PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS.
PLATO,
AND THE
OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
BY
GEORGE GROTE
_A NEW EDITION._
IN FOUR VOLUMES.
VOL. I.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1885.
_The right of Translation is reserved._
ADVERTISEMENT.
In the present Edition, with a view to the distribution into four
volumes, there is a slight transposition of the author's arrangement.
His concluding chapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled "Other Companions
of Sokrates," and "Xenophon," are placed in the First Volume, as
chapters III. and IV. By this means each volume is made up of nearly
related subjects, so as to possess a certain amount of unity.
Volume First contains the following subjects:--Speculative Philosophy
in Greece before Sokrates; Growth of Dialectic; Other Companions of
Sokrates; Xenophon; Life of Plato; Platonic Canon; Platonic
Compositions generally; Apology of Sokrates; Kriton; Euthyphron.
Volume Second comprises:--Alkibiades I. and II.; Hippias
Major--Hippias Minor; Hipparchus--Minos; Theages; Erastæ or
Anterastæ--Rivales; Ion; Laches; Charmides; Lysis; Euthydemus;
Menon; Protagoras; Gorgias; Phædon.
Volume Third:--Phædrus--Symposion; Parmenides; Theætetus; Sophistes;
Politikus; Kratylus; Philebus; Menexenus; Kleitophon.
Volume Fourth:--Republic; Timæus and Kritias; Leges and Epinomis;
General Index.
The Volumes may be obtained separately.
PREFACE.
The present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History
of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells
upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting,
&c., as contrasted with those collective political and social
manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modern
writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.
Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history
as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described
by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would
allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them--above
all, to Plato, with his extreme variety and abundance--except in a
book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only
the accessory.
The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian
philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though
only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such
preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in
Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics
of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except
their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial
indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics.
But none of these once celebrated philosophers, except Plato and
Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by
themselves. The Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius
which they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like
the Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical
literature, once immense and diversified.
Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and
commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be
considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and
undiminished, the catalogue of Plato's works as it was inherited from
antiquity and recognised by all critics before the commencement of the
present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested
the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained
in it,--I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the
vindication of the views on which I have proceeded.
The title of these volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to
describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic
philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the
death of Sokrates in 399 B.C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish
a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy: but I profess to take my
departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted
mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded
may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth
chapter of my History, I have done my best to throw light on the
impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates: a character original
and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I
scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly
and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions--the
"Sokratic dialogues": composed by many different authors, among whom
Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphæus, yet amidst other names
well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or
opponents.
It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various companions of Sokrates
from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to
exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation of Hellenic philosophy--as
contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent
in Aristotle.
But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large
intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was
more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing
the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the
foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of
philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which
I here briefly prepare the reader.
Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of
matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination
gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others:
the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident--or
conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant
reasons favourable and unfavourable. "Philosophia" (in the words of
Cicero), "ex rationum collatione consistit." This is not the form in
which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been
no conscious examination--there is no capacity of explaining to
others--there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed--nor
have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on
both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless
exist as established facts generated by traditional or other
authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men's
declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has
been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously
heard the pleadings.[1]
[Footnote 1: Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune
et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste
fin--interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérès sur le neuf
Thermidor. "_C'est un procès jugé et non plaidé_," répondait
Cambacérès, avec la finesse d'un jurisconsulte courtisan.--(Hippolyte
Carnot--Notice sur Barère, p. 109; Paris, 1842.)]
Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission
of the pleadings into conscious notice--next to discover, evolve, and
bring under hearing the matters omitted, as far as they suggest
themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he
ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof
where others believe without proof--of rejecting the received
doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind
unsound or insufficient--and of enforcing instead of them any others
which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he
tenders for acceptance must of necessity be _reasoned truth_;
supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against
preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly
belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such
novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated.
When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use
the phrase of an acute modern author[2]) it is by necessity polemical:
the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who
dissent from the unreasoning belief which reigns authoritative in the
social atmosphere around them, and who recognise no correction or
refutation except from the counter-reason of others. We see besides,
that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or
less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be
differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even
of the same age and country: and it is sure to be differently
performed, if they belong to ages and countries widely apart. It is
essentially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the
medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has
every thing to gain by such dissent; for it is only thereby that the
weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be
exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the
dissentients will better understand what he rejects as well as what he
adopts.
[Footnote 2: Professor Ferrier, in his instructive volume, 'The
Institutes of Metaphysic,' has some valuable remarks on the scope and
purpose of Philosophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment.
(Sections 1-8) "A system of philosophy is bound by two main
requisitions: it ought to be true--and it ought to be reasoned.
Philosophy, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. Of
these obligations, the latter is the more stringent. It is more proper
that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true:
because, while truth may perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is
certainly his province and within his power. . . . A system is of the
highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions--that is,
when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned
without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is
true without being reasoned. The latter kind of system is of no value:
because philosophy is the attainment of truth _by the way of reason_.
That is its definition. A system, therefore, which reaches the truth
but not by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all, and has
therefore no scientific worth. Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even
though true, carries no guarantee of its truth. It may be true, but it
cannot be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned
without being true, has always some value. It creates reason by
exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though
it may fail to reach it." (Sections 38-41)--"The student will find
that the system here submitted to his attention is of a very polemical
character. Why! Because philosophy exists only to correct the
inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to
fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think
aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not
require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of philosophy is
gone: her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes and must
assume that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to
do so: that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be
brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think
aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies
malice prepense) but inadvertently: the native occupant of his mind
must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice
prepense) but error. The original dowry then of universal man is
inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only
justification of the existence of philosophy. The circumstance that
philosophy exists only to put right the oversights of common
thinking--renders her polemical not by choice, but by necessity. She is
controversial as the very tenure and condition of her existence: for
how can she correct the slips of common opinion, the oversights of
natural thinking, except by controverting them?" Professor Ferrier
deserves high commendation for the care taken in this volume to set
out clearly Proposition and Counter-Proposition: the thesis which he
impugns, as well as that which he sustains.]
The number of individual intellects, independent, inquisitive, and
acute, is always rare everywhere; but was comparatively less rare in
these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke
loose from the common consciousness of the world around them, and
struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the
Kosmos or the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen
divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena
of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander,
Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras. Each of these volunteers,
following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new
hypothesis, and endeavoured to commend it to others with more or less
of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or
refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to disprove the
received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence.
Each of them unfolded his own hypothesis, or his own version of
affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it
might find favour.
The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with
Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were
altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated
the Ciceronian dictum--that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the
heavens to the earth: from the distant, abstruse, and complicated
phenomena of the Kosmos--in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar
point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to
rationalise it--to the familiar business of man, and the common
generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed
about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change
of topics he introduced a complete revolution in method. He placed the
negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an
emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His
peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his
Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real knowledge. He found men
full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political
topics--affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves
to define--and persuaded that they required no farther teaching: yet at
the same time unable to give clear or consistent answers to his
questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real
knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident
unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook, as the mission of
his life, to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was
disabused thereof and made painfully conscious of ignorance, no
affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of
success.
Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified
in the compositions here reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always
talked so; but that such was the marked peculiarity which
distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or
reasoned truth, approached in the most polemical manner; operative at
first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths
of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of
ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout
these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of
the Platonic dialogues; one half of which must appear unmeaning,
unless construed with reference to this separate function and value of
negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such
estimation of negative dialectic, is another question: but they must
keep it in mind as the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his
life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover
one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many
respectable orthodox contemporaries. I have thought it right to take
constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public,
as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely
repressive, upon free speculation.
Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous
negative dialogues in Plato as being really negative and nothing
beyond. I have not presumed, still less tried to divine, an ulterior
Affirmative beyond what the text reveals--neither _arcana coelestia_,
like Proklus and Ficinus,[3] nor any other _arcanum_ of terrestrial
character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space
permitted and as will enable the reader to comprehend its general
scope and peculiarities--I have studied each as it stands written, and
have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself
intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any
solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his
closet, but that he had failed in finding one: that he thought it
useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and
authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved
difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the
attention of others.[4]
[Footnote 3: F. A. Wolf, Vorrede, Plato, Sympos. p. vi.
"Ficinus suchte, wie er sich in der Zueignungsschrift seiner Vision
ausdrückt, im Platon allenthalben _arcana coelestia_: und da er sie
in seinem Kopfe mitbrachte, so konnte es ihm nicht sauer werden,
etwas zu finden, was freilich jedem andern verborgen bleiben muss."]
[Footnote 4: A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well
both the Sokratic and the Platonic point of view. (Principles of
Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.)
"Gross ignorance descries no difficulties. Imperfect knowledge finds
them out and struggles with them. It must be perfect knowledge that
overcomes them."
Of the three different mental conditions here described, the first is
that against which Sokrates made war, _i.e._ real ignorance, and false
persuasion of knowledge, which therefore descries no difficulties.
The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is
represented by the Platonic negative dialogues.
The third--or perfect knowledge victorious over difficulties--will be
found in the following pages marked by the character [Greek: to\
du/nasthai lo/gon dido/nai kai\ de/chesthai]. You do not possess "perfect
knowledge," until you are able to answer, with unfaltering promptitude
and consistency, all the questions of a Sokratic cross-examiner--and
to administer effectively the like cross-examination yourself, for the
purpose of testing others. [Greek: O(\lôs de\ sêmei=on tou= ei)do/tos
to\ du/nasthai dida/skein e)/stin.] (Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 981, b.
8.)
Perfect knowledge, corresponding to this definition, will not be found
manifested in Plato. Instead of it, we note in his latter years the
lawgiver's assumed infallibility.]
Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate composition. Each
represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment,
which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Plato would have
protested not less earnestly than Cicero,[5] against those who sought
to foreclose debate, in the grave and arduous struggles for searching
out reasoned truth--and to bind down the free inspirations of his
intellect in one dialogue, by appealing to sentence already pronounced
in another preceding. Of two inconsistent trains of reasoning, both
cannot indeed be true--but both are often useful to be known and
studied: and the philosopher, who professes to master the theory of
his subject, ought not to be a stranger to either. All minds athirst
for reasoned truth will be greatly aided in forming their opinions by
the number of points which Plato suggests, though they find little
which he himself settles for them finally.
[Footnote 5: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 11, 38.
The collocutor remarks that what Cicero says is inconsistent with
what he (Cicero) had written in the fourth book De Finibus.
To which Cicero replies:--
"Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum, et testificaris, quid
dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus
impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus: quodcunque nostros animos
probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi."]
There have been various critics, who, on perceiving inconsistencies in
Plato, either force them into harmony by a subtle exegêsis, or discard
one of them as spurious.[6] I have not followed either course. I
recognise such inconsistencies, when found, as facts--and even as very
interesting facts--in his philosophical character. To the marked
contradiction in the spirit of the Leges, as compared with the earlier
Platonic compositions, I have called special attention. Plato has been
called by Plutarch a mixture of Sokrates with Lykurgus. The two
elements are in reality opposite, predominant at different times:
Plato begins his career with the confessed ignorance and philosophical
negative of Sokrates: he closes it with the peremptory, dictatorial,
affirmative of Lykurgus.
[Footnote 6: Since the publication of the first edition of this work,
there have appeared valuable commentaries on the philosophy of the
late Sir William Hamilton, by Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. Stirling
and others. They have exposed inconsistencies, both grave and
numerous, in some parts of Sir William Hamilton's writings as compared
with others. But no one has dreamt of drawing an inference from this
fact, that one or other of the inconsistent trains of reasoning must
be spurious, falsely ascribed to Sir William Hamilton.
Now in the case of Plato, this same fact of inconsistency is accepted
by nearly all his commentators as a sound basis for the inference that
both the inconsistent treatises cannot be genuine: though the dramatic
character of Plato's writings makes inconsistencies much more easily
supposable than in dogmatic treatises such as those of Hamilton.]
To Xenophon, who belongs only in part to my present work, and whose
character presents an interesting contrast with Plato, I have devoted
a separate chapter. To the other less celebrated Sokratic Companions
also, I have endeavoured to do justice, as far as the scanty means of
knowledge permit: to them, especially, because they have generally
been misconceived and unduly depreciated.
The present volumes, however, contain only one half of the speculative
activity of Hellas during the fourth century B.C. The second half, in
which Aristotle is the hero, remains still wanting. If my health and
energies continue, I hope one day to be able to supply this want: and
thus to complete from my own point of view, the history, speculative
as well as active, of the Hellenic race, down to the date which I
prescribed to myself in the Preface of my History near twenty years
ago.
The philosophy of the fourth century B.C. is peculiarly valuable and
interesting, not merely from its intrinsic speculative worth--from the
originality and grandeur of its two principal heroes--from its
coincidence with the full display of dramatic, rhetorical, artistic
genius--but also from a fourth reason not unimportant--because it is
purely Hellenic; preceding the development of Alexandria, and the
amalgamation of Oriental veins of thought with the inspirations of the
Academy or the Lyceum. The Orontes[7] and the Jordan had not yet begun
to flow westward, and to impart their own colour to the waters of
Attica and Latium. Not merely the real world, but also the ideal
world, present to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, were purely
Hellenic. Even during the century immediately following, this had
ceased to be fully true in respect to the philosophers of Athens: and
it became less and less true with each succeeding century. New foreign
centres of rhetoric and literature--Asiatic and Alexandrian
Hellenism--were fostered into importance by regal encouragement. Plato
and Aristotle are thus the special representatives of genuine Hellenic
philosophy. The remarkable intellectual ascendancy acquired by them in
their own day, and maintained over succeeding centuries, was one main
reason why the Hellenic vein was enabled so long to maintain itself,
though in impoverished condition, against adverse influences from the
East, ever increasing in force. Plato and Aristotle outlasted all
their Pagan successors--successors at once less purely Hellenic and
less highly gifted. And when Saint Jerome, near 750 years after the
decease of Plato, commemorated with triumph the victory of unlettered
Christians over the accomplishments and genius of Paganism--he
illustrated the magnitude of the victory, by singling out Plato and
Aristotle as the representatives of vanquished philosophy.[8]
[Footnote 7: Juvenal iii. 62:--
"Jampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes," &c.]
[Footnote 8: The passage is a remarkable one, as marking both the
effect produced on a Latin scholar by Hebrew studies, and the neglect
into which even the greatest writers of classical antiquity had then
fallen (about 400 A.D.).
Hieronymus--Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas, iii. 5, p. 486-487, ed.
Venet. 1769:--
"Sed omnem sermonis elegantiam, et Latini sermonis venustatem, stridor
lectionis Hebraicæ sordidavit. Nostis enim et ipsæ" (_i.e._ Paula and
Eustochium, to whom his letter is addressed) "quod plus quam quindecim
anni sunt, ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius, nunquam Maro, nunquam
Gentilium literarum quilibet Auctor ascendit: et si quid forte inde,
dum loquimur, obrepit, quasi antiqua per nebulam somnii recordamur.
