[70] See Bk. I., Ch. XXV.
The doctrines of Kant which convert the external world into a purely
subjective fact, and thus give rise to Fichte's transcendental
idealism, are refuted in the second book, where I have demonstrated the
objectiveness of sensations,--in the third book, where I have proved
the reality of extension, and in the seventh book, where I have proved
that time is not a pure form of the internal sense.
165. The argument founded on the idea of the universality of being,
that is, the impossibility of more than one being, because the idea
of being is absolute and embraces every thing, is a sophism in which
there is a transition from the ideal order to the real, by which an
indeterminate and abstract idea is converted into an absolute being.
To form a perfect conception of this idea and its relations to the
reality, see what has been said in the fifth book, when treating of the
idea of being.
166. Spinosa, Fichte, Cousin, Krause, and all who have taught pantheism
under one form or another, start with a wrong definition of substance.
It is impossible to overrate the necessity of acquiring clear and
distinct ideas of this definition, for there is no doubt but that here
is the origin of the error of the pantheists, and the secret to put a
stop to their progress. When one examines profoundly the principles of
systems which have made so much noise in the philosophical world, one
is surprised at contemplating their insubsistency in its nakedness. The
doctrines summed up in Chapter XIV. should be kept always in sight.
167. In the importance and transcendency of the definition, the notion
of the infinite may compete with that of substance. It is incredible to
what extent this word has been abused without any care to explain its
different senses, or its origin, or the legitimacy of its applications.
All the arguments which the pantheists pretend to found on the idea
of the infinite vanish like smoke when we clearly understand the
character, the origin, and the application of this idea.[71]
[71] See the whole of Book VIII.
168. I will conclude with one remark. I am profoundly convinced
that the most baneful systems in philosophy arise in great part
from confusion of ideas, and the superficiality with which the most
fundamental points of ontology, ideology, and psychology are examined.
My ruling idea in the present work is to prevent this evil; this is
why I have so greatly extended the part of _fundamental philosophy_,
abstracting, as far as possible, all secondary questions. These last
are easily answered, after we have once acquired a clear and exact
knowledge of the fundamental ideas of human science. (4)
BOOK TENTH.
NECESSITY AND CAUSALITY.
CHAPTER I.
NECESSITY.
1. Beings are divided into two classes: necessary and contingent;
necessary being is that which cannot but be; contingent is that which may
be and cease to be. In these definitions every thing is said; but their
laconism does not permit all that is expressed in them to be easily
understood. Necessity and contingency may refer to different aspects
and give rise to very diverse considerations. This makes a careful
analysis of the ideas expressed by them necessary.
2. What is meant by necessity? In general that is called necessary
which cannot but be; but the expression _cannot_, may be taken in
different senses: in a moral sense, as when we say: I cannot but fulfil
this duty; in a physical, as in this proposition; a paralytic cannot
move himself; and in a metaphysical sense, as: A triangle cannot be a
quadrilateral. In the first example, the obstacle is founded on a law;
in the second, it arises from nature; in the third, it follows from the
essence of the things. In all these suppositions, necessity implies the
impossibility of the contrary, and this impossibility results from the
necessity.
3. Hence it follows that the ideas necessity and impossibility are
correlative, and that is metaphysically necessary whose opposite is
metaphysically impossible. Impossibility consists in the exclusion
of one thing by another; thus, "a circular triangle is impossible,"
means the same as "the nature of a triangle excludes the nature of a
circle." In all impossibility, therefore, there is a term denied; as in
all necessity there is a term affirmed; the metaphysically necessary
is that whose opposite is contradictory; the existence of the absurd
is impossible, the non-existence of the necessary is absurd. It is
contradictory for a triangle to have four sides; and it is absurd for a
triangle not to have three angles.
4. In the purely ideal order we see many necessities without any
relation to existence; such are all geometrical truths. Even in the
real order we conceive many hypothetical necessities in contingent
beings: such are those which are obtained by applying absolute
principles to any hypothesis furnished by experience. The principle
of contradiction serves in an infinity of cases to found a certain
necessity even in contingent beings. There is no absolute necessity
of the existence of extended beings; but on the supposition that they
exist, it is necessary for them to have the properties proceeding from
extension.
5. In no finite being can there be an absolute necessity; the only
necessity which it can have is hypothetical. The relation of its
essential attributes is necessary; but, as its essence does not exist
necessarily, whatever is necessary in it is so only hypothetically,
that is, on the supposition that it exists.
6. We must then distinguish two necessities: one absolute, the other
hypothetical. The latter relates to the essences of things, abstracting
their existence, although implying it as a condition, and supposing
another necessary as the ground of its possibility;[72] the former
relates to the existence of the thing. The absolutely necessary is that
whose existence is absolutely necessary.
[72] See Bk. IV., Chs. XXIII., XXIV., XXV., XXVI., and XXVII.
7. The essence of the necessary being must contain existence; its idea
must involve the idea of existence, not only logical and conceptual,
but also realized.
8. We can conceive the existence of the necessary being distinct from
its essence, but the reason of this is in the imperfection of the idea,
which with us is not intuitive, but discursive; and consequently, we
can distinguish between the logical order and the real order.
Here we find the defect of Descartes' argument by which he pretends
to demonstrate the existence of God from the fact that the predicate,
existence, is included in the idea of a necessary and infinite being.
The idea of necessary being involves existence, but not real existence,
only logical and conceptual; since after we have the idea of the
necessary being, it still remains to be proved that there is an object
which corresponds to this idea; the predicate belongs to the subject
according to the manner in which the subject is taken, and as this is
only in the purely ideal order, the predicate is also purely ideal.
9. The reality of the necessary idea cannot be demonstrated from its
idea alone; but it may be demonstrated with complete evidence by
introducing into the argument other elements which experience furnishes
us.
Something exists; at least ourselves; at least this perception which we
have in this act; at least the appearance of this act. I leave aside
for the present all the questions disputed between the dogmatists
and the skeptics; I only suppose a _datum_ which no one can deny me,
though he carry skepticism to the utmost exaggeration. When I say that
something exists, I only mean to affirm that not every thing is a pure
nothing.
If something exists, something has always existed, or there is no
moment in which it could be said with truth: there is nothing. If
such a moment of universal nothingness had ever been, nothing would
now exist, there never could have been any thing. Let us imagine a
universal and absolute nothingness; I then ask: Is it possible that
any thing should come from nothing? Evidently not; therefore on the
supposition of universal nothingness reality is absurd.
10. Therefore something has always existed, with a cause, without a
condition on which it depends; therefore there is a necessary being.
Its existence is supposed always, without relation to any hypothesis;
therefore its _not-being_ is always excluded under all conditions;
therefore there exists an absolutely necessary _being_, that is, a
being whose _not-being_ implies a contradiction.
11. Summing up the doctrine which precedes, we may say:
I. That we have the idea of a necessary being.
II. That we deduce its existence from its idea alone.
III. That in order to demonstrate the existence of a necessary being,
it is sufficient to know that something exists.
IV. We know by experience that something exists; for experience
presents to us, if nothing else, the existence of our own thought.
CHAPTER II.
THE UNCONDITIONED.
12. The words, conditioned and unconditioned, are greatly used in
modern philosophy; as the ideas which these terms express have a great
analogy to those explained in the last chapter, I will briefly consider
them here.
13. The conditioned is that which depends on a condition; that is
to say, that which is supposed if another thing, which is called
the condition, is supposed. If the sun is above the horizon, there
is light; here the light is the conditioned, the sun the condition.
The unconditioned is that which supposes no condition, as its name
expresses.
14. The universe is an assemblage of conditioned beings; this is
manifested by both internal and external experience: does any thing
unconditioned exist? Yes.
15. Representing the universe by a series A, B, C, D, E, F, ...
etc., the condition of F is in E; the condition of E in D; that of
D in C; that of C in B, and so on successively. If there is nothing
unconditioned this retrogression will extend to infinity, and we shall
have an infinite series of conditioned terms.
To arrive at any term, for example, B, it will have been necessary to
pass through the infinite conditions which precede it: the infinite
series will have been exhausted: this is contradictory. And as what
is said of B may be said of A, or of any other of the preceding or
succeeding terms, it follows that they are all impossible: therefore
the series is absurd.
16. In the supposed series all is conditioned, there is nothing
unconditioned; and still the existence of its successive totality is
necessary. Therefore the series in itself is unconditioned; therefore
a collection of conditioned terms is unconditioned, although it is
supposed impossible to assign any thing, out of the series, which is
unconditioned. Who would admit such an absurdity?
17. Let us give a more precise formula to the argument. Taking any
three terms in the series; A ... F ... N, we may form the following
propositions.
If A exists, F and N will exist.
If N exists, F and A have existed.
If F exists, A has existed and N will exist.
Objections.--I. Whence arises the connection of the conditions with one
another?
II. Why should any one of them be supposed?
18. By admitting a necessary, unconditioned being which contains the
condition of whatever exists, every thing is explained. To the first
objection it may be answered, that the connection of the _conditioned_
conditions depends on the _unconditioned_ condition. To the second,
it may be said that the primitive condition has no need of any other
condition, supposing it to be a necessary being. To ask _why_ it should
be supposed, is to fall into a contradiction; since it is unconditioned
it has no _why_, the reason of its existence is in itself.
19. But if we admit nothing necessary, nothing unconditioned, neither
the terms nor their connection can be explained. Infinite terms would
exist, necessarily connected, with any internal or external sufficient
reason. There would be no more reason for the existence of the universe
than for its non-existence; being and nonentity would be indifferent to
it; and it cannot be conceived why existence should have prevailed. For
nothing it is evident that nothing is required; why then is there not
an absolute and eternal nothing?
20. The more we examine the necessity of the connection of the
conditions, one with another, the stronger this difficulty becomes; for
if it be said that one condition cannot exist without another; with
still more reason we ask why a first condition is not necessary for the
collection of the conditions, or the entire series.
21. Therefore the conditioned supposes the unconditioned; the first
given, we can conclude the second. The conditioned is given us in
the external and in the internal world. Therefore there exists an
unconditioned being, whose existence has no reason in any thing outside
of itself.
