PLATONIC CANON AS APPRECIATED AND MODIFIED BY MODERN CRITICS.
[Side-note: The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally
acknowledged, by the Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the
succeeding critics after the revival of learning.]
The Platonic Canon established by Thrasyllus maintained its authority
until the close of the last century, in regard to the distinction
between what was genuine and spurious. The distribution indeed did not
continue to be approved: the Tetralogies were neglected, and the order
of the dialogues varied: moreover, doubts were intimated about
Kleitophon and Epinomis. But nothing was positively removed from, or
positively added to, the total recognised by Thrasyllus. The
Neo-Platonists (from the close of the second century B.C., down to the
beginning of the sixth A.D.) introduced a new, mystic, and theological
interpretation, which often totally changed and falsified Plato's
meaning. Their principles of interpretation would have been strange
and unintelligible to the rhetors Thrasyllus and Dionysius of
Halikarnassus--or to the Platonic philosopher Charmadas, who expounded
Plato to Marcus Crassus at Athens. But they still continued to look
for Plato in the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, in each and all of
them. So also continued Ficinus, who, during the last half of the
fifteenth century, did so much to revive in the modern world the study
of Plato. He revived along with it the neo-platonic interpretation.
The Argumenta, prefixed to the different dialogues by Ficinus, are
remarkable, as showing what an ingenious student, interpreting in that
spirit, discovered in them.
But the scholars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
centuries, speaking generally--though not neglecting these
neo-platonic refinements, were disposed to seek out, wherever they could
find it, a more literal interpretation of the Platonic text, correctly
presented and improved. The next great edition of the works of Plato
was published by Serranus and Stephens, in the latter portion of the
sixteenth century.
[Side-note: Serranus--his six Syzygies--left the aggregate Canon
unchanged, Tennemann--importance assigned to the Phædrus.]
Serranus distributed the dialogues of Plato into six groups which he
called Syzygies. In his first Syzygy were comprised Euthyphron,
Apologia, Kriton, Phædon (coinciding with the first Tetralogy of
Thrasyllus), as setting forth the defence of Sokrates and of his
doctrine. The second Syzygy included the dialogues introductory to
philosophy generally, and impugning the Sophists--Theagês, Erastæ,
Theætêtus, Sophistês, Euthydêmus, Protagoras, Hippias II. In the third
Syzygy were three dialogues considered as bearing on Logic--Kratylus,
Gorgias, Ion. The fourth Syzygy contained the dialogues on Ethics
generally--Philêbus, Menon, Alkibiadês I.; on special points of
Ethics--Alkibiadês II., Charmidês, Lysis, Hipparchus; and on
Politics--Menexenus, Politikus, Minos, Republic, Leges, Epinomis. The
fifth Syzygy included the dialogues on Physics, and Metaphysics (or
Theology)--Timæus, Kritias, Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædrus, Hippias
I.** In the sixth Syzygy were ranged the thirteen Epistles, the various
dialogues which Serranus considered spurious (Kleitophon among them,
which he regarded as doubtful), and the Definitions.
Serranus, while modifying the distribution of the Platonic works, left
the entire Canon very much as he found it. So it remained throughout
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the scholars who devoted
themselves to Plato were content with improvement of the text,
philological illustration, and citations from the ancient
commentators. But the powerful impulse, given by Kant to the
speculative mind of Europe during the last quarter of the eighteenth
century, materially affected the point of view from which Plato was
regarded. Tennemann, both in his System of the Platonic Philosophy,
and in dealing with Plato as a portion of his general history of
philosophy, applied the doctrines of Kant largely and even excessively
to the exposition of ancient doctrines. Much of his comment is
instructive, greatly surpassing his predecessors. Without altering the
Platonic Canon, he took a new view of the general purposes of Plato,
and especially he brought forward the dialogue Phædrus into a
prominence which had never before belonged to it, as an index or
key-note ([Greek: e)ndo/simon]) to the whole Platonic series. Shortly
after Tennemann, came Schleiermacher, who introduced a theory of his
own, ingenious as well as original, which has given a new turn to all
the subsequent Platonic criticism.
[Side-note: Schleiermacher--new theory about the purposes of Plato.
One philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the
beginning--essential order and interdependence of the dialogues, as
contributing to the full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not
constituent items in the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of
arrangement.]
Schleiermacher begins by assuming two fundamental postulates, both
altogether new. 1. A systematic unity of philosophic theme and
purpose, conceived by Plato in his youth, at first
obscurely--afterwards worked out through successive dialogues; each
dialogue disclosing the same purpose, but the later disclosing it more
clearly and fully, until his old age. 2. A peremptory, exclusive, and
intentional order by Plato of the dialogues, composed by Plato with a
view to the completion of this philosophical scheme. Schleiermacher
undertakes to demonstrate what this order was, and to point out the
contribution brought by each successive dialogue to the accomplishment
of Plato's premeditated scheme.
To those who understand Plato, the dialogues themselves reveal (so
Schleiermacher affirms) their own essential order of sequence--their
own mutual relations of antecedent and consequent. Each presupposes
those which go before: each prepares for those which follow.
Accordingly, Schleiermacher distributes the Platonic dialogues into
three groups: the first, or elementary, beginning with Phædrus,
followed by Lysis, Protagoras, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron,
Parmenidês: the second, or preparatory, comprising Gorgias, Theætêtus,
Menon, Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Symposion, Phædon,
Philêbus: the third, or constructive, including Republic, Timæus, and
Kritias. These groups or files are all supposed to be marshalled under
Platonic authority: both the entire files as first, second, third and
the dialogues composing each file, carrying their own place in the
order, imprinted in visible characters. But to each file, there is
attached what Schleiermacher terms an Appendix, containing one or more
dialogues, each a composition by itself, and lying not in the series,
but alongside of it (Nebenwerke). The Appendix to the first file
includes Apologia, Kriton, Ion, Hippias II., Hipparchus, Minos,
Alkibiadês II. The Appendix to the second file consists of Theagês,
Erastæ, Alkibiadês I., Menexenus, Hippias I., Kleitophon. That of the
third file consists of the Leges. The Appendix is not supposed to
imply any common positive character in the dialogues which it
includes, but simply the negative attribute of not belonging to the
main philosophical column, besides a greater harmony with the file to
which it is attached than with the other two files. Some dialogues
assigned to the Appendixes are considered by Schleiermacher as
spurious; some however he treats as compositions on special occasions,
or adjuncts to the regular series. To this latter category belong the
Apologia, Kriton, and Leges. Schleiermacher considers the Charmidês to
have been composed during the time of the Anarchy, B.C. 404: the
Phædrus (earliest of all), in Olymp. 93 (B.C. 406), two years
before:[1] the Lysis, Protagoras, and Lachês, to lie between them in
respect of date.
[Footnote 1: Schleierm. vol. i. p. 72; vol. ii. p. 8.]
[Side-note: Theory of Ast--he denies the reality of any preconceived
scheme--considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas.]
Such is the general theory of Schleiermacher, which presents to us
Plato in the character of a Demiurgus, contemplating from the first an
Idea of philosophy, and constructing a series of dialogues (like a
Kosmos of Schleiermacher), with the express purpose of giving
embodiment to it as far as practicable. We next come to Ast, who
denies this theory altogether. According to Ast, there never was any
philosophical system, to the exposition and communication of which
each successive dialogue was deliberately intended to contribute:
there is no scientific or intentional connection between the
dialogues,--no progressive arrangement of first and second, of
foundation and superstructure: there is no other unity or connecting
principle between them than that which they involve as all emanating
from the same age, country, and author, and the same general view of
the world (Welt-Ansicht) or critical estimate of man and nature.[2]
The dialogues are dramatic (Ast affirms), not merely in their external
form, but in their internal character: each is in truth a
philosophical drama.[3] Their purpose is very diverse and many-sided:
we mistake if we imagine the philosophical purpose to stand alone. If
that were so (Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most
of the dialogues there is no philosophical result at all? Nothing but
a discussion without definite end, which leaves every point
unsettled.[4] Plato is poet, artist, philosopher, blended in one. He
does not profess to lay down positive opinions. Still less does he
proclaim his own opinions as exclusive orthodoxy, to be poured
ready-prepared into the minds of recipient pupils. He seeks to urge the
pupils to think and investigate for themselves. He employs the form of
dialogue, as indispensable to generate in their minds this impulse of
active research, and to arm them with the power of pursuing it
effectively.[5] But each Platonic dialogue is a separate composition
in itself, and each of the greater dialogues is a finished and
symmetrical whole, like a living organism.[6]
[Footnote 2: Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p. 40.]
[Footnote 3: Ast, ib. p. 46.]
[Footnote 4: Ast, ibid. p. 89.]
[Footnote 5: Ast, ib. p. 42.]
[Footnote 6: The general view here taken by Ast--dwelling upon the
separate individuality as well as upon the dramatic character of each
dialogue--calling attention to the purpose of intellectual
stimulation, and of reasoning out different aspects of ethical and
dialectical questions, as distinguished from endoctrinating purpose--this
general view coincides more nearly with my own than that of any
other critic. But Ast does not follow it out consistently. If he were
consistent with it, he ought to be more catholic than other critics,
in admitting a large and undefinable diversity in the separate
Platonic manifestations: instead of which, he is the most sweeping of
all repudiators, on internal grounds. He is not even satisfied with
the Parmenides as it now stands; he insists that what is now the
termination was not the real and original termination; but that Plato
must have appended to the dialogue an explanation of its [Greek:
a)pori/ai], puzzles, and antinomies; which explanation is now lost.]
[Side-note: His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen
dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest.]
Though Ast differs thus pointedly from Schleiermacher in the
enunciation of his general principle, yet he approximates to him more
nearly when he comes to detail: for he recognises three classes of
dialogues, succeeding each other in a chronological order verifiable
(as he thinks) by the dialogues themselves. His first class (in which
he declares the poetical and dramatic element to be predominant)
consists of Protagoras, Phædrus, Gorgias, Phædon. His second class,
distinguished by the dialectic element, includes Theætêtus, Sophistês,
Politikus, Parmenidês, Kratylus. His third class, wherein the poetical
and dialectic element are found both combined, embraces Philêbus,
Symposion, Republic, Timæus, Kritias. These fourteen dialogues, in
Ast's view, constitute the whole of the genuine Platonic works. All
the rest he pronounces to be spurious. He rejects Leges, Epinomis,
Menon, Euthydêmus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Alkibiades I. and II.,
Hippias I. and II., Ion, Erastæ, Theages, Kleitophon, Apologia,
Kriton, Minos, Epistolæ--together with all the other dialogues which
were rejected in antiquity by Thrasyllus. Lastly, Ast considers the
Protagoras to have been composed in 408 B.C., when Plato was not more
than 21 years of age--the Phædrus in 407 B.C.--the Gorgias in 404
B.C.[7]
[Footnote 7: Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p. 376.]
[Side-note: Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme--his
arrangement of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and
Schleiermacher--he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês,
Politikus, Kritias, with many others.]
Socher agrees with Ast in rejecting the fundamental hypothesis of
Schleiermacher--that of a preconceived scheme systematically worked
out by Plato. But on many points he differs from Ast no less than from
Schleiermacher. He assigns the earliest Platonic composition (which he
supposes to be Theagês), to a date preceding the battle of Arginusæ,
in 406 B.C., when Plato was about 22-23 years of age.[8] Assuming it
is certain that Plato composed dialogues during the lifetime of
Sokrates, he conceives that the earliest of them would naturally be
the most purely Sokratic in respect of theme, as well as the least
copious, comprehensive, and ideal, in manner of handling. During the
six and a half years between the battle of Arginusæ and the death of
Sokrates, Socher registers the following succession of Platonic
compositions: Theagês, Lachês, Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Dialogus de
Virtute (usually printed with the spurious, but supposed by Socher to
be a sort of preparatory sketch for the Menon), Menon, Kratylus,
Euthyphron. These three last he supposes to precede very shortly the
death of Sokrates. After that event, and very shortly after, were
composed the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon.
[Footnote 8: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 102. These critics
adopt 429** B.C. as the year of Plato's birth: I think 427** B.C.
is the true year.]
