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The Naval War of 1812
or the
History of the United States Navy during
the Last War with Great Britain
to Which Is Appended an Account of
the Battle of New Orleans
By Theodore Roosevelt
With an Introduction by
Edward K. Eckert
CONTENTS
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Introduction
_The Naval War of 1812_
Index
ILLUSTRATIONS
Captain Isaac Hull
_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "The Engagement"
_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "In Action"
_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "Dropping Astern"
_Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "She Fell in the Sea"
_Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_
Captain Stephen Decatur
Captain William Bainbridge
_Constitution_ vs. _Java_
Captain James Lawrence
_Chesapeake_ vs. _Shannon_
_Argus_ vs. _Pelican_
The Battle of Lake Erie
The _Essex_
Captain David Porter
Master Commandant Lewis Warrington
Captain Samuel C. Reid
The Battle of Lake Borgne
Commodore Thomas Macdonough
Capture of the _President_
Captain Charles Stewart
_Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_
Master Commandant James Biddle
_Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For their amiable and expert assistance in the selection of the
illustrations in this volume, thanks are due to Mr. James W. Cheevers,
curator of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum; Ms. Sigrid Trumpy, curator of
the museum's Beverley R. Robinson Collection of naval prints; and Mrs.
Patty Maddocks, director of the Naval Institute Library and Photographic
Service.
JS
PREFACE
The history of the naval events of the War of 1812 has been repeatedly
presented both to the American and the English reader. Historical
writers have treated it either in connection with a general account of
the contest on land and sea, or as forming a part of the complete record
of the navies of the two nations. A few monographs, which confine
themselves strictly to the naval occurrences, have also appeared. But
none of these works can be regarded as giving a satisfactorily full or
impartial account of the war--some of them being of he "popular" and
loosely-constructed order, while others treat it from a purely partisan
standpoint. No single book can be quoted which would be accepted by the
modern reader as doing justice to both sides, or, indeed, as telling
the whole story. Any one specially interested in the subject must read
all; and then it will seem almost a hopeless task to reconcile the
many and widely contradictory statements he will meet with.
There appear to be three works which, taken in combination, give the
best satisfaction on the subject. First, in James' "Naval History of
Great Britain" (which supplies both the material and the opinions of
almost every subsequent English or Canadian historian) can be found
the British view of the case. It is an invaluable work, written with
fulness and care; on the other hand it is also a piece of special
pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan. This, in the
second place, can be partially supplemented by Fenimore Cooper's
"Naval History of the United States." The latter gives the American
view of the cruises and battles; but it is much less of an authority
than James', both because it is written without great regard for
exactness, and because all figures for the American side need to be
supplied from Lieutenant (now Admiral) George E. Emmons' statistical
"History of the United States Navy," which is the third of the works
in question.
But even after comparing these three authors, many contradictions
remain unexplained, and the truth can only be reached in such cases
by a careful examination of the navy "Records," the London "Naval
Chronicle," "Niles' Register," and other similar documentary
publications. Almost the only good criticisms on the actions are
those incidentally given in standard works on other subjects, such as
Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery," and Admiral Jurien de la
Gravière's "Guerres Maritimes." Much of the material in our Navy
Department has never been touched at all. In short, no full, accurate,
and unprejudiced history of the war has ever been written.
The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has received. At present
people are beginning to realize that it is folly for the great
English-speaking Republic to rely for defence upon a navy composed
partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new vessels rather more
worthless than the old. It is worth while to study with some care
that period of our history during which our navy stood at the highest
pitch of its fame; and to learn any thing from the past it is necessary
to know, as near as may be, the exact truth. Accordingly the work
should be written impartially, if only from the narrowest motives.
Without abating a jot from one's devotion to his country and flag,
I think a history can be made just enough to warrant its being
received as an authority equally among Americans and Englishmen. I
have endeavored to supply such a work. It is impossible that errors,
both of fact and opinion, should not have crept into it; and
although I have sought to make it in character as non-partisan as
possible, these errors will probably be in favor of the American
side.
As my only object is to give an accurate narrative of events, I shall
esteem it a particular favor if any one will furnish me with the
means of rectifying such mistakes; and if I have done injustice to
any commander, or officer of any grade, whether American or British,
I shall consider myself under great obligations to those who will set
me right.
I have been unable to get access to the original reports of the
British commanders, the logs of the British ships, or their
muster-rolls, and so have been obliged to take them at second hand
from the "Gazette," or "Naval Chronicle," or some standard history.
The American official letters, log-books, original contracts,
muster-rolls, etc., however, being preserved in the Archives at
Washington, I have been able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon.
Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over. The set of
letters from the officers is very complete, in three series,--"Captains'
Letters," "Masters' Commandant Letters," and "Officers' Letters,"
there being several volumes for each year. The books of contracts
contain valuable information as to the size and build of some of
the vessels. The log-books are rather exasperating, often being very
incomplete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's extremely vague
official letter describing the capture of the Macedonian to the
log-book of the Frigate _United States_, not a fact about the fight
could be gleaned. The last entry in the log on the day of the fight
is "strange sail discovered to be a frigate under English colors,"
and the next entry (on the following day) relates to the removal
of the prisoners. The log of the _Enterprise_ is very full indeed,
for most of the time, but is a perfect blank for the period during
which she was commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, and in which she
fought the Boxer. I have not been able to find the Peacock's log
at all, though there is a very full set of letters from her commander.
Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed a great deal of valuable material.
When ever it was possible I have referred to printed matter in
preference to manuscript, and my authorities can thus, in most cases,
be easily consulted. In conclusion I desire to express my sincerest
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of the United States
Navy, and Commander Adolf Mensing, formerly of the German Navy,
without whose advice and sympathy this work would probably never
have been written or even begun.
NEW YORK CITY, 1882.
PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION
I originally intended to write a companion volume to this, which
should deal with the operations on land. But a short examination
showed that these operations were hardly worth serious study.
They teach nothing new; it is the old, old lesson, that a miserly
economy in preparation may in the end involve a lavish outlay of
men and money, which, after all, comes too late to more than partially
offset the evils produced by the original short-sighted parsimony.
This might be a lesson worth dwelling on did it have any practical
bearing on the issues of the present day; but it has none, as far
as the army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jefferson, and
his follower Madison, to neglect to give us a force either of regulars
or of well-trained volunteers during the twelve years they had in
which to prepare for the struggle that any one might see was
inevitable; but there is now far less need of an army than there was
then. Circumstances have altered widely since 1812. Instead of the
decaying might of Spain on our southern frontier, we have the still
weaker power of Mexico. Instead of the great Indian nations of the
interior, able to keep civilization at bay, to hold in check strong
armies, to ravage large stretches of territory, and needing
formidable military expeditions to overcome them, there are now only
left broken and scattered bands, which are sources of annoyance
merely. To the north we are still hemmed in by the Canadian
possessions of Great Britain; but since 1812 our strength has
increased so prodigiously, both absolutely and relatively, while
England's military power has remained almost stationary, that we
need now be under no apprehensions from her land-forces; for, even
if checked in the beginning, we could not help conquering in the
end by sheer weight of numbers, if by nothing else. So that there
is now no cause for our keeping up a large army; while, on the
contrary, the necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that
only our almost incredible short-sightedness prevents our at once
preparing one.
