Aristotle, in his comment on the opinion of Antisthenes, makes us

understand better what it really is:--"Respecting simple essences (A

or B), I cannot tell what they really are: but I can tell what they

are like or unlike, _i.e._, I can compare them with other essences,

simple or compound. But respecting the compound AB, I can tell what it

really is: its essence is, to be compounded of A and B. And this I

call _knowing_ or _knowledge_."[139] The distinction here taken by

Antisthenes (or by his followers) is both real and useful: Plato does

not contest it: while Aristotle distinctly acknowledges it, only that

among the simple items he ranks both Percepta and Concepta.

[Footnote 139: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. 1043, b. 24-32, with the

Scholia, p. 774, b. Br.

Mr. J. S. Mill observes, Syst. of Logic, i. 5, 6, p. 116,

ed. 9:--"There is still another exceptional case, in which, though

the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm

nothing but resemblance: the class being founded not on resemblance in

any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The

classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or

other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance,

are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say,

they are alike in this, not alike in that but because we feel them to

be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When therefore I

say--The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation

I feel is one of tightness--in both cases the attribute I affirm of

the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance: simple

likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had

that name bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other

concrete general names, are connotative: but they connote a mere

resemblance. When predicated of any individual feelings, the

information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings

which we have been accustomed to call by the same name."]

[Side-note: Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia.]

Monimus a Syracusan, and Krates a Theban, with his wife

Hipparchia,[140] were successors of Diogenes in the Cynic vein of

philosophy: together with several others of less note. Both Monimus

and Krates are said to have been persons of wealthy condition,[141]

yet their minds were so powerfully affected by what they saw of

Diogenes, that they followed his example, renounced their wealth, and

threw themselves upon a life of poverty; with nothing beyond the

wallet and the threadbare cloak, but with fearless independence of

character, free censure of every one, and indifference to opinion. "I

choose as my country" (said Krates) "poverty and low esteem, which

fortune cannot assail: I am the fellow-citizen of Diogenes, whom the

snares of envy cannot reach."[142] Krates is said to have admonished

every one, whether they invited it or not: and to have gone unbidden

from house to house for the purpose of exhortation. His persistence in

this practice became so obtrusive that he obtained the title of "the

Door-Opener".[143] This feature, common to several other Cynics,

exhibits an approximation to the missionary character of Sokrates, as

described by himself in the Platonic Apology: a feature not found in

any of the other eminent heads of philosophy--neither in Plato nor in

Aristotle, Zeno, or Epikurus.

[Footnote 140: Hipparchia was a native of Maroneia in Thrace; born in

a considerable station, and belonging to an opulent family. She came

to Athens with her brother Mêtroklês, and heard both Theophrastus and

Kratês. Both she and her brother became impressed with the strongest

admiration for Kratês: for his mode of life, as well as for his

discourses and doctrine. Rejecting various wealthy suitors, she

insisted upon becoming his wife, both against his will and against the

will of her parents. Her resolute enthusiasm overcame the reluctance

of both. She adopted fully his hard life, poor fare, and threadbare

cloak. She passed her days in the same discourses and controversies,

indifferent to the taunts which were addressed to her for having

relinquished the feminine occupations of spinning and weaving.

Diogenes Laertius found many striking dicta or replies ascribed to her

([Greek: a)/lla muri/a tê=s philoso/phou] vi. 96-98). He gives an

allusion made to her by the contemporary comic poet Menander, who (as

I before observed) handled the Cynics of his time as Aristophanes,

Eupolis, &c., had handled Sokrates--

[Greek: Sumperipatê/seis ga\r tri/bôn' e)/chous e)moi\,

ô(/sper Kra/têti tô=| Kunikô=| poth' ê( gunê\.

Kai\ thugate/r' e)xe/dôk' e)kei=nos, ô(s e)/phê

au)to\s, e)pi\ peira=| dou\s tria/konth' ê(me/ras].

(vi. 93.)]

[Footnote 141: Diog, L. vi. 82-88. [Greek: Mo/nimos o( Ku/ôn], Sext.

Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-88.

About Krates, Plutarch, De Vit. Aere Alieno, 7, p. 831 F.]

[Footnote 142: Diog. L. vi. 93. [Greek: e)/chein de\ patri/da a)doxi/an

te kai\ peni/an, a)na/lôta tê=| tu/chê|: kai\--Dioge/nous ei)=nai

poli/tês a)nepibouleu/tou phtho/nô|]. The parody or verses of Krates,

about his city of Pera (the Wallet), vi. 85, are very spirited--

[Greek: Pê/rê tis po/lis e)sti\ me/sô| e)ni\ oi)/nopi tu/phô|], &c.

Krates composed a collection of philosophical Epistles, which Diogenes

pronounces to be excellent, and even to resemble greatly the style of

Plato (vi. 98).]

[Footnote 143: Diog. L. vi. 86, [Greek: e)kalei=to de\

_thurepanoi/ktês_, dia\ to\ ei)s pa=san ei)sie/nai oi)ki/an kai\

nouthetei=n]. Compare Seneca, Epist. 29.]

[Side-note: Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus.]

Among other hearers of Krates, who carried on, and at the same time

modified, the Cynic discipline, we have to mention Zeno, of Kitium in

Cyprus, who became celebrated as the founder of the Stoic sect. In him

the Cynic, Megaric, and Herakleitean tendencies may be said to have

partially converged, though with considerable modifications:[144] the

ascetic doctrines (without the ascetic practices or obtrusive

forwardness) of the Cynics--and the logical subtleties of the others.

He blended them, however, with much of new positive theory, both

physical and cosmological. His compositions were voluminous; and those

of the Stoic Chrysippus, after him, were still more numerous. The

negative and oppugning function, which in the fourth century B.C. had

been directed by the Megarics against Aristotle, was in the third

century B.C. transferred to the Platonists, or Academy represented by

Arkesilaus: whose formidable dialectic was brought to bear upon the

Stoic and Epikurean schools--both of them positive, though greatly

opposed to each other.

[Footnote 144: Numenius ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 5.]

* * * * *

ARISTIPPUS.

Along with Antisthenes, among the hearers and companions of Sokrates,

stood another Greek of very opposite dispositions, yet equally marked

and original--Aristippus of Kyrênê. The stimulus of the Sokratic

method, and the novelty of the topics on which it was brought to bear,

operated forcibly upon both, prompting each of them to theorise in his

own way on the best plan of life.

[Side-note: Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine.]

Aristippus, a Kyrenean of easy circumstances, having heard of the

powerful ascendancy exercised by Sokrates over youth, came to Athens

for the express purpose of seeing him, and took warm interest in his

conversation.[145] He set great value upon mental cultivation and

accomplishments; but his habits of life were inactive, easy, and

luxurious. Upon this last count, one of the most interesting chapters

in the Xenophontic Memorabilia reports an interrogative lecture

addressed to him by Sokrates, in the form of dialogue.[146]

[Footnote 145: Plutarch (De Curiositate, p. 516 A) says that

Aristippus informed himself, at the Olympic games, from Ischomachus

respecting the influence of Sokrates.]

[Footnote 146: See the first chapter of the Second Book of the

Memorabilia.

I give an abstract of the principal points in the dialogue, not a

literal translation.]

[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus.]

Sokrates points out to Aristippus that mankind may be distributed into

two classes: 1. Those who have trained themselves to habits of

courage, energy, bodily strength, and command over their desires and

appetites, together with practice in the actual work of life:--these

are the men who become qualified to rule, and who do actually rule. 2.

The rest of mankind, inferior in these points, who have no choice but

to obey, and who do obey.[147]--Men of the first or ruling class

possess all the advantages of life: they perform great exploits, and

enjoy a full measure of delight and happiness, so far as human

circumstances admit. Men of the second class are no better than

slaves, always liable to suffer, and often actually suffering,

ill-treatment and spoliation of the worst kind. To which of these

classes (Sokrates asks Aristippus) do you calculate on belonging--and

for which do you seek to qualify yourself?--To neither of them (replies

Aristippus). I do not wish to share the lot of the subordinate

multitude: but I have no relish for a life of command, with all the

fatigues, hardships, perils, &c., which are inseparable from it. I

prefer a middle course: I wish neither to rule, nor to be ruled, but

to be a freeman: and I consider freedom as the best guarantee for

happiness.[148] I desire only to pass through life as easily and

pleasantly as possible.[149]--Which of the two do you consider to live

most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? asks Sokrates.--I do not

rank myself with either (says Aristippus): nor do I enter into active

duties of citizenship anywhere: I pass from one city to another, but

everywhere as a stranger or non-citizen.--Your scheme is impracticable

(says Sokrates). You cannot obtain security in the way that you

propose. You will find yourself suffering wrong and distress along

with the subordinates[150]--and even worse than the subordinates: for

a stranger, wherever he goes, is less befriended and more exposed to

injury than the native citizens. You will be sold into slavery, though

you are fit for no sort of work: and your master will chastise you

until you become fit for work.--But (replies Aristippus) this very art

of ruling, which you consider to be happiness,[151] is itself a hard

life, a toilsome slavery, not only stripped of enjoyment, but full of

privation and suffering. A man must be a fool to embrace such

discomforts of his own accord.--It is that very circumstance (says

Sokrates), that he does embrace them of his own accord--which renders

them endurable, and associates them with feelings of pride and

dignity. They are the price paid beforehand, for a rich reward to

come. He who goes through labour and self-denial, for the purpose of

gaining good friends or subduing enemies, and for the purpose of

acquiring both mental and bodily power, so that he may manage his own

concerns well and may benefit both his friends and his country--such a

man will be sure to find his course of labour pleasurable. He will

pass his life in cheerful[152] satisfaction, not only enjoying his own

esteem and admiration, but also extolled and envied by others. On the

contrary, whoever passes his earlier years in immediate pleasures and

indolent ease, will acquire no lasting benefit either in mind or body.

He will have a soft lot at first, but his future will be hard and

dreary.[153]

[Footnote 147: Xen. Memor. ii. 1, 1 seq. [Greek: to\n me\n o(/pôs

i(kano\s e)/stai a)/rchein, to\n de\ o(/pôs mê/d' a)ntipoiê/setai

a)rchê=s--tou\s a)rchikou/s.]]

[Footnote 148: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 11. [Greek: a)ll' ei)=nai ti/s moi

dokei= me/sê tou/tôn o(do/s, ê)\n peirô=mai badi/zein, ou)/te di'

a)rchê=s, ou)/te dia\ doulei/as, a)lla\ di' e)leutheri/as, ê)/per

ma/lista pro\s eu)daimoni/an a)/gei.]]