CHAPTER III.
IMMUTABILITY OF NECESSARY AND UNCONDITIONED BEING.
22. The absolutely necessary and unconditioned is immutable. For
its existence _is_, or, to speak in modern language, is _supposed_
absolutely, by intrinsic necessity, without any condition; and
with this existence its _state_ is also supposed. We abstract for
the present the nature of this state, whether it be of this or
that perfection, this or that degree, or even finite or infinite.
Its existence being supposed unconditionally, its state is
supposed unconditionally also; therefore as its _non-existence_ is
contradictory, (Ch. I.) its _no-state_ is also contradictory. Change
is only a transition from one state to another state which implies
the _no-state_ of the first; therefore change in the necessary is
contradictory.
23. In order to present this in a clearer and more precise manner, we
will call E the necessary and unconditioned being. As E is supposed
absolutely by intrinsic necessity, without any condition, the _not-E_
must be contradictory. E is not abstract but real being, consequently
it must have certain perfections, as intelligence, will, activity,
or any other whatever; and it must have these perfections in a
certain degree, abstracting for the present, whether it be greater or
less, finite or infinite. With the absolute existence of E a state
of perfection, which we shall call N, is also supposed. What has
determined the state N? By the supposition, it can have been determined
by nothing; since the state is unconditioned. Therefore, if the state N
is absolutely and necessarily, the _not-N_ is contradictory. Therefore
the change by which E would pass from N to _not-N_ is contradictory.
24. But let us for a moment suppose a change in the necessary being,
and suppose it to have proceeded from this being itself. As the
reason of the change must be necessary and eternal, we should have to
admit an infinite series of evolutions, and should again fall into
the impossibility of reconciling the infinity of the series with the
existence of any one of its terms.[73]
[73] See Ch. II.
25. Thus it is demonstrated that the necessary and unconditioned being
can suffer no change which would cause it to lose its primitive state.
The necessary being can lose nothing; it cannot pass from N to _not-N_;
but who knows but what it is possible that without losing N, or
passing to _not-N_, it might acquire something which could be united
to N in one way or another. In other words; N being given, _not-N_
is contradictory, but would N + P be contradictory, P expressing a
perfection, or degree of perfection? This would be impossible; because
P which is added must emanate from N; therefore all that is in P was
already in N; therefore there has been no change, and to suppose it is
contradictory.
26. It may be replied that P was in N virtually, and that the new state
only adds a new form. But does this form, as such, involve something
_new_ in reality? Either it does or it does not: if it does not, there
is no change; if it does, it was either contained in N or not contained
in it; if contained in it, there is no change; if not contained in it,
whence does it come?
27. To elude this demonstration, some have imagined various necessary
beings acting on each other, and mutually producing changes in each
other,--by this means they attempt to explain whence the _new_ states
come. But these are not only fictions, and evidently groundless cavils
in contradiction with the principles of ontology, but they may be
destroyed by one conclusive argument.
Let A, B, C, D, be the necessary and unconditioned beings; each
is supposed absolutely, and with primitive states, which we shall
respectively call _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_. Then, taking them in their
primitive state, the collection of the existences will be united with
a collection of necessary and unconditioned states, which we may
represent in this formula: A_a_, B_b_, C_c_, D_d_, (1.) This expression
represents a primitive, necessary, and unconditioned state: now I
ask: whence come the changes? All is unconditioned; how then is the
conditioned, the mutable introduced?
28. The force of the argument is not weakened by supposing the
primitive and mutual action of A, B, C, D, to be implied in the
primitive states _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_. For the mutual actions, being
primitive and absolute, would produce primitively and absolutely a
result in their respective terms. This result would be primitively
necessary, and would be contained in the formula. (1.) Therefore
the formula would suffer no variation by the new supposition; and
consequently there would have been no change of any kind.
29. By imagining that the mutual action does not suppose a primitive
state, but a successive series of states, we fall into the infinite
series, and consequently into the impossibility of arriving at any term
of it, without supposing the infinity to be exhausted, (Ch. II.).
30. Again, the essences of the necessary and unconditioned beings A, B,
C, D, being distinct, what reason is there for supposing them to be in
relations of activity? What is the ground of this relation if they are
all four necessary, unconditioned, and therefore independent of each
other?
31. But let us leave such absurdities, and go on with our analysis of
the idea of a necessary and unconditioned being. Immutability excludes
perfectibility, so that it is necessary either to suppose the summit
of perfection primitively in the necessary being, or to admit that
it can never attain this perfection. Perfectibility is one of the
characteristics of the contingent, which improves its mode of being by
a series of transformations; the absolutely necessary is what it is,
and can be nothing else.
32. The contingent must emanate from the necessary, the conditioned
from the unconditioned; therefore all perfections, of whatever order,
must be found in the necessary and unconditioned being; therefore
all the perfections of existing reality must be in it, at least,
_virtually_, and those which imply no imperfection must be contained in
it _formally_.[74]
[74] See Bk. VIII., Ch. XX. to the end.
33. The possibility of the non-existent must have a foundation;[75]
possible perfections must exist in a real being, if their idea is
possible; therefore the infinite scale of perfections, which we
conceive in the order of pure possibility, besides those which exist,
must be realized in the necessary and unconditioned being.
[75] See Bk. IV., Chs. XXII. to XXVIII., and Bk. V., Chs. VII. and VIII.
CHAPTER IV.
IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.
34. We have the idea of cause; the continual use which we are always
making of it shows this. Philosophers do not alone possess it; it is
the inheritance of mankind. But what do we understand by cause? All
that makes any thing pass from not-being to being, as the effect is all
that which passes from not-being to being. I am not now considering
whether that which passes from not-being to being is substance or
accident, nor the manner in which the cause influences this transition.
Hence the definition includes every class of cause, and every species
of causality.
35. The idea of cause contains:
I. The idea of being.
II. The relation to that which passes from not-being to being, as of a
condition to the conditioned.
The idea of effect contains:
I. The idea of being.
II. The idea of the transition from not-being to being.
III. The relation to the cause, as of the conditioned to the condition.
36. Axiom I.--Nothing cannot be a cause; or in other terms: every cause
is a being, or exists.
37. I say that this is an axiom, because it cannot be demonstrated,
since the predicate existence, is evidently contained in the idea of
cause. That which is a cause, is; if it is not, it is not a cause. To
affirm the cause and deny that it is, is to affirm and deny at the same
time. Therefore this proposition is an axiom. To be convinced of its
truth, we need only to attend to the ideas of cause and effect, and we
see the idea of being evidently contained in the idea of cause. The
explanation which I give must not be regarded as a demonstration, but
as an illustration, for the purpose of better comparing the two ideas.
Whoever compares them as he ought will want no demonstration, he will
see it intuitively, and this is what constitutes the character of an
axiom.
38. Axiom II.--There is no effect without a cause.
39. To understand the sense of this axiom it must be observed, that
here the word _effect_ only means that which passes from not-being
to being, whether it be caused or not; for, if by effect was meant a
thing caused, the axiom would be an identical and useless proposition.
Substituting for effect its meaning, it would be, "There is nothing
caused without being caused,"--which is very true, but of no use. The
sense then is this: whatever passes from not-being to being, requires
something distinct from itself, which produces this transition.
40. I say that this proposition is an axiom, and to be convinced of
it, we need only fix our attention upon the ideas contained in it. Let
us consider a thing that is, and transfer it to the time when it was
not. Let us abstract all that which is not it, let us suppose no other
being which may have produced it or taken part in its production; I
assert that we see evidently that the transition to being, will never
be made. Not only is it impossible for us to make the object emanate
from the pure idea of its not-being, but we also see that it can never
emanate from it. There is no being, no action, no production of any
kind; there is pure nothing; whence will the being emanate? The truth,
of the proposition is then intuitively presented to us: we not only do
not see the possibility of the apparition of being in the pure idea
of not-being by itself, but we see in this idea the impossibility of
this apparition. They are ideas which exclude each other; not-being is
possible only by the exclusion of being, and _vice versa_.
41. When we conceive a productive action, we either refer it to the
thing which from not-being must pass to being, or to something distinct
from this. In the first case, we fall into contradiction; because we
suppose an action and do not suppose it, since there is no action in
pure nothing. Let us suppose that the thing is cause before being; we
then find ourselves in contradiction with Axiom I, (§ 36). In the
second case, we already conceive the cause, since cause is only that
which produces the transition from not-being to being.
42. The common expression, "ex nihilo nihil fit," is a truth, if
understood in the sense of Axiom II.
CHAPTER V.
ORIGIN OF THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY.
43. Are there in the world any cause and effect? This is equivalent to
asking whether there is any change in the world. All change involves a
transition from not-being to being. The least change is inconceivable
without this transition. Whatever is changed is, after changing, in
_another_ way than it was before the change; therefore it has this mode
of being which it had not before. This mode did not exist _before_, it
exists _now_; it has passed, therefore, from not-being to being.
44. Even if we were not in relation with the external world, and our
mind was confined to internal facts alone, to the consciousness of the
_me_ and its modifications, we should know that there is transition
from not-being to being, by the testimony of the successive appearance
of new perceptions and affections. Within ourselves we experience the
ebb and flow of modifications which pass from not-being to being, and
from being to not-being.
45. It is clear, from what has been said, that the ideas of cause and
effect suppose a real or possible order of contingent beings. If there
were only necessary and immutable beings, there could be no causes and
effects.
46. I said (Chap. IV.) that the idea of cause contains the idea of
being and the idea of relation to the not-being which has passed or
passes to being. The idea of cause is not a simple idea; it is composed
of these two. The idea of being alone is not sufficient to constitute
it; for we may conceive being without conceiving cause. What the idea
of cause adds to the idea of being is something distinct from the
idea of being, and not contained in it; it may be called causality,
power, productive force, activity, or any such term; they all express
the relation of one being to realize in another the transition from
not-being to being.