Not only do the events of the war on land teach very little to the
statesman who studies history in order to avoid in the present the
mistakes of the past, but besides this, the battles and campaigns
are of little interest to the student of military matters. The British
regulars, trained in many wars, thrashed the raw troops opposed to
them whenever they had any thing like a fair chance; but this is not
to be wondered at, for the same thing has always happened the world
over under similar conditions. Our defeats were exactly such as
any man might have foreseen, and there is nothing to be learned
from the follies committed by incompetent commanders and untrained
troops when in the presence of skilled officers having under them
disciplined soldiers. The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks,
and panic routs of our armies can all be paralleled in the campaigns
waged by Napoleon's marshals against the Spaniards and Portuguese
in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of our own war. The
Peninsular troops were as little able to withstand the French veterans
as were our militia to hold their own against the British regulars.
But it must always be remembered, to our credit, that while seven
years of fighting failed to make the Spaniards able to face the
French,[Footnote: At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between
the allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so rapid
and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington the bitter
observation, that "though he had seen a good many remarkable things
in the course of his life, yet this was the first time he had ever
seen ten thousand men running a race."] two years of warfare gave us
soldiers who could stand against the best men of Britain. On the
northern frontier we never developed a great general,--Brown's claim
to the title rests only on his not having committed the phenomenal
follies of his predecessors,--but by 1814 our soldiers had become
seasoned, and we had acquired some good brigade commanders, notably
Scott, so that in that year we played on even terms with the British.
But the battles, though marked by as bloody and obstinate fighting
as ever took place, were waged between small bodies of men, and were
not distinguished by any feats of generalship, so that they are not
of any special interest to the historian. In fact, the only really
noteworthy feat of arms of the war took place at New Orleans, and
the only military genius that the struggle developed was Andrew
Jackson. His deeds are worthy of all praise, and the battle he won
was in many ways so peculiar as to make it well worth a much closer
study than it has yet received. It was by far the most prominent
event of the war; it was a victory which reflected high honor on
the general and soldiers who won it, and it was in its way as
remarkable as any of the great battles that took place about the
same time in Europe. Such being the case, I have devoted a chapter
to its consideration at the conclusion of the chapters devoted to
the naval operations.
As before said, the other campaigns on land do not deserve very
minute attention; but, for the sake of rendering the account of the
battle of New Orleans more intelligible, I will give a hasty sketch
of the principal engagements that took place elsewhere.
The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by the campaign of General
Hull on the Michigan frontier. With two or three thousand raw
troops he invaded Canada. About the same time Fort Mackinaw was
surrendered by its garrison of 60 Americans to a British and Indian
force of 600. Hull's campaign was unfortunate from the beginning.
Near Brownstown the American Colonel Van Horne, with some 200 men,
was ambushed and routed by Tecumseh and his Indians. In revenge
Col. Miller, with 600 Americans, at Maguaga attacked 150 British
and Canadians under Capt. Muir, and 250 Indians under Tecumseh,
and whipped them,--Tecumseh's Indians standing their ground longest.
The Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At Chicago the small
force of 66 Americans was surprised and massacred by the Indians.
Meanwhile, General Brock, the British commander, advanced against
Hull with a rapidity and decision that seemed to paralyze his
senile and irresolute opponent. The latter retreated to Detroit,
where, without striking a blow, he surrendered 1,400 men to Brock's
nearly equal force, which consisted nearly one half of Indians under
Tecumseh. On the Niagara frontier, an estimable and honest old
gentleman and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of military matters,
Gen. Van Rensselaer, tried to cross over and attack the British at
Queenstown; 1,100 Americans got across and were almost all killed or
captured by a nearly equal number of British, Canadians, and Indians,
while on the opposite side a large number of their countrymen looked
on, and with abject cowardice refused to cross to their assistance.
The command of the army was then handed over to a ridiculous
personage named Smythe, who issued proclamations so bombastic that
they really must have come from an unsound mind, and then made a
ludicrously abortive effort at invasion, which failed almost of
its own accord. A British and Canadian force of less than 400 men
was foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight skirmish,
by about 1,000 Americans under Brown; and with this trifling
success the military operations of the year came to an end.
Early in 1813, Ogdensburg was again attacked, this time by between
500 and 600 British, who took it after a brisk resistance from some
300 militia; the British lost 60 and the Americans 20, in killed
and wounded. General Harrison, meanwhile, had begun the campaign
in the Northwest. At Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, Winchester's
command of about 900 Western troops was surprised by a force of
1,100 men, half of them Indians, under the British Colonel Proctor.
The right division, taken by surprise, gave up at once; the left
division, mainly Kentucky riflemen, and strongly posted in houses
and stockaded enclosures, made a stout resistance, and only
surrendered after a bloody fight, in which 180 British and about
half as many Indians were killed or wounded. Over 300 Americans
were slain, some in battle, but most in the bloody massacre that
followed. After this, General Harrison went into camp at Fort Meigs,
where, with about 1,100 men, he was besieged by 1,000 British and
Canadians under Proctor and 1,200 Indians under Tecumseh. A force
of 1,200 Kentucky militia advanced to his relief and tried to cut
its way into the fort while the garrison made a sortie. The sortie
was fairly successful, but the Kentuckians were scattered like
chaff by the British regulars in the open, and when broken were
cut to pieces by the Indians in the woods. Nearly two thirds of
the relieving troops were killed or captured; about 400 got into
the fort. Soon afterward Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort Stephenson,
garrisoned by Major Croghan and 160 men, was attacked by a force
of 391 British regulars, who tried to carry it by assault, and
were repulsed with the loss of a fourth of their number. Some four
thousand Indians joined Proctor, but most of them left him after
Perry's victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison, having received large
reinforcements, invaded Canada. At the River Thames his army of 3,500
men encountered and routed between 600 and 700 British under Proctor,
and about 1,000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle was decided at
once by a charge of the Kentucky mounted riflemen, who broke through
the regulars, took them in rear, and captured them, and then
dismounting attacked the flank of the Indians, who were also
assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped by the skin of his teeth
and Tecumseh died fighting, like the hero that he was. This battle
ended the campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter it must be
remembered that the war was, on the part of the Americans, mainly
one against Indians; the latter always forming over half of the
British forces. Many of the remainder were French Canadians, and
the others were regulars. The American armies, on the contrary,
were composed of the armed settlers of Kentucky and Ohio, native
Americans, of English speech and blood, who were battling for lands
that were to form the heritage of their children. In the West the
war was only the closing act of the struggle that for many years
had been waged by the hardy and restless pioneers of our race, as
with rifle and axe they carved out the mighty empire that we their
children inherit; it was but the final effort with which they wrested
from the Indian lords of the soil the wide and fair domain that now
forms the heart of our great Republic. It was the breaking down of
the last barrier that stayed the flood of our civilization; it
settled, once and for ever, that henceforth the law, the tongue,
and the blood of the land should be neither Indian, nor yet French,
but English. The few French of the West were fighting against a
race that was to leave as little trace of them as of the doomed
Indian peoples with whom they made common cause. The presence of
the British mercenaries did not alter the character of the contest;
it merely served to show the bitter and narrow hatred with which
the Mother-Island regarded her greater daughter, predestined as
the latter was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond the Atlantic.
Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans made successful descents
on York and Fort George, scattering or capturing their comparatively
small garrisons; while a counter descent by the British on Sackett's
Harbor failed, the attacking force being too small. After the capture
of Fort George, the Americans invaded Canada; but their advance guard,
1,400 strong, under Generals Chandler and Winder, was surprised in
the night by 800 British, who, advancing with the bayonet, broke up
the camp, capturing both the generals and half the artillery. Though
the assailants, who lost 220 of their small number, suffered much
more than the Americans, yet the latter were completely demoralized,
and at once retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward, Col. Boerstler
with about 600 men surrendered with shamefully brief resistance to
a somewhat smaller force of British and Indians. Then about 300
British crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, which they took,
but were afterward driven off by a large body of militia with the
loss of 40 men. Later in the season the American General McClure
wantonly burned the village of Newark, and then retreated in panic
flight across the Niagara. In retaliation the British in turn crossed
the river; 600 regulars surprised and captured in the night Fort
Niagara, with its garrison of 400 men; two thousand troops attacked
Black Rock, and after losing over a hundred men in a smart engagement
with somewhat over 1,500 militia whom they easily dispersed, captured
and burned both it and Buffalo. Before these last events took place
another invasion of Canada had been attempted, this time under General
Wilkinson, "an unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very properly
styled him. It was mismanaged in every possible way, and was a
total failure; it was attended with but one battle, that of Chrystler's
Farm, in which 1,000 British, with the loss of less than 200 men,
beat back double their number of Americans, who lost nearly 500 men
and also one piece of artillery. The American army near Lake
Champlain had done nothing, its commander, General Wade Hampton,
being, if possible, even more incompetent than Wilkinson. He remained
stationary while a small force of British plundered Plattsburg and
Burlington; then, with 5,000 men he crossed into Canada, but returned
almost immediately, after a small skirmish at Chauteaugay between
his advance guard and some 500 Canadians, in which the former lost
41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which hardly a tenth of
the American force was engaged, has been, absurdly enough, designated
a "battle" by most British and Canadian historians. In reality it
was the incompetency of their general and not the valor of their
foes that caused the retreat of the Americans. The same comment,
by the way, applies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, in the
following year, which may have been lost by Sir George Prevost, but
was certainly not won by the Americans. And, again, a similar
criticism should be passed on General Wilkinson's attack on La
Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. Neither one of the
three affairs was a stand-up fight; in each a greatly superior
force, led by an utterly incapable general, retreated after a slight
skirmish with an enemy whose rout would have been a matter of
certainty had the engagement been permitted to grow serious.
In the early spring of 1814 a small force of 160 American regulars,
under Captain Holmes, fighting from behind felled logs, routed 200
British with a loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 8. On
Lake Ontario the British made a descent on Oswego and took it by
fair assault; and afterward lost 180 men who tried to cut out some
American transports, and were killed or captured to a man. All
through the spring and early summer the army on the Niagara frontier
was carefully drilled by Brown, and more especially by Scott, and
the results of this drilling were seen in the immensely improved
effectiveness of the soldiers in the campaign that opened in July.
Fort Erie was captured with little resistance, and on the 4th of
July, at the river Chippeway, Brown, with two brigades of regulars,
each about 1,200 strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade of
800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a total of about 3,200
men, won a stand-up fight against the British General Riall, who
had nearly 2,500 men, 1,800 of them regulars. Porter's brigade
opened by driving in the Canadian militia and the Indians; but was
itself checked by the British light-troops. Ripley's brigade took
very little part in the battle, three of the regiments not being
engaged at all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but five men.
The entire brunt of the action was borne by Scott's brigade, which
was fiercely attacked by the bulk of the British regulars under
Riall. The latter advanced with great bravery, but were terribly
cut up by the fire of Scott's regulars; and when they had come
nearly up to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and drove them
clean off the field. The American loss was 322, including 23 Indians;
the British loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. The number
of Americans actually engaged did not exceed that of the British;
and Scott's brigade, in fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge,
defeated an equal force of British regulars.
On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara, or Lundy's Lane, fought
between General Brown with 3,100 [Footnote: As near as can be found
out; most American authorities make it much less; Lossing, for
example, says only 2,400.] Americans and General Drummond with
3,500 [Footnote: General Drummond in his official letter makes it
but 2,800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3,000 rank and
file; adding 13 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and drummers,
brings it up to 3,400; and we still have to count in the artillery
drivers, etc.] British. It was brought on by accident in the evening,
and was waged with obstinate courage and savage slaughter till
midnight. On both sides the forces straggled into action by
detachments. The Americans formed the attacking party. As before,
Scott's brigade bore the brunt of the fight, and over half of his
men were killed or wounded; he himself was disabled and borne from
the field. The struggle was of the most desperate character, the
combatants showing a stubborn courage that could not be surpassed.
[Footnote: General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner were
their attacks directed against our guns that our artillerymen were
bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the muzzle of the enemy's
guns were advanced within a few yards of ours." Even James says:
"Upon the whole, however, the American troops fought bravely; and the
conduct of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially,
would have done honor to any service."] Charge after charge was made
with the bayonet, and the artillery was taken and retaken once and
again. The loss was nearly equal; on the side of the Americans,
854 men (including Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and two guns;
on that of the British, 878 men (including General Riall captured)
and one gun. Each side claimed it as a victory over superior numbers.
The truth is beyond question that the British had the advantage in
numbers, and a still greater advantage in position; while it is
equally beyond question that it was a defeat and not a victory for
the Americans. They left the field and retired in perfect order to
Fort Erie, while the British held the field and the next day pursued
their foes.
Having received some reinforcements General Drummond, now with
about 3,600 men, pushed forward to besiege Fort Erie, in which was
the American army, some 2,400 strong, under General Gaines. Col.
Tucker with 500 British regulars was sent across the Niagara to
destroy the batteries at Black Rock, but was defeated by 300
American regulars under Major Morgan, fighting from behind a strong
breastwork of felled trees, with a creek in front. On the night of
the 15th of August, the British in three columns advanced to storm
the American works, but after making a most determined assault
were beaten off. The assailants lost 900 men, the assailed about
80. After this nothing was done till Sept. 17th, when General
Brown, who had resumed command of the American forces, determined
upon and executed a sortie. Each side had received reinforcements;
the Americans numbered over 3,000, the British nearly 4,000. The
fighting was severe, the Americans losing 500 men; but their
opponents lost 600 men, and most of their batteries were destroyed.
Each side, as usual, claimed the victory; but, exactly as Lundy's
Lane must be accounted an American defeat, as our forces retreated
from the ground, so this must be considered an American victory,
for after it the British broke up camp and drew off to Chippeway.
Nothing more was done, and on November 5th the American army
recrossed the Niagara. Though marked by some brilliant feats of
arms this four months' invasion of Canada, like those that had
preceded it, thus came to nothing. But at the same time a British
invasion of the United States was repulsed far more disgracefully.
Sir George Prevost, with an army of 13,000 veteran troops, marched
south along the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which was
held by General Macomb with 2,000 regulars, and perhaps double
that number of nearly worthless militia;--a force that the British
could have scattered to the winds, though, as they were strongly
posted, not without severe loss. But the British fleet was captured
by Commodore MacDonough in the fight on the lake; and then Sir George,
after some heavy skirmishing between the outposts of the armies, in
which the Americans had the advantage, fled precipitately back to
Canada.
