LIFE OF NAPOLEON
POCKET EDITION
VOL. V.
LIFE OF
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
BY SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.
VOL. 5.
[Illustration: Hougoumont]
EDINBURGH; A. & C. BLACK,
1876
CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAP. LXXV.--Buonaparte marches upon Blucher, who is in possession of
Soissons--Attacks the Place without success--Battle of
Craonne--Blucher Retreats on Laon--Battle of Laon--Napoleon is
compelled to withdraw on the 11th--He attacks Rheims, which is
evacuated by the Russians--Defeat at Bar-sur-Aube of Oudinot and
Gerard, who, with Macdonald, are forced to Retreat towards
Paris--Schwartzenberg wishes to Retreat behind the Aube--but the
Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh opposing the measure, it is
determined to proceed upon Paris--Napoleon occupies Arcis--Battle of
Arcis--Napoleon is joined, in the night after the Battle, by
Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gerard--and Retreats along the Aube, 1
CHAP. LXXVI.--Plans of Buonaparte--Military and Political Questions
regarding Paris--Napoleon crosses the Marne on 22d March--Retrospect
of Events in the Vicinity of Lyons, &c.--Defeats of the French in
various Quarters--Marmont and Mortier Retreat under the walls of
Paris--Joseph Buonaparte--Maria Louisa, with the Civil Authorities,
leave the City--Attack of Paris on the 30th--A Truce accorded--Joseph
flies, 11
CHAP. LXXVII.--State of Parties in Paris--Royalists--Revolutionists--
Buonapartists--Talleyrand--Chateaubriand--Mission to the Allied
Sovereigns--Their Answer--Efforts of the Buonapartists--Feelings of
the Lowest Classes--of the Middling Ranks--Neutrality of the National
Guard--Growing confidence of the Royalists--Proclamations and White
Cockades--Crowds assemble at the Boulevards--The Allies are received
with shouts of welcome--Their Army retires to quarters--and the
Cossacks bivouac in the Champs-Elysées, 28
CHAP. LXXVIII.--Fears of the Parisians--Proceedings of
Napoleon--Operations of the French Cavalry in rear of the
Allies--Capture of Weissemberg--The Emperor Francis is nearly
surprised--Napoleon reaches Troyes on the night of the 29th
March--Opinion of Macdonald as to the possibility of relieving
Paris--Napoleon leaves Troyes, on the 30th and meets Belliard, a few
miles from Paris, in full Retreat--Conversation betwixt them--He
determines to proceed to Paris, but is at length dissuaded--and
Despatches Caulaincourt to receive terms from the Allied
Sovereigns--He himself returns to Fontainbleau, 35
CHAP. LXXIX.--The Allied Sovereigns issue a Proclamation that they
will not treat with Buonaparte--A Provisional Government is named by
the Conservative Senate, who also decree the Forfeiture of
Napoleon--This decree is sanctioned by all the Public Bodies in
Paris--The Legality of these Proceedings discussed--Feelings towards
Napoleon, of the Lower Classes, and of the Military--On 4th April,
Buonaparte issues a document Abdicating the Throne of France--His
subsequent agitation, and wish to continue the War--The deed is
finally dispatched, 40
CHAP. LXXX.--Victor, and other Maréchals give in their adhesion to the
Provisional Government--Marmont enters into a separate Convention; but
assists at the Conferences held at Paris, leaving Souham second in
command of his Army--The Commanders have an Interview with the Emperor
Alexander--Souham enters with his Army into the lines of the Allies;
in consequence, the Allied Sovereigns insist upon the unconditional
Submission of Napoleon--His reluctant acquiescence--The Terms granted
to him--Disapprobation of Lord Castlereagh--General Desertion of
Napoleon--Death of Josephine--Singular Statement made by Baron Fain,
Napoleon's Secretary, of the Emperor's attempt to commit
Suicide--After this he becomes more Resigned--Leaves Fontainbleau,
28th April, 53
CHAP. LXXXI.--Commissioners appointed to escort Napoleon--He leaves
Fontainbleau on the 20th April--His Interview with Augereau at
Valence--Expressions of Popular dislike towards Napoleon in the South
of France--Fears for his Personal safety--His own agitation and
Precautions--He arrives at Frejus, and embarks on board the Undaunted,
with the British and Austrian Commissioners--Arrives at Elba on 4th
May, 66
CHAP. LXXXII.--Elba--Napoleon's mode of Life and occupation
there--Effects of his Residence at Elba upon the adjoining Kingdom of
Italy--He is visited by his Mother and the Princess Pauline--and by a
Polish lady--Sir Niel Campbell the only Commissioner left at
Elba--Napoleon's Conversations on the State of Europe--His pecuniary
Difficulties--and fears of Assassination--Symptoms of some approaching
Crisis--A part of the Old Guard disbanded--Napoleon escapes from
Elba--Fruitless pursuit by Sir Neil Campbell, 72
CHAP. LXXXIII.--Retrospect--Restoration of the Bourbons displeasing to
the Soldiery, but satisfactory to the People--Terms favourable to
France granted by the Allies--Discontent about the manner of conceding
the Charter--Other grounds of Dissatisfaction--Apprehensions lest the
Church and Crown Lands should be resumed--Resuscitation of the Jacobin
Faction--Increased Dissatisfaction in the Army--The Claims of the
Emigrants mooted in the Chamber of Delegates--Maréchal Macdonald's
Proposal--Financial Difficulties--Restriction on the
Press--Reflections on this Subject, 85