These eleven dialogues fill up what Socher regards as the first period
of Plato's life, ending when he was somewhat more than thirty years of
age. The second period extends to the commencement of his teaching at
the Academy, when about 41 or 42 years old (B.C. 386). In this second
period were composed Ion, Euthydêmus, Hippias I, Protagoras,
Theætêtus, Gorgias, Philêbus--in the order here set forth. During the
third period of Plato's life, continuing until he was 65 or more, he
composed Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Republic, Timæus. To the
fourth and last period, that of extreme old age, belongs the
composition of the Leges.[9]
[Footnote 9: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 301-459-460.]
Socher rejects as spurious Hipparchus, Minos, Kleitophon, Alkibiadês
II., Erastæ, Epinomis, Epistolæ, Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus,
Kritias: also Charmidês, and Lysis, these two last however not quite
so decisively.
[Side-note: Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and
Protagoras as early compositions--Socher puts Protagoras into the
second period, Phædrus into the third.]
Both Ast and Schleiermacher consider Phædrus and Protagoras as among
the earliest compositions of Plato. Herein Socher dissents from them.
He puts Protagoras into the second period, and Phædrus into the third.
But the most peculiar feature in his theory is, that he rejects as
spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias.
[Side-note: K. F. Hermann--Stallbaum--both of them consider the
Phædrus as a late dialogue--both of them deny preconceived order and
system--their arrangements of the dialogues--they admit new and
varying philosophical points of view.]
From Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher, we pass to K. F. Hermann[10]--and
to Stallbaum, who has prefixed Prolegomena to his edition of each
dialogue. Both these critics protest against Socher's rejection of the
four dialogues last indicated: but they agree with Socher and Ast in
denying the reality of any preconceived system, present to Plato's
mind in his first dialogue, and advanced by regular steps throughout
each of the succeeding dialogues. The polemical tone of K. F. Hermann
against this theory, and against Schleiermacher, its author, is
strenuous and even unwarrantably bitter.[11] Especially the position
laid down by Schleiermacher--that Phædrus is the earliest of Plato's
dialogues, written when he was 22 or 23 years of age, and that the
general system presiding over all the future dialogues is indicated
therein as even then present to his mind, afterwards to be worked
out--is controverted by Hermann and Stallbaum no less than by Ast and
Socher. All three concur in the tripartite distribution of the life of
Plato. But Hermann thinks that Plato acquired gradually and
successively, new points of view, with enlarged philosophical
development: and that the dialogues as successively composed are
expressions of these varying phases. Moreover, Hermann thinks that
such variations in Plato's philosophy may be accounted for by external
circumstances. He reckons Plato's first period as ending with the
death of Sokrates, or rather at an epoch not long after the death of
Sokrates: the second as ending with the commencement of Plato's
teaching at the Academy, after his return from Sicily--about 385 B.C.:
the third, as extending from thence to his old age. To the first, or
Sokratic stadium, Hermann assigns the smaller dialogues: the earliest
of which he declares to be--Hippias II., Ion, Alkibiadês I., Lysis,
Charmidês, Lachês: after which come Protagoras and Euthydêmus, wherein
the batteries are opened against the Sophists, shortly before the
death of Sokrates. Immediately after the last mentioned event, come a
series of dialogues reflecting the strong and fresh impression left by
it upon Plato's mind--Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Menon,
Hippias I.--occupying a sort of transition stage between the first and
the second period. We now enter upon the second or dialectic period;
passed by Plato greatly at Megara, and influenced by the philosophical
intercourse which he there enjoyed, and characterised by the
composition of Theætêtus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus,
Parmenidês.[12] To the third, or constructive period, greatly
determined by the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, belong
Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Phædon, Philêbus, Republic, Timæus,
Kritias: a series composed during Plato's teaching at the Academy, and
commencing with Phædrus, which last Hermann considers to be a sort of
(Antritts-Programme) inauguratory composition for the opening of his
school of oral discourse or colloquy. Lastly, during the final years
of the philosopher, after all the three periods, come the Leges or
treatise de Legibus: placed by itself as the composition of his old
age.
[Footnote 10: K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen
Philosophie, p. 368, seq. Stallbaum, Disputatio de Platonis Vitâ et
Scriptis, prefixed to his edition of Plato's Works, p. xxxii., seq.]
[Footnote 11: Ueberweg (Untersuchungen, pp. 50-52) has collected
several citations from K. F. Hermann, in which the latter treats
Schleiermacher "wie einen Sophisten, der sich in absichtlicher
Unwahrhaftigkeit gefalle, mitunter fast als einen Mann der innerlich
wohl wisse, wie die Sache stehe (nämlich, dass sie so sei, wie
Hermann lehrt), der sich aber, etwa aus Lust, seine überlegene
Dialektik zu beweisen, Mühe gebe, sie in einem anderen Lichte
erscheinen zu lassen; also--[Greek: to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô
poiei=n]--recht in rhetorisch sophistischer Manier."
We know well, from other and independent evidence, what Schleiermacher
really was, that he was not only one of the most accomplished
scholars, but one of the most liberal and estimable men of his age.
But how different would be our appreciation if we had no other
evidence to judge by except the dicta of opponents, and even
distinguished opponents, like Hermann! If there be any point clear in
the history of philosophy, it is the uncertainty of all judgments,
respecting writers and thinkers, founded upon the mere allegations of
opponents. Yet the Athenian Sophists, respecting whom we have no
independent evidence (except the general fact that they had a number
of approvers and admirers), are depicted confidently by the Platonic
critics in the darkest colours, upon the evidence of their bitter
opponent Plato--and in colours darker than even his evidence warrants.
The often-repeated calumny, charged against almost all
debaters--[Greek: to\ to\n ê(/tto lo/gon krei/ttô poiei=n]--by Hermann
against Schleiermacher, by Melêtus against Sokrates, by Plato against the
Sophists--is believed only against these last.]
[Footnote 12: K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. d. Plat. Phil., p. 496,
seq. Stallbaum (p. xxxiii.) places the Kratylus during the lifetime of
Sokrates, a little earlier than Euthydêmus and Protagoras, all three
of which he assigns to Olymp. 94, 402-400 B.C. See also his Proleg. to
Kratylus, tom. v. p. 26.
Moreover, Stallbaum places the Menon and Ion about the same time--a
few months or weeks before the trial of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Menonem,
tom. vi. pp. 20, 21; Proleg. ad Ionem, tom. iv. p. 289). He considers
the Euthyphron to have been actually composed at the moment to which
it professes to refer (viz., after Melêtus had preferred indictment
against Sokrates), and with a view of defending Sokrates against the
charge of impiety (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. tom. vi. pp. 138-139-142).
He places the composition of the Charmidês about six years before the
death of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Charm. p. 86). He seems to consider,
indeed, that the Menon and Euthydêmus were both written for the
purpose of defending Sokrates: thus implying that they too were
written _after_ the indictment was preferred (Proleg. ad Euthyphron.
p. 145).
In regard to the date of the Euthyphron, Schleiermacher also had
declared, prior to Stallbaum, that it was _unquestionably_
(unstreitig) composed at a period between the indictment and the trial
of Sokrates (Einl. zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. p. 53, of his transl. of
Plato).]
[Side-note: They reject several dialogues.]
Hermann and Stallbaum reject (besides the dialogues already rejected
by Thrasyllus) Alkibiadês II., Theagês, Erastæ, Hipparchus, Minos,
Epinomis: Stallbaum rejects the Kleitophon: Hermann hesitates, and is
somewhat inclined to admit it, as he also admits, to a considerable
extent, the Epistles.[13]
[Footnote 13: Stallbaum, p. xxxiv. Hermann,** pp. 424, 425.]
[Side-note: Steinhart--agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's
fundamental postulate--his arrangement of the dialogues--considers the
Phædrus as late in order--rejects several.]
Steinhart, in his notes and prefaces to H. Müller's translation of the
Platonic dialogues, agrees in the main with K. F. Hermann, both in
denying the fundamental postulate of Schleiermacher, and in settling
the general order of the dialogues, though with some difference as to
individual dialogues. He considers Ion as the earliest, followed by
Hippias I, Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês,
Protagoras. These constitute what Steinhart calls the
ethico-Sokratical series of Plato's compositions, having the common
attributes--That they do not step materially beyond the philosophical
range of Sokrates himself--That there is a preponderance of the mimic
and plastic element--That they end, to all appearance, with unsolved
doubts and unanswered questions.[14] He supposes the Charmidês to have
been composed during the time of the Thirty, the Lachês shortly
afterwards, and the Protagoras about two years before the death of
Sokrates. He lays it down as incontestable that the Protagoras was not
composed after the death of Sokrates.[15] Immediately prior to this
last-mentioned event, and posterior to the Protagoras, he places the
Euthydêmus, Menon, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Kratylus:
preparatory to the dialectic series consisting of Parmenidês,
Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, the result of Plato's stay at Megara,
and contact with the Eleatic and Megaric philosophers. The third
series of dialogues, the mature and finished productions of Plato at
the Academy, opens with Phædrus. Steinhart rejects as spurious
Alkibiadês II., Erastæ, Theagês, &c.
[Footnote 14: See Steinhart's Proleg. to the Protag. vol. i. p. 430.
of Müller's transl. of Plato.]
[Footnote 15: Steinhart, Prolegg. to Charmidês, p. 295.]
[Side-note: Susemihl--coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann
his order of arrangement.]
Another author, also, Susemihl, coincides in the main with the
principles of arrangement adopted by K. F. Hermann for the Platonic
dialogues. First in the order of chronological composition he places
the shorter dialogues--the exclusively ethical, least systematic; and
he ranges them in a series, indicating the progressive development of
Plato's mind, with approach towards his final systematic
conceptions.[16] Susemihl begins this early series with Hippias II.,
followed by Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, Protagoras, Menon, Apologia,
Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron. The seven first, ending with the Menon,
he conceives to have been published successively during the lifetime
of Sokrates: the Menon itself, during the interval between his
indictment and his death;[17] the Apologia and Kriton, very shortly
after his death; followed, at no long interval, by Gorgias and
Euthyphron.[18] The Ion and Alkibiadês I. are placed by Susemihl among
the earliest of the Platonic compositions, but as not belonging to the
regular series. He supposes them to have been called forth by some
special situation, like Apologia and Kriton, if indeed they be
Platonic at all, of which he does not feel assured.[19]
[Footnote 16: F. Susemihl, Die Genetische Entwickelung der
Platonischen Philosophie, Leipsic, 1865, p. 9.]
[Footnote 17: Susemihl, ibid. pp. 40-61-89.]
[Footnote 18: Susemihl, ib. pp. 113-125.]
[Footnote 19: Susemihl, ib. p. 9.]
Immediately after Euthyphron, Susemihl places Euthydêmus, which he
treats as the commencement of a second series of dialogues: the first
series, or ethical, being now followed by the dialectic, in which the
principles, process, and certainty of cognition are discussed, though
in an indirect and preparatory way. This second series consists of
Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Theætêtus, Phædrus, Sophistês, Politikus,
Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædon. Through all these dialogues Susemihl
professes to trace a thread of connection, each successively unfolding
and determining more of the general subject: but all in an indirect,
negative, round-about manner. Allowing for this manner, Susemihl
contends that the dialectical counter-demonstrations or Antinomies,
occupying the last half of the Parmenidês, include the solution of
those difficulties, which have come forward in various forms from the
Euthydêmus up to the Sophistês, against Plato's theory of Ideas.[20]
The Phædon closes the series of dialectic compositions, and opens the
way to the constructive dialogues following, partly ethical, partly
physical--Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.[21] The Leges come last
of all.
[Footnote 20: Susemihl, ib. p. 355, seq.]
[Footnote 21: Susemihl, pp. 466-470. The first volume of Susemihl's
work ends with the Phædon.]
[Side-note Edward Munk--adopts a different principle of arrangement,
founded upon the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the
life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates--his arrangement,
founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of
composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic
plan.]
A more recent critic, Dr. Edward Munk, has broached a new and very
different theory as to the natural order of the Platonic dialogues.