All through the war the sea-coasts of the United States had been
harried by small predatory excursions; a part of what is now the
State of Maine was conquered with little resistance, and kept until
the close of hostilities; and some of the towns on the shores of
Chesapeake Bay had been plundered or burnt. In August, 1814, a more
serious invasion was planned, and some 5,000 troops--regulars,
sailors, and marines--were landed, under the command of General
Ross. So utterly helpless was the Democratic Administration at
Washington, that during the two years of warfare hardly any steps
had been taken to protect the Capitol, or the country round about;
what little was done, was done entirely too late, and bungled badly
in addition. History has not yet done justice to the ludicrous and
painful folly and stupidity of which the government founded by
Jefferson, and carried on by Madison, was guilty, both in its
preparations for, and in its way of carrying on, this war; nor is
it yet realized that the men just mentioned, and their associates,
are primarily responsible for the loss we suffered in it, and the
bitter humiliation some of its incidents caused us. The small British
army marched at will through Virginia and Maryland, burned Washington,
and finally retreated from before Baltimore and reembarked to take
part in the expedition against New Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburg
and North Point, it came in contact with superior numbers of militia
in fairly good position. In each case the result was the same.
After some preliminary skirmishing, manoeuvring, and volley firing,
the British charged with the bayonet. The rawest regiments among
the American militia then broke at once; the others kept pretty
steady, pouring in quite a destructive fire, until the regulars had
come up close to them, when they also fled. The British regulars
were too heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their mode of
attack, and the rapidity with which their opponents ran away, the
loss of the latter was in each case very slight. At North Point,
however, the militia, being more experienced, behaved better than
at Bladensburg. In neither case were the British put to any trouble
to win their victory.
The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns of the war. It is not
cheerful reading for an American, nor yet of interest to a military
student; and its lessons have been taught so often by similar
occurrences in other lands under like circumstances, and, moreover,
teach such self-evident truths, that they scarcely need to be
brought to the notice of an historian. But the crowning event of
the war was the Battle of New Orleans; remarkable in its military
aspect, and a source of pride to every American. It is well worth
a more careful study, and to it I have devoted the last chapter of
this work.
New York City, 1883.
[Illustration: Fig. 1.--Long gun.]
[Illustration: Fig. 2.--Carronade.]
[Illustration: Fig. 3.--Section of flush-decked corvette or sloop,
carrying long guns. Such was the armament of the _Pike_ and _Adams_,
but most flush-decked ships mounted carronades.]
[Illustration: Fig. 4.--Section of frigate-built ship, with long
gun on main-deck and carronade on spar-deck. Taken from the
_American Artillerist's Companion_, by Louis de Toussard
(Philadelphia, 1811).]
PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO
(_See also in alphabetical place in index_.)
American State Papers.
Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, 1783 to 1836. 2 vols.,
octavo. London, 1837.
Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo, London, 1866.
"Captains' Letters" in Archives at Washington.
Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his daughter. 2 vols.,
octavo. London, 1873.
Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers. New York, 1876.
Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New York, 1856.
Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London, 1860.
Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. London, 1860.
Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States Navy, 1853.
Farragut, Adm. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. Octavo.
New York, 1878.
Gravière, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols., octavo. Paris, 1881.
James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols., octavo.
London, 1837.
James, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans. Octavo,
London, 1817.
Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. Octavo. New York, 1869.
Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613 to 1863. 2 vols., octavo.
London, 1877.
_London Naval Chronicle_.
Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols., octavo. London, 1825.
"Masters-Commandant Letters" in the Archives at Washington.
Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880.
Naval Archives at Washington.
Niles. _Weekly Register_.
Pielat. B. La Vie et les Actions Mémorables du St. Michel de Ruyter.
Amsterdam, 1677.
Rivière, Lieut. H. La Marine Française sous le Régime de Louis XV.
Paris, 1859.
Tatnall, Commod., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah, 1878.
Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. Phila., 1811.
Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, 1868.
Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859.
Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy. 3 vols., octavo.
London, 1866.
AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER X
Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 20 vols. London, 1852.
Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report for the Morning
of Jan. 8, 1815.
Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward. Memoir of, by Lady Bourchier.
London, 1873.
Cole, John William. Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished
during the Peninsular War. London, 1856.
Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. Official Report.
Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of the British
Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Philadelphia, 1821.
Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by W G. Sumner. Boston, 1882.
Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters.
James, William. Military Occurrences of the Late War. 2 vols.
London, 1818.
Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 1814.
Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 1815.
Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of the War in West
Florida and Louisiana. Translated from the French by H. P. Nugent.
Philadelphia, 1816.
Lossing, Benson J. Field-Book of the War of 1812. New York, 1859.
Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, Dec. 20, 1814, and Jan. 13, 1815.
Monroe, James. Sketch of his Life, by Daniel C. Gilman. 16mo. Boston, 1883.
Napier, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War in the Peninsula.
5 vols. New York, 1882.
Scott, Lieut.-Gen. W. Memoirs, by himself, 2 vols. New York, 1864.
Thornton, Col. W. Letter, Jan. 8, 1815.
CONTENTS
PREFACE
Chapter I
INTRODUCTORY
Causes of the war of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britain
as regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibility
of avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war June 18, 1812--Slight
preparations made--General features of the contest--Race identity
of combatants--The treaty of peace nominally leaves the situation
unchanged--But practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect
to maritime rights--The British navy and its reputation prior to
1812--Comparison with other European navies--British and American
authorities consulted in the present work
Chapter II
Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared war
against her--Race identity of the combatants--American navy at the
beginning of the war--Officers well trained--Causes tending to make
our seamen especially efficient--Close similarity between British
and American sailors--Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans,
many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British navy--Quotas
of seamen contributed by the different States--Navy yards--Lists
of officers and men--List of vessels--Tonnage--Different ways of
estimating it in Britain and America--Ratings--American ships
properly rated--Armaments of the frigates and corvettes--Three
styles of guns used--Difference between long guns and carronades--Short
weight of American shot--Comparison of British frigates rating 38
and American frigates rating 44 guns--Compared with a 74
Chapter III
1812 ON THE OCEAN
Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the
_Belvidera_--Engagement between _Belvidera_ and _President_--_Hornet_
captures a privateer--Cruise of the _Essex_--Captain Hull's cruise
and escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke--_Constitution_
captures _Guerrière_--Marked superiority shown by the Americans--_Wasp_
captures _Frolic_--Disproportionate loss on British side--Both
afterward captured by _Poictiers_--Second unsuccessful cruise of
Commodore Rodgers--_United States_ captures _Macedonian_--_Constitution_
captures _Java_--Cruise of _Essex_--Summary
Chapter IV
1812 ON THE LAKES
PRELIMINARY.--The combatants starting nearly on an equality--Difficulties
of creating a naval force--Difficulty of comparing the force of the
rival squadrons--Meagreness of the published accounts--Unreliability
of authorities, especially James.--ONTARIO--Extraordinary nature of
the American squadron--Canadian squadron a kind of water
militia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle--Commodore
Chauncy attacks the Royal George--And bombards York.--ERIE--Lieutenant
Elliot captures the _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_--Lieutenant Angus'
unsuccessful attack on Red House barracks
Chapter V
1813 ON THE OCEAN
Blockade of the American coast--Commodore Porter's campaign with
the _Essex_ in the South Pacific--_Hornet_ blockades Bonne
Citoyenne--_Hornet_ captures _Resolution_--_Hornet_ captures
_Peacock_--Generous treatment shown to the conquered--_Viper_
captured by _Narcissus_--American privateers cut out by British
boats--Third cruise of Commodore Rodgers--_United States_,
_Macedonian_, and _Wasp_ blockaded in New London--Broke's challenge
to Lawrence--The _Chesapeake_ captured by the _Shannon_--Comments
and criticisms by various authorities--_Surveyor_ captured by
boats of _Narcissus_--Futile gun-boat actions--British attack on