CHAP. LXXXIV.--Carnot's Memorial on Public Affairs--Fouché joins the
Jacobins--Projects of that Party; which finally joins the
Buonapartists--Active Intrigues--Congress of Vienna--Murat, alarmed at
its Proceedings, opens an Intercourse with Napoleon--Plans of the
Conspirators--Buonaparte's Escape from Elba--He Lands at Cannes--Is
joined at Grenoble, by 3000 Troops--Halts at Lyons, appoints a
Ministry, and issues several Decrees--Dismay of the
Government--Intrigues of Fouché--Treachery of Ney--Revolt of the Royal
Army at Melun--The King leaves Paris, and Buonaparte arrives
there--His Reception, 108
CHAP. LXXXV.--Various attempts to organise a defence for the Bourbons
fail--Buonaparte, again reinstated on the throne of France, is
desirous of continuing the peace with the Allies--but no answer is
returned to his letters--Treaty of Vienna--Grievances alleged by
Buonaparte in justification of the step he had taken--Debates in the
British House of Commons, on the renewal of War--Murat occupies Rome
with 50,000 men--his proclamation summoning all Italians to arms--He
advances against the Austrians--is repulsed at Occhio-Bello--defeated
at Tolentino--flies to Naples, and thence, in disguise, to
France--where Napoleon refuses to receive him, 134
CHAP. LXXXVI.--Buonaparte's attempts to conciliate Britain--Plot to
carry off Maria Louisa fails--State of feeling in France--The
Army--The Jacobins--The Constitutionalists--Fouché and Siêyes made
Peers--Freedom of the Press granted, and outraged--Independent conduct
of Comté, editor of Le Censeur--Disaffections among the lower
orders--Part of these assemble before the Tuileries, and applaud the
Emperor--Festival of the Federates--New Constitution--It is received
with dissatisfaction--Meeting of the Champ de Mai to ratify
it--Buonaparte's Address to the Chambers of Peers and Deputies--The
spirit of Jacobinism predominant in the latter, 144
CHAP. LXXXVII.--Preparations for War--Positions of the Allied Forces,
amounting in whole to One Million of men--Buonaparte's Force not more
than 200,000--Conscription not ventured upon--National Guard--their
reluctance to serve--Many Provinces hostile to Napoleon--Fouché's
Report makes known the Disaffection--Insurrection in La
Vendée--quelled--Military Resources--Plan of Campaign--Paris placed in
a Complete State of Defence--Frontier Passes and Towns
fortified--Generals who accept Command under Napoleon--He Announces
his Purpose to measure himself with Wellington, 157
CHAP. LXXXVIII.--Army of Wellington covers Brussels--that of Blucher
on the Sambre and Meuse--Napoleon reviews his Grand Army on 14th
June--Advances upon Charleroi--His plan to separate the Armies of the
two opposing Generals fails--Interview of Wellington and Blucher at
Bric--British Army concentrated at Quatre-bras--Napoleon's plan of
attack--Battle of Ligny, and defeat of Blucher on the 16th
June--Action at Quatre-bras on the same day--The British retain
possession of the field--Blucher eludes the French pursuit--Napoleon
joins Ney--Retreat of the British upon Waterloo, 164
CHAP. LXXXIX.--Strength of the two Armies--Plans of their
Generals--THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO commenced on the forenoon of the 18th
June--French attack directed against the British centre--shifted to
their right--Charges of the Cuirassiers--and their reception--Advance
of the Prussians--Ney's charge at the head of the Guards--His
repulse--and Napoleon's orders for retreat--The Victorious Generals
meet at La Belle Alliance--Behaviour of Napoleon during the
engagement--Blucher's pursuit of the French--Loss of the British--of
the French--Napoleon's subsequent attempts to undervalue the military
skill of the Duke of Wellington answered--His unjust censures of
Grouchy--The notion that the British were on the point of losing the
Battle when the Prussians came up, shown to be erroneous, 174
CHAP. XC.--Buonaparte's arrival at Paris--The Chambers assemble, and
adopt Resolutions, indicating a wish for Napoleon's Abdication--Fouché
presents Napoleon's Abdication, which stipulates that his Son shall
succeed him--Carnot's Report to the Peers, of the means of
defence--Contradicted by Ney--Stormy Debate on the Abdication
Act--Both Chambers evade formally recognising Napoleon
II.--Provisional Government--Napoleon at Malmaison--His offer of his
services in defence of Paris rejected--Surveillance of General
Beker--Means provided at Rochefort for his departure to the United
States--He arrives at Rochefort on 3d July--The Provisional Government
attempt in vain to treat with the Allies--The Allies advance to
Paris--Chamber of Peers disperse--Louis XVIII. re-enters Paris on 8th
July, 195
CHAP. XCI.--Disposition of the British Fleet along the Western Coast
of France, in order to prevent Buonaparte's Escape--the Bellerophon
off Rochefort--Orders under which Captain Maitland acted--Plans
agitated for Napoleon's Escape--Savary and Las Cases open a
Negotiation with Captain Maitland--Captain Maitland's Account of what
passed at their Interviews--Las Cases' Account--The Statements
compared--Napoleon's Letter to the Prince Regent--He surrenders
himself on board the Bellerophon, on 15th July--His arrival off
Plymouth--All approach to the Ship prohibited--Final determination of
the English Government that Buonaparte shall be sent to St.