[Footnote 149: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9. [Greek: e)mauton toi/nun ta/ttô

ei)s tou\s boulome/nous ê)=| r(a=|sta kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]]

[Footnote 150: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 12. [Greek: ei) me/ntoi e)n

a)nthrô/pois ô)\n mê/te a)/rchein a)xiô/seis mê/te a)/rchesthai, mê/te

tou\s a)/rchontas e(kô\n therapeu/seis, oi)=mai/ se o(ra=|n ô(s

e)pi/stantai oi( krei/ttones tou\s ê(/ttonas kai\ koinê=| kai\ i)di/a|

klai/ontas kathi/santes, ô(s dou/lois chrê=sthai].

What follows is yet more emphatic, about the unjust oppression of

rulers, and the suffering on the part of subjects.]

[Footnote 151: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 17. [Greek: A)lla\ ga\r, ô)=

Sô/krates, oi( ei)s tê\n basilikê\n te/chnên paideuo/menoi, ê)\n

dokei=s moi su\ nomi/zein eu)daimoni/an ei)=nai].

Compare Memor. ii. 3, 4.]

[Footnote 152: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 19. [Greek: pô=s ou)k oi)/esthai chrê\

tou/tous kai\ ponei=n ê(de/ôs ei)s ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ zê=n

eu)phronome/nous, a)game/nous me\n e(autou\s, e)painoume/nous de\ kai\

zêloume/nous u(po\ tô=n a)/llôn?]

[Footnote 153: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 20, cited from Epicharmus:--

[Greek: mê\ ta\ malaka\ mô/eo, mê\ ta\ sklê/r' e)/chê|s.]]

[Side-note: Choice of Hêraklês.]

Sokrates enforces his lecture by reciting to Aristippus the memorable

lecture or apologue, which the Sophist Prodikus was then delivering in

lofty diction to numerous auditors[154]--the fable still known as the

Choice of Hêraklês. Virtue and Pleasure (the latter of the two being

here identified with Evil or Vice) are introduced as competing for the

direction of the youthful Hêraklês. Each sets forth her case, in

dramatic antithesis. Pleasure is introduced as representing altogether

the gratification of the corporeal appetites and the love of repose:

while Virtue replies by saying, that if youth be employed altogether

in pursuing such delights, at the time when the appetites are most

vigorous--the result will be nothing but fatal disappointment,

accompanied with entire loss of the different and superior pleasures

available in mature years and in old age. Youth is the season of

labour: the physical appetites must be indulged sparingly, and only at

the call of actual want: accomplishments of body and mind must be

acquired in that season, which will enable the mature man to perform

in after life great and glorious exploits. He will thus realise the

highest of all human delights--the love of his friends and the

admiration of his countrymen--the sound of his own praises and the

reflexion upon his own deserts. At the price of a youth passed in

labour and self-denial, he will secure the fullest measure of mature

and attainable happiness.

[Footnote 154: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21-34. [Greek: e)n tô=| suggra/mmati

tô=| peri\ Ê(rakle/ous, o(/per dê\ kai\ plei/stois

e)pidei/knutai--megaleiote/rois r(ê/masin.]]

"It is worth your while, Aristippus" (says Sokrates, in concluding

this lecture), "to bestow some reflexion on what is to happen in the

latter portions of your life."

[Side-note: Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting

Good and Evil.]

This dialogue (one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and

probably reported by Xenophon from actual hearing) is valuable in

reference not only to Aristippus, but also to Sokrates himself. Many

recent historians of philosophy describe Sokrates and Plato as setting

up an idea of Virtue or Good Absolute (_i.e._ having no essential

reference to the happiness or security of the agent or of any one

else) which they enforce--and an idea of Vice or Evil Absolute (_i.e._

having no essential reference to suffering or peril, or

disappointment, either of the agent or of any one else) which they

denounce and discommend and as thereby refuting the Sophists, who are

said to have enforced Virtue and denounced Vice only relatively--_i.e._

in consequence of the bearing of one and the other upon the

security and happiness of the agent or of others. Whether there be any

one doctrine or style of preaching which can be fairly ascribed to the

Sophists as a class, I will not again discuss here: but I believe that

the most eminent among them, Protagoras and Prodikus, held the

language here ascribed to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that

upon this point Sokrates was their opponent. The Xenophontic Sokrates

(a portrait more resembling reality than the Platonic) always holds

this same language: the Platonic Sokrates not always, yet often. In

the dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, as well as in the

apologue of Prodikus, we see that the devotion of the season of youth

to indulgence and inactive gratification of appetite, is blamed as

productive of ruinous consequences--as entailing loss of future

pleasures, together with a state of weakness which leaves no

protection against future suffering; while great care is taken to

show, that though laborious exercise is demanded during youth, such

labour will be fully requited by the increased pleasures and happiness

of after life. The pleasure of being praised, and the pleasure of

seeing good deeds performed by one's self, are especially insisted on.

On this point both Sokrates and Prodikus concur.[155]

[Footnote 155: Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, 31. [Greek: tou= de\ pa/ntôn

ê(di/stou a)kou/smatos, e)pai/nou seautê=s, a)nê/koos ei)=, kai\ tou=

pa/ntôn ê(distou thea/matos a)the/atos; ou)de\n ga\r pô/pote seautê=s

e)/rgon kalo\n tethe/asai. . . .

ta\ me\n ê(de/a e)n tê=| veo/têti diadramo/ntes, ta\ de\ chalepa\ e)s

to\ gê=ras a)pothe/menoi.]]

[Side-note: Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic

Sokrates.]

If again we compare the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic

Sokrates, we shall find that the lecture of the former to Aristippus

coincides sufficiently with the theory laid down by the latter in the

dialogue Protagoras; to which theory the Sophist Protagoras is

represented as yielding a reluctant adhesion. But we shall find also

that it differs materially from the doctrine maintained by Sokrates in

the Platonic Gorgias. Nay, if we follow the argument addressed by the

Xenophontic Sokrates to Aristippus, we perceive that it is in

substance similar to that which the Platonic dialogue Gorgias puts in

the mouth of the rhetor Pôlus and the politician Kalliklês. The

Xenophontic Sokrates distributes men into two classes--the rulers and

the ruled: the former strong, well-armed, and well-trained, who enjoy

life at the expense of the submission and suffering of the latter: the

former committing injustice, the latter enduring injustice. He

impresses upon Aristippus the misery of being confounded with the

suffering many, and exhorts him to qualify himself by a laborious

apprenticeship for enrolment among the ruling few. If we read the

Platonic Gorgias, we shall see that this is the same strain in which

Pôlus and Kalliklês address Sokrates, when they invite him to exchange

philosophy for rhetoric, and to qualify himself for active political

life. "Unless you acquire these accomplishments, you will be helpless

and defenceless against injury and insult from others: while, if you

acquire them, you will raise yourself to political influence, and will

exercise power over others, thus obtaining the fullest measure of

enjoyment which life affords: see the splendid position to which the

Macedonian usurper Archelaus has recently exalted himself.[156]

Philosophy is useful, when studied in youth for a short time as

preface to professional and political apprenticeship: but if a man

perseveres in it and makes it the occupation of life, he will not only

be useless to others, but unable to protect himself; he will be

exposed to suffer any injustice which the well-trained and powerful

men may put upon him." To these exhortations of Pôlus and Kalliklês

Sokrates replies by admitting their case as true matter of fact. "I

know that I am exposed to such insults and injuries: but my life is

just and innocent. If I suffer, I shall suffer wrong: and those who do

the wrong will thereby inflict upon themselves a greater mischief than

they inflict upon me. Doing wrong is worse for the agent than

suffering wrong."[157]

[Footnote 156: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 466-470-486.]

[Footnote 157: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 508-509-521-527 C. [Greek: kai\

e)/aso/n tina sou= kataphronê=sai ô(s a)noê/tou, kai\ propêlaki/sai

e)a\n bou/lêtai, kai\ nai\ ma\ Di/a su/ ge thar)r(ô=n pata/xai tê\n

a)/timon tau/tên plêgê/n; ou)de\n ga\r deino\n pei/sei, e)a\n tô=|

o)/nti ê(=|s kalo\s ka)gatho/s, a)skô=n a)retê/n.]]

[Side-note: Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kallikes in

Platonic Gorgias.]

There is indeed this difference between the Xenophontic Sokrates in

his address to Aristippus, and the Platonic Kalliklês in his

exhortation to Sokrates: That whereas Kalliklês proclaims and even

vindicates it as natural justice and right, that the strong should

gratify their desires by oppressing and despoiling the weak--the

Xenophontic Sokrates merely asserts such oppression as an actual fact,

notorious and undeniable,[158] without either approving or blaming it.

Plato, constructing an imaginary conversation with the purpose that

Sokrates shall be victorious, contrives intentionally and with

dramatic consistency that the argument of Kalliklês shall be advanced

in terms so invidious and revolting that no one else would be bold

enough to speak it out:[159] which contrivance was the more necessary,

as Sokrates is made not only to disparage the poets, rhetors, and most

illustrious statesmen of historical Athens, but to sustain a thesis in

which he admits himself to stand alone, opposed to aristocrats as well

as democrats.[160] Yet though there is this material difference in the

manner of handling, the plan of life which the Xenophontic Sokrates

urges upon Aristippus, and the grounds upon which he enforces it, are

really the same as those which Kalliklês in the Platonic Gorgias urges

upon Sokrates. "Labour to qualify yourself for active political

power"--is the lesson addressed in the one case to a wealthy man who

passed his life in ease and indulgence, in the other case to a poor

man who devoted himself to speculative debate on general questions,

and to cross-examination of every one who would listen and answer. The

man of indulgence, and the man of speculation,[161] were both of them

equally destitute of those active energies which were necessary to

confer power over others, or even security against oppression by

others.

[Footnote 158: If we read the conversation alleged by Thucydides (v.

94-105-112) to have taken place between the Athenian generals and the

executive council of Melos, just before the siege of that island by

the Athenians, we shall see that this same language is held by the

Athenians. "You, the Melians, being much weaker, must submit to us who

are much stronger; this is the universal law and necessity of nature,

which we are not the first to introduce, but only follow out, as

others have done before us, and will do after us. Submit--or it will

be worse for you. No middle course, or neutrality, is open to you."]

[Footnote 159: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-487-492.]

[Footnote 160: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 472-521.]

[Footnote 161: If we read the treatise of Plutarch, [Greek: Peri\

Stôi/kôn e)nantiôma/tôn] (c. 2-3, p. 1033 C-D), we shall see that the

Stoic writers, Zeno, Kleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, all

of them earnestly recommended a life of active citizenship and

laborious political duty, as incumbent upon philosophers not less than

upon others; and that they treated with contempt a life of literary

leisure and speculation. Chrysippus explicitly declared [Greek:

ou)de\n diaphe/rein to\n scholastiko\n bi/on tou= ê(donikou=] _i. e._

that the speculative philosopher who kept aloof from political

activity, was in substance a follower of Epikurus. Tacitus holds much

the same language (Hist. iv. 5) when he says about Helvidius

Priscus:--"ingenium illustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit:

non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo

constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret," &c.