Quod autem profecerim ex linguæ illius infatigabili studio, aliorum
judicio derelinquo: _ego quid in meâ amiserim, scio_ . . . Si quis
eloquentiam quærit vel declamationibus delectatur, habet in utrâque
linguâ Demosthenem et Tullium, Polemonem et Quintilianum. Ecclesia
Christi non de Academiâ et Lyceo, sed de vili plebeculâ congregata
est. . . . Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? Quanti Platonis vel
libros novêre vel nomen? Vix in angulis otiosi eos senes recolunt.
Rusticanos vero et piscatores nostros totus orbis loquitur, universus
mundus sonat."]
CONTENTS.
PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER I.
Speculative Philosophy in Greece, before and in the time of Sokrates.
Change in the political condition of Greece during the life of Plato 1
Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in polytheistic personal
agents, as the real producing causes of phenomena 2
Belief in such agency continued among the general public, even after
the various sects of philosophy had arisen 3
Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of physical
agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance, or
[Greek: a)rchê/] 4
Anaximander--laid down as [Greek: a)rchê/] the Infinite or
Indeterminate--generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of
latent, fundamental contraries--astronomical and geological doctrines
_ib._
Anaximenes--adopted Air as [Greek: a)rchê/]--rise of substances out of
it, by condensation and rarefaction 7
Pythagoras--his life and career--Pythagorean brotherhood--great
political influence which it acquired among the Greco-Italian
cities--incurred great enmity, and was violently put down 8
The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without political power 9
Doctrine of the Pythagoreans--Number the Essence of Things _ib._
The Monas--[Greek: a)rchê/], or principle of Number--geometrical
conception of number--symbolical attributes of the first ten numbers,
especially of the Dekad 11
Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy--geometrical and harmonic laws
guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies 12
Music of the Spheres 14
Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries--Ten opposing pairs _ib._
Eleatic philosophy--Xenophanes 16
His censures upon the received Theogony and religious rites _ib._
His doctrine of Pankosmism; or Pantheism--the whole Kosmos is Ens Unum
or God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pan]. Non-Ens inadmissible 17
Scepticism of Xenophanes--complaint of philosophy as unsatisfactory 18
His conjectures on physics and astronomy _ib._
Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes--Ens Parmenideum,
self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended--Non-Ens, an unmeaning
phrase 19
He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and relative, apart from
Ens 20
Parmenidean ontology--stands completely apart from phenomenology 21
Parmenidean phenomenology--relative and variable 23
Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less of probability, in
phenomenal explanations.--His physical and astronomical conjectures 24
Herakleitus--his obscure style, impressive metaphors, confident and
contemptuous dogmatism 26
Doctrine of Herakleitus--perpetual process of generation and
destruction--everything flows, nothing stands--transition of the
elements into each other backwards and forwards 27
Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying the same
general doctrine 28
Nothing permanent except the law of process and implication of
contraries--the transmutative force. Fixity of particulars is an
illusion for the most part: so far as it exists, it is a sin against
the order of Nature 29
Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his perpetual force,
destroying and generating 30
Water--Intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth 31
Sun and Stars--not solid bodies, but meteoric aggregations dissipated
and renewed--Eclipses--[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], or destruction of the
Kosmos by fire 32
His doctrines respecting the human soul and human knowledge. All
wisdom resided in the Universal Reason--individual Reason is
worthless 34
By Universal Reason, he did not mean the Reason of most men as it is,
but as it ought to be 35
Herakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides 37
Empedokles--his doctrine of the four elements and two moving or
restraining forces _ib._
Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and forces--action and
counteraction of love and enmity. The Kosmos alternately made and
unmade 38
Empedoklean predestined cycle of things--complete empire of Love
Sphærus--Empire of Enmity--disengagement or separation of the
elements--astronomy and meteorology 39
Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and plants 41
Physiology of Empedokles--Procreation--Respiration--movement of the
blood 43
Doctrine of effluvia and pores--explanation of
perceptions--intercommunication of the elements with the sentient
subject--like acting upon like 44
Sense of vision 45
Senses of hearing, smell, taste 46
Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of
anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. Sufferings
of life, are an expiation for wrong done during an antecedent life.
Pretensions to magical power 46
Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding out truth 47
Theory of Anaxagoras denied--generation and destruction--recognised
only mixture and severance of pre-existing kinds of matter 48
Homoeomeries--small particles of diverse kinds of matter, all mixed
together _ib._
First condition of things all--the primordial varieties of matter were
huddled together in confusion. [Greek: Nou=s] or reason, distinct from
all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, setting the
constituent particles in movement 49
Movement of rotation in the mass, originated by [Greek: Nou=s] on a
small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate
together--distinguishable aggregates are formed 50
Nothing (except [Greek: Nou=s]) can be entirely pure or unmixed; but
other things may be comparatively pure. Flesh, Bone, &c., are purer
than Air or Earth 51
Theory of Anaxagoras, compared with that of Empedokles 52
Suggested partly by the phenomena of of animal nutrition 53
Chaos common to both Empedokles and Anaxagoras: moving agency,
different in one from the other theory 54
[Greek: Nou=s], or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras--how understood by
later writers--how intended by Anaxagoras himself _ib._
Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own theory 56
Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras 57
His geology, meteorology, physiology 58
The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious 59
Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element 60
Air was the primordial, universal element 61
Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was eminently
modifiable _ib._
Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in the human
body 62
Kosmology and Meteorology 64
Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory 65
Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions, of Demokritus
_ib._
Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides 66
Demokritean theory--Atoms Plena and Vacua--Ens and Non-Ens 67
Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and
arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements and
combinations generated qualities 69
Combination of atoms--generating different qualities in the compound 70
All atoms essentially separate from each other 71
All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal
and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the
real and absolute _ib._
Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was
attainable 72
No separate force required to set the atoms in motion--they moved by
an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards
like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos 72
Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation 75
His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire, diffused
throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles
intermingled throughout all frame with corporeal particles _ib._
Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body 76
Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. Colours 77
Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from objects.
Hearing 78
Difference of tastes--how explained _ib._
Thought or intelligence--was produced by influx of atoms from without 79
Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient: Thought,
genuine knowledge--absolute, or object _per se_ 80
Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the
tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c. 81
Universality of Demokritus--his ethical views 82
CHAPTER II.
General Remarks on the Earlier Philosophers--Growth of Dialectic--Zeno
and Gorgias.
Variety of sects and theories--multiplicity of individual authorities
is the characteristic of Greek philosophy 84
These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which
have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them 85
Abundance of speculative genius and invention--a memorable fact in the
Hellenic mind 86
Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to overcome--prevalent
view of Nature, established, impressive, and misleading _ib._
Views of the Ionic philosophers--compared with the more recent
abstractions of Plato and Aristotle 87
Parmenides and Pythagoras--more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle 89
Advantage derived from this variety of constructive imagination among
the Greeks 90
All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato,
and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative
Dialectic 91
The early theorists were studied, along with Plato and Aristotle, in
the third and second centuries B.C. 92
Negative attribute common to all the early theorists--little or no
dialectic 93
Zeno of Elea--Melissus _ib._
Zeno's Dialectic--he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing
that their assumptions led to contradictions and absurdities 93
Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura Discontinua.
Reductiones ad absurdum 94
Each thing must exist in its own place--Grain of millet not sonorous 95
Zenonian arguments in regard to motion 97
General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is
knowable except the relative 98
Mistake of supposing Zeno's _reductiones ad absurdum_ of an opponent's
doctrine, to be contradictions of data generalized from experience 99
Zenonian Dialectic--Platonic Parmenides 100
Views of historians of philosophy, respecting Zeno 101
Absolute and relative--the first, unknowable _ib._
Zeno did not deny motion, as a fact, phenomenal and relative 102
Gorgias the Leontine--did not admit the Absolute, even as conceived by
Parmenides 103
His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or Entia _ib._
Ens, incogitable and unknowable 104
Ens, even if granted to be knowable, is still incommunicable to others
_ib._
Zeno and Gorgias--contrasted with the earlier Grecian philosophers 105
New character of Grecian philosophy--antithesis of affirmative and
negative--proof and disproof _ib._
CHAPTER III.
Other Companions of Sokrates.
Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions 110
Names of those companions 111
Æschines--Oration of Lysias against him 112
Written Sokratic Dialogues--their general character 114
Relations between the companions of Sokrates--Their proceedings after
the death of Sokrates 116
No Sokratic school--each of the companions took a line of his own 117
Eukleides of Megara--he blended Parmenides with Sokrates 118
Doctrine of Eukleides about _Bonum_ 119
The doctrine compared to that of Plato--changes in Plato _ib._
Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as Eukleides 120
Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eretrian succession 121
Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus--Ethical, not transcendental 122
Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age 123
Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative
vein _ib._
Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of the
affirmative _ib._
Sokrates--the most persevering and acute Eristic of his age 124
Platonic Parmenides--its extreme negative character 125
The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and Plato 126
Eubulides--his logical problems or puzzles--difficulty of solving
them--many solutions attempted 128
Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to deceive, but
to guard against deception 129
If the process of theorising be admissible, it must include negative
as well as affirmative 130
Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously described by
historians of philosophy. Necessity of a complete collection of
difficulties 131
Sophisms propounded by Eubulides. 1. Mentiens. 2. The Veiled Man. 3.
Sorites. 4. Cornutus 133
Causes of error constant--The Megarics were sentinels against them 135
Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. Arguments of
Aristotle _ib._
These arguments not valid against the Megarici 136
His argument cited and criticised 137
Potential as distinguished from the Actual--What it is 139
Diodôrus Kronus--his doctrine about [Greek: to\ dunato/n] 140
Sophism of Diodôrus [Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn] 141
Question between Aristotle and Diodôrus, depends upon whether
universal regularity of sequence be admitted or denied _ib._
Conclusion of Diodôrus defended by Hobbes--Explanation given by
Hobbes 143
Reasonings of Diodôrus--respecting Hypothetical
Propositions--respecting Motion. His difficulties about the _Now_
of time 145
Motion is always present, past, and future 146
Stilpon of Megara--His great celebrity 147
Menedêmus and the Eretriacs 148
Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus 149
Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative Logic
intermingled _ib._
He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and rigour 150
Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. He despised
music, literature, and physics 151
Constant friendship of Antisthenes with Sokrates--Xenophontic
Symposion 152
Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes--His Cynical perfection--striking
effect which he produced _ib._
Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes--Contempt of
pleasure--training and labour required--indifference to literature
and geometry 154
Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency
in acting out his own ethical creed 157
Admiration excited by the asceticism of the Cynics--Asceticism extreme
in the East. Comparison of the Indian Gymnosophists with Diogenes
_ib._
The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were carried into
fullest execution by the Cynics 160
Antithesis between Nature and Law or Convention insisted on by the
Indian Gymnosophists 162
The Greek Cynics--an order of ascetic or mendicant friars 163
Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes--they opposed the Platonic
Ideas _ib._
First protest of Nominalism against Realism 164
Doctrine of Antisthenes about predication--He admits no other
predication but identical 165
The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle 166
Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication 167
Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to
more than one subject 169
Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenides _ib._
Menedêmus disallowed all negative predications 170
Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex
objects. Simple objects undefinable 171
Remarks of Plato on this doctrine 172
Remarks of Aristotle upon the same _ib._
Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia 173
Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus 174
Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine 175
Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus _ib._
Choice of Hêraklês 177
Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting Good and
Evil _ib._
Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates 178
Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kalliklês in Platonic
Gorgias 179
Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life 181
Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the character of
the hearer 182
Conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus about the Good and
Beautiful 184
Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good 185
Good is relative to human beings and wants in the view of Sokrates
_ib._
Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates 186
Life and dicta of Aristippus--His type of character _ib._
Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates 187
Self mastery and independence--the great aspiration of Aristippus 188
Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes--Points of agreement
and disagreement between them 190
Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and philosophy--contempt for other
studies 192
Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus acquired procured
for him the attentions of Dionysius and others 193
Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic philosophers 195
Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the
pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or
custom--not by nature 197
Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the phenomenal, our own
sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the absolute 197
Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the Stoics and
Epikureans 198
Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the Platonic
Sokrates in the Protagoras 199
Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the two 200
Distinction to be made between a general theory--and the particular
application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes and
circumstances 201
Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus 202
Theodôrus--Annikeris--Hegesias _ib._
Hegesias--Low estimation of life--renunciation of
pleasure--coincidence with the Cynics 203
Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well as by
Protagoras 204
CHAPTER IV.
Xenophon.
Xenophon--his character--essentially a man of action and not a
theorist--the Sokratic element is in him an accessory 206
Date of Xenophon--probable year of his birth 207
His personal history--He consults Sokrates--takes the opinion of the
Delphian oracle 208
His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks, afterwards under
Agesilaus and the Spartans.--He is banished from Athens 209
His residence at Skillus near Olympia 210
Family of Xenophon--his son Gryllus killed at Mantineia _ib._
Death of Xenophon at Corinth--Story of the Eleian Exegetæ 211
Xenophon different from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren 212
His various works--Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, &c. 213
Ischomachus, hero of the Oekonomikus--ideal of an active citizen,
cultivator, husband, house-master, &c. 214
Text upon which Xenophon insists--capital difference between command
over subordinates willing and subordinates unwilling 215
Probable circumstances generating these reflections in Xenophon's
mind 215
This text affords subjects for the Hieron and Cyropædia--Name of
Sokrates not suitable 216
Hieron--Persons of the dialogue--Simonides and Hieron _ib._
Questions put to Hieron, view taken by Simonides. Answer of Hieron 217
Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by Hieron 218
Advice to Hieron by Simonides--that he should govern well, and thus
make himself beloved by his subjects 219
Probable experience had by Xenophon of the feelings at Olympia against
Dionysius 220
Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to illustrate his
theory of the happiness of governing willing subjects 222
Cyropædia--blending of Spartan and Persian customs--Xenophon's
experience of Cyrus the Younger _ib._
Portrait of Cyrus the Great--his education--Preface to the Cyropædia 223
Xenophon does not solve his own problem--The governing aptitude and
popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from education 225
Views of Xenophon about public and official training of all citizens 226
Details of (so called) Persian education--Severe
discipline--Distribution of four ages 227
Evidence of the good effect of this discipline--Hard and dry condition
of the body 228
Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline--He had learnt
justice well--His award about the two coats--Lesson inculcated upon
him by the Justice-Master 229
Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems--He does not recognise
the Sokratic order of solution of those problems 230
Definition given by Sokrates of Justice--Insufficient to satisfy the
exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus 231
Biography of Cyrus--constant military success earned by suitable
qualities--Variety of characters and situations 232
Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus. Abradates and Pantheia 233
Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests are
completed--Oriental despotism, wisely arranged 234
Persian present reality--is described by Xenophon as thoroughly
depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of Cyrus 236
Xenophon has good experience of military and equestrian
proceedings--No experience of finance and commerce 236
Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the condition of Athens.
His admiration of active commerce and variety of pursuits _ib._
Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for improvement 238
Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be encouraged
_ib._
Proposal to raise by voluntary contributions a large sum to be
employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per head
per day to all the citizens _ib._
Purpose and principle of this distribution 240
Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and commercial 241
Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace 243
Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and Plato, from
their point of view in the earlier 244
CHAPTER V.
Life of Plato.