47. In the idea of causality is likewise included another simple idea,
which, though accompanying the idea of being, must not be confounded
with it. If any one should call it a modification of the idea of being,
I should have no objection.
48. Whence does the idea of causality arise? The mere intuition of the
idea of being does not seem sufficient to produce it. The idea of being
is simple, it expresses nothing but being; we can, therefore, find in
it no relation to the transition from not-being to being.
49. Does it, perchance, spring from experience? Here we must
distinguish between the idea of causality, and the knowledge of the
existence of the cause. Experience reveals the succession of beings,
that is, their transition from not-being to being, and _vice versa_.
We have already remarked that in the intuition of not-being with
relation to being we see the impossibility of a transition, without the
mediation of some being which executes it; therefore the certainty of
the existence of the cause arises from experience, combined with the
intuition of the ideas of being and not-being.
50. If this experience did not exist, we should not know that causality
is possible; because in the idea of being, as we possess it, we do
not see the idea of force: we might perhaps conceive the force, but
we could not know whether any thing in reality corresponds to it. We
should thus have the _notion_ of the force, but not the _notice_ of its
existence, nor even the certainty of its possibility.
51. But if we examine it well, this want of experience is an impossible
supposition; because a limited intelligent being, as uniting
intelligence with limitation, feels the succession of its perceptions,
and, consequently, experiences within itself the transition from
a not-being to being. And as, on the other hand, it perceives its
power of combining ideas, it perceives within itself the existence of
causality, of a power which produces its reflections.
52. The exercise of our will, whether with respect to internal or
external acts, likewise gives us the knowledge of the dependence of
some things upon others; and the impressions which we receive without
our will, or against it, confirm us in this conviction. Without this
experience we should see the succession of the phenomena, but should
not know their relations of causality; for it is clear that the
inclination to assign as the cause of a phenomenon that which preceded
it, supposes the idea of cause and the knowledge of the dependence of
the phenomena in the relation of causes and effects.
53. Some philosophers say that man has no idea of the creation, from
which, without intending it, they come to the conclusion that we have
not the idea of any cause. By creation is meant the transition of a
substance from not-being to being, by virtue of the productive action
of another substance. I hold that this is only the idea of causality
in its highest degree, that is, as applied to the production of a
substance; but since therefore we have the idea of cause, the idea
of creation is not a new and inconceivable idea, but a perfection of
an idea which is common to all mankind. We have seen that the idea
of cause contains the idea of producing a transition from not-being
to being; this power is an attribute of every active being, but with
this difference, that finite causes have only the power to produce
modifications, whilst the infinite cause has also the power to produce
substances.
54. Here we find the same thing as in other branches of our
philosophical cognitions: the idea of the essence pertains to reason,
the knowledge of its existence depends on experience. The first is
independent of the second, and we may reason on the essence by means
of the condition of existence, that is, by means of a postulate.[76]
We always have this postulate, if in nothing else, at least in the
phenomena of our consciousness.
[76] See Bk. V., Chs. VII. and VIII.
CHAPTER VI.
FORMULA AND DEMONSTRATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.
55. The principle of causality, or the proposition: all that commences
must have a cause; has been somewhat disputed latterly; hence it is
necessary for us to place it beyond the reach of attack. I believe
it possible to do this, by presenting the doctrine of the preceding
chapters under a clear point of view, which shall drive away all doubt
and clear up all difficulty. I beg the reader's attention for a few
moments to the argument which I am going to propose.
56. Let us take any being, A. In order that the principle of causality
may be applied to it it is necessary that it should have begun to be,
and that it should not have existed before; for, if we do not suppose
this beginning, A must have existed always.
We can then assign a duration in which A was not, and in which there
was not-A. Therefore in the order of duration there has been a little
series of two terms:
not-A ... A.
To begin is to pass from the first term, not-A to A. The principle of
causality says: the transition from the first term to the second is not
possible without the intervention of a third term, B, which must be
something real.
57. What does the term not-A represent by itself alone? the pure
negation of A, the mere nonentity of A. In the conception of not-A,
instead of A, we find its contradictory term; so that, instead of the
second being contained in the former, they mutually exclude each other,
and make the proposition: it is impossible for not-A and A to exist at
the same time, absolutely true. Thus it is impossible for A ever to
emanate from the conception not-A, and consequently without a real term
to produce the transition it is impossible to pass from not-A to A,
even in the purely ideal order.
58. Observe, however, that I do not pretend to say that, conceiving
not-A so as to deny A as known, it would be impossible to conceive
A; for it is evident that whoever conceives not-A, must have just
conceived A, and he might conceive it entirely alone, by simply
destroying the negation; but I say that on the supposition that there
is an absolute conception of not-A, conformed to the absolute objective
not-A, A could never emanate from this conception; and if we reflect on
it we shall see that there could not even be this conception, since the
thought of pure negation is no thought, no conception. There would then
be an absolute absence of conception; and in the purely ideal order,
we should find ourselves in the first term of the series, in a pure
negation, in not-A, without any means of passing to the second term, A.
59. Those, then, who deny the principle of causality, conceive the
transition from not-A to A without any reason, or any intermediary:
those who deny creation, admit what is a thousand times more
incomprehensible than creation. Whence do they infer the possibility of
this transition? Not from experience; because experience presents only
succession, and therefore not absolute appearance in the manner which
they suppose: not from reason; because reason cannot make a positive
conception emanate from a pure negation.
60. How is the transition from not-A to A effected? Those who admit
the principle of causality, say it is effected by the action of B,
which they call the cause. If it is a substance which is produced, they
suppose the intervention of an infinite power. But those who deny the
principle of causality can only answer that the transition from not-A
to A is made absolutely. They imagine the instant M, in which A did
not exist; and then the instant N, in which A exists. But why? They
allege no reason: without their knowing how, A has arisen from nothing,
without the action of any thing. This is a manifest contradiction.
61. The principle of causality is founded on the pure ideas of being
and not-being. Suppose only not-being, and we see evidently that
being cannot begin. The principle then is purely ontological: those
who, in order to establish, or oppose it, appeal _only_ to reasons of
experience, put the question badly; they take it from its true field;
they confound the _notice_ of causality with the _notion_ or idea of
causality.
Those philosophers who keep within the sensible order, cannot give a
solid foundation to this principle; for this reason, they who admit
no other ideas than sensations, have all fallen into errors or doubts
on this point; and all sensists would have fallen into the same doubt
if they had only been logical enough to draw the last consequences of
their doctrine.
CHAPTER VII.
THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECEDENCY.
62. The transition from not-being to being implies succession: to
conceive that something begins, we must conceive that something did not
exist. The series
not-A, A,
has no sense if either term is wanting; and these terms, inasmuch as
they are contradictory, cannot exist at the same time.
63. Let us imagine absolute nothingness. The first term, not-A, stands
alone. All existence is denied: nothing can be affirmed without
contradicting the supposition. Then there is no time; for time being
only the succession of things, or of being and not-being,[77] cannot
exist when there is nothing which can succeed. If we suppose any thing
to begin, we establish the series not-A, A; in which case we imagine
two different instants M and N, to which the terms of the series
respectively correspond in this manner:
[77] See Bk. VII.
not-A .. A.
M .... N.
It may be said with truth: M is not N. What is the meaning of this
proposition? Since time and duration in general is not distinct from
the things that endure[78], N can only represent the existence of A,
in relation to not-A; M in the same manner can represent only not-A,
in relation to A. Hence the conception of A, in so far as it begins,
contains the relation to not-A, without which it could not be conceived
as _begun_.
[78] See Bk. VII., Chs. IV. and V.
64. What we have explained is conceivable on the supposition at least
of one intelligence; because this intelligence would refer not-A
and A to their proper duration, successively, if this duration were
successive like ours; in some other way, if this duration were not
successive. But if there is absolutely nothing, the series, not-A ...
A, is inconceivable, since the relation of A, in so far as it begins,
has no real or conceived term of comparison, unless we imagine a pure
time, entirely empty, in which we suppose the terms of the series to be
placed.
65. Thus it seems that by the mere fact of thinking A, in so far
as begun, we think also a preceding existence, because there is no
beginning unless not-A preceded A; and this precedence means nothing
unless there is an existence to which it relates, either as to a
successive series, or as to an immutable duration.
66. If A must be preceded by an existence B, then nothing can begin
independently of a preceding existence, or unless something already
exists; or the simple conception of succession implies the necessity of
something _always_ existing, in order that something may begin.
67. As duration is nothing distinct from things, the two terms of
the series, B, A, of which one precedes the other, cannot be placed
in an absolute duration distinct from the things themselves, as in
two distinct instants, independently of the things. The relation,
then, which exists between B and A is not a relation of one instant
to another, since the instants in themselves are nothing, but of one
thing to another. Therefore A, inasmuch as it begins, has a necessary
relation to B. Therefore B is the necessary condition of the existence
of A. Therefore it is demonstrated that every being which begins,
depends on an existent being.
68. This demonstration, though differently developed, is found in
the works of Baron Pascual Galuppi, Professor of Philosophy in the
University of Naples;[79] and although it is impossible to deny that
it is very profound, still it does not leave the understanding wholly
satisfied. These are the words of the Italian philosopher:
[79] _Lett. filos. sulle vicissit. della filosofia_, Lettera XIV.
"Is the proposition: there is no effect without a cause, an identical
proposition? I have demonstrated its identity in this manner: whatever
has a beginning of existence must have been preceded either by an
empty time or by a being; because otherwise the thing of which we are
speaking would be the first existence, and the first letter of the
alphabet of beings, and it could not be said that it begins to be, for
the notion of _beginning of existence_ implies a priority in relation
to the being which begins. These two notions, _existence begun_, and
_existence preceded by another_, are then identical; but is it possible
for an existence to be preceded by an empty time? I have proved that
an empty duration is a chimera, a product of the imagination, without
any reality. The development of this proof, which I shall not give in
this place, may be found in my _Essays on the Critique of Knowledge_.
I have there established that time is nothing else than the _number
of productions_. Aristotle said that time was the _number of motion_.