The contradiction which Plutarch notes is, that these very Stoic

philosophers (Chrysippus and the others) who affected to despise all

modes of life except active civic duty--were themselves, all, men of

literary leisure, spending their lives away from their native cities,

in writing and talking philosophy. The same might have been said about

Sokrates and Plato (except as to leaving their native cities), both of

whom incurred the same reproach for inactivity as Sokrates here

addresses to Aristippus.]

[Side-note: Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life.]

In the Xenophontic dialogue, Aristippus replies to Sokrates that the

apprenticeship enjoined upon him is too laborious, and that the

exercise of power, itself laborious, has no charm for him. He desires

a middle course, neither to oppress nor to be oppressed: neither to

command, nor to be commanded--like Otanes among the seven Persian

conspirators.[162] He keeps clear of political obligation, and seeks

to follow, as much as he can, his own individual judgment. Though

Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue, is made to declare this middle

course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the

Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias aspires to:--moreover the same as

what the real Sokrates at Athens both pursued as far as he could, and

declared to be the only course consistent with his security.[163] The

Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias declares emphatically that no man can

hope to take active part in the government of a country, unless he be

heartily identified in spirit with the ethical and political system of

the country: unless he not merely professes, but actually and

sincerely shares, the creed, doctrines, tastes, and modes of

appreciation prevalent among the citizens.[164] Whoever is deficient

in this indispensable condition, must be content "to mind his own

business and to abstain from active meddling with public affairs".

This is the course which the Platonic Sokrates claims both for himself

and for the philosopher generally:[165] it is also the course which

Aristippus chooses for himself, under the different title of a middle

way between the extortion of the ruler and the suffering of the

subordinate. And the argument of Sokrates that no middle way is

possible--far from refuting Aristippus (as Xenophon says that it

did)[166] is founded upon an incorrect assumption: had it been

correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed.

[Footnote 162: Herodot. iii. 80-83.]

[Footnote 163: Plato, Apol. So. p. 32 A. [Greek: i)diôteu/ein, a)lla\

mê\ dêmosieu/ein].]

[Footnote 164: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 510-513. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n pot'

e)sti\ te/chnê tê=s paraskeuê=s tou= mêde\n a)dikei=sthai ê)\ ô(s

o)li/gista? ske/psai ei)/ soi dokei= ê(=|per e)moi/. e)moi\ me\n ga\r

dokei= ê(/de; ê)\ au)to\n a)/rchein dei=n e)n tê=| po/lei ê)\ kai\

turannei=n, ê)\ tê=s u(parchou/sês politei/as e(tai=ron ei)=nai].

(This is exactly the language which Sokrates holds to Aristippus,

Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1, 12.)

[Greek: o(\s a)\n o(moê/thês ô)\n, tau)ta pse/gôn kai\ e)painô=n,

e)the/lê| a)/rchesthai kai\ u(pokei=sthai tô=| a)/rchonti--eu)thu\s

e)k ne/ou e)thi/zein au(to\n toi=s au)toi=s chai/rein kai\

a)/chthesthai tô=| despo/tê|] (510 D). [Greek: ou) ga\r mimêtê\n dei=

ei)=nai a)ll' au)tophuô=s o(/moion tou/tois] (513 B).]

[Footnote 165: Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C-D. (Compare Republic, vi. p.

496 D.) [Greek: a)ndro\s i)diô/tou ê)\ a)/llou tino/s, ma/lista me/n,

e)/gôge/ phêmi, ô)= Kalli/kleis, philoso/phou ta\ au(tou= pra/xantos

kai\ ou) polupragmonê/santos e)n tô=| bi/ô|--kai\ dê\ kai\ se\

a)ntiparakalô=] (Sokrates to Kalliklês) [Greek: e)pi\ tou=ton to\n

bi/on]. Upon these words Routh remarks: "Respicitur inter hæc verba ad

Calliclis orationem, quâ rerum civilium tractatio et [Greek:

polupragmosu/nê] Socrati persuadentur,"--which is the same invitation

as the Xenophontic Sokrates addresses to Aristippus. Again, in Plat.

Republ. viii. pp. 549 C, 550 A, we read, that corruption of the

virtuous character begins by invitations to the shy youth to depart

from the quiet plan of life followed by a virtuous father (who is

[Greek: ta\ e(autou= pra/ttei]) and to enter on a career of active

political ambition. The youth is induced, by instigation of his mother

and relatives without, to pass from [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê] to [Greek:

philopragmosu/nê], which is described as a change for the worse. Even

in Xenophon (Memor. iii. 11, 16) Sokrates recognises and jests upon

his own [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê].]

[Footnote 166: Xen. Mem. iii. 8, 1. Diogenes L. says (and it is

probable enough, from radical difference of character) that Xenophon

was adversely disposed to Aristippus. In respect to other persons

also, Xenophon puts invidious constructions (for which at any rate no

ground is shown) upon their purposes in questioning Sokrates: thus, in

the dialogue (i. 6) with the Sophist Antiphon, he says that Antiphon

questioned Sokrates in order to seduce him away from his companions

(Mem. i. 6, 1).]

[Side-note: Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the

character of the hearer.]

The real Sokrates, since he talked incessantly and with every one,

must of course have known how to diversify his conversation and adapt

it to each listener. Xenophon not only attests this generally,[167]

but has preserved the proofs of it in his Memorabilia--real

conversations, reported though doubtless dressed up by himself. The

conversations which he has preserved relate chiefly to piety and to

the duties and proceedings of active life: and to the necessity of

controuling the appetites: these he selected partly because they

suited his proclaimed purpose of replying to the topics of indictment,

partly because they were in harmony with his own _idéal_. Xenophon was

a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing

with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His

heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus--warriors,

horsemen, hunters, husbandmen, always engaged in active competition

for power, glory, or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue,

or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence, even

though accompanied by mental and speculative activity--"homines ignavâ

operâ et philosophiâ sententiâ"--he had no respect. It was on this

side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be, and

probably really was, the most defective. Sokrates employed the

arguments the most likely to call forth within him habits of action--to

render him [Greek: praktikô/teron].[168] In talking with the

presumptuous youth Glaukon, and with the diffident Charmides,[169]

Sokrates used language adapted to correct the respective infirmities

of each. In addressing Kritias and Alkibiades, he would consider it

necessary not only to inculcate self-denial as to appetite, but to

repress an exorbitance of ambition.[170] But in dealing with

Aristippus, while insisting upon command of appetite and acquirement

of active energy, he at the same time endeavours to kindle ambition,

and the love of command: he even goes so far as to deny the

possibility of a middle course, and to maintain (what Kritias and

Alkibiades[171] would have cordially approved) that there was no

alternative open, except between the position of the oppressive

governors and that of the suffering subjects. Addressed to Aristippus,

these topics were likely to thrust forcibly upon his attention the

danger of continued indulgences during the earlier years of life, and

the necessity, in view to his own future security, for training in

habits of vigour, courage, self-command, endurance.

[Footnote 167: Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2-3.]

[Footnote 168: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 1. [Greek: ô(s de\ kai\

praktikôte/rous e)poi/ei tou\s suno/ntas au)tô=|, nu=n au)= tou=to

le/xô.]]

[Footnote 169: Xenoph. Mem. iii. capp. 6 and 7.]

[Footnote 170: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 15-18-24. Respecting the different

tone and arguments employed by Sokrates, in his conversations with

different persons, see a good passage in the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat.

xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n tetta/rôn], p. 161, Dindorf.]

[Footnote 171: We see from the first two chapters of the Memorabilia

of Xenophon (as well as from the subsequent intimation of Æschines, in

the oration against Timarchus, p. 173) how much stress was laid by the

accusers of Sokrates on the fact that he had educated Kritias and

Alkibiades; and how the accusers alleged that his teaching tended to

encourage the like exorbitant aspirations in others, dangerous to

established authority, traditional, legal, parental, divine. I do not

doubt (what Xenophon affirms) that Sokrates, when he conversed with

Kritias and Alkibiades, held a very opposite language. But it was

otherwise when he talked with men of ease and indulgence without

ambition, such as Aristippus. If Melêtus and Anytus could have put in

evidence the conversation of Sokrates with Aristippus, many points of

it would have strengthened their case against Sokrates before the

Dikasts. We read in Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 58) how the point was made to

tell, that Sokrates often cited and commented on the passage of the

Iliad (ii. 188) in which the Grecian chiefs, retiring from the agora

to their ships, are described as being respectfully addressed by

Odysseus--while the common soldiers are scolded and beaten by him, for

the very same conduct: the relation which Sokrates here dwells on as

subsisting between [Greek: oi( a)rchikoi\] and [Greek: oi(

a)rcho/menoi], would favour the like colouring.]

[Side-note: Conversations between Sokrates and Aristippus about the

Good and Beautiful.]

Xenophon notices briefly two other colloquies between Sokrates and

Aristippus. The latter asked Sokrates, "Do you know anything good?" in

order (says Xenophon) that if Sokrates answered in the affirmative and

gave as examples, health, wealth, strength, courage, bread, &c., he

(Aristippus) might show circumstances in which this same particular

was evil; and might thus catch Sokrates in a contradiction, as

Sokrates had caught him before.[172] But Sokrates (says Xenophon) far

from seeking to fence with the question, retorted it in such a way as

to baffle the questioner, and at the same time to improve and instruct

the by-standers.[173] "Do you ask me if I know anything good for a

fever?--No. Or for ophthalmic distemper?-No. Or for hunger?--No. Oh!

then, if you mean to ask me, whether I know anything good, which is

good for nothing--I reply that I neither know any such thing, nor care

to know it."

[Footnote 172: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his

commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by

Aristippus--'captiosas Aristippi quæstiunculas". Such a criticism is

preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually

examining and questioning others in the same manner. See in particular

his cross-examination of Euthydêmus, reported by Xenophon, Memor. iv.

2; and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.]

[Footnote 173: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. [Greek: boulo/menos tou\s

suno/ntas ô(phelei=n.]]