Helena--His Protest, 219
CHAP. XCII.--Napoleon's real view of the measure of sending him to St.
Helena--Allegation that Captain Maitland made terms with
him--disproved--Probability that the insinuation arose with Las
Cases--Scheme of removing Napoleon from the Bellerophon, by citing him
as a witness in a case of libel--Threats of self-destruction--Napoleon
goes on board the Northumberland, which sails for St. Helena--His
behaviour on the voyage--He arrives at St. Helena, 16th October, 234
CHAP. XCIII.--Causes which justify the English Government in the
measure of Napoleon's Banishment--Napoleon's wish to retire to
England, in order that, being near France, he might again interfere in
her affairs--Reasons for withholding from him the title of
Emperor--Sir George Cockburn's Instructions--Temporary Accommodation
at Briars--Napoleon removes to Longwood--Precautions taken for the
safe custody of the Prisoner, 245
CHAP. XCIV.--Buonaparte's alleged grievances considered--Right to
restrict his Liberty--Limits allowed Napoleon--Complaints urged by Las
Cases against Sir George Cockburn--Sir Hudson Lowe appointed Governor
of St. Helena--Information given by General Gourgaud to
Government--Agitation of various Plans for Buonaparte's
Escape--Writers on the subject of Napoleon's Residence at St.
Helena--Napoleon's irritating Treatment of Sir Hudson Lowe--Interviews
between them, 255
CHAP. XCV.--Instructions to Sir Hudson Lowe--Sum allowed for the
Ex-Emperor's Expenses--Napoleon's proposal to defray his own
Expenses--Sale of his Plate--made in order to produce a false
impression: he had at that time a large sum of Money in his
strong-box--Wooden-House constructed in London, and transported to St.
Helena--Interview between Sir H. Lowe and Napoleon--Delays in the
Erection of the House--The Regulation that a British Officer should
attend Napoleon in his Rides--Communication with Europe carried on by
the Inmates of Longwood--Regulation respecting Napoleon's Intercourse
with the Inhabitants of St. Helena--General Reflections on the
Disputes between him and Sir H. Lowe, 279
CHAP. XCVI.--Napoleon's Domestic Habits--Manner in which he spent the
day--His Dress--Nature of the Fragments of Memoirs he dictated to
Gourgaud and Montholon--His admiration of Ossian--He prefers Racine
and Corneille to Voltaire--Dislike of Tacitus--His Vindication of the
Character of Cæsar--His behaviour towards the Persons of his
Household--Amusements and Exercises--His Character of Sir Pulteney
Malcolm--Degree of his Intercourse with the Islanders, and with
Visitors to the Island--Interview with Captain Basil Hall--with Lord
Amherst and the Gentlemen attached to the Chinese Embassy, 297
CHAP. XCVII.--Napoleon's Illness--viz. Cancer in the Stomach--Removal
of Las Cases--Montholon's Complaints brought forward by Lord
Holland--and replied to by Lord Bathurst--Effect of the failure of
Lord Holland's motion--Removal of Dr. O'Meara from his attendance on
Buonaparte--who refuses to permit the visits of any other English
Physician--Two Priests sent to St. Helena at his desire--Dr.
Antommarchi--Continued Disputes with Sir Hudson Lowe--Plans for
Effecting Buonaparte's Escape--Scheme of a Smuggler to approach St.
Helena in a Submarine Vessel--Seizure of the Vessel--Letter expressing
the King of England's interest in the Illness of Napoleon--Consent of
the latter to admit the visits of Dr. Arnott--Napoleon employs himself
in making his Will--and gives other directions connected with his
Decease--Extreme Unction administered to him--HIS DEATH, on 5th May,
1821--Anatomization of the Body--His Funeral, 313
APPENDIX--
No. I.--Remarks on the Campaign of 1815, 353
No. II.--Buonaparte's Protest, 373
No. III.--States of Thermometer, 377
No. IV.--Interview betwixt Napoleon Buonaparte and Henry Ellis, Esq.,
third Commissioner of Lord Amherst's Embassy to China, 377
No. V.--Memorandum of the Establishment at Longwood, 381
No. VI.--Interview between Buonaparte and the Widow of Theobald Wolfe
Tone, 382
No. VII.--Buonaparte's last Will and Testament, 384
CHAPTER LXXV.