Therefore an _existence begun is an existence preceded by another
existence_. This proposition is identical; but how can an existence
be preceded by another? Is that which precedes, perchance, found in
an instant of time prior to that in which that which is preceded is
found? Then we fall again into the doctrine of a time distinct from
existent things. Thus we must admit that the existence which precedes
is such as to make the existence preceded _existence begun_. It is not
begun because it is preceded; the _priority_ of the existence which
precedes, is a priority of _nature_, an objective priority, which makes
the beginning of the existence which is preceded; it is therefore
the _efficient cause_ of this existence. Thus the great principle
of causality stands invincibly demonstrated,--it is an identical
proposition."
69. I say again that this demonstration does not leave one wholly
satisfied; not because it is not conclusive in itself, but because
it needs greater development. The nerve of the proof is in the
impossibility of conceiving a _beginning_, without conceiving something
pre-existent; or to conceive precedency, without the relation of that
which begins to that which pre-exists. It is not easy to conceive how
from this may be inferred the intrinsic dependence of the things;
and founding the argument upon so difficult an idea as that of time,
greatly increases the doubt.
70. Let us suppose the world to exist, and something to begin now.
Precedence is then conceived without dependence. This, in fact,
happens continually; since beings are continually beginning which are
preceded by others on which they do not depend. It may be said that
they do not depend on all those which precede them, but still they
depend on one of them. This is precisely what is to be proved. In
order to prove that the principle of causality is demonstrated by the
mere idea of the order of duration, it is necessary to prove that the
relation of precedence is a relation of dependence. That which begins
supposes something: certainly; but it remains to be proved that it
depends on this thing as on something producing it, and not only as on
a condition which makes the conception of beginning possible for us.
Until it is proved that the _action_ of a being is indispensable for
the transition from not-being to being, the principle of causality does
not seem to be proved, but only that of precedency; and as the order
of things in duration, as priority and posteriority, can represent no
other dependence than that of pure succession, it would follow that if
we should confine ourselves to precedency, we should not prove that
every thing that begins must depend on another, but that every thing
that begins must succeed another; this last is not the principle of
causality, but of succession.
71. We will make these ideas clearer. The difficulty raised against
the former demonstration will be better understood, if we observe
that those who reject the principle of causality, do not conceive it
impossible for _any_ thing to begin at _any_ moment without any cause.
Let us represent the successive beings of the universe by the series
... A, B, C, D, E, ... and the times in which they exist, by the series
... _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_.... According to the demonstration which we
are examining, no term could have begun, unless another had preceded
it; wherefore, D _begun_ means the same as D _preceded_. Therefore D
has a necessary relation to C, because the instants _d_ and _c_ are
nothing in themselves, as distinguished from D and C.
Any one who does not admit the principle of causality will say that
D may begin without any dependence on C; and that in order that the
conception of beginning may be possible, it is only necessary that
there should _always_ have been something existing, although the terms
_preceding_ and those _preceded_ have no relation to each other. Thus
as the order of beings is represented by the series ... A, B, C, D,
E, ... another series ... M, N, P, Q, R, ... may be imagined, to both
of which the series ... _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, ... corresponds.
Then D may begin without any _necessary_ dependence on C, for it is
sufficient that P pre-exists at the instant _c_, in order to make the
conception of beginning possible for us; in which case, D will have
no _necessary_ relation, either to C or to P; since the precedence
of either is sufficient. And as it is evident that what we have said
of C and P may be said of any other terms of these or other series,
it follows that the demonstration only leads us to the necessity of
conceiving something _pre-existent_; and this only in order to make
the conception of a beginning possible. If to this we add the peculiar
difficulty proceeding from the nature of the ideas of time and of all
duration, I think we must conclude that the demonstration is not so
satisfactory as might be desired. Those who have not examined the idea
of time very profoundly will scarcely understand the meaning of the
proof; the others will see the contradiction involved in an absolute
beginning demonstrated, and therefore the necessity of something having
been _always_ existing; but not the intrinsic dependence implied in
the relation of an effect to a cause. These difficulties render a more
rigorous and profound examination necessary.
72. The principle of precedency leads us to an important result. Our
understanding conceives absolutely an external existence; since it is
impossible for it to conceive an absolute beginning without a preceding
being.
73. The conception of absolute nothing is impossible. I. Because this
conception would be entirely void, or rather, the absence of all
conception. We conceive negation relatively to an existence,[80] but
not absolutely. II. Because a conception is not possible without
consciousness, and consciousness implies the idea of a being, of
something, and this is contradictory of absolute nothing.
[80] See Book V., Chap. IX.
74. Unable to conceive absolute nothing, we always conceive something
existing; and since, as we have demonstrated, we cannot conceive an
absolute beginning, it follows that we cannot think without our thought
implying an eternal existence.
How luminous a truth! What reflections it inspires! Let us continue to
meditate on it.
75. Hence the necessity of thinking the necessary and eternal is a
primitive fact of our mind, and the confusion which we feel in thinking
on duration in the abstract, and the inclination to imagine time
before the world existed, arise from the necessity of conceiving the
eternal,--a necessity, from which our mind cannot emancipate itself so
long as it thinks.
76. The basis of the principle of contradiction, the idea of being,
is found in our conceptions in an absolute manner; its opposite, the
conception of not-being is found only in relation to the contingent,
and is a sort of condition implied by contingency.
77. Every thing contingent includes some not-being, so far as
contingent it can _not be_, and therefore its not-being is at least
in the order of possibility. But these transitions from not-being to
being are not even conceivable without presupposing something existing,
necessary, and eternal.
78. Thus in our ideas we find being as absolute, and not-being only as
relative; and we can conceive being which has proceeded from not-being,
or has begun, only in relation to an absolute being.
79. This relation considered objectively does not seem at first sight
to be the relation of causality, but only of succession; but it
presents a subjective fact which brings us to the knowledge of the
objective truth. Our conceptions of not-being and being are connected
in such sort that we cannot conceive the transition from not-being to
being without conceiving a pre-existent being: here we find a reflex
of objective causality which is revealed to us in subjective facts.
Duration, as distinct from things, is a pure imagination; the relation
of durations is therefore a relation of beings. True, in this relation
of durations we discover only succession, and not intrinsic dependence;
but this dependence, though not known intuitively, is represented in
the very connection in which we conceive beings in duration. It is
certain that we can imagine different series; but that of time is a
pure imagination in so far as we conceive it distinct from others.
If the series of times disappears, there remains only the series of
things: the relation between the terms will be the relation between the
things; and what is called the dependence of _succession_ will be the
dependence of _reality_. The real relation of that which passes from
not-being to being, with that which is absolutely, is a dependence of
causality.
80. Let us imagine any series of realities. A, B, C, D, E, ... M, N, P,
Q, R....
The series of times _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, in so far as distinct
from the others, means nothing. In this case it may be eliminated, and
all the relations of some of the terms on others will be relations of
things, not of time.
Now, it has been demonstrated that a term, D, for example, cannot
be conceived as passing from not-being to being, or as beginning,
without a relation, and it has been shown that this relation is a real
relation of D to any of the terms. It has been objected that D, in
order to begin, requires only a term which would make the conception of
priority, and consequently, of beginning, possible, which term might be
sought in another distinct series; but this is really only to change a
name; for, if the term which is necessary for the beginning is found in
another series, the cause is found in it also, for in it is found that
which is necessary for the effect.
81. All the terms begun presuppose another, either one or more, for
we here abstract their unity; therefore we must come at last to one
or more terms not begun. Those which have begun could not have begun
without the existence of those which have not begun; therefore the
existence of these is necessary for the existence of those. Therefore
the existence of these last contains the reasons of the beginning of
the existence of the others; therefore they contain true causality.
82. The difficulties opposed to this demonstration arise from
inadvertently violating the supposition by attributing to duration an
existence distinct from the beings. In order to perceive the whole
force of the proof, it is necessary to eliminate entirely the imaginary
conception of pure duration: and then it will be seen that the
dependence represented as the relation of duration is the dependence of
the beings themselves,--a dependence which represents nothing else than
the relation expressed by the principle of causality.
83. After completely eliminating the conception of pure duration as a
thing distinct from the beings, there remains only the transition from
not-being to being as all that is expressed by the word, beginning.
In this case we find that the principle of precedency is the same as
the principle of causality; and as we have had to abstract entirely
duration in itself in order to solve the difficulties, we find that if
the principle of causality is to be placed beyond all doubt, and to be
regarded as an axiom, it can only rest on the contradiction between
not-being and being, or the impossibility of conceiving a being which
suddenly makes its appearance, without any thing more than a pure
not-being preceding it.
84. Thus, after examining the question on every side, we come to what
we established in the preceding chapters: a not-being cannot arrive
at being without the intervention of a being: the series not-A, A, is
impossible without the intervention of a being, B. We find it so even
in our ideas, and to contradict this truth is to deny our reason.
I believe, then, that the principle of causality is completely
explained only in the manner in which we have treated it in the
preceding chapters. To begin supposes a not-being of that which
begins; and it is impossible and contradictory to deduce being from
the conception of not-being. The principle is true subjectively,
because it is founded on our ideas; but it is also true objectively,
because in these cases objectiveness is necessarily joined with
subjectiveness.[81] The being which suddenly appears, without a cause,
without a reason, without any thing, is an absurd representation which
our intellect rejects as instantly and as strongly as it accepts the
principle of contradiction.
[81] See Bk. I., Chap. XXV.
As time is the relation of not-being to being--the order of the
variable--it is a contradiction to conceive succession without any
thing which pre-exists; and thus the principle of precedency confirms
the principle of causality; or rather, it shows that the two are one,
though presented under different aspects: the principle of precedency
relates to duration, that of causality to being; but both of them
express an application of the fundamental principle: it is impossible
for the same thing to be and not be at the same time.
CHAPTER VIII.
CAUSALITY IN ITSELF.--INSUFFICIENCY AND ERROR OF SOME EXPLANATIONS.
