1. Of marks. 2. Names or appellations. 3. Names positive and
privative. 4. Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.
5. Names universal and singular. 6. Universals not in _rerum
natura_. 7. Equivocal names. 8. Understanding. 9. Affirmation,
negation, proposition. 10. Truth, falsity. 11. Ratiocination.
12. According to reason, against reason. 13. Names causes of
knowledge, so of error. 14. Translation of the discourse of the
mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence
proceeding.
[Sidenote: Of marks.]
1. Seeing the _succession_ of conceptions in the _mind_ are caused,
as hath been said before, by the succession they _had_ one to
another when they were produced by the _senses_, and that there is
no conception that hath not been produced immediately before or
after innumerable others, by the innumerable acts of sense; it must
needs follow, that one _conception_ followeth _not_ another,
according to our election, and the need we have of them, _but_ as it
_chanceth_ us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our
mind. The experience we have hereof, is in such brute beasts, which,
having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their
meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they
hid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but
man, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the
nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this
defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a
visible or other sensible mark, the which, when he seeth it again,
may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. A _mark_
therefore is a _sensible object_ which a man erecteth voluntarily to
himself, to the end to _remember_ thereby somewhat past, when the
same is objected to his sense again: as men that have passed by a
rock at sea, set up some mark, thereby to remember their former
danger, and avoid it.
[Sidenote: Names or appellations.]
2. In the number of these _marks_, are those _human voices_, which
we call the _names_ or appellations of things sensible by the ear,
by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to
which we gave those names or appellations; as the appellation
_white_ bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as
produce that colour or conception in us. A _name_ or appellation
therefore is the _voice_ of a man _arbitrary_, imposed for a _mark_
to bring into his mind some conception concerning the thing on which
it is imposed.
[Sidenote: Names positive and privative.]
3. Things named, are either the _objects_ themselves, as a man; or
the _conception_ itself that we have of man, as shape and motion: or
some privation, which is when we conceive that there is something
which we conceive, not in him; as when we conceive he is not just,
not finite, we give him the name of unjust, of infinite, which
signify privation or defect; and to the privations themselves we
give the names of injustice and infiniteness: so that here be _two
sorts_ of names; one of _things_, in which we conceive something; or
of the conceptions themselves, which are called _positive_: the
other of things wherein we conceive _privation_ or defect, and those
names are called _privative_.
[Sidenote: Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.]
4. By the advantage of _names_ it is that we are capable of
_science_, which beasts, for want of them are not; nor man, without
the use of them: for as a beast misseth not one or two out of many
her young ones, for want of those names of order, one, two, and
three, and which we call _number_; so neither would a man, without
repeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many
pieces of money or other things lie before him.
[Sidenote: Names universal and singular.]
5. Seeing there be _many_ conceptions of _one_ and the same thing,
and for _every_ conception we give it a _several_ name; it followeth
that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes;
as to the same man we give the appellations of _just_, _valiant_,
&c. for divers _virtues_; of _strong_, _comely_, &c. for divers
_qualities_ of the _body_. And again, because from divers things we
receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same
appellation: as to all things we _see_, we give the same name of
_visible_; and to all things we _see moveable_, we give the
appellation of _moveable_: and those names we give to _many_, are
called _universal_ to them all; as the name of man to every
particular of mankind: such appellation as we give to _one_ only
thing, we call _individual_, or singular; as Socrates, and other
proper names: or, by circumlocution, he that writ the _Iliads_, for
Homer.
[Sidenote: Universals not in _rerum natura_.]
6. The universality of _one name_ to many things, hath been the
cause that men think the _things_ are themselves universal; and so
seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of
the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet
something else that we call _man_, viz. _man in general_, deceiving
themselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the
thing it signifieth: for if one should desire the painter to make
him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in
general; he meaneth no more, but that the painter should choose what
man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are,
or have been, or may be, none of which are _universal_. But when he
would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular
person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It
is plain therefore, that there is _nothing universal_ but _names_;
which are therefore called _indefinite_; because we limit them not
ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a
singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it
signifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him
his proper name, or by some such other way.
[Sidenote: Equivocal names.]
7. The appellations that be _universal_, and common to many
things, are _not_ always given to all the _particulars_, (as they
ought to be) for like conceptions, and like considerations in them
all; which is the cause that many of them are _not_ of _constant_
signification, but bring into our mind other thoughts than those
for which they were ordained, and these are called equivocal. As
for example, the word faith signifieth the same with belief;
sometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which maketh a
Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a promise.
Also all _metaphors_ are by profession _equivocal_: and there is
scarce any word that is not made _equivocal_ by divers contextures
of speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.
[Sidenote: Understanding.]