_Buonaparte marches upon Blucher, who is in possession of
Soissons--Attacks the place without success--Battle of
Craonne--Blucher retreats on Laon--Battle of Laon--Napoleon is
compelled to withdraw on the 11th--He attacks Rheims, which is
evacuated by the Russians--Defeat at Bar-sur-Aube of Oudinot and
Gerard, who, with Macdonald, are forced to retreat towards
Paris--Schwartzenberg wishes to retreat behind the Aube--but the
Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh opposing the measure, it is
determined to proceed upon Paris--Napoleon occupies Arcis--Battle of
Arcis--Napoleon is joined, in the night after the battle, by
Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gerard--and retreats along the Aube._
The sword was now again brandished, not to be sheathed or reposed, until
the one party or the other should be irretrievably defeated.
The situation of Buonaparte, even after the victory of Montereau, and
capture of Troyes, was most discouraging. If he advanced on the grand
army of the allies which he had in front, there was every likelihood
that they would retire before him, wasting his force in skirmishes,
without a possibility of his being able to force them to a general
action; while, in the meantime, it might be reckoned for certain that
Blucher, master of the Marne, would march upon Paris. On the contrary,
if Napoleon moved with his chief force against Blucher, he had, in like
manner, to apprehend that Schwartzenberg would resume the route upon
Paris by way of the valley of the Seine. Thus, he could make no exertion
upon the one side, without exposing the capital to danger on the other.
After weighing all the disadvantages on either side, Napoleon determined
to turn his arms against Blucher, as most hostile to his person, most
rapid in his movements, and most persevering in his purposes. He left
Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gerard in front of the grand army, in hopes
that, however inferior in numbers, they might be able to impose upon
Schwartzenberg a belief that Napoleon was present in person, and thus
either induce the Austrian to continue his retreat, or at least prevent
him from resuming the offensive. For this purpose the French troops were
to move on Bar-sur-Aube, and occupy, if practicable, the heights in that
neighbourhood. The soldiers were also to use the cry of _Vive
l'Empereur_, as if Napoleon had been present. It was afterwards seen,
that as the maréchals did not command 40,000 men in all, including a
force under Macdonald, it was impossible for them to discharge
effectually the part assigned them. In the meanwhile, Napoleon himself
continued his lateral march on Blucher, supposing it possible for him,
as formerly, to surprise his flank, as the Prussians marched upon Paris.
For this purpose he moved as speedily as possible to La Ferté-Gauchère,
where he arrived 1st March; but Sacken and D'Yorck, who would have been
the first victims of this manœuvre, as their divisions were on the left
bank of the Marne, near to Meaux, crossed the river at La Ferté Jouarre,
and formed a junction with Blucher, who now resolved to fall back on the
troops of Bulow and Winzengerode. These generals were, it will be
remembered, advancing from the frontiers of Belgium.
A sudden hard frost rendered the country passable, which had before been
in so swampy a condition as to render marching very difficult. This was
much to the advantage of the Prussians. Napoleon detached the forces
under Marmont and Mortier, whom he had united with his own, to press
upon and harass the retreat of the Prussian field-maréchal; while he
himself, pushing on by a shorter line, possessed himself of the town of
Fismes, about half way betwixt Rheims and Soissons. The occupation of
this last place was now a matter of the last consequence. If Blucher
should find Soissons open to him, he might cross the Marne, extricate
himself from his pursuers without difficulty, and form his junction with
the army of the North. But if excluded from this town and bridge,
Blucher must have hazarded a battle on the most disadvantageous terms,
having Mortier and Marmont on his front, Napoleon on his left flank, and
in his rear, a town, with a hostile garrison and a deep river.
It was almost a chance, like that of the dice, which party possessed
this important place. The Russians had taken it on 15th February;[1]
but, being immediately evacuated by them, it was on the 19th occupied by
Mortier, and garrisoned by 500 Poles, who were imagined capable of the
most determined defence. On the 2d March, however, the commandant,
intimidated by the advance of Bulow's army of 30,000 men, yielded up
Soissons to that general, upon a threat of an instant storm, and no
quarter allowed. The Russian standards then waved on the ramparts of
Soissons, and Blucher, arriving under its walls, acquired the full power
of uniting himself with his rear-guard, and giving or refusing battle at
his pleasure, on the very moment when Buonaparte, having turned his
flank, expected to have forced on him a most disadvantageous action.
The Emperor's wrath exhaled in a bulletin against the inconceivable
baseness of the commandant of Soissons, who was said to have given up so
important a place when he was within hearing of the cannonade on the 2d
and 3d, and must thereby have known the approach of the Emperor.[2] In
the heat of his wrath, he ordered Soissons to be assaulted and carried
by storm at all risks; but it was defended by General Langeron with
10,000 Russians. A desperate conflict ensued, but Langeron retained
possession of the town.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF CRAONNE.]