85. Causality implies relation: if in exercise, it implies actual
relation; considered not in exercise, but _in potentia_, it implies a
possible relation. Nothing causes itself; causality always relates to
another. There is no cause where there is no effect; and there is no
effect where there is no transition from not-being to being. If this
transition takes place in a substance which was not, but begins to be,
it is called creation; and is said to be passive, relatively to the
effect, and active, in relation to the cause. If the transition is of
accidents only, the effect is a _new_ modification; we do not then say
that there is a new being, but that the being is _in another manner_.
86. From this it may be inferred that causality is not the same
as activity: all causality is activity, but not all activity is
causality. God is active in himself; but he is cause only in relation
to the external. His intelligence and his will are certainly infinite
activity, considered in themselves, and abstracted from creation, as
we conceive God from all eternity before the beginning of the world;
yet, inasmuch as they are purely immanent, they are causality, for they
produce nothing new in God. His intelligence is a pure act, infinitely
perfect, and can never suffer any change; the same must be said of
his will: therefore the divine intelligence and will with respect to
God himself are not acts of causality. Even as referred to external
objects, they are a producing cause in reality, only by subjection to
the free will of the Creator; for otherwise we should have to admit
that God created the world necessarily.
Activity in creatures, even in immanent operations, is always
causality; for they cannot exercise their activity without producing
new modifications. Acts of understanding and will are the exercise of
an immanent activity, and yet they modify us in different ways. When we
think or will we are in _a different manner_ from that in which we are
when we do not think or will; and when we pass from thinking or willing
one thing to think or will another, this transition cannot take place
without our experiencing _new modes_ of being.
87. In what does the relation of efficient causality consist? What is
the meaning of the dependence of the effect in relation to the cause?
This is a difficult and a profound question; one of the most difficult
and most profound which can be presented to science. The majority of
men and even of philosophers imagine that they can solve it, by using
words which, rightly analyzed, explain nothing.
88. To cause, it is said, is to give being. What means to give? To give
is here synonymous with to produce. What means to produce? With this
the explanations are at an end, unless one should wish to fall into a
vicious circle, saying that to produce is to cause or give being.
A cause, it is also said, is that from which a thing results. What is
understood by resulting? To emanate. What is to emanate? To emanate is
to proceed, to flow from another. Always the same thing: metaphorical
expressions which at bottom have all the same meaning.
It is said that a cause is that which _gives_, _produces_, _makes_,
_communicates_, _generates_, etc., and that an effect is that which
_receives_, _proceeds_, _emanates_, _results_, _flows_, _comes_,
_springs_, etc.
89. Causality implies succession, but is not identified with it. We can
clearly conceive that B is after A, without A being the cause of B.
Internal and external experience present continual examples of
succession distinct from causality. A man goes out into the field,
another follows him: between the going out of both there is succession,
but there may be no causality. The two phenomena, whether considered
objectively in themselves, or subjectively, as known by us, are
connected by the relation of succession, but not by that of causality.
There is as great a difference in philosophy as in ordinary language
between _post_ and _propter_, _after_ and _because_ of. The same is
true in purely internal phenomena. I think of a question of philosophy,
and then pass to a literary question: the two thoughts are successive,
but one is not the cause of the other.
90. The relation of causality is not the connection of the ideas of
things. The representations of A and B may be strongly connected in
our mind without our even thinking of the relation of causality. We
have seen in a place a scene which made a profound impression on us;
ever afterwards the remembrance of the place recalls the scene, and
the recollection of the scene reminds us of the place; here we find
two internal representations strongly connected, without our therefore
attributing to the objects the relation of causality. We know that two
persons arrive at the same place and without the coming of the one
influencing the coming of the other. The idea of the coming of the
one will be associated in the mind with the idea of the coming of the
other. There will then be a connection of representations, although we
deny to the objects the relation of causality.
91. Although the connection of the ideas in our understanding may,
in consequence of a constant experience, be such that one is always
preceded by the other, as the conditioned is by the condition, this
is not enough for true causality. An observer may have remarked the
correspondence of the ebb and flow of the tide with the motion of the
moon; but whether for reasons of philosophy, or because it has never
occurred to him that the motion of the moon could influence the motion
of the sea, he considers these phenomena entirely independent of one
another, although he may try hard to explain so strange a coincidence.
In the mind of this observer the two phenomena will be always joined,
in such a way that the phenomenon of the moon will always be that of
the ebb and flow, without its being possible to invert the order and
make the ebb and flow precede the motion of the moon. Here then is a
necessary priority in an idea, and yet true causality is not attributed
to the object.
92. There is a fact in the history of philosophy which proves with the
greatest evidence the truth of what I have just said. This fact is the
system of occasional causes maintained by eminent philosophers. If a
body, they say, strike another body at rest, it will communicate to it
its motion; but this communication does not imply a true causality, but
that the motion of the impinging body is a mere occasion of the motion
of the body impinged. Here then a thing is conceived as a necessary
condition of the existence of another, and yet it is denied that there
is between them the relation of causality. In thinking of the two
phenomena we cannot invert the order, and conceive the motion of the
body impinged as the condition of the motion of the impinging body,
yet we can deny the relation of causality between the condition and
the conditioned. Therefore the idea of causality represents something
besides the necessary order of things among themselves.
93. This brings us to a new phasis of the question. Is the relation of
causality faithfully represented in the conditional proposition: if
A exists, B will exist? The connection expressed by this proposition
is not the relation of causality. If the fruit-tree N flourishes in a
certain country, M will flourish. A constant experience proves it. The
conditional proposition in this case does not express the relation of
causality of the flourishing of N with respect to the flourishing of
M; yet the proposition is true. One phenomenon may be the sign of the
immediate approach of another, without being its cause.
94. Conditional propositions, in which the existence of one object
is affirmed as the condition of the existence of another, express a
connection; but this may not be a connection of the objects with each
other, but with a third. If a gentleman's servant goes to a place, and
then another servant of the same gentleman goes to the same place, the
cause of the going of the second may not be the going of the first, but
simply that their master wished them to go one after the other. The
crops in one field indicate the state of the crops of another field,
and this indication may be expressed by a conditional proposition.
Why so? Is it on account of the causality of the crops in one field
in relation to those in another? Certainly not; but because the
circumstances of the climate and the soil produce a sufficiently fixed
order between them to verify the conditional proposition, without the
intervention of the idea of the causality of one in relation to the
other.
95. There are many cases in which the relation between the condition
is necessary, and yet the condition neither is, nor can be, the
cause of the conditioned. We are here treating of efficient cause,
of that which gives being to the thing, and it would often be absurd
to attribute this kind of causality to conditions which on the other
side are necessarily connected with the conditioned. Take away the
pillar on which a body rests, and the body will fall; the connection of
the condition with the conditioned, or of the taking away the pillar
with the fall of the body is necessary; the proposition in which this
connection is expressed is true and necessary in the natural order;
and still it cannot be said that the removal of the pillar is the
_efficient_ cause of the fall of the body.
96. Even a purely occasional connection is all that is necessary for
the truth of the conditional proposition; and no one ever confounds
the occasion with the cause. In the present example, the body cannot
fall unless the pillar is removed; and it must necessarily fall if it
is removed; but the cause of the fall is not in the removal of the
pillar, but in the weight of the body, as is evident if we suppose the
specific gravity of the body to be equal to that of the fluid in which
it is submerged, since in that case, the removal of the pillar is not
followed by the fall of the body.
97. Causality cannot express a necessary relation of the condition to
the conditioned, unless we deny all free causes. Supposing the idea of
causality to be correctly expressed in this proposition: if A exists,
B will exist; by substituting God and the world for A and B, it will
become: if God exists the world will exist; which would lead us into
the error of the necessity of the creation. By substituting man and
determinate actions for A and B, we shall have the proposition: if man
exists, his determinate actions will exist, which implies necessity,
and destroys free will.
98. Here arises the question: would the relation of causality be
correctly expressed by a conditional proposition, taken in an inverse
sense, or with the effect, as the condition and the cause as the
conditioned, (not conditioned in the order of existence, but only as
a thing necessarily supposed,) that is, if, instead of saying: if A
exists, B will exist, we say: if B exists, A exists? In this case, the
proposition may be applied even to the dependence of creatures on God,
and in general of all free actions on their causes; for we can say with
truth: if the world exists, God exists; if there is a free action,
there is a free agent.
99. Although at first sight this seems to explain the relation of
causality, this new formula cannot be regarded as correct. For, though
it is true in general, that if there is an effect there is a cause,
it is also certain that oftentimes one thing supposes another, not
as its cause, but as a mere occasion, as a condition _sine qua non_;
which is far from being true causality. Supposing the body supported
by the pillar to be so placed that it cannot fall unless the pillar
is removed, we might form the conditional proposition: if the body
has fallen, the pillar has been taken away; the proposition is true,
although the removal of the pillar is not the efficient cause of the
fall of the body.
100. God could have so created the world that creatures would have no
true action of causality upon one another, and yet have so arranged
them that the phenomena would correspond with each other in the same
manner as they now do. This is the opinion of defenders of the doctrine
of occasional causes, and to this is reduced the _pre-established
harmony_ of Leibnitz, according to which all the monads constituting
the universe are like so many clocks, which, though independent of one
another, agree with admirable exactness. On this hypothesis we might
form infinite conditional propositions expressing the correspondence of
the phenomena without the idea of causality entering into any of them.
101. From what has been said we must infer that this idea is something
distinct from the necessary connection, and that it is not correctly
expressed in all its purity by the relation contained in the
conditional propositions, whether the cause be taken as the condition
or as the conditioned. The dependence of the effect on its cause is
something more than the simple connection. To say that whatever is
necessarily connected, even successively and in a fixed order, is
connected by the relation of causality, is to confound the ideas of
common language as well as those of philosophy.
CHAPTER IX.
NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS OF TRUE ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY.
102. We have just seen that the necessary connection of two objects is
not enough to establish the character of causality; what circumstances
are then necessary?
103. If we conceive an object, B, which begins, and suppose that the
object A was _necessary_ to its existence, and that _of itself alone_
it was sufficient for the existence of B, we find in the relation of
A to B the true character of the relation of a cause to its effect.