Upon his theory, they were intended by Plato[22] to depict the life
and working of a philosopher, in successive dramatic exhibitions, from
youth to old age. The different moments in the life of Sokrates,
indicated in each dialogue, mark the place which Plato intended it
to occupy in the series. The Parmenidês is the first, wherein Sokrates
is introduced as a young man, initiated into philosophy by the ancient
Parmenidês: the Phædon is last, describing as it does the closing
scene of Sokrates. Plato meant his dialogues to be looked at partly in
artistic sequence, as a succession of historical dramas--partly in
philosophical sequence, as a record of the progressive development of
his own doctrine: the two principles are made to harmonize in the
main, though sometimes the artistic sequence is obscured for the
purpose of bringing out the philosophical, sometimes the latter is
partially sacrificed to the former.[23] Taken in the aggregate, the
dialogues from Parmenidês to Phædon form a Sokratic cycle, analogous
to the historical plays of Shakespeare, from King John to Henry
VIII.[24] But Munk at the same time contends that this natural order
of the dialogues--or the order in which Plato intended them to be
viewed--is not to be confounded with the chronological order of their
composition.[25] The Parmenidês, though constituting the opening
Prologue of the whole cycle, was not composed first: nor the Phædon
last. All of them were probably composed after Plato had attained the
full maturity of his philosophy: that is, probably after the opening
of his school at the Academy in 386 B.C. But in composing each, he had
always two objects jointly in view: he adapted the tone of each to the
age and situation in which he wished to depict Sokrates:[26] he
commemorated, in each, one of the past phases of his own
philosophising mind.
[Footnote 22: Dr. Edward Munk. Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen
Schriften, Berlin, 1857. His scheme of arrangement is explained
generally, pp. 25-48, &c.]
[Footnote 23: Munk, ib. p. 29.]
[Footnote 24: Munk, ib. p. 27.]
[Footnote 25: Munk, ibid. p. 27.]
[Footnote 26: Munk, ib. p. 54; Preface, p. viii.]
The Cycle taken in its intentional or natural order, is distributed by
Munk into three groups, after the Parmenidês as general prologue.[27]
1. Sokratic or Indirect Dialogues.--Protagoras, Charmidês, Lachês,
Gorgias, Ion, Hippias I., Kratylus, Euthydêmus, Symposion.
2. Direct or Constructive Dialogues.--Phædrus, Philêbus, Republic,
Timæus, Kritias.
3. Dialectic and Apologetic Dialogues.--Menon, Theætêtus, Sophistês,
Politikus, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon.
The Leges and Menexenus stand apart from the Cycle, as compositions on
special occasion. Alkibiadês I., Hippias II., Lysis, are also placed
apart from the Cycle, as compositions of Plato's earlier years, before
he had conceived the general scheme of it.[28]
[Footnote 27: Munk, ib. p. 50.]
[Footnote 28: Munk, ib. pp. 25-34.]
The first of the three groups depicts Sokrates in the full vigour of
life, about 35 years of age: the second represents him an elderly man,
about 60: the third, immediately prior to his death.[29] In the first
group he is represented as a combatant for truth: in the second as a
teacher of truth: in the third, as a martyr for truth.[30]
[Footnote 29: Munk, ib. p. 26.]
[Footnote 30: Munk, ib. p. 31.]
[Side-note: Views of Ueberweg--attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and
Hermann--admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues,
composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the earlier.]
Lastly, we have another German author still more recent, Frederick
Ueberweg, who has again investigated the order and authenticity of the
Platonic dialogues, in a work of great care and ability: reviewing the
theories of his predecessors, as well as proposing various
modifications of his own.[31] Ueberweg compares the different opinions
of Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann, and admits both of them to a
certain extent, each concurrent with and limiting the other.[32] The
theory of a preconceived system and methodical series, proposed by
Schleiermacher, takes its departure from the Phædrus, and postulates
as an essential condition that that dialogue shall be recognised as
the earliest composition.[33] This condition Ueberweg does not admit.
He agrees with Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, in referring the
Phædrus to a later date (about 386 B.C.), shortly after Plato had
established his school in Athens, when he was rather above forty years
of age. At this period (Ueberweg thinks) Plato may be considered as
having acquired methodical views which had not been present to him
before; and the dialogues composed after the Phædrus follow out, to a
certain extent, these methodical views. In the Phædrus, the Platonic
Sokrates delivers the opinion that writing is unavailing as a means of
imparting philosophy: that the only way in which philosophy can be
imparted is, through oral colloquy adapted by the teacher to the
mental necessities, and varying stages of progress, of each individual
learner: and that writing can only serve, after such oral instruction
has been imparted, to revive it if forgotten, in the memory both of
the teacher and of the learner who has been orally taught. For the
dialogues composed after the opening of the school, and after the
Phædrus, Ueberweg recognises the influence of a preconceived method
and of a constant bearing on the oral teaching of the school: for
those anterior to that date, he admits no such influence: he refers
them (with Hermann) to successive enlargements, suggestions,
inspirations, either arising in Plato's own mind, or communicated from
without. Ueberweg does not indeed altogether exclude the influence of
this non-methodical cause, even for the later dialogues: he allows its
operation to a certain extent, in conjunction with the methodical:
what he excludes is, the influence of any methodical or preconceived
scheme for the earlier dialogues.[34] He thinks that Plato composed
the later portion of his dialogues (_i.e._, those subsequent to the
Phædrus and to the opening of his school), not for the instruction of
the general reader, but as reminders to his disciples of that which
they had already learnt from oral teaching: and he cites the analogy
of Paul and the apostles, who wrote epistles not to convert the
heathen, but to admonish or confirm converts already made by
preaching.[35]
[Footnote 31: Ueberweg, Untersuchungen.]
[Footnote 32: Ueberweg, p. 111.]
[Footnote 33: Ueberweg, pp. 23-26.]
[Footnote 34: Ueberweg, pp. 107-110-111. "Sind beide Gesichtspunkte,
der einer methodischen Absicht und der einer Selbst-Entwicklung
Platon's durchweg mit einander zu verbinden, so liegt es auch in der
Natur der Sache und wird auch von einigen seiner Nachfolger
(insbesondere nachdrücklich von Susemihl) anerkannt, dass der erste
Gesichtspunkt vorzugsweise für die späteren Schriften von der Gründung
der Schule an--der andere vorzugsweise für die früheren--gilt."]
[Footnote 35: Ueberweg, pp. 80-86, "Ist unsere obige Deutung richtig,
wonach Platon nicht für Fremde zur Belehrung, sondern wesentlich für
seine Schüler zur Erinnerung an den mündlichen Unterricht, schrieb
(wie die Apostel nicht für Fremde zur Bekehrung, sondern für die
christlichen Gemeinden zur Stärke und Läuterung, nachdem denselben der
Glaube aus der Predigt gekommen war)--so folgt, dass jede
Argumentation, die auf den Phaedrus gegründet wird, nur für die Zeit
gelten kann, in welcher bereits die Platonische Schule bestand."]
[Side-note: His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the
dialogues, He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon,
Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus.]
Ueberweg investigates the means which we possess, either from external
testimony (especially that of Aristotle) or from internal evidence, of
determining the authenticity as well as the chronological order of the
dialogues. He remarks that though, in contrasting the expository
dialogues with those which are simply enquiring and debating, we may
presume the expository to belong to Plato's full maturity of life, and
to have been preceded by some of the enquiring and debating--yet we
cannot safely presume _all_ these latter to be of his early
composition. Plato may have continued to inclined to compose dialogues
of mere search, even after the time when he began to compose
expository dialogues.[36] Ueberweg considers that the earliest of
Plato's dialogues are, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Lachês, Charmidês,
Protagoras, composed during the lifetime of Sokrates: next the
Apologia, and Kriton, not long after his death. All these (even the
Protagoras) he reckons among the "lesser Platonic writings".[37] None
of them allude to the Platonic Ideas or Objective Concepts. The
Gorgias comes next, probably soon after the death of Sokrates, at
least at some time earlier than the opening of the school in 386
B.C.[38] The Menon and Ion may be placed about the same general
period.[39] The Phædrus (as has been already observed) is considered
by Ueberweg to be nearly contemporary with the opening of the school:
shortly afterwards Symposion and Euthydêmus:[40] at some subsequent
time, Republic, Timæus, Kritias, and Leges. In regard to the four
last, Ueberweg does not materially differ from Schleiermacher,
Hermann, and other critics: but on another point he differs from them
materially, _viz._: that instead of placing the Theætêtus, Sophistês,
and Politikus, in the Megaric period or prior to the opening of the
school, he assigns them (as well as the Phædon and Philêbus) to the
last twenty years of Plato's life. He places Phædon later than Timæus,
and Politikus later than Phædon: he considers that Sophistês,
Politikus, and Philêbus are among the latest compositions of
Plato.[41] He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, and
Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron. He scarcely
recognises Menexenus, in spite of the direct attestation of Aristotle,
which attestation he tries (in my judgment very unsuccessfully) to
invalidate.[42] He recognises the Kratylus, but without determining
its date. He determines nothing about Alkibiadês I. and II.
[Footnote 36: Ueberweg, p. 81.]
[Footnote 37: Ueberweg, pp. 100-105-296. "Eine Anzahl kleinerer
Platonischer Schriften."]
[Footnote 38: Ueberweg, pp. 249-267-296.]
[Footnote 39: Ueberweg, pp. 226, 227.]
[Footnote 40: Ueberweg, p. 265.]
[Footnote 41: Ueberweg, pp. 204-292.]
[Footnote 42: Ueberweg, pp. 143-176-222-250.]
[Side-note: Other Platonic critics--great dissensions about scheme and
order of the dialogues.]
The works above enumerated are those chiefly deserving of notice,
though there are various others also useful, amidst the abundance of
recent Platonic criticism. All these writers, Schleiermacher, Ast,
Socher, K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, Munk, Ueberweg,
have not merely laid down general schemes of arrangement for the
Platonic dialogues, but have gone through the dialogues seriatim, each
endeavouring to show that his own scheme fits them well, and each
raising objections against the schemes earlier than his own. It is
indeed truly remarkable to follow the differences of opinion among
these learned men, all careful students of the Platonic writings. And
the number of dissents would be indefinitely multiplied, if we took
into the account the various historians of philosophy during the last
few years. Ritter and Brandis accept, in the main, the theory of
Schleiermacher: Zeller also, to a certain extent. But each of these
authors has had a point of view more or less belonging to himself
respecting the general scheme and purpose of Plato, and respecting the
authenticity, sequence, and reciprocal illustration of the
dialogues.[43]
[Footnote 43: Socher remarks (Ueber, Platon. p. 225) (after
enumerating twenty-two dialogues of the Thrasyllean canon, which he
considers the earliest) that of these twenty-two, there are _only two_
which have not been declared spurious by some one or more critics. He
then proceeds to examine the remainder, among which are Sophistês,
Politikus, Parmenidês. He (Socher) declares these three last to be
spurious, which no critic had declared before.]
[Side-note: Contrast of different points of view instructive--but no
solution has been obtained.]
By such criticisms much light has been thrown on the dialogues in
detail. It is always interesting to read the different views taken by
many scholars, all careful students of Plato, respecting the order and
relations of the dialogues: especially as the views are not merely
different but contradictory, so that the weak points of each are put
before us as well as the strong. But as to the large problem which
these critics have undertaken to solve--though several solutions have
been proposed, in favour of which something may be urged, yet we look
in vain for any solution at once sufficient as to proof and defensible
against objectors.
[Side-note: The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of
the theory propounded by Schleiermacher--slenderness of his proofs.]