Abandoning this project, Napoleon crossed the Aisne at Béry-au-Bac, with
the purpose of attacking the left wing of Blucher's army, which, being
now concentrated, was strongly posted betwixt the village of Craonne and
the town of Laon, in such a manner as to secure a retreat upon the very
strong position which the latter town affords. Blucher imagined a
manœuvre, designed to show Buonaparte that his favourite system of
turning an enemy's flank had its risks and inconveniences. He detached
ten thousand horse under Winzengerode, by a circuitous route, with
orders that when the French commenced their march on Craonne, they
should move round and act upon their flank and rear. But the state of
the roads, and other impediments, prevented this body of cavalry from
getting up in time to execute the intended manœuvre.
Meanwhile, at eleven in the morning of the 7th March, the French began
their attack with the utmost bravery. Ney assaulted the position on the
right flank, which was defended by a ravine, and Victor, burning to show
the zeal which he had been accused of wanting, made incredible exertions
in front. But the assault was met by a defence equally obstinate, and
the contest became one of the most bloody and best-sustained during the
war. It was four in the afternoon, and the French had not yet been able
to dislodge the Russians on any point, when the latter received orders
from Blucher to withdraw from the disputed ground, and unite with the
Prussian army on the splendid position of Laon, which the maréchal
considered as a more favourable scene of action. There were no guns
lost, or prisoners made. The Russians, in despite of a general charge of
the French cavalry, retreated as on the parade. As the armies,
considering the absence of Winzengerode with the detachment of cavalry,
and of Langeron with the garrison of Soissons, were nearly equal, the
indecisive event of the battle was the more ominous. The slain and
wounded were about the same number on both sides, and the French only
retained as a mark of victory the possession of the field of battle.[3]
Napoleon himself followed the retreat of the Russians as far as an inn
between Craonne and Laon, called L'Ange Gardien, where he reposed for
the night. He, indeed, never more needed the assistance of a guardian
angel, and his own appears to have deserted his charge. It was here that
Rumigny found him when he presented the letter of Caulaincourt, praying
for final instructions from the Emperor; and it was here he could only
extract the ambiguous reply, that if he must submit to the bastinado, it
should be only by force. At this cabaret, also, he regulated his plan
for attacking the position of Blucher on the next morning; and thus
ridding himself finally, if possible, of that Silesian army, which had
been his object of disquietude for forty-two days, during the course of
which, scarce two days had passed without their being engaged in serious
conflict, either in front or rear. He received valuable information for
enabling him to make the projected attack, from a retired officer, M.
Bussy de Bellay, who had been his schoolfellow at Brienne, who lived in
the neighbourhood, and was well acquainted with the ground, and whom he
instantly rewarded with the situation of an aide-de-camp, and a large
appointment. When his plan for the attack was finished, he is said to
have exclaimed, "I see this war is an abyss without a bottom, but I am
resolved to be the last whom it shall devour."
The town of Laon is situated upon a table-land, or eminence, flattened
on the top, which rises very abruptly above a plain extending about a
league in length. The face of the declivity is steep, shelving, almost
precipitous, and occupied by terraces serving as vineyards. Bulow
defended this town and bank. The rest of the Silesian army was placed on
the plain below; the left wing, composed of Prussians, extending to the
village of Athies; the right, consisting of Russians, resting on the
hills between Thiers and Semonville.
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF LAON--RHEIMS.]
Only the interval of one day elapsed between the bloody battle of
Craonne and that of Laon. On the 9th, availing himself of a thick mist,
Napoleon pushed his columns of attack to the very foot of the eminence
on which Laon is situated, possessed himself of two of the villages,
termed Semilly and Ardon, and prepared to force his way up the hill
towards the town. The weather cleared, the French attack was repelled by
a tremendous fire from terraces, vineyards, windmills, and every point
of advantage. Two battalions of Yagers, the impetus of their attack
increased by the rapidity of the descent, recovered the villages, and
the attack of Laon in front seemed to be abandoned. The French, however,
continued to retain possession, in that quarter, of a part of the
village of Clacy. Thus stood the action on the right and centre. The
French had been repulsed all along the line. On the left Maréchal
Marmont had advanced upon the village of Athies, which was the key of
Blucher's position in that point. It was gallantly defended by D'Yorck
and Kleist, supported by Sacken and Langeron. Marmont made some
progress, notwithstanding this resistance, and night found him
bivouacking in front of the enemy, and in possession of part of the
disputed village of Athies. But he was not destined to remain there till
daybreak.
Upon the 10th, at four in the morning, just as Buonaparte, arising
before daybreak, was calling for his horse, two dismounted dragoons were
brought before him, with the unpleasing intelligence that the enemy had
made a _hourra_ upon Marmont, surprised him in his bivouac, and cut to
pieces, taken, or dispersed his whole division, and they alone had
escaped to bring the tidings. All the maréchal's guns were lost, and
they believed he was himself either killed or prisoner. Officers sent to
reconnoitre, brought back a confirmation of the truth of this
intelligence, excepting as to the situation of the maréchal. He was on
the road to Rheims, near Corbeny, endeavouring to rally the fugitives.
Notwithstanding this great loss, and as if in defiance of bad fortune,
Napoleon renewed the attack upon Clacy and Semilly; but all his attempts
being fruitless, he was induced to relinquish the undertaking, under the
excuse that the position was found impregnable. On the 11th, he withdrew
from before Laon, having been foiled in all his attempts, and having
lost thirty guns, and nearly 10,000 men. The allies suffered
comparatively little, as they fought under cover.
