[Footnote 159: Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 984, b. 17. He praises

Anaxagoras for this, [Greek: oi(=on nê/phôn par' ei)kê= le/gontas

tou\s pro/teron], &c.]

[Footnote 160: Aristoteles (or Pseudo-Aristot.) De Plantis, i. 1.

Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 65-6-13.

Aristotle says that the language of Anaxagoras about [Greek: nou=s]

and [Greek: psuchê\] was not perfectly clear or consistent. But it

seems also from Plato De Legg. xii. p. 967, B, that Anaxagoras made no

distinction between [Greek: nou=s] and [Greek: psuchê/]. Compare

Plato, Kratylus, p. 400 A.]

[Footnote 161: Anaxag. Fr. 8, and Schaubach's Comm. p. 112-116.

"Mens erat id, quod movebat molem homoeomeriarum: hâc ratione, per

hunc motum à mente excitatum, secretio facta est . . . . Materiæ autem

propriæ insunt vires: proprio suo pondere hæc, quæ mentis vi mota et

secreta sunt, feruntur in eum locum, quo nunc sunt."

Compare Alexand. Aphrod. ap. Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194,

a. (Schol. p. 348 a. Brandis); Marbach, Lehrbuch der Gesch. Philos. s.

54, note 2, p. 82; Preller, Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, s. 53,

with his comment.]

[Footnote 162: Plato, Phædo, c. 107, 108, p. 98; Plato, De Legg. xii.

p. 967 B; Aristot. Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 18; Plato, Timæus, 34 A.

88 E.]

[Footnote 163: Aristoph. Nub. 380, 828. [Greek: ai)the/rios

Di=nos--Di=nos basileu/ei, to\n Di/' e)xelêlakô/s]--the sting of which

applies to Anaxagoras and his doctrines.

Anaxagoras [Greek: di/nous tina\s a)noê/tous a)nazôgraphô=n, su\n tê=|

tou= nou= a)praxi/a| kai\ a)noi/a|] (Clemens. Alexandrin. Stromat. ii.

p. 365).

To _move_ (in the active sense, _i.e._ to cause movement in) and to

_know_, are the two attributes of the Anaxagorean [Greek: Nou=s]

(Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 18).]

[Side-note: Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own

theory.]

This we learn from Plato and Aristotle, who blame Anaxagoras for

inconsistency in deserting his own hypothesis, and in invoking

explanations from physical agencies, to the neglect of Nous and its

supposed optimising purposes. But Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge

by his remaining fragments, seems not to have committed any such

inconsistency. He did not proclaim his Nous to be a powerful

extra-cosmical Architect, like the Demiurgus of Plato--nor an

intra-cosmical, immanent, undeliberating instinct (such as Aristotle

calls Nature), tending towards the production and renewal of regular

forms and conjunctions, yet operating along with other agencies which

produced concomitants irregular, unpredictable, often even obstructive

and monstrous. Anaxagoras appears to conceive his Nous as one among

numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest, yet

differing from the rest as being powerful, simple, and pure from all

mixture,[164] as being endued with universal cognizance, as being the

earliest to act in point of time, and as furnishing the primary

condition to the activity of the rest by setting on foot the cosmical

rotation. The Homoeomeries are coeternal with, if not anterior to,

Nous. They have laws and properties of their own, which they follow,

when once liberated, without waiting for the dictation of Nous. What

they do is known by, but not ordered by, Nous.[165] It is therefore no

inconsistency in Anaxagoras that he assigns to mind one distinct and

peculiar agency, but nothing more; and that when trying to explain the

variety of phenomena he makes reference to other physical agencies, as

the case seems to require.[166]

[Footnote 164: Anaxagoras, Fr. 8,** p. 100, Schaub.

[Greek: e)sti\ ga\r lepto/tato/n te pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn], &c.

This means, not that [Greek: nou=s] was unextended or immaterial, but

that it was thinner or more subtle than either fire or air.

Herakleitus regarded [Greek: to\ perie/chon] as [Greek: logiko\n kai\

phrenê=res]. Diogenes of Apollonia considered air as endued with

cognition, and as imparting cognition by being inhaled. Compare

Plutarch, De Placit. Philos. iv. 3.

I cannot think, with Brücker (Hist. Philosop. part ii. b. ii. De Sectâ

Ionicâ, p. 504, ed. 2nd), and with Tennemann, Ges. Ph. i. 8, p. 312,

that Anaxagoras was "primus qui Dei ideam inter Græcos à materialitate

quasi purificavit," &c. I agree rather with Zeller (Philos. der

Griech. i. p. 680-683, ed. 2nd), that the Anaxagorean Nous is not

conceived as having either immateriality or personality.]

[Footnote 165: Simplikius, in Physic. Aristot. p. 73. [Greek: kai\

A)naxago/ras de\ to\n nou=n e)a/sas, ô(/s phêsin Eu)/dêmos, kai\

au)tomati/zôn ta\ polla\ suni/stêsin.]]

[Footnote 166: Diogen. Laert. ii. 8. [Greek: Nou=n . . . a)rchê\n

kinê/seôs].

Brücker, Hist. Philos. ut supra. "Scilicet, semel inducto in materiam

à mente motu, sufficere putavit Anaxagoras, juxta leges naturæ

motûsque, rerum ortum describere."]

[Side-note: Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras.]

In describing the formation of the Kosmos, Anaxagoras supposed that,

as a consequence of the rotation initiated by mind, the primitive

chaos broke up. "The Dense, Wet, Cold, Dark, Heavy, came together into

the place where now Earth is: Hot, Dry, Bare, Light, Bright, departed

to the exterior region of the revolving Æther."[167] In such

separation each followed its spontaneous and inherent tendency. Water

was disengaged from air and clouds, earth from water: earth was still

farther consolidated into stones by cold.[168] Earth remained

stationary in the centre, while fire and air were borne round it by

the force and violence of the rotatory movement. The celestial

bodies--Sun, Moon, and Stars--were solid bodies analogous to the earth,

either caught originally in the whirl of the rotatory movement, or

torn from the substance of the earth and carried away into the outer

region of rotation.[169] They were rendered hot and luminous by the

fiery fluid in the rapid whirl of which they were hurried along. The

Sun was a stone thus made red-hot, larger than Peloponnesus: the Moon

was of earthy matter, nearer to the Earth, deriving its light from the

Sun, and including not merely plains and mountains, but also cities

and inhabitants.[170] Of the planetary movements, apart from the

diurnal rotation of the celestial sphere, Anaxagoras took no

notice.[171] He explained the periodical changes in the apparent

course of the sun and moon by resistances which they encountered, the

former from accumulated and condensed air, the latter from the

cold.[172] Like Anaximenes and Demokritus, Anaxagoras conceived the

Earth as flat, round in the surface, and not deep, resting on and

supported by the air beneath it. Originally (he thought) the earth was

horizontal, with the axis of celestial rotation perpendicular, and the

north pole at the zenith, so that this rotation was then lateral, like

that of a dome or roof; it was moreover equable and unchanging with

reference to every part of the plane of the earth's upper surface, and

distributed light and heat equally to every part. But after a certain

time the Earth tilted over of its own accord to the south, thus

lowering its southern half, raising the northern half, and causing the

celestial rotation to appear oblique.[173]

[Footnote 167: Anaxag. Fr. 19, p. 131, Schaub.; compare Fr. 6, p. 97;

Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.]

[Footnote 168: Anaxag. Fr. 20, p. 133, Schau.]

[Footnote 169: See the curious passage in Plutarch, Lysander 12, and

Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Diogen. Laert. ii. 12; Plutarch, Placit.

Philos. ii. 13.]

[Footnote 170: Plato, Kratylus, p. 409 A; Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 14;

Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7.]

[Footnote 171: Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 165.]

[Footnote 172: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. ii. 23.]

[Footnote 173: Diogenes Laert. ii. 9. [Greek: ta\ d' a)/stra kat'

a)rcha\s tholoeidô=s e)nechthê=nai, ô(/ste kata\ koruphê\n tê=s gê=s

to\n a)ei\ phaino/menon ei)=nai po/lon, u(/steron de\ tê\n (gê=n)

e)/gklisin labei=n.] Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 8.]

