PART IV

ADDRESS AT THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THE

KENTISH MEN AND MEN OF KENT

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

Whilst seeing the present little book through the press an opportunity

unexpectedly offered itself to me of speaking to some officers of the

existing Territorial Force in regard to the dilemma in which they are

placed between their duty as patriotic citizens and their growing

conviction of the inadequacy of the Territorial Force to perform the

task imposed upon it in the event of war.

I therefore subjoin the address which, on the invitation of the

officers themselves, I delivered at the annual dinner of the Kentish

Men and the Men of Kent, on November 27, 1912.

In that address I was able to state more fully than at Manchester my

reasons for criticizing the Territorial Force with regard to

discipline, numbers, equipment, and energy.

ADDRESS AT THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THE

KENT TERRITORIAL ASSOCIATION,

LONDON

NOVEMBER 27, 1912.

GENTLEMEN,

Words fail me when I try to tell you what a great pleasure it was to me

to be able to accept the invitation of the Kentish Men and the Men of

Kent to their annual dinner. I was more than gratified by their

invitation, for I felt that I should not have been asked to be their

guest had they interpreted my comments on the Territorial Force in my

Manchester speech in the way some people have done, as an attack upon

the members of the Force. Indeed, I am profoundly grateful for this

opportunity having been given to me to explain my views about the Force

more fully than it was possible for me to do at Manchester.

Well, gentlemen, if I am right in feeling that you acquit me of any

desire to disparage the officers and men who compose the Territorial

Force, and that you will believe me when I repeat, what I have often

said before, that I am second to none in my admiration of the

patriotism and self-sacrifice displayed by them in their endeavour to

make Lord Haldane's scheme a success--you will not, I am sure,

misunderstand me if I now express my views quite frankly to you.

At the Manchester meeting I gave it as my opinion that the Territorial

Force is a _failure in discipline_, a _failure in numbers_, a _failure

in equipment_, and a _failure in energy_. Let me say a few words on

each of these supremely important points.

_Failure in Discipline_.--Gentlemen, only those who have taken part in

war, or have carefully studied the history of wars, can, I am

persuaded, realize to its full extent the significance of discipline as

applied to war. They alone can know that it is by discipline, and

discipline alone, that bodies of men can be relied upon to work

together in times of great difficulty and danger, and to withstand the

disintegrating effect of war; for they have learnt that it is

discipline alone which prevents panic seizing upon men when unforeseen

circumstances arise. They alone know that amongst untrained or

ill-trained troops panic spreads with lightning rapidity, and that when

there is no sense of discipline to be appealed to and to keep the men

together, defeat is the inevitable result.

It is discipline alone which gives the soldier confidence in himself,

reliance on his comrades, and belief in his officers. It is discipline

alone which gives him the courage to face vastly superior numbers; to

continue marching, though worn out with fatigue and want of food, ready

to fight again, and yet again. It is discipline alone that supports

him under the strain of lying still for successive hours in the

punishing fire zone--one of the most trying of the many exacting

conditions of modern warfare. It is discipline alone which makes the

soldier obey the word of command, even under such circumstances as I

have described. Clear understanding of and prompt obedience to an

order become an instinct to the properly trained soldier, whereas the

imperfectly trained man, when he finds himself in an unfamiliar and

trying position, frequently misunderstands the word of command, and,

when matters become acute, he does not heed or even hear it.

Gentlemen, when I tell you that discipline is the backbone of an army,

I ask you whether it is possible for that essential quality to be

instilled into the ranks of the Territorial Force with the amount of

training that is given to them.

_Failure in Numbers_.--Gentlemen, despite the untiring efforts of the

Territorial Associations--a large proportion of whose members are

staunch supporters of the National Service League--the Territorial

Force is still far short of its established strength of 315,000 men.

Possibly this is a blessing in disguise, for if men had come forward in

sufficient numbers to bring the Force up to its establishment,

politicians would have assured the country, even more fervently than

they do now, that our Home Defence Army is in all respects what is

needed. The truth is that the number 315,000 has no relation to our

real requirements. It was fixed upon because the experience of fifty

years had proved that a larger number could never be forthcoming under

the voluntary system. As with the Regular Army, so with the Home

Defence Army, the strength is governed by what is known to be the limit

obtainable by voluntary effort. It has no relation to the requirements

of war. It solves no known problem. Again, therefore, gentlemen, I

ask you whether it is possible to regard the Territorial Force as

fitted, in respect to numbers, for the defence of the United Kingdom.

_Failure in Equipment_.--In common with the Regular Army the

Territorial Force is armed with a rifle inferior to the rifle possessed

by foreign nations, and with a less deadly bullet than is used by them.

But the Territorial rifle is even inferior to the present Regular Army

rifle in range, in trajectory, and in stopping power.