Napoleon halted at Soissons, which, evacuated by Langeron when Blucher
concentrated his army, was now again occupied by the French. Napoleon
directed its defences to be strengthened, designing to leave Mortier to
defend the place against the advance of Blucher, which, victorious as he
was, might be instantly expected.
While at Soissons, Napoleon learned that Saint Priest, a French
emigrant, and a general in the Russian service, had occupied Rheims,
remarkable for the venerable cathedral in which the kings of France were
crowned. Napoleon instantly saw that the possession of Rheims would
renew the communication betwixt Schwartzenberg and Blucher, besides
neutralizing the advantages which he himself expected from the
possession of Soissons. He moved from Soissons to Rheims, where, after
an attack which lasted till late in the night, the Russian general being
wounded, his followers were discouraged, and evacuated the place. The
utmost horrors might have been expected during a night attack, when one
army forced another from a considerable town. But in this instance we
have the satisfaction to record, that the troops on both sides behaved
in a most orderly manner.[4] In his account of the previous action,
Napoleon threw in one of those strokes of fatality which he loved to
introduce. He endeavoured to persuade the public, or perhaps he himself
believed, that Saint Priest was shot by a ball from the same cannon
which killed Moreau.[5]
During the attack upon Rheims, Marmont came up with such forces as he
had been able to rally after his defeat at Athies, and contributed to
the success of the assault. He was, nevertheless, received by Napoleon
with bitter reproaches, felt severely by a chief, of whose honour and
talents no doubt had been expressed through a long life of soldiership.
Napoleon remained at Rheims three days, to repose and recruit his
shattered army, which was reinforced from every quarter where men could
be collected. Janssens, a Dutch officer, displayed a particular degree
of military talent in bringing a body of about 4000 men, draughted from
the garrisons of the places on the Moselle, to join the army at Rheims;
a movement of great difficulty, considering he had to penetrate through
a country which was in a great measure possessed by the enemy's
troops.[6]
The halt of Napoleon at Rheims was remarkable, as affording the last
means of transacting business with his civil ministers. Hitherto, an
auditor of the council of state had weekly brought to the Imperial
headquarters the report of the ministers, and received the orders of the
Emperor.[7] But a variety of causes rendered this regular communication
during the rest of the campaign, a matter of impossibility. At Rheims,
also, Napoleon addressed to Caulaincourt, a letter, dated 17th March, by
which he seems to have placed it in the power of that plenipotentiary to
comply in full with the terms of the allies. But the language in which
it is couched is so far from bearing the precise warrant necessary for
so important a concession, that there must remain a doubt whether
Caulaincourt would have felt justified in acting upon it, or whether so
acting, Napoleon would have recognised his doing so, if circumstances
had made it convenient for him to disown the treaty.[8]
[Sidenote: OUDINOT AND GERARD.]
While Napoleon was pursuing, fighting with, and finally defeated by
Blucher, his lieutenant-generals were not more fortunate in front of the
allied grand army. It will be recollected that the Maréchals Oudinot and
Gerard were left at the head of 25,000 men exclusive of the separate
corps under Macdonald, with orders to possess themselves of the heights
of Bar-sur-Aube, and prevent Schwartzenberg from crossing that river.
They made the movement in advance accordingly, and after a sharp action,
which left the town in their possession, they were so nigh to the allied
troops, who still held the suburbs, that a battle became unavoidable,
and the maréchals had no choice save of making the attack, or of
receiving it. They chose the former, and gained at first some advantages
from the very audacity of their attempt; but the allies had now been
long accustomed to stand their ground under greater disasters. Their
numerous reserves were brought up, and their long train of artillery got
into line. The French, after obtaining a temporary footing on the
heights of Vernonfait, were charged and driven back in disorder. Some
fine cavalry, which had been brought from the armies in Spain, was
destroyed by the overpowering cannonade. The French were driven across
the Aube, the town of Bar-sur-Aube was taken, and the defeated maréchals
could only rally their forces at the village of Vandœuvres, about
half-way between Bar and Troyes.
The defeat of Oudinot and Gerard obliged Maréchal Macdonald, who
defended the line of the river above Bar, to retreat to Troyes, from his
strong position at La Ferté-sur-Aube. He therefore fell back towards
Vandœuvres. But though these three distinguished generals, Macdonald,
Oudinot, and Gerard, had combined their talents, and united their
forces, it was impossible for them to defend Troyes, and they were
compelled to retreat upon the great road to Paris. Thus, the
headquarters of the allied monarchs were, for the second time during
this changeful war, established in the ancient capital of Champagne; and
the allied grand army recovered, by the victory of Bar-sur-Aube, all the
territory which they had yielded up in consequence of Buonaparte's
success at Montereau. They once more threatened to descend the Seine
upon Paris, being entitled to despise any opposition offered by a feeble
line, which Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gerard, endeavoured to defend on the
left bank.