[Side-note: His geology, meteorology, physiology.]

Besides these doctrines respecting the great cosmical bodies,

Anaxagoras gave explanations of many among the striking phenomena in

geology and meteorology--the sea, rivers, earthquakes, hurricanes,

hail, snow, &c.[174] He treated also of animals and plants--their

primary origin, and the manner of their propagation.[175] He thought

that animals were originally produced by the hot and moist earth; but

that being once produced, the breeds were continued by propagation.

The seeds of plants he supposed to have been originally contained in

the air, from whence they fell down to the warm and moist earth, where

they took root and sprung up.[176] He believed that all plants, as

well as all animals, had a certain measure of intelligence and

sentiment, differing not in kind but only in degree from the

intelligence and sentiment of men; whose superiority of intelligence

was determined, to a great extent, by their possession of hands.[177]

He explained sensation by the action of unlike upon unlike (contrary

to Empedokles, who referred it to the action of like upon like),[178]

applying this doctrine to the explanation of the five senses

separately. But he pronounced the senses to be sadly obscure and

insufficient as means of knowledge. Apparently, however, he did not

discard their testimony, nor assume any other means of knowledge

independent of it, but supposed a concomitant and controlling effect

of intelligence as indispensable to compare and judge between the

facts of sense when they appeared contradictory.[179] On this point,

however, it is difficult to make out his opinions.

[Footnote 174: See Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 174-181. Among the

points to which Anaxagoras addressed himself was the annual inundation

of the Nile, which he ascribed to the melting of the snows in

Æthiopia, in the higher regions of the river's course.--Diodor. i. 38.

Herodotus notices this opinion (ii. 22), calling it plausible, but

false, yet without naming any one as its author. Compare Euripides,

Helen. 3.]

[Footnote 175: Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 6, iv. 1.]

[Footnote 176: Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iii. 2; Diogen. Laert. ii.

9; Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2.]

[Footnote 177: Aristot. De Plantis, i. 1; Aristot. Part. Animal. iv.

10.]

[Footnote 178: Theophrastus, De Sensu, sect. 1--sect. 27-30.

This difference followed naturally from the opinions of the two

philosophers on the nature of the soul or mind. Anaxagoras supposed it

peculiar in itself, and dissimilar to the Homoeomeries without.

Empedokles conceived it as a compound of the four elements, analogous

to all that was without: hence man knew each exterior element by its

like within himself--earth by earth, water by water, &c.]

[Footnote 179: Anaxag. Fr. 19, Schaub.; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathem.

vii. 91-140; Cicero, Academ. i. 12.

Anaxagoras remarked that the contrast between black and white might be

made imperceptible to sense by a succession of numerous intermediate

colours very finely graduated. He is said to have affirmed that snow

was really black, notwithstanding that it appeared white to our

senses: since water was black, and snow was only frozen water (Cicero,

Academ. iv. 31; Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 33). "Anaxagoras non

modo id ita esse (_sc._ albam nivem esse) negabat, sed sibi, quia

sciret aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse

_ne videri quidem_." Whether Anaxagoras ever affirmed that snow did

not _appear to him_ white, may reasonably be doubted: his real

affirmation probably was, that snow, though it appeared white, was not

really white. And this affirmation depended upon the line which he

drew between the fact of sense, the phenomenal, the relative, on one

side--and the substratum, the real, the absolute, on the other. Most

philosophers recognise a distinction between the two; but the line

between the two has been drawn in very different directions.

Anaxagoras assumed as his substratum, real, or absolute, the

Homoeomeries--numerous primordial varieties of matter, each with its

inherent qualities. Among these varieties he reckoned _water_, but he

did not reckon _snow_. He also considered that water was really and

absolutely black or dark (the Homeric [Greek: me/lan u(/dôr])--that

blackness was among its primary qualities. Water, when consolidated

into snow, was so disguised as to produce upon the spectator the

appearance of whiteness; but it did not really lose, nor could it

lose, its inherent colour. A negro covered with white paint, and

therefore looking white, is still really black: a wheel painted with

the seven prismatic colours, and made to revolve rapidly, will look

white, but it is still really septi-coloured: _i.e._ the state of

rapid revolution would be considered as an exceptional state, not

natural to it. Compare Plato, Lysis, c. 32, p. 217 D.]

[Side-note: The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and

impious.]

Anaxagoras, residing at Athens and intimately connected with Perikles,

incurred not only unpopularity, but even legal prosecution, by the

tenor of his philosophical opinions, especially those on astronomy. To

Greeks who believed in Helios and Selênê as not merely living beings

but Deities, his declaration that the Sun was a luminous and fiery

stone, and the Moon an earthy mass, appeared alike absurd and impious.

Such was the judgment of Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon, as well as of

Aristophanes and the general Athenian public.[180] Anaxagoras was

threatened with indictment for blasphemy, so that Perikles was

compelled to send him away from Athens.

[Footnote 180: Plato, Apol. So. c. 14; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7.]

That physical enquiries into the nature of things, and attempts to

substitute scientific theories in place of the personal agency of the

Gods, were repugnant to the religious feelings of the Greeks, has been

already remarked.[181] Yet most of the other contemporary philosophers

must have been open to this reproach, not less than Anaxagoras; and we

learn that the Apolloniate Diogenes left Athens from the same cause.

If others escaped the like prosecution which fell upon Anaxagoras, we

may probably ascribe this fact to the state of political party at

Athens, and to the intimacy of the latter with Perikles. The numerous

political enemies of that great man might fairly hope to discredit him

in the public mind--at the very least to vex and embarrass him--by

procuring the trial and condemnation of Anaxagoras. Against other

philosophers, even when propounding doctrines not less obnoxious

respecting the celestial bodies, there was not the same collateral

motive to stimulate the aggressive hostility of individuals.

[Footnote 181: Plutarch, Nikias, 23.]

[Side-note: Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element.]

Contemporary with Anaxagoras--yet somewhat younger, as far as we can

judge, upon doubtful evidence--lived the philosopher Diogenes, a

native of Apollonia in Krete. Of his life we know nothing except that

he taught during some time at Athens, which city he was forced to quit

on the same ground as Anaxagoras. Accusations of impiety were either

brought or threatened against him:[182] physical philosophy being

offensive generally to the received religious sentiment, which was

specially awakened and appealed to by the political opponents of

Perikles.

[Footnote 182: Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes

the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of

Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact

may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when

Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for

foreign visitors--when the visits of philosophers to the city had been

multiplied by the countenance of Perikles--and when the political

rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in

order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for

determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is,

that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and

detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C.

440-410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen.

Apoll. c. 12-18 (Leipsic, 1830).

Simplikius (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having

been [Greek: schedo\n neô/tatos] in the series of physical theorists.]

Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic

philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and

enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There was but one

primordial element--and that element was air. He laid it down as

indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at

the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they

would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm

to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of

the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there

existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing

therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same

nature, but very changeable and diversified.[183]

[Footnote 183: Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29 Panzerb.; Theophrastus, De

Sensu, s. 39.

[Greek: ei) ga\r ta\ e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta nu=n gê= kai\

u(/dôr kai\ ta)/lla, o(/sa phainetai e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta,

ei) toute/ôn ti ê)=n to\ e(/teron tou= e(te/rou e(/teron e)o\n tê=|

i)di/ê| phu/sei, kai\ mê\ to\ au)to\ e)o\n mete/pipte pollachô=s kai\

ê(teroiou=to; ou)damê= ou)/te mi/sgesthai a)llê/lois ê)du/nato ou)/te

ô)phe/lêsis tô=| e(te/rô| ou)/te bla/bê], &c.

Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion

that there must be one common Something out of which all things

came--[Greek: e)x e(no\s a(/panta] (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7,

p. 322, a. 14), inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.]

[Side-note: Air was the primordial, universal element.]

Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was

infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of intelligence and

knowledge. This latter property Diogenes proved by the succession of

climatic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and

day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed

in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out

things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed

with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and

intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by

respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to

respire.[184]

[Footnote 184: Diog. Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz.--[Greek: Ou)

ga\r a)\n ou(/tô de/dasthai oi(=o/n te ê)=n a)/neu noê/sios, ô(/ste

pa/ntôn me/tra e)/chein, cheimô=no/s te kai\ the/reos kai nukto\s kai\

ê(me/rês kai\ u(etô=n kai\ a)ne/môn kai\ eu)diô=n. kai\ ta\ a)/lla

ei)/ tis bou/letai e)nnoe/esthai, eu(/riskoi a)\n ou(/tô diakei/mena,

ô(s a)nusto\n ka/llista. E)/ti de pro\s tou/tois kai\ ta/de mega/la

sêmei=a; a)/nthrôpos ga\r kai\ ta\ a)/lla zô=a a)napne/onta zô/ei tô=|

a)e/ri. Kai\ tou=to au)toi=s kai\ psuchê/ e)sti kai\ no/êsis----

--Kai\ moi\ doke/ei to\ tê\n no/êsin e)/chon ei)=nai o( a)ê\r

kaleo/menos u(po\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn], &c.

Schleiermacher has an instructive commentary upon these fragments of

the Apolloniate Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162;

Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).]

[Side-note: Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was

eminently modifiable.]

Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the

essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing

in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in

nature partook of it in a different manner.[185] For it was

distinguished by great diversity of properties and by many gradations

of intelligence. It was hotter or colder--moister or drier--denser or

rarer--more or less active and movable--exhibiting differences of

colour and taste. All these diversities were found in objects, though

all at the bottom were air. Reason and intelligence resided in the

warm air. So also to all animals as well as to men, the common source

of vitality, whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air;

hotter than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that

near the sun.[186] Nevertheless, in spite of this common

characteristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely

modifiable, that animals were of all degrees of diversity, in form,

habits, and intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among

themselves: yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished

with the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things,

animate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning from air

and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and

indestructible.[187]

[Footnote 185: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ e)sti mêde\ e(\n o(/, ti

mê\ mete/chei tou/tou] (air). [Greek: Mete/chei de\ ou)de\ e(\n

o(moi/ôs to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|; a)lla\ polloi\ tro/poi\ kai\

au)tou\ tou= a)e/ros kai\ tê=s noê/sio/s ei)sin.]

Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 21. [Greek: Dioge/nês d',

ô(/sper kai\ e(teroi/ tines, a)e/ra [u(pe/labe tê\n psuchê/n]], &c.]

[Footnote 186: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ pa/ntôn zô/ôn dê\ ê(

psuchê\ to\ au)to/ e)stin, a)ê\r thermo/teros me\n tou= e)/xô e)n ô(=|

e)sme/n, tou= me/ntoi para\ tô=| ê(eli/ô| pollo\n psuchro/teros.]]

[Footnote 187: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.]

[Side-note: Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in

the human body.]

The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in character and

degree, was imbibed by respiration, the inspired air passing by means

of the veins and along the blood into all parts of the body. Of the

veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its minuteness of

detail, in an age when philosophers dwelt almost exclusively in loose

general analogies.[188] He conceived the principal seat of

intelligence in man to be in the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle

of the heart, where a quantity of air was accumulated ready for

distribution.[189] The warm and dry air concentrated round the brain,

and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of

sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the

tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices

of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous

stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were

thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To

this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted,

thereby causing vision:[190] while pulsations and vibrations of the

air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same

centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the

eye with the brain were inflamed, no visual sensation could take

place;[191] moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other

things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of

sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the

real seat of sensation.[192] Thought and intelligence, as well as

sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us,

depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded

or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less

intelligence than men: because they had more moisture in their bodies,

so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them

freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures

or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our

sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the

blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to all

parts: they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood

was torpid and thick.[193]

[Footnote 188: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz. The description

of the veins given by Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel. Hist.

Animal, iii. 2: yet seemingly only in a defective abstract, for

Theophrastus alludes to various opinions of Diogenes on the veins,

which are not contained in Aristotle. See Philippson, [Greek: U(/lê

a)nthrôpi/nê], p. 203.]

[Footnote 189: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. [Greek: E)n tê=|

a)rtêriakê=| koili/a| tê=s kardi/as, ê(/tis e)sti\ kai\ pneumatikê/].

See Panzerbieter's commentary upon these words, which are not very

clear (c. 50), nor easy to reconcile with the description given by

Diogenes himself of the veins.]

[Footnote 190: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 18. Theophrast. De

Sensu, s. 39-41-43. [Greek: Kritikô/taton de\ ê(donê=s tê\n glô=ttan;

a(palô/taton ga\r ei)=nai kai\ mano\n kai\ ta\s phle/bas a(pa/sas

a)nê/kein ei)s au)tê/n.]]

[Footnote 191: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 16; Theophrastus, De

Sensu, s. 40.]

[Footnote 192: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 42. [Greek: O(/ti de\ o(

e)nto\s a)ê\r ai)stha/netai, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion tou= theou=,

sêmei=on ei)=nai, o(/ti polla/kis pro\s a)/lla to\n nou=n e)/chontes

ou)/th' o(rô=men ou)/t' a)kou/omen]. The same opinion--that sensation,

like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions--is

ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by

Porphyry, De Abstinentiâ, iii. 21. [Greek: Stra/tônos tou= phusikou=

lo/gos e)sti\n a)podeiknu/ôn, ô(s ou)de\ ai)stha/nesthai to para/pan

a)/neu tou= noei=n u(pa/rchei. kai\ ga\r gra/mmata polla/kis

e)piporeuome/nous tê=| o)/psei kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes tê=| a)koê=|

dialantha/nousin ê(ma=s kai\ diapheu/gousi pro\s e(te/rous to\n nou=n

e)/chontas--ê(=| kai\ le/lektai, nou=s o(rê= kai\ nou=s a)kou/ei,

ta)/lla kôpha\ kai\ tuphla/.]

The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus--[Greek: o(

e)nto\s a)ê\r, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion _tou= theou=_]--is so printed by

Philippson; but the word [Greek: theou=] seems not well avouched as to

the text, and Schneider prints [Greek: thumou=]. It is not impossible

that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his

physical theory; but this requires proof.]

[Footnote 193: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 43-46; Plutarch, Placit.

Philos. v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry

soul is the best and most intelligent--is cited among the doctrines of

Herakleitus, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony.

[Greek: Au)/ê psuchê\ sophôta/tê kai\ a)ri/stê.] See Schleiermach.

Herakleitos, sect. 59-64.]

[Side-note: Kosmology and meteorology.]

The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by

portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and

undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense,

and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as

earth and water: while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and

formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a

rapid rotatory movement round the earth, and shaping itself into sun,

moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone.

The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and

water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the

water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment

to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the

Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the

infinite mass without.[194] Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the

figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum; and the rotation

of the heavens as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface

of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he

supposed to have been the original arrangement; but after a certain

time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south--the

northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed--so that

the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation

of the heavens became apparently oblique.[195] He thought, moreover,

that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would

perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from

the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.[196]

Respecting animal generation--and to some extent respecting

meteorological phenomena[197]--Diogenes also propounded several

opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have

resembled those of Anaxagoras.

[Footnote 194: Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8; Aristotel. De

Animâ, i. 2; Diogen. Laert. ix. 53. [Greek: Dioge/nês kissêroeidê= ta\

a)/stra, diapnoi/as de\ au)ta\ nomi/zei tou= ko/smou, ei)=nai de\

dia/pura; sumperiphe/resthai de\ toi=s phaneroi=s a)/strois a)phanei=s

li/thous kai\ par' au)to\ tou=t' a)nônu/mous; pi/ptonta de\ polla/kis

e)pi\ tê=s gê=s sbe/nnusthai; katha/per to\n e)n Ai)go\s potamoi=s

purôdô=s katenechthe/nta _a)ste/ra_ pe/trinon.] This remarkable

anticipation of modern astronomy--the recognition of aerolithes as a

class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but

occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth's attraction,

becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there

being extinguished--is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his Kosmos,

vol. i. p. 98-104, Eng. trans. He says--"The opinion of Diogenes of

Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day," p. 110. The

charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his

frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical

subjects.]