Again, on another occasion Aristippus asked him "Do you know anything

beautiful?--Yes; many things.--Are they all like to each other?--No;

they are as unlike as possible to each other.--How then (continues

Aristippus) can that which is unlike to the beautiful, be itself

beautiful?--Easily enough (replies Sokrates); one man is beautiful for

running; another man, altogether unlike him, is beautiful for

wrestling. A shield which is beautiful for protecting your body, is

altogether unlike to a javelin, which is beautiful for being swiftly

and forcibly hurled.--Your answer (rejoined Aristippus) is exactly the

same as it was when I asked you whether you knew anything

good.--Certainly (replies Sokrates). Do you imagine, that the Good is one

thing, and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that all things are

good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? Virtue is not good

in relation to one purpose, and beautiful in relation to another. Men

are called both good and beautiful in reference to the same ends: the

bodies of men, in like manner: and all things which men use, are

considered both good and beautiful, in consideration of their serving

their ends well.--Then (says Aristippus) a basket for carrying dung is

beautiful?--To be sure (replied Sokrates), and a golden shield is

ugly; if the former be well made for doing its work, and the latter

badly.--Do you then assert (asked Aristippus) that the same things are

beautiful and ugly?--Assuredly (replied Sokrates); and the same things

are both good and evil. That which is good for hunger, is often bad

for a fever: that which is good for a fever, is often bad for hunger.

What is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling--and _vice

versâ_. All things are good and beautiful, in relation to the ends

which they serve well: all things are evil and ugly, in relation to

the ends which they serve badly."[174]

[Footnote 174: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1-9.]

[Side-note: Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good.]

These last cited colloquies also, between Sokrates and Aristippus, are

among the most memorable remains of Grecian philosophy: belonging to

one of the years preceding 399 B.C., in which last year Sokrates

perished. Here (as in the former dialogue) the doctrine is distinctly

enunciated by Sokrates--That Good and Evil--Beautiful (or Honourable)

and Ugly (or Dishonourable--Base)--have no intelligible meaning except

in relation to human happiness and security. Good or Evil Absolute

(_i.e._, apart from such relation) is denied to exist. The theory of

Absolute Good (a theory traceable to the Parmenidean doctrines, and

adopted from them by Eukleides) becomes first known to us as

elaborated by Plato. Even in his dialogues it is neither always nor

exclusively advocated, but is often modified by, and sometimes even

exchanged for, the eudæmonistic or relative theory.

[Side-note: Good is relative to human beings and wants, in the view of

Sokrates.]

Sokrates declares very explicitly, in his conversation with

Aristippus, what _he_ means by the Good and the Beautiful: and when

therefore in the name of the Good and the Beautiful, he protests

against an uncontrolled devotion to the pleasures of sense (as in one

of the Xenophontic dialogues with Euthydemus[175]), what he means is,

that a man by such intemperance ruins his prospects of future

happiness, and his best means of being useful both to himself and

others. Whether Aristippus first learnt from Sokrates the relative

theory of the Good and the Beautiful, or had already embraced it

before, we cannot say. Some of his questions, as reported in Xenophon,

would lead us to suspect that it took him by surprise: just as we

find, in the Protagoras of Plato that a theory substantially the same,

though in different words, is proposed by the Platonic Sokrates to the

Sophist Protagoras: who at first repudiates it, but is compelled

ultimately to admit it by the elaborate dialectic of Sokrates.[176] If

Aristippus did not learn the theory from Sokrates, he was at any rate

fortified in it by the authority of Sokrates; to whose doctrine, in

this respect, he adhered more closely than Plato.

[Footnote 175: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5.

Sokrates exhorts those with whom he converses to be sparing in

indulgences, and to cultivate self-command and fortitude as well as

bodily energy and activity. The reason upon which these exhortations

are founded is eudæmonistic: that a person will thereby escape or be

able to confront serious dangers--and will obtain for himself

ultimately greater pleasures than those which he foregoes (Memor. i.

6, 8; ii. 1, 31-33; iii. 12, 2-5). [Greek: Tou= de\ mê\ douleu/ein

gastri\ mêde\ u(/pnô| kai\ lagnei/a| oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)tiô/teron

ei)=nai, ê)\ to\ e(/tera e)/chein tou/tôn ê(di/ô, a(\ ou) mo/non e)n

chrei/a| o)/nta eu)phrai/nei, a)lla\ kai\ e)/lpidas pare/chonta

ô)phelê/sein a)ei/?] See also Memor. ii. 4, ii. 10, 4, about the

importance of acquiring and cultivating friends, because a good friend

is the most useful and valuable of all possessions. Sokrates, like

Aristippus, adopts the prudential view of life, and not the

transcendental; recommending sobriety and virtue on the ground of

pleasures secured and pains averted. We find Plutarch, in his very

bitter attacks on Epikurus, reasoning on the Hedonistic basis, and

professing to prove that Epikurus discarded pleasures more and greater

for the sake of obtaining pleasures fewer and less. See Plutarch, Non

posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, pp. 1096-1099.]

[Footnote 176: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 351-361.]

[Side-note: Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates.]

Aristippus is recognised by Aristotle[177] in two characters: both as

a Sophist, and as a companion of Sokrates and Plato. Moreover it is

remarkable that the doctrine, in reference to which Aristotle cites

him as one among the Sophists, is a doctrine unquestionably

Sokratic--contempt of geometrical science as useless, and as having no

bearing on the good or evil of life.[178] Herein also Aristippus followed

Sokrates, while Plato departed from him.

[Footnote 177: Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 24; Metaphysic. B. 996, a. 32.]

[Footnote 178: Xenophon. Memor. iv. 7, 2.]

[Side-note: Life and dicta of Aristippus--His type of character.]

In estimating the character of Aristippus, I have brought into

particular notice the dialogues reported by Xenophon, because the

Xenophontic statements, with those of Aristotle, are the only

contemporary evidence (for Plato only names him once to say that he

was not present at the death of Sokrates, and was reported to be in

Ægina). The other statements respecting Aristippus, preserved by

Diogenes and others, not only come from later authorities, but give us

hardly any facts; though they ascribe to him a great many sayings and

repartees, adapted to a peculiar type of character. That type of

character, together with an imperfect notion of his doctrines, is all

that we can make out. Though Aristippus did not follow the

recommendation of Sokrates, to labour and qualify himself for a ruler,

yet both the advice of Sokrates, to reflect and prepare himself for

the anxieties and perils of the future--and the spectacle of

self-sufficing independence which the character of Sokrates

afforded--were probably highly useful to him. Such advice being adverse

to the natural tendencies of his mind, impressed upon him forcibly those

points of the case which he was most likely to forget: and contributed

to form in him that habit of self-command which is a marked feature in

his character. He wished (such are the words ascribed to him by

Xenophon) to pass through life as easily and agreeably as possible.

Ease comes before pleasure: but his plan of life was to obtain as much

pleasure as he could, consistent with ease, or without difficulty and

danger. He actually realised, as far as our means of knowledge extend,

that middle path of life which Sokrates declared to be impracticable.

[Side-note: Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates.]

Much of the advice given by Sokrates, Aristippus appears to have

followed, though not from the reasons which Sokrates puts forward for

giving it. When Sokrates reminds him that men liable to be tempted and

ensnared by the love of good eating, were unfit to command--when he

animadverts on the insanity of the passionate lover, who exposed

himself to the extremity of danger for the purpose of possessing a

married woman, while there were such abundant means of gratifying the

sexual appetite without any difficulty or danger whatever[179]--to all

this Aristippus assents: and what we read about his life is in perfect

conformity therewith. Reason and prudence supply ample motives for

following such advice, whether a man be animated with the love of

command or not. So again, when Sokrates impresses upon Aristippus that

the Good and the Beautiful were the same, being relative only to human

wants or satisfaction--and that nothing was either good or beautiful,

except in so far as it tended to confer relief, security, or

enjoyment--this lesson too Aristippus laid to heart, and applied in a

way suitable to his own peculiar dispositions and capacities.

[Footnote 179: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 5. [Greek: kai\ têlikou/tôn me\n

e)pikeime/nôn tô=| moicheu/onti kakô=n te kai\ ai)schrô=n, o)/ntôn de\

pollô=n tô=n a)poluso/ntôn tê=s tô=n a)phrodisiô=n e)pithumi/as e)n

a)dei/a|, o(/môs ei)s ta\ e)piki/nduna phe/resthai, a)=r' ou)k ê)/dê

tou=to panta/pasi kakodaimonô=nto/s e)stin? E)/moige dokei=, e)/phê

(A)ri/stippos).]]

[Side-note: Self-mastery and independence--the great aspiration of

Aristippus.]

The type of character represented by Aristippus is the man who enjoys

what the present affords, so far as can be done without incurring

future mischief, or provoking the enmity of others--but who will on no

account enslave himself to any enjoyment; who always maintains his own

self-mastery and independence and who has prudence and intelligence

enabling him to regulate each separate enjoyment so as not to incur

preponderant evil in future.[180] This self-mastery and independence

is in point of fact the capital aspiration of Aristippus, hardly less

than of Antisthenes and Diogenes. He is competent to deal suitably

with all varieties of persons, places, and situations, and to make the

best of each--[Greek: Ou(= ga\r toiou/tôn dei=, touou=tos ei)=m'

e)gô/]:[181] but he accepts what the situation presents, without

yearning or struggling for that which it cannot present.[182] He

enjoys the society both of the Syracusan despot Dionysius, and of the

Hetæra Lais; but he will not make himself subservient either to one or

to the other: he conceives himself able to afford, to both, as much

satisfaction as he receives.[183] His enjoyments are not enhanced by

the idea that others are excluded from the like enjoyment, and that he

is a superior, privileged man: he has no jealousy or antipathy, no

passion for triumphing over rivals, no demand for envy or admiration

from spectators. Among the Hetæræ in Greece were included all the most

engaging and accomplished women--for in Grecian matrimony, it was

considered becoming and advantageous that the bride should be young

and ignorant, and that as a wife she should neither see nor know any

thing beyond the administration of her own feminine apartments and

household.[184] Aristippus attached himself to those Hetæræ who

pleased him; declaring that the charm of their society was in no way

lessened by the knowledge that others enjoyed it also, and that he

could claim no exclusive privilege.[185] His patience and mildness in

argument is much commended. The main lesson which he had learnt from

philosophy (he said), was self-appreciation--to behave himself with

confidence in every man's society: even if all laws were abrogated,

the philosopher would still, without any law, live in the same way as

he now did.[186] His confidence remained unshaken, when seized as a

captive in Asia by order of the Persian satrap Artaphernes: all that

he desired was, to be taken before the satrap himself.[187] Not to

renounce pleasure, but to enjoy pleasure moderately and to keep

desires under controul,--was in his judgment the true policy of life.

