1. These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself,
analyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which
it bears itself enjoys,—for the fruits of plants and that in animals
which corresponds to fruits others enjoy,—it obtains its own end,
wherever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a
play and in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete if
anything cuts it short; but in every part, and where-ever it may be
stopped, it makes what has been set before it full and complete, so
that it can say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses the
whole universe, and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and
it extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and
comprehends the periodical renovation of all things, and it comprehends
that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor have those
before us seen anything more, but in a manner he who is forty years
old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the
uniformity that prevails all things which have been and all that will
be. This too is a property of the rational soul, love of one’s
neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself,
which is also the property of Law. Thus then right reason differs not
at all from the reason of justice.
2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the
pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its
several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by
this; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in
the matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do
the same; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all
things, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply
thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to value
them little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life.
3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be
separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or
dispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a
man’s own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,
but considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another,
without tragic show.
4. Have I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had
my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop
[doing such good].
5. What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well
except by general principles, some about the nature of the universe,
and others about the proper constitution of man?
6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding
men of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to
nature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with
what is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which
takes place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be
accomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out, “O
Cithaeron.” And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic
writers, of which kind is the following especially:—
“Me and my children if the gods neglect,
This has its reason too.”
And again,—
“We must not chafe and fret at that which happens.”
And,—
“Life’s harvest reap like the wheat’s fruitful ear.”
And other things of the same kind.
After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial
freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in
reminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes
used to take from these writers.
But as to the middle comedy, which came next, observe what it was, and
again, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually
sank down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said
even by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such
poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look?
7. How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life
so well suited for philosophizing as this in which thou now happenest
to be.
8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut
off from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from
another man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a
branch, another cuts it off; but a man by his own act separates himself
from his neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him, and he
does not know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the
whole social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who
framed society, for it is in our power to grow again to that which is
near to us, and again to become a part which helps to make up the
whole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes
it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and
to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from
the first grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one
life with it, is not like that which after being cut off is then
ingrafted, for this is something like what the gardeners mean when they
say that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that it has not the
same mind with it.
9. As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding
according to right reason will not be able to turn thee aside from thy
proper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent
feelings towards them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not
only in the matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the
matter of gentleness to those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble
thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to
be diverted from thy course of action and to give way through fear; for
both are equally deserters from their post,—the man who does it through
fear, and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman
and a friend.
10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate
the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most
perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of
the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of
the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed,
hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have
their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care
for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and
careless and changeable (V. 16, 30; VII. 55).
11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of
which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy
judgment about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou
wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.
12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is
neither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor
dispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees
the truth,—the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself
(VIII. 41, 45; XII. 3).
13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But
I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything
deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I
will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even
him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my
endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless
indeed he only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such,
and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with
anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now
doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that
which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since
thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is for the
common advantage may be done in some way?
14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to
raise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.
15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal
with thee in a fair way!—What art thou doing, man? There is no occasion
to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought
to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man’s character is, he
immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith
reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good
ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander
as soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But
the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. Nothing is more
disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this
most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these things
in the eyes, and there is no mistaking.
16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be
indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be
indifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all
together, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an
opinion about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain
immovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them,
and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not
to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgments
have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if
we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time, and
then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in
doing this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in
them and they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek
what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even if
it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek his own good.
17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and
into what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has
changed, and that it will sustain no harm.
18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my
relation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another
respect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a
bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from
this: If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all
things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the
superior, and these for the sake of one another (II. 1; IX. 39; V. 16;
III. 4).
Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so
forth: and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions
they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what
they do (VIII. 14; IX. 34).
Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be
displeased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so
involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly
deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power
of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are
pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a
word wrong-doers to their neighbors (VII. 62, 63; II. 1; VII. 26; VIII.
29).
Fourth, consider that thou also dost many things wrong, and that thou
art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain
faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either
through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean
motive, thou dost abstain from such faults (I. 17).
Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are
doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference
to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable
him to pass a correct judgment on another man’s acts (IX. 38; IV. 51).
Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man’s life is
only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (VII.
58; IV. 48).
Seventh, that it is not men’s acts which disturb us, for those acts
have their foundation in men’s ruling principles, but it is our own
opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve
to dismiss thy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous,
and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By
reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for
unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity
do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else (V. 25;
VII. 16).
Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and
vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we
are angry and vexed (IV. 39, 49; VII. 24).
Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine,
and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most
violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition
towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him
and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to
do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature
for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art
injuring thyself, my child.—And show him with gentle tact and by
general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he
does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And
thou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of
reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and
not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may
admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present….[6]
Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift
from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But
thou must equally avoid flattering men and being vexed at them, for
both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to
thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not
manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to
human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these
qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who
is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in
which a man’s mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same
degree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a
characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain
and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both submit.
But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the
[Muses, Apollo], and it is this,—that to expect bad men not to do wrong
is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to
allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any
wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.
19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty
against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou
hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each
occasion thus: This thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy
social union: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real
thoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things
for a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when
thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of
the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less
honorable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross
pleasures (IV. 24; II. 16).
20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee,
though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to
the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the
compound mass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee
and the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up
and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner
then the elemental parts obey the universal; for when they have been
fixed in any place, perforce they remain there until again the
universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then
strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and
discontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but
only those things which are comformable to its nature: still it does
not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the movement
towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is
nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also
when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens,
then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety and
reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these
qualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment
with the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior to acts of
justice.
21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be
one and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not
enough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as
there is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or
other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some
certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so
also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a
common kind [social] and political. For he who directs all his own
efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will
always be the same.
22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm
and trepidation of the town mouse.[7]
23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of
Lamiae,—bugbears to frighten children.
24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in
the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.
25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying,
It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that is, I
would not receive a favor and then be unable to return it.
26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] there was this precept,
constantly to think of some one of the men of former times who
practised virtue.
27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we
may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things
and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of
their purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.
28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,
after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates
said to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when
they saw him dressed thus.
29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down
rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules
thyself. Much more is this so in life.
30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.
31. And my heart laughed within.
_Odyssey_, IX. 413.
32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.
HESIOD, _Works and Days_, 184.
33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman’s act: such is he who
looks for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, III. 24,
87).
34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to
himself, “To-morrow perchance thou wilt die.”—But those are words of
bad omen.—“No word is a word of bad omen,” said Epictetus, “which
expresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad
omen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped” (Epictetus, III. 24,
88).
35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are changes,
not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus,
III. 24).
36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus III. 22, 105).
37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with
respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must
be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be
consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of
the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away
from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with
respect to any of the things which are not in our power.
38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but
about being mad or not.
39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or
irrational?—souls of rational men.—Of what rational men, sound or
unsound?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek for them?—Because we have
them.—Why then do you fight and quarrel?