[Footnote 195: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Panzerbieter ad Diog.

Ap. c. 76-78; Schaubach ad Anaxagor. Fr. p. 175.]

[Footnote 196: Plut. Ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.]

[Footnote 197: Preller, Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom. ex Font. Loc.

Contexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief

attention "in animantium naturâ ex aeris principio repetendâ"; and

that he was less full "in cognitione [Greek: tô=n meteô/rôn]". But the

fragments scarcely justify this.]

[Side-note: Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory.]

Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other

enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those

already noticed--usually known under the name of the atomic theory.

This Atomic theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus,

obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdera, its

expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and

reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than

Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger

than Anaxagoras.[198] The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can

hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras.

[Footnote 198: Diogen. Laert. ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus

discussed in Mullach, Frag. Dem. p. 12-25; and in Zeller, Phil. der

Griech., vol. i. p. 576-681, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as

to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier

date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared himself to

be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.]

[Side-note: Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions of

Demokritus.]

Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little--yet enough

to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to

philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics,

but even of inherited patrimony.[199] His attention was chiefly turned

towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more

enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever

bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in

extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and

converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical

relations of lines.[200] He spent several years in visiting Egypt,

Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many

different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy,

and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read, even

from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they

were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy

to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in range and diversity of

subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.[201]

[Footnote 199: Dionys. ix. 36-39.]

[Footnote 200: Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 238, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p.

41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 35; Strabo, xv. p. 703.

Pliny, Hist. Natur. "Democritus--vitam inter experimenta consumpsit,"

&c.]

[Footnote 201: Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24;

Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos, o( tê=|

Dio\s phô/nê| pareikazo/menos], &c.

Diogenes (ix. 46-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of

Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor

Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also

distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of

style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus

to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of philosophy, the

difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have

had a positive antipathy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to

burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be

from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to

both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus,

while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked

praise.]

[Side-note: Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of

Parmenides.]

The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of

distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out the Eleatic

theory.[202] Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in

distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one

side--from the phenomenal and relative on the other--conceived the former

in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The

real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring,

continuous, unchangeable, immovable: the conception of Ens included

these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily

Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient,

discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and

Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since

Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the

real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as

phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parmenides _did_ affirm

it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts

from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the

absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal

on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised

each in a sphere of its own.

[Footnote 202: Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. [Greek:

Leu/kippos . . . . koinônê/sas Parmeni/dê| tê=s philosophi/as, ou) tê\n

au)tê\n e)ba/dise Parmeni/dê| kai\ Xenopha/nei peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn

do/xan, a)ll', ô(s dokei=, tê\n e)nanti/an]. Aristotel. De Gener. et

Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31. Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.]

[Side-note: Demokritean theory--Atoms--Plena and Vacua--Ens and

Non-Ens.]

This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that

Ens could not really change--that there could be no real generation,

or destruction--no transformation of qualities--no transition of many

into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and

continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was

essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the

extended, which Parmenides had treated as an _Unum continuum_, into

extension with body, and extension without body: into _plenum_ and

_vacuum_, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus

found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which

Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the

_vacuum_; not less self-existent than that which he called Something.

They established their point by showing that Ens, thus interpreted,

would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they

assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal

fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even

appear to be a fact, without supposing _vacuum_ as well as body to be

real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this

manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the

existence of a _vacuum_ by appeal to direct physical observation,

which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of

receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead

of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens,

essentially many and discontinuous: _plena_ and _vacua_, spaces full

and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.[203] There existed

atoms innumerable, each one in itself essentially a plenum, admitting

no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as

indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant

space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty

space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be

visible: yet all atoms were not equally small; there were fundamental

differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no

other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be

divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two

or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real

separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close

approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a

phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible

properties.[204]

[Footnote 203: It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise De

Gener. et Corr. (i. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus

as having grown out of that of the Eleates. [Greek: Leu/kippos d'

e)/chein ô)|ê/thê lo/gous, oi(/tines pro\s tê\n ai)/sthêsin

o(mologou/mena le/gontes ou)k a)nairê/sousin ou)/te ge/nesin ou)/te

phthora\n ou)/te ki/nêsin kai\ to\ plê=thos tô=n o)/ntôn], &c.

Compare also Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 4, p. 303, a. 6; Metaphys. A.

4, p. 985, b. 5; Physic. iv. 6: [Greek: le/gousi de\] (Demokritus,

&c., in proving a vacuum) [Greek: e(\n me\n o(/ti ê( ki/nêsis ê( kata\

to/pon ou)k a)\n ei)/ê, _ou) ga\r a)\n dokei=n_ ei)=nai ki/nêsin ei)

mê\ ei)/ê keno/n; to\ ga\r plê=res a)du/naton ei)=nai de/xasthai/ ti],

&c.

Plutarch adv. Kolot. p. 1108. [Greek: Oi(=s ou)d' o)/nar e)ntuchô\n o(

Kolô/tês, e)spha/lê peri\ le/xin tou= a)ndro\s] (Demokritus) [Greek:

e)n ê)=| diori/zetai, mê\ ma=llon to\ de\n, ê)\ to\ mêde\n ei)=nai;

de\n me\n o)noma/zôn to\ sô=ma mêde\n de\ to\ keno/n, ô(s kai\ tou/tou

phu/sin tina\ kai\ u(po/stasin i)di/an e)/chontos.]

The affirmation of Demokritus--That Nothing existed, just as much as

Something--appears a paradox which we must probably understand as

implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language

of the Eleates, his opponents. They called the vacuum _Nothing_, but

Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum

_Nothing_, then I say that Nothing exists as well as Something.

The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a

vacuum were--1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as

if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes,

into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins.

3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through

which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot.

Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b.)

Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact,

ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was

impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum existed. Melissus,

the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against

the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist

a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real

motion. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6.)

Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his

hypothesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (Gen. et Corr. i. 2; De

Animâ, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as

truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement

and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was

discoverable by man. See Mullach, Demokritus (pp. 414, 415). Compare

Philippson--[Greek: U(=lê a)nthrôpi/nê]--Berlin, 1831.]

[Footnote 204: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 25, [Greek:

ta\ prô=ta mege/thê ta\ a)diai/reta sterea/]. Diogen. Laert. ix. 44;

Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1110 seq.

Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristotel.

Metaphys. Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, [Greek: a)du/naton ei)=nai/ phêsi

Dêmo/kritos e)k du/o e(\n ê)\| e)x e(no\s du/o gene/sthai; ta\ ga\r

mege/thê ta\ a)/toma ta\s ou)si/as poiei=.]]

[Side-note: Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure,

position, and arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements

and combinations generated qualities.]

The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the

phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established. For the real

world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely from the sameness

and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient

movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypothesis,

accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world.

In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than

all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the

condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as

phenomenal aggregates.[205] But in respect to quantity or magnitude as

well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover,

besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each

atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all

objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental

differences--partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the

manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination--arose all

the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms

passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new

substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was

destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely

arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was

simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such

compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no "nature of

their own," or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic

composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and

absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but

phenomenal and relative--_i.e._ they were powers of acting upon

correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of

such organs.[206] Such were the colour, sonorousness, taste, smell,

heat, cold, &c., of the bodies around us: they were relative, implying

correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but

perpetually fluctuating; since the compounds were frequently changing

either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic

change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our

organs.[207]

[Footnote 205: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was

the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where

agent and patient were alike. [Greek: Phêsi\ ga\r to\ au)to\ kai\

o(/moion ei)=nai to/ te poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon; ou) ga\r

e)gchôrei=n ta\ e(/tera kai\ diaphe/ronta pa/schein u(p' a)llê/lôn;

a)lla\ ka)\n e(/tera o)/nta poiê=| ti ei)s a)/llêla, ou)ch ê(=|

e(/tera, a)ll' ê(=| tau)to/n ti u(pa/rchei, tau/tê| tou=to sumbai/nein

au)toi=s]. Many contemporary philosophers affirmed distinctly the

opposite. [Greek: To\ o(/moion u(po\ tou= o(moi/ou pa=n a)pathe/s],

&c. Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with

Demokritus; see above, p. 61, note 1 [*Footnote 185*]. The facility

with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly

observable.]