But Schwartzenberg's confidence in his position was lowered, when he
heard that Napoleon had taken Rheims; and that, on the evening of the
17th, Ney, with a large division, had occupied Chalons-sur-Marne. This
intelligence made a deep impression on the Austrian council of war.
Their tactics being rigidly those of the old school of war, they
esteemed their army turned whenever a French division occupied such a
post as interposed betwixt them and their allies. This, indeed, is in
one sense true; but it is equally true, that every division so
interposed is itself liable to be turned, if the hostile divisions
betwixt which it is interposed take combined measures for attacking it.
The catching, therefore, too prompt an alarm, or considering the
consequences of such a movement as irretrievable, belongs to the
pedantry of war, and not to its science.
At midnight a council was held for the purpose of determining the future
motions of the allies. The generalissimo recommended a retreat behind
the line of the Aube. The Emperor Alexander opposed this with great
steadiness. He observed, with justice, that the protracted war was
driving the country people to despair, and that the peasantry were
already taking up arms, while the allies only wanted resolution,
certainly neither opportunity nor numbers, to decide the affair by a
single blow.
So many were the objections stated, and so difficult was it to bring the
various views and interests of so many powers to coincide in the same
general plan, that the Emperor informed one of his attendants, he
thought the anxiety of the night must have turned half his hair grey.
Lord Castlereagh was against the opinion of Schwartzenberg, the rather
that he concluded that a retreat behind the Aube would be a preface to
one behind the Rhine. Taking it upon him, as became the Minister of
Britain at such a crisis, he announced to the allied powers, that, so
soon as they should commence the proposed retreat, the subsidies of
England would cease to be paid to them.[9]
[Sidenote: THE MARCH UPON PARIS.]
It was, therefore, finally agreed to resume offensive operations, for
which purpose they proposed to diminish the distance betwixt the allied
grand army and that of Silesia, and resume such a communication with
Blucher as might prevent the repetition of such disasters as those of
Montmirail and Montereau. With this view it was determined to descend
the Aube, unite their army at Arcis, offer Napoleon battle, should he
desire to accept it, or move boldly on Paris if he should refuse the
proffered action. What determined them more resolutely, from this
moment, to approach the capital as soon as possible, was the
intelligence which arrived at the headquarters by Messieurs de
Polignac.[10] These gentlemen brought an encouraging account of the
progress of the Royalists in the metropolis, and of the general
arrangements which were actively pursued for uniting with the interests
of the Bourbons that of all others, who, from dislike to Buonaparte's
person and government, or fear that the country, and they themselves,
must share in his approaching ruin, were desirous to get rid of the
Imperial government. Talleyrand was at the head of the confederacy, and
all were resolved to embrace the first opportunity of showing
themselves, which the progress of the allies should permit. This
important intelligence, coming from such unquestionable authority,
strengthened the allies in their resolution to march upon Paris.
In the meantime, Napoleon being at Rheims, as stated, on the 15th and
16th March, was alarmed by the news of the loss of the battle of Bar,
the retreat of the three maréchals beyond the Seine, and the
demonstrations of the grand army to cross that river once more. He broke
up, as we have seen, from Rheims on the 17th, and sending Ney to take
possession of Chalons, marched himself to Epernay, with the purpose of
placing himself on the right flank, and in the rear of Schwartzenberg,
in case he should advance on the road to Paris. At Epernay, he learned
that the allies, alarmed by his movements, had retired to Troyes, and
that they were about to retreat upon the Aube, and probably to Langres.
He also learned that the maréchals, Macdonald and Oudinot, had resumed
their advance so soon as their adversaries began to retreat. He hastened
to form a junction with these persevering leaders, and proceeded to
ascend the Aube as high as Bar, where he expected to throw himself into
Schwartzenberg's rear, having no doubt that his army was retiring from
the banks of the Aube.
In these calculations, accurate as far as the information permitted,
Buonaparte was greatly misled. He conceived himself to be acting upon
the retreat of the allies, and expected only to find a rear-guard at
Arcis; he was even talking jocularly of making his father-in-law
prisoner during his retreat. If, contrary to his expectation, he should
find the enemy, or any considerable part of them, still upon the Aube,
it was, from all he had heard, to be supposed his appearance would
precipitate their retreat towards the frontier. It has also been
asserted, that he expected Maréchal Macdonald to make a corresponding
advance from the banks of the Seine to those of the Aube; but the orders
had been received too late to admit of the necessary space being
traversed so as to arrive on the morning of the day of battle.
Napoleon easily drove before him such bodies of light cavalry, and
sharp-shooters, as had been left by the allies, rather for the purpose
of reconnoitring than of making serious opposition. He crossed the Aube
at Plancey, and moved upwards along the left bank of the river, with
Ney's corps, and his whole cavalry, while the infantry of his guard
advanced upon the right; his army being thus, according to the French
military phrase, _à cheval_ upon the Aube. The town of Arcis had been
evacuated by the allies upon his approach, and was occupied by the
French on the morning of the 20th March. That town forms the outlet of a
sort of defile, where a succession of narrow bridges cross a number of
drains, brooks, and streamlets, the feeders of the river Aube, and a
bridge in the town crosses the river itself. On the other side of Arcis
is a plain, in which some few squadrons of cavalry, resembling a
reconnoitring party, were observed manœuvring.
