Although the trial of war through which our country and our army passed
in 1904-5 is now a subject for history, the material thus far collected
is not sufficiently abundant to enable the historian to estimate fairly
the events that preceded the war, nor to give a detailed explanation
of the defeats that we sustained in the course of it. It is urgently
necessary, however, that we should make immediate use of our recent
experience, because by ascertaining the nature of our mistakes and the
weaknesses of our troops we may learn what means should be adopted
to increase, hereafter, the material and spiritual strength of our
military force.
In times past, when wars were carried on by small standing armies,
defeats did not affect the every-day interests of the whole nation
so profoundly as they affect them now, when the obligation to render
military service is general, and when, in time of war, most of our
soldiers are drawn from the great body of the people. If a war is to
be successful, in these days, it must be carried on, not by an army,
but by an armed nation, and in such a contest all sides of the national
life are more seriously affected and all defeats are more acutely felt
than they were in times past.
When the national pride has been humiliated by failure in war, attempts
are usually made to ascertain what brought about the failure and who
was responsible for it. Some persons attribute it to general causes,
others to special causes. Some censure the system, or the régime,
while others throw the blame on particular individuals. I have been
so closely connected with immensely important events in the Far East,
and have been responsible to such an extent for the failure of our
military operations there, that I can hardly hope to take an absolutely
dispassionate and objective view of the persons and matters that I
shall deal with in the present work; but my object is not so much
to justify myself by replying to the charges that have been brought
against me personally as to furnish material that will make it easier
for the future historian to state fairly the reasons for our defeat,
and thus render possible the adoption of measures that will prevent
such defeats hereafter. The army that Russia put into the field in
1904-5 was unable, in the time allowed, to conquer the Japanese; and
yet Japan, only a short time before the war began, had no regular army
and was regarded by us as a second-class Power. How was she able to win
a complete victory over Russia at sea, and to defeat a powerful Russian
army on land? Many writers will study this question and, in time, they
will give us a comprehensive answer to it; but I shall confine myself,
in the present work, to an enumeration of the most broad and general
reasons for Japanese success. Among the most important of such reasons
is the following:--we did not fully appreciate the material and moral
strength of Japan and did not regard a conflict with her seriously
enough.[A]
_The Secret Growth of Japan's Army_
The Japanese first became our neighbors when, in the reign of Peter
the Great, we acquired the peninsula of Kamchatka. In 1860, by virtue
of the Treaty of Peking, we took peaceful possession of the extensive
Usuri territory; moved down to the boundary of Korea; and obtained
an outlet on the Sea of Japan. This sea, which is almost completely
enclosed by Korea and the Japanese islands, was immensely important
to the whole adjacent coast of the main land; but as the straits that
connected it with the ocean were in the hands of the Japanese, we might
easily be prevented by them from getting free access to the Pacific.
When we acquired the island of Sakhalin, we obtained an outlet through
the Tartar Strait; but that was all we had, and during a large part of
the time it was frozen over.
For a long time, Japan lived a life that was wholly apart from ours and
did not particularly attract our attention. We knew the Japanese as
extremely skilful and patient artisans; we were fond of the things that
they made; and we were charmed with the delicacy and bright coloring of
their artistic products; but, from a military point of view, we took no
interest in them and regarded them as a weak nation. Our sailors always
spoke with sympathetic appreciation of the country and its inhabitants,
and were delighted to stay in Japanese ports--especially Nagasaki,
where they were liked and favorably remembered; but our travellers,
diplomats, and naval officers entirely overlooked the awakening of an
energetic, independent people.
In 1867, the army of Japan consisted of nine battalions of infantry,
two squadrons of cavalry, and eight batteries, and numbered only 10,000
men. This force, which formed the _cadre_ of the present army, had French
teachers and adopted from the latter the French uniform. After the
Franco-German war of 1870-71, German officers took the places of the
French instructors; military service was made a national obligation;
and Japanese officers were sent to Europe, every year, for the purpose
of study. At the time of her war with China, Japan had an army
consisting of seven infantry divisions; but finding herself unable, at
the end of that war, to retain the fruits of her victory, on account
of her weakness both on land and at sea, she made every possible
effort to create an army and a fleet that would be strong enough to
protect her interests. On the 19th of March, 1896, the Mikado issued
a decree providing for such a reorganization of the army as would
double its strength in the course of seven years. This reorganization
was completed in 1903. Our military and naval authorities did not
overlook the creation and development in Japan of a strong army and
fleet; but they confined themselves to the collection and tabulation of
statistics. We kept an account of every ship built and every division
of troops organized; but we did not estimate highly enough these
beginnings of Japan, and did not admit the possibility of measuring her
fighting-power by European standards. The latest information that we
had with regard to her military strength, prior to the late war, was
compiled by our General Staff from the reports of Colonel Vannofski
and other Russian military agents in Tokio. It showed that her army,
on a peace footing, numbered 8,116 officers and 133,457 men (not
including the troops in Formosa); and on a war footing, 10,735 officers
(not including reserve officers) and 348,074 men, with perhaps 50,000
untrained reserve recruits. There was no mention of additional reserve
forces.
_Russian Generals Pigeonhole Reports of Japan's Fighting Strength_
In 1903 Colonel Adabash, who had just visited Japan, gave to General
Zhilinski, of our General Staff, very important information with regard
to new reserves which the Japanese were organizing for service in case
of war. Inasmuch, however, as this information did not agree at all
with that previously furnished by Colonel Vannofski, General Zhilinski
did not give it credence. A few months later, Captain Rusine, a very
talented officer who was acting as naval observer in Japan, made a
similar report upon Japanese reserves to his superiors, and extracts
from it were furnished to General Sakharoff, Chief of Staff of the
army. Although the information contained in this report ultimately
proved to be perfectly accurate, the report was pigeonholed, simply
because Generals Zhilinski and Sakharoff did not believe it; and in our
compendium of data with regard to the military strength of Japan in
1903-4, no reference whatever was made to additional reserve forces.
According to the figures of our General Staff, therefore, the total
number of available men in the standing army, the territorial army, and
the regular reserve of Japan, was a little more than 400,000.[B]
[Illustration: _Stereograph copyright, 1904, by Underwood & Underwood_