[Footnote 206: Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast.

De Sensu, s. 63, 64. [Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n bare/os kai\ kou/phou

kai\ sklêrou= kai\ malakou= e)n tou/tois a)phori/zei; tô=n de\ a)/llôn

ai)sthêtô=n ou)deno\s ei)=nai phu/sin, a)lla\ pa/nta pa/thê tê=s

ai)sthê/seôs a)lloioume/nês, e)x ê(=s gi/nesthai tê\n phantasi/an],

&c.

Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 16. [Greek: Phu/sin me\n mêde\n ei)=nai

chrô=ma, ta\ me\n ga\r stoichei=a a)/poia, ta/ te mesta\ kai\ to\

keno/n; ta\ d' e)x au)tô=n sugkri/mata ke/chrô=sthai diatagê=| te kai\

r(uthmô=| kai\ protropê=|], &c.

Demokritus restricted the term [Greek: Phu/sis]--Nature--to the

primordial atoms and vacua (Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. p. 310

A.).]

[Footnote 207: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 2, p. 315, b. 10. [Greek:

Ô(/ste tai=s metabolai=s tou= sugkeime/nou to\ au)to\ e)nanti/on

dokei=n a)/llô| kai\ a)/llô|, kai\ metakinei=sthai mikrou=

e)mmignume/nou, _kai\ o(/lôs e(/teron phai/nesthai e(no\s

metakinêthe/ntos_.]]

[Side-note: Combinations of atoms--generating different qualities in

the compounds.]

Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which

Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also

as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and

hardness--primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and

Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste,

and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to

Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its

magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal.

In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as

its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.[208]

The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the

peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus,

comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter

is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger

proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the

iron: hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout;

it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk,

equally close to and coherent with each other on every side, but not

more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of

the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger

spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in

other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence

there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular

side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the

lead.[209]

[Footnote 208: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 61. [Greek: Baru\ me\n ou)=n

kai\ kou=phon tô=| mege/thei diairei= Dêmo/kritos], &c.

Aristotel. De Coelo, iv. 2, 7, p. 309, a. 10; Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p.

326, a. 9. [Greek: Kai/toi baru/teron ge kata\ tê\n u(perochê/n phêsin

ei)=nai Dêmo/kritos e(/kaston tô=n a)diaire/tôn], &c.]

[Footnote 209: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 62.]

[Side-note: All atoms essentially separate from each other.]

We thus see that Demokritus, though he supposed single atoms to be all

of the same specific gravity, yet recognised a different specific

gravity in the various compounds of atoms or material masses. It is to

be remembered that, when we speak of contact or combination of atoms,

this is not to be understood literally and absolutely, but only in a

phenomenal and relative sense; as an approximation, more or less

close, but always sufficiently close to form an atomic combination

which our senses apprehended as one object. Still every atom was

essentially separate from every other, and surrounded by a margin of

vacant space: no two atoms could merge into one, any more than one

atom could be divided into two.

[Side-note: All properties of objects, except weight and hardness,

were phenomenal and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no

knowledge of the real and absolute.]

Pursuant to this theory, Demokritus proclaimed that all the properties

of objects, except weight, hardness, and softness, were not inherent

in the objects themselves, but simply phenomenal and relative to the

observer--"modifications of our sensibility". Colour, taste, smell,

sweet and bitter, hot and cold, &c., were of this description. In

respect to all of them, man differed from other animals, one man from

another, and even the same man from himself at different times and

ages. There was no sameness of impression, no unanimity or constancy

of judgment, because there was no real or objective "nature"

corresponding to the impression. From none of these senses could we at

all learn what the external thing was in itself. "Sweet and bitter,

hot and cold (he said) are by law or convention (_i.e._ these names

designate the impressions of most men on most occasions, taking no

account of dissentients): what really exists is, atoms and vacuum. The

sensible objects which we suppose and believe to exist do not exist in

truth; there exist only atoms and vacuum. We know nothing really and

truly about an object, either what it is or what it is not: our

opinions depend upon influences from without, upon the position of our

body, upon the contact and resistances of external objects. There are

two phases of knowledge, the obscure and the genuine. To the obscure

belong all our senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The

genuine is distinct from these. When the obscure phase fails, when we

can no longer see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch--from

minuteness and subtlety of particles--then the genuine phase, or

reason and intelligence, comes into operation."[210]

[Footnote 210: Demokritus, Fr. p. 205, Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv.

Mathemat. vii. p. 135; Diogen. Laert. ix. 72.]

[Side-note: Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little

of it was attainable.]

True knowledge (in the opinion of Demokritus) was hardly at all

attainable; but in so far as it could be attained, we must seek it,

not merely through the obscure and insufficient avenues of sense, but

by reason or intelligence penetrating to the ultimatum of corpuscular

structure, farther than sense could go. His atoms were not pure

Abstracta (like Plato's Ideas and geometrical plane figures, and

Aristotle's materia prima), but concrete bodies, each with its

own[211] magnitude, figure, and movement; too small to be seen or felt

by us, yet not too small to be seen or felt by beings endowed with

finer sensitive power. They were abstractions mainly in so far as all

other qualities were supposed absent. Demokritus professed to show how

the movements, approximations, and collisions of these atoms, brought

them into such combinations as to form the existing Kosmos; and not

that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent

of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist.

[Footnote 211: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 29. [Greek:

A)/peira to\ plê=thos kai\ a)o/rata dia\ smikro/têta tô=n o)/gkôn],

&c.

Marbach observes justly that the Demokritean atoms, though not really

objects of sense in consequence of their smallness (of their

disproportion to our visual power), are yet spoken of as objects of

sense: they are as it were microscopic objects, and the [Greek:

gnêsi/ê gnô/mê], or intelligence, is conceived as supplying something

of a microscopic power. (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der

Philosophie, sect. 58, vol. i. p. 94.)]

[Side-note: No separate force required to set the atoms in

motion--they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms

naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the

Kosmos.]

How this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the

original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is

certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set

the atoms in motion--such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles--the

Nous or Intelligence of Anaxagoras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms

moved by an inherent force of their own: that this motion was as much

without beginning as the atoms themselves:[212] that eternal motion

was no less natural, no more required any special cause to account for

it, than eternal rest. "Such is the course of nature--such is and

always has been the fact," was his ultimatum.[213] He farther

maintained that all the motions of the atoms were necessary--that is,

that they followed each other in a determinate order, each depending

upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he

could not explain.[214] Fixed laws, known or unknown, he recognised

always. Fortune or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover

their own want of knowledge and foresight.[215] Demokritus seems to

have supposed that like atoms had a spontaneous tendency towards like;

that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with

unequal force, owing to their different size, and weight proportional

to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and

collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory

motion, gradually extending itself, and comprehending a larger and

larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior

membrane or shell was formed around them.[216] This rotatory motion

was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained

the severance of its central and peripheral masses--Earth and Water in

the centre--Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, near the

circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Empedokles, imagined

different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation; but

all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to

deduce the formation of the various cosmical bodies and their known

manifestations.[217] In respect to these bodies--Sun, Moon, Stars,

Earth, &c.--Demokritus seems to have held several opinions like those

of Anaxagoras. Both of them conceived the Sun as a redhot mass, and

the Earth as a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a

drum, stationary in the centre of the revolving celestial bodies, and

supported by the resistance of air beneath.[218]

[Footnote 212: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. [Greek:

Leuki/ppô| kai\ Dê/mokritô|, toi=s le/gousin a)ei\ kinei=sthai, ta\

prô=ta sô/mata], &c. (Physic. viii. 3, 3, p. 253, b. 12, viii. 9, p.