Scanty information about Plato's life 246
His birth, parentage, and early education 247
Early relations of Plato with Sokrates 248
Plato's youth--service as a citizen and soldier 249
Period of political ambition 251
He becomes disgusted with politics 252
He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates--his travels 253
His permanent establishment at Athens--386 B.C. _ib._
He commences his teaching at the Academy 254
Plato as a teacher--pupils numerous and wealthy, from different
cities 255
Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 B.C. Second
visit to the same--mortifying failure 258
Expedition of Dion against Dionysius--sympathies of Plato and the
Academy 259
Success, misconduct, and death of Dion _ib._
Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C. 260
Scholars of Plato--Aristotle _ib._
Little known about Plato's personal history 262
CHAPTER VI.
Platonic Canon, as Recognised by Thrasyllus.
Platonic Canon--Ancient and modern discussions 264
Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour 265
Fixed residence and school at Athens--founded by Plato and transmitted
to successors _ib._
Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato's manuscripts.
School library 266
Security provided by the school for distinguishing what were Plato's
genuine writings 267
Unfinished fragments and preparatory sketches, preserved and published
after Plato's death 268
Peripatetic school at the Lykeum--its composition and arrangement 269
Peripatetic school library, its removal from Athens to Skêpsis--its
ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then to Rome 270
Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of its library
_ib._
Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its MSS. 272
Conditions favourable, for preserving the genuine works of Plato
_ib._
Historical facts as to their preservation _ib._
Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes 273
Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library _ib._
Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time of
Aristophanes 274
Kallimachus--predecessor of Aristophanes--his published Tables of
authors whose works were in the library 275
Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library _ib._
Plato's works--in the library at the time of Kallimachus 276
First formation of the library--intended as a copy of the Platonic and
Aristotelian [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens 277
Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at Athens 279
Demetrius Phalereus--his history and character _ib._
He was chief agent in the first establishment of the Alexandrine
Library 280
Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the library 282
Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among the
earliest acquisitions made by him for the library 283
Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS. 285
Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is trustworthy
_ib._
No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, when
arranged by Aristophanes 286
Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, in which
spurious Platonic works might get footing _ib._
Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrangements
of the Platonic dialogues 287
Panætius, the Stoic--considered the Phædon to be spurious--earliest
known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon internal
grounds 288
Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor
Thrasyllus--dramatic--philosophical 289
Dramatic principle--Tetralogies _ib._
Philosophical principle--Dialogues of Search--Dialogues of
Exposition 291
Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications 294
Dramatic principle of classification--was inherited by Thrasyllus from
Aristophanes 295
Authority of the Alexandrine library--editions of Plato published,
with the Alexandrine critical marks _ib._
Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and Aristophanes, as to
genuine Platonic works 296
Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as well as by
Thrasyllus--evidence that these critics followed the common authority
of the Alexandrine library 297
Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own in
rejecting dialogues as spurious 298
Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllean Canon 299
CHAPTER VII.
Platonic Canon, as Appreciated and Modified by Modern Critics.
The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged, by the
Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the succeeding critics after
the revival of learning 301
Serranus--his six Syzygies--left the aggregate Canon unchanged,
Tennemann--importance assigned to the Phædrus 302
Schleiermacher--new theory about the purposes of Plato. One
philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the beginning--essential
order and interdependence of the dialogues, as contributing to the
full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not constituent items in
the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of arrangement 303
Theory of Ast--he denies the reality of any preconceived
scheme--considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas 304
His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen dialogues as
genuine, rejecting all the rest 305
Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme--his arrangement
of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and Schleiermacher--he
rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias, with
many others 306
Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and Protagoras as early
compositions--Socher puts Protagoras into the second period, Phædrus
into the third 307
K. F. Hermann--Stallbaum--both of them consider the Phædrus as a late
dialogue--both of them deny preconceived order and system--their
arrangements of the dialogues--they admit new and varying
philosophical points of view _ib._
They reject several dialogues 309
Steinhart--agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's fundamental
postulate--his arrangement of the dialogues--considers the Phædrus
as late in order--rejects several _ib._
Susemihl--coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann--his order of
arrangement 310
Edward Munk--adopts a different principle of arrangement, founded upon
the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the life,
philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates--his arrangement,
founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of
composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic
plan 311
Views of Ueberweg--attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and
Hermann--admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues,
composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the
earlier 313
His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues, He
rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Parmenidês: he is
inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus 314
Other Platonic critics--great dissensions about scheme and order of
the dialogues 316
Contrast of different points of view instructive--but no solution has
been obtained _ib._
The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory
propounded by Schleiermacher--slenderness of his proofs 317
Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a
peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues 318
Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus inadmissible 319
Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any
tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues
_ib._
Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to
Schleiermacher's 320
The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a circumstance of
little moment _ib._
No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be
made out 322
Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable--successive
changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot explain either the
order or the causes of these changes _ib._
Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's 323
Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to
date or order of the dialogues 324
Trilogies indicated by Plato himself 325
Positive dates of all the dialogues--unknown 326
When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death of Sokrates
_ib._
Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition--does not consist
with youth of the author 327
Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with
Plato 328
Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and position of Plato 330
Plato's early life--active by necessity, and to some extent
ambitious 331
Plato did not retire from political life until after the restoration
of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until after the
death of Sokrates 333
All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one years after
the death of Sokrates 334
The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the modern critical
theories by which it has been condemned 335
Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed 336
Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this 337
Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, and must be
based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion
of the rest 339
CHAPTER VIII.
Platonic Compositions Generally.
Variety and abundance visible in Plato's writings 342
Plato both sceptical and dogmatical _ib._
Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all 343
Form of dialogue--universal to this extent, that Plato never speaks in
his own name 344
No one common characteristic pervading all Plato's works _ib._
The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but also lecturer
and president of a school. In this last important function he is
scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures taken by
Aristotle 346
Plato's lectures De Bono obscure and transcendental. Effect which they
produced on the auditors 347
They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They coincide mainly
with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas 348
The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than
Plato's other lectures 349
Plato's Epistles--in them only he speaks in his own person _ib._
Intentional obscurity of his Epistles in reference to philosophical
doctrine 350
Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His anxiety to
confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared minds 351
He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own
philosophical doctrine 352
He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of geometrical
teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at each of
these stages 353
No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of error 355
Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of the deceased
Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound Plato's
doctrines _ib._
Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by Plato; the
assumption intelligible in his day 357
Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository
process.--Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination 358
Plato never published any of the lectures which he delivered at the
Academy _ib._
Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in his own name;
but he may have published them in the dialogues under the name of
others 360
Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown 361
Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still useful--Dialogues
of Search, Dialogues of Exposition _ib._
Dialogues of Exposition--present affirmative result. Dialogues of
Search are wanting in that attribute 362
The distribution coincides mainly with that of Aristotle--Dialectic,
Demonstrative 363
Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. He applies his own
principles erroneously 364
The classification, as it would stand, if his principles were applied
correctly 365
Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the
expository and dogmatical 366
Dialogues of Search--sub-classes among them recognised by
Thrasyllus--Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c. _ib._
Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching,
positive results, direct proofs _ib._
The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and
teaching--assume truth to be unknown to all alike--follow a process
devious as well as fruitless 367
The questioner has no predetermined course, but follows the lead given
by the respondent in his answers _ib._
Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is suppressed 368
In the modern world the search for truth is put out of sight. Every
writer or talker professes to have already found it, and to proclaim
it to others 369
The search for truth by various interlocutors was a recognised process
in the Sokratic age. Acute negative Dialectic of Sokrates 370
Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the Sophists and the
Megarici; discouraged and censured by historians of philosophy 371
Vocation of Sokrates and Plato for the negative procedure: absolute
necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth. Parmenidês of
Plato 372
Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable by itself,
and separately. His theory of the natural state of the human mind; not
ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge 373
Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant mission to make
war against the false persuasion of knowledge 374
Opposition of feeling between Sokrates and the Dikasts 375
The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. Mistake of
supposing that Plato had in his mind an ulterior affirmative end, not
declared _ib._
False persuasion of knowledge--had reference to topics social,
political, ethical 376
To those topics, on which each community possesses established dogmas,
laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and traditional, peculiar to
itself. The local creed, which is never formally proclaimed or taught,
but is enforced unconsciously by every one upon every one else.
Omnipotence of King Nomos 377
Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not yield to
the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own
judgment 382
Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or free-thinkers
in Greece 384
Rise of Dialectic--Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery 386
Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by
Sokrates _ib._
Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of satisfaction for his
own individual reason 386
Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates.
Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs peculiarly
to the Sophists and the Megarici 387
The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring against the
Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They
represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox
public 388
Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme publicity of
speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is
universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato's
Dialogues of Search 393
Result called _Knowledge_, which Plato aspires to. Power of going
through a Sokratic cross-examination; not attainable except through
the Platonic process and method 396
Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics--man and society 397
Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has
raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him completely
distinct. His dogmas are enunciations _à priori_ of some impressive
sentiment 399
Hypothesis--that Plato had solved all his own difficulties for
himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few select
auditors in oral lectures--Untenable 401
Characteristic of the oral lectures--that they were delivered in
Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed from the
dialogues, we cannot say 402
Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search
and debate _per se_. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a
tiresome obligation 403
Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of enquiry
interesting to others, as it was to himself 405
Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated
throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search--general terms and
propositions made subjects of conscious analysis 406
The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by the same
author, illustrating each other, but without assignable
inter-dependence 407
Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate
review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis last
_ib._
Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate
dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order 408
CHAPTER IX.
Apology of Sokrates.
The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the
Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional transformation 410
Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally first in the
review of his dialogues 411
General character of the Apology--Sentiments entertained towards
Sokrates at Athens 412
Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of
Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the
citizens generally--The oracle is proved to be true 413
False persuasion of wisdom is universal--the God alone is wise 414
Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining mission imposed
upon him by the God _ib._
He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, and he
intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger 416
He disclaims the function of a teacher--he cannot teach, for he is not
wiser than others. He differs from others by being conscious of his
own ignorance _ib._
He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He is
perpetually seeking for them, but in vain 417
Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the Stoic 418
Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for
himself--exemplified by Plato throughout the Dialogues of
Search--Xenophon and Plato enlarge it _ib._
Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive teacher,
employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of his
own 419
Incorrectness of such assumption--the Sokratic Elenchus does not
furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the respondent,
stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own 420
Value and importance of this process--stimulating active individual
minds to theorise each for itself 421
View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to know what it
is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know 422
Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether agreeing or
disagreeing with others 423
Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, generated without
any ostensible author 424
CHAPTER X.
Kriton.
General purpose of the Kriton 425
Subject of the dialogue--interlocutors _ib._
Answer of Sokrates to the appeal made by Kriton 426
He declares that the judgment of the general public is not worthy of
trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is wise on
the matter in debate _ib._
Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with
Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? Never in any
case to act unjustly 427
Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that most persons
hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point is cardinal
_ib._
Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to Sokrates,
demanding from him implicit obedience 428
Purpose of Plato in this pleading--to present the dispositions of
Sokrates in a light different from that which the Apology had
presented--unqualified submission instead of defiance _ib._
Harangue of Sokrates delivered in the name of the Laws, would have
been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens 430
The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with other
citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character 431
Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution to obey, from
his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, but which would
not weigh with others _ib._
The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but
represents feelings common among Athenian citizens 432
Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason and
conscience, for the individual himself _ib._
The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference between Rhetoric
and Dialectic 433
The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but overlooks the
ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be solved _ib._
Incompetence of the general public or [Greek: i)diô=tai]--appeal to
the professional Expert 435
Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been declared--he does
not name who the trustworthy Expert is _ib._
Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in his own
reason and conscience 436
CHAPTER XI
Euthyphron.
Situation supposed in the dialogue--interlocutors 437
Indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates--Antipathy of the Athenians
towards those who spread heretical opinions 437
Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment for murder
against his own father--Displeasure of his friends at the proceeding
438
Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his is both
required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him--What
is Holiness? 439
Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son Kronus and
of Kronus by his son Zeus 440
Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these stories of
discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief in them,
as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much circulation
_ib._
Bearing of this dialogue on the relative position of Sokrates and the
Athenian public 441
Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates and the
freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox
champion 442
Sequel of the dialogue--Euthyphron gives a particular example as the
reply to a general question 444
Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion _ib._
First general answer given by Euthyphron--that which is pleasing to
the Gods is holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon 445
To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy--they love it
because it is holy. In what then does its essence consist? Perplexity
of Euthyphron 446
Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or variety of
the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the
Gods 447
Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose? _ib._
Holiness--rectitude in sacrifice and prayer--right traffic between men
and the Gods 448
This will not stand--the Gods gain nothing--they receive from men
marks of honour and gratitude--they are pleased therewith--the Holy,
therefore, must be that which is pleasing to the Gods 448
This is the same explanation which was before declared insufficient. A
fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He breaks off the
dialogue _ib._
Sokratic spirit of the dialogue--confessed ignorance applying the
Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge 449
The questions always difficult, often impossible to answer. Sokrates
is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad answers of others
_ib._
Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure 450
Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from the
subjective 451
Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent _ib._
Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condition by
Sokrates--position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to it 452
The Holy--it has an essential characteristic--what is this?--not the
fact that it is loved by the Gods--this is true, but is not its
constituent essence 454
Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy--different from
those of the Platonic Sokrates--he disallows any common absolute
general type of the Holy--he recognises an indefinite variety of
types, discordant and relative _ib._
The Holy a branch of the Just--not tenable as a definition, but useful
as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms 455
The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the charge of
impiety, preferred by Melêtus against Sokrates--comparison with
Xenophon's way of replying _ib._
CHAPTER I.
PLATO.
PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER I.
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE, BEFORE AND IN THE TIME OF SOKRATES.
[Side-note: Change in the political condition of Greece during the
life of Plato.]
The life of Plato extends from 427-347 B.C. He was born in the fourth
year of the Peloponnesian war, and he died at the age of 80, about the
time when Olynthus was taken by the Macedonian Philip. The last years
of his life thus witnessed a melancholy breach in the integrity of the
Hellenic world, and even exhibited data from which a far-sighted
Hellenic politician might have anticipated something like the coming
subjugation, realised afterwards by the victory of Philip at
Chæroneia. But during the first half of Plato's life, no such
anticipations seemed even within the limits of possibility. The forces
of Hellas, though discordant among themselves, were superabundant as
to defensive efficacy, and were disposed rather to aggression against
foreign enemies, especially against a country then so little
formidable as Macedonia. It was under this contemplation of Hellas
self-acting and self-sufficing--an aggregate of cities, each a
political unit, yet held together by strong ties of race, language,
religion, and common feelings of various kinds--that the mind of Plato
was both formed and matured.
In appreciating, as far as our scanty evidence allows, the
circumstances which determined his intellectual and speculative
character, I shall be compelled to touch briefly upon the various
philosophical theories which were propounded anterior to Sokrates--as
well as to repeat some matters already brought to view in the
sixteenth, sixty-seventh, and sixty-eighth chapters of my History of
Greece.
[Side-note: Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in
polytheistic personal agents as the real producing causes of
phenomena.]
To us, as to Herodotus, in his day, the philosophical speculation of
the Greeks begins with the theology and cosmology of Homer and Hesiod.