Craney Island repulsed--Cutting out expeditions--The _Argus_ captured
by the _Pelican_--The _Enterprise_ captures the _Boxer_--Ocean warfare
of 1813 in favor of British--Summary
Chapter VI
1813 ON THE LAKES
ONTARIO--Comparison of the rival squadrons--Chauncy's superior in
strength--Chauncy takes York and Fort George--Yeo is repulsed at
Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake--_The Lady of the
Lake_ captures _Lady Murray_--_Hamilton_ and _Scourge_ founder in a
squall--Yeo's partial victory off Niagara--Indecisive action off
the Genesee--Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which gives
him the command of the lake--Yeo and Chauncy compared--Reasons
for American success.--ERIE--Perry's success in creating a
fleet--His victory--"Glory" of it overestimated--Cause of his
success--CHAMPLAIN--The _Growler_ and _Eagle_ captured by
gun-boats--Summary of year's campaign
Chapter VII
1814 ON THE OCEAN
Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the
_Constitution_--Chased into Marblehead--Attempt to cut-out the
_Alligator_--The _Essex_ captured after engagement with _Phoebe_ and
_Cherub_--The _Frolic_ captured--The _Peacock_ captures the
_Epervier_--Commodore Barney's flotilla afloat--The British in
the Chesapeake--Capture of Washington, and burning of the public
buildings--The _Wasp_ captures the _Reindeer_--The _Wasp_ sinks the
_Avon_--Cruise and loss of the _Adams_--The privateer _General
Armstrong_--The privateer _Prince de Neufchatel_--Loss of the gun-boats
on Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary
Chapter VIII
1814 ON THE LAKES
ONTARIO--The contest one of ship-building merely--Statistics of
the two squadrons--Serious sickness among the Americans--Extreme
caution of the commanders, verging on timidity--Yeo takes Oswego
and blockades Sackett's Harbor--British gun-boats captured--Chauncy
blockades Kingston.--ERIE--Captain Sinclair burns St. Joseph--Makes
unsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw--Daring and successful
cutting-out expeditions of the British--Capture of the _Ohio_ and
_Somers_.--CHAMPLAIN--Macdonough's and Downie's squadrons--James'
erroneous statements concerning them--Gallant engagement and
splendid victory of Macdonough--Macdonough one of the greatest
of American sea-captains
Chapter IX
1815 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS
The _President_ captured by Captain Hayes' squadron--Successful
cutting-out expedition of the Americans--American privateer
_Chasseur_ captures _St. Lawrence_--The _Constitution_ engages the
_Cyane_ and the _Levant_ and captures both--Escapes from a British
squadron--The _Hornet_ captures the _Penguin_ and escapes from pursuit
of the _Cornwallis_--The _Peacock's_ wanton attack on the
_Nautilus_--Wanton attack on American gun-boat after treaty of
peace--Summary of events in 1815--Remarks on the war--Tables of
comparative loss, etc.--Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle
Chapter X
1815 THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS
The war on land generally disastrous--British send great expedition
against New Orleans--Jackson prepares for the defence of the city--Night
attack on the British advance guard--Artillery duels--Great Battle
of Jan. 8th, 1815--Slaughtering repulse of the main attack--Rout of
the Americans on the right bank of the river--Final retreat of the
British--Observations on the character of the troops and commanders
engaged
APPENDIX
Chapter I
INTRODUCTORY
_Causes of the War of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britain
as regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibility
of avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war--General features
of the contest--Racial identity of the contestants--The treaty of
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged--But practically
settles the dispute in our favor in respect to maritime rights--The
British navy and its reputation prior to 1812--Comparison with other
European navies--British and American authorities consulted in the
present work._
The view professed by Great Britain in 1812 respecting the rights
of belligerents and neutrals was diametrically opposite to that held
by the United States. "Between England and the United States of
America," writes a British author, "a spirit of animosity, caused
chiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted
to be such, from on board of American merchant vessels, had unhappily
subsisted for a long time" prior to the war. "It is, we believe,"
he continues, "an acknowledged maxim of public law, as well that
no nation but the one he belongs to can release a subject from his
natural allegiance, as that, provided the jurisdiction of another
independent state be not infringed, every nation has a right to
enforce the services of her subjects wherever they may be found.
Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over her merchant
vessels upon the high seas as to exclude a belligerent nation from
the right of searching them for contraband of war or for the property
or persons of her enemies. And if, in the exercise of that right,
the belligerent should discover on board of the neutral vessel a
subject who has withdrawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the
neutral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver him up;
more especially if that subject is proved to be a deserter from
the sea or land service of the former." [Footnote: "The Naval History
of Great Britain," by William James, vol. iv, p. 324. (New edition
by Captain Chamier, R. N., London, 1837.)]
Great Britain's doctrine was "once a subject always a subject." On
the other hand, the United States maintained that any foreigner,
after five years' residence within her territory, and after having
complied with certain forms, became one of her citizens as completely
as if he was native born. Great Britain contended that her war
ships possessed the right of searching all neutral vessels for the
property and persons of her foes. The United States, resisting this
claim, asserted that "free bottoms made free goods," and that
consequently her ships when on the high seas should not be molested
on any pretext whatever. Finally, Great Britain's system of
impressment, [Footnote: The best idea of which can be gained by
reading Marryatt's novels.] by which men could be forcibly seized
and made to serve in her navy, no matter at what cost to themselves,
was repugnant to every American idea.
Such wide differences in the views of the two nations produced
endless difficulties. To escape the press-gang, or for other
reasons, many British seamen took service under the American flag;
and if they were demanded back, it is not likely that they or their
American shipmates had much hesitation in swearing either that they
were not British at all, or else that they had been naturalized as
Americans. Equally probable is it that the American blockade-runners
were guilty of a great deal of fraud and more or less thinly veiled
perjury. But the wrongs done by the Americans were insignificant
compared with those they received. Any innocent merchant vessel
was liable to seizure at any moment; and when overhauled by a
British cruiser short of men was sure to be stripped of most of
her crew. The British officers were themselves the judges as to
whether a seaman should be pronounced a native of America or of
Britain, and there was no appeal from their judgment. If a captain
lacked his full complement there was little doubt as to the view
he would take of any man's nationality. The wrongs inflicted on our
seafaring countrymen by their impressment into foreign ships formed
the main cause of the war.
There were still other grievances which are thus presented by the
British Admiral Cochrane. [Footnote: "Autobiography of a Seaman,"
by Thomas, tenth Earl of Dundonald, Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral
of the Fleet, London, 1860, vol. i, p. 24.] "Our treatment of its
(America's) citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national
privileges to which the young Republic had become entitled. There
were no doubt many individuals among the American people who, caring
little for the Federal Government, considered it more profitable
to break than to keep the laws of nations by aiding and supporting
our enemy (France), and it was against such that the efforts of the
squadron had chiefly been directed; but the way the object was
carried out was scarcely less an infraction of those national laws
which we were professedly enforcing. The practice of taking English
(and American) seamen out of American ships without regard to the
safety of navigating them when thus deprived of their hands has
been already mentioned. To this may be added the detention of
vessels against which nothing contrary to international neutrality
could be established, whereby their cargoes became damaged; the
compelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than
those to which they were destined; and generally treating them as
though they were engaged in contraband trade. * * * American ships
were not permitted to quit English ports without giving security
for the discharge of their cargoes in some other British or neutral
port." On the same subject James [Footnote: _L. c._, iv, 325.]
writes: "When, by the maritime supremacy of England, France could
no longer trade for herself, America proffered her services, as a
neutral, to trade for her; and American merchants and their agents,
in the gains that flowed in, soon found a compensation for all the
perjury and fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her
belligerent rights. The high commercial importance of the United
States thus obtained, coupled with a similarity of language and,
to a superficial observer, a resemblance in person between the
natives of America and Great Britain, has caused the former to be
the chief, if not the only sufferers by the exercise of the right
of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and prosperity to
emigration from Europe, the United States hold out every allurement
to foreigners, particularly to British seamen, whom, by a process
peculiarly their own, they can naturalize as quickly as a dollar
can exchange masters and a blank form, ready signed and sworn to,
can be filled up. [Footnote: This is an exaggeration.] It is the
knowledge of this fact that makes British naval officers when
searching for deserters from their service, so harsh in their
scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and asseverations."
