Whitehall, Nov. 13th, 1788.
My dear Brother,
Your messenger has performed his journey with uncommon
expedition, and brought me your letters at a little after eleven
this morning. The account of to-day is, I think, more favourable
than that of the two preceding days. The King had last night a
strong return of his fever, which left him this morning more
composed than he has been for several days. Warren's account
adds that he even "understood questions that were put to him,
though he soon relapsed into his former inconsistency." The
material part of this, I think, is that it proves him never to
have been without fever, though it has been kept under, and
therefore affords ground still to hope for such a crisis as may
end this scene, either by his death or by his total recovery.
And there can be no doubt that even, for his sake, either of
those alternatives is preferable to his continuing in his
present situation, though with the possibility of recovering his
reason by intervals.
This circumstance affords an additional and strong reason for
delaying as long as possible the taking any decisive steps for
providing for carrying on the Government under the present
circumstances. It is intended to meet Parliament on the 20th,
and circular letters are to be sent to-day to all the members,
notifying the probability of this. But, as things now stand,
Pitt means immediately to propose to them to adjourn; and it is
most likely that this will meet with no opposition, especially
as Fox cannot be in town by that time.
If the present circumstances should still continue, Pitt means
to propose a Bill, declaring the Prince of Wales Regent, or
Guardian, to exercise the King's authority during his illness,
but in the King's name only. We have, I think, not yet entirely
made up our minds as to the degree of power and authority which
it will be right to put into his hands for that purpose. That it
cannot be necessary to invest him with the whole regal
authority, is, I think, quite evident; and we owe it to the
King, both as public men professing allegiance to him, and as
individuals bound to him by many ties of gratitude and honour,
to take whatever steps we can with propriety to preserve to him,
in case of his recovery, not merely his legal rights, of which
he cannot be deprived, but also the political means of
exercising those rights according to the opinions which he
entertains both of public men and public measures. And to this
extent I am inclined to hope that the general opinion will bear
us out; but we must be extremely cautious that we do nothing
which shall bear in the public estimation the appearance of
wishing to establish ourselves under this pretence in the
continuance of our power in opposition to the Prince of Wales,
in whom we are to propose the supreme authority to be vested.
All the precedents, as far as they apply to this case, would
justify the appointment of a Council of Regency, to be named by
Parliament, by the majority of which the Regent would be bound.
And I think it is not clear that in all events we shall not be
obliged, by the strong analogy to be drawn from some of those
cases, to provide some such Council. But it seems now to be
agreed that we ought not to propose their being named by
Parliament, because that would be in effect to propose that the
executive authority should be vested by Parliament in our hands,
instead of those of the Prince of Wales. Such a proposition
would be difficult to carry, and might be seen by the public in
such a light as materially and permanently to affect our
characters. Besides this, what is more important even than these
considerations, is, that on the fullest consideration, we are
persuaded such a proposal ought not to be made, and would, if
carried, be injurious to the country. Examine the provisions of
the last Regency Bill, and you will, I think, be convinced that
the present Government, being joined in such a Council with the
Prince of Wales and the Royal Family, could produce nothing but
discord, confusion and anarchy; and that on such a plan the
administration of public affairs cannot proceed.
This line of argument leads to the nomination of the Prince of
Wales, either without a Council, or with a Council, consisting
only of the Cabinet Ministers for the time being, and removable
by him, limiting at the same time his authority in other
respects in such a manner as may not be inconsistent with the
means of carrying on a temporary Government; but may provide in
the manner I have already mentioned for securing to the King, in
case of his recovery, the possession and exercise of his rights,
such as he enjoyed them before his illness. The means of doing
this appear to be the restraining the Prince from granting any
office or pension for life, or in reversion, except those only
which must by law be granted either for life, or during good
behaviour; restraining him from creating or advancing peers,
and, perhaps, from dissolving the present or any future
Parliament. The last of these points appear to be that which
admits of most doubt, whether it should be stated to the extent
which I have mentioned, or whether it should be confined to this
Parliament, or should be entirely omitted. My own opinion, I
think, rather leans to inserting it in its full extent, though I
see and confess that there are weighty objections to it.
I have now mentioned to you all I know of our views and
intentions on this most important subject. The next point
relates to our own situation. We have no knowledge at all, any
more than when I wrote to you before, of the Prince of Wales's
intentions, nor has any overture, direct or indirect, been made
to Mr. Pitt. This circumstance, joined to the affectation with
which Sheridan appears to be consulted on all occasions, seems
sufficiently to indicate what is to be expected. A part of this,
however, is to be attributed to Sheridan's eagerness to display
his personal importance, by which silly vanity I am told he has
much offended the Duke of Portland and Fox's immediate friends.
