1. Imagination defined. 2. Sleep and dreams defined. 3. Causes of
dreams. 4. Fiction defined. 5. Phantasms defined. 6. Remembrance
defined. 7. Wherein remembrance consisteth. 8. Why in a dream a
man never thinks he dreams. 9. Why few things seem strange in
dreams. 10. That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.
[Sidenote: Imagination defined.]
1. As standing water put into motion by the stroke of a _stone_, or
blast of wind, doth _not presently_ give over moving as soon as the
wind ceaseth, or the stone settleth: so _neither_ doth the _effect_
cease which the _object_ hath wrought upon the _brain_, so soon as
ever by turning aside of the organs the _object ceaseth_ to work;
that is to say, though the _sense_ be _past_, the _image_ or
_conception_ remaineth; but more _obscure_ while we are _awake_,
because some _object_ or other continually _plieth_ and soliciteth
our eyes, and ears, _keeping_ the mind in a _stronger_ motion,
whereby the _weaker_ doth not easily _appear_. And this obscure
conception is that we call _phantasy_, or _imagination_:
_imagination_ being, to define it, _conception remaining, and by
little and little decaying from and after the act of sense_.
[Sidenote: Sleep and dreams defined.]
2. But when _present_ sense is _not_, as in _sleep_, there the
_images_ remaining after sense, when there be many, as in dreams,
are _not obscure_, but _strong_ and _clear_, as in sense itself. The
reason is, that which obscured and made the conceptions weak, namely
sense, and present _operation_ of the object, is _removed_: for
_sleep_ is the _privation of the act of sense_, (the power
remaining) and _dreams_ are the _imagination_ of them that _sleep_.
[Sidenote: Causes of dreams.]
3. The _causes_ of dreams, if they be natural, are the _actions_ or
violence of the _inward_ parts of a man upon his _brain_, by which
the _passages_ of sense by sleep _benumbed_, are _restored_ to their
motion. The signs by which this appeareth to be so, are the
_differences_ of dreams (old men commonly dream oftener, and have
their dreams more painful than young) proceeding from the
_different_ accidents of man’s body, as dreams of _lust_, as dreams
of _anger_, according as the heart, or other parts within, work more
or less upon the brain, by more or less _heat_; so also the descents
of different _sorts of phlegm_ maketh us a dream of different tastes
of meats and drinks; and I believe there is a _reciprocation_ of
motion from the brain to the vital parts, and back from the vital
parts to the brain; whereby not only _imagination_ begetteth
_motion_ in those parts; but also motion in those parts begetteth
imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true,
and that _sad_ imaginations nourish the _spleen_, then we see also a
cause, why a strong _spleen_ reciprocally causeth _fearful dreams_,
and why the effects of _lasciviousness_ may in a dream produce the
image of some person that had _caused_ them. Another sign that
dreams are caused by the action of the inward parts, is the
_disorder_ and casual consequence of one conception or image to
another: for when we are _waking_, the _antecedent_ thought or
conception introduceth, and is cause of the _consequent_, as the
water followeth a man’s finger upon a dry and level table; but in
_dreams_ there is commonly _no coherence_, and when there is, it is
by chance, which must needs proceed from this, that the _brain_ in
dreams is _not restored_ to its motion in every part alike; whereby
it cometh to pass, that our thoughts appear like the stars between
the flying clouds, not in the order which a man would choose to
observe them, but as the uncertain flight of broken clouds permits.
[Sidenote: Fiction defined.]
4. As when the _water_, or any liquid thing moved at once by
_divers_ movents, receiveth _one_ motion compounded of them all; so
also the _brain_ or spirit therein, having been stirred by _divers_
objects, composeth an imagination of _divers_ conceptions that
appeared single to the sense. As for example, the sense sheweth at
one time the figure of a _mountain_, and at another time the colour
of _gold_; but the imagination afterwards hath them both at once in
a _golden mountain_. From the same cause it is, there appear unto us
_castles_ in the _air_, _chimeras_, and other monsters which are
_not_ in _rerum natura_, _but_ have been conceived by the sense in
pieces at several times. And this composition is that which we
commonly call _fiction_ of the mind.