Behind these horse, at a place called Clermont, the Prince Royal of
Wirtemberg, whose name has been so often honourably mentioned, was
posted with his division, while the elite of the allied army was drawn
up on a chain of heights still farther in the rear, called Mesnil la
Comtesse. But these forces were not apparent to the vanguard of
Napoleon's army. The French cavalry had orders to attack the light
troops of the allies; but these were instantly supported by whole
regiments, and by cannon, so that the attack was unsuccessful; and the
squadrons of the French were repulsed and driven back on Arcis at a
moment, when, from the impediments in the town and its environs, the
infantry could with difficulty debouche from the town to support them.
Napoleon showed, as he always did in extremity, the same heroic courage
which he had exhibited at Lodi and Brienne. He drew his sword, threw
himself among the broken cavalry, called on them to remember their
former victories, and checked the enemy by an impetuous charge, in which
he and his staff-officers fought hand to hand with their opponents, so
that he was in personal danger from the lance of a Cossack, the thrust
of which was averted by his aide-de-camp, Girardin. His Mameluke Rustan
fought stoutly by his side, and received a gratuity for his bravery.
These desperate exertions afforded time for the infantry to debouche
from the town. The Imperial Guards came up, and the combat waxed very
warm. The superior numbers of the allies rendered them the assailants on
all points. A strongly situated village in front, and somewhat to the
left of Arcis, called Grand Torcy, had been occupied by the French. This
place was repeatedly and desperately attacked by the allies, but the
French made good their position. Arcis itself was set on fire by the
shells of the assailants, and night alone separated the combatants, by
inducing the allies to desist from the attack.
In the course of the night, Buonaparte was joined by Macdonald, Oudinot,
and Gerard, with the forces with which they had lately held the
defensive upon the Seine; and the anxious question remained, whether,
thus reinforced, he should venture an action with the grand army, to
which he was still much inferior in numbers. Schwartzenberg, agreeably
to the last resolution of the allies, drew up on the heights of Mesnil
la Comtesse, prepared to receive battle. On consideration of the
superior strength of the enemy, and of the absence of some troops not
yet come up, Napoleon finally determined not to accept a battle under
such disadvantageous circumstances. He therefore commenced a retreat,
the direction of which was doomed to prove the crisis of his fate. He
retired as he had advanced, along both sides of the Aube; and though
pursued and annoyed in this movement (which was necessarily executed
through Arcis and all its defiles,) his rear-guard was so well
conducted, that he sustained little loss. A late author,[11] who has
composed an excellent and scientific work on this campaign, has
remarked--"In concluding the account of the two days thus spent by the
contending armies in presence of each other, it is equally worthy of
remark, that Buonaparte, with a force not exceeding 25,000 or 30,000
men, should have risked himself in such a position in front of 80,000 of
the allies, as that the latter should have allowed him to escape them
with impunity." The permitting him to retreat with so little annoyance
has been censured in general by all who have written on this
campaign.[12]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See _ante_, vol. iv., p. 356.
[2] Moniteur, March 11.
[3] "This was the best fought action during the campaign: the numbers
engaged on both sides were nearly equal; the superiority, if any, being
on the side of the French."--LORD BURGHERSH, _Operations_, &c., p. 196.
[4] Baron Fain, p. 193.
[5] Moniteur, March 14.
[6] Baron Fain, p. 194.
[7] "Whatever might have been the hardships of the campaign, and the
importance of occasional circumstances, Napoleon superintended and
regularly provided for everything; and, up to the present moment, showed
himself adequate to direct the affairs of the interior, as well as the
complicated movements of the army."--BARON FAIN, p. 195.
[8] The words alleged to convey such extensive powers as totally to
recall and alter every former restriction upon Caulaincourt's exercise
of his own opinion, are contained, as above stated, in a letter from
Rheims, dated 17th March, 1814. "I have charged the Duke of Bassano to
answer your letter in detail. I give you directly the authority to make
such concessions as shall be indispensable to maintain the continuance
(_activité_) of the negotiations, and to arrive at a knowledge of the
ultimatum of the allies; it being distinctly understood that the treaty
shall have for its immediate result the evacuation of our territory, and
the restoring prisoners on both sides."--NAPOLEON, _Mémoires_, tom. ii.,
p. 399.
[9] Lord Burghersh, in his memoranda previously quoted, states that Lord
Castlereagh was not at Troyes upon this occasion, that he made no such
declaration as Sir Walter Scott ascribes to him: and that any such
declaration would have been uncalled for, as Prince Schwartzenberg was
bent on concentrating his forces at Arcis--which he did. Compare
"_Operations_," &c., p. 179.--ED. (1842.)
[10] For _Messieurs de Polignac_, we should read _Monsieur de
Vitrolles_.--See Lord Burghersh's "Operations," p. 266. _Note._--ED.
(1842.)
[11] Memoir of the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 1814. By
Lord Burghersh.