_Whether faln Angels be Corporeal or simply Incorporeal, and the
absurdity of the assuming of Bodies, and the like consequents._
I am not insensible what great censure I may incurr for entring upon
such a ticklish and nice point as the corporeity or incorporeity of
Angels, seeing it hath exercised and crucified the wits of the most
learned in all ages, especially being but an obscure person, and not
heightned with those lofty titles that usually elevate Mens fames, more
by those attributes than by the weight and strength of their arguments.
Yet it being no necessary Article of the Christian Faith, but that a Man
may lawfully defend either, it cannot rationally be judged by
understanding Readers either to be pride or just offence for me to
handle this subject. For seeing that most of the Christian and Learned
Fathers for the space of four hundred years after Christ, were of the
opinion that they were corporeal, it can be no novelty in me to revive
or assert that opinion, and therefore I shall labour to make it manifest
in this ensuing order.
[Sidenote: The immort. of the Soul, p. 7, 8.]
[Sidenote: _Nov. Organ._ _lib._ 1. _p._ 49.]
[Sidenote: _Ibid._ _p._ 21.]
1. There is a late way of arguing taken up by Dr. _Moore_ and others,
that they will undertake to prove a thing to be so or so, or else to
make Man to deny his own faculties. And so the said Doctor doth
undertake to prove the existence of immaterial and incorporeal beings,
or else he thinketh he bringeth Men to deny their own faculties: And
these faculties he maketh to be, common notions, external sense, and
evident and undeniable deductions of reason. And concludeth that, what
is not consonant to all or some of these is meer fancy, and is of no
moment for the evincing of truth or falshood, by either its vigour or
perplexiveness. But this will not accomplish the business he intends,
for these reasons. 1. Because there is not the common notion of a
spiritual and immaterial being in all or any Man, neither is it (to use
his own words) true at first sight to all men in their wits upon a clear
perception of the terms, without any further discourse or reasoning, but
is only a bare supposition without any proof or evidence at all. 2. The
being of an immaterial and spiritual substance can no way incurr into
the senses nor affect them, because it is manifest (as _Des Cartes_ hath
sufficiently proved) that all sensation is procured by corporeal
contact, and not otherwise. And though we deny not that there have been,
are and may be apparitions, that cannot be rationally supposed to be the
ordinary _Phænomena_ of corporeal matter, yet affecting the senses,
there must be something in them that performeth that effect, that is
corporeal, or else the senses could not be wrought upon, for
_immateriale non agit in materiale, nisi eminenter ut Deus_. 3. No right
deductions can possibly be drawn from the highest power of
ratiocination, where the understanding hath no cognoscibility of the
things that reason would draw its conclusions from, for as the same
Doctor frameth his Axiome which is this: Whatsoever things are in
themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become
known to our faculties or cognitive powers. But we assert (which we
shall make good anon) that our faculties or cognitive powers (how far
soever some would vainly magnifie and extol them) have not the power of
understanding beings that are simply and absolutely immaterial and
incorporeal. 4. There is nothing that is more undoubtedly true than what
the Lord _Verulam_ hath told us in these words: _Causa vero & radix ferè
omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est: quod dum mentis humanæ vires
falso miramur & extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quæramus_. And again:
_Subtilitas naturæ subtilitatem sensûs & intellectûs multis partibus
superat_, the which may be proved from many undeniable instances, which
need not here be mentioned, only we shall add what the aforesaid learned
Lord speaks to the same purpose which is this: “The fault of sense is
twofold: For it either forsaketh or deceiveth us. For first there are
many things that escape the sense, though rightly disposed, and no way
impeded either by the subtilty of the whole body or by the minuteness of
the parts, or by the distance of place, or tardity and velocity of
motion, or by the familiarity of the object, or by reason of other
causes. Neither again, where the sense doth apprehend the thing, are
those apprehensions sufficiently firm. For the testimony and information
of sense is always from the Analogie of Man, not from the Analogie of
the Universe.” And it is altogether asserted with great error, that
sense is the measure of things. Neither can these notions the Doctor
would make so clear, be had or gathered, without some intimation from
some of the senses.