The last sentence of the foregoing from James is an euphemistic
way of saying that whenever a British commander short of men came
across an American vessel he impressed all of her crew that he
wanted, whether they were citizens of the United States or not. It
must be remembered, however, that the only reason why Great Britain
did us more injury than any other power was because she was better
able to do so. None of her acts were more offensive than Napoleon's
Milan decree, by which it was declared that any neutral vessel which
permitted itself to be searched by a British cruiser should be
considered as British, and as the lawful prize of any French vessel.
French frigates and privateers were very apt to snap up any American
vessel they came across and were only withheld at all by the memory
of the sharp dressing they had received in the West Indies during
the quasi-war of 1799-1800. What we undoubtedly ought to have done
was to have adopted the measure actually proposed in Congress, and
declared war on both France and England. As it was, we chose as a
foe the one that had done, and could still do, us the greatest injury.
The principles for which the United States contended in 1812 are
now universally accepted, and those so tenaciously maintained by
Great Britain find no advocates in the civilized world. That England
herself was afterward completely reconciled to our views was amply
shown by her intense indignation when Commodore Wilkes, in the
exercise of the right of search for the persons of the foes of his
country, stopped the neutral British ship _Trent_; while the applause
with which the act was greeted in America proves pretty clearly
another fact, that we had warred for the right, not because it
_was_ the right, but because it agreed with our self-interest to do
so. We were contending for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights": meaning
by the former expression, freedom to trade wherever we chose without
hindrance save from the power with whom we were trading; and by the
latter, that a man who happened to be on the sea should have the
same protection accorded to a man who remained on land. Nominally,
neither of these questions was settled by, or even alluded to, in
the treaty of peace; but the immense increase of reputation that
the navy acquired during the war practically decided both points
in our favor. Our sailors had gained too great a name for any one
to molest them with impunity again.
Holding views on these maritime subjects so radically different
from each other, the two nations could not but be continually dealing
with causes of quarrel. Not only did British cruisers molest our
merchant-men, but at length one of them, the 50-gun ship _Leopard_,
attacked an American frigate, the _Chesapeake_, when the latter was
so lumbered up that she could not return a shot, killed or disabled
some twenty of her men and took away four others, one Briton and
three Americans, who were claimed as deserters. For this act an
apology was offered, but it failed to restore harmony between
the two nations. Soon afterward another action was fought. The
American frigate _President_, Commodore Rodgers, attacked the
British sloop _Little Belt_, Captain Bingham, and exchanged one
or two broadsides with her,--the frigate escaping scot-free
while the sloop was nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual recriminations
followed, each side insisting that the other was the assailant.
When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council forbidding our
trading with France, we retaliated by passing an embargo act, which
prevented us from trading at all. There could be but one result to
such a succession of incidents, and that was war. Accordingly, in
June, 1812, war was declared; and as a contest for the rights of
seamen, it was largely waged on the ocean. We also had not a little
fighting to do on land, in which, as a rule, we came out second-best.
Few or no preparations for the war had been made, and the result
was such as might have been anticipated. After dragging on through
three dreary and uneventful years it came to an end in 1815, by a
peace which left matters in almost precisely the state in which
the war had found them. On land and water the contest took the form
of a succession of petty actions, in which the glory acquired by
the victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace incurred by the vanquished.
Neither side succeeded in doing what it intended. Americans declared
that Canada must and should be conquered, but the conquering came
quite as near being the other way. British writers insisted that
the American navy should be swept from the sea; and, during the
sweeping process it increased fourfold.
When the United States declared war, Great Britain was straining
every nerve and muscle in a death struggle with the most formidable
military despotism of modern times, and was obliged to entrust the
defence of her Canadian colonies to a mere handful of regulars, aided
by the local fencibles. But Congress had provided even fewer trained
soldiers, and relied on militia. The latter chiefly exercised their
fighting abilities upon one another in duelling, and, as a rule,
were afflicted with conscientious scruples whenever it was
necessary to cross the frontier and attack the enemy. Accordingly,
the campaign opened with the bloodless surrender of an American
general to a much inferior British force, and the war continued
much as it had begun; we suffered disgrace after disgrace, while
the losses we inflicted, in turn, on Great Britain were so slight
as hardly to attract her attention. At last, having crushed her
greater foe, she turned to crush the lesser, and, in her turn,
suffered ignominious defeat. By this time events had gradually
developed a small number of soldiers on our northern frontier,
who, commanded by Scott and Brown, were able to contend on equal
terms with the veteran troops to whom they were opposed, though
these formed part of what was then undoubtedly the most formidable
fighting infantry any European nation possessed. The battles at
this period of the struggle were remarkable for the skill and
stubborn courage with which they were waged, as well as for the
heavy loss involved; but the number of combatants was so small
that in Europe they would have been regarded as mere outpost
skirmishes, and they wholly failed to attract any attention
abroad in that period of colossal armies.
When Great Britain seriously turned her attention to her
transatlantic foe, and assembled in Canada an army of 14,000 men
at the head of Lake Champlain, Congressional forethought enabled
it to be opposed by soldiers who, it is true, were as well
disciplined, as hardy, and as well commanded as any in the world,
but who were only a few hundred strong, backed by more or less
incompetent militia. Only Macdonough's skill and Sir George
Prevost's incapacity saved us from a serious disaster; the sea-fight
reflected high honor on our seamen, but the retreat of the British
land-forces was due to their commander and not their antagonists.
Meanwhile a large British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achieved
much glory by the destruction of local oyster-boats and the burning
of a few farmers' houses, so an army was landed to strike a decisive
blow. At Bladensburg [Footnote: See the "Capture of Washington,"
by Edward D. Ingraham (Philadelphia. 1849).] the five thousand
British regulars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by their
mere appearance, frightened into a panic double their number of
American militia well posted. But the only success attained was
burning the public buildings of Washington, and that result was
of dubious value. Baltimore was attacked next, and the attack
repulsed, after the forts and ships had shelled one another with
the slight results that usually attend that spectacular and harmless
species of warfare.
The close of the contest was marked by the extraordinary battle of
New Orleans. It was a perfectly useless shedding of blood, since
peace had already been declared. There is hardly another contest of
modern times where the defeated side suffered such frightful carnage,
while the victors came off almost scatheless. It is quite in
accordance with the rest of the war that the militia, hitherto worse
than useless, should on this occasion win against great odds in point
of numbers; and, moreover, that their splendid victory should have
been of little consequence in its effects upon the result. On the
whole, the contest by land, where we certainly ought to have been
successful, reflected greater credit on our antagonists than upon
us, in spite of the services of Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small
force of regulars and volunteers did excellently; as for the militia,
New Orleans proved that they _could_ fight superbly, and the other
battles that they generally _would not_ fight at all.