Then the gun in use with the Territorial Artillery is a mere makeshift.

It is distinctly inferior in power, range, and rapidity of fire to the

gun of any first-rate State, and it is not too much to say that, if our

Regular soldiers were armed as the Territorials are armed, they could

not keep the field against the troops of any European nation. If this

is so, how unfair, how disastrous, it would be to ask Territorial

troops to undertake a task which their seasoned and disciplined

comrades of the Regular Army could not face.

Then as regards mobilization arrangements, supply and transport

services, ammunition columns, trains, horses, vehicles, harness, even

boots for the men--in none of these essentials are the Territorials, as

a Force, complete. I therefore repeat that _failure in equipment_ is

not an unfair statement.

_Failure in Energy_.--By failure in energy, I do not for a moment mean

to imply that individual members of the Territorial Force are wanting

in energy. I know how earnestly many of them have striven to learn and

to do their duty under adverse circumstances. My criticism applies to

the Force itself--to its corporate energy--if I may use such an

expression. And even those who are the firmest believers in the Force

must, I think, admit that, under existing conditions, it is not

practicable for it to attain that combined action, that alertness, that

intensity and vitality, all of which are essential to success in war.

But, gentlemen, in addition to the shortcomings of the Territorial

Force which I have enumerated, there is one defect in its conception

which would alone show its unfitness for what you all know is its

primary duty--that is, to defend these shores from invasion. That

defect lies in the strange condition which is an essential factor in

this scheme--a condition unprecedented with any army in the

world--namely, that the Force is to receive six months' training, after

war has broken out, before it is even supposed to be capable of dealing

with an invading army. Can any scheme for the defence of any nation be

more madly conceived? We have been given an object lesson in the Near

East as to the insanity of the idea that our Citizen Army will be given

six months to prepare after war has been declared. On October 8

Montenegro declared war, and in four weeks the Turks were beaten in all

directions and were making their last stand within a few miles of

Constantinople.

Gentlemen, I am told by my opponents that it is unpatriotic of me to

express these opinions, and that by doing so I am discouraging the

Territorial Force. But which is really the more unpatriotic course, to

tell the truth about the Force, so that the people of this country may

insist upon its terrible deficiencies being remedied, or to gloss over

these deficiencies and thus to expose to certain disaster the few

patriotic men who have joined it, and who are asked to be prepared with

a Force untrained, under-officered, and under-manned to cope with a

highly-trained enemy.

I venture to think, gentlemen, that I am doing you no disservice in

speaking plainly about the Territorial Force. My hope is that when its

grave condition is no longer concealed from our countrymen, they will

realize the folly of trusting the defence of these shores to a

make-believe Army, that they will take to heart the false position in

which the patriotic members of the Force are placed, and that they will

insist upon a law being passed by which all able-bodied men must be

prepared to take their place in the Citizen Army. The Territorial

Force must either be made efficient in all respects, or it will

speedily cease to be a Force even in name.

I hope, gentlemen, you will understand that I am thinking and speaking

of the Territorial Force as a Force that must be prepared to move and

live, to march and fight as an army. I am not thinking of individual

men, or companies, or batteries, or squadrons, but of a Force which, if

it is ever called upon to take the field, will have to deal as a whole

with highly-trained picked troops.

What, then, gentlemen, is right for the Territorial officers to do? It

seems to me that a tremendous responsibility rests upon those officers.

If they agree with me that neither they themselves, nor the men they

command, are sufficiently trained to take the field against first-class

soldiers; if they agree with me that neither in discipline nor in

numbers, neither in equipment nor in vital energy, can the Territorial

Force be reckoned as a modern army; if they agree with me that no great

improvement either in efficiency or numbers can ever be reached under

the conditions necessarily imposed upon all citizens who enter a

voluntary force; if they agree with me that the safety of these

islands, and therefore of our Empire, is endangered by this state of

affairs--then their course of action is clear. While still giving of

their best to the Force to which they belong, while still setting the

fine example which they have consistently done, they should make the

Government and the nation distinctly understand that, in their opinion,

they are unable to carry out the duties entrusted to them, and that

unless they are given the trained assistance of the manhood of the

country, they can never guarantee the safety of these islands and the

integrity of the Empire.

Such a warning, coming from such men, will awaken the country in a way

that I can never hope to do. Such an announcement, coming from the men

who alone in the country have obeyed the call of duty, and who, at the

cost of convenience, time, and money, have tried to fit themselves for

the defence of their country and the security of the Empire--such a

summons, I say, will arouse the People, and they themselves will call

upon the Government to enact a law which shall impose upon all citizens

of a military age the noble duty of defending the country and the

Empire to which they have the glory to belong.

THE END

BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD.

Lord Roberts' Message to the Nation · 第 4 / 4 章