers of
individuals, as well as the sword of justice. This charge of encouraging
assassination was warmly repelled by the supporters of Ministry.[115]
The purpose of the proclamation, it was said, was merely to point out
Napoleon to the French nation, as a person who had forfeited his civil
rights, by the act of resuming, contrary to treaty, a position in which,
from his temper, habits, and talents, he must again become an object of
suspicion and terror to all Europe. His inflexible resolution, his
unbounded ambition, his own genius, his power over the mind of
others--those great military talents, in short, which, so valuable in
war, are in peace so dangerous, had afforded reasons for making the
peace of Paris, by which Napoleon was personally excluded from the
throne. When Napoleon broke that peace, solemnly concluded with Europe,
he forfeited his political rights, and in that view alone the outlawry
was to be construed. In consequence of these resolutions, adopted at
Vienna and London, all Europe rang with the preparations for war; and
the number of troops with which the allies proposed to invade France
were rated at no less than one million and eleven thousand
soldiers.[116]
Before proceeding farther, it is requisite to say a few words on the
subject of Murat. He had been for some time agitated by fears naturally
arising from the attack made upon his government at the Congress by
Talleyrand. The effect had not, it was true, induced the other powers to
decide against him; but he seems to have been conscious that the reports
of General Nugent and Lord William Bentinck concurred in representing
him as having acted in the last campaign rather the part of a trimmer
betwixt two parties, than that of a confederate, sincere, as he
professed to be, in favour of the allies. Perhaps his conscience
acknowledged this truth, for it certainly seems as if Eugene might have
been more hardly pressed, had Murat been disposed to act with energy in
behalf of the allies. He felt, therefore, that the throne of Tancred
tottered under him, and rashly determined that it was better to brave a
danger than to allow time to see whether it might not pass away. Murat
had held intercourse with the isle of Elba, and cannot but have known
Buonaparte's purpose when he left it; but he ought, at the same time, to
have considered, that if his brother-in-law met with any success, his
own alliance would become essential to Austria, who had such anxiety to
retain the north of Italy, and must have been purchased on his own
terms.
[Sidenote: MURAT.]
Instead, however, of waiting for an opportunity of profiting by
Napoleon's attempt, which could not have failed to arrive, Murat
resolved to throw himself into the fray, and carve for himself. He
placed himself at the head of an army of 50,000 men, and without
explaining his intentions, occupied Rome, the Pope and cardinals flying
before him; threatened the whole line of the Po, which the Austrian
force was inadequate to maintain; and, on 31st of March, addressed a
proclamation to all Italians, summoning them to rise in arms for the
liberation of their country.[117] It seemed now clear, that the purpose
of this son of a pastry-cook amounted to nothing else than the formation
of Italy into one state, and the placing himself on the throne of the
Cæsars. The proclamation was signed Joachim Napoleon, which last name,
formerly laid aside, he reassumed at this critical period. The appeal to
the Italians was in vain. The feuds among the petty states are so
numerous, their pretensions so irreconcilable, and their weakness has
made them so often the prey of successive conquerors, that they found
little inviting in the proposal of union, little arousing in the sound
of independence. The proclamation, therefore, had small effect, except
upon some of the students at Bologna. Murat marched northward, however,
and being much superior in numbers, defeated the Austrian general
Bianchi, and occupied Modena and Florence.
Murat's attitude was now an alarming one to Europe. If he should press
forward into Lombardy, he might co-operate with Buonaparte, now restored
to his crown, and would probably be reinforced by thousands of the
veterans of the Viceroy Eugene's army. Austria, therefore, became
desirous of peace, and offered to guarantee to him the possession of the
kingdom of Naples, with an addition he had long coveted, the marches,
namely, of the Roman See. Britain, at the same time, intimated, that
having made truce with Joachim at the instance of Austria, it was to
last no longer than his good intelligence with her ally. Murat refused
the conditions of the one power, and neglected the remonstrances of the
other. "It was too late," he said; "Italy deserves freedom, and she
shall be free." Here closed all hopes of peace; Austria declared war
against Murat, and expedited the reinforcements sent into Italy; and
Britain prepared a descent upon his Neapolitan dominions, where
Ferdinand still continued to have many adherents.[118]
Murat's character as a tactician was far inferior to that which he
deservedly bore as a soldier in the field of battle, and he was still a
worse politician than a general. A repulse sustained in an attempt to
pass the Po near Occhio-bello, seems to have disconcerted the plan of
his whole campaign, nor did he find himself able to renew the
negotiations which he had rashly broken off. He seemed to acknowledge,
by his military movements, that he had attempted a scheme far beyond his
strength and understanding. He retreated upon his whole line, abandoning
Parma, Reggio, Modena, Florence, and all Tuscany, by which last movement
he put the Austrians in possession of the best and shortest road to
Rome. In consequence, he was pressed on his retreat in front and rear,
and compelled to give battle near Tolentino. It was sustained for two
days, (2d and 3d of May,) but the Neapolitans could not be brought into
close action with the iron-nerved Austrians. It was in vain that Murat
placed field-pieces in the rear of his attacking columns, with orders to
fire grape on them should they retreat; in vain that he himself set the
example of the most desperate courage. The Neapolitan army fled in
dispersion and discomfiture. Their guns, ammunition, treasure, and
baggage, became the spoil of the Austrians; and in traversing the
mountains of Abruzzo, Murat lost half his army without stroke of sword.