But he was not solicitous to grasp enjoyment beyond what was easily

attainable, nor to accumulate wealth or power which did not yield

positive result.[188] While Sokrates recommended, and Antisthenes

practised, the precaution of deadening the sexual appetite by

approaching no women except such as were ugly and

repulsive,[189]--while Xenophon in the Cyropædia,[190] working out the

Sokratic idea of the dangerous fascination of beauty, represents Cyrus

as refusing to see the captive Pantheia, and depicts the too confident

Araspes (who treats such precaution as exaggerated timidity, and fully

trusts his own self-possession), when appointed to the duty of guarding

her, as absorbed against his will in a passion which makes him forget all

reason and duty--Aristippus has sufficient self-mastery to visit the

most seductive Hetæræ without being drawn into ruinous extravagance or

humiliating subjugation. We may doubt whether he ever felt, even for

Lais, a more passionate sentiment than Plato in his Epigram expresses

towards the Kolophonian Hetæra Archeanassa.

[Footnote 180: Diog. L. ii. 67. [Greek: ou)/tôs ê)=n kai\ e(le/sthai

kai\ kataphronê=sai polu\s.]]

[Footnote 181: Diog. L. ii. 66. [Greek: ê)=n de\ i(kano\s

a(rmo/sasthai kai\ to/pô| kai\ chro/nô| kai\ prosô/pô|, kai\ pa=san

peri/stasin a(rmoni/ôs u(pokri/nasthai; dio\ kai\ para\ Dionusi/ô|

tô=n a)/llôn êu)doki/mei ma=llon, a)ei\ to\ prospeso\n eu)=

diatithe/menos; a)pe/laue me\n ga\r ê(donê=s tô=n paro/ntôn, ou)k

e)thê/ra de\ po/nô| tê\n a)po/lausin tô=n ou) paro/ntôn].

Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 23-24:--

"Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,

Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum."]

[Footnote 182: Sophokles, Philoktêtes, 1049 (the words of Odysseus).]

[Footnote 183: Diog. L. ii. 75. [Greek: e)/chrêto kai\ Lai+/di tê=|

e(tai/ra|; pro\s ou)=n tou\s memphome/nous e)/phê, E)/chô Lai+/da,

a)ll' ou)k e)/chomai; e)pei\ to\ kratei=n kai\ mê\ ê(tta=sthai

ê(donô=n, a)/riston--ou) to\ mê\ chrê=sthai]. ii. 77, [Greek:

Dionusi/ou pote\ e)rome/nou, e)pi\ ti/ ê(/koi, e)/phê, e)pi\ tô=|

metadô/sein ô(=n e)/choi, kai\ metalê/psesthai ô(=n mê\ e)/choi].

Lucian introduces [Greek: A)retê\] and [Greek: Truphê\] as litigating

before [Greek: Di/kê] for the possession of Aristippus: the litigation

is left undecided (Bis Accusatus, c. 13-23).]

[Footnote 184 Xenophon, Oeconomic. iii. 13, vii. 6, Ischomachus says

to Sokrates about his wife, [Greek: Kai\ ti/ a)\n e)pistame/nên

au)tê\n pare/labon, ê(\ e)/tê me\n ou)/pô pentekai/deka gegonui=a

ê)=lthe pro\s e)me/, to\n d' e)mprosthen _chro/non e)/zê u(po\ pollê=s

e)pimelei/as, o(/pôs ô(s e)/lachista me\n o)/psoito, e)la/chista d'

a)kou/soito, e)la/chista de\ e)/roito?_]]

[Footnote 185: Diog.** L. ii. 74. On this point his opinion coincided

with that of Diogenes, and of the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus (D. L.

vii. 131), who maintained, that among the wise wives ought to be in

common, and that all marital jealousy ought to be discarded. [Greek:

A)re/skei d' au)toi=s kai\ koina\s ei)=nai ta\s gunai=kas dei=n para\

toi=s sophoi=s ô(/ste to\n e)ntucho/nta tê=| e)ntuchou/sê| chrê=sthai,

katha/ phêsi Zê/nôn e)n tê=| Politei/a| kai\ Chru/sippos e)n tô=|

peri\ Politei/as, a)lla/ te Dioge/nês o( Kuniko\s kai\ Pla/tôn;

pa/ntas te pai=das e)pi/sês ste/rxomen pate/rôn tro/pon, kai\ ê( e)pi\

moichei/a| zêlotupi/a periairethê/setai]. Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh.

H. iii. 205.]

[Footnote 186: Diog. L. ii. 68. The like reply is ascribed to

Aristotle. Diog. L. v. 20; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtut. p. 80 D.]

[Footnote 187: Diog. L. ii. 79.]

[Footnote 188: Diog. L. ii. 72-74.]

[Footnote 189: Xenoph. Memor. i. 3, 11-14; Symposion, iv. 38; Diog. L.

vi. 3. [Greek: (A)ntisthe/nês) e)/lege suneche\s--Manei/ên ma=llon ê)\

ê(sthei/ên--kai\--chrê\ toiau/tais plêsia/zein gunaixi/n, ai(\ cha/rin

ei)/sontai.]]

[Footnote 190: Xenoph. Cyropæd. v. 1, 2-18.]

[Side-note: Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes--Points

of agreement and disagreement between them.]

Aristippus is thus remarkable, like the Cynics Antisthenes and

Diogenes, not merely for certain theoretical doctrines, but also for

acting out a certain plan of life.[191] We know little or nothing of

the real life of Aristippus, except what appears in Xenophon. The

biography of him (as of the Cynic Diogenes) given by Diogenes

Laertius, consists of little more than a string of anecdotes, mostly

sayings, calculated to illustrate a certain type of character.[192]

Some of these are set down by those who approved the type, and who

therefore place it in a favourable point of view--others by those who

disapprove it and give the opposite colour.

[Footnote 191: Sextus Empiricus and others describe this by the Greek

word [Greek: a)gôgê/] (Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 150). Plato's beautiful

epigram upon Archeanassa is given by Diogenes L. iii. 31. Compare this

with the remark of Aristippus--Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 750 E.

That the society of these fascinating Hetæræ was dangerous, and

exhaustive to the purses of those who sought it, may be seen from the

expensive manner of life of Theodotê, described in Xenophon, Mem. iii.

11, 4.

The amorous impulses or fancies of Plato were censured by Dikæarchus.

See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 34, 71, with Davies's note.]

[Footnote 192: This is justly remarked by Wendt in his instructive

Dissertation, De Philosophiâ Cyrenaicâ, p. 8 (Göttingen, 1841).]

We can understand and compare the different types of character

represented by Antisthenes or Diogenes, and by Aristippus: but we have

little knowledge of the real facts of their lives. The two types, each

manifesting that marked individuality which belongs to the Sokratic

band, though in many respects strongly contrasted, have also some

points of agreement. Both Aristippus and Diogenes are bent on

individual freedom and independence of character: both of them stand

upon their own appreciation of life and its phenomena: both of them

are impatient of that servitude to the opinions and antipathies of

others, which induces a man to struggle for objects, not because they

afford him satisfaction, but because others envy him for possessing

them--and to keep off evils, not because he himself feels them as

such, but because others pity or despise him for being subject to

them; both of them are exempt from the competitive and ambitious

feelings, from the thirst after privilege and power, from the sense of

superiority arising out of monopolised possession and exclusion of

others from partnership. Diogenes kept aloof from political life and

civil obligations as much as Aristippus; and would have pronounced (as

Aristippus replies to Sokrates in the Xenophontic dialogue) that the

task of ruling others, instead of being a prize to be coveted, was

nothing better than an onerous and mortifying servitude,[193] not at

all less onerous because a man took up the burthen of his own accord.

These points of agreement are real: but the points of disagreement are

not less real. Diogenes maintains his free individuality, and puts

himself out of the reach of human enmity, by clothing himself in

impenetrable armour: by attaining positive insensibility, as near as

human life permits. This is with him not merely the acting out of a

scheme of life, but also a matter of pride. He is proud of his ragged

garment and coarse[194] fare, as exalting him above others, and as

constituting him a pattern of endurance: and he indulges this

sentiment by stinging and contemptuous censure of every one.

Aristippus has no similar vanity: he achieves his independence without

so heavy a renunciation: he follows out his own plan of life, without

setting himself up as a pattern for others. But his plan is at the

same time more delicate; requiring greater skill and intelligence,

more of manifold sagacity, in the performer. Horace, who compares the

two and gives the preference to Aristippus, remarks that Diogenes,

though professing to want nothing, was nevertheless as much dependent

upon the bounty of those who supplied his wallet with provisions, as

Aristippus upon the favour of princes: and that Diogenes had only one

fixed mode of proceeding, while Aristippus could master and turn to

account a great diversity of persons and situations--could endure

hardship with patience and dignity, when it was inevitable, and enjoy

the opportunities of pleasure when they occurred. "To Aristippus alone

it is given to wear both fine garments and rags" is a remark ascribed

to Plato.[195] In truth, Aristippus possesses in eminent measure that

accomplishment, the want of which Plato proclaims to be so misleading

and mischievous--artistic skill in handling human affairs, throughout

his dealings with mankind.[196]

[Footnote 193: It is this servitude of political life, making the

politician the slave of persons and circumstances around him, which

Horace contrasts with the philosophical independence of Aristippus:--

Ac ne forté roges, quo me duce, quo lare tuter;

Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri

Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.

Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis,

Virtutis veræ custos rigidusque satelles:

Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta relabor,

Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor.

(Epist. i. 1, 15.)

So also the Platonic Sokrates (Theætêt. pp. 172-175) depicts forcibly

the cramped and fettered lives of rhetors and politicians; contrasting

them with the self-judgment and independence of speculative and

philosophical enquirers--[Greek: ô(s oi)ke/tai pro\s e)leuthe/rous

tethra/phthai--o( me\n tô=| o)/nti e)n e)leutheri/a| te kai\ scholê=|

tethramme/nos, o(\n dê\ philo/sophon kalei=s.]]

[Footnote 194: Diog. L. ii. 36. [Greek: stre/psantos A)ntisthe/nous

to\ dier)r(ôgo\s tou= tri/bônos ei)s tou)mphane/s, O(rô= sou=, e)/phê

(Sôkra/tês), dia\ tou= tri/bônos tê\n kenodoxi/an.]]

[Footnote 195: Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 13-24; Diog. L. vi. 46-56-66.

"Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti

Nollet Aristippus." "Si sciret regibus uti,

Fastidiret olus, qui me notat." Utrius horum

Verba probes et facta, doce: vel junior audi

Cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. Namque

Mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt:

"Scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et

Splendidius multò est. Equus ut me portet, alat rex,

Officium facio: tu poscis vilia rerum,

Dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem."

Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res,

Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum.

(Compare Diog. L. ii. 102, vi. 58, where this anecdote is reported as

of Plato instead of Aristippus.)