For the complete character of _absolute_ cause, two conditions are
indispensable: I. The necessity of the existence of A for the existence
of B. II. That the existence of A be sufficient for the existence of B,
without any thing more being requisite.
These conditions may be expressed in the following propositions or
formulas:
If B exists, A exists.
The existence of A alone is sufficient for the existence of B.
When the relation between two objects is such that both these
propositions are true at the same time, there is a relation of absolute
causality.
104. From this explanation it is evident that the character of cause
must be denied to all mere occasions, since the second proposition
cannot be applied to them. When two facts are occasionally connected,
it may be said that if the one exists the other must exist, and the
first proposition is verified in this case; but it cannot be said that
the existence of the one is sufficient for the existence of the other;
and therefore the second proposition fails of its application. If two
men have agreed that the one shall fire a pistol when the other gives
a signal with his hand, it may be said that if the signal is given the
pistol will be fired, but not that the signal alone contains what is
sufficient for the firing of the pistol. For, supposing the man with
the pistol to be asleep, the signal may be repeated a number of times
without the firing of the pistol.
105. The character of cause must also be denied to every condition
which is only the removal of an obstacle (_removens prohibens_). To
such the first proposition is applicable, but not the second. In the
case of a body resting on a pillar so that it cannot fall unless the
pillar be removed, we may say: if the body has fallen, the pillar has
been taken away; but not that the removal of the pillar is sufficient
for the fall of the body; because if the body were of a less specific
gravity than the fluid in which it is submerged, or united to another
body which would prevent its falling, it would not fall. It is evident
that the removal of the obstacle is not sufficient for the fall, but
that something more is required, as the force of gravity, or an impulse.
106. All phenomena connected in succession of time necessarily and in
a fixed order, must be denied the relation of cause and effect, unless
the application of these ideas is made legitimate by something else;
because, although the constant order authorizes us to say that if A
happens, B will happen, and then C, and then D, and so on successively,
it cannot be said that in the existence of A is contained that which is
sufficient for the existence of B, nor in the existence of B what is
sufficient for the existence of C, since we suppose an indispensable
condition outside of the series.
107. The first proposition: if B exists, A exists; is true of every
cause whether necessary or free. The second proposition is likewise
applicable to both these classes of causes. It is necessary to observe
with care that the proposition does not say that if A exists, B will
exist; but that the existence of A is all that is requisite in order
that B _may_ exist. If, supposing A, B is necessarily supposed also,
the cause is necessary; but if, supposing A, only that which is
sufficient for the existence of B is supposed, the cause remains free;
because the existence of B is not affirmed, but only the possibility of
its existence.
108. Let us apply this doctrine to the first cause. If the world
exists, God exists: this proposition is absolutely true. If God exists,
the world exists; this proposition is false, because, God existing,
the world might not have existed. If God exists, the world may exist;
that is, in the existence of God is contained that which is sufficient
for the possibility of the existence of the world: this proposition
is true; because in the infinite being is contained the possibility
of finite beings, and in him is found sufficient power to give them
existence, if he thus freely wills it.
CHAPTER X.
SECONDARY CAUSALITY.
109. In determining in the last chapter the conditions of true
causality, I spoke only of _absolute_ causality; the reason of this,
which I shall now explain, turns on the difference between the first
cause and second causes.
110. We have seen that the pure idea of absolute causality is the
perception of three conditions: the necessity of one thing for the
existence of another; the sufficiency of the first alone for the
existence of the second; and lastly (when the cause is free) the act
of the will necessary for the production of the effect. These three
conditions are fulfilled absolutely in the first cause, since nothing
can exist unless God exists; and for the existence of any object
the existence of God, with the free will of creating the object, is
sufficient. It is evident that causality cannot be applied in the
same sense to second causes; of none of them can it be said that its
existence is absolutely necessary for the existence of the effect,
since God could have produced it either by means of another secondary
agent, or immediately by himself; neither is its existence alone
sufficient for the existence of the effect, since whatever exists
presupposes and requires the existence of the first cause.
111. Thus, then, the idea of causality applied to God has a very
different meaning from that which it has when applied to second causes:
it is necessary to bear this in mind, and not to raise questions
concerning second causes before the meaning of the word _cause_ is
strictly defined. It is certain that the relation of an effect to its
cause is a relation of dependence; but we have seen that the words
dependence, connection, condition, etc., are susceptible of different
meanings; if they are not clearly and strictly determined it is
impossible to give any solution to these questions.
112. What then is meant by secondary causality? After the observations
which we have made, it is not difficult to say. In the order of created
beings A will be the cause of B when the following conditions are
fulfilled.
I. That the existence of A is necessary (according to the order
established) for the existence of B; which may be expressed by this
formula: if B exists, A exists or has existed.
II. That in the order established B and A form a series which goes back
to the first cause, without the concurrence of the terms of any other
series being requisite.
This last condition will not, perhaps, be understood, unless explained
by some examples.
113. The motion of my pen is the effect of the motion of my hand; here
I have the true relation of secondary causality, for I pass through
a series of conditions, which do not require the conditions of any
other series: the motion of the pen depends on the motion of my hand;
that of my hand depends on the animal spirits (or whatever cause
physiologists may please to assign); that of the animal spirits depends
on the command of my will; and my will depends on God, who created it,
and preserves it. I here find a series of second causes to which I
give the true character of causality, in so far as it can exist in a
secondary order; and the efficient cause, the principal among secondary
causes is my will; because in the secondary order of it is the first
term of the series. The motion of the pen of my secretary depends on
my will, not however as its true efficient cause, but as its occasion;
because in the secretary is found the same series as in the former
example: the first term of this series is his will, which I cannot
absolutely determine, since being free, it determines itself. There is
true efficient causality in the will of the secretary; because there
ends the series whose first term is at my disposal only in an improper
sense, that is to say, so long as the secretary pleases.
114. The body, A, in motion strikes upon the body, B at rest: the
motion of the body A is the cause of the motion of the body B, and the
causality will be found in all the terms of the series, that is, in
all the motions whose successive communication has been necessary in
order that the motion might reach the body B. Let us suppose that in
the series of these communications obstacles have been removed which
impeded the communication of the motion; the removal of the obstacles
is an indispensable condition on the supposition that they existed,
but it is not a true cause, since it is a term foreign to the series
of the communications, and might not have existed, without the motion
therefore ceasing to exist. For, supposing there had been no obstacles,
they would not have been removed, and yet the motion would have been
communicated. But it is not the same with respect to the terms which
form the series of the communications; for if we represent them by A.
B. C. D. E. F. . . . . . . . . . the motion of A cannot reach F if one
of the intermediate bodies serving as the vehicle of the communication
be taken away.
115. From this theory it follows that the idea of secondary causality
represents a concatenation of various objects forming a series, which
terminates in the first cause, whether by a necessary order, as in the
phenomena of corporeal nature, or by the medium of a first term in the
secondary order with a determination of its own, as is the case in
things which depend on free will.
CHAPTER XI.
FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE OBSCURITY OF IDEAS IN WHAT
RELATES TO CAUSALITY.
116. It may be asked, of what nature is this connection of the terms of
the series; _how_ one communicates with another; _what_ it is which is
communicated; by virtue _of what quality_ they are placed in relation.
All these questions arise from a confusion of ideas which has been the
occasion of interminable disputes. In order to avoid them we must
remember the difference between intuitive and discursive knowledge,
and between determinate and indeterminate, intuitive and not-intuitive
ideas, as explained in its proper place.[82]
[82] See Bk. IV., Chaps. XI., XIII., XIV., XV., XVI., XIX., XX., XXI., and
XXII.
117. I there said[83] that the pure intellect may exercise its
functions by indeterminate ideas, or those representing general
relations which are not applied to any real or possible object, until
a determination furnished by experience is added to them.[84] The idea
of cause is indeterminate;[85] and, consequently, taken in general, it
cannot be presented to us without the relation of being and not-being,
or of beings united among themselves by a certain necessity, but in
an absolute indeterminate manner.[86] Therefore the idea of cause
is not enough to determine the character of this activity and its
means of communication; this idea by itself can tell us nothing of
the particular; it can only teach us certain truths _a priori_; the
application of these truths to beings rests on experience.
[83] See Bk. IV., Chap. XXI.
[84] Ib., § 135.
[85] Ib., § 134.
[86] Ib., § 130.
118. I said[87] that our intuition is confined to passive sensibility,
active sensibility, intelligence, and will; whatever lies outside
of this sphere we can know only by indeterminate conceptions, and,
consequently, it is impossible for us to expose to the intuition of
another that which we feel to be wanting to our own. We may develop
this doctrine farther by applying it to the philosophical questions on
causality.
[87] Ib., Chap. XXII.
119. There have been great disputes as to whether bodies exercise a
true action on each other; and those who hold the negative are always
asking, _how_ one body can cause any thing in another? _what_ that
is which is transmitted, and what is the _character_ of its active
quality? Various replies have been made; but I greatly doubt if it
is possible to make any which is satisfactory, without considering
the doctrine which I have just explained,--what answer, then, can
be made? It is this: we know nothing intuitively of bodies except
passive sensibility, which, in the last result, is only extension
with its various modifications.[88] Now these modifications are
reduced to figure and motion; whatever would make us depart from
these two intuitions, requiring an explanation with characteristic
determinations, would ask for that which is beyond the power of man.
The limits of our intuition on this point are confined to extension and
motion, and their relations to our sensibility; we must, therefore, be
contented with observing the phenomena of bodies, and subjecting them
to calculation within the circle of this intuition: all beyond this
is impossible. We know that the body A moves with a certain velocity,
which we measure by the relation of space to time; when it arrives at
the place where it meets B, B moves in a corresponding direction and
with a corresponding velocity. Here there is a succession of phenomena
in time and space; the phenomena are subject to constant laws, which
are known by experience. Our intuitive cognitions go no farther; when
we attempt to go beyond this we find the general relations of being
and not-being, of being _before_ and being _after_, of condition and
conditioned, which present nothing determinate by which we can explain
the true character of secondary causality.