It appears to me that the problem itself is one which admits of no
solution. Schleiermacher was the first who proposed it with the large
pretensions which it has since embraced, and which have been present
more or less to the minds of subsequent critics, even when they differ
from him. He tells us himself that he comes forward as _Restitutor
Platonis_, in a character which no one had ever undertaken before.[44]
And he might fairly have claimed that title, if he had furnished
proofs at all commensurate to his professions. As his theory is
confessedly novel as well as comprehensive, it required greater
support in the way of evidence. But when I read the Introductions (the
general as well as the special) in which such evidence ought to be
found, I am amazed to find that there is little else but easy and
confident assumption. His hypothesis is announced as if the simple
announcement were sufficient to recommend it[45]--as if no other
supposition were consistent with the recognised grandeur of Plato as a
philosopher--as if any one, dissenting from it, only proved thereby
that he did not understand Plato. Yet so far from being of this
self-recommending character, the hypothesis is really loaded with the
heaviest antecedent improbability. That in 406 B.C., and at the age of
23, in an age when schemes of philosophy elaborated in detail were
unknown--Plato should conceive a vast scheme of philosophy, to be
worked out underground without ever being proclaimed, through numerous
Sokratic dialogues one after the other, each ushering in that which
follows and each resting upon that which precedes: that he should have
persisted throughout a long life in working out this scheme, adapting
the sequence of his dialogues to the successive stages which he had
attained, so that none of them could be properly understood unless
when studied immediately after its predecessors and immediately before
its successors--and yet that he should have taken no pains to impress
this one peremptory arrangement on the minds of readers, and that
Schleiermacher should be the first to detect it--all this appears to
me as improbable as any of the mystic interpretations of Iamblichus or
Proklus. Like other improbabilities, it may be proved by evidence, if
evidence can be produced: but here nothing of the kind is producible.
We are called upon to grant the general hypothesis without proof, and
to follow Schleiermacher in applying it to the separate dialogues.
[Footnote 44: Schleiermacher, Einleitung, pp. 22-29. "Diese natürliche
Folge (der Platonischen Gespräche) wieder herzustellen, diess ist,
wie jedermann sieht, eine Absicht, welche sich sehr weit entfernt von
allen bisherigen Versuchen zur Anordnung der Platonischen Werke," &c.]
[Footnote 45: What I say about Schleiermacher here will be assented to
by any one who reads his Einleitung, pp. 10, 11, seq.]
[Side-note: Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived
scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the
dialogues.]
Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes two parts. 1. A premeditated
philosophical scheme, worked out continuously from the first dialogue
to the last. 2. A peremptory canonical order, essential to this
scheme, and determined thereby. Now as to the scheme, though on the
one hand it cannot be proved, yet on the other hand it cannot be
disproved. But as to the canonical order, I think it may be disproved.
We know that no such order was recognised in the days of Aristophanes,
and Schleiermacher himself admits that before those days it had been
lost.[46] But I contend that if it was lost within a century after the
decease of Plato, we may fairly presume that it never existed at all,
as peremptory and indispensable to the understanding of what Plato
meant. A great philosopher such as Plato (so Schleiermacher argues)
must be supposed to have composed all his dialogues with some
preconceived comprehensive scheme: but a great philosopher (we may
add), if he does work upon a preconceived scheme, must surely be
supposed to take some reasonable precautions to protect the order
essential to that scheme from dropping out of sight. Moreover,
Schleiermacher himself admits that there are various dialogues which
lie apart from the canonical order and form no part of the grand
premeditated scheme. The distinction here made between these outlying
compositions (Nebenwerke) and the members of the regular series, is
indeed altogether arbitrary: but the admission of it tends still
farther to invalidate the fundamental postulate of a grand Demiurgic
universe of dialogues, each dovetailed and fitted into its special
place among the whole. The universe is admitted to have breaks: so
that the hypothesis does not possess the only merit which can belong
to gratuitous hypothesis--that of introducing, if granted, complete
symmetry throughout the phenomena.
[Footnote 46: Schleiermacher, Einleitung, p. 24.]
[Side-note: Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus
inadmissible.]
To these various improbabilities we may add another--that
Schleiermacher's hypothesis requires us to admit that the Phædrus is
Plato's earliest dialogue, composed about 406 B.C., when he was 21
years of age, on my computation, and certainly not more than 23: that
it is the first outburst of the inspiration which Sokrates had
imparted to him,[47] and that it embodies, though in a dim and
poetical form, the lineaments of that philosophical system which he
worked out during the ensuing half century. That Plato at this early
age should have conceived so vast a system--that he should have
imbibed it from Sokrates, who enunciated no system, and abounded in
the anti-systematic negative--that he should have been inspired to
write the Phædrus (with its abundant veins, dithyrambic,[48] erotic,
and transcendental) by the conversation of Sokrates, which exhibited
acute dialectic combined with practical sagacity, but neither poetic
fervour nor transcendental fancy,--in all this hypothesis of
Schleiermacher, there is nothing but an aggravation of
improbabilities.
[Footnote 47: See Schleiermacher's Einleitung to the Phædrus: "Der
Phaidros, der erste Ausbruch seiner Begeisterung vom Sokrates".]
[Footnote 48: If we read Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De Admirab. Vi
Dic. in Demosth. pp. 968-971, Reiske), we shall find that rhetor
pointing out the Phædrus as a signal example of Plato's departure from
the manner and character of Sokrates, and as a specimen of misplaced
poetical exaggeration. Dikæarchus formed the same opinion about the
Phædrus (Diog. L. iii. 38).]
[Side-note: Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet
produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic
dialogues.]
Against such improbabilities (partly external partly internal)
Schleiermacher has nothing to set except internal reasons: that is,
when he shall have arranged the dialogues and explained the
interdependence as well as the special place of each, the arrangement
will impress itself upon all as being the intentional work of Plato
himself.[49] But these "internal reasons" (innere Gründe), which are
to serve as constructive evidence (in the absence of positive
declarations) of Plato's purpose, fail to produce upon other minds the
effect which Schleiermacher demands. If we follow them as stated in
his Introductions (prefixed to the successive Platonic dialogues), we
find a number of approximations and comparisons, often just and
ingenious, but always inconclusive for his point: proving, at the very
best, what Plato's intention may possibly have been--yet subject to be
countervailed by other "internal reasons" equally specious, tending to
different conclusions. And the various opponents of Schleiermacher
prove just as much and no more, each on behalf of his own mode of
arrangement, by the like constructive evidence--appeal to "internal
reasons". But the insufficient character of these "internal reasons"
is more fatal to Schleiermacher than to any of his opponents: because
his fundamental hypothesis--while it is the most ambitious of all and
would be the most important, if it could be proved--is at the same
time burdened with the strongest antecedent improbability, and
requires the amplest proof to make it at all admissible.
[Footnote 49: See the general Einleitung, p. 11.]
[Side-note: Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most
gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher's.]
Dr. Munk undertakes the same large problem as Schleiermacher. He
assumes the Platonic dialogues to have been composed upon a
preconceived system, beginning when Plato opened his school, about 41
years of age. This has somewhat less antecedent improbability than the
supposition that Plato conceived his system at 21 or 23 years of age.
But it is just as much destitute of positive support. That Plato
intended his dialogues to form a fixed series, exhibiting the
successive gradations of his philosophical system--that he farther
intended this series to coincide with a string of artistic portraits,
representing Sokrates in the ascending march from youth to old age, so
that the characteristic feature which marks the place and time of each
dialogue, is to be found in the age which it assigns to Sokrates--these
are positions for the proof of which we are referred to "internal
reasons"; but which the dialogues do not even suggest, much less sanction.
[Side-note: The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a
circumstance of little moment.]
In many dialogues, the age assigned to Sokrates is a circumstance
neither distinctly brought out, nor telling on the debate. It is true
that in the Parmenidês he is noted as young, and is made to conduct
himself with the deference of youth, receiving hints and admonitions
from the respected veteran of Elea. So too in the Protagoras, he is
characterised as young, but chiefly in contrast with the extreme and
pronounced old age of the Sophist Protagoras: he does not conduct
himself like a youth, nor exhibit any of that really youthful or
deferential spirit which we find in the Parmenidês; on the contrary,
he stands forward as the rival, cross-examiner, and conqueror of the
ancient Sophist. On the contrary, in the Euthydêmus,[50] Sokrates is
announced as old; though that dialogue is indisputably very analogous
to the Protagoras, both of them being placed by Munk in the earliest
of his three groups. Moreover in the Lysis also, Sokrates appears as
old;--here Munk escapes from the difficulty by setting aside the
dialogue as a youthful composition, not included in the consecutive
Sokratic Cycle.[51] What is there to justify the belief, that the
Sokrates depicted in the Phædrus (which dialogue has been affirmed by
Schieiermacher and Ast, besides some ancient critics, to exhibit
decided marks of juvenility) is older than the Sokrates of the
Symposion? or that Sokrates in the Philêbus and Republic is older than
in the Kratylus or Gorgias? It is true that the dialogues Theætêtus
and Euthyphron are both represented as held a little before the death
of Sokrates, after the indictment of Melêtus against him had already
been preferred. This is a part of the hypothetical situation, in which
the dialogists are brought into company. But there is nothing in the
two dialogues themselves (or in the Menon, which Munk places in the
same category) to betoken that Sokrates is old. Holiness, in the
Euthyphron--Knowledge, in the Theætêtus--is canvassed and debated just
as Temperance and Courage are debated in the Charmidês and Lachês.
Munk lays it down that Sokrates appears as a Martyr for Truth in the
Euthyphron, Menon, and Theætêtus and as a Combatant for Truth in the
Lachês, Charmidês, Euthydêmus, &c. But the two groups of dialogues,
when compared with each other, will not be found to warrant this
distinctive appellation. In the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon, it may
be said with propriety that Sokrates is represented as a martyr for
truth: in all three he appears not merely as a talker, but as a
personal agent: but this is not true of the other dialogues which Munk
places in his third group.
[Footnote 50: Euthydêmus, c. 4, p. 272.]
[Footnote 51: Lysis, p. 223, ad fin. [Greek: Katage/lastoi gego/namen
e)gô/ te, ge/rôn a)nê/r, kai\ u(mei=s]. See Munk, p. 25.]
[Side-note: No intentional sequence or interdependence of the
dialogues can be made out.]
I cannot therefore accede to this "natural arrangement of the Platonic
dialogues," assumed to have been intended by Plato, and founded upon
the progress of Sokrates as he stands exhibited in each, from youth to
age--which Munk has proposed in his recent ingenious volume. It is
interesting to be made acquainted with that order of the Platonic
dialogues which any critical student conceives to be the "natural
order". But in respect to Munk as well as to Schleiermacher, I must
remark that if Plato had conceived and predetermined the dialogues, so
as to be read in one natural peremptory order, he would never have
left that order so dubious and imperceptible, as to be first divined
by critics of the nineteenth century, and understood by them too in
several different ways. If there were any peremptory and intentional
sequence, we may reasonably presume that Plato would have made it as
clearly understood as he has determined the sequence of the ten books
of his Republic.
[Side-note: Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is
reasonable--successive changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot
explain either the order or the causes of these changes.]
The principle of arrangement proposed by K. F. Hermann (approved also
by Steinhart and Susemihl) is not open to the same antecedent
objection. Not admitting any preconceived, methodical, intentional,
system, nor the maintenance of one and the same successive
philosophical point of view throughout--Hermann supposes that the
dialogues as successively composed represent successive phases of
Plato's philosophical development and variations in his point of view.
Hermann farther considers that these variations may be assigned and
accounted for: first pure Sokratism, next the modifications
experienced from Plato's intercourse with the Megaric philosophers,--then
the influence derived from Kyrênê and Egypt--subsequently that
from the Pythagoreans in Italy--and so forth. The first portion of
this hypothesis, taken generally, is very reasonable and probable. But
when, after assuming that there must have been determining changes in
Plato's own mind, we proceed to inquire what these were, and whence
they arose, we find a sad lack of evidence for the answer to the
question. We neither know the order in which the dialogues were
composed,--nor the date when Plato first began to compose,--nor the
primitive philosophical mind which his earliest dialogues
represented,--nor the order of those subsequent modifications which
his views underwent. We are informed, indeed, that Plato went from
Athens to visit Megara, Kyrênê, Egypt, Italy; but the extent or kind
of influence which he experienced in each, we do not know at all.[52]
I think it a reasonable presumption that the points which Plato had in
common with Sokrates were most preponderant in the mind of Plato
immediately after the death of his master: and that other trains of
thought gradually became more and more intermingled as the
recollection of his master became more distant. There is also a
presumption that the longer, more elaborate, and more transcendental
dialogues (among which must be ranked the Phædrus), were composed in
the full maturity of Plato's age and intellect: the shorter and less
finished may have been composed either then or earlier in his life.