265, b. 23; Cicero, De Finib. i. 6, 17.)]

[Footnote 213: Aristot. Generat. Animal. ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20; Physic.

viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32.

Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course

of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final

causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation, Sur la Philosophie

Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), shows that this is exactly the

ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. "Un phénomène se

passait-il, si on lui en demandait la raison, il (Demokritus)

répondait, 'La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ'elle s'est toujours

passée ainsi.' C'est, en d'autres termes, la seule réponse que font

encore aujourd'hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand

elle n'est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur.

Qu'est-ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait

plusieurs fois observé, qu'une pierre tombe quand elle n'est pas

soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque

toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu'implique l'explication

des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c'est que la nature

demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite--'Tel

phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de

cette même façon'--est la première forme qu' ait revêtue le principe

de la stabilité des lois naturelles."]

[Footnote 214: Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that

Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the

atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place [Greek: a)po\

tou= au)toma/tou]. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly

remarks--"Casu ([Greek: a)po\ tau)toma/tou]) videntur fieri, quæ

naturali quâdam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus evenire dicuntur.

Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem,

vitato [Greek: a)na/gkês] vocabulo, quod alii aliter usurpabant, casum

et fortunam vocaret--ipse tamen Democritus, abhorrens ab iis omnibus

quæ destinatam causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam

perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus

concessit."

Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is

calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Phil. d.

Griech., i. p. 600, 2nd.** ed.).

Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the

Encyclopædia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the

fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical _quoad hoc_ with the

Demokritean) philosophy.

"I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation

ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz--'that the _blind chance_ of the

Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without

a cause'. This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught

by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition.

The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the

universe does not imply the existence of _intelligent_ causes, but may

be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the atoms of

matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely

long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced,

exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are

surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to

produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the

truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute

of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words _blind

chance_ to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am

ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place:

but only to intimate that I do not here act as a _designing_ cause, in

consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die

is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this

Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the

main object of the Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace) to inculcate."

(Stewart--First Dissertation, part ii. p. 139, note.)]

[Footnote 215: Demokrit. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, Præp.

Evang. xiv. 27. [Greek: a)/nthrôpoi tu/chês ei)/dôlon e)pla/santo

pro/phasin i)di/ês a)bouli/ês.]]

[Footnote 216: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit.

Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.]

[Footnote 217: Demokrit. Fragm. p. 208, Mullach. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos

e)n oi(=s phêsi di/nê a)po\ panto\s a)pokri/nesthai pantoi/ôn

ei)de/ôn], &c.

Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.]

[Footnote 218: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 612, ed. 2nd.]

[Side-note: Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal

generation.]

Among the researches of Demokritus there were some relating to animal

generation, and zoology; but we cannot find that his opinions on these

subjects were in peculiar connection with his atomic theory.[219] Nor

do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing

the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic

reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and

arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special

cases that he thus connected determinate atoms with compounds of

determinate quality; for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean

elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small

and globular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all; those

constituting air, water, and earth, were an assemblage of all

varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude--the

atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest.[220]

[Footnote 219: Mullach, Demokr. Fragm. p. 395 seqq.]

[Footnote 220: Aristotle, Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 5; De Coelo,

iii. 8, p. 306, b. 35; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.]

[Side-note: His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire

diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental

particles intermingled throughout all the frame with corporeal

particles.]

In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with heat or

fire, conceiving it to consist in the same very small, globular,

rapidly movable atoms, penetrating everywhere: which he illustrated by

comparison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when shining through a

doorway. That these were the constituent atoms of mind, he proved by

the fact, that its first and most essential property was to move the

body, and to be itself moved.[221] Mind, soul, the vital principle,

fire, heat, &c., were, in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially

identical--not confined to man or even to animals, but

diffused, in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and

nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of

mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed

to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and

alternating with the corporeal particles.[222] It was the essential

condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained in

proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their

subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed

or thrust out at all apertures by the pressure of air on all the

external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of

respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly

distributed throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and

formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or

compensated the loss, of those which were tending outwards. When

breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the

vital particles in the interior were speedily forced out, and death

ensued.[223]

[Footnote 221: Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, 2-3, p. 403, b. 28; i. 3, p.

406, b. 20; Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. i. 11; Diogen. Laert. ix. 44.]

[Footnote 222: Aristotel. De Respirat. (c. 4, p. 472, a. 5), [Greek:

le/gei] (Demokritus) [Greek: ô(s ê( psuchê\ kai\ to\ thermo\n

tau)to\n, ta\ prô=ta schê/mata tô=n sphairoeidô=n].

Lucretius, iii. 370.

Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis,

Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit;

Corporis atque animi primordia singula privis

Adposita alternis variare ac nectere membra.]

[Footnote 223: Aristotel. De Respiratione, c. 4, p. 472, a. 10; De

Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, a. 12.]

[Side-note: Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of

the body.]

Though Demokritus conceived those mental particles as distributed all

over the body, yet he recognised different mental aptitudes attached

to different parts of the body. Besides the special organs of sense,

he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, passion to the

heart, and appetite to the liver:[224] the same tripartite division

afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or

sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or

thought. Sensation and thought were, in his opinion, alike material,

and alike mental. Both were affections of the same peculiar particles,

vital or mental, within us: both were changes operated in these

particles by effluvia or images from without; nevertheless the one

change was different from the other.[225]

[Footnote 224: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 618, ed. 2nd.

Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iv. 4), ascribes a bipartite division of the

soul to Demokritus: [Greek: to\ logiko\n], in the thorax: [Greek: to\

a)/logon], distributed over all the body. But in the next section (iv.

6), he departs from this statement, affirming that both Demokritus and

Plato supposed [Greek: to\ ê(gemoniko\n] of the soul to be in the

head.]

[Footnote 225: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 8. Demokritus and

Leukippus affirm [Greek: tê\n ai)/sthêsin kai\ tê\n no/êsin

gi/nesthai, ei)dô/lôn e)/xôthen prosio/ntôn; mêdeni\ ga\r e)piba/llein

mêdete/ran chôri\s tou= prospi/ptontos ei)dô/lou].

Cicero, De Finibus, i. 6, 21, "imagines, quæ idola nominant, quorum

incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus," &c.]

In regard to sensations, Demokritus said little about those of touch,

smell, and hearing; but he entered at some length into those of sight

and taste.[226]

[Footnote 226: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.]

[Side-note: Explanation of different sensations and perceptions.

Colours.]

Proceeding upon his hypothesis of atoms and vacua as the only

objective existences, he tried to show what particular modifications

of atoms, in figure, size, and position, produced upon the sentient

the impressions of different colours. He recognised four fundamental

or simple colours--white, black, red, and green--of which all other

colours were mixtures and combinations.[227] White colour (he said)

was caused by smooth surfaces, which presented straight pores and a

transparent structure, such as the interior surface of shells: where

these smooth substances were brittle or friable, this arose from the

constituent atoms being at once spherical and loosely connected

together, whereby they presented the clearest passage through their

pores, the least amount of shadow, and the purest white colour. From

substances thus constituted, the effluvia flowed out easily, and

passed through the intermediate air without becoming entangled or

confused with it. Black colour was caused by rough, irregular, unequal

substances, which had their pores crooked and obstructed, casting much

shadow, and sending forth slowly their effluvia, which became hampered

and entangled with the intervening medium of air. Red colour arose

from the effluvia of spherical atoms, like those of fire, though of

larger size: the connection between red colour and fire was proved by

the fact that heated substances, man as well as the metals, became

red. Green was produced by atoms of large size and wide vacua, not

restricted to any determinate shape, but arranged in peculiar order

and position. These four were given by Demokritus as the simple

colours. But he recognised an infinite diversity of compound colours,

arising from mixture of them in different proportions, several of

which he explained--gold-colour, purple, blue, violet, leek-green,

nut-brown, &c.[228]

[Footnote 227: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 73 seq.; Aristotel. De

Sensu, c. iv. p. 442, b. 10. The opinions of Demokritus on colour are

illustrated at length by Prantl in his Uebersicht der Farbenlehre der

Alten (p. 49 seq.), appended to his edition of the Aristotelian or

Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, [Greek: Peri\ Chrôma/tôn] (Munich,

1849).