The defeated prince was pursued into his Neapolitan dominions, where he
learned that the Calabrians were in insurrection, and that an English
fleet, escorting an invading army from Sicily, had appeared in the Bay
of Naples. His army, reduced to a handful by repeated skirmishes, in
which he had behaved with such temerity as to make his followers think
he desired death, was directed to throw itself into Capua. He himself,
who had left Naples splendidly apparelled, according to his custom, and
at the head of a gallant army, now entered its gates, attended only by
four lancers, alighted at the palace, and appeared before the Queen,
pale, haggard, dishevelled, with all the signs of extreme fatigue and
dejection. His salutation was in the affecting words, "Madam, I have not
been able to find death." He presently found, that remaining at Naples,
which was about to fall into other hands, would compromise his liberty,
perhaps his life. He took leave of his Queen, whom circumstances were
about to deprive of that title, cut off his hair, and disguising himself
in a grey frock, escaped to the little island of Ischia, and reached on
25th May, Cannes, which had received Napoleon a few weeks before. His
wife, immediately afterwards, alarmed by the tendency of the Neapolitan
mob to insurrection, surrendered herself to Commodore Campbell of the
Tremendous, and was received on board his vessel.[119]
A courier announced Murat's arrival in France to Buonaparte, who,
instead of sending consolation to his unhappy relative, is said to have
asked with bitter scorn, "Whether Naples and France had made peace since
the war of 1814!" The answer seems to imply, that although the attempts
of Joachim and Napoleon coincided in time, and in other circumstances,
so punctually as to make it evident they had been undertaken in concert,
yet that there had been no precise correspondence, far less any formal
treaty, betwixt the adventurous brothers. Indeed, Napoleon at all times
positively denied that he had the least accession to Murat's
wildly-concerted project (_levée des boucliers_,) and affirmed that it
was essentially injurious to him. Napoleon's account was, that when he
retired to Elba, he took farewell of Murat by letter, forgiving all that
had passed between them, and recommending to his brother-in-law to keep
on good terms with the Austrians, and only to check them if he saw them
likely to advance on France. He offered also to guarantee his kingdom.
Murat returned an affectionate answer, engaging to prove himself, in his
conduct towards Napoleon, more an object of pity than resentment,
declining any other guarantee than the word of the Emperor, and
declaring that the attachment of his future life was to make amends for
the past defection. "But it was Murat's fate to ruin us every way,"
continued Napoleon; "once by declaring against us, and again by
unadvisedly taking our part."[120] He encountered Austria without
sufficient means, and being ruined, left her without any
counterbalancing power in Italy. From that time it became impossible for
Napoleon to negotiate with her.
Receiving the Emperor's account as correct, and allowing that the
brothers-in-law played each his own part, it was not to be supposed that
they acted entirely without a mutual understanding. Each, indeed, was
willing to rest on his own fortunes, well knowing that his claim to the
other's assistance would depend chiefly upon his success, and unwilling,
besides, to relinquish the privilege of making peace, should it be
necessary, at the expense of disowning the kindred enterprise of his
brother-in-law. Notwithstanding the splendid details which the
_Moniteur_ gave of Murat's undertaking, while it yet seemed to promise
success, it is certain that Buonaparte endeavoured to propitiate
Austria, by the offer of abandoning Murat; and that Murat, could his
offers have obtained a hearing after the repulse of Occhio-bello, was
ready once more to have deserted Napoleon, whose name he had so lately
reassumed. Involved in this maze of selfish policy, Murat had now the
mortification to find himself contemned by Napoleon, when he might,
indeed, be a burden, but could afford him no aid. Had he arrived at
Milan as a victor, and extended a friendly hand across the Alps, how
different would have been his reception! But Buonaparte refused to see
him in his distress, or to permit him to come to Paris, satisfied that
the sight of his misery would be a bitter contradiction to the fables
which the French journals had, for some time, published of his success.