Here are two presumptions, plausible enough when stated generally, yet
too vague to justify any special inferences: the rather, if we may
believe the statement of Dionysius, that Plato continued to "comb and
curl his dialogues until he was eighty years of age".[53]
[Footnote 52: Bonitz (in his instructive volume, Platonische Studien,
Wien, 1858, p. 5) points out how little we know about the real
circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical development: a
matter which most of the Platonic critics are apt to forget.
I confess that I agree with Strümpell, that it is impossible to
determine chronologically, from Plato's writings, and from the other
scanty evidence accessible to us, by what successive steps his mind
departed from the original views and doctrines held and communicated
by Sokrates (Strümpell, Gesch. der Griechen, p. 294, Leipsic, 1861).]
[Footnote 53: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p. 208; Diog. L. iii. 37;
Quintilian, viii. 6.
F. A. Wolf, in a valuable note upon the [Greek: diaskeuastai\]
(Proleg. ad Homer. p. clii.) declares, upon this ground, that it is
impossible to determine the time when Plato composed his best
dialogues. "Ex his collatis apparet [Greek: diaskeua/zein] a veteribus
magistris adscitum esse in potestatem verbi [Greek:
e)pidiaskeua/zein]: ut in Scenicis propé idem esset quod [Greek:
a)nadida/skein]--h. e. repetito committere fabulam, sed mutando,
addendo, detrahendo, emendatam, refictam, et secundis curis
elaboratam. Id enim facere solebant illi poetæ sæpissimé: mox etiam
alii, ut Apollonius Rhodius. Neque aliter Plato fecit in optimis
dialogis suis: _quam ob causam exquirere non licet, quando quisque
compositus sit_; quum in scenicis fabulis saltem ex didascaliis
plerumque notum sit tempus, quo editæ sunt."
Preller has a like remark (Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect.
250).
In regard to the habit of correcting compositions, the contrast
between Plato and Plotinus was remarkable. Porphyry tells us that
Plotinus, when once he had written any matter, could hardly bear even
to read it over--much less to review and improve it (Porph. Vit.
Plotini, 8).]
[Side-note: Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's.]
If we compare K. F. Hermann with Schleiermacher, we see that Hermann
has amended his position by abandoning Schleiermacher's gratuitous
hypothesis, of a preconceived Platonic system with a canonical order
of the dialogues adapted to that system--and by admitting only a
chronological order of composition, each dialogue being generated by
the state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed. This,
taken generally, is indisputable. If we perfectly knew Plato's
biography and the circumstances around him, we should be able to
determine which dialogues were first, second, and third, &c., and what
circumstances or mental dispositions occasioned the successive
composition of those which followed. But can we do this with our
present scanty information? I think not. Hermann, while abandoning the
hypothesis of Schleiermacher, has still accepted the large conditions
of the problem first drawn up by Schleiermacher, and has undertaken to
decide the real order of the dialogues, together with the special
occasion and the phase of Platonic development corresponding to each.
Herein, I think, he has failed.
[Side-note: Small number of certainties, or even reasonable
presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues.]
It is, indeed, natural that critics should form some impression as to
earlier and later in the dialogues. But though there are some peculiar
cases in which such impression acquires much force, I conceive that in
almost all cases it is to a high degree uncertain. Several dialogues
proclaim themselves as subsequent to the death of Sokrates. We know
from internal allusions that the Theætêtus must have been composed
after 394 B.C., the Menexenus after 387 B.C., and the Symposion after
385 B.C. We are sure, by Aristotle's testimony, that the Leges were
written at a later period than the Republic; Plutarch also states that
the Leges were composed during the old age of Plato, and this
statement, accepted by most modern critics, appears to me
trustworthy.[54] The Sophistês proclaims itself as a second meeting,
by mutual agreement, of the same persons who had conversed in the
Theætêtus, with the addition of a new companion, the Eleatic stranger.
But we must remark that the subject of the Theætêtus, though left
unsettled at the close of that dialogue, is not resumed in the
Sophistês: in which last, moreover, Sokrates acts only a subordinate
part, while the Eleatic stranger, who did not appear in the Theætêtus,
is here put forward as the prominent questioner or expositor. So too,
the Politikus offers itself as a third of the same triplet: with this
difference, that while the Eleatic stranger continues as the
questioner, a new respondent appears in the person of Sokrates Junior.
The Politikus is not a resumption of the same subject as the
Sophistês, but a second application of the same method (the method of
logical division and subdivision) to a different subject. Plato speaks
also as if he contemplated a third application of the same method--the
Philosophus: which, so far as we know, was never realised. Again, the
Timæus presents itself as a sequel to the Republic, and the Kritias as
a sequel to the Timæus: a fourth, the Hermokrates, being apparently
announced, as about to follow--but not having been composed.
[Footnote 54: Plutarch, Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370.]
[Side-note: Trilogies indicated by Plato himself.]
Here then are two groups of three each (we might call them Trilogies,
and if the intended fourth had been realised, Tetralogies), indicated
by Plato himself. A certain relative chronological order is here
doubtless evident: the Sophistês must have been composed after the
Theætêtus and before the Politikus, the Timæus after the Republic and
before the Kritias. But this is all that we can infer: for it does not
follow that the sequence must have been immediate in point of time:
there may have been a considerable interval between the three forming
the so-called Trilogy.[55] We may add, that neither in the Theætêtus
nor in the Republic, do we find indication that either of them is
intended as the first of a Trilogy: the marks proving an intended
Trilogy are only found in the second and third of the series.
[Footnote 55: It may seem singular that Schlelermacher is among those
who adopt this opinion. He maintains that the Sophistes does not
follow _immediately_ upon the Theætêtus; that Plato, though intending
when he finished the Theætêtus to proceed onward to the Sophistês,
altered his intention, and took up other views instead: that the Menon
(and the Euthydêmus) come in between them, in immediate sequel to the
Theætêtus (Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 326).
Here Schleiermacher introduces a new element of uncertainty, which
invalidates yet more seriously the grounds for his hypothesis of a
preconceived sequence throughout all the dialogues. In a case where
Plato directly intimates an intentional sequence, we are called upon
to believe, on "internal grounds" alone, that he altered his
intention, and introduced other dialogues. He may have done this: but
how are we to prove it? How much does it attenuate the value of his
intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? We become
involved more and more in unsupported hypothesis. I think that K. F.
Hermann's objections against Schleiermacher, on the above ground, have
much force; and that Ueberweg's reply to them is unsatisfactory.
(Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil. p. 350. Ueberweg,
Untersuchungen, p. 82, seq.)]
[Side-note: Positive dates of all the dialogues--unknown.]
While even the relative chronology of the dialogues is thus faintly
marked in the case of a few, and left to fallible conjecture in the
remainder--the positive chronology, or the exact year of composition,
is not directly marked in the case of any one. Moreover, at the very
outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did
Plato begin to publish his dialogues? Did he publish any of them
during the lifetime of Sokrates? and if so, which? Or does the
earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates?
[Side-note: When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death
of Sokrates.]
Amidst the many dissentient views of the Platonic critics, it is
remarkable that they are nearly unanimous in their mode of answering
this question.[56] Most of them declare without hesitation, that Plato
published several before the death of Sokrates--that is, before he was
28 years of age--though they do not all agree in determining which
these dialogues were. I do not perceive that they produce any external
proofs of the least value. Most of them disbelieve (though Stallbaum
and Hermann believe) the anecdote about Sokrates and his criticism on
the dialogue Lysis.[57] In spite of their unanimity, I cannot but
adopt the opposite conclusion. It appears to me that Plato composed no
Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates.
[Footnote 56: Valentine Rose (De Aristotelis Librorum ordine, p. 25,
Berlin, 1854), Mullach (Democriti Fragm. p. 99), and R. Schöne (in his
Commentary on the Platonic Protagoras), are among the critics known to
me, who intimate their belief that Plato published no Sokratic
dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. In discussing the matter,
Schöne adverts to two of the three lines of argument brought forward
in my text:--1. The too early and too copious "productivity" which the
received supposition would imply in Plato. 2. The improbability that
the name of Sokrates would be employed in written dialogues, as
spokesman, by any of his scholars during his lifetime.
Schöne does not touch upon the improbability of the hypothesis,
arising out of the early position and aspirations of Plato himself
(Schöne, Ueber Platon's Protagoras, p. 64, Leipsic, 1862).]
[Footnote 57: Diog. Laert. iii. 85; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Lys.
p. 90; K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 370.
Schleiermacher (Einl. zum Lysis, i. p. 175) treats the anecdote about
the Lysis as unworthy of credence. Diogenes (iii. 38) mentions that
some considered the Phædrus as Plato's earliest dialogue; the reason
being that the subject of it was something puerile: [Greek: lo/gos de\
prô=ton gra/psai au)to\n to\n Phai=dron; kai\ ga\r e)/chei
meirakiô=des ti to\ pro/blêma. Dikai/archos de\ kai\ to\n tro/pon tê=s
graphê=s o(/lon e)pime/mphetai ô(s phortiko/n]. Olympiodorus also in
his life of Plato mentions the same report, that the Phædrus was
Plato's earliest composition, and gives the same ground of belief,
"its dithyrambic character". Even if the assertion were granted, that
the Phædrus is the earliest Platonic composition, we could not infer
that it was composed during the life-time of Sokrates. But that
assertion cannot be granted. The two statements, above cited, give it
only as a report, suggested to those who believed it by the character
and subject-matter of the dialogue. I am surprised that Dr.
Volquardsen, who in a learned volume, recently published, has
undertaken the defence of the theory of Schleiermacher about the
Phædrus (Phädros, Erste Schrift Platon's, Kiel, 1862), can represent
this as a "_feste historische Ueberlieferung_"--the rather as he
admits that Schleiermacher himself placed no confidence in it, and
relied upon other reasons (pp. 90-92-93). Comp. Schleiermacher, Einl.
zum Phaidros, p. 76.
Whoever will read the Epistle of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, addressed
to Cneius Pompeius (pp. 751-765, Reiske), will be persuaded that
Dionysius can neither have known, nor even believed, that the Phædrus
was the first composition, and a youthful composition, of Plato. If
Dionysius had believed this, it would have furnished him with the
precise excuse which his letter required. For the purpose of his
letter is to mollify the displeasure of Cn. Pompey, who had written to
blame him for some unfavourable criticisms on the style of Plato.
Dionysius justifies his criticisms by allusions to the Phædrus. If he
had been able to add, that the Phædrus was a first composition, and
that Plato's later dialogues were comparatively free from the like
faults--this would have been the most effective way of conciliating
Cn. Pompey.]
[Side-note: Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition--does
not consist with youth of the author.]
All the information (scanty as it is) which we obtain from the rhetor
Dionysius and others respecting the composition of the Platonic
dialogues, announces them to have cost much time and labour to their
author: a statement illustrated by the great number of inversions of
words which he is said to have introduced successively in the first
sentence of the Republic, before he was satisfied to let the sentence
stand. This corresponds, too, with all that we read respecting the
patient assiduity both of Isokrates and Demosthenes.[58] A first-rate
Greek composition was understood not to be purchasable at lower cost.
I confess therefore to great surprise, when I read in Ast the
affirmation that the Protagoras was composed when Plato was only 22
years old--and when I find Schleiermacher asserting, as if it were a
matter beyond dispute, that Protagoras, Phædrus, and Parmenidês, all
bear evident marks of Plato's youthful age (Jugendlichkeit). In regard
to the Phædrus and Parmenidês, indeed, Hermann and other critics
contest the view of Schleiermacher; and detect, in those two
dialogues, not only no marks of "juvenility," but what they consider
plain proofs of maturity and even of late age. But in regard to the
Protagoras, most of them agree with Schleiermacher and Ast, in
declaring it to be a work of Plato's youth, some time before the death
of Sokrates. Now on this point I dissent from them: and since the
decision turns upon "internal grounds," each must judge for himself.