The series of divine persons and attributes, and generations presented
by these poets, and especially the Theogony of Hesiod, supplied at one
time full satisfaction to the curiosity of the Greeks respecting the
past history and present agencies of the world around them. In the
emphatic censure bestowed by Herakleitus on the poets and philosophers
who preceded him, as having much knowledge but no sense--he includes
Hesiod, as well as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hekatæus: upon Homer
and Archilochus he is still more severe, declaring that they ought to
be banished from the public festivals and scourged.[1] The sentiment
of curiosity as it then existed was only secondary and derivative,
arising out of some of the strong primary or personal sentiments--fear
or hope, antipathy or sympathy,--impression of present
weakness,--unsatisfied appetites and longings,--wonder and awe under the
presence of the terror-striking phenomena of nature, &c. Under this state
of the mind, when problems suggested themselves for solution, the answers
afforded by Polytheism gave more satisfaction than could have been
afforded by any other hypothesis. Among the indefinite multitude of
invisible, personal, quasi-human agents, with different attributes and
dispositions, some one could be found to account for every perplexing
phenomenon. The question asked was, not What are the antecedent
conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but Who rains
and thunders? Who produces earthquakes?[2] The Hesiodic Greek was
satisfied when informed that it was Zeus or Poseidon. To be told of
physical agencies would have appeared to him not merely
unsatisfactory, but absurd, ridiculous, and impious. It was the task
of a poet like Hesiod to clothe this general polytheistic sentiment in
suitable details: to describe the various Gods, Goddesses, Demigods,
and other quasi-human agents, with their characteristic attributes,
with illustrative adventures, and with sufficient relations of
sympathy and subordination among each other, to connect them in men's
imaginations as members of the same brotherhood. Okeanus, Gæa, Uranus,
Helios, Selênê,--Zeus, Poseidon, Hades--Apollo and Artemis, Dionysus
and Aphroditê--these and many other divine personal agents, were
invoked as the producing and sustaining forces in nature, the past
history of which was contained in their filiations or contests.
Anterior to all of them, the primordial matter or person, was Chaos.
[Footnote 1: Diogen. Laert. ix. 1. [Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou)
dida/skei;] ([Greek: ou) phu/ei,] ap. Proclum in Platon. Timæ. p. 31 F.,
p. 72, ed. Schneider), [Greek: Ê(si/odon ga\r a)\n e)di/daxe kai\
Puthago/rên, auti/s te Xenopha/nea/ te kai\ E(katai=on; to/n th'
O(/mêron e)/phasken a)/xion ei)=nai e)k tô=n agô/nôn e)kba/llesthai
kai\ rhapi/zesthai, kai\ A)rchi/lochon o(moi/ôs.]
[Footnote 2: Aristophanes, Nubes, 368, [Greek: A)lla\ ti/s u(/ei?]
Herodot. vii. 129.]
[Side-note: Belief in such agency continued among the general public,
even after the various sects of philosophy had arisen.]
Hesiod represents the point of view ancient and popular (to use
Aristotle's expression[3]) among the Greeks, from whence all their
philosophical speculation took its departure; and which continued
throughout their history, to underlie all the philosophical
speculations, as the faith of the ordinary public who neither
frequented the schools nor conversed with philosophers. While
Aristophanes, speaking in the name of this popular faith, denounces
and derides Sokrates as a searcher, alike foolish and irreligious,
after astronomical and physical causes--Sokrates himself not only
denies the truth of the allegation, but adopts as his own the
sentiment which dictated it; proclaiming Anaxagoras and others to be
culpable for prying into mysteries which the Gods intentionally kept
hidden.[4] The repugnance felt by a numerous public, against
scientific explanation--as eliminating the divine agents and
substituting in their place irrational causes,[5]--was a permanent
fact of which philosophers were always obliged to take account, and
which modified the tone of their speculations without being powerful
enough to repress them.
[Footnote 3: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 8, p. 989, a. 10. [Greek: Phêsi\
de/ kai\ Ê(si/odos tê\n gê=n prô/tên gene/sthai tô=n sôma/tôn; ou(/tôs
a)rchai/an kai\ dêmotikê\n sumbe/bêken ei)=nai tê\n u(po/lêpsin.]
Again in the beginning of the second book of the Meteorologica,
Aristotle contrasts the ancient and primitive theology with the "human
wisdom" which grew up subsequently: [Greek: Oi( a)rchai=oi kai\
diatri/bontes peri\ ta\s theologi/as--oi( sophô/teroi tê\n
a)nthrôpi/nên sophi/an] (Meteor, ii. i. p. 353, a.)]
[Footnote 4: Xenophon, Memor. iv. 7, 5; i. 1, 11-15. Plato, Apolog. p.
26 E.]
[Footnote 5: Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23. [Greek: Ou) ga\r ê)neichonto
tou\s phusikou\s kai\ meteôrole/schas to/te kaloume/nous, ô(s ei)s
ai)ti/as a)lo/gous kai\ duna/meis a)pronoê/tous kai\ katênagkasme/na
pa/thê diatri/bontas to\ thei=on.]]
[Side-note: Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of
physical agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance,
or [Greek: a)rchê/].]
Even in the sixth century B.C., when the habit of composing in prose
was first introduced, Pherekydes and Akusilaus still continued in
their prose the theogony, or the mythical cosmogony, of Hesiod and the
other old Poets: while Epimenides and the Orphic poets put forth
different theogonies, blended with mystical dogmas. It was, however,
in the same century, and in the first half of it, that Thales of
Miletus (620-560 B.C.), set the example of a new vein of thought.
Instead of the Homeric Okeanus, father of all things, Thales assumed
the material substance, Water, as the primordial matter and the
universal substratum of everything in nature. By various
transmutations, all other substances were generated from water; all of
them, when destroyed, returned into water. Like the old poets, Thales
conceived the surface of the earth to be flat and round; but he did
not, like them, regard it as stretching down to the depths of
Tartarus: he supposed it to be flat and shallow, floating on the
immensity of the watery expanse or Ocean.[6] This is the main feature
of the Thaletian hypothesis, about which, however, its author seems to
have left no writing. Aristotle says little about Thales, and that
little in a tone of so much doubt,[7] that we can hardly confide in
the opinions and discoveries ascribed to him by others.[8]
[Footnote 6: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 3, p. 983, b. 21. De Coelo, ii.
13, p. 294, a. 29. [Greek: Thalê=s, o( tê=s toiau/tês a)rchêgo\s
philosophi/as], &c. Seneca, Natural. Quæst. vi. 6.
Pherekydes, Epimenides, &c., were contemporary with the earliest Ionic
philosophers (Brandis, Handbuch der Gesch. der Gr.-Röm. Phil., s. 23).
According to Plutarch (Aquæ et Ignis Comparatio, p. 955, init.), most
persons believed that Hesiod, by the word Chaos, meant Water. Zeno the
Stoic adopted this interpretation (Schol. Apollon. Rhod. i. 498). On
the other hand, Bacchylides the poet, and after him Zenodotus, called
Air by the name Chaos (Schol. Hesiod. Theogon. p. 392, Gaisf.).
Hermann considers that the Hesiodic Chaos means empty space (see note,
Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-Röm. Phil., vol. i., p. 71).]
[Footnote 7: See two passages in Aristotle De Animâ, i. 2, and i. 5.]
[Footnote 8: Cicero says (De Naturâ Deorum, i. 10), "Thales--aquam
dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aquâ cuncta
fingeret." That the latter half of this Ciceronian statement,
respecting the doctrines of Thales, is at least unfounded, and
probably erroneous, is recognised by Preller, Brandis, and Zeller.
Preller, Histor. Philos. Græc. ex Fontium Locis Contexta, sect. 15;
Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. sect. 31, p. 118; Zeller, Die
Philos. der Griechen, vol. i., p. 151, ed. 2.
It is stated by Herodotus that Thales foretold the year of the
memorable solar eclipse which happened during the battle between the
Medes and the Lydians (Herod. i. 74). This eclipse seems to have
occurred in B.C. 585, according to the best recent astronomical
enquiries by Professor Airy.]
[Side-note: Anaximander--laid down as [Greek: a)rchê/] the Infinite or
indeterminate--generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of
latent fundamental contraries--astronomical and geological doctrines.]
The next of the Ionic philosophers, and the first who published his
opinions in writing, was Anaximander, of Miletus, the countryman and
younger contemporary of Thales (570-520 B.C.). He too searched for an
[Greek: A)rchê/], a primordial Something or principle, self-existent
and comprehending in its own nature a generative, motive, or
transmutative force. Not thinking that water, or any other known and
definite substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted as the
foundation of his hypothesis a substance which he called the Infinite
or Indeterminate. Under this name he conceived Body simply, without
any positive or determinate properties, yet including the fundamental
contraries, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, &c., in a potential or latent
state, including farther a self-changing and self-developing force,[9]
and being moreover immortal and indestructible.[10] By this inherent
force, and by the evolution of one or more of these dormant contrary
qualities, were generated the various definite substances of
nature--Air, Fire, Water, &c. But every determinate substance thus
generated was, after a certain time, destroyed and resolved again into
the Indeterminate mass. "From thence all substances proceed, and into
this they relapse: each in its turn thus making atonement to the others,
and suffering the penalty of injustice."[11] Anaximander conceived
separate existence (determinate and particular existence, apart from
the indeterminate and universal) as an unjust privilege, not to be
tolerated except for a time, and requiring atonement even for that. As
this process of alternate generation and destruction was unceasing, so
nothing less than an Infinite could supply material for it. Earth,
Water, Air, Fire, having been generated, the two former, being cold
and heavy, remained at the bottom, while the two latter ascended. Fire
formed the exterior circle, encompassing the air like bark round a
tree: this peripheral fire was broken up and aggregated into separate
masses, composing the sun, moon, and stars. The sphere of the fixed
stars was nearest to the earth: that of the moon next above it: that
of the sun highest of all. The sun and moon were circular bodies
twenty-eight times larger than the earth: but the visible part of them
was only an opening in the centre, through which[12] the fire or light
behind was seen. All these spheres revolved round the earth, which was
at first semi-fluid or mud, but became dry and solid through the heat
of the sun. It was in shape like the section of a cylinder, with a
depth equal to one-third of its breadth or horizontal surface, on
which men and animals live. It was in the centre of the Kosmos; it
remained stationary because of its equal distance from all parts of
the outer revolving spheres; there was no cause determining it to move
upward rather than downward or sideways, therefore it remained
still.[13] Its exhalations nourished the fire in the peripheral
regions of the Kosmos. Animals were produced from the primitive muddy
fluid of the earth: first, fishes and other lower animals--next, in
process of time man, when circumstances permitted his development.[14]
We learn farther respecting the doctrines of Anaximander, that he
proposed physical explanations of thunder, lightning, and other
meteorological phenomena:[15] memorable as the earliest attempt of
speculation in that department, at a time when such events inspired
the strongest religious awe, and were regarded as the most especial
manifestations of purposes of the Gods. He is said also to have been
the first who tried to represent the surface and divisions of the
earth on a brazen plate, the earliest rudiment of a map or chart.[16]
[Footnote 9: See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 157,
seq., ed. 2nd.
Anaximander conceived [Greek: to\ a)peiron] as _infinite matter_; the
Pythagoreans and Plato conceived it as a distinct nature by itself--as
a subject, not as a predicate (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a.
2).
About these fundamental contraries, Aristotle says (Physic. i. 4,
init.): [Greek: oi( d' e)k tou e(no\s e)nou/sas ta\s e)nantio/têtas
e)kkri/nesthai, ô(/sper A)naxi/mandro/s phêsi]. Which Simplikius
explains, [Greek: e)nantio/tête/s ei)si, thermo\n, psuchro\n, xêro\n,
u(gro\n, kai\ ai( a)/llai], &c.
Compare also Schleiermacher, "Ueber Anaximandros," in his Vermischte
Schriften, vol. ii. p. 178, seq. Deutinger (Gesch. der Philos. vol. i.
p. 165, Regensb. 1852) maintains that this [Greek: e)/krisis] of
contraries is at variance with the hypothesis of Anaximander, and has
been erroneously ascribed to him. But the testimony is sufficiently
good to outweigh this suspicion.]
[Footnote 10: Anaximander spoke of his [Greek: a)/peiron] as [Greek:
a)tha/naton kai\ a)nô/lethron] (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 7, p. 203,
b. 15).]
[Footnote 11: Simplikius ad Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6 a. apud Preller,
Histor. Philos. Græco-Rom. § 57, [Greek: e)x ô(=n de\ ê( ge/nesi/s
e)sti toi=s ou)=si, kai\ tê\n phthora\n ei)s tau)ta\ gi/nesthai kata\
to\ chreô/n; dido/nai ga\r au)ta\ ti/sin kai\ di/kên a)llê/lois tê=s
a)diki/as kata\ tê\n tou= chro/nou ta/xin.] Simplikius remarks upon
the poetical character of this phraseology, [Greek: poiêtikôte/rois
o)no/masin au)ta\ le/gôn].]
[Footnote 12: Origen. Philosophumen. p. 11, ed. Miller; Plutarch ap.
Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, xv. 23-46-47; Stobæus Eclog. i. p. 510.
Anaximander supposed that eclipses of the sun and moon were caused by
the occasional closing of these apertures (Euseb. xv. 50-61). The part
of the sun visible to us was, in his opinion, not smaller than the
earth, and of the purest fire (Diog. Laert. ii. 1).
Eudêmus, in his history of astronomy, mentioned Anaximander as the
first who had discussed the magnitudes and distances of the celestial
bodies (Simplikius ad Aristot. De Coelo, ap. Schol. Brand, p. 497, a.
12).]
[Footnote 13: Aristotel. Meteorol. ii. 2, p. 355, a. 21, which is
referred by Alexander of Aphrodisias to Anaximander; also De Coelo,
ii. 13, p. 295, b. 12.
A doctrine somewhat like it is ascribed even to Thales. See
Alexander's Commentary on Aristotel. Metaphys. i. p. 983, b. 17.
The reason here assigned by Anaximander why the Earth remained still,
is the earliest example in Greek philosophy of that fallacy called the
principle of the Sufficient Reason, so well analysed and elucidated by
Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, book v., ch. 3, sect. 5.
The remarks which Aristotle himself makes upon it are also very
interesting, when he cites the opinion of Anaximander. Compare Plato,
Phædon, p. 109, c. 132, with the citations in Wyttenbach's note.]
[Footnote 14: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 19.]
[Footnote 15: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iii. 3; Seneca, Quæst. Nat.
ii. 18-19.]
[Footnote 16: Strabo, i. p. 7. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 1) states that
Anaximander affirmed the figure of the earth to be spherical; and Dr.
Whewell, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, follows his
statement. But Schleiermacher (Ueber Anaximandros, vol. ii. p. 204 of
his Sämmtliche Werke) and Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen,
p. 38) contest this assertion, and prefer that of Plutarch (ap.
Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, Placit. Philos. iii. 10), which I have
adopted in the text. It is to be remembered that Diogenes himself, in
another place (ix. 3, 21), affirms Parmenides to have been the first
who propounded the spherical figure of the earth. See the facts upon
this subject collected and discussed in the instructive dissertation
of L. Oettinger, Die Vorstellungen der Griechen und Römer ueber die
Erde als Himmelskörper, p. 38; Freiburg, 1850.]