Fouché sent him a message, much like that which enjoined the dishonoured
ambassadors of Solomon to tarry at Jericho till their beards grew. It
recommended to Murat to remain in seclusion, till the recollection of
his disgrace should be abated by newer objects of general interest.
Buonaparte had sometimes entertained thoughts of bringing Murat to the
army, but was afraid of shocking the French soldiers, who would have
felt disgust and horror at seeing the man who had betrayed France. "I
did not," he said to his followers at St. Helena, "think I could carry
him through, and yet he might have gained us the victory; for there were
moments during the battle (of Waterloo) when to have forced two or three
of the English squares might have insured it, and Murat was just the man
for the work. In leading a charge of cavalry, never was there an officer
more determined, more brave, and more brilliant."[121]
Murat was thus prohibited to come to the court of the Tuileries, where
his defection might have been forgiven, but his defeat was an inexpiable
offence. He remained in obscurity near Toulon, till his fate called him
elsewhere, after the decisive battle of Waterloo.[122] From this
episode, for such, however important, it is in the present history, we
return to France and our immediate subject.
FOOTNOTES:
[108] Napoleon to Grouchy.
[109] "The result of the royalist enterprise rather contributed to
tranquillise Napoleon. He was astonished by the courage which the Duke
d'Angoulême exhibited in La Drôme, and especially Madame at Bourdeaux.
He admired the intrepidity of this heroic princess, whom the desertion
of an entire army had not been able to dispirit. It was proposed in
council to obtain the crown diamonds for the Duke d'Angoulême. I
recommended the Emperor to throw M. de Vitrolles into the bargain; but
he would not consent."--FOUCHÉ, tom. ii., p. 261.
[110] Parl. Debates, vol. xxx., p. 373.
[111] Parl. Debates, vol. xxx.; Ann. Reg., vol. lvii.
[112] Parl. Debates, vol. xxx., p. 378.
[113] See debate, May 25, 1815, on the Prince Regent's message relating
to France. Parl. Debates, vol. xxxii., p. 424.
[114] See Parl. Debates, vol. xxx., p. 726.
[115] See Parl. Debates, vol. xxx., p. 338.
[116] The contingents of the various powers were as follows:--Austria
300,000 men; Russia 225,000; Prussia 236,000; States of Germany 150,000;
Great Britain 50,000; Holland 50,000; in all, 1,011,000 soldiers.--S.
[117] Mémoires de Fleury de Chamboullon, tom. i., p. 397.
[118] See papers relating to Maréchal Murat.--Parl. Debates, vol. xxxi.,
pp. 59-153.
[119] Commodore Campbell had promised Caroline a free passage to France;
but, on the declaration of Lord Exmouth, that the commodore had exceeded
his instructions, fresh negotiations were entered into with Austria; the
result being that the ex-queen accepted the protection of the Emperor
Francis, and has since resided, as Countess of Lipano, in his dominions.
[120] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 355.
[121] O'Meara, vol. ii., p. 95.
[122] It is well known that Joachim Murat, escaping with difficulty from
France, fled to Corsica, and might have obtained permission to reside
upon parole in the Austrian territories, safe and unmolested. He
nourished a wild idea, however, of recovering his crown, which induced
him to reject these terms of safety, and invade the Neapolitan
territories at the head of about two hundred men. That his whole
expedition might be an accurate parody on that of Buonaparte to Cannes,
he published swaggering proclamations, mingled with a proper quantum of
falsehood. A storm dispersed his flotilla. He himself, October 8th,
landed at a little fishing town near Monte Leone. He was attacked by the
country people, fought as he was wont, but was defeated and made
prisoner, tried by martial law, and condemned. The Sicilian royal family
have shown themselves no forgiving race, otherwise mercy might have been
extended to one, who, though now a private person, had been so lately a
king, that he might be pardoned for forgetting that he had no longer the
power of making peace and war without personal responsibility. Murat met
his fate as became _Le Beau Sabreur_. He fastened his wife's picture on
his breast, refused to have his eyes bandaged, or to use a seat,
received six balls through his heart, and met the death which he had
braved with impunity in the thick of many conflicts, and sought in vain
in so many others.--S.