The Protagoras appears to me one of the most finished and elaborate of
all the dialogues: in complication of scenic arrangements, dramatic
vivacity, and in the amount of theory worked out, it is surpassed by
none--hardly even by the Republic.[59] Its merits as a composition are
indeed extolled by all the critics; who clap their hands, especially,
at the humiliation which they believe to be brought upon the great
Sophist by Sokrates. But the more striking the composition is
acknowledged to be, the stronger is the presumption that its author
was more than 22 or 24 years of age. Nothing short of good positive
testimony would induce me to believe that such a dialogue as the
Protagoras could have been composed, even by Plato, before he attained
the plenitude of his powers. No such testimony is produced or
producible. I extend a similar presumption, even to the Lysis, Lachês,
Charmidês, and other dialogues: though with a less degree of
confidence, because they are shorter and less artistic, not equal to
the Protagoras. All of them, in my judgment, exhibit a richness of
ideas and a variety of expression, which suggest something very
different from a young novice as the author.
[Footnote 58: Timæus said that Alexander the Great conquered the
Persian empire in less time than Isokrates required for the
composition of his panegyrical oration (Longinus, De Sublim. c. 4).]
[Footnote 59: "Als aesthetisches Kunstwerk ist der Dialog Protagoras
das meisterhafteste unter den Werken Platon's.' (Socher, Ueber Platon,
p. 226.)]
But over and above this presumption, there are other reasons which
induce me to believe, that none of the Platonic dialogues were
published during the lifetime of Sokrates. My reasons are partly
connected with Sokrates, partly with Plato.
[Side-note: Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his
relations with Plato.]
First, in reference to Sokrates--we may reasonably doubt whether any
written reports of his actual conversations were published during his
lifetime. He was the most constant, public, and indiscriminate of all
talkers: always in some frequented place, and desiring nothing so much
as a respondent with an audience. Every one who chose to hear him,
might do so without payment and with the utmost facility. Why then
should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations?
especially when we know that the strong interest which they excited in
the hearers depended much upon the spontaneity of his inspirations,
and hardly less upon the singularity of his manner and physiognomy.
Any written report of what he said must appear comparatively tame.
Again, as to fictitious dialogues (like the Platonic) employing the
name of Sokrates as spokesman--such might doubtless be published
during his lifetime by derisory dramatists for the purpose of raising
a laugh, but not surely by a respectful disciple and admirer for the
purpose of giving utterance to doctrines of his own. The greater was
the respect felt by Plato for Sokrates, the less would he be likely to
take the liberty of making Sokrates responsible before the public for
what Sokrates had never said.[60] There is a story in Diogenes--to the
effect that Sokrates, when he first heard the Platonic dialogue called
Lysis, exclaimed--"What a heap of falsehoods does the young man utter
about me!"[61] This story merits no credence as a fact: but it
expresses the displeasure which Sokrates would be likely to feel, on
hearing that one of his youthful companions had dramatised him as he
appears in the Lysis. Xenophon tells us, and it is very probable, that
inaccurate oral reports of the real colloquies of Sokrates may have
got into circulation. But that the friends and disciples of Sokrates,
during his lifetime, should deliberately publish fictitious dialogues,
putting their own sentiments into his mouth, and thus contribute to
mislead the public--is not easily credible. Still less credible is it
that Plato, during the lifetime of Sokrates, should have published
such a dialogue as the Phædrus, wherein we find ascribed to Sokrates,
poetical and dithyrambic effusions utterly at variance with the real
manifestations which Athenians might hear every day from Sokrates in
the market-place.[62] Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, complains of
the comic poet Aristophanes for misrepresenting him. Had the Platonic
Phædrus been then in circulation, or any other Platonic dialogues, he
might with equally good reason have warned the Dikasts against judging
of him, a real citizen on trial, from the titular Sokrates whom even
disciples did not scruple to employ as spokesman for their own
transcendental doctrine, and their own controversial sarcasms.
[Footnote 60: Valentine Rose observes, in regard to a dialogue
composed by some one else, wherein Plato was introduced as one of the
interlocutors, that it could not have been composed until after
Plato's death, and that the dialogues of Plato were not composed until
after the death of Sokrates. "Platonis autem sermones antequam mortuus
fuerit, scripto neminem tradidisse, neque magistri viventis personâ in
dialogis abusos fuisse (non magis quam vivum Socratem induxerunt
Xenophon, Plato, cæteri Socratici), hoc veterum mori et religioni
quivis facile concedet," &c. (V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus,
pp. 57, 74, Leipsic, 1863.)--Val. Rose expresses the same opinion (that
none of the Sokratic dialogues, either by Plato or the other
companions of Sokrates, were written until after the death of
Sokrates) in his earlier work, De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et
Auctoritate, p. 25.]
[Footnote 61: Diog. L. iii. 35.]
[Footnote 62: In regard to the theory (elaborated by Schleiermacher,
recently again defended by Volquardsen), that the Phædrus is the
earliest among the Platonic dialogues, composed about 406 B.C., it
appears to me inconsistent also with what we know about Lysias. In the
Platonic Phædrus, Lysias is presented as a [Greek: logogra/phos] of
the highest reputation and eminence (p. 228 A, 257 C, and indeed
throughout the whole dialogue). Now this is quite inconsistent with
what we read from Lysias himself in the indictment which he preferred
against Eratosthenes, not long after the restoration of the democracy,
403 B.C. He protests therein strenuously that he had never had
judicial affairs of his own, nor meddled with those of others; and he
expresses the greatest apprehension from his own [Greek: a)peiri/a]
(sects. 4-6). I cannot believe that this would be said by a person
whom Phædrus terms [Greek: deino/tatos ô(\n tô=n nu=n gra/phein].
Moreover, Lysias, in that same discourse, describes his own position
at Athens, anterior to the Thirty: he belonged to a rich metic family,
and was engaged along with his brother Polemarchus in a large
manufactory of shields, employing 120 slaves (s. 20). A person thus
rich and occupied was not likely to become a professed and notorious
[Greek: logogra/phos], though he may have been a clever and
accomplished man. Lysias was plundered and impoverished by the Thirty;
and he is said to have incurred much expense in aiding the efforts of
Thrasybulus. It was after this change of circumstances that he took to
rhetoric as a profession; and it is to some one of these later years
that the Platonic Phædrus refers.]
[Side-note: Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and
position of Plato.]
Secondly, in regard to Plato, the reasons leading to the same
conclusion are yet stronger. Unfortunately, we know little of the life
of Plato before he attained the age of 28, that is, before the death
of Sokrates: but our best means of appreciating it are derived from
three sources. 1. Our knowledge of the history of Athens from 409-399
B.C., communicated by Thucydides, Xenophon, &c. 2. The seventh Epistle
of Plato himself, written four or five years before his death (about
352 B.C.). 3. A few hints from the Memorabilia of Xenophon.
[Side-note: Plato's early life--active by necessity, and to some
extent ambitious.]
To these evidences about the life of Plato, it has not been customary
to pay much attention. The Platonic critics seem to regard Plato so
entirely as a spiritual person ("like a blessed spirit, visiting earth
for a short time," to cite a poetical phrase applied to him by Göthe),
that they disdain to take account of his relations with the material
world, or with society around him. Because his mature life was
consecrated to philosophy, they presume that his youth must have been
so likewise. But this is a hasty assumption. You cannot thus abstract
_any_ man from the social medium by which, he is surrounded. The
historical circumstances of Athens from Plato's nineteenth year to his
twenty-sixth (409-403 B.C.) were something totally different from what
they afterwards became. They were so grave and absorbing, that had he
been ever so much inclined to philosophy, he would have been compelled
against his will to undertake active and heavy duty as a citizen.
Within those years (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) fell
the closing struggles of the Peloponnesian war; in which (to repeat
words already cited from Thucydides) Athens became more a military
post than a city--every citizen being almost habitually under arms:
then the long blockade, starvation, and capture of the city, followed
by the violences of the Thirty, the armed struggle under Thrasybulus,
and the perilous, though fortunately successful and equitable,
renovation of the democracy. These were not times for a young citizen,
of good family and robust frame, to devote himself exclusively to
philosophy and composition. I confess myself surprised at the
assertion of Schleiermacher and Steinhart, that Plato composed the
Charmidês and other dialogues under the Anarchy.[63] Amidst such
disquietude and perils he could not have renounced active duty for
philosophy, even if he had been disposed to do so.
[Footnote 63: Steinhart, Einl. zum Laches, vol. i. p. 358, where he
says that Plato composed the Charmidês, Lachês, and Protagoras, all in
404 B.C. under the Thirty. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Charmides,
vol. ii. p. 8.
The lines of Lucretius (i. 41) bear emphatically upon this trying
season:
Nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo
Possumus æquo animo nec Memmi clara propago
Talibus in rebus communi desse saluti.]
But, to make the case stronger, we learn from Plato's own testimony,
in his seventh Epistle, that he was not at that time disposed to
renounce active political life. He tells us himself, that as a young
man he was exceedingly eager, like others of the same age, to meddle
and distinguish himself in active politics.[64] How natural such
eagerness was, to a young citizen of his family and condition, may be
seen by the analogy of his younger brother Glaukon, who was
prematurely impatient to come forward: as well as by that of his
cousin Charmides, who had the same inclination, but was restrained by
exaggerated diffidence of character. Now we know that the real
Sokrates (very different from the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias)
did not seek to deter young men of rank from politics, and to consign
them to inactive speculation. Sokrates gives[65] earnest encouragement
to Charmides; and he does not discourage Glaukon, but only presses him
to adjourn his pretensions until the suitable stock of preliminary
information has been acquired. We may thus see that assuming the young
Plato to be animated with political aspirations, he would certainly
not be dissuaded,--nay, he would probably be encouraged--by Sokrates.
[Footnote 64: Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 C. [Greek: Ne/os e)gô/ pote
ô)\n polloi=s dê\ tau)to\n e)/pathon; ô)|ê/thên, ei) tha=tton
e)mautou= genoi/mên ku/rios, e)pi\ ta\ koina\ tê=s po/leôs eu)thu\s
i)e/nai]. Again, 325 E: [Greek: ô(/ste me, to\ prô=ton pollê=s mesto\n
o)/nta o(rmê=s e)pi\ to\ pra/ttein ta\ koina/], &c.]
[Footnote 65: See the two interesting colloquies of Sokrates, with
Glaukon and Charmides (Xenoph. Mem. iii. 6, 7).
Charmides was killed along with Kritias during the eight months called
The Anarchy, at the battle fought with Thrasybulus and the democrats
(Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 19). The colloquy of Sokrates with Charmides,
recorded by Xenophon in the Memorabilia, must have taken place at some
time before the battle of Ægospotami; perhaps about 407 or 406 B.C.]
Plato farther tells us that when (after the final capitulation of
Athens) the democracy was put down and the government of the Thirty
established, he embarked in it actively under the auspices of his
relatives (Kritias, Charmides, &c., then in the ascendant), with the
ardent hopes of youth[66] that he should witness and promote the
accomplishment of valuable reforms. Experience showed him that he was
mistaken. He became disgusted with the enormities of the Thirty,
especially with their treatment of Sokrates; and he then ceased to
co-operate with them. Again, after the year called the Anarchy, the
democracy was restored, and Plato's political aspirations revived
along with it. He again put himself forward for active public life,
though with less ardent hopes.[67] But he became dissatisfied with the
march of affairs, and his relationship with the deceased Kritias was
now a formidable obstacle to popularity. At length, four years after
the restoration of the democracy, came the trial and condemnation of
Sokrates. It was that event which finally shocked and disgusted Plato,
converting his previous dissatisfaction into an utter despair of
obtaining any good results from existing governments. From
thenceforward, he turned away from practice and threw himself into
speculation.[68]
[Footnote 66: Plato, Epist. vii. 324 D. [Greek: Kai\ e)gô\ thaumasto\n
ou)de\n e)/pathon u(po\ neo/têtos], &c.]