We are therefore still much in doubt whether there is any idea
of proposing terms of junction. We are all agreed that the most
desirable thing would be, that Pitt should be removed at once,
and without management. The difficulties of a real _bonâ fide_
junction appear insuperable, and in anything short of that,
duplicity and dishonesty might give them advantages which,
though we should not certainly envy, yet we might have much
cause to lament. There is, however, one circumstance arising
from the present state of things which, if that should continue,
will, I think, afford a clear and distinct line for us to
follow. The King's illness being such as it is now described to
be, it is not only possible, but much the most probable event,
that he will at some period be restored to the use of his
reason, either permanently, or during intervals of considerable
length. Under this impression, it seems impossible for us for a
moment to entertain proposals which might involve us in
contradictory obligations, and our acceptance of which might be
not only injurious to the King's feelings, which we are so much
bound to consult, but even prejudicial to the state of his mind.
Suppose him to awake out of the sort of dream, in which he now
is, and to find that Pitt had, by his own consent and his own
act, brought into his Government those very men whom he was
pledged to him to keep at a distance from it; suppose the King's
aversion and dislike to those men, so justly founded as it is,
to remain in full force and vigour. What then is Pitt to do? Is
he to separate himself from people whom he has joined on the
promise of mutual good faith and confidence, or is he to abandon
the King in the very point to which he has pledged him, and on
which he has always received from him a full and unequivocal
support? Besides the difficulties in which Pitt would thus find
himself involved, must not the very idea of such a situation
striking the King's imagination at the first moments of his
recovery, and agitating him in the same manner as these very
situations have done before, drive him back into his former
state, and render all further hopes of recovery desperate and
impossible?
This consideration I think unanswerable, and have no doubt that
it will continue to be so felt. In the case, therefore, of a
Regency, all proposals of junction will instantly be negatived
as inconsistent with our duty to the King. In the case of a
demise, which there is to-day more reason to think probable than
there has been for several days past, we shall feel ourselves
considerably embarrassed. I put the idea of a _bonâ fide_
junction, as I have already said, wholly out of the question,
being persuaded that the thing is impossible, and that our
opponents will never seriously intend it. Their proposals, if
any are made, will, I am convinced, have no other object than
that perhaps of satisfying the Prince of Wales, if your
information respecting him is well grounded, and of lessening
the odium of Pitt's removal in the eyes of the public, and
holding him out as a haughty and impracticable character.
Against this he must defend himself as well as he can, but the
whole will, I am persuaded, be nothing more than a match at
fencing; and the guard which I mentioned to you before, of
insisting on his present situation, seems as good a one as any
other. I have delivered to him your letter, and shown him that
which you wrote to me. He has desired me to say that he will, if
possible, write a few words to you by this messenger, but if he
should find that quite impossible, without delaying him, he has
begged me to express how strongly he feels your kind and
affectionate conduct towards him.
His popularity was never greater than in the present moment, and
if the Prince should be so ill-advised as to dismiss him, it is
probable that the current will run at least as strongly in his
favour as it did in his father's.
I have written you a dissertation rather than a letter, but I
know the desire which you must feel to be as fully informed as
possible, not only of facts, but also of opinions and
intentions. I need not mention to you how confidential every
part of this letter is, but particularly that part which
respects our intentions as to the settlement of a Regency;
because we conceive it of the utmost importance, though these
and many other ideas are floating in the public, to keep our
enemies as ignorant as we can of our real intentions in this
respect.
Of the different questions which you have stated respecting
Ireland, in the case of a demise, you will certainly be much
better able to judge than I am; but I cannot help wishing you to
look into the Act of Settlement in Queen Anne's time, and to
consider whether that does not provide for the continuance of
Irish officers, civil and military, as well as English.
In the case of a Regency, my idea is that as soon as the King's
illness is communicated to Parliament here, which will not be
till after the adjournment, directions should be given to the
Lord-Lieutenant and Council of Ireland to assemble the two
Houses by special summons; and that our Bill, whatever it is,
should be communicated to them in a speech from the
Lord-Lieutenant, and should be passed _verbatim_ in the Irish
Parliament. Some opinions here seem to doubt the necessity of
this; there has, however, been very little discussion upon it.
You will easily see the impossibility of doing anything about
your commissions, which must share the fate of many others in
England. I much fear that Tompkins's office at Chelsea will
stand in this predicament. The form is, that a recommendation
goes from this office to the Secretary of State, who takes the
King's pleasure upon it. The first step has been taken, but the
latter has been impossible. If my successor is a gentleman, he
will confirm the appointment; but the chances are so much
against that, that I almost despair.
Adieu, my dear brother.
Believe me ever most affectionately yours,
W. W. G.
I had written before your messenger arrived a long letter in
cypher, which this opportunity of writing will save you the
labour of decyphering. In case, however, we should want to use
the cypher any more, pray add the following names: 5, Sheridan;
6, Duke of Portland; 7, First Lord of the Treasury.