Demokritus seems also to have attempted to show, that the sensation of

cold and shivering was produced by the irruption of jagged and acute

atoms. See Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 947, 948, c. 8.]

[Footnote 228: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 76-78. [Greek: a)/peira ta\

chrô/mata kai\ tou\s chulou\s kata\ ta\s mi/xeis--ou)de\n ga\r

o(/moion e)/sesthai tha)/teron tha)te/rou.]]

[Side-note: Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from

objects. Hearing.]

Besides thus setting forth those varieties of atoms and atomic motions

which produced corresponding varieties of colour, Demokritus also

brought to view the intermediate stages whereby they realised the act

of vision. All objects, compounds of the atoms, gave out effluvia or

images resembling themselves. These effluvia stamped their impression,

first upon the intervening air, next upon the eye beyond: which, being

covered by a fine membrane, and consisting partly of water, partly of

vacuum, was well calculated to admit the image. Such an image, the

like of which any one might plainly see by looking into another

person's eye, was the immediate cause of vision.[229] The air,

however, was no way necessary as an intervening medium, but rather

obstructive: the image proceeding from the object would be more

clearly impressed upon the eye through a vacuum: if the air did not

exist, vision would be so distinct, even at the farthest distance,

that an object not larger than an ant might be seen in the

heavens.[230] Demokritus believed that the visual image, after having

been impressed upon the eye, was distributed or multiplied over the

remaining body.[231] In like manner, he believed that, in hearing, the

condensed air carrying the sound entered with some violence through

the ears, passed through the veins to the brain, and was from thence

dispersed over the body.[232] Both sight and hearing were thus not

simply acts of the organ of sense, but concurrent operations of the

entire frame: over all which (as has been already stated) the mental

or vital particles were assumed to be disseminated.

[Footnote 229: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 50. [Greek: to\n a)e/ra to\n

metaxu\ tê=s o)/pseôs kai\ tou= o(rôme/nou tupou=sthai], &c.

Aristotel. De Sensu, c. 2, p. 438, a. 6.

Theophrastus notices this intermediate [Greek: a)potu/pôsis e)n tô=|

a)e/ri] as a doctrine peculiar ([Greek: i)di/ôs]) to Demokritus: he

himself proceeds to combat it (51, 52).]

[Footnote 230: Aristotel. De Animâ, ii. 7-9, p. 419, a. 16.]

[Footnote 231: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 54.]

[Footnote 232: Theophrastus, De Sensu, 55, 56. [Greek: tê\n ga\r

phônê\n ei)=nai puknoume/nou tou= a)e/ros kai\ meta\ bi/as

ei)sio/ntos], &c.

Demokritus thought that air entered into the system not only through

the ears, but also through pores in other parts of the body, though so

gently as to be imperceptible to our consciousness: the ears afforded

a large aperture, and admitted a considerable mass.]

[Side-note: Differences of taste--how explained.]

Farther, Demokritus conceived that the diversities of taste were

generated by corresponding diversities of atoms, or compounds of

atoms, of particular figure, magnitude and position. Acid taste was

caused by atoms rough, angular, twisted, small, and subtle, which

forced their way through all the body, produced large interior vacant

spaces, and thereby generated great heat: for heat was always

proportional to the amount of vacuum within.[233] Sweet taste was

produced by spherical atoms of considerable bulk, which slid gently

along and diffused themselves equably over the body, modifying and

softening the atoms of an opposite character. Astringent taste was

caused by large atoms with many angles, which got into the vessels,

obstructing the movement of fluids both in the veins and intestines.

Salt taste was produced by large atoms, much entangled with each

other, and irregular. In like manner Demokritus assigned to other

tastes particular varieties of generating atoms: adding, however, that

in every actual substance, atoms of different figures were

intermingled, so that the effect of each on the whole was only

realised in the ratio of the preponderating figure.[234] Lastly, the

working of all atoms, in the way of taste, was greatly modified by the

particular system upon which they were brought to act: effects totally

opposite being sometimes produced by like atoms upon different

individuals.[235]

[Footnote 233: Theophrast. De Sensu, 65-68.]

[Footnote 234: Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. [Greek: a(pa/ntôn de\ tô=n

schêma/tôn ou)de\n a)ke/raion ei)=nai kai\ a)mige\s toi=s a)/llois,

a)ll' e)n e(ka/stô| polla\ ei)=nai . . . . ou)= d' a)\n e)nê=| plei=ston,

tou=to ma/lista e)nischu/ein pro/s te tê\n ai)/sthêsin kai\ tê\n

du/namin].

This essential intermixture, in each distinct substance, of atoms of

all different shapes, is very analogous to the essential intermixture

of all sorts of Homoeomeries in the theory of Anaxagoras.]

[Footnote 235: Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. [Greek: ei)s o(poi/an e(/xin

a)\n ei)se/lthê|, diaphe/rein ou)k o)li/gon; kai\ dia\ tou=to to\

au)to\ ta)nanti/a, kai\ ta)nanti/a to\ au)to\ pa/thos poiei=n

e)ni/ote.]]

[Side-note: Thought or Intelligence--was produced by influx of atoms

from without.]

As sensation, so also thought or intelligence, was produced by the

working of atoms from without. But in what manner the different

figures and magnitudes of atoms were understood to act, in producing

diverse modifications of thought, we do not find explained. It was,

however, requisite that there should be a symmetry, or correspondence

of condition between the thinking mind within and the inflowing atoms

from without, in order that these latter might work upon a man

properly: if he were too hot, or too cold, his mind went astray.[236]

Though Demokritus identified the mental or vital particles with the

spherical atoms constituting heat or fire, he nevertheless seems to

have held that these particles might be in excess as well as in

deficiency, and that they required, as a condition of sound mind, to

be diluted or attempered with others. The soundest mind, however, did

not work by itself or spontaneously, but was put in action by atoms or

effluvia from without: this was true of the intellectual mind, not

less than of the sensational mind. There was an objective something

without, corresponding to and generating every different thought--just

as there was an objective something corresponding to every different

sensation. But first, the object of sensation was an atomic compound

having some appreciable bulk, while that of thought might be separate

atoms or vacua so minute as to be invisible and intangible. Next, the

object of sensation did not reveal itself as it was in its own nature,

but merely produced changes in the percipient, and different changes

in different percipients (except as to heavy and light, hard and soft,

which were not simply modifications of our sensibility, but were also

primary qualities inherent in the objects themselves[237]): while the

object of thought, though it worked a change in the thinking subject,

yet also revealed itself as it was, and worked alike upon all.

[Footnote 236: Theophrast. De Sensu, 58. [Greek: Peri\ de\ tou=

phronei=n e)pi\ tosou=ton ei)/rêken, o(/ti gi/netai summe/trôs

e)chou/sês tê=s psuchê=s meta\ tê\n ki/nêsin; e)a\n de\ peri/thermo/s

tis ê)\ peri/psuchros ge/nêtai, metalla/ttein phêsi/.]]

[Footnote 237: Theophrastus, De Sensu, 71. [Greek: nu=n de\ sklêrou=

me\n kai\ malakou= kai\ bare/os kai\ kou/phou poiei= tê\n ou)si/an,

_o(/per (a(/per) ou)ch' ê(=tton e)/doxe le/gesthai pro\s ê(ma=s,_

thermou= de\ kai\ psuchrou= kai\ tô=n a)/llôn ou)deno/s].