[Footnote 67: Plato, Epist. vii. 325 A. [Greek: Pa/lin de/,
bradu/teron me\n, ei)=lke de/ me o(/môs ê( peri\ to\ pra/ttein ta\
koina\ kai\ politika\ e)pithumi/a.]]
[Footnote 68: Plato, Epist. vii. 325 C: [Greek: Skopou=nti dê/ moi
tau=ta te kai\ tou\s a)nthrô/pous tou\s pra/ttontas ta\ politika/],
&c. 325 E: [Greek: Kai\ tou= me\n skopei=n mê\ a)postê=nai, pê= pote\
a)/meinon a)\n gi/gnoito peri/ te au)ta\ tau=ta kai\ dê\ kai\ peri\
tê\n pa=san politei/an, tou= de\ pra/ttein au)= perime/nein ai)ei\
kairou/s, teleutô=nta de\ noê=sai peri\ pasô=n tô=n nu=n po/leôn o(/ti
kakô=s xu/mpasai politeu/ontai].
I have already stated in the 84th chapter of my History, describing
the visit of Plato to Dionysius in Sicily, that I believe the Epistles
of Plato to be genuine, and that the seventh Epistle especially
contains valuable information. Some critics undoubtedly are of a
different opinion, and consider them as spurious. But even among these
critics, several consider that the author of the Epistles, though not
Plato himself, was a contemporary and well informed: so that his
evidence is trustworthy. See K. F. Hermann, Gesammelte Abhandlungen,
pp. 282-283. The question has been again discussed recently by
Ueberweg (Untersuch. über d. Aechth. u. Zeitf. d. Plat. Schriften, pp.
120-123-125-129), who gives his own opinion that the letters are not
by Plato, and produces various arguments to the point. His arguments
are noway convincing to me: for the mysticism and pedantry of the
Epistles appear to me in full harmony with the Timæus and Leges, and
with the Pythagorean bias of Plato's later years, though not in
harmony with the Protagoras, and various other dialogues. Yet Ueberweg
also declares his full belief that the seventh Epistle is the
composition of a well-informed contemporary, and perfectly worthy of
credit as to the facts and K. F. Hermann declares the same. This is
enough for my present purpose.
The statement, trusted by all the critics, that Plato's first visit to
Syracuse was made when he was about 40 years of age, depends
altogether on the assertion of the seventh Epistle. How numerous are
the assertions made by Platonic critics respecting Plato, upon
evidence far slighter than that of these Epistles! Boeckh considers
the seventh Epistle as the genuine work of Plato. Valentine Rose also
pronounces it to be genuine, though he does not consider the other
Epistles to be so (De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine, p. 25, p. 114,
Berlin, 1854). Tennemann admits the Epistles generally to be genuine
(System der Platon. Philos. i. p. 106).
It is undeniable that these Epistles of Plato were recognised as
genuine and trusted by all the critics of antiquity from Aristophanes
downwards. Cicero, Plutarch, Aristeides, &c., assert facts upon the
authority of the Epistles. Those who declare the Epistles to be
spurious and worthless, ought in consistency to reject the statements
which Plutarch makes on the authority of the Epistles: they will find
themselves compelled to discredit some of the best parts of his life
of Dion. Compare Aristeides, [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s] Or. 45, pp.
90-106, Dindorf.]
[Side-note: Plato did not retire from political life until after the
restoration of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until
after the death of Sokrates.]
This very natural recital, wherein Plato (at the age of 75) describes
his own youth between 21 and 28--taken in conjunction with the other
reasons just enumerated--impresses upon me the persuasion, that Plato
did not devote himself to philosophy, nor publish any of his
dialogues, before the death of Sokrates: though he may probably have
composed dramas, and the beautiful epigrams which Diogenes has
preserved. He at first frequented the society of Sokrates, as many
other aspiring young men frequented it (likewise that of Kratylus, and
perhaps that of various Sophists[69]), from love of ethical debate,
admiration of dialectic power, and desire to acquire a facility of the
same kind in his own speech: not with any view to take up philosophy
as a profession, or to undertake the task either of demolishing or
constructing in the region of speculation. No such resolution was
adopted until after he had tried political life and had been
disappointed:--nor until such disappointment had been still more
bitterly aggravated by the condemnation of Sokrates. It was under this
feeling that Plato first consecrated himself to that work of
philosophical meditation and authorship,--of inquisitive travel and
converse with philosophers abroad,--and ultimately of teaching in the
Academy,--which filled up the remaining fifty years of his life. The
death of Sokrates left that venerated name open to be employed as
spokesman in his dialogues: and there was nothing in the political
condition of Athens after 399 B.C., analogous to the severe and
perilous struggle which tasked all the energies of her citizens from
409 B.C. down to the close of the war.
[Footnote 69: Compare Plat. Protag. 312 A-B, 315 A, where the
distinction is pointedly drawn between one who visited Protagoras
[Greek: e)pi\ te/chnê|, ô(s dêmiourgo\s e)so/menos], and others who
came simply [Greek: e)pi\ paidei/a|, ô(s to\n i)diô/tên kai\ to\n
e)leu/theron pre/pei.]]
[Side-note: All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one
years after the death of Sokrates.]
I believe, on these grounds, that Plato did not publish any dialogues
during the life of Sokrates. An interval of fifty-one years separates
the death of Sokrates from that of Plato. Such an interval is more
than sufficient for all the existing dialogues of Plato, without the
necessity of going back to a more youthful period of his age. As to
distribution of the dialogues, earlier or later, among these fifty-one
years, we have little or no means of judging. Plato has kept out of
sight--with a degree of completeness which is really surprising--not
merely his own personality, but also the marks of special date and the
determining circumstances in which each dialogue was composed. Twice
only does he mention his own name, and that simply in passing, as if
it were the name of a third person.[70] As to the point of time to
which he himself assigns each dialogue, much discussion has been held
how far Plato has departed from chronological or historical
possibility; how far he has brought persons together in Athens who
never could have been there together, or has made them allude to
events posterior to their own decease. A speaker in Athenæus[71]
dwells, with needless acrimony, on the anachronisms of Plato, as if
they were gross faults. Whether they are faults or not, may fairly be
doubted: but the fact of such anachronisms cannot be doubted, when we
have before us the Menexenus and the Symposion. It cannot be supposed,
in the face of such evidence, that Plato took much pains to keep clear
of anachronisms: and whether they be rather more or rather less
numerous, is a question of no great moment.
[Footnote 70: In the Apologia, c. 28, p. 38, Sokrates alludes to Plato
as present in court, and as offering to become guarantee, along with
others, for his fine. In the Phædon, Plato is mentioned as being sick;
to explain why he was not present at the last scene of Sokrates
(Phædon, p. 59 B). Diog. L. iii. 37.
The pathos as well as the detail of the narrative in the Phædon makes
one imagine that Plato really was present at the scene. But being
obliged, by the uniform scheme of his compositions, to provide another
narrator, he could not suffer it to be supposed that he was himself
present.
I have already remarked that this mention of Plato in the third person
([Greek: Pla/tôn de/, oi)=mai, ê)sthe/nei]) was probably one of the
reasons which induced Panætius to declare the Phædon _not_ to be the
work of Plato.]
[Footnote 71: Athenæus, v. pp. 220, 221. Didymus also attacked Plato
as departing from historical truth--[Greek: e)piphuo/menos tô=|
Pla/tôni ô(s paristorou=nti]--against which the scholiast (ad Leges,
i. p. 630) defends him. Groen van Prinsterer, Prosopogr. Plat. p. 16.
The rhetor Aristeides has some remarks of the same kind, though less
acrimonious (Orat. xlvii. p. 435, Dind.) than the speaker in
Athenæus.]
[Side-note: The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the
modern critical theories by which it has been condemned.]
I now conclude my enquiry respecting the Platonic Canon. The
presumption in favour of that Canon, as laid down by Thrasyllus, is
stronger (as I showed in the preceding chapter) than it is in regard
to ancient authors generally of the same age: being traceable, in the
last resort, through the Alexandrine Museum, to authenticating
manuscripts in the Platonic school, and to members of that school who
had known and cherished Plato himself.[72] I have reviewed the
doctrines of several recent critics who discard this Canon as unworthy
of trust, and who set up for themselves a type of what Plato _must
have_ been, derived from a certain number of items in the
Canon--rejecting the remaining items as unconformable to their
hypothetical type. The different theories which they have laid down
respecting general and systematic purposes of Plato (apart from the
purpose of each separate composition), appear to me uncertified and
gratuitous. The "internal reasons," upon which they justify rejection
of various dialogues, are only another phrase for expressing their own
different theories respecting Plato as a philosopher and as a writer. For
my part I decline to discard any item of the Thrasyllean Canon, upon such
evidence as they produce: I think it a safer and more philosophical
proceeding to accept the entire Canon, and to accommodate my general
theory of Plato (in so far as I am able to frame one) to each and all
of its contents.
[Footnote 72: I find this position distinctly asserted, and the
authority of the Thrasyllean catalogue, as certifying the genuine
works of Plato, vindicated, by Yxem, in his able dissertation on the
Kleitophon of Plato (pp. 1-3, Berlin, 1846). But Yxem does not set
forth the grounds of this opinion so fully as the present state of the
question demands. Moreover, he combines it with another opinion, upon
which he insists even at greater length, and from which I altogether
dissent--that the tetralogies of Thrasyllus exhibit the genuine order
established by Plato himself among the Dialogues.]
[Side-note: Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed.]
Considering that Plato's period of philosophical composition extended
over fifty years, and that the circumstances of his life are most
imperfectly known to us--it is surely hazardous to limit the range of
his varieties, on the faith of a critical repugnance, not merely
subjective and fallible, but withal entirely of modern growth: to
assume, as basis of reasoning, the admiration raised by a few of the
finest dialogues--and then to argue that no composition inferior to
this admired type, or unlike to it in doctrine or handling, can
possibly be the work of Plato. "The Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ,
Epinomis, &c., are unworthy of Plato: nothing so inferior in
excellence can have been composed by him. No dialogue can be admitted
as genuine which contradicts another dialogue, or which advocates any
low or incorrect or un-Platonic doctrine. No dialogue can pass which
is adverse to the general purpose of Plato as an improver of morality,
and a teacher of the doctrine of Ideas." On such grounds as these we
are called upon to reject various dialogues: and there is nothing upon
which, generally speaking, so much stress is laid as upon inferior
excellence. For my part, I cannot recognise any of them as sufficient
grounds of exception. I have no difficulty in believing, not merely
that Plato (like Aristophanes) produced many successive novelties,
"not at all similar one to the other, and all clever"[73]--but also
that among these novelties, there were inferior dialogues as well as
superior: that in different dialogues he worked out different, even
contradictory, points of view--and among them some which critics
declare to be low and objectionable: that we have among his works
unfinished fragments and abandoned sketches, published without order,
and perhaps only after his death.
[Footnote 73: Aristophan. Nubes, 547-8.
[Greek: A)ll' a)ei\ kaina\s i)de/as ei)sphe/rôn sophi/zomai,
Ou)de\n a)llê/laisin o(moi/as, kai\ pa/sas dexia/s.]]
[Side-note: Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this.]
It may appear strange, but it is true, that Schleiermacher, the
leading champion of Plato's central purpose and systematic unity from
the beginning, lays down a doctrine to the same effect. He says,
"Truly, nothing can be more preposterous, than when people demand that
all the works even of a great master shall be of equal perfection--or
that such as are not equal, shall be regarded as not composed by him".
Zeller expresses himself in the same manner, and with as little
reserve.[74] These eminent critics here proclaim a general rule which
neither they nor others follow out.
[Footnote 74: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 337.
"Und wahrlich, nichts ist wohl wunderlicher, als wenn man verlangt,
dass alle Werke auch eines grossen Meisters von gleicher Volkommenheit
seyn sollten--oder die es nicht sind, soll er nicht verfertigt haben."
Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., vol. ii. p. 322, ed. 2nd.
It is to be remembered that this opinion of Schleiermacher refers only
to _completed works_ of the same master. You are not authorised in
rejecting any completed work as spurious, on the ground that it is not
equal in merit to some other. Still less, then, are you authorised in
rejecting, on the like ground, an uncompleted work--a professed
fragment, or a preliminary sketch. Of this nature are several of the
minor items in the Thrasyllean canon.