[88] Ib., § 139.
120. Philosophy, when treating of bodies, is limited to what is
strictly called physics; when it attempts to rise to the region of
metaphysics bodies disappear, in so far as they are phenomena subject
to sensible observation, and there remains only the general and
indeterminate ideas of them.
121. As regards the sensitive faculty, we are in some sort passive,
inasmuch as we receive the impressions which we call sensations.
Whatever activity we possess in sensation does not depend on our free
will, supposing that we are subject to the conditions of sensibility.
If you put your hand in the fire it is impossible for you not to
experience the sensation of heat. In what regards the causality which
we have as to the reproduction of past sensations or the production of
new sensible sensations, it is vain to ask us the _manner_ in which
we exercise this activity: its exercise is a part of consciousness;
all we know about it is that it exists in such or such a manner in our
consciousness.
122. The same may be said of the elaboration of ideas. None of the
philosophers can explain the _manner_ of this immanent production;
ideological investigations go no farther than the characterizing and
classifying these phenomena and showing the order of their succession;
they can tell us nothing concerning the manner in which they are
produced.
123. The exercise of the will presents to our intuition, or if you
please, to our consciousness, another series of phenomena, of the
manner of the production of which we know nothing. Consciousness
testifies that the free principle which exercises this activity is
within us: this is all that we know about it. These phenomena are
found at times connected with motions of our bodies, which a constant
experience presents as depending on our will, but how things so
different are connected, we know not: philosophy will never know.
CHAPTER XII.
CAUSALITY OF PURE FORCE OF THE WILL.
124. In what does creation consist? How can God produce things from
nothing? Such a thing is incomprehensible. This is the language of
many who do not reflect that the same incomprehensibility is found in
the exercise of secondary causality, both in the corporeal and in the
incorporeal world. If we knew God in the intuitive manner in which,
according to the Catholic dogma, the blessed see him in the mansion
of glory, we might know intuitively the manner of the creation. As
it is, we say that in so far as we can form any idea of the action
of the Creator, he produces all things from nothing by the force of
his will; which besides according with the teachings of religion, is
in harmony with what we experience in ourselves. God wills, and the
universe springs up out of nothing: how can this be understood? To him
who asks this, I say: man wills, and his arm rises; he wills, and his
whole body is in motion. How can this be understood? Here is a small,
weak, and incomplete, but true image of the Creator: an intelligent
being which wills, and a fact which appears. Where is the connection?
If you cannot explain it to us in so far as concerns finite beings, how
can you ask us to explain it with respect to the infinite being? The
incomprehensibility of the conception of the motion of the body with
the force of the will does not authorize us to deny the connection;
therefore the incomprehensibility of the connection of a being which
appears for the first time with the force of the infinite will cannot
authorize us to deny the truth of the creation: on the contrary,
the finding a similar thing in ourselves greatly strengthens the
ontological arguments which demonstrate its necessity. In the dogmas of
the Christian religion, besides what they reveal that is supernatural,
we find at every step philosophical truths as profound as they are
important.
125. The causality which relates to purely possible effects can only
be understood by placing it in an intelligence. The cause which does
not produce an effect, but which may produce it, involves a relation
of the existent to the non-existent; the cause exists, the effect does
not exist; the cause does not produce it, but may produce it; what is
the relation of that which exists to that which does not exist? is not
a relation without a term to which it relates, a contradiction? It
is certainly, if abstracted from the intelligence: the intelligence
alone can relate to that which does not exist; for it can _think the
non-existent_. A body can have no relation to a body which does not
exist; but an intelligence may have a relation to that which does not
exist, even knowing that it does not exist; we may ourselves wander at
pleasure through the regions of pure possibility.
126. The will also participates of this character of the intellect.
Desire relates to an enjoyment which is not, but which may be; we will
and will not, we love and hate things that are often purely ideal, and
whose identity we know perfectly well, still this does not prevent
our willing them. Thus we desire things to happen which are not, and
we may even desire things which we know to be impossible. We may wish
to recover that which we know is lost forever; we may wish for the
presence of a friend whom we know to be at so great a distance as to
render his coming impossible; we may wish that time would stop or hurry
on in conformity to our wants or our caprices.
127. Thus we find both the intellect and the will in relation to that
which does not exist;--a relation which is not even conceivable in a
being destitute of intellect. This leads to an important result. The
absolute beginning of any thing is not possible unless we conceive
causality as having its root in the intellect. That which begins
passes from not-being to being, and how is it possible that a being
has produced in _another_ a transition from not-being to being, if the
relation to the _other_ before it existed was intrinsically impossible?
An intelligent being may think another although the other does not
exist; but for an unintelligent being if the other does not exist in
_reality_ it does not exist at all; consequently no relation to it is
possible, any such relation that may be imagined is contradictory, and
therefore it is absurd to suppose that which is not to begin to be.
128. This reasoning proves that in the origin of things there is
an intelligent being, the cause of every thing, and that without
this intelligence nothing could have begun. If something has begun,
something must have existed from all eternity; and that which began was
_known_ by that which existed. Not admitting intelligence, beginning is
absurd. Imagine in the origin of things a being without intelligence,
its relations can only be to that which exists; it can have no relation
to the non-existent; how then is it possible for the non-existent to
begin to exist, through the action of the existent? In order that the
non-existent may begin to be, some reason is necessary; for otherwise
the beginning of one thing or of another, and even its beginning or
not-beginning would be indifferent. Unless we suppose a being which
knows that which does not exist, and may establish, so to speak, a
communication with nothing, the being which does not exist can never
exist.
CHAPTER XIII.
ACTIVITY.
129. To understand more clearly the idea of causality, it will be
useful to reflect on the ideas of activity and action, as also on those
of inertness, or inactivity, and inaction.
130. An absolutely inactive being is a being without intelligence,
without will, without sensibility, without any kind of consciousness,
containing in itself nothing which can change its own state or that of
any thing else.
Thus absolute inactivity or inertness requires the following
conditions: I. The absolute denial of all principle, of intelligence,
of will, of sensibility, and in general of every thing which is
accompanied by consciousness. II. The absolute denial of all principle
of change in itself. III. The absolute denial of all principle of
change in others. The union of these three conditions forms the idea of
absolute inactivity or inertness: the state of such a being is that of
absolute inaction.
131. A being of this nature, regarded in general, presents only the
idea of an existing thing: we may also consider it as a substance,
supposing it not to inhere as a modification in another, or rather,
supposing it as a substratum capable of receiving modifications by the
action of other beings upon it.
The only means by which we can characterize to a certain extent this
general idea, so that it may be presented to our intuition, is to add
to it the idea of extension, by which we make in some manner the idea
of inert matter.
132. After the ideas of inertness and inaction are explained, their
opposites, the ideas of activity and action, are clearly understood.
When we conceive a being which has the reason of its changes within
itself, we conceive an active being.
When we conceive a being which has within itself the reason of the
changes of other beings, we conceive an active being.
When we conceive a being which knows, wills, perceives, or has
consciousness in any way, we conceive an active being.
Hence activity may represent three things to us: the origin of its own
changes; the origin of the changes of others; and consciousness.
133. The first kind of activity can belong only to changeable beings;
the second also to immutable beings, which are causes; the third is
an activity which belongs to mutable or immutable beings, abstracting
absolutely the idea of causality.
134. The general relation of principle of its own or another's changes,
is an indeterminate idea; consequently the only activity of which
we can have an intuitive idea is that of intelligence, of will, and
in general of whatever relates to the phenomena which require the
perception called consciousness.
135. We must consider consciousness as an activity, and include in this
order the idea of intelligence and will abstracted from all relation to
their own or another's changes, unless we mean to say that God was from
all eternity an inactive being, because he had no other action than the
immanent acts of knowing and willing.
136. Therefore not all activity is transient, but there is a true
immanent activity, of which we have an intuitive knowledge in the
phenomena of our consciousness.
137. The activity which we can conceive in bodies is reduced to a
principle of their own changes or those of some other being; it is
therefore something of which we can have no intuitive knowledge. In
fact, we are in relation with bodies only by means of the senses, which
present but two orders of facts with respect to corporeal nature;
subjective facts, or the impressions which we experience and call
sensations, and which we believe to emanate from the action of bodies
upon our organs; and objective facts, that is, extension motion, and
the different modifications which the senses discover in extended
things which move. Neither the first class of facts nor the second give
us an intuitive idea of the activity of corporeal beings.
Subjective facts or sensations are immanent, that is, are in us, not
in the things; and inasmuch as subjective tell us nothing of what is
outside of us, but only what is within us. Even supposing sensations
to be a true effect of the activity of bodies, this activity is not
presented in the effect. When our hand is warmed by the fire we have
the intuitive perception of the sensation of heat, inasmuch as it is
in us; if we suppose that this sensation is really an effect of the
activity of the fire, we know the relation of our sensation to this
activity considered in general, and indeterminately as the origin of
our sensation; but we do not know the activity intuitively in itself,
because as such it is not represented in our sensation.
Neither do objective facts, that is, extension, motion, and whatever
we conceive which is not in our sensation, but in the object itself,
give us any intuitive idea of the activity of corporeal things. The
modifications of extension, or figures, motion with all its accidents,
and in general all that presents the corporeal world to our senses, are
the changes themselves and their relations, but not the principle of
these relations or of these changes. The body A, which is in motion,
strikes upon the body B at rest; B after the impact begins to move:
without considering whether the impact of A is the cause of the motion
of B, that which we are certain of is, that we have no intuition of the
activity producing the motion. What do the senses tell us of the body
A? They only tell us that it has moved with a certain velocity towards
the point M where the body B was situated. What do they tell us of the
body B? Only that it began to move the instant the body A reached the
point M: so far we have only the relations of space and time between
the two extended objects A and B. Where is the intuition of the
activity of A, and of its action on B? We see absolutely nothing of it.
By reasoning, by analogy, by considerations of order, of agreement, and
such like, we may prove with more or less evidence that in the body A
there is an activity which causes the motion of the body B; but this
gives us only an indeterminate idea, not an intuition of activity.