[Side-note: Anaximenes--adopted Air as [Greek: a)rchê/]--rise of
substances out of it, by condensation and rarefaction.]
The third physical philosopher produced by Miletus, seemingly before
the time of her terrible disasters suffered from the Persians after
the Ionic revolt between 500-494 B.C., was Anaximenes, who struck out
a third hypothesis. He assumed, as the primordial substance, and as
the source of all generation or transmutation, Air, eternal in
duration, infinite in extent. He thus returned to the principle of the
Thaletian theory, selecting for his beginning a known substance,
though not the same substance as Thales. To explain how generation of
new products was possible (as Anaximander had tried to explain by his
theory of evolution of latent contraries), Anaximenes adverted to the
facts of condensation and rarefaction, which he connected respectively
with cold and heat.[17] The Infinite Air, possessing and exercising an
inherent generative and developing power, perpetually in motion,
passing from dense to rare or from rare to dense, became in its utmost
rarefaction, Fire and Æther; when passing through successive stages of
increased condensation it became first cloud, next water, then earth,
and, lastly, in its utmost density, stone.[18] Surrounding, embracing,
and pervading the Kosmos, it also embodied and carried with it a vital
principle, which animals obtained from it by inspiration, and which
they lost as soon as they ceased to breathe.[19] Anaximenes included
in his treatise (which was written in a clear Ionic dialect) many
speculations on astronomy and meteorology, differing widely from those
of Anaximander. He conceived the Earth as a broad, flat, round plate,
resting on the air.[20] Earth, Sun, and Moon were in his view
condensed air, the Sun acquiring heat by the extreme and incessant
velocity with which he moved. The Heaven was not an entire hollow
sphere encompassing the Earth below as well as above, but a hemisphere
covering the Earth above, and revolving laterally round it like a cap
round the head.[21]
[Footnote 17: Origen. Philosophumen. c. 7; Simplikius in Aristot.
Physic. f. 32; Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-R. Phil. p. 144.
Cicero, Academic. ii. 37, 118. "Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea, quæ
ex eo orirentur, definita."
The comic poet Philemon introduced in one of his dramas, of which a
short fragment is preserved (Frag. 2, Meineke, p. 840), the
omnipresent and omniscient Air, to deliver the prologue:
[Greek: ----ou(to/s ei)m' e)gô\
A)ê/r, o(\n a)/n tis o)noma/seie kai\ Di/a.
e)gô\ d', o(\ theou=' stin e)/rgon, ei)mi\ pantachou=--
pa/nt' e)x a)na/gkês oi)=da, pantachou= parô/n.]]
[Footnote 18: Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 917; Plutarch, ap. Euseb.
P. E. i. 8.]
[Footnote 19: Plutarch, Placit. Philosophor, i. 3, p. 878.]
[Footnote 20: Aristotel. De Coelo, ii. 13; Plutarch, Placit.
Philosoph. iii. 10, p. 895.]
[Footnote 21: Origen. Philosophum. p. 12, ed. Miller: [Greek:
ô(sperei\ peri\ tê\n ê(mete/ran kephalê\n stre/phetai to\ pili/on.]]
The general principle of cosmogony, involved in the hypothesis of
these three Milesians--one primordial substance or Something endued
with motive and transmutative force, so as to generate all the variety
of products, each successive and transient, which our senses
witness--was taken up with more or less modification by others, especially
by Diogenes of Apollonia, of whom I shall speak presently. But there were
three other men who struck out different veins of thought--Pythagoras,
Xenophanes, and Herakleitus: the two former seemingly contemporary
with Anaximenes (550-490 B.C.), the latter somewhat later.
[Side-note: Pythagoras--his life and career--Pythagorean brotherhood,
great political influence which it acquired among the Greco-Italian
cities--incurred great enmity and was violently put down.]
Of Pythagoras I have spoken at some length in the thirty-seventh
chapter of my History of Greece. Speculative originality was only one
among many remarkable features in his character. He was an
inquisitive traveller, a religious reformer or innovator, and the
founder of a powerful and active brotherhood, partly ascetic, partly
political, which stands without parallel in Grecian history. The
immortality of the soul, with its transmigration (metempsychosis)
after death into other bodies, either of men or of other animals--the
universal kindred thus recognised between men and other animals, and
the prohibition which he founded thereupon against the use of animals
for food or sacrifice--are among his most remarkable doctrines: said
to have been borrowed (together with various ceremonial observances)
from the Egyptians.[22] After acquiring much celebrity in his native
island of Samos and throughout Ionia, Pythagoras emigrated (seemingly
about 530 B.C.) to Kroton and Metapontum in Lower Italy, where the
Pythagorean brotherhood gradually acquired great political ascendancy:
and from whence it even extended itself in like manner over the
neighbouring Greco-Italian cities. At length it excited so much
political antipathy among the body of the citizens,[23] that its rule
was violently put down, and its members dispersed about 509 B.C.
Pythagoras died at Metapontum.
[Footnote 22: Herodot. ii. 81; Isokrates, Busirid. Encom. s. 28.]
[Footnote 23: Polybius, ii. 39; Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 54, seq.]
[Side-note: The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without
political power.]
Though thus stripped of power, however, the Pythagoreans still
maintained themselves for several generations as a social, religious,
and philosophical brotherhood. They continued and extended the vein of
speculation first opened by the founder himself. So little of
proclaimed individuality was there among them, that Aristotle, in
criticising their doctrine, alludes to them usually under the
collective name Pythagoreans. Epicharmus, in his comedies at Syracuse
(470 B.C.) gave occasional utterance to various doctrines of the sect;
but the earliest of them who is known to have composed a book, was
Philolaus,[24] the contemporary of Sokrates. Most of the opinions
ascribed to the Pythagoreans originated probably among the successors
of Pythagoras; but the basis and principle upon which they proceed
seems undoubtedly his.
[Footnote 24: Diogen. Laert. viii. 7-15-78-85.
Some passages of Aristotle, however, indicate divergences of doctrine
among the Pythagoreans themselves (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22). He
probably speaks of the Pythagoreans of his own time when dialectical
discussion had modified the original orthodoxy of the order. Compare
Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas, cap. 5, p. 61-63. About the
gradual development of the Pythagorean doctrine, see Brandis, Handbuch
der Gr.-R. Philos. s. 74, 75.]
[Side-note: Doctrine of the Pythagoreans--Number the Essence of
Things.]
The problem of physical philosophy, as then conceived, was to find
some primordial and fundamental nature, by and out of which the
sensible universe was built up and produced; something which
co-existed always underlying it, supplying fresh matter and force for
generation of successive products. The hypotheses of Thales,
Anaximander, and Anaximenes, to solve this problem, have been already
noticed: Pythagoras solved it by saying, That the essence of things
consisted in Number. By this he did not mean simply that all things
were numerable, or that number belonged to them as a predicate.
Numbers were not merely predicates inseparable from subjects, but
subjects in themselves: substances or magnitudes, endowed with active
force, and establishing the fundamental essences or types according to
which things were constituted. About water,[25] air, or fire,
Pythagoras said nothing.[26] He conceived that sensible phenomena had
greater resemblance to numbers than to any one of these substrata
assigned by the Ionic philosophers. Number was (in his doctrine) the
self-existent reality--the fundamental material and in-dwelling force
pervading the universe. Numbers were not separate from things[27]
(like the Platonic Ideas), but _fundamenta_ of things--their essences
or determining principles: they were moreover conceived as having
magnitude and active force.[28] In the movements of the celestial
bodies, in works of human art, in musical harmony--measure and number
are the producing and directing agencies. According to the Pythagorean
Philolaus, "the Dekad, the full and perfect number, was of supreme and
universal efficacy as the guide and principle of life, both to the
Kosmos and to man. The nature of number was imperative and lawgiving,
affording the only solution of all that was perplexing or unknown;
without number all would be indeterminate and unknowable."[29]
[Footnote 25: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 27. [Greek: E)n
de\ toi=s a)rithmoi=s, e)ndo/koun theôrei=n o(moiô/mata polla\ toi=s
ou)=si kai\ gignome/nois, ma=llon ê)\ e)n puri\ kai\ gê=| kai\
u(/dati], &c. Cf. N. 3, p. 1090, a. 21.]
[Footnote 26: Aristotel. Metaph. A. 9, p. 990, a. 16. [Greek: Dio\
peri\ puro\s ê)\ gê=s ê)\ tô=n a)/llôn tô=n toiou/tôn sôma/tôn ou)d'
o(tiou=n ei)rê/kasin], &c. (the Pythagoreans); also N. 3.]
[Footnote 27: Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a. 6. [Greek: Ou) ga\r
chôristo\n poiou=si] (the Pythagoreans) [Greek: to\n a)rithmo/n], &c.
Metaphys. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 19: [Greek: ta\s mona/das u(polamba/nousin
e)/chein me/gethos]. M. 8, p. 1083, b. 17: [Greek: e)kei=noi] (the
Pythagoreans) [Greek: to\n a)rithmo\n ta\ o)/nta le/gousin; ta\ gou=n
theôrê/mata prosa/ptousi toi=s sô/masin ô(s e)x e)kei/nôn o)/ntôn tô=n
a)rithmô=n.]]
[Footnote 28: An analogous application of this principle (Number as
the fundamental substance and universal primary agent) may be seen in
an eminent physical philosopher of the nineteenth century, Oken's
Elements of Physio-Philosophy, translated by Tulk. Aphorism
57:--"While numbers in a mathematical sense are positions and negations
of nothing, in the philosophical sense they are positions and negations
of the Eternal. Every thing which is real, posited, finite, has become
this, out of numbers; or more strictly speaking, every Real is
absolutely nothing else than a number. This must be the sense
entertained of numbers in the Pythagorean doctrine--namely, that every
thing, or the whole universe, had arisen from numbers. This is not to
be taken in a merely quantitative sense, as it has hitherto been
erroneously; but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things
are numbers themselves, or the acts of the Eternal. The essence in
numbers is nought else than the Eternal. The Eternal only is or
exists, and nothing else is when a number exists. There is therefore
nothing real but the Eternal itself; for every Real, or every thing
that is, is only a number and only exists by virtue of a number."
Ibid., Aphorism 105-107:--"Arithmetic is the science of the second
idea, or that of time or motion, or life. It is therefore the first
science. Mathematics not only begin with it, but creation also, with
the becoming of time and of life. Arithmetic is, accordingly, the
truly absolute or divine science; and therefore every thing in it is
also directly certain, because every thing in it resembles the Divine.
Theology is arithmetic personified."--"A natural thing is nothing but
a self-moving number. An organic or living thing is a number moving
itself out of itself or spontaneously: an inorganic thing, however, is
a number moved by another thing: now as this other thing is also a
real number, so then is every inorganic thing a number moved by
another number, and so on _ad infinitum_. The movements in nature are
only movements of numbers by numbers: even as arithmetical computation
is none other than a movement of numbers by numbers; but with this
difference--that in the latter, this operates in an ideal manner, in
the former after a real."]
[Footnote 29: Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 139. seqq.
[Greek: Theôrei=n dei= ta\ e)/rga kai\ ta\n e)ssi/an (ou)si/an) tô=
a)rithmô= katta\n du/namin, a(/tis e)nti\ e)n ta=| deka/di; mega/la
ga\r kai\ pantelê\s kai\ pantoergo\s kai\ thei/ô kai\ ou)rani/ô bi/ô
kai\ a)nthrôpi/nô a)rcha\ kai\ a(gemô\n . . . a)/neu de\ tau/tas pa/nta
a)/peira kai\ a)/dêla kai\ a)phanê=; nomika\ ga\r a( phu/sis tô=
a)rithmô= kai\ a(gemonika\ kai\ didaskalika\ tô= a)poroume/nô panto\s
kai\ a)gnooume/nô panti/]. Compare the Fr. p. 58, of the same work.
According to Plato, as well as the Pythagoreans, number extended to
ten, and not higher: all above ten were multiples and increments of
ten. (Aristot. Physic. iii. 6, p. 203, b. 30).]
[Side-note: The Monas--[Greek: a)rchê/], or principle of
Number--geometrical conception of number--symbolical attributes of the
first ten numbers, especially of the Dekad.]
The first principle or beginning of Number, was the One or
Monas--which the Pythagoreans conceived as including both the two
fundamental contraries--the Determining and the Indeterminate.[30] All
particular numbers, and through them all things, were compounded from
the harmonious junction and admixture of these two fundamental
contraries.[31] All numbers being either odd or even, the odd numbers
were considered as analogous to the Determining, the even numbers to
the Indeterminate. In One or the Monad, the Odd and Even were supposed
to be both contained, not yet separated: Two was the first
indeterminate even number; Three, the first odd and the first
determinate number, because it included beginning, middle, and end.
The sum of the first four numbers--One, Two, Three, Four = Ten (1 + 2
+ 3 + 4) was the most perfect number of all.[32] To these numbers,
one, two, three, four, were understood as corresponding the
fundamental conceptions of Geometry--Point, Line, Plane, Solid. _Five_
represented colour and visible appearance: _Six_, the phenomenon of
Life: _Seven_, Health, Light, Intelligence, &c.: _Eight_, Love or
Friendship.[33] Man, Horse, Justice and Injustice, had their
representative numbers: that corresponding to Justice was a square
number, as giving equal for equal.[34]
[Footnote 30: See the instructive explanations of Boeckh, in his work
on the Fragments of Philolaus, p. 54 seq.]
[Footnote 31: Philolaus, Fr., p. 62, Boeckh.--Diogen. L. viii. 7, 85.
By [Greek: a(rmoni/a], Philolaus meant the musical octave: and his
work included many explanations and comparisons respecting the
intervals of the musical scale. (Boeckh, p. 65 seq.)]
[Footnote 32: Aristotel. De Coelo, i. 1, p. 268, a. 10. [Greek:
katha/per ga/r phasin oi( Puthago/reioi, to\ pa=n kai\ ta\ pa/nta
toi=s tri/sin ô(/ristai; teleutê\ ga\r kai\ me/son kai\ a)rchê\ to\n
a)rithmo\n e)/chei to\n tou= panto\s, tau=ta de\ to\n tê=s tria/dos.
Dio\ para\ tê=s phu/seôs ei)lêpho/tes ô(/sper no/mous e)kei/nês, kai\
pro\s ta\s a(gistei/as chrô/metha tô=n theô=n tô=| a)rithmô=| tou/tô|]
(i. e. three). It is remarkable that Aristotle here adopts and
sanctions, in regard to the number Three, the mystic and fanciful
attributes ascribed by the Pythagoreans.]
[Footnote 33: Strümpell, Geschichte der theoretischen Philosophie der
Griechen, s. 78. Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-Röm. Phil., sect. 80, p.
467 seq.
The number Five also signified marriage, because it was a junction of
the first masculine number Three with the first feminine Two. Seven
signified also [Greek: kairo\s] or Right Season. See Aristotel.
Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 26, and M. 4, p. 1078, b. 23, compared with
the commentary of Alexander on the former passage.]
[Footnote 34: Aristotel. Ethica Magna, i. 1.]
[Side-note: Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy--geometrical and harmonic
laws guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies.]
The Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single
system, generated out of numbers.[35] Of this system the central
point--the determining or limiting One--was first in order of time,
and in order of philosophical conception. By the determining influence
of this central constituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite
were successively attracted and brought into system: numbers,
geometrical figures, solid substances, were generated. But as the
Kosmos thus constituted was composed of numbers, there could be no
continuum: each numerical unit was distinct and separated from the
rest by a portion of vacant space, which was imbibed, by a sort of
inhalation, from the infinite space or spirit without.[36] The central
point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans the Hearth of the Universe
(like the public hearth or perpetual fire maintained in the prytaneum
of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of Zeus. Around it revolved,
from West to East, ten divine bodies, with unequal velocities, but in
symmetrical movement or regular dance.[37] Outermost was the circle of
the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans Olympus, and composed of
fire like the centre. Within this came successively,--with orbits more
and more approximating to the centre,--the five planets, Saturn,
Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury: next, the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth.
Lastly, between the Earth and the central fire, an hypothetical body,
called the Antichthon or Counter-Earth, was imagined for the purpose
of making up a total represented by the sacred number Ten, the symbol
of perfection and totality. The Antichthon was analogous to a
separated half of the Earth; simultaneous with the Earth in its
revolutions, and corresponding with it on the opposite side of the
central fire.
[Footnote 35: Aristot. Metaph. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 18. [Greek: to\n ga\r
o(/lon ou)/ranon kataskeua/zousin e)x a)rithmô=n]. Compare p. 1075, b.
37, with the Scholia.
A poet calls the tetraktys (consecrated as the sum total of the first
four numbers 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10) [Greek: pêgê\n a)ena/ou phu/seôs
rhizô/mat' e)/chousan]. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 94.]
[Footnote 36: Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 91-95. [Greek: to\ pra=ton
a(rmosthe\n, to\ e(/n e)n tô=| me/sô| tê=s sphai/ras e(sti/a
kalei=tai--bômo/n te kai\ sunochê\n kai\ me/tron phu/seôs--prô=ton
ei)=nai phu/sei to\ me/son].
Aristot. Metaph. N. 3, p. 1091, a. 15. [Greek: phanerô=s ga\r
le/gousin] (the Pythagoreans) [Greek: ô(s tou= e(no\s
sustathe/ntos--eu)thu\s to\ e)/ggista tou= a)pei/rou o(/ti ei(lketo
kai\ e)perai/neto u(po\ tou= pe/ratos].
Aristot. Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b. 21. [Greek: Ei)=nai d' e)/phasan
kai\ oi( Puthago/reioi keno/n, kai\ e)peisie/nai au)to\ tô=| ou)ra/nô|
e)k tou= a)pei/rou pneu/matos, ô(s a)napne/onti; kai\ to\ keno/n, o(\
diori/zei ta\s phu/seis, ô(s o)/ntos tou= kenou= chôrismou= tinos tô=n
e)phexê=s kai\ tê=s diori/seôs, kai\ tou=t' ei)=nai prô=ton e)n toi=s
a)rithmoi=s; to\ ga\r keno\n diori/zein tê\n phu/sin au)tô=n]. Stobæus
(Eclog. Phys. i. 18, p. 381, Heer.) states the same, referring to the
lost work of Aristotle on the Pythagorean philosophy. Compare Preller,
Histor. Philos. Gr. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect. 114-115.]
[Footnote 37: Philolaus, p. 94. Boeckh. [Greek: peri\ de\ tou=to de/ka
sô/mata thei=a choreu/ein], &c. Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13. Metaphys. A.
5.]
The inhabited portion of the Earth was supposed to be that which was
turned away from the central fire and towards the Sun, from which it
received light. But the Sun itself was not self-luminous: it was
conceived as a glassy disk, receiving and concentrating light from the
central fire, and reflecting it upon the Earth, so long as the two
were on the same side of the central fire. The Earth revolved, in an
orbit obliquely intersecting that of the Sun, and in twenty-four
hours, round the central fire, always turning the same side towards
that fire. The alternation of day and night was occasioned by the
Earth being during a part of such revolution on the same side of the
central fire with the Sun, and thus receiving light reflected from
him: and during the remaining part of her revolution on the side
opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from him. The
Earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day: the Moon,
in one month:[38] the Sun, with the planets, Mercury and Venus, in one
year: the planets, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, in longer periods
respectively, according to their distances from the centre: lastly,
the outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Aplanes),
in some unknown period of very long duration.[39]
[Footnote 38: The Pythagoreans supposed that eclipses of the moon took
place, sometimes by the interposition of the earth, sometimes by that
of the Antichthon, to intercept from the moon the light of the sun
(Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 27, p. 560. Heeren). Stobæus here cites the
history ([Greek: i(stori/an]) of the Pythagorean philosophy by
Aristotle, and the statement of Philippus of Opus, the friend of
Plato.]
[Footnote 39: Aristot. de Coelo, ii. 13. Respecting this Pythagorean
cosmical system, the elucidations of Boeckh are clear and valuable.
Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, Berlin, 1852, p.
99-102; completing those which he had before given in his edition of
the fragments of Philolaus.
Martin (in his Études sur le Timée de Platon, vol. ii. p. 107) and
Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, ch. iv.) maintain that
the original system proposed by Pythagoras was a geocentric system,
afterwards transformed by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans into that
which stands in the text. But I agree with Boeckh (Ueber das Kosmische
System des Platon, p. 89 seqq.), and with Zeller (Phil. d. Griech.,
vol. i. p. 308, ed. 2), that this point is not made out. That which
Martin and Gruppe (on the authority of Alexander Polyhistor, Diog.
viii. 25, and others) consider to be a description of the original
Pythagorean system as it stood before Philolaus, is more probably a
subsequent transformation of it; introduced after the time of
Aristotle, in order to suit later astronomical views.]
[Side-note: Music of the Spheres.]
The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the
opinion of the' Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful
sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to
be arranged in musical ratios,[40] so the result of all these separate
sounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection--Why were not
these sounds heard by us?--they replied, that we had heard them
constantly and without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence
they had become imperceptible by habit.[41]
[Footnote 40: Playfair observes (in his dissertation on the Progress
of Natural Philosophy, p. 87) respecting Kepler--"Kepler was perhaps
the first person who conceived that there must be always a law capable
of being expressed by arithmetic or geometry, which connects such
phenomena as have a physical dependence on each other". But this seems
to be exactly the fundamental conception of the Pythagoreans: or
rather a part of their fundamental conception, for they also
considered their numbers as active forces bringing such law into
reality. To illustrate the determination of the Pythagoreans to make
up the number of Ten celestial bodies, I transcribe another passage
from Playfair (p. 98). Huygens, having discovered one satellite of
Saturn, "believed that there were no more, and that the number of the
planets was now complete. The planets, primary and secondary, thus
made up twelve--the double of six, the first of the perfect numbers."]
[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 9; Pliny, H.N. ii. 20.
See the Pythagorean system fully set forth by Zeller, Die Philosophie
der Griechen, vol. i. p. 302-310, ed. 2nd.]
[Side-note: Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries--Ten opposing
pairs.]
Ten was, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the perfection and
consummation of number. The numbers from One to Ten were all that they
recognised as primary, original, generative. Numbers greater than ten
were compounds and derivatives from the decad. They employed this
perfect number not only as a basis on which to erect a bold
astronomical hypothesis, but also as a sum total for their list of
contraries. Many Hellenic philosophers[42] recognised pairs of
opposing attributes as pervading nature, and as the fundamental
categories to which the actual varieties of the sensible world might
be reduced. While others laid down Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, as the
fundamental contraries, the Pythagoreans adopted a list of ten pairs.
1. Limit and Unlimited; 2. Odd and Even; 3. One and Many; 4. Right and
Left; 5. Male and Female; 6. Rest and Motion; 7. Straight and Curve;
8. Light and Darkness; 9. Good and Evil; 10. Square and Oblong.[43] Of
these ten pairs, five belong to arithmetic or to geometry, one to
mechanics, one to physics, and three to anthropology or ethics. Good
and Evil, Regularity and Irregularity, were recognised as alike
primordial and indestructible.[44]
[Footnote 42: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 2, p. 1004, b. 30.
[Greek: ta\ d' o)/nta kai\ tê\n ou)sian o(mologou=sin e)x e)nanti/ôn
schedo\n a(/pantes sugkei=sthai.]]
[Footnote 43: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22. He goes on to
say that Alkmæon, a semi-Pythagorean and a younger contemporary of
Pythagoras himself, while agreeing in the general principle that
"human affairs were generally in pairs," ([Greek: ei)=nai du/o ta\
polla\ tô=n a)nthrôpi/nôn]), laid down pairs of fundamental contraries
at random ([Greek: ta\s e)nantio/têtas ta\s tuchou/sas])--black and
white, sweet and bitter, good and evil, great and little. All that you
can extract from these philosophers is (continues Aristotle) the
general axiom, that "contraries are the principia of existing
things"--[Greek: o(/ti ta)na/ntia a)rchai\ tô=n o)/ntôn].
This axiom is to be noted as occupying a great place in the minds of
the Greek philosophers.]
[Footnote 44: Theophrast. Metaphys. 9. Probably the recognition of one
dominant antithesis--[Greek: To\ E(/n--ê( a)o/ristos Dua\s]--is the
form given by Plato to the Pythagorean doctrine. Eudorus (in
Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 39) seems to blend the two
together.]
The arithmetical and geometrical view of nature, to which such
exclusive supremacy is here given by the Pythagoreans, is one of the
most interesting features of Grecian philosophy. They were the
earliest cultivators of mathematical science,[45] and are to be
recognised as having paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes,
notwithstanding the symbolical and mystical fancies with which they
so largely perverted what are now regarded as the clearest and most
rigorous processes of the human intellect. The important theorem which
forms the forty-seventh Proposition of Euclid's first book, is
affirmed to have been discovered by Pythagoras himself: but how much
progress was made by him and his followers in the legitimate province
of arithmetic and geometry, as well as in the applications of these
sciences to harmonics,[46] which they seem to have diligently
cultivated, we have not sufficient information to determine with
certainty.
[Footnote 45: Aristot. Metaph. A. 5, p. 985, b. 23. [Greek: oi(
Puthagorei=oi tô=n mathêma/tôn a)psa/menoi _prô=toi tau=ta
proê/gagon_, kai\ e)ntraphe/ntes e)n au)toi=s ta\s tou/tôn a)rcha\s
tô=n o)/ntôn a)rcha\s ô)|ê/thêsan ei)=nai pa/ntôn.]]
[Footnote 46: Concerning the Pythagorean doctrines on Harmonics, see
Boeckh's Philolaus, p. 60-84, with his copious and learned comments.]
[Side-note: Eleatic philosophy--Xenophanes.]
Contemporary with Pythagoras, and like him an emigrant from Ionia to
Italy, was Xenophanes of Kolophon. He settled at the Phokæan colony of
Elea, on the Gulf of Poseidonia; his life was very long, but his
period of eminence appears to belong (as far as we can make out amidst
conflicting testimony) to the last thirty years of the sixth century
B.C. (530-500 B.C.). He was thus contemporary with Anaximander and
Anaximenes, as well as with Pythagoras, the last of whom he may have
personally known.[47] He composed, and recited in person, poems--epic,
elegiac, and iambic--of which a very few fragments remain.
[Footnote 47: Karsten. Xenophanis Fragm., s. 4, p. 9, 10.]
[Side-note: His censures upon the received Theogony and religious
rites.]
Xenophanes takes his point of departure, not from Thales or
Anaximander, but from the same ancient theogonies which they had
forsaken. But he follows a very different road. The most prominent
feature in his poems (so far as they remain), is the directness and
asperity with which he attacks the received opinions respecting the
Gods--and the poets Hesiod and Homer, the popular exponents of those
opinions. Xenophanes not only condemns these poets for having ascribed
to the Gods discreditable exploits, but even calls in question the
existence of the Gods, and ridicules the anthropomorphic conception
which pervaded the Hellenic faith. "If horses or lions could paint,
they would delineate their Gods in form like themselves. The
Ethiopians conceive their Gods as black, the Thracians conceive theirs
as fair and with reddish hair."[48] Dissatisfied with much of the
customary worship and festivals, Xenophanes repudiated divination**
altogether, and condemned the extravagant respect shown to victors in
Olympic contests,[49] not less than the lugubrious ceremonies in
honour of Leukothea. He discountenanced all Theogony, or assertion of
the birth of Gods, as impious, and as inconsistent with the prominent
attribute of immortality ascribed to them.[50] He maintained that
there was but one God, identical with, or a personification of, the
whole Uranus. "The whole Kosmos, or the whole God, sees, hears, and
thinks." The divine nature (he said) did not admit of the conception
of separate persons one governing the other, or of want and
imperfection in any way.[51]
[Footnote 48: Xenophanis Fragm. 5-6-7, p. 39 seq. ed. Karsten; Clemens
Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 601; vii. p. 711.]
[Footnote 49: Xenophan. Fragm. 19, p. 60, ed. Karsten; Cicero,
Divinat. i. 3, 5.]
[Footnote 50: Xenophanis Fragment. 34-35, p. 85, ed. Karsten;
Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 23; Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 19.]
[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Frag. 1-2, p. 35.
[Greek: Ou)=los o(ra=|, ou)=los de\ noei=, ou)=los de t' a)kou/ei.]
Plutarch ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. i. 8; Diogen. Laert. ix. 19.]
[Side-note: His doctrine of Pankosmism, or Pantheism--The whole Kosmos
is Ens Unum or God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pa=n]. Non-Ens inadmissible.]
Though Xenophanes thus appears (like Pythagoras) mainly as a religious
dogmatist, yet theogony and cosmogony were so intimately connected in
the sixth century B.C., that he at the same time struck out a new
philosophical theory. His negation of theogony was tantamount to a
negation of cosmogony. In substituting Ens Unum--one God for many, he
set aside all distinct agencies in the universe, to recognise only one
agent, single, all-pervading, indivisible. He repudiated all genesis
of a new reality, all actual existence of parts, succession, change,
beginning, end, etc., in reference to the universe, as well as in
reference to God. "Wherever I turned my mind (he exclaimed) everything
resolved itself into One and the same: all things existing came back
always and everywhere into one similar and permanent nature."[52] The
fundamental tenet of Xenophanes was partly religious, partly
philosophical, Pantheism, or Pankosmism: looking upon the universe as
one real all-comprehensive Ens, which he would not call either finite
or infinite, either in motion or at rest.[53] Non-Ens he pronounced to
be an absurdity--an inadmissible and unmeaning phrase.
[Footnote 52: Timon, fragment of the Silli ap. Sext. Empiric. Hypot.
Pyrrh. i. 33, sect. 224.
[Greek: o)/ppê ga\r e)mo\n no/on ei)ru/saimi,
ei)s e(\n tau)to/ te pa=n a)nelu/eto, pa=n de o)\n ai)ei\
pa/ntê a)nelko/menon mi/an ei)s phu/sin i)/stath' o(moi/an].
[Greek: Ai)ei\] here appears to be more conveniently construed with
[Greek: i)/stath'] not (as Karsten construes it, p. 118) with [Greek:
o)/n].
It is fair to presume that these lines are a reproduction of the
sentiments of Xenophanes, if not a literal transcript of his words.]
