CHAPTER XXVI.

REMARKS ON THE REAL FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY.

162. Since the argument proving the necessity of a being in which is

laid the foundation of all the relations in the possible order, is one

of the most transcendental in all metaphysics, and at the same time one

of the most difficult to be perfectly understood, we judge it advisable

to enlarge somewhat upon the considerations thrown out in the preceding

chapter.

An example, in which we undertake to establish the possibility of

things, independently of a being in which is found the reason of all,

will serve our purpose better than abstract reflections.

163. "Two circles of equal diameters are equal." This proposition is

evidently true. Let us analyze its meaning. The proposition refers

to the possible order, and abstracts absolutely the existence of the

circles and of the diameters. No case is excepted; all are comprised in

the proposition.

164. Neither does the truth refer to our mode of understanding; but on

the contrary, we conceive it as independent of our thought. Were we

asked, what would become of this truth were we not to exist, we should

without hesitation reply that it would be the same, that it acquired

nothing by our existence, that it would lose nothing by our extinction.

If we believed this truth to depend in any way upon us, it would cease

to be what it is, it would no longer be a necessary but a contingent

truth.

165. Nor is the corporeal world indispensable to the truth and

necessity of the proposition: on the contrary, if we suppose no body

to exist, the proposition would lose none of its truth, necessity, or

universality.

166. What would happen, if, withdrawing all bodies, all sensible

representations, and even all intelligences, we should imagine absolute

and universal nothing? We see the truth of the proposition even on this

supposition; for it is impossible for us to hold it to be false. On

every supposition, our understanding sees a connection which it cannot

destroy: the condition once established, the result will infallibly

follow.

167. An absolutely necessary connection, founded neither on us, nor

on the external world, which exists before any thing we can imagine,

and subsists after we have annihilated all by an effort of our

understanding, must be based upon something, it cannot have nothing for

its origin: to say this, would be to assert a necessary fact without a

sufficient reason.

168. It is true that in the proposition now before us, nothing real is

affirmed; but if we reflect carefully, we find even here the greatest

difficulty for those who deny a real foundation to pure possibility.

What is remarkable in this phenomenon, is precisely this, that our

understanding feels itself forced to give its assent to a proposition

which affirms an absolutely necessary connection without any relation

to an existing object. It is conceivable that an intelligence affected

by other beings may know their nature and relations; but it is not so

easy of comprehension how it can discover their nature and relations in

an absolutely necessary manner, when it abstracts all existence, when

the ground upon which the eyes of the understanding are fixed, is the

abyss of nothing.

169. We deceive ourselves when we imagine it possible to abstract

all existence. Even when we suppose our mind to have lost sight of

every thing, a very easy supposition, granting that we find in our

consciousness the contingency of our being, the understanding still

perceives a possible order, and imagines it to be all occupied with

pure possibility, independent of a being on which it is based. We

repeat, that this is an illusion, which disappears so soon as we

reflect upon it. In pure nothing, nothing is possible; there are

no relations, no connections of any kind; in nothing there are no

combinations, it is a ground upon which nothing can be pictured.

170. The objectivity of our ideas and the perception of necessary

relations in a possible order, reveal a communication of our

understanding with a being on which is founded all possibility. This

possibility can be explained on no supposition except that which makes

the communication consist in the action of God giving to our mind

faculties perceptive of the necessary relation of certain ideas, based

upon necessary being, and representative of his infinite essence.

171. Without this communication the order of pure possibility means

nothing: none of the combinations referable to it contain any truth:

and this ruins all science. There can be no necessary relations if

there be no necessity upon which they are based, and where they are

represented; if this condition be wanting, all cognitions must refer to

something actually existing; they are even limited to what _appears_,

to what affects us, and they cannot affirm any thing beyond the actual

order. Science, in this supposition, is unworthy of the name; it is

nothing but a collection of facts, gathered together in the field of

experience; we cannot say: "This will be, or will not be; this may be,

or may not be;" we are necessarily limited to what is; or, rather,

we ought to confine ourselves to that which affects us by simple

appearances, and never be able to rise above the sphere of individual

phenomena.

Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2) · 第 26 / 36 章