At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were widely different.
Here we possessed a small but highly effective force, the ships
well built, manned by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by
able and experienced officers. The deeds of our navy form a part
of history over which any American can be pardoned for lingering.
* * * * *
Such was the origin, issue, and general character of the war. It
may now be well to proceed to a comparison of the authorities on
the subject. Allusion has already been made to them in the preface,
but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in this connection.
At the close of the contest, the large majority of historians who
wrote of it were so bitterly rancorous that their statements must
be received with caution. For the main facts, I have relied,
wherever it was practicable, upon the official letters of the
commanding officers, taking each as authority for his own force
and loss.[Footnote: As where Broke states his own force at 330,
his antagonists at 440, and the American court of inquiry makes
the numbers 396 and 379, I have taken them as being 330 and 379
respectively. This is the only just method; I take it for granted
that each commander meant to tell the truth, and of course knew
his own force, while he might very naturally and in perfect good
faith exaggerate his antagonist's.] For all the British victories
we have British official letters, which tally almost exactly, as
regards matters of _fact_ and not of _opinion_, with the corresponding
American accounts. For the first year the British also published
official accounts of their defeats, which in the cases of the
_Guerrière_, _Macedonian_ and _Frolic_, I have followed as closely
as the accounts of the American victors. The last British official
letter published announcing a defeat was that in the case of the
_Java_, and it is the only letter that I have not strictly accepted:
The fact that no more were published thereafter is of itself
unfortunate; and from the various contradictions it contains it
would appear to have been tampered with. The surgeon's report
accompanying it is certainly false. Subsequent to 1812 no letter
of a defeated British commander was published, [Footnote: Except
about the battles on the Lakes, where I have accordingly given the
same credit to the accounts both of the British and of the Americans.]
and I have to depend upon the various British historians, especially
James, of whom more anon.
The American and British historians from whom we are thus at
times forced to draw our material regard the war from very different
stand-points, and their accounts generally differ. Each writer
naturally so colored the affair as to have it appear favorable to
his own side. Sometimes this was done intentionally and sometimes
not. Not unfrequently errors are made against the historian's own
side; as when the British author, Brenton, says that the British
brig _Peacock_ mounted 32's instead of 24's, while Lossing in his
"Field-Book of the War of 1812" makes the same mistake about the
armament of the American brig _Argus_. Errors of this description
are, of course, as carefully to be guarded against as any others.
Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has been said," "a prisoner on
board the opposing fleet has observed," "an American (or British)
newspaper of such and such a date has remarked," are of course to
be rejected. There is a curious parallelism in the errors on both
sides. For example, the American, Mr. Low, writing in 1813, tells
how the _Constitution_, 44, captured the _Guerrière_ of 49 guns,
while the British Lieutenant Low, writing in 1880, tells how the
_Pelican_, 18, captured the _Argus_ of 20 guns. Each records the
truth but not the whole truth, for although rating 44 and 18 the
victors carried respectively 54 and 21 guns, of heavier metal than
those of their antagonists. Such errors are generally intentional.
Similarly, most American writers mention the actions in which the
privateers were victorious, but do not mention those in which they
were defeated; while the British, in turn, record every successful
"cutting-out" expedition, but ignore entirely those which terminated
unfavorably. Other errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, James
in speaking of the repulse of the _Endymion's_ boats by the
_Neufchatel_ gives the latter a crew of 120 men; she had more than
this number originally, but only 40 were in her at the time of the
attack. So also when the captain of the _Pelican_ writes that the
officers of the _Argus_ report her loss at 40, when they really
reported it at 24 or when Captain Dacres thought the _Constitution_
had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The American gun-boat captains
in recounting their engagements with the British frigates invariably
greatly overestimated the loss of the latter. So that on both sides
there were some intentional misstatements or garblings, and a much
more numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely from an
incapacity for seeing more than one side of the question.
Among the early British writers upon this war, the ablest was
James. He devoted one work, his "Naval Occurrences," entirely to
it; and it occupies the largest part of the sixth volume of his more
extensive "History of the British Navy." [Footnote: A new edition,
London, 1826.] Two other British writers, Lieutenant Marshall
[Footnote: "Royal Naval Biography," by John Marshall (London,
1823-1835).] and Captain Brenton, [Footnote: "Naval History of
Great Britain," by Edward Pelham Brenton (new edition, London,
1837).] wrote histories of the same events, about the same time;
but neither of these naval officers produced half as valuable a
work as did the civilian James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes,
each filled with several scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirs
of as many different officers. There is no attempt at order, hardly
any thing about the ships, guns, or composition of the crews; and
not even the pretence of giving both sides, the object being to
make every Englishman appear in his best light. The work is
analogous to the numerous lives of Decatur, Bainbridge, Porter,
etc., that appeared in the United States about the same time, and
is quite as untrustworthy. Brenton made a far better and very
interesting book, written on a good and well-connected plan, and
apparently with a sincere desire to tell the truth. He accepts the
British official accounts as needing nothing whatever to supplement
them, precisely as Cooper accepts the American officials'. A more
serious fault is his inability to be accurate. That this inaccuracy
is not intentional is proved by the fact that it tells as often
against his own side as against his opponents. He says, for example,
that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's squadrons "were about equal
in number and weight," that the _Peacock_ (British) was armed with
32's instead of 24's, and underestimates the force of the second
_Wasp_. But the blunders are quite as bad when distributed as when
confined to one side; in addition, Brenton's disregard of all
details makes him of but little use.
James, as already said, is by far the most valuable authority on
the war, as regards _purely British_ affairs. He enters minutely
into details, and has evidently laboriously hunted up his authorities.
He has examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, various
treatises, all the _Gazette_ reports, gives very well-chosen
extracts, has arranged his work in chronological order, discriminates
between the officers that deserve praise and those that deserve
blame, and in fact writes a work which ought to be consulted by
every student of naval affairs. But he is unfortunately afflicted
with a hatred toward the Americans that amounts to a monomania. He
wishes to make out as strong a case as possible against them. The
_animus_ of his work may be gathered from the not over complimentary
account of the education of the youthful seafaring American, which
can be found in vol. vi, p. 113, of his "History." On page 153 he
asserts that he is an "impartial historian"; and about three lines
before mentions that "it may suit the Americans to invent any
falsehood, no matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant character
on themselves." On page 419 he says that Captain Porter is to be
believed, "so far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where
an American is concerned),"--which somewhat sweeping denunciation
of the veracity of all of Captain Porter's compatriots would seem
to indicate that James was not, perhaps, in that dispassionate
frame of mind best suited for writing history. That he should be
biassed against individual captains can be understood, but when he
makes rabid onslaughts upon the American people as a whole, he
renders it difficult for an American, at any rate, to put implicit
credence in him. His statements are all the harder to confute
when they are erroneous, because they are intentionally so. It is
not, as with Brenton and Marshall, because he really thinks a
British captain _cannot_ be beaten, except by some kind of distorted
special providence, for no man says worse things than he does about
certain officers and crews. A writer of James' undoubted ability
must have known perfectly well that his statements were untrue in
many instances, as where he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's
loss, or misstates the comparative force of the fleets on Lake
Champlain.