[Footnote 53: Theophrastus ap. Simplikium in Aristotel. Physic. f. 6,
Karsten, p. 106; Arist. Met. A. 5, p. 986, b. 21: [Greek: Xenopha/nês
de\ prô=tos tou/tôn e(ni/sas, o( ga\r Parmeni/dês tou/ton le/getai
mathêtê/s,--eis to\n o(/lon ou)/ranon a)poble/psas to\ e(\n ei)=nai/
phêsi to\n theo/n.]]
[Side-note: Scepticism of Xenophanes--complaint of philosophy as
unsatisfactory.]
It was thus from Xenophanes that the doctrine of Pankosmism obtained
introduction into Greek philosophy, recognising nothing real except
the universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole. Such a creed
was altogether at variance with common perception, which apprehends
the universe as a plurality of substances, distinguishable, divisible,
changeable, &c. And Xenophanes could not represent his One and All,
which excluded all change, to be the substratum out of which
phenomenal variety was generated--as Water, Air, the Infinite, had
been represented by the Ionic philosophers. The sense of this
contradiction, without knowing how to resolve it, appears to have
occasioned the mournful complaints of irremediable doubt and
uncertainty, preserved as fragments from his poems. "No man (he
exclaims) knows clearly about the Gods or the universe: even if he
speak what is perfectly true, he himself does not know it to be true:
all is matter of opinion."[54]
[Footnote 54: Xenophan. Fragm. 14, p. 51, ed. Karsten.
[Greek: kai\ to\ me\n ou)=n saphe\s ou)/tis a)nê\r ge/net' ou)/de tis
e)/stai
ei)dô\s, a)mphi\ theô=n te kai\ a)/ssa le/gô peri\ pa/ntôn;
ei) ga\r kai\ ta\ ma/lista tu/choi tetelesme/non ei)pô\n,
au)to\s o(mô=s ou)k oi)=de; do/kos d' e)pi\ pa=si te/tuktai].
Compare the extract from the Silli of Timon in Sextus
Empiricus--Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. 224; and the same author, adv.
Mathemat. vii. 48-52.]
Nevertheless while denying all real variety or division in the
universe, Xenophanes did not deny the variety of human perceptions and
beliefs. But he allowed them as facts belonging to man, not to the
universe--as subjective or relative, not as objective or absolute. He
even promulgated opinions of his own respecting many of the physical
and cosmological subjects treated by the Ionic philosophers.
[Side-note: His conjectures on physics and astronomy.]
Without attempting to define the figure of the Earth, he considered it
to be of vast extent and of infinite depth;[55] including, in its
interior cavities, prodigious reservoirs both of fire and water. He
thought that it had at one time been covered with water, in proof of
which he noticed the numerous shells found inland and on mountain
tops, together with the prints of various fish which he had observed
in the quarries of Syracuse, in the island of Paros, and elsewhere.
From these facts he inferred that the earth had once been covered with
water, and even that it would again be so covered at some future time,
to the destruction of animal and human life.[56] He supposed that the
sun, moon, and stars were condensations of vapours exhaled from the
Earth, collected into clouds, and alternately inflamed and
extinguished.[57]
[Footnote 55: Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13.]
[Footnote 56: Xenophan. Fragm. p. 178, ed. Karsten; Achilles Tatius,
[Greek: Ei)sagôgê\] in Arat. Phænom. p. 128, [Greek: ta\ ka/tô d' e)s
a)/peiron i(ka/nei].
This inference from the shells and prints of fishes is very remarkable
for so early a period. Compare Herodotus (ii. 12) who notices the
fact, and draws the same inference, as to Lower Egypt; also Plutarch,
De Isid. et Osirid. c. 40, p. 367; and Strabo, i. p. 49-50, from whom
we learn that the Lydian historian Xanthus had made the like
observation, and also the like inference, for himself. Straton of
Lampsakus, Eratosthenes, and Strabo himself, approved what Xanthus
said.]
[Footnote 57: Xenophanes Frag. p. 161 seq., ed. Karsten. Compare
Lucretius, v. 458.
"per rara foramina, terræ
Partibus erumpens primus se sustulit æther
Ignifer et multos secum levis abstulit ignis . . . .
Sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis æther
Corpore concreto circumdatus undique flexit: . . . .
Hunc exordia sunt solis lunæque secuta."]
[Side-note: Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes--Ens
Parmenideum, self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended,--Non-Ens,
an unmeaning phrase.]
Parmenides, of Elea, followed up and gave celebrity to the Xenophanean
hypothesis in a poem, of which the striking exordium is yet preserved.
The two veins of thought, which Xenophanes had recognised and lamented
his inability to reconcile, were proclaimed by Parmenides as a sort of
inherent contradiction in the human mind--Reason or Cogitation
declaring one way, Sense (together with the remembrances and
comparisons of sense) suggesting a faith altogether opposite. Dropping
that controversy with the popular religion which had been raised by
Xenophanes, Parmenides spoke of many different Gods or Goddesses, and
insisted on the universe as one, without regarding it as one God. He
distinguished Truth from matter of Opinion.[58] Truth was knowable
only by pure mental contemplation or cogitation, the object of which
was Ens or Being, the Real or Absolute: here the Cogitans and the
Cogitatum were identical, one and the same.[59] Parmenides conceived
Ens not simply as existent, but as self-existent, without beginning or
end,[60] as extended, continuous, indivisible, and unchangeable. The
Ens Parmenideum comprised the two notions of Extension and
Duration:[61] it was something Enduring and Extended; Extension
including both space, and matter so far forth as filling space.
Neither the contrary of Ens (Non-Ens), nor anything intermediate
between Ens and Non-Ens, could be conceived, or named, or reasoned
about. Ens comprehended all that was Real, without beginning or end,
without parts or difference, without motion or change, perfect and
uniform like a well-turned sphere.[62]
[Footnote 58: Parmenid. Fr. v. 29.]
[Footnote 59: Parm. Frag. v. 40, 52-56.
[Greek: to\ ga\r au)to\ noei=n e)sti/n te kai\ ei)=nai.
A)lla\ su\ tê=s d' a)ph' o(dou= dizê/sios ei)=rge no/êma,
mêde/ s' e)/thos polu/peiron o(do\n kata\ tê/nde bia/sthô,
nôma=|n a)/skopon o)/mma kai\ ê)chê/essan a)kouê\n
kai\ glô=ssan; kri=nai de\ lo/gô| polu/dênin e)/legchon
e)x e)me/then rhêthe/nta.]]
[Footnote 60: Parm. Frag. v. 81.
[Greek: au)ta\r a)ki/nêton mega/lôn e)n pei/rasi desmô=n
e)sti\n, a)/narchon, a)/pauston], &c.]
[Footnote 61: Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griech., i. p. 403, ed. 2)
maintains, in my opinion justly, that the Ens Parmenideum is conceived
by its author as extended. Strümpell (Geschichte der theor. Phil. der
Griech., s. 44) represents it as unextended: but this view seems not
reconcilable with the remaining fragments.]
[Footnote 62: Parm. Frag. v. 102.]
[Side-note: He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and
relative, apart from Ens.]
In this subject Ens, with its few predicates, chiefly negative,
consisted all that Parmenides called Truth. Everything else belonged
to the region of Opinion, which embraced all that was phenomenal,
relative, and transient: all that involved a reference to man's
senses, apprehension, and appreciation, all the indefinite diversity
of observed facts and inferences. Plurality, succession, change,
motion, generation, destruction, division of parts, &c., belonged to
this category. Parmenides did not deny that he and other men had
perceptions and beliefs corresponding to these terms, but he denied
their application to the Ens or the self-existent. We are conscious of
succession, but the self-existent has no succession: we perceive
change of colour and other sensible qualities, and change of place or
motion, but Ens neither changes nor moves. We talk of things generated
or destroyed--things coming into being or going out of being--but this
phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which _is_
always and cannot properly be called either past or future.[63]
Nothing is really generated or destroyed, but only in appearance to
us, or relatively to our apprehension.[64] In like manner we perceive
plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is
essentially One, and cannot be divided.[65] Though you may divide a
piece of matter you cannot divide the extension of which that matter
forms part: you cannot (to use the expression of Hobbes[66]) pull
asunder the first mile from the second, or the first hour from the
second. The milestone, or the striking of the clock, serve as marks to
assist you in making a mental division, and in considering or
describing one hour and one mile apart from the next. This, however,
is your own act, relative to yourself: there is no real division of
extension into miles, or of duration into hours. You may consider the
same space or time as one or as many, according to your convenience:
as one hour or as sixty minutes, as one mile or eight furlongs. But
all this is a process of your own mind and thoughts; another man may
divide the same total in a way different from you. Your division noway
modifies the reality without you, whatever that may be--the Extended
and Enduring Ens--which remains still a continuous one, undivided and
unchanged.
[Footnote 63: Parm. Frag. v. 96.
[Greek: ----e)pei\ to/ ge moi=r' e)pe/dêsen
Oi)=on a)ki/nêton tele/thein tô=| pa/nt' o)/nom' _ei)=nai_,
O)/ssa brotoi\ kate/thento, pepoitho/tes ei)=nai a)lêthê=,
gi/gnesthai/ te kai\ o)/llusthai, ei)=nai/ te kai\ ou)ki\,
kai\ to/pon a)lla/ssein, dia/ te chro/a phano\n a)mei/bein;
v. 75:--
ei)/ ge ge/noit', ou)k e)/st'; ou)d' ei)/ po/te me/llei e)/sesthai;
tô=s ge/nesis me\n a)pe/sbestai, kai\ a)/pistos o)/lethros.]]
[Footnote 64: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 1. [Greek: Oi( me\n ga\r
au)tô=n o(/lôs a)nei=lon ge/nesin kai\ phthora/n; ou)the\n ga\r ou)/te
gi/gnesthai/ phasin ou)/te phthei/resthai tô=n o)/ntôn, _a)lla\ mo/non
dokei=n ê(mi=n_; oi)=on oi( peri\ Me/lisson kai\ Parmeni/dên], &c.]
[Footnote 65: Parm. Frag. v. 77.
[Greek: Ou)de\ diai/reto/n e)stin, e)pei\ pa=n e)sti\n o(/moion,
ou)de/ ti tê=| ma=llon to/ ken ei)/rgoi min xune/chesthai,
ou)de/ ti cheiro/teron; pa=n de\ ple/on e)sti\n e)o/ntos;
tô=| xuneche\s pa=n e)sti/n; e)o\n ga\r e)o/nti pela/zei].
Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 29, with the Scholia, and
Physic. i. 2, 3. Simplikius Comm. in Physic. Aristot. (apud Tennemann
Geschichte der Philos. b. i. s. 4, vol. i. p. 170) [Greek: pa/nta ga/r
phêsi (Parmeni/dês) ta\ o)/nta, katho\ o)/nta, e(n e)sti/n]. This
chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eleatic
philosophy, appears to me one of the best and most instructive in his
work.]
[Footnote 66: "To make parts,--or to part or divide, Space or Time,--is
nothing else but to consider one and another within the same: so
that if any man divide space or time, the diverse conceptions he has
are more, by one, than the parts which he makes. For his first
conception is of that which is to be divided--then, of some part of
it--and again of some other part of it: and so forwards, as long as he
goes in dividing. But it is to be noted, that here, by _division_, I
do not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one space or time from
another (for does any man think that one hemisphere may be separated
from the other hemisphere, or the first hour from the second?), but
_diversity of consideration_: so that division is not made by the
operation of the hands, but of the mind."--Hobbes, First Grounds of
Philosophy, chap. vii. 5, vol. i. p. 96, ed. Molesworth.
"Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they
are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not
separable one from another, not even in thought; though the parts of
bodies from which we take our measure of the one--and the parts of
motion, from which we may take the measure of the other--may be
interrupted or separated."--Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding,
book ii. ch. 15. s. 11.
In the Platonic Parmenides, p. 156 D., we find the remarkable
conception of what he calls [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês, a)/topo/s tis
phu/sis]--a break in the continuity of duration, an extra-temporal
moment.]
[Side-note: Parmenidean ontology stands completely apart from
phenomenology.]
The Ens of Parmenides thus coincided mainly with that which (since
Kant) has been called the Noumenon--the Thing in itself--the Absolute;
or rather with that which, by a frequent illusion, passes for the
absolute--no notice being taken of the cogitant and believing apart
from mind, as if cogitation and belief, _cogitata_ and _credita_,
would be had without it. By Ens was understood the remnant in his
mind, after leaving out all that abstraction, as far as it had then
been carried, could leave out. It was the minimum indispensable to the
continuance of thought; you cannot think (Parmenides says) without
thinking of Something, and that Something Extended and Enduring.
Though he and others talk of this Something as an Absolute (_i.e._
apart from or independent of his own thinking mind), yet he also uses
some juster language ([Greek: to\ ga\r au)to\ noei=n e)/stin te kai\
ei)=nai]), showing that it is really relative: that if the Cogitans
implies a Cogitatum, the Cogitatum also implies no less its
correlative Cogitans: and that though we may divide the two in words,
we cannot divide them in fact. It is to be remarked that Parmenides
distinguishes the Enduring or Continuous from the Transient or
Successive, Duration from Succession (both of which are included in
the meaning of the word Time), and that he considers Duration alone as
belonging to Ens or the Absolute--to the region of Truth--setting it
in opposition or antithesis to Succession, which he treats as relative
and phenomenal. We have thus (with the Eleates) the first appearance
of Ontology, the science of Being or Ens, in Grecian philosophy. Ens
is everything, and everything is Ens. In the view of Parmenides,
Ontology is not merely narrow, but incapable of enlargement or
application; we shall find Plato and others trying to expand it into
numerous imposing generalities.[67]
[Footnote 67: Leibnitz says, Réponse à M. Foucher, p. 117, ed.
Erdmann, "Comment seroit il possible qu'aucune chose existât, si
l'être même, ipsum Esse, n'avoit l'existence? Mais bien au contraire
ne pourrait on pas dire avec beaucoup plus de raison, qu'il n'y a que
lui qui existe véritablement, les êtres particuliers n'ayant rien de
permanent? Semper generantur, et nunquam sunt."]
[Side-note: Parmenidean phenomenology--relative and variable.]
Apart from Ontology, Parmenides reckons all as belonging to human
opinions. These were derived from the observations of sense (which he
especially excludes from Ontology) with the comparisons, inferences,
hypothesis, &c., founded thereupon: the phenomena of Nature
generally.[68] He does not attempt (as Plato and Aristotle do after
him) to make Ontology serve as a principle or beginning for anything
beyond itself,[69] or as a premiss from which the knowledge of nature
is to be deduced. He treats the two--Ontology and Phenomenology, to
employ an Hegelian word--as radically disparate, and incapable of any
legitimate union. Ens was essentially one and enduring: Nature was
essentially multiform, successive, ever changing and moving relative
to the observer, and different to observers at different times and
places. Parmenides approached the study of Nature from its own
starting point, the same as had been adopted by the Ionic
philosophers--the data of sense, or certain agencies selected among
them, and vaguely applied to explain the rest. Here he felt that he
relinquished the full conviction, inseparable from his intellectual
consciousness, with which he announced his few absolute truths
respecting Ens and Non-Ens, and that he entered upon a process of
mingled observation and conjecture, where there was great room for
diversity of views between man and man.