[Sidenote: _An Antidot. &c._ _p._ 12.]
[Sidenote: _Immortal._ _p._ 21.]
2. Further the Doctor tells us that the Idea of a Spirit is as easie a
notion, as of any other substance whatsoever. And he also saith:
“Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that his Idea or
notion (speaking of God) is as easy as any notion else whatsoever, and
that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the World.” This
later he speaketh concerning God. But that these assertions are unsound,
these following reasons will sufficiently evince.
[Sidenote: _Reas. 1._]
1. He doth define a Spirit thus: A Spirit is a substance penetrable and
indiscerpible. Now if it be true that he affirms before, that, “the
subject, or naked essence, or substance of a thing is utterly
unconceiveable to any of our faculties, and that if we take away
aptitudes, operations, properties and modifications from a subject, that
then the conception vanisheth into nothing, but into the Idea of a meer
undiversificated substance, so that one substance is not then
distinguishable from another, but only from accidents or modes, to which
properly belongs no subsistence.” So then if we take away penetrability
and indiscerpibility, which are but the modes and properties of a
Spirit, whose genus he maketh substance to be, then it vanisheth into an
indistinguishable notion, and so his definition comes to nothing.
[Sidenote: _Reas. 2._]
2. For if substances be known by their properties and modifications, as
we grant they are, the modifications and properties must of necessity be
some ways known unto us: but there are no ways either by common notions,
evidence of the senses, or sound deductions of reason that can certainly
inform us of these properties or modifications of penetrability and
indiscerpibility, and the Doctor yet never proved either; but is only a
bare supposition, and a melancholy figment.
[Sidenote: _Reas. 3._]
[Sidenote: The Immort. p. 68.]
[Sidenote: _De Inject._ _p._ 598.]
[Sidenote: _De Natur. Subst. Energ._ _p._ 406.]
3. He tells us that all substance has dimensions, that is, length,
breadth and depth, but all has not impenetrability, and boldly saith: It
is not the Characteristical of a body to have dimensions, but to be
impenetrable; to which we answer. It is strongly asserted by learned
_Helmont_, that by the ultimate strength of nature, bodies do sometimes
penetrate themselves and one another, and to that purpose he giveth
convincing examples, and concludeth thus from them. _Invenio equidem,
naturæ contiguam dimensionum penetrationem, licet non ordinariam. And
after saith thus: Quibus constat corpora solida, satis magna, penetrasse
stomachum, intestina, uterum, omentum, abdomen, pleuram, vesicam,
membranas inquam, tanti vulneris impatientes. Id est, absq; vulnere
cultros per istas membranas transmissos. Quod æquivalet penetrationi
dimensionum, factæ in natura, absq; ope Diaboli._ And to the same
purpose that most acute person, Dr. _Glisson_, handling this very point
saith: _Verum enimverò, si sola quantitas actualis sit causa
impenetrabilitatis corporum (ut ex supra dictis liquet,) eaq; sit
naturaliter mutabilis; quid impedit ne substantia materialis aliam
substantiam, mutatâ quantitate, novâq; simul assumptâ utrisq; communi,
penetret?_ And therefore we may as confidently deny his assumption, that
Impenetrability is the Characteristical of body, as he affirm it without
proof, and must with all the whole company of the learned, assign
Extension to be the true and Genuine Character of Body. And further he
granting that substance hath length, breadth, and depth, we must of
necessity conclude, that whatsoever hath those properties must needs be
material and corporeal, and so that which he would make to be Spirit is
meerly Body.
[Sidenote: _Reas. 4._]
[Sidenote: _Nov. organ._ _p._ 18.]