Horace's view and scheme of life are exceedingly analogous to those of

Aristippus. Plutarch, Fragm. De Homero, p. 1190; De Fortunâ Alex. p.

330 D. Diog. Laert. ii. 67. [Greek: dio/ pote Stra/tôna, oi( de\

Pla/tôna, pro\s au)to\n ei)pei=n, Soi\ mo/nô| de/dotai kai\ chlani/da

phorei=n kai\ r(a/kos]. The remark cannot have been made by Straton,

who was not contemporary with Aristippus. Even Sokrates lived by the

bounty of his rich friends, and indeed could have had no other means

of supporting his wife and children; though he accepted only a portion

of what they tendered to him, declining the remainder. See the remark

of Aristippus, Diog. L. ii. 74.]

[Footnote 196: Plato, Phædon, p. 89 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)/neu te/chnês

tê=s peri\ ta)nthrô/peia o( toiou=tos chrê=sthai e)picheirei= toi=s

a)nthrô/pois.]]

[Side-note: Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and

philosophy--contempt for other studies.]

That the scheme of life projected by Aristippus was very difficult

requiring great dexterity, prudence, and resolution, to execute it--we

may see plainly by the Xenophontic dialogue; wherein Sokrates

pronounces it to be all but impracticable. As far as we can judge, he

surmounted the difficulties of it: yet we do not know enough of his

real life to determine with accuracy what varieties of difficulties he

experienced. He followed the profession of a Sophist, receiving fees

for his teaching: and his attachment to philosophy (both as contrasted

with ignorance and as contrasted with other studies not philosophy)

was proclaimed in the most emphatic language. It was better (he said)

to be a beggar, than an uneducated man:[197] the former was destitute

of money, but the latter was destitute of humanity. He disapproved

varied and indiscriminate instruction, maintaining that persons ought

to learn in youth what they were to practise in manhood: and he

compared those who, neglecting philosophy, employed themselves in

literature or physical science, to the suitors in the Odyssey who

obtained the favours of Melantho and the other female servants, but

were rejected by the Queen Penelopê herself.[198] He treated with

contempt the study of geometry, because it took no account, and made

no mention, of what was good and evil, beautiful and ugly. In other

arts (he said), even in the vulgar proceeding of the carpenter and the

currier, perpetual reference was made to good, as the purpose intended

to be served and to evil as that which was to be avoided: but in

geometry no such purpose was ever noticed.[199]

[Footnote 197: Diog. L. ii. 70; Plutarch, Fragm. [Greek: U(pomnê/mat'

ei)s Ê(si/odon], s. 9. [Greek: A)ri/stippos de\ a)p' e)nanti/as o(

Sôkratiko\s e)/lege, sumbou/lou dei=sthai chei=ron ei)=nai ê)\

prosaitei=n.]]

[Footnote 198: Diog. L. ii. 79-80. [Greek: tou\s tô=n e)gkukli/ôn

paideuma/tôn metascho/ntas, philosophi/as de\ a)poleiphthe/ntas], &c.

Plutarch, Fragm. [Greek: Strômate/ôn], sect. 9.]

[Footnote 199: Aristot. Metaph. B. 996, a 32, M. 1078, a. 35. [Greek:

ô(/ste dia\ tau=ta kai\ tô=n sophistô=n tine\s oi(=on A)ri/stippos

_proepêla/kizon_ au)ta\s], &c.]

[Side-note: Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus

acquired procured for him the attentions of Dionysius and others.]

This last opinion of Aristippus deserves particular attention,

because it is attested by Aristotle. And it confirms what we hear upon

less certain testimony, that Aristippus discountenanced the department

of physical study generally (astronomy and physics) as well as

geometry; confining his attention to facts and reasonings which bore

upon the regulation of life.[200] In this restrictive view he followed

the example and precepts of Sokrates--of Isokrates--seemingly also of

Protagoras and Prodikus though not of the Eleian Hippias, whose course

of study was larger and more varied.[201] Aristippus taught as a

Sophist, and appears to have acquired great reputation in that

capacity both at Athens and elsewhere.[202] Indeed, if he had not

acquired such intellectual and literary reputation at Athens, he would

have had little chance of being invited elsewhere, and still less

chance of receiving favours and presents from Dionysius and other

princes:[203] whose attentions did not confer celebrity, but waited

upon it when obtained, and doubtless augmented it. If Aristippus lived

a life of indulgence at Athens, we may fairly presume that his main

resources for sustaining it, like those of Isokrates, were derived

from his own teaching: and that the presents which he received from

Dionysius of Syracuse, like those which Isokrates received from

Nikokles of Cyprus, were welcome additions, but not his main income.

Those who (like most of the historians of philosophy) adopt the

opinion of Sokrates and Plato, that it is disgraceful for an

instructor to receive payment from the persons taught will doubtless

despise Aristippus for such a proceeding: for my part I dissent from

this opinion, and I therefore do not concur in the disparaging

epithets bestowed upon him. And as for the costly indulgences, and

subservience to foreign princes, of which Aristippus stands accused,

we must recollect that the very same reproaches were advanced against

Plato and Aristotle by their contemporaries: and as far as we know,

with quite as much foundation.[204]

[Footnote 200: Diog. L. ii. 92. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 11.

Plutarch, apud Eusebium Præp. Ev. i. 8, 9.]

[Footnote 201: Plato, Protagor. p. 318 E, where the different methods

followed by Protagoras and Hippias are indicated.]

[Footnote 202: Diog. Laert. ii. 62. Alexis Comicus ap. Athenæ. xii.

544.

Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18) treats the first Aristippus

as a mere voluptuary, who said nothing generally [Greek: peri\ tou=

te/lous]. All the doctrine (he says) came from the younger Aristippus.

I think this very improbable. To what did the dialogues composed by

the first Aristippus refer? How did he get his reputation?]

[Footnote 203: Several anecdotes are recounted about sayings and

doings of Aristippus in his intercourse with _Dionysius_. _Which_

Dionysius is meant?--the elder or the younger? Probably the elder.

It is to be remembered that Dionysius the Elder lived and reigned

until the year 367 B.C., in which year his son Dionysius the Younger

succeeded him. The death of Sokrates took place in 399 B.C.: between

which, and the accession of Dionysius the Younger, an interval of 32

years occurred. Plato was old, being sixty years of age, when he first

visited the younger Dionysius, shortly after the accession of the

latter. Aristippus cannot well have been younger than Plato, and he is

said to have been older than Æschines Sokraticus (D. L. ii. 83).

Compare D. L. ii. 41.

When, with these dates present to our minds, we read the anecdotes

recounted by Diogenes L. respecting the sayings and doings of

Aristippus with _Dionysius_, we find: that several of them relate to

the contrast between the behaviour of Aristippus and that of Plato at

Syracuse. Now it is certain that Plato went _once_ to Syracuse when he

was forty years of age (Epist. vii. init.), in 387 B.C.--and according

to one report (Lucian, De Parasito, 34), he went there _twice_--while

the elder Dionysius was in the plenitude of power: but he made an

unfavourable impression, and was speedily sent away in displeasure. I

think it very probable that Aristippus may have visited the elder

Dionysius, and may have found greater favour with him than Plato found

(see Lucian, l. c.), since Dionysius was an accomplished man and a

composer of tragedies. Moreover Aristippus was a Kyrenæan, and

Aristippus wrote about Libya (D. L. ii. 83).]

[Footnote 204: See the epigram of the contemporary poet, Theokritus of

Chios, in Diog. L. v. 11; compare Athenæus, viii. 354, xiii. 566.

Aristokles, ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2.]

Aristippus composed several dialogues, of which the titles alone are

preserved.[205] They must however have been compositions of

considerable merit, since Theopompus accused Plato of borrowing

largely from them.

[Footnote 205: Diog. L. ii. 84-85.]

[Side-note: Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic

philosophers.]

As all the works of Aristippus are lost, we cannot pretend to

understand fully his theory from the meagre abstract given in Sextus

Empiricus and Diogenes. Yet the theory is of importance in the history

of ancient speculation, since it passed with some modifications to

Epikurus, and was adopted by a large proportion of instructed men. The

Kyrenaic doctrine was transmitted by Aristippus to his disciples

Æthiops and Antipater: but his chief disciple appears to have been his

daughter Arêtê: whom he instructed so well, that she was able to

instruct her own son, the second Aristippus, called for that reason

Metrodidactus. The basis of his ethical theory was, pleasure and pain:

pleasure being _smooth motion_, pain, _rough motion_:[206] pleasure

being the object which all animals, by nature and without

deliberation, loved, pursued, and felt satisfaction in obtaining pain

being the object which they all by nature hated and tried to avoid.

Aristippus considered that no one pleasure was different from another,

nor more pleasurable than another:[207] that the attainment of these

special pleasurable moments, or as many of them as practicable, was

The End to be pursued in life. By _Happiness_, they understood the sum

total of these special pleasures, past, present, and future: yet

Happiness was desirable not on its own account, but on account of its

constituent items, especially such of those items as were present and

certainly future.[208] Pleasures and pains of memory and expectation

were considered to be of little importance. Absence of pain or relief

from pain, on the one hand--they did not consider as equivalent to

positive pleasure--nor absence of pleasure or withdrawal of pleasure,

on the other hand--as equivalent to positive pain. Neither the one

situation nor the other was a _motion_ ([Greek: ki/nêsis]), _i.e._ a

positive situation, appreciable by the consciousness: each was a

middle state--a mere negation of consciousness, like the phenomena of

sleep.[209] They recognised some mental pleasures and pains as

derivative from bodily sensation and as exclusively individual--others

as not so: for example, there were pleasures and pains of sympathy;

and a man often felt joy at the prosperity of his friends and

countrymen, quite as genuine as that which he felt for his own good

fortune. But they maintained that the bodily pleasures and pains were

much more vehement than the mental which were not bodily: for which

reason, the pains employed by the laws in punishing offenders were

chiefly bodily. The fear of pain was in their judgments more operative

than the love of pleasure: and though pleasure was desirable for its

own sake, yet the accompanying conditions of many pleasures were so

painful as to deter the prudent man from aiming at them. These

obstructions rendered it impossible for any one to realise the sum

total of pleasures constituting Happiness. Even the wise man sometimes

failed, and the foolish man sometimes did well, though in general the

reverse was the truth: but under the difficult conditions of life, a

man must be satisfied if he realised some particular pleasurable

conjunctions, without aspiring to a continuance or totality of the

like.[210]

[Footnote 206: Diog. L. ii. 86-87. [Greek: du/o pa/thê u(phi/stanto,

po/non kai\ ê(donê/n; tê\n me\n lei/an ki/nêsin, tê\n ê(donê/n, to\n

de\ po/non, trachei=an ki/nêsin; mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n ê(donê=s,

mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai; kai\ tê\n me\n, eu)dokêtê\n** pa=si zô/ois,

to\n de\ a)pokroustiko/n.]]