8. This _equivocation_ of names maketh it _difficult_ to recover
those conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not only
in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the
_drift_, and _occasion_, and _contexture_ of the speech, as well as
the _words_ themselves; but also in our discourse, which being
derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto
us not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a
man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of
language, to deliver himself from _equivocation_, and to find out
the true meaning of what is said: and this is it we call
_understanding_.
[Sidenote: Affirmation, negation, proposition.]
9. Of two _appellations_, by the help of this little verb _is_, or
something equivalent, we make an _affirmation_ or _negation_, either
of which in the Schools we call also a _proposition_, and consisteth
of two appellations joined together by the said verb _is_: as for
example, man is a living creature; or thus, man is not righteous:
whereof the former is called an _affirmation_, because the
appellation, living creature, is _positive_; the latter a
_negative_, because not righteous is _privative_.
[Sidenote: Truth, falsity.]
10. In _every proposition_, be it affirmative or negative, the
latter appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this
proposition, charity is a virtue, the name of virtue comprehendeth
the name of charity, and many other virtues beside; and then is the
proposition said to be _true_, or _truth_: for, _truth_, and a _true
proposition_, is all one. Or _else_ the _latter_ appellation
comprehendeth _not_ the former; as in this proposition, every man is
just; the name of just comprehendeth not every man; for unjust is
the name of the far greater part of men: and the proposition is said
to be _false_, or falsity: _falsity_ and a _false proposition_ being
also the same thing.
[Sidenote: Ratiocination.]
11. In what manner of two propositions, whether _both_ affirmative,
or _one_ affirmative, the _other_ negative, is made a _syllogism_, I
forbear to write. All this that hath been said of names or
propositions, though _necessary_, is but _dry_ discourse: and this
place is not for the whole art of logic, which if I enter further
into, I ought to pursue: besides, it is not needful; for there be
few men which have not so much natural logic, as thereby to discern
well enough, whether any conclusion I shall make in this discourse
hereafter, be well or ill collected: only thus much I say in this
place, that _making of syllogisms_ is that we call _ratiocination_
or _reasoning_.
[Sidenote: According to reason, against reason.]
12. Now when a man _reasoneth_ from _principles_ that are _found_
indubitable by experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation
of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be _according
to right reason_: but when from his conclusion a man may, by good
ratiocination, derive that which is _contradictory_ to any evident
truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded _against
reason_: and such a conclusion is called _absurdity_.
[Sidenote: Names causes of knowledge, so of error.]
13. As the _invention_ of _names_ hath been _necessary_ for the
drawing men _out of_ ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the
necessary _coherence_ of one conception to another; so also hath it
on the other side precipitated men into _error_: insomuch, that
whereas by the benefit of _words_ and ratiocination they exceed
_brute beasts_ in knowledge, and the commodities that accompany the
same; so they exceed them also in _error_: for _true_ and _false_
are things not incident to beasts, because they adhere not to
propositions and language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to
multiply one untruth by another, as men have.
[Sidenote: Translation of the discourse of the mind into the
discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence
proceeding.]
14. It is the _nature_ almost of every _corporal_ thing, being
_often moved_ in one and the same manner, to receive continually a
_greater_ and _greater easiness_ and aptitude to the _same_ motion,
insomuch as in time the same becometh so _habitual_, that, to
_beget_ it, there needs no more than to _begin_ it. The _passions_
of man, as they are the beginning of _voluntary_ motions; so are
they the beginning of _speech_, which is the motion of the tongue.
And men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions,
conceptions, and passions which are in themselves, and to that end
having invented _language_, have by that means transferred all that
_discursion_ of their _mind_ mentioned in the former chapter, by the
_motion_ of their _tongues_, into _discourse_ of _words_: and
_ratio_ now is but _oratio_, for the most part, wherein custom hath
so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word; the
rest follow _habitually_, and are not followed by the mind; as it is
with beggars, when they say their _paternoster_, putting together
such words, and in such manner, as in their education they have
learned from their nurses, from their companies, or from their
teachers, having _no images_ or _conceptions_ in their mind,
answering to the words they speak: and as they have learned
themselves, so they teach posterity. Now, if we consider the power
of those _deceptions_ of the sense, mentioned chapter II. section
10, and also how _unconstantly_ names have been settled, and how
subject they are to _equivocation_, and how _diversified_ by
_passion_, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and
what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what
temerity) and how subject men are to paralogism or fallacy in
reasoning, I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible to
_rectify_ so many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from
those causes, without beginning _anew_ from the very first grounds
of all our knowledge and sense; and instead of books, reading over
orderly one’s own conceptions: in which meaning, I take _nosce te
ipsum_ for a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.
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