When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge wished to run
away from the _Java_, and would have done so if he had not been
withheld by the advice of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade
Englishman, [Footnote: Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in
Virginia, and never in England in his life.] it is not of much
consequence whether his making the statement was due to excessive
credulity or petty meanness, for, in either case, whether the
defect was in his mind or his morals, it is enough to greatly
impair the value of his other "facts." Again, when James (p. 165)
states that Decatur ran away from the _Macedonian_ until, by some
marvellous optical delusion, he mistook her for a 32, he merely
detracts a good deal from the worth of his own account. When the
Americans adopt boarding helmets, he considers it as proving
conclusively that they are suffering from an acute attack of
cowardice. On p. 122 he says that "had the _President_, when she
fell in with the _Belvidera_, been cruising alone * * * Commodore
Rodgers would have magnified the British frigate into a line-of-battle
ship, and have done his utmost to avoid her," which gives an excellent
idea of the weight to be attached to the various other anecdotes he
relates of the much-abused Commodore Rodgers.
But it must always be remembered that untrustworthy as James is in
any thing referring purely to the Americans, he is no worse than
his compeers of both nationalities. The misstatements of Niles in
his "Weekly Register" about the British are quite as flagrant, and
his information about his own side even more valuable. [Footnote:
In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of the
traditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place I remember
his describing "The Immortal Rodgers," baulked of his natural prey,
the British, as "soaring about like the bold bald eagle of his
native land," seeking whom he might devour. The accounts he gives of
British line-of-battle ships fleeing from American 44's quite match
James' anecdotes of the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's
for fear they might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works taken
together give a very good idea of the war; separately, either is
utterly unreliable, especially in matters of opinion.] Every little
American author crowed over Perry's "Nelsonic victory over a greatly
superior force." The _Constitution_ was declared to have been at a
disadvantage when she fought the _Guerrière_, and so on _ad
infinitum_. But these writers have all faded into oblivion, and
their writings are not even referred to, much less believed. James,
on the contrary, has passed through edition after edition, is
considered as unquestionable authority in his own country, and
largely throughout Europe, and has furnished the basis for every
subsequent account by British authors. From Alison to Lieutenant
Low, almost every English work, whether of a popular character or
not, is, in so far as it touches on the war, simply a "rehash" of
the works written by James. The consequence is that the British
and American accounts have astonishingly little resemblance. One
ascribes the capture of the British frigates simply to the fact
that their opponents were "cut down line-of-battle ships"; the
other gives all the glory to the "undaunted heroism," etc., of
the Yankee sailors.
One not very creditable trait of the early American naval historians
gave their rivals a great advantage. The object of the former was
to make out that the _Constitution_, for example, won her victories
against an equal foe, and an exact statement of the forces showed
the contrary; so they always avoided figures, and thus left the
ground clear for James' careful misstatements. Even when they
criticised him they never went into details, confining themselves
to some remark about "hurling" his figures in his face with
"loathing." Even Cooper, interesting though his work is, has gone
far less into figures than he should, and seems to have paid little
if any attention to the British official statements, which of
course should be received as of equal weight with the American.
His comments on the actions are generally very fair, the book never
being disfigured by bitterness toward the British; but he is
certainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the loss of the
_Chesapeake_ solely to accident, that of the _Argus_ solely to her
inferiority in force, and so on. His disposition to praise _all_
the American commanders may be generous, but is nevertheless unjust.
If Decatur's surrender of the _President_ is at least impliedly
praised, then Porter's defence of the _Essex_ can hardly receive
its just award. There is no weight in the commendation bestowed
upon Hull, if commendation, the same in kind though less in degree,
is bestowed upon Rodgers. It is a great pity that Cooper did not
write a criticism on James, for no one could have done it more
thoroughly. But he never mentions him, except once in speaking of
Barclay's fleet. In all probability this silence arose from sheer
contempt, and the certainty that most of James' remarks were false;
but the effect was that very many foreigners believe him to have
shirked the subject. He rarely gives any data by which the statements
of James can be disproved, and it is for this reason that I have
been obliged to criticise the latter's work very fully. Many of
James' remarks, however, defy criticism from their random nature,
as when he states that American midshipmen were chiefly masters and
mates of merchantmen, and does not give a single proof to support
the assertion. It would be nearly as true to assert that the
British midshipmen were for the most part ex-members of the
prize-ring, and as much labor would be needed to disprove it. In
other instances it is quite enough to let his words speak for
themselves, as where he says (p. 155) that of the American sailors
one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness were in
reality British. That is, of the 450 men the _Constitution_ had when
she fought the _Java_ 150 were British, and the remaining 300 could
have been as effectively replaced by 150 more British. So a very
little logic works out a result that James certainly did not intend
to arrive at; namely, that 300 British led by American officers
could beat, with ease and comparative impunity, 400 British led by
their own officers. He also forgets that the whole consists of the
sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories of the Americans
by stating (p. 280) that they were lucky enough to meet with frigates
and brigs who had unskilful gunners or worthless crews; he also
carefully shows that the _Macedonian_ was incompetently handled,
the _Peacock_ commanded by a mere martinet, the _Avon's_ crew
unpractised weak and unskilful, the _Java's_ exceedingly poor, and
more to the same effect. Now the Americans took in single fight
three frigates and seven sloops, and when as many as ten vessels
are met it is exceedingly probable that they represent the fair
average; so that James' strictures, so far as true, simply show
that the average British ship was very apt to possess, comparatively
speaking, an incompetent captain or unskilful crew. These
disadvantages were not felt when opposed to navies in which they
existed to an even greater extent, but became very apparent when
brought into contact with a power whose few officers knew how to
play their own parts very nearly to perfection, and, something
equally important, knew how to make first-rate crews out of what
was already good raw material. Finally, a large proportion of
James' abuse of the Americans sufficiently refutes itself, and
perhaps Cooper's method of contemptuously disregarding him was the
best; but no harm can follow from devoting a little space to
commenting upon him.
Much the best American work is Lieutenant George E. Emmons'
statistical "History of the United States Navy." Unfortunately it
is merely a mass of excellently arranged and classified statistics,
and while of invaluable importance to the student, is not interesting
to the average reader. Almost all the statements I have made of
the force, tonnage, and armament of the American vessels, though
I have whenever practicable taken them from the Navy Records, etc.,
yet could be just as well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most of
the American official letters which I have quoted can be found in
"Niles' Register," volumes 1 to 10, and all of the British ones in
the "London Naval Chronicle" for the same years. It is to these two
authorities that I am most indebted, and nearly as much so to the
"American State Papers," vol. xiv. Next in order come Emmons,
Cooper, and the invaluable, albeit somewhat scurrilous, James; and
a great many others whose names I have quoted in their proper
places. In commenting upon the actions, I have, whenever possible,
drawn from some standard work, such as Jurien de la Gravière's
"Guerres Maritimes," Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery,"
or, better still, from the lives and memoirs of Admirals Farragut,
Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles of the various works will
be found given in full as they are referred to. [Footnote: To get
an idea of the American seamen of that time Cooper's novels,
"Miles Wallingford," "Home as Found," and the "Pilot," are far
better than any history; in the "Two Admirals" the description of
the fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His view of Jack's life is
rather rose-colored however. "Tom Cringle's log" ought to be read
for the information it gives. Marryatt's novels will show some of
the darker aspects of sailor life.] In a few cases, where extreme
accuracy was necessary, or where, as in the case of the _President's_
capture, it was desirable that there should be no room for dispute
as to the facts, I have given the authority for each sentence; but
in general this would be too cumbersome, and so I have confined
myself to referring, at or near the beginning of the account of
each action, to the authorities from whom I have taken it. For the
less important facts on which every one is agreed I have often given
no references.