[Footnote 207: Diog. L. ii. p. 87. [Greek: mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n

ê(donê=s, mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai]. They did not mean by these words

to deny that one pleasure was more vehement and attractive than

another pleasure, or that one pain is more vehement and deterrent than

another pain: for it is expressly said afterwards (s. 90) that they

admitted this. They meant to affirm that one pleasure did not differ

from another _so far forth as pleasure_: that all pleasures must be

ranked as a class, and compared with each other in respect of

intensity, durability, and other properties possessed in greater or

less degree.]

[Footnote 208: Diog. L. ii. pp. 88-89. Athenæus, xii. p. 544.]

[Footnote 209: Diog. L. ii. 89-90. [Greek: mê\ ou)/sês tê=s a)poni/as

ê)\ tê=s a)êdoni/as kinê/seôs, e)pei\ ê( a)poni/a oi(onei\

katheu/donto/s e)sti kata/stasis--me/sas katasta/seis ô)no/mazon

a)êdoni/an kai\ a)poni/an].

A doctrine very different from this is ascribed to Aristippus in

Galen--Placit. Philos. (xix. p. 230, Kühn). It is there affirmed that

by pleasure Aristippus understood, not the pleasure of sense, but that

disposition of mind whereby a person becomes insensible to pain, and

hard to be imposed upon ([Greek: a)na/lgêtos kai\ dusgoê/teutos]).]

[Footnote 210: Diog. L. ii. 91.

It does not appear that the Kyrenaic sect followed out into detail the

derivative pleasures and pains; nor the way in which, by force of

association, these come to take precedence of the primary, exercising

influence on the mind both more forcible and more constant. We find

this important fact remarkably stated in the doctrine of Kalliphon.

Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. p. 415, ed. 1629. [Greek: Kata\ de\

tou\s peri\ Kalliphô=nta, e(/neka me\n tê=s ê(donê=s pareisê=lthen ê(

a)retê/; chro/nô| de\ u(/steron, to\ peri\ au)tê\n ka/llos katidou=sa,

i)so/timon e(autê\n tê=| a)rchê=|, toute/sti tê=| ê(donê=|,

pare/schen.]]

[Side-note: Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it

ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and

honourable, by law or custom--not by nature.]

Aristippus regarded prudence or wisdom as good, yet not as good _per

se_, but by reason of the pleasures which it enabled us to procure and

the pains which it enabled us to avoid--and wealth as a good, for the

same reason. A friend also was valuable, for the use and necessities

of life: just as each part of one's own body was precious, so long as

it was present and could serve a useful purpose.[211] Some branches of

virtue might be possessed by persons who were not wise: and bodily

training was a valuable auxiliary to virtue. Even the wise man could

never escape pain and fear, for both of these were natural:

but he would keep clear of envy, passionate love, and superstition,

which were not natural, but consequences of vain opinion. A thorough

acquaintance with the real nature of Good and Evil would relieve him

from superstition as well as from the fear of death.[212]

[Footnote 211: Diog. L. ii. 91. [Greek: tê\n phro/nêsin a)gatho\n me\n

ei)=nai le/gousin, ou) di' e(autê\n de\ ai(retê/n, a)lla\ dia\ ta\ e)x

au)tê=s perigino/mena; to\n phi/lon tê=s chrei/as e(/neka; kai\ ga\r

me/ros sô/matos, me/chris a)\n parê=|, a)spa/zesthai].

The like comparison is employed by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the

Memorabilia (i. 2, 52-55), that men cast away portions of their own

body, so soon as these portions cease to be useful.]

[Footnote 212: Diog. L. ii. p. 92.]

The Kyrenaics did not admit that there was anything just, or

honourable, or base, by nature: but only by law and custom:

nevertheless the wise man would be sufficiently restrained, by the

fear of punishment and of discredit, from doing what was repugnant to

the society in which he lived. They maintained that wisdom was

attainable; that the senses did not at first judge truly, but might be

improved by study; that progress was realised in philosophy as in

other arts, and that there were different gradations of it, as well as

different gradations of pain and suffering, discernible in different

men. The wise man, as they conceived him, was a reality; not (like the

wise man of the Stoics) a sublime but unattainable ideal.[213]

[Footnote 213: Diog. L. ii. p. 93.]

[Side-note: Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the

phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the

absolute.]

Such were (as far as our imperfect evidence goes) the ethical and

emotional views of the Kyrenaic school: their theory and precepts

respecting the plan and prospects of life. In regard to truth and

knowledge, they maintained that we could have no knowledge of anything

but human sensations, affections, feelings, &c. ([Greek: pa/thê]):

that respecting the extrinsic, extra-sensational, absolute, objects or

causes from whence these feelings proceeded, we could know nothing at

all. Partly for this reason, they abstained from all attention to the

study of nature--to astronomy and physics: partly also because they

did not see any bearing of these subjects upon good and evil, or upon

the conduct of life. They turned their attention mainly to ethics,

partly also to logic as subsidiary to ethical reasoning.[214]

[Footnote 214: Diog. L. ii. p. 92. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vi.

53.]

Such low estimation of mathematics and physics and attention given

almost exclusively to the feelings and conduct of human life--is a

point common to the opposite schools of Aristippus and Antisthenes,

derived by both of them from Sokrates. Herein Plato stands apart from

all the three.

The theory of Aristippus, as given above, is only derived from a

meagre abstract and from a few detached hints. We do not know how he

himself stated it: still less how he enforced and vindicated it.--He,

as well as Antisthenes, composed dialogues: which naturally implies

diversity of handling. Their main thesis, therefore--the text, as it

were, upon which they debated or expatiated (which is all that the

abstract gives)--affords very inadequate means, even if we could rely

upon the accuracy of the statement, for appreciating their

philosophical competence. We should form but a poor idea of the acute,

abundant, elastic and diversified dialectic of Plato, if all his

dialogues had been lost--and if we had nothing to rely upon except the

summary of Platonism prepared by Diogenes Laertius: which summary,

nevertheless, is more copious and elaborate than the same author has

furnished either of Aristippus or Antisthenes.

[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the

Stoics and Epikureans.]

In the history of the Greek mind these two last-mentioned philosophers

(though included by Cicero among the _plebeii philosophi_) are not

less important than Plato and Aristotle. The speculations and precepts

of Antisthenes passed, with various enlargements and modifications,

into the Stoic philosophy: those of Aristippus into the Epikurean: the

two most widely extended ethical sects in the subsequent Pagan

world.--The Cynic sect, as it stood before it embraced the enlarged

physical, kosmical, and social theories of Zeno and his contemporaries,

reducing to a minimum all the desires and appetites--cultivating

insensibility to the pains of life, and even disdainful insensibility to

its pleasures--required extraordinary force of will and obstinate

resolution, but little beyond. Where there was no selection or

discrimination, the most ordinary prudence sufficed. It was otherwise

with the scheme of Aristippus and the Kyrenaics: which, if it tasked

less severely the powers of endurance, demanded a far higher measure

of intelligent prudence. Selection of that which might safely be

enjoyed, and determination of the limit within which enjoyment must be

confined, were constantly indispensable. Prudence, knowledge, the art

of mensuration or calculation, were essential to Aristippus, and ought

to be put in the foreground when his theory is stated.

[Side-note: Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the

Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras.]

That theory is, in point of fact, identical with the theory expounded

by the Platonic Sokrates in Plato's Protagoras. The general features

of both are the same. Sokrates there lays it down explicitly, that

pleasure _per se_ is always good, and pain _per se_ always evil: that

there is no other good (_per se_) except pleasure and diminution of

pain--no other evil (_per se_) except pain and diminution of pleasure:

that there is no other object in life except to live through it as

much as possible with pleasures and without pains;[215] but that many

pleasures become evil, because they cannot be had without depriving us

of greater pleasures or imposing upon us greater pains while many

pains become good, because they prevent greater pains or ensure

greater pleasures: that the safety of life thus lies in a correct

comparison of the more or less in pleasures and pains, and in a

selection founded thereupon. In other words, the safety of life

depends upon calculating knowledge or prudence, the art or science of

measuring.

[Footnote 215: Plato, Protag. p. 355 A. [Greek: ê)\ a)rkei= u(mi=n to\

ê(de/ôs katabiô=nai to\n bi/on a)/neu lupô=n? ei) de\ a)rkei=, kai\

mê\ e)/chete mêde\n a)/llo pha/nai ei)=nai a)gatho\n ê)\ kako/n, o(\

mê\ ei)s tau=ta teleuta=|, to\ meta\ tou=to a)kou/ete].

The exposition of this theory, by the Platonic Sokrates, occupies the

latter portion of the Protagoras, from p. 351 to near the conclusion.

See below, ch. xxiii. of the present work.

The language held by Aristippus to Sokrates, in the Xenophontic

dialogue (Memor. ii. 1. 9), is exactly similar to that of the Platonic

Sokrates, as above cited--[Greek: e)mauto\n ta/ttô ei)s tou\s

boulome/nous ê(=| r(a=|sta/ te kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]]

[Side-note: Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the

two.]

The theory here laid down by the Platonic Sokrates is the same as that

of Aristippus. The purpose of life is stated almost in the same words

by both: by the Platonic Sokrates, and by Aristippus in the

Xenophontic dialogue--"to live through with enjoyment and without

suffering." The Platonic Sokrates denies, quite as emphatically as

Aristippus, any good or evil, honourable or base, except as

representing the result of an intelligent comparison of pleasures and

pains. Judicious calculation is postulated by both: pleasures and

pains being assumed by both as the only ends of pursuit and avoidance,

to which calculation is to be applied. The main difference is, that

the prudence, art, or science, required for making this calculation

rightly, are put forward by the Platonic Sokrates as the prominent

item in his provision for passing through life: whereas, in the scheme

of Aristippus, as far as we know it, such accomplished intelligence,

though equally recognised and implied, is not equally thrust into the

foreground. So it appears at least in the abstract which we possess of

his theory; if we had his own exposition of it, perhaps we might find

the case otherwise. In that abstract, indeed, we find the writer

replying to those who affirmed prudence or knowledge, to be good _per

se_--and maintaining that it is only good by reason of its

consequences:[216] that is, that it is not good as End, in the same

sense in which pleasure or mitigation, of pain are good. This point of

the theory, however, coincides again with the doctrine of the Platonic

Sokrates in the Protagoras: where the art of calculation is extolled

simply as an indispensable condition to the most precious results of

human happiness.

[Footnote 216: Diog. L. ii. p. 91.]