4. Whereas he saith that the notion of Spirit is as easy a notion, as
any other whatsoever, it is granted, but is not at all to the purpose:
for our inquiry need not be of the facility of a notion, but of the
verity of it, that is, of the congruity and adequation of the notion and
the thing from whence it is taken; otherwise though the notion be easy,
yet without an adequate congruity to the thing it is meerly false. As
for instance, when a melancholy person doth verily imagine himself to be
changed into a Wolf or Dog, it is not only an easy notion, but also it
is truly a notion, and yet a false notion, because there is no true
congruity betwixt it and the thing from whence it is taken, the Body of
the person so conceiving, being not at all changed into Wolf or Dog, but
still retaining its humane shape and figure. And therefore the Lord
_Verulam_ doth to this point speak truly and clearly in these words:
_Itaq; si notiones ipsæ mentis (quæ verborum quasi anima sunt, & totius
hujusmodi structuræ ac fabricæ basis) malè ac temere à rebus abstractæ,
& vagæ, nec satis definitæ & circumscriptæ, deniq; multis modis vitiosæ
fuerint, omnia ruunt._ And therefore the Doctor might very well have
considered, whether these his new notions had been fitly and rightly
drawn from the things, to which he doth so confidently affix them,
before he had so boldly asserted them, which though they be truly his
notions, that is, that he did think, conceive, and frame them, yet they
are not truly abstracted from the things: And so he may be rather judged
to be led by speculative and Philosophick Enthusiasm, than by the clear
light of a sound understanding.
[Sidenote: _Reas. 5._]
[Sidenote: Job 11. 12.]
[Sidenote: 1 Kings 8. 27.]
5. And concerning his Tenent that the Idea or Notion of God is as easy
as the notion of any thing else whatsoever, that the notion may be easy
we grant; but whether it be true and adequate, there lies the question.
For those old Hereticks that held that God had Eyes, Ears, Head, Hands
and Feet and the like, had an easie notion of it, conceiving him to have
humane members, but I hope the Doctor will not say that this notion of
theirs was a notion truly drawn from the nature and being of God,
because there is no corporeity in him at all. And it is and hath been
the Tenent of all Orthodox Divines, Ancient, Middle and Modern, that God
in his own nature and being is infinite and incomprehensible, and
therefore there can no true and adequate notion of him, as being so, be
duly and rightly gathered in the understanding of creatures; and so the
Doctors position or notion must needs be Phantastry and imaginary
Enthusiasm. For as there are many things in nature that in themselves
are finite and comprehensible, that as he grants of naked essence or
substance are utterly unconceivable to any of our faculties; much more
must the being of God that is infinite and incomprehensible, which are
attributes that are incommunicable, be utterly unconceivable to any of
our faculties. And it is but the vain pride of Mans Head and Heart,
thereby to magnifie his own abilities, whereas the Text doth pronounce
this of him, _For vain man would be wise; though he be born like a wild
ass colt_; that lifts him up to conceit that he can fathom and
comprehend the Infinite and Almighty, whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot
contain, and therefore cannot frame a true notion of him, whom perfectly
he doth not understand nor comprehend, and the attributes of God are
matters of Faith and not the weak deductions of humane reason.
[Sidenote: _Origin. sacr._ _l._ 2. _c._ 8. _p._ 233, 234.]
3. Those that seem to idolize humane abilities and carnal reason, have
not only applied those so much magnified Engines to the discovery of
created things, wherein they have effected so little, that sufficiently
proclaims the invalidity of the instruments or the inauspicious
application of them, or both, all the several sorts of Natural
Philosophy hitherto found out, or used, being examined, coming far short
of solving the _Phænomena_ of nature, when even the least animal or
vegetable affords matter enough to puzzle and _nonplus_ the greatest
Philosopher, so that we may justly complain with _Seneca_, that the
greatest part of those things we know are the least part of those things
we know not; These engines (I say) though proving ineffectual to find
out the true notions and knowledge of natural things, have also (like
the fiction of the Gyants) notwithstanding invaded Heaven, and taken
upon them to discover and determine of Celestials, wherein it is in a
manner totally blind, or sees but with an Owl-like vision. For indeed
the deciding of this point must be taken from the Divine authority of
the Scriptures, and the clear deductions that may be drawn from thence;
for this is that clear light, that we ought to follow, and not the
Dark-lanthorn of Mans blind, frail and weak reason, for it is _a sure
word of Prophecie whereunto_ it is good _to take heed_, and not to _vain
Philosophy, old Wives Fables, or opposition of Sciences falsly so
called_. And therefore we shall conclude this point here concerning the
corporeity or incorporeity of Angels with that Christian and learned
position of Dr. _Stillingfleet_ in these words: “But although
Christianity be a Religion which comes in the highest way of credibility
to the minds of Men, although we are not bound to believe any thing but
what we have sufficient reason to make it appear that it is revealed by
God, yet that any thing should be questioned whether it be of Divine
revelation, meerly because our reason is to seek, as to the full and
adequate conception of it, is a most absurd and unreasonable pretence.”
