OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE TO IDEAS.
175. The relation between thought and language is one of the most
important ideological phenomena. When we speak we think; and when we
think we speak with an internal language. The understanding needs
speech as a kind of guiding thread in the labyrinth of ideas.
176. The connection of ideas by a sign seems necessary. The most
universal and most convenient of these signs is language; but we must
not forget that it is an arbitrary sign, as is proved by the variety of
words used in different languages to express the same idea.
177. The phenomenon of the relation of ideas to language originates
in the necessity of perpetuating ideas by determinate signs; and the
importance of speech results from its being the most general, most
convenient, and most flexible sign. And hence it is that when these
circumstances can be united in another sign, the same object is
attained. Physically speaking, written language is very different from
language spoken; nevertheless, in very many cases it answers equally
well.
178. The internal language is, sometimes, rather a reflection in which
the idea is enlarged and developed, than an expression of it. True,
we do not ordinarily think without speaking inwardly; but as we have
already observed, speech is an arbitrary sign, and consequently we
cannot establish a perfectly exact parallel between ideas and the
internal language.
179. We think with instantaneousness, which defies the succession of
words, however rapid we may suppose them to be. It is true that the
internal language is far more rapid than the external; but it always
involves succession, and requires a greater or less time, according to
the words to be spoken.
This observation is important, lest we too greatly exaggerate the
relation of ideas to speech. Language is certainly a wonderful channel
for the communication of ideas, and a powerful auxiliary of our
understanding; but we can, without ignoring these qualities, take
care to avoid that exaggeration which seems to pronounce all thought
impossible, if some word thought does not correspond to it.
180. We experience often enough the instantaneous occurrence of a
multitude of ideas, which we afterwards develop in our discourse.
We see this in those quick and lively replies excited by a word, or
a gesture, which contradicts our opinions or wounds our feelings.
In replying, it is impossible for us to speak inwardly, since the
instantaneousness with which we reply forbids it. How often, in
listening to an argument, do we instantly detect a fault, which we
could not explain with words without a long discourse? How often, in
proposing a difficulty to ourselves, do we catch its solution in an
instant, although we could not possibly explain it without many words?
How often do we at the very first glance discover the flaw in a proof,
the force of an argument, or the ease with which it can be retorted
upon the proposer of it, and all this without occupying a moiety of
the intervals necessary to either external or internal locution? Thus
it happens that the sudden thought is not unfrequently expressed by a
single gesture, a glance of the eye, a nod of the head, a _yes_, or a
_no_, an exclamation, or any other similar sign; all far more rapid
than it is possible for the words expressive of our thought to be.
181. Let us illustrate this observation by a few examples. Some one
says: "All men are naturally equal." The sense of this proposition
cannot be known until the word _equal_ is pronounced. How, then, is it
that an enlightened and judicious man, will, by an instinctive impulse,
answer _no_, will catch the word at the moment, and refute the empty
boast of the declaimer with a flow of reasons? Until after the word,
naturally the understanding remained in suspense; there was nothing
to show the meaning of the proposition, since instead of _equal_,
might have been said _weak_, _mortal_, _inconstant_, or any other such
word; but so soon as the word _equal_ is pronounced, the understanding
says _no_, without having had the time to use an internal or external
locution. The exact parallel which some suppose to exist between ideas
and speech is, therefore, impossible; and they who defend it are guilty
of an exaggeration incompatible with experience.
Another asserts, "justice to have no bounds but the limit of power."
All who have any idea of morality, at once answer _no_: do they,
forsooth, need an inward locution? True, in order to explain what is
expressed by this _no_, and upon what it is based, many words are
required, and that to reflect upon the proposition one must speak
in inwardly; but this is all independent of that intellectual act,
signified by the _no_, and which would have been still more briefly
expressed had it been possible.
Another yet may say: "If this fact be attested by the senses, it
will be true; and if it be true, it will be attested by the senses."
The hearer assents to the former part, but rests in suspense as
to the latter part until the word _attest_ is pronounced. Then an
instantaneous _no_ leaps from his lips, or is expressed by a negative
gesture. Does any interior locution precede? None, for none is
possible. The following would be the words expressive of this act: "It
is not true that every fact must be attested by the senses; since many
facts are true, which do not belong to the sphere of sensibility."
Let us examine whether or not these words are compatible with the
instantaneousness of the _no_.
182. It will, perhaps, be objected, that the negation is one thing,
and the reason of the negation another: that the simple _no_ suffices
for the former, and that it is only for the latter that more words are
needed. But this is an equivocation. When the _no_ was said, it was
said for a reason, and this reason was the sight of the inconsequence
then expressed by the words. Otherwise it would be necessary to admit
the negative to be a blind judgment, and given without a reason. This
being so, this reason founded upon the judgment, although expressed in
the most laconical mode possible, would require some words, to form
which, either interiorly or exteriorly, there has been no time. There
is a question of calculation. He who hears the proposition cannot know
the meaning of it, until the word _attest_ is pronounced, and the
sentence brought to a _full stop_. Before reaching the word attest,
the sense of the proposition was unknown; it was not possible to form
any judgment, since instead of saying, "If it be true the senses will
attest it," he might have said, "If it be true the senses _will not
belie it_."
We have spoken of the _full stop_, in order to show the
instantaneousness of the perception and of the judgment, which proves
that the understanding does not determine until the last moment. But
let us suppose the same word _attest_ to have been used indeed, but
instead of a full stop, to have been followed by these other words, "if
this fact falls under their jurisdiction." The words are the same, and
yet they do not provoke a negative judgment; and why? Simply because
the speaker continued. If he had ceased speaking, or had used an
inflection of voice indicative of a period, the _no_ would have risen
like a flash. A comma or a period in writing, produce the same effect
as a pause or an inflection of the voice in speaking. When we see these
signs, we judge instantaneously, with a velocity incomparably greater
than any internal or external locution.
It would be easy to multiply examples showing the superiority of
thought to speech, so far as rapidity is concerned; but those already
adduced seem to us sufficient to prove that there is some exaggeration
in saying that "man before speaking his thought, thinks his words," if
it be understood that all thought is impossible without a word thought.