What I say here applies especially to the Protagoras: for I am well

aware that in other dialogues the Platonic Sokrates is made to hold

different language.[217] But in the Protagoras he defends a theory the

same as that of Aristippus, and defends it by an elaborate argument

which silences the objections of the Sophist Protagoras; who at first

will not admit the unqualified identity of the pleasurable,

judiciously estimated and selected, with the good. The general and

comprehensive manner in which Plato conceives and expounds the theory,

is probably one evidence of his superior philosophical aptitude as

compared with Aristippus and his other contemporaries. He enunciates,

side by side, and with equal distinctness, the two conditions

requisite for his theory of life. 1. The calculating or measuring art.

2. A description of the items to which alone such measurement must be

applied--pleasures and pains.--These two together make the full

theory. In other dialogues Plato insists equally upon the necessity of

knowledge or calculating prudence: but then he is not equally distinct

in specifying the items to which such prudence or calculation is to be

applied. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Aristippus, in

laying out the same theory, may have dwelt with peculiar emphasis upon

the other element in the theory: _i.e._ that while expressly insisting

upon pleasures and pains, as the only data to be compared, he may have

tacitly assumed the comparing or calculating intelligence, as if it

were understood by itself, and did not require to be formally

proclaimed.

[Footnote 217: See chapters xxiii., xxiv.,** xxxii. of the present work,

in which I enter more fully into the differences between the

Protagoras, Gorgias, and Philêbus, in respect to this point.

Aristippus agrees with the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras, as to

the general theory of life respecting pleasure and pain.

He agrees with the Platonic Sokrates _in the Gorgias_ (see pp.

500-515), in keeping aloof from active political life. [Greek: a\

au(tou= pra/ttein, kai\ ou) polupragmonei=n e)n tô=| bi/ô|]--which

Sokrates, in the Gorgias (p. 526 C), proclaims as the conduct of the true

philosopher, proclaimed with equal emphasis by Aristippus. Compare the

Platonic Apology, p. 31 D-E.]

[Side-note: Distinction to be made between a general theory--and the

particular application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes

and circumstances.]

A distinction must here be made between the general theory of life

laid down by Aristippus--and the particular application which he made

of that theory to his own course of proceeding. What we may observe

is, that the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras) agrees in the

first, or general theory: whether he would have agreed in the second

(or application to the particular case) we are not informed, but we

may probably assume the negative. And we find Sokrates (in the

Xenophontic dialogue) taking the same negative ground against

Aristippus--upon the second point, not upon the first. He seeks to

prove that the course of conduct adopted by Aristippus, instead of

carrying with it a preponderance of pleasure, will entail a

preponderance of pain. He does not dispute the general theory.

[Side-note: Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus.]

Though Aristippus and the Kyrenaic sect are recognised as the first

persons who laid down this general theory, yet various others apart

from them adopted it likewise. We may see this not merely from the

Protagoras of Plato, but also from the fact that Aristotle, when

commenting upon the theory in his Ethics,[218] cites Eudoxus (eminent

both as mathematician and astronomer, besides being among the hearers

of Plato) as its principal champion. Still the school of Kyrênê are

recorded as a continuous body, partly defending, partly modifying the

theory of Aristippus.[219] Hegesias, Annikeris, and Theodôrus are the

principal Kyrenaics named: the last of them contemporary with Ptolemy

Soter, Lysimachus, Epikurus, Theophrastus, and Stilpon.

[Footnote 218: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 2.]

[Footnote 219: Sydenham, in his notes on Philêbus (note 39, p. 76),

accuses Aristippus and the Kyrenaics of prevarication and sophistry in

the statement of their doctrine respecting Pleasure. He says that they

called it indiscriminately [Greek: a)gatho\n] and

[Greek: ta)gatho/n]--(a good--The Good)--"they used the fallacy of

changing a particular term for a term which is universal, or vice versâ,

by the sly omission or insertion of the definite article _The_ before

the word Good" (p. 78). He contrasts with this prevarication the

ingenuousness of Eudoxus, as the advocate of Pleasure (Aristot. Eth.

N. x. 2). I know no evidence for either of these allegations: either

for the prevarication of Aristippus or the ingenuousness of Eudoxus.]

[Side-note: Theodôrus--Annikeris--Hegesias.]

Diogenes Laertius had read a powerfully written book of Theodôrus,

controverting openly the received opinions respecting the Gods:--which

few of the philosophers ventured to do. Cicero also mentions a

composition of Hegesias.[220] Of Annikeris we know none; but he, too,

probably, must have been an author. The doctrines which we find

ascribed to these Kyrenaics evince how much affinity there was, at

bottom, between them and the Cynics, in spite of the great apparent

opposition. Hegesias received the surname of the Death-Persuader: he

considered happiness to be quite unattainable, and death to be an

object not of fear, but of welcome acceptance, in the eyes of a wise

man. He started from the same basis as Aristippus: pleasure as the

_expetendum_, pain as the _fugiendum_, to which all our personal

friendships and aversions were ultimately referable. But he considered

that the pains of life preponderated over the pleasures, even under

the most favourable circumstances. For conferring pleasure, or for

securing continuance of pleasure--wealth, high birth, freedom, glory,

were of no greater avail than their contraries poverty, low birth,

slavery, ignominy. There was nothing which was, by nature or

universally, either pleasurable or painful. Novelty, rarity, satiety,

rendered one thing pleasurable, another painful, to different persons

and at different times. The wise man would show his wisdom, not in the

fruitless struggle for pleasures, but in the avoidance or mitigation

of pains: which he would accomplish more successfully by rendering

himself indifferent to the causes of pleasure. He would act always for

his own account, and would value himself higher than other persons:

but he would at the same time reflect that the mistakes of these

others were involuntary, and he would give them indulgent counsel,

instead of hating them. He would not trust his senses as affording any

real knowledge: but he would be satisfied to act upon the probable

appearances of sense, or upon phenomenal knowledge.[221]

[Footnote 220: Diog. L. ii. 97. [Greek: Theo/dôros--panta/pasin

a)nairô=n ta\s peri\ theô=n do/xas]. Diog. L. ii. 86, 97. Cicero, Tusc.

Disp. i. 34, 83-84. [Greek: Ê(gêsi/as o( peisitha/natos].]

[Footnote 221: Diog. L. ii. 93, 94.]

[Side-note: Hegesias--Low estimation of life--renunciation of

pleasure--coincidence with the Cynics.]

Such is the summary which we read of the doctrines of Hegesias: who is

said to have enforced his views,[222]--of the real character of life,

as containing a great preponderance of misfortune and suffering--in a

manner so persuasive, that several persons were induced to commit

suicide. Hence he was prohibited by the first Ptolemy from lecturing

in such a strain. His opinions respecting life coincide in the main

with those set forth by Sokrates in the Phædon of Plato: which

dialogue also is alleged to have operated so powerfully on the

Platonic disciple Kleombrotus, that he was induced to terminate his

own existence. Hegesias, agreeing with Aristippus that pleasure would

be the Good, if you could get it--maintains that the circumstances of

life are such as to render pleasure unattainable: and therefore

advises to renounce pleasure at once and systematically, in order that

we may turn our attention to the only practicable end--that of

lessening pain. Such deliberate renunciation of pleasure brings him

into harmony with the doctrine of the Cynics.

[Footnote 222: Compare the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue entitled Axiochus,

pp. 366, 367, and the doctrine of Kleanthes in Sext. Empiric. adv.

Mathemat. ix. 88-92. Lucretius, v. 196-234.]

[Side-note: Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well

as by Protagoras.]

On another point, however, Hegesias repeats just the same doctrine as

Aristippus. Both deny any thing like absolute knowledge: they maintain

that all our knowledge is phenomenal, or relative to our own

impressions or affections: that we neither do know, nor can know,

anything about any real or supposed ultra-phenomenal object, _i.e._,

things in themselves, as distinguished from our own impressions and

apart from our senses and other capacities. Having no writings of

Aristippus left, we know this doctrine only as it is presented by

others, and those too opponents. We cannot tell whether Aristippus or

his supporters stated their own doctrine in such a way as to be open

to the objections which we read as urged by opponents. But the

doctrine itself is not, in my judgment, refuted by any of those

objections. "Our affections ([Greek: pa/thê]) alone are known to us,

but not the supposed objects or causes from which they proceed." The

word rendered by _affections_ must here be taken in its most general

and comprehensive sense--as including not merely sensations, but also

remembrances, emotions, judgments, beliefs, doubts, volitions,

conscious energies, &c. Whatever we know, we can know only as it

appears to, or implicates itself somehow with, our own minds. All the

knowledge which I possess, is an aggregate of propositions affirming

facts, and the order or conjunction of facts, as they are, or have

been, or may be, relative to myself. This doctrine of Aristippus is in

substance the same as that which Protagoras announced in other words

as--"Man is the measure of all things". I have already explained and

illustrated it, at considerable length, in my chapter on the Platonic

Theætêtus, where it is announced by Theætetus and controverted by

Sokrates.[223]

[Footnote 223: See below, vol. iii. ch. xxviii. Compare Aristokles ap.

Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii.

190-197, vi. 53. Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the

Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles--at

least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to

judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it

many absurd consequences--in my judgment without foundation. It is

probable that by the term [Greek: pa/thos] the Kyrenaics meant simply

sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they

handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object

of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable

that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the

memory of past sensations--and the expectation of future sensations,

in successions or conjunctions more or less similar--associating in

the mind with the sensation present and actual, to form what is called

a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth

their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner.

But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On

the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates

against them the hypothesis of the ultra phenomenal, absolute,

transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation,

present, past, or future--and from any sentient Subject. Besides that,

he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory

noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when

properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their

favour. "If these philosophers," says Aristokles (Eus. xiv. 19, 1),

"know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know

something beyond the sensation itself. If I say [Greek: e)gô\

kai/omai], 'I am being burned,' this is a proposition, not a

sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential--the

sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels

it ([Greek: a)na/gkê ge tri/a tau=ta sunuphi/stasthai--to/ te pa/thos

au)to\ kai\ to\ poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon])." In trying to make good

his conclusion--That you cannot know the sensation without the Object

of sense--Aristokles at the same time asserts that the Object cannot

be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject.

He asserts that the three are by necessity _co-essential--i.e._

implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if

distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically ([Greek:

lo/gô| chôrista\]), admitting of being looked at in different points

of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly

stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they

deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of

the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as

reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The

reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is

trying to refute. Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in

favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective

Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a

non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought

to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does

not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very

forcible part of Sextus's reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272,

where he shows that a logical Subject _per se_ is undefinable and

inconceivable--that those who attempt to define Man (_e.g._) do so by

specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man--and that if you

suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with

them.]