[Sidenote: Gen. 2. 7.]
[Sidenote: Eccles. 3. 21.]
4. In handling this point of the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels,
we do here once for all exclude and except forth of our discourse and
arguments the humane and rational Soul as not at all to be comprised in
these limits, and that especially for these reasons. 1. Because the
humane Soul had a peculiar kind of Creation differing from the Creation
of other things, as appeareth in the words of the Text. _And the Lord
God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils
the breath of life; and man became a living soul._ Upon which the note
of _Tremellius_ and _Junius_ is, _anima verò hominis spiritale quiddam
est, & divinum_. 2. Because I find _Solomon_ the wisest of Men making
this question: _who knoweth the spirit of man, that goeth upward: and
the spirit of the beast, that goeth downward to the earth?_ 3. Because
it is safer to believe the nature of the Soul to be according to the
Analogy of Faith, and the concurrent opinion of the learned, than to
sift such a deep question by our weak understanding and reason. So
having premised these things, and left this as a general exception and
caution, we shall proceed to the matter intended in this order.
[Sidenote: John 4. 24.]
[Sidenote: 2 Cor. 3. 17.]
1. We lay it down for a most certain and granted truth, that God simply
and absolutely is only a most simple spirit, in whom there is no
corporeity or composition at all, and what other things soever that are
called or accounted spirits are but so in a relative and respective
consideration, and not in a simple and absolute acceptation. And this is
the unanimous Tenent of the Fathers, Schoolmen and all other Orthodox
Divines, agreeing with the plain and clear words of the Scripture, as,
_God is a spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit
and in truth_. And again: _Now the Lord is that spirit, and where the
spirit of the Lord is there is liberty_. Therefore we shall lay down
this following proposition.
2. That Angels being created substances, are not simply and absolutely
incorporeal, but if they be by any called or accounted spirits, it can
but be in a relative and respective sense, but that really and truly
they are corporeal. And this we shall labour to make good not only by
shewing the absurdities of that opinion of their being simply spiritual,
but in laying open the unintelligibility of that opinion, and by
answering the most material objections.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 1._]
1. And first to begin at the lowest step, Body is a thing that affecteth
the senses most plainly and feelingly; for though many bodies are so
pure, as the air, æther, steams of the Loadstone, and many other steams
of bodies, that they escape the sight of our eyes, yet are they either
manifest to our feeling, or otherwise made manifest by some sensible
effect, operation, or the like; yet for all this, the intrinsick nature
of body as such is utterly unknown unto us, for when we speak of the
extension of body, as its Characteristical property, we do but conceive
of its superficial dimensions, its internal nature _quatenus Corpus_,
being utterly unknown unto us; it being a certain truth, that
_Quidditates rerum, non sunt cognoscibiles_; and as D^r _Moore_
granteth, the naked essence or substance of a thing is utterly
unconceiveable to any of our faculties. From whence we argue, _à minori
ad majus_, that if the substance of a body, whose affections and
modifications do fully incur into, and work upon our senses, be utterly
unconceiveable to any of our senses, much more of necessity must the
substance of a Created spirit, conceived as immaterial and incorporeal,
be utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties, because it hath no
effects, operations, or modifications that can or do operate upon our
senses.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 2._]
2. And as we know not the intrinsick nature of body, so also we are
ignorant of the highest degree of the purity and spiritualness of
bodies, nor do we know where they end, and therefore cannot tell where
to fix the beginning of a meer spiritual and immaterial being. For there
are of Created bodies in the Universe, so great a diversity, and of so
many sorts and degrees of purity and fineness, one exceeding another,
that we cannot assign which of them cometh nearest to incorporeity, or
the nature of spirit. And many of these being compared with other more
gross and palpable bodies, may be and are called and accounted spirits,
though notwithstanding they be all Corporeal, and but under a gradual
difference. So the vital part in the bodies of men are by Physicians