[Sidenote: Phantasms defined.]
5. There is yet another kind of imagination, which for _clearness
contendeth_ with _sense_, as well as a _dream_; and that is, when
the _action_ of sense hath been _long_ or _vehement_: and the
experience thereof is more frequent in the sense of seeing, than the
rest. An example whereof is, the _image_ remaining before the _eye_
after looking upon the _sun_. Also, those little images that appear
before the eyes in the _dark_ (whereof I think every man hath
experience, but they most of all, who are _timorous_ or
superstitious) are examples of the same. And these, for
distinction-sake, may be called _phantasms_.
[Sidenote: Remembrance defined.]
6. By the _senses_, which are numbered according to the _organs_ to
be _five_, we take notice (as hath been said already) of the objects
_without_ us; and that _notice_ is our _conception_ thereof: but we
take _notice_ also some way or other _of our conceptions_: for when
the conception of the same thing cometh _again_, we take notice that
it is _again_; that is to say, that we have had the same conception
_before_; which is as much as to imagine a thing _past_; which is
impossible to the _sense_, which is only of things _present_. This
therefore may be accounted a _sixth sense_, but _internal_, (not
_external_, as the rest) and is commonly called _remembrance_.
[Sidenote: Wherein remembrance consisteth.]
7. For the _manner_ by which we take notice of a conception _past_,
we are to remember, that in the _definition_ of _imagination_, it is
said to be a conception by _little_ and _little decaying_, or
growing more _obscure_. An _obscure_ conception is that which
representeth the _whole object_ together, but _none_ of the _smaller
parts_ by themselves; and as _more_ or _fewer_ parts be represented,
so is the conception or representation said to be _more_ or _less
clear_. Seeing then the _conception_, which when it was _first_
produced by sense, was _clear_, and represented the _parts_ of the
object _distinctly_; and when it cometh _again_ is _obscure_, we
find _missing_ somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it
_past_ and _decayed_. For example, a man that is present in a
foreign _city_, seeth not only _whole_ streets, but can also
distinguish particular _houses_, and _parts_ of houses; but departed
thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his mind as he
did, some _house_ or turning escaping him; yet is this to
_remember_: when _afterwards_ there escape him _more_ particulars,
this is also to _remember_, but _not_ so well. In process of time,
the _image_ of the city _returneth_ but as a _mass_ of building
_only_, which is _almost_ to have _forgotten_ it. Seeing then
remembrance is _more_ or _less_, as we find more or less
_obscurity_, why may not we well think _remembrance_ to be nothing
else but the _missing of parts_, which every man expecteth should
succeed after they have a conception of the whole? To see at a great
distance of place, and to remember at a great distance of time, is
to have like conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth distinction
of parts in both; the one conception being weak by operation at
distance, the other by decay.
[Sidenote: Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams.]
8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, that a man
can _never know_ he _dreameth_; he _may_ dream he _doubteth_,
whether it be a dream or no: but the clearness of the imagination
representeth every thing with as many parts as doth sense itself,
and consequently, he can take notice of nothing but as present;
whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his conceptions,
that is to say dreams, obscurer than they were in the sense: so that
he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as sense; which
is impossible.
[Sidenote: Why few things seem strange in dreams.]
9. From the same ground it proceedeth, that men _wonder not_ in
their dreams at place and persons, as they would do waking: for
waking, a man would think it strange to be in a place where he never
was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a
dream, there cometh little of that kind into consideration. The
_clearness_ of conception in a dream, taketh away _distrust_, unless
the _strangeness_ be _excessive_, as to think himself fallen from on
high without hurt, and then most commonly he _waketh_.
[Sidenote: That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.]
10. Nor is it _impossible_ for a man to be so far deceived, as when
his dream is _past_, to think it real: for if he dream of such
things as are ordinarily in his mind, and in such order as he useth
to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place
where he findeth himself when he awaketh; all which may happen: I
know no κριτήριον or mark by which he can discern whether it were a
dream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a man
sometimes to tell his dream for a truth, or to take it for a vision.
-------