This is a remarkable point to be noted in the criticisms of

Theophrastus on the doctrine of Demokritus. Demokritus maintains that

_hot_ and _cold_ are relative to us: _hard_ and _soft_, _heavy_ and

_light_, are not only relative to us, but also absolute, objective,

things in their own nature,--though causing in us sensations which are

like them. Theophrastus denies this distinction altogether: and denies

it with the best reason. Not many of his criticisms on Demokritus are

so just and pertinent as this one.]

[Side-note: Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient;

Thought, genuine knowledge--absolute, or object per se.]

Hence Demokritus termed sensation, _obscure knowledge_--thought,

_genuine knowledge_.[238] It was only by thought (reason,

intelligence) that the fundamental realities of nature, atoms and

vacua, could be apprehended: even by thought, however, only

imperfectly, since there was always more or less of subjective

movements and conditions, which partially clouded the pure objective

apprehension--and since the atoms themselves were in perpetual

movement, as well as inseparably mingled one with another. Under such

obstructions, Demokritus proclaimed that no clear or certain knowledge

was attainable: that the sensible objects, which men believed to be

absolute realities, were only phenomenal and relative to us,--while

the atoms and vacua, the true existences or things in themselves,

could scarce ever be known as they were:[239] that truth was hidden in

an abyss, and out of our reach.

[Footnote 238: Demokritus Fragm. Mullach, p. 205, 206; ap. Sext.

Empir. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139, [Greek: gnô/mês du/o ei)si\n

i)de/ai; ê( me\n gnêsi/ê, ê( de\ skoti/ê], &c.]

[Footnote 239: Democr. Frag., Mull., p. 204-5. [Greek: A(/per

nomi/zetai me\n ei)=nai kai\ doxa/zetai ta\ ai)sthêta/, _ou)k e)/sti

de\ kata\ a)lê/theian tau=ta;_ a)lla\ ta\ a)/toma mo/non kai\ keno/n.

ê(me/es de\ tô=| me\n e)o/nti ou)de\n a)treke\s xuni/emen, meta/pipton

de\ kata/ te sô/matos diathigê/n, kai\ tô=n e)peisio/ntôn, kai\ tô=n

a)ntistêrizo/ntôn . . . . e)teê=| me/n nun, o(/ti oi(/on e(/kasto/n

e)stin ê)\ ou)/k e)stin, ou) xuni/emen, pollachê= dedê/lôtai], &c.

Compare Cicero, Acad. Quæst. i. 13, ii. 10; Diog. Laert. ix. 72;

Aristotel. Metaphys. iii. 5, p. 1009, b. 10.]

[Side-note: Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which

determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c.]

As Demokritus supposed both sensations and thoughts to be determined

by effluvia from without, so he assumed a similar cause to account for

beliefs, comfortable or uncomfortable dispositions, fancies, dreams,

presentiments, &c. He supposed that the air contained many effluences,

spectres, images, cast off from persons and substances in

nature--sometimes even from outlying very distant objects which lay

beyond the bounds of the Kosmos. Of these images, impregnated with the

properties, bodily and mental, of the objects from whence they came,

some were beneficent, others mischievous: they penetrated into the

human body through the pores and spread their influence all through

the system.[240] Those thrown off by jealous and vindictive men were

especially hurtful,[241] as they inflicted suffering corresponding to

the tempers of those with whom they originated. Trains of thought and

feeling were thus excited in men's minds; in sleep,[242] dreams,

divinations, prophetic warnings, and threats, were communicated:

sometimes, pestilence and other misfortunes were thus begun.

Demokritus believed that men's happiness depended much upon the nature

and character of the images which might approach them, expressing an

anxious wish that he might himself meet with such as were

propitious.[243] It was from grand and terrific images of this nature,

that he supposed the idea and belief of the Gods to have arisen: a

supposition countenanced by the numerous tales, respecting appearances

of the Gods both to dreaming and to waking men, current among the

poets and in the familiar talk of Greece.

[Footnote 240: Demokriti Frag. p. 207, Mullach; Sext. Empiric. adv.

Mathemat. ix. 19; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 10, p. 735 A.]

[Footnote 241: Plutarch, Symposiac. v. 7, p. 683 A.]

[Footnote 242: Aristotel. De Divinat. per Somnum, p. 464, a. 5;

Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733 E. [Greek: o(/ti kai\ ko/smôn

e)kto\s phthare/ntôn kai\ sôma/tôn a)llophu/lôn e)k tê=s a)por)r(oi/as

e)pir)r(eo/ntôn, e)ntau=tha polla/kis a)rchai\ parempi/ptousi loimô=n

kai\ pathô=n ou) sunê/thôn.]]

[Footnote 243: Plutarch, De Oraculor. Defectu, p. 419. [Greek: au)to\s

eu)/chetai eu)lo/gchôn ei)dôlôn tugcha/nein.]]

[Side-note: Universality of Demokritus--his ethical views.]

Among the lost treasures of Hellenic intellect, there are few which

are more to be regretted than the works of Demokritus. Little is known

of them except the titles: but these are instructive as well as

multifarious. The number of different subjects which they embrace is

astonishing. Besides his atomic theory, and its application to

cosmogony and physics, whereby he is chiefly known, and from whence

his title of _physicus_ was derived--we find mention of works on

geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, optics, geography or geology,

zoology, botany, medicine, music, and poetry, grammar, history,

ethics, &c.[244] In such universality he is the predecessor, perhaps

the model, of Aristotle. It is not likely that this wide range of

subjects should have been handled in a spirit of empty generality,

without facts or particulars: for we know that his life was long, his

curiosity insatiable, and his personal travel and observation greater

than that of any contemporary. We know too that he entered more or

less upon the field of dialectics, discussing those questions of

evidence which became so rife in the Platonic age. He criticised, and

is said to have combated, the doctrine laid down by Protagoras, "Man

is the measure of all things". It would have been interesting to know

from what point of view he approached it: but we learn only the fact

that he criticised it adversely.[245] The numerous treatises of

Demokritus, together with the proportion of them which relate to

ethical and social subjects, rank him with the philosophers of the

Platonic and Aristotelian age. His Summum Bonum, as far as we can make

out, appears to have been the maintenance of mental serenity and

contentment: in which view he recommended a life of tranquil

contemplation, apart from money-making, or ambition, or the exciting

pleasures of life.[246]

[Footnote 244: See the list of the works of Demokritus in Diogen.

Laert. ix. 46, and in Mullach's edition of the Fragments, p. 105-107.

Mullach mentions here (note 18) that Demokritus is cited seventy-eight

times in the extant works of Aristotle, and sometimes with honourable

mention. He is never mentioned by Plato. In the fragment of Philodemus

de Musica, Demokritus is called [Greek: a)nê\r ou) phusiologô/tatos

mo/non tô=n a)rchai/ôn, a)lla\ kai\ peri\ ta\ i(storou/mena ou)deno\s

ê)=tton polupra/gmôn] (Mullach, p. 237). Seneca calls him "Democritus,

subtilissimus antiquorum omnium".--Quæstion. Natural. vii. 2. And

Dionysius of Hal. (De Comp. Verb. p. 187, R.) characterises

Demokritus, Plato, and Aristotle (he arranges them in that order) as

first among all the philosophers, in respect of [Greek: su/nthesis

tô=n o)noma/tôn].]

[Footnote 245: Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1108.

Among the Demokritean treatises, was one entitled Pythagoras, which

contained probably a comment on the life and doctrines of that eminent

man, written in an admiring spirit. (Diog. Laert. ix. 38.)]

[Footnote 246: Seneca, De Tranquill. Animæ, cap. 2. "Hanc stabilem

animi sedem Græci [Greek: Eu)thumi/an] vocant, de quo Democriti

volumen egregium est." Compare Cicero De Finib. v. 29; Diogen. Laert.

ix. 45. For [Greek: eu)thumi/a] Demokritus used as synonyms [Greek:

eu)estô/, a)thambi/ê, a)taraxi/ê], &c. See Mullach, p. 416.]