138. These considerations are conclusive as applied to all the
phenomena of corporeal nature. Take any one you please, select that one
which leads us most strongly to imagine a true activity; analyze it
well, and you will find our intuition limited to relations of extension
in space and in time.
That all bodies are heavy is a fact of experience; do we know
intuitively the principle from which the phenomena of weight proceed?
By no means. Let us examine it in the subjective order and in the
objective. What does weight as perceived by us present to us? Only
that affection which we call heaviness, that is, the pressure on
the members of the body. What does it present objectively? Only the
direction of bodies towards a centre with a certain velocity depending
on circumstances. We find in all this only a purely internal fact,
which is the unpleasant sensation of weight or heaviness, or the pure
relations of extended objects in space and time.
139. The fire burns objects and reduces them to ashes; nothing could be
better suited to give us the idea of activity. Still we cannot say that
we know it intuitively. In the subjective order we have the painful
sensation of burning, which thus far is a purely internal fact; in the
objective order we have the disorganization of the bodies burnt, which
presents to the senses only a change in the size, figure, color, and
other qualities relative to our senses--all this may be the effect of
the activity, but it is not the activity itself.
140. The light reflected from an object strikes our eyes, painting
on the retina the object which reflects it. Have we in this case an
intuition of the activity of light. Not at all. In the subjective order
we find the sensation called _seeing_; in the objective order, we find
the size, figure, and other qualities of the object in space. If we
consider the light itself, we find a fluid whose rays have this or that
direction in subjection to determinate laws, but we have no intuitive
knowledge of its activity; and in order to persuade ourselves that the
activity exists, we reason from principles which are not within the
sphere of our intuition.
141. The four intuitions of passive sensibility, active sensibility,
intelligence, and will, may be reduced to two:[89] extension and
consciousness; including in extension all its modifications, and in
consciousness all the internal phenomena of a sensitive or intellectual
being; in so far as they have the common ground of consciousness.
We therefore know intuitively two modes of being: consciousness and
extension; consciousness is within us, it is a subjective fact;
extension is external, its existence is revealed by sensations,
particularly those of sight and touch.
[89] See Book IV., Ch. XXII.
142. The classification of these two intuitions is important
beyond measure for the distinction of the active from the inert. In
consciousness we find a type of true activity; in extension, as such,
we have a type of true inertness. In thinking of consciousness, we
think of something active without adding any other idea; when we think
of extension, it presents to us the image of a thing susceptible of
various modifications, the principle of none of which is contained in
extension; in order to think of a corporeal activity we have to go out
of the pure idea of extension, and consider a principle of change in
general, which is not the object of the intuition of the extended.
143. Thus the only activity which we know intuitively is that of
consciousness; for we have only indeterminate ideas of corporeal
activity. The words action, reaction, force, resistance, impulse,
express only indeterminate relations, and represent something fixed and
determinate, only in their effects. Mechanists express forces by lines
or numbers, that is, by results subject to calculation. Even Newton, in
establishing his system of universal attraction, declares his ignorance
of the immediate cause of the phenomenon, and confines himself to
assigning the laws to which the motions of bodies are subjected.
144. Activity in changeable beings represents a principle of their own
and others' changes, a sort of superabundance of being which constantly
develops itself, and, in proportion as it is developed, perfects
itself. We find an example of this development in our own mind. The
child at its birth receives in a confused manner the impressions of all
that surrounds it. By the repetition of these impressions its activity
is developed; that which was obscure becomes clear, the confusion is
put into order, that which was feeble becomes strong, thought arises,
comparison begins, reflection is unfolded, and the being which was
torpid and almost inert becomes perhaps a genius which astonishes the
world. Materials have come to it from without, but of what use would
they have been without that living fire of activity which transformed
them and deduced from them new and valuable products? The same
phenomena of nature are presented to the eyes of brute animals as to
Kepler or Newton; but what for the first is only a sensible impression
is for the latter a starting-point of sublime and wonderful theories.
145. The active being possesses virtually the perfections which it is
to acquire; it may be compared to the acorn which contains the mighty
oak, whose development depends on circumstances of soil and climate. On
the other hand, the inactive being can give itself nothing; it has a
state, and it preserves it till some other changes it; and it remains
in this new state until another action from without takes it away and
communicates another.
146. Activity is a principle of its own or another's changes; this
activity may operate in two ways: with intelligence and without it.
When the being is intelligent its inclination to that which is known
is called will. The will is inclined to the object necessarily or not
necessarily: in the first case, it is a necessary spontaneity; in the
second, it is a free spontaneity. Liberty, then, does not consist
solely in the absence of coaction; it requires the absence of all, even
spontaneous, necessity; the will must be able to will or not will the
object; if this condition is wanting there is no freewill.
147. It is worthy of remark that our intuition of the external relates
only to the inactive, to extension; and that internal intuition
relates principally to activity, to consciousness. By the first we
know a substratum of changes, since all change seems to take place in
extension; by the second we know no subject intuitively, but only the
changes themselves. We prove the unity of their subject by reasoning,
but we do not see it intuitively.[90] Extension, as such, is presented
to us as simply passive: consciousness, as such, is always active; for,
even in those cases in which it is most passive, as in sensations,
in so far as there is consciousness, it implies activity; for by it
the subject gives itself an account, explicitly or implicitly, of the
affection experienced.
[90] See Bk. IX., Chs. VI., VII., IX., and XI.
CHAPTER XIV.
POSSIBILITY OF THE ACTIVITY OF BODIES.
148. Having marked the limits of our intuitive knowledge with respect
to causality and activity, it is easy to answer the objections against
secondary causality, which arise from confounding intuitive and
indeterminate ideas; but we have still to examine whether there are
true second causes, that is, whether there really is in finite beings
a principle of their own and others' changes. Some philosophers,
among others the illustrious Malebranche, have denied the efficacy of
second causes, thus reducing them to mere occasions. The author of the
_Investigation de la Vérité_ goes so far as to maintain that secondary
causality not only does not exist, but is impossible.
149. The universe contains two classes of beings,--immaterial beings,
and corporeal beings: each presents difficulties which it will be well
to examine separately. Let us begin with matter. It is said that matter
is incapable of all activity, that its essence is indifferent to every
thing, susceptible of any sort of modification. I cannot discover on
what this general proposition is founded, nor do I see how it is
possible to prove it either by reason or by experience.
150. In order to maintain that matter is completely inactive, or
incapable of any activity, it would be necessary to know its essence;
but this we do not know. By what right do we deny the possibility of
an attribute when we are ignorant of the nature of the object to which
it should belong, when we do not know even one of its properties to
which this attribute is repugnant? It is true that we deny to matter
the possibility of thought, and even of sensation; but we can do so
only because we know enough of matter, to establish this impossibility.
In matter, whatever may be its intrinsic essence, there are parts,
consequently there is multiplicity; and the facts of consciousness
necessarily require a being which is one and simple.[91]
[91] See Bk. IX.
It is not the same with respect to activity; for activity, when it
does not present the intuitive idea of consciousness, gives us only
the indeterminate conception of a principle of changes in itself or
in other beings. This does not contradict the idea of multiplicity.
Suppose bodies in motion to have a true activity which really produces
motion in others, there is no contradiction in this activity being
distributed among the different parts of the other body, which at the
moment of impact produce their respective effects, causing motion in
the parts of the other body with which they come in contact.
151. Consequently, examining the question _a priori_, or considering
the idea of body, we can find no reason for denying the possibility of
its being active. It is true that the extension of bodies, inasmuch as
extension, is presented to us as something without life, indifferent
to all figures and to all motions, and that we do not discover in it
any principle of activity;[92] but this can prove nothing, unless we
suppose that the essence of bodies consists in extension, and that
extension contains nothing more than is presented to our senses, that
it includes nothing on which its activity can be founded. The first is
an opinion, but one without any foundation; the second can never be
demonstrated, because it escapes all observation, and cannot be the
object of investigations _a priori_.
[92] See Ch. XIII.
152. How can it be proved that the essence of bodies consists in
extension?[93] What we may say is, that we experience it, and that all
corporeal nature is presented to us under the form of extended. If we
assert any thing more than this we do so without any foundation, we
substitute for the reality a play of our fancy. The essence of any
thing is that which constitutes it what it is, that which serves as
the internal ground or root of the properties: who can say that we
know this ground, this root, in corporeal objects? Our senses, it is
true, perceive nothing not extended: we cannot conceive to what bodies
would be reduced if deprived of extension; but from this we can only
infer that extension is a form under which bodies are presented to our
senses; that this form is a necessary condition of the affection of our
sensibility; but not that the form is the essence of the thing, not
that there is in the object nothing more intimate in which the form
itself has its root.
[93] See Bk. III.
153. If the essence of bodies consisted in extension, such as it
appears to our senses, extension being equal there would be equality
of essence; the essences of bodies might be measured like their
dimensions; two globes of equal diameters, would be two essentially
equal bodies. Experience, and even common sense are opposed to this. It
may be said, that pure dimension, in so far as subject to measure, is
not enough to form equality of essence; but that the equality of nature
of the extension of both bodies is also requisite; but what, I ask,
is the meaning of the _nature_ of extension? If the word nature here
means any thing, it must mean something distinct from extension, in
so far as subject to our sensibility; in which case I infer that just
as in order to diversify the essences of bodies something is imagined
which is not contained in extension in so far as subject to sensible
intuition, something may in the same manner be supposed which is
capable of activity, and which offers to our understanding an accessory
idea giving life, so to speak, to the dead matter which we find in
extension, considered as the simple object of purely geometrical ideas.
154. Experience cannot demonstrate the impossibility of the activity
of bodies. Absolute inactivity cannot affect us, and therefore cannot
be known by experience. We can only experience action, or the exercise
of activity; inaction, or the state of an absolutely inactive thing,
cannot be the object of experience without a contradiction.
CHAPTER XV.
CONJECTURES AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF CORPOREAL ACTIVITY.