called Spirits in relation to the bones, ligaments, musculous flesh and
the like; nay even in respect of the blood, lymphatick humor, lacteal
juyce, or the _succus nutritius nervosus_, and yet still are contained
within the limits of body, and are as really Corporeal as any of the
rest, and so are the air and æther. And those visible species of other
bodies that are carried in the air and represented unto our Eyes, by
which we distinguish the shape, colour, site and similitude of one body
from another, though by the Schools passed over with that sleight title
of qualities, as though they were either simply nothing, or incorporeal
things, are notwithstanding really Corporeal, else they could not incur
into, nor affect the visive sensories: And these do in the air intersect
and pass through one another (as may be optically demonstrated) without
Confusion, Commixion, or discerpsion, and may comparatively be accounted
spirital and incorporeal, though really they be not so. But what shall
we say to that wonderful body, Image or _Idolum_ of our selves, and
other things that we behold in a mirrour or looking-glass? must this be
a meer nothing, or an absolute incorporeal thing? surely not. For it is
as really a body as any in the Universe, though of the greatest purity
and fineness of any that we know; and how near it approaches to the
nature of spirit, is very difficult (if not impossible) to determine;
for if it did exist when the body or subject from whence it floweth were
removed, it might rationally be taken for a Spirit, and with far more
probable ground than many things else that have been vainly supposed to
be Spirits. And that these visible shapes of things, and this Image in
the glass, are not meerly imaginary nothings, but Corporeal Figures and
steams, is most manifest, because they vanish when the body or subject
is removed, because that _nullius entis nulla est operatio, &
Incorporeum non incurrit in sensus_, and because they would pass through
the glass, but only for the foil or _Bractea_ laid on the otherside, by
which the Image is reflected. So that if we have bodies of so great
purity, and near approach unto the nature of spirit, we cannot tell
where spirit must begin, because we know not where the purest bodies
end.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 3._]
[Sidenote: The Immortal. of the Soul. _Axiom._ 2. _p._ 6.]
[Sidenote: _De natura substant. Energetic._ _c._ 27. _p._ 379.]
3. D^r _Moore_ maketh substance to be the genus, and spirit and body to
be the two species, so that body and spirit are of one generical
Identity, and so there must of necessity some certain specific
difference betwixt them be assigned and proved, or else the division is
vitious, and the property of spirit not proved, and so their opinion of
spirit falls totally to the ground. For we affirm (and shall prove) that
though a difference be imagined and supposed, yet it was never yet
sufficiently proved, for _omnia supposita, non sunt vera_, otherwise all
the impossible figments and vain _Chimæras_ of melancholy and doting
persons might pass for true Oracles: but it is one thing truly to
understand, and another thing to imagine and fancy what indeed is not,
nor ever was. And though the supposition seem never so probable and
like, yet it will but at the best infer the possibility of such an
imagined difference, but not prove it really to be so, and therefore
here we shall retort the Doctors Axiom against him, which is this:
“Whatsoever is unknown to us, or is known but as meerly possible, is not
to move us or determine us any way, or make us undetermined; but we are
to rest in the present light and plain determination of our own
faculties.” Now that a spirit is penetrable and indiscerpible, may be
imagined as possible to the fancies of some, but cannot be clearly
intelligible to any sober mind; for to imagine, and to understand, are
faculties that are very different, and however if such a difference be
conceived as possible (which cannot enter the narrow gate of my
Intellect) yet the difference of being penetrable and indiscerpible, is
not to move us to determine that a spirit hath those distinct properties
from bodies, because they are but known to us as meerly possible. And
therefore that these two differences of penetrability and
indiscerpibility assigned by D^r _Moore_, are not sufficiently proved to
be so, we shall give these reasons. 1. If bodies in the ultimate act of
nature can penetrate themselves and one another, as Helmont and D^r
_Glisson_ do strongly labour to prove, then penetrability is not the
proper difference of spirit from body, because then common to them both.