[Footnote 68: Karsten observes that the Parmenidean region of opinion
comprised not merely the data of sense, but also the comparisons,
generalisations, and notions, derived from sense.
"[Greek: Doxasto\n] et [Greek: noêto\n] vocantur duo genera inter se
diversa, quorum alterum complectitur res externas et fluxas,
_notionesque quæ ex his ducuntur_--alterum res æternas et à conspectu
remotas," &c. (Parm. Fragm. p. 148-149).]
[Footnote 69: Marbach (Lehrbuch der Gesch. der Philos., s. 71, not. 3)
after pointing out the rude philosophical expression of the
Parmenidean verses, has some just remarks upon the double aspect of
philosophy as there proclaimed, and upon the recognition by Parmenides
of that which he calls the "illegitimate" vein of enquiry along with
the "legitimate."
"Learn from me (says Parmenides) the opinions of mortals, brought to
your ears in the deceitful arrangement of my words. This is not
philosophy (Marbach says): it is Physics. We recognise in modern times
two perfectly distinct ways of contemplating Nature: the philosophical
and the physical. Of these two, the second dwells in plurality, the
first in unity: the first teaches everything as infallible truth, the
second as multiplicity of different opinions. We ought not to ask why
Parmenides, while recognising the fallibility of this second road of
enquiry, nevertheless undertook to march in it,--any more than we can
ask, Why does not modern philosophy render physics superfluous?"
The observation of Marbach is just and important, that the line of
research which Parmenides treated as illegitimate and deceitful, but
which he nevertheless entered upon, is the analogon of modern Physics.
Parmenides (he says) indicated most truly the contrast and divergence
between Ontology and Physics; but he ought to have gone farther, and
shown how they could be reconciled and brought into harmony. This
(Marbach affirms) was not even attempted, much less achieved, by
Parmenides: but it was afterwards attempted by Plato, and achieved by
Aristotle.
Marbach is right in saying that the reconciliation was attempted by
Plato; but he is not right (I think) in saying that it was achieved by
Aristotle--nor by any one since Aristotle. It is the merit of
Parmenides to have brought out the two points of view as radically
distinct, and to have seen that the phenomenal world, if explained at
all, must be explained upon general principles of its own, raised out
of its own data of facts--not by means of an illusory Absolute and
Real. The subsequent philosophers, in so far as they hid and slurred
over this distinction, appear to me to have receded rather than
advanced.]
[Side-note: Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less
probability, in phenomenal explanations.--His physical and
astronomical conjectures.]
Yet though thus passing from Truth to Opinions, from full certainty to
comparative and irremediable uncertainty,[70] Parmenides does not
consider all opinions as equally true or equally untrue. He announces
an opinion of his own--what he thinks most probable or least
improbable--respecting the structure and constitution of the Kosmos,
and he announces it without the least reference to his own doctrines
about Ens. He promises information respecting Earth, Water, Air, and
the heavenly bodies, and how they work, and how they came to be what
they are.[71] He recognises two elementary principles or beginnings,
one contrary to the other, but both of them positive--Light,
comprehending the Hot, the Light, and the Rare--Darkness,
comprehending the Cold, the Heavy, and the Dense.[72] These two
elements, each endued with active and vital properties, were brought
into junction and commixture by the influence of a Dea Genitalis
analogous to Aphroditê,[73] with her first-born son Eros, a personage
borrowed from the Hesiodic Theogony. From hence sprang the other
active forces of nature, personified under various names, and the
various concentric circles or spheres of the Kosmos. Of those spheres,
the outer-most was a solid wall of fire--"flammantia moenia
mundi"--next under this the Æther, distributed into several circles of
fire unequally bright and pure--then the circle called the Milky Way,
which he regarded as composed of light or fire combined with denser
materials--then the Sun and Moon, which were condensations of fire
from the Milky Way--lastly, the Earth, which he placed in the centre
of the Kosmos.[74] He is said to have been the first who pronounced
the earth to be spherical, and even distributed it into two or five
zones.[75] He regarded it as immovable, in consequence of its exact
position in the centre. He considered the stars to be fed by
exhalation from the Earth. Midway between the Earth and the outer
flaming circle, he supposed that there dwelt a Goddess--Justice or
Necessity--who regulated all the movements of the Kosmos, and
maintained harmony between its different parts. He represented the
human race as having been brought into existence by the power of the
sun,[76] and he seems to have gone into some detail respecting animal
procreation, especially in reference to the birth of male and female
offspring. He supposed that the human mind, as well as the human body,
was compounded of a mixture of the two elemental influences, diffused
throughout all Nature: that like was perceived and known by like: that
thought and sensation were alike dependent upon the body, and upon the
proportions of its elemental composition: that a certain limited
knowledge was possessed by every object in Nature, animate or
inanimate.[77]
[Footnote 70: Parmen. Fr. v. 109.
[Greek: e)n tô=| soi\ pau/ô pisto\n lo/gon ê)de\ no/êma
a)mphi\s a)lêthei/ês; do/xas d' a)po\ tou=de brotei/as
ma/nthane, ko/smon e)mô=n e)pe/ôn a)patêlo\n a)kou/ôn.]]
[Footnote 71: Parm. Frag. v. 132-142.]
[Footnote 72: Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 987, a. 1) represents
Parmenides as assimilating one of his phenomenal principles (Heat) to
Ens, and the other (Cold) to Non-Ens. There is nothing in the
fragments of Parmenides to justify this supposed analogy. Heat as well
as Cold belongs to Non-Ens, not to Ens, in the Parmenidean doctrine.
Moreover Cold or Dense is just as much a positive principle as Hot or
Rare, in the view of Parmenides; it is the female to the male (Parm.
Fragm. v. 129; comp. Karsten, p. 270). Aristotle conceives Ontology as
a substratum for Phenomenology; and his criticisms on Parmenides imply
(erroneously in my judgment) that Parmenides did the same. The remarks
which Brucker makes both on Aristotle's criticism and on the Eleatic
doctrine are in the main just, though the language is not very
suitable.
Brucker, Hist. Philosoph., part ii. lib. ii. ch. xi. tom. 1, p.
1152-3, about Xenophanes:--"Ex iis enim quæ apud Aristotelem ex ejus
mente contra motum disputantur, patet Xenophanem motûs notionem aliam
quam quæ in physicis obtinet, sibi concepisse; et ad verum motum
progressum a nonente ad ens ejusque existentiam requisivisse. Quo sensu
notionis hujus semel admisso, sequebatur (cum illud impossibile sit, ut
ex nihilo fiat aliquid) universum esse immobile, adeoque et partes ejus
non ita moveri, ut ex statu nihili procederent ad statum existentiæ.
Quibus admissis, de rerum tamen mutationibus disserere poterat, quas
non alterationes, generationes, et extinctiones, rerum naturalium, sed
modificationes, esse putabat: hoc nomine indignas, eo quod rerum
universi natura semper maneret immutabilis, soliusque materiæ æternum
fluentis particulæ varie inter se modificarentur. Hâc ratione si
Eleaticos priores explicemus de motu disserentes, rationem facile
dabimus, quî de rebus physicis disserere et phenomena naturalia
explicare, salvâ istâ hypothesi, potuerint. Quod tamen de iis negat
Aristoteles, _conceptum motûs metaphysicum ad physicum transferens_:
ut, more suo, Eleatico systemate corrupto, eò vehementius illud
premeret."]
[Footnote 73: Parmenides, ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 9 a.
[Greek: e)n de\ me/sô| tou/tôn Daimôn, ê(\ pa/nta kuberna=|], &c.
Plutarch, Amator, 13.]
[Footnote 74: See especially the remarkable passage from Stobæus,
Eclog. Phys. i. 23, p. 482, cited in Karsten, Frag. Parm. p. 241, and
Cicero, De Natur. Deor, i. 11, s. 28, with the Commentary of Krische,
Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, viii. p. 98, seqq.
It is impossible to make out with any clearness the Kosmos and its
generation as conceived by Parmenides. We cannot attain more than a
general approximation to it.]
[Footnote 75: Diogen. Laert. ix. 21, viii. 48; Strabo, ii. p. 93 (on
the authority of Poseidonius). Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iii. 11) and
others ascribe to Parmenides the recognition not of five zones, but
only of two. If it be true that Parmenides held this opinion about the
figure of the earth, the fact is honourable to his acuteness; for
Leukippus, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes the Apolloniate, and
Demokritus, all thought the earth to be a flat, round surface, like a
dish or a drum: Plato speaks about it in so confused a manner that his
opinion cannot be made out: and Aristotle was the first who both
affirmed and proved it to be spherical. The opinion had been
propounded by some philosophers earlier than Anaxagoras, who
controverted it. See the dissertation of L. Oettinger. Die
Vorstellungen der Griechen über die Erde als Himmelskörper, Freiburg,
1850, p. 42-46.]
[Footnote 76: Diogen. Laert. ix. 22.]
[Footnote 77: Parmen. Frag. v. 145; Theophrastus, De Sensu, Karsten.
pp. 268, 270.
Parmenides (according to Theophrastus) thought that the dead body,
having lost its fiery element, had no perception of light, or heat, or
sound; but that it had perception of darkness, cold, and
silence--[Greek: kai\ o(/lôs de\ pa=n to\ o)\n e)/chein tina gnô=sin].]
Before we pass from Parmenides to his pupil and successor Zeno, who
developed the negative and dialectic side of the Eleatic doctrine, it
will be convenient to notice various other theories of the same
century: first among them that of Herakleitus, who forms as it were
the contrast and antithesis to Xenophanes and Parmenides.
[Side-note: Herakleitus--his obscure style, impressive metaphors,
confident and contemptuous dogmatism.]
Herakleitus of Ephesus, known throughout antiquity by the denomination
of the Obscure, comes certainly after Pythagoras and Xenophanes and
apparently before Parmenides. Of the two first he made special
mention, in one of the sentences, alike brief and contemptuous which
have been preserved from his lost treatise:--"Much learning does not
teach reason: otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras,
Xenophanes and Hekatæus." In another passage Herakleitus spoke of the
"extensive knowledge, cleverness, and wicked arts" of Pythagoras. He
declared that Homer as well as Archilochus deserved to be scourged and
expelled from the public festivals.[78] His thoughts were all embodied
in one single treatise, which he is said to have deposited in the
temple of the Ephesian Artemis. It was composed in a style most
perplexing and difficult to understand, full of metaphor, symbolical
illustration, and antithesis: but this very circumstance imparted to
it an air of poetical impressiveness and oracular profundity.[79] It
exercised a powerful influence on the speculative minds of Greece,
both in the Platonic age, and subsequently: the Stoics especially both
commented on it largely (though with many dissentient opinions among
the commentators), and borrowed with partial modifications much of its
doctrine.[80]
[Footnote 78: Diogen. L. ix. 1. [Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou)
dida/skei; Ê(si/odon ga\r a)\n e)di/daxe kai\ Puthago/rên, au)=tis te
Xenopha/nea kai\ E(katai=on], &c. Ib. viii. 1, 6. [Greek: Puthago/rês
Mnêsa/rchou i(stori/ên ê)/skêsen a)nthrô/pôn ma/lista pa/ntôn, kai\
e)klexa/menos tau/tas ta\s suggrapha\s e)poi/êsen e(ôu+tou= sophi/ên,
polumathi/ên, kakotechni/ên.]]
[Footnote 79: Diogen. Laert. ix. 1-6. Theophrastus conceived that
Herakleitus had left the work unfinished, from eccentricity of
temperament ([Greek: u(po\ melagcholi/as]). Of him, as of various
others, it was imagined by some that his obscurity was intentional
(Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 26, 74, De Finib. 2, 5). The words of Lucretius
about Herakleitus are remarkable (i. 641):--
Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanes
Quamde graves inter Græcos qui vera requirunt:
Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque
Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt.
Even Aristotle complains of the difficulty of understanding
Herakleitus, and even of determining the proper punctuation (Rhetoric.
iii. 5).]
[Footnote 80: Cicero, Nat. Deor., iii. 14, 35.]
[Side-note: Doctrine of Herakleitus--perpetual process of generation
and destruction--everything flows, nothing stands--transition of the
elements into each other, backwards and forwards.]
The expositors followed by Lucretius and Cicero conceived Herakleitus
as having proclaimed Fire to be the universal and all-pervading
element of nature;[81] as Thales had recognised water, and Anaximenes
air. This interpretation was countenanced by some striking passages of
Herakleitus: but when we put together all that remains from him, it
appears that his main doctrine was not physical, but metaphysical or
ontological: that the want of adequate general terms induced him to
clothe it in a multitude of symbolical illustrations, among which fire
was only one, though the most prominent and most significant.[82]
Xenophanes and the Eleates had recognised, as the only objective
reality, One extended Substance or absolute Ens, perpetual, infinite,
indeterminate, incapable of change or modification. They denied the
objective reality of motion, change, generation, and
destruction--considering all these to be purely relative and phenomenal.
Herakleitus on the contrary denied everything in the nature of a
permanent and perpetual substratum: he laid down nothing as permanent
and perpetual except the process of change--the alternate sequence of
generation and destruction, without beginning or end--generation and
destruction being in fact coincident or identical, two sides of the
same process, since the generation of one particular state was the
destruction of its antecedent contrary. All reality consisted in the
succession and transition, the coming and going, of these finite and
particular states: what he conceived as the infinite and universal,
was the continuous process of transition from one finite state to the
next--the perpetual work of destruction and generation combined, which
terminated one finite state in order to make room for a new and
contrary state.
[Footnote 81: To some it appeared that Herakleitus hardly
distinguished Fire from Air. Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Empiric.
adv. Mathemat. vii. 127-129, ix. 360.]
[Footnote 82: Zeller's account of the philosophy of Herakleitus in the
second edition of his Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 450-496, is
instructive. Marbach also is useful (Gesch. der Phil. s. 46-49); and
his (Hegelian) exposition of Herakleitus is further developed by
Ferdinand Lassalle (Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen, published
1858). This last work is very copious and elaborate, throwing great
light upon a subject essentially obscure and difficult.]
[Side-note: Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying
the same general doctrine.]
This endless process of transition, or ever-repeated act of generation
and destruction in one, was represented by Herakleitus under a variety
of metaphors and symbols--fire consuming its own fuel--a stream of
water always flowing--opposite currents meeting and combating each
other--the way from above downwards, and the way from below upwards,
one and the same--war, contest, penal destiny or retributive justice,
the law or decree of Zeus realising each finite condition of things
and then destroying its own reality to make place for its contrary and
successor. Particulars are successively generated and destroyed, none
of them ever arriving at permanent existence:[83] the universal
process of generation and destruction alone continues. There is no
Esse, but a perpetual Fieri: a transition from Esse to Non-Esse, from
Non-Esse to Esse, with an intermediate temporary halt between them: a
ceaseless meeting and confluence of the stream of generation with the
opposite stream of destruction: a rapid and instant succession, or
rather coincidence and coalescence, of contraries. Living and dead,
waking and sleeping, light and dark, come into one or come round into
each other: everything twists round into its contrary: everything both
is and is not.[84]
[Footnote 83: Plato, Kratylus, p. 402, and Theætet. p. 152, 153.