M. Boeckh, in his Commentary on the dialogue called Minos, has
assigned the reasons which induce him to throw out that dialogue,
together with the Hipparchus, from the genuine works of Plato (and
farther to consider both of them, and the pseudo-Platonic dialogues De
Justo and De Virtute, as works of [Greek: Si/môn o( skuteu/s]: with
this latter hypothesis I have here no concern). He admits fully that
the Minos is of the Platonic age and irreproachable in style--"veteris
esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores totus denique
character, spondent" (p. 32). Next, he not only admits that it is like
Plato, but urges the _too great likeness_ to Plato as one of the
points of his case. He says that it is a bad, stupid, and unskilful
imitation of different Platonic dialogues: "Pergamus ad alteram partem
nostræ argumentationis, eamque etiam firmiorem, de _nimiâ
similitudine_ Platonicorum aliquot locorum. Nam de hoc quidem
conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse
imitari: ni forté quis dubitet de sanâ ejus mente" (p. 23). In the
sense which Boeckh intends, I agree that Plato did not imitate
himself: in another sense, I think that he did. I mean that his
consummate compositions were preceded by shorter, partial, incomplete
sketches, which he afterwards worked up, improved, and re-modelled. I
do not understand how Plato could have composed such works as
Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Symposion, Phædrus, Phædon, &c.,
without having before him many of these preparatory sketches. That
some of these sketches should have been preserved is what we might
naturally expect; and I believe Minos and Hipparchus to be among them.
I do not wonder that they are of inferior merit. One point on which
Boeckh (pp. 7, 8) contends that Hipparchus and Minos are unlike to
Plato is, that the _collocutor_ with Sokrates is anonymous. But we
find anonymous talkers in the Protagoras, Sophistês, Politikus, and
Leges.]
I find elsewhere in Schleiermacher, another opinion, not less
important, in reference to disallowance of dialogues, on purely
internal grounds. Take the Gorgias and the Protagoras: both these two
dialogues are among the most renowned of the catalogue: both have
escaped all suspicion as to legitimacy, even from Ast and Socher, the
two boldest of all disfranchising critics. In the Protagoras, Sokrates
maintains an elaborate argument to prove, against the unwilling
Protagoras, that the Good is identical with the Pleasurable, and the
Evil identical with the Painful--in the Gorgias, Sokrates holds an
argument equally elaborate, to show that Good is essentially different
from Pleasurable, Evil from Painful. What the one affirms, the other
denies. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself characterises the thesis
vindicated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, as "entirely un-Sokratic and
un-Platonic".[75] If internal grounds of repudiation are held to be
available against the Thrasyllean canon, how can such grounds exist in
greater force than those which are here admitted to bear against the
Protagoras--That it exhibits Sokrates as contradicting the Sokrates of
the Gorgias--That it exhibits him farther as advancing and proving, at
great length, a thesis "entirely un-Sokratic and un-Platonic"? Since
the critics all concur in disregarding these internal objections, as
insufficient to raise even a suspicion against the Protagoras, I
cannot concur with them when they urge the like objections as valid
and irresistible against other dialogues.
[Footnote 75: Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Protag. vol. i. p. 232. "Jene
ganz unsokratische und unplatonische Ansicht, dass das Gute nichts
anderes ist als das Angenehme."
So also, in the Parmenides, we find a host of unsolved objections
against the doctrine of Ideas; upon which in other dialogues Plato so
emphatically insists. Accordingly, Socher, resting upon this
discrepancy as an "internal ground," declares the Parmenides not to be
the work of Plato. But the other critics refuse to go along with this
inference. I think they are right in so refusing. But this only shows
how little such internal grounds are to be trusted, as evidence to
prove spuriousness.]
I may add, as farther illustrating this point, that there are few
dialogues in the list against which stronger objections on internal
grounds can be brought, than Leges and Menexenus. Yet both of them
stand authenticated, beyond all reasonable dispute, as genuine works
of Plato, not merely by the Canon of Thrasyllus, but also by the
testimony of Aristotle.[76]
[Footnote 76: See Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 384: and still
more, Zeller, Plat. Studien, pp. 1-131, Tübingen, 1839. In that
treatise, where Zeller has set forth powerfully the grounds for
denying the genuineness of the Leges, he relied so much upon the
strength of this negative case, as to discredit the direct testimony
of Aristotle affirming the Leges to be genuine. In his Phil. d.
Griech. Zeller altered this opinion, and admitted the Leges to be
genuine. But Strümpell adheres to the earlier opinion given by Zeller,
and maintains that the partial recantation is noway justified. (Gesch.
d. Prakt. Phil. d. Griech. p. 457.)
Suckow mentions (Form der Plat. Schriften, 1855, p. 135) that Zeller
has in a subsequent work reverted to his former opinion, denying the
genuineness of the Leges. Suckow himself denies it also; relying not
merely on the internal objections against it, but also on a passage of
Isokrates (ad Philippum, p. 84), which he considers to sanction his
opinion, but which (in my judgment) entirely fails to bear him out.
Suckow attempts to show (p. 55), and Ueberweg partly countenances the
same opinion, that the two passages in which Aristotle alludes to the
Menexenus (Rhet. i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11) do not prove that he
(Aristotle) considered it as a work of Plato, because he mentions the
name of Sokrates only, and not that of Plato. But this is to require
from a witness such precise specification as we cannot reasonably
expect. Aristotle, alluding to the Menexenus, says, [Greek: Sôkra/tês
e)n tô=| E)pitaphi/ô|]: just as, in alluding to the Gorgias in another
place (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173), he says, [Greek: Kalliklê=s e)n
tô=| Gorgi/a|]: and again, in alluding to the Phædon, [Greek: o( e)n
Phai/dôni Sôkra/tês] (De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9, p. 335): not to
mention his allusions in the Politica to the Platonic Republic, under
the name of Sokrates. No instance can be produced in which Aristotle
cites any Sokratic dialogue, composed by Antisthenes, Æschines, &c.,
or any other of the Sokratic companions except Plato. And when we read
in Aristotle's Politica (ii. 3, 3) the striking compliment
paid--[Greek: To\ me\n ou)=n peritto\n e)/chousi pa/ntes oi( tou=
Sôkra/tous lo/goi, kai\ to\ kompso/n, kai\ to\ kaino/tomon, kai\ to\
zêtêtiko/n; kalô=s de\ pa/nta i)/sôs chalepo/n]--we cannot surely
imagine that he intends to designate any other dialogues than those
composed by Plato.]
[Side-note: Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties,
and must be based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to
the exclusion of the rest.]
While adhering therefore to the Canon of Thrasyllus, I do not think
myself obliged to make out that Plato is either like to himself, or
equal to himself, or consistent with himself, throughout all the
dialogues included therein, and throughout the period of fifty years
during which these dialogues were composed. Plato is to be found in
all and each of the dialogues, not in an imaginary type abstracted
from some to the exclusion of the rest. The critics reverence so much
this type of their own creation, that they insist on bringing out a
result consistent with it, either by interpretation specially
contrived, or by repudiating what will not harmonise. Such sacrifice
of the inherent diversity, and separate individuality, of the
dialogues, to the maintenance of a supposed unity of type, style, or
purpose, appears to me an error. In fact,[77] there exists, for us, no
personal Plato any more than there is a personal Shakespeare. Plato
(except in the Epistolæ) never appears before us, nor gives us any
opinion as his own: he is the unseen prompter of different characters
who converse aloud in a number of distinct dramas--each drama a
separate work, manifesting its own point of view, affirmative or
negative, consistent or inconsistent with the others, as the case may
be. In so far as I venture to present a general view of one who keeps
constantly in the dark--who delights to dive, and hide himself, not
less difficult to catch than the supposed Sophist in his own dialogue
called Sophistês--I shall consider it as subordinate to the dialogues,
each and all: and above all, it must be such as to include and
acknowledge not merely diversities, but also inconsistencies and
contradictions.[78]
[Footnote 77: The only manifestation of the personal Plato is in the
Epistolæ. I have already said that I accept these as genuine, though
most critics do not. I consider them valuable illustrations of his
character, as far as they go. They are all written after he was more
than sixty years of age. And most of them relate to his relations with
Dionysius the younger, with Dion, and with Sicilian affairs generally.
This was a peculiar and outlying phase of Plato's life, during which
(through the instigation of Dion, and at the sacrifice of his own
peace of mind) he became involved in the world of political action: he
had to deal with real persons, passions, and interests--with the
feeble character, literary velleities, and jealous apprehensions of
Dionysius--the reforming vehemence and unpopular harshness of Dion--the
courtiers, the soldiers, and the people of Syracuse, all moved by
different passions of which he had had no practical experience. It
could not be expected that, amidst such turbulent elements, Plato as
an adviser could effect much: yet I do not think that he turned his
chances, doubtful as they were, to the best account. I have
endeavoured to show this in the tenth volume of my History of Greece,
c. 84. But at all events, these operations lay apart from Plato's true
world--the speculation, dialectic, and lectures of the Academy at
Athens. The Epistolæ, however, present some instructive points,
bearing upon Plato's opinions about writing as a medium of
philosophical communication and instruction to learners, which I shall
notice in the suitable place.]
[Footnote 78: I transcribe from the instructive work of M. Ernest
Renan, _Averroès et l'Averroïsme_, a passage in which he deprecates
the proceeding of critics who presume uniform consistency throughout
the works of Aristotle, and make out their theory partly by forcible
exegesis, partly by setting aside as spurious all those compositions
which oppose them. The remark applies more forcibly to the dialogues
or Plato, who is much less systematic than Aristotle:--
"On a combattu l'interprétation d'Ibn-Rosehd (Averroès), et soutenu
que l'intellect actif n'est pour Aristote qu'une faculté de l'ame.
L'intellect passif n'est alors que la faculté de recevoir les [Greek:
phanta/smata]: l'intellect actif n'est que l'induction s'exerçant sur
les [Greek: phanta/smata] et en tirant les idées générales. Ainsi l'on
fait concorder la théorie exposée dans le troisième livre du Traité de
l'Ame, avec celle des Seconds Analytiques, où Aristote semble réduire
le rôle de la raison à l'induction généralisant les faits de la
sensation. Certes, je ne me dissimule pas qu'Aristote paraît souvent
envisager le [Greek: nou=s] comme personnel à l'homme. Son attention
constante à repéter que l'intellect est identique à l'intelligible,
que l'intellect passe à l'acte quand il devient l'objet qu'il pense,
est difficile à concilier avec l'hypothèse d'un intellect séparé de
l'homme. Mais il est dangereux de faire ainsi coincider de force les
différents aperçus des anciens. Les anciens philosophaient souvent
sans se limiter dans un système, traitant le même sujet selon les
points de vue qui s'offraient à eux, ou qui leur étaient offerts par
les écoles antérieures, sans s'inquiéter des dissonances qui pouvaient
exister entre ces divers tronçons de théorie. Il est puéril de
chercher à les mettre d'accord avec eux-mêmes, quand eux-mêmes s'en
sont peu souciés. Autant vaudrait, comme certains critiques Allemands,
déclarer interpolés tous les passages que l'on ne peut concilier avec
les autres. Ainsi, la théorie des Seconds Analytiques et celles du
troisième livre de l'Ame, sans se contredire expressément,
représentent deux aperçus profondément distincts et d'origine
différente, sur le fait de l'intelligence." (Averroès et l'Averroïsme,
p. 96-98, Paris, 1852.)
There is also in Strümpell (Gesch. der Prakt. Phil. der Griech. vor
Aristot. p. 200) a good passage to the same purpose as the above from
M. Renan: disapproving this presumption,--that the doctrines of every
ancient philosopher must of course be systematic and coherent with
each other--as "a phantom of modern times": and pointing out that both
Plato and Aristotle founded their philosophy, not upon any one
governing [Greek: a)rchê\] alone, from which exclusively consequences
are deduced, but upon several distinct, co-ordinate, independent,
points of view: each of which is by turns followed out, not always
consistently with the others.]