2. But if it be taken for a truth (and the one of necessity must be
true) that bodies do not, or can possibly penetrate themselves or one
another, as the common tenent holdeth, and seemeth most agreeable to
verity, for it is simply unintelligible and impossible to conceive, that
two Cubes (suppose of Marble or Metal) should penetrate one another, and
yet but to have the dimensions of one, and to possess no greater space
than the one did formerly fill: And if this be impossible and
unintelligible in respect of bodies, whose properties, aptitudes,
affections and modifications are apparent to our senses, then must it be
more impossible and unintelligible in substances supposed to be meerly
incorporeal, because they must needs be more pure and perfect, and
therefore less subject to such unconceiveable affections; and however,
it can be no wayes known to our faculties or cognitive powers, that they
have any such specifical property or affection. 3. As it is not any way
manifest to any of our senses, nor can be proved by any sound deductions
of reason, so it cannot be manifested to be any innate notion shining
from the Intellect it self, and we ought not to take adventitious ones
instead of those that are innate, nor fictitious ones for either, but to
make a due distinction of each of them one from another. 4. Neither is
indiscerpibility a proper difference of a spiritual substance from a
corporeal one, because the visible species of things do in the air
intersect one another, and suffer not discerpibility: and that these are
bodies is manifest, because they affect the senses; and therefore that
which is a property of some bodies cannot be the proper difference to
distinguish a spirit from a body. 5. This is only an arbitrary and
feigned supposition, and cannot be proved either by the testimony of any
of the senses, by sound reason, or innate notions; and what is or cannot
be proved by some of these (according to his own position) ought to be
rejected. And therefore as indiscerpibility is no proper difference of a
spirit from a body, no more is penetrability, which can no more be in a
spiritual substance, than either in discreet quantity one can be two, or
two one, or in continuate quantity one inch can be two, or two can
become one. D^r _Glisson_ from his much admired _Suarius_ the great
Weaver of fruitless Cobwebs, hath devised another difference of spirit
from body which he thus layeth down, as we give it in this English. “I
assign (he saith) a twofold difference betwixt the substance of matter
and that of spirits. The first is taken from the substantial (_à
substantiali materiæ mole_) heap or weight of the matter. For I (he
saith) besides the actual and accidental extension, do attribute to the
matter this substantial heap or weight which is denied to spirits. But
the sign of this heap or weight is, that if the matter in the same space
be duplicated, triplicated, or centuplicated, that it will be made more
dense twofold, threefold, or an hundred fold. And concludeth thus: I
answer (he saith) that matter and spirit in this do agree betwixt
themselves, that they both are finite, and from thence that they have
this common, that neither of them can reduce themselves into a
littleness that is infinite, or into an infinite magnitude. Therefore
the difference betwixt them doth not consist in this; but in this, that
a spirit whether it be contracted or dilated, is not made more dense or
rare; but on the contrary, matter, whether it be contracted or expanded,
is made more dense, or more rare.” To which we return this responsion.
1. It is usual with men, when by their wills and fancies they would
maintain an opinion that is weak and groundless, finding they cannot
clearly perform it, to bring in some strange, obscure or equivocal word,
thereby to make a flourish, though they prove nothing: So here this
learned person to make a shew to prove the difference of spirit doth
assign _moles substantialis_ as peculiar to body, but not to spirit; but
what is to be understood by _moles_, he might know his own meaning, but
I am sure there are few others that do or can understand it, and
therefore is but a devised subterfuge to stumble and blind mens
intellects, and not to prove the thing intended. 2. If by the word
_moles_ he intend weight or gravity (and what else it can signifie is
not intelligible) then it will not be a difference betwixt body and
spirit, because gravity and levity are differences of bodies in respect
of one another, and therefore can be none as he assignes it. 3. To
assert that a spirit when contracted or dilated is not made more dense
or more rare, but that matter whether it be contracted or expanded, is
made more dense or more rare, is easily spoken, but not so easily
proved: and rude assertions without sound proof, are of no validity, and
may with as good reason be denied and rejected, as affirmed or received.
4. We have no density in bodies but in respect of the paucity and
parvity of the pores, so that less of another body is contained in them,
and that is accounted rare that hath many or greater, and so containeth
more of another body in them, and are qualities or modifications that
only belong unto bodies, and not at all unto spirits, and is but
precariously taken up by the Doctor without any proof or demonstration
at all. 5. If spirits cannot expand themselves into an infinite space,
nor contract themselves into an infinite littleness, then where are
bounds and limits of this contraction and expansion, or how is it proved
that they can do either? seeing they are properties and affections of
bodies and matter, and never were proved to be peculiar to spirits.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 4._]
4. Those that are much affected to and zealous for experimental
Philosophie, do often run into that extream, as utterly to condemn and
throw away all the ancient Scholastick Learning, as though there were
nothing in it of verity or worth: But this is too severe and dissonant
from truth, as might be made manifest in many of their Maximes; but we
shall only instance in one as pertinent to our present purpose, which is
this: _Imaginatio non transcendit Continuum_. And this if we perpend it
seriously, is a most certain and transcendant truth; for when we come to
cogitate and conceive of a thing, we cannot apprehend it otherwise than
as continuate and corporeal; for what other notions soever we make of
things, they are but adventitious, arbitrary, and fictitious, for even
_non entia ad modum entium concipiuntur_. And therefore those that
pretend that Angels are meerly incorporeal, must needs err, and put
force upon their own faculties, which cannot conceive a thing that is
not continuate and corporeal: But if they will trust their own
Cogitations and faculties rightly disposed, and not vitiated, then they
must believe that Angels are Corporeal, and not meerly and simply
spirits, for absolutely nothing is so but God only.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 5._]
[Sidenote: _Vid. Rob. Fludd. utri. Cosm. Hist._ _Tract._ 1. _l._ 4. _c._
2. _p._ 110.]
5. If the Angelical nature were simply and absolutely spiritual and
incorporeal, then they would be of the same essential Identity with God,
which is simply impossible. For the Angels were not Created forth of any
part of Gods Essence, for then he should be divisible, which he is not,
nor can be, his Essence being simplicity, unity, and Identity it self,
and therefore the Angels must of necessity be of an essence of Alterity,
and different from the essence of God. Now God being a simple, pure, and
absolute spirit in the Identity of his essence, if the Angels were
simply and absolutely spiritual and incorporeal, then they must be of
the same essence with him, which is absurd and impossible; and therefore
they have Alterity in them, and so of necessity must be Corporeal, and
not simply and meerly spiritual. And that as much as we contend for here
is granted by D^r _Moore_ in these words: “For (he saith) I look upon
Angels to be as truly a compound Being consisting of soul and body, as
that of men and brutes.” Whereby he plainly asserteth their Composition,
and so their Alterity, and therefore that they must needs have an
_Internum_ and _externum_, as the learned and Christian Philosopher D^r
_Fludd_ doth affirm in these words: _Certum est igitur inesse ipsis
(scilicet Angelis) aliud, quod agit, aliud autem, quod patitur; nec verò
illud secundùm quod agunt, aliud quam actus esse poterit, qui forma
dicitur; neq; etiam illud secundum quod patiuntur, est quicquam præter
potentiam, hæc autem materia appellatur_.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 6._]
[Sidenote: _Serm._ 6 _sup. Cantic._ _p._ 505.]
[Sidenote: _Lib._ 5.]
6. Therefore to conclude, these arguments do sufficiently and evidently
prove that Angels are either Corporeal, or have bodies united unto them,
which is all one to our purpose whether way soever it be taken. To which
only we shall add these authorities; and first S. _Bernard_ tells us
thus much rendered into English. “Therefore (he saith) as we render unto
God alone true immortality, so also incorporeity, because he alone doth
so far transcend the universal Corporeal nature of spirits, that he doth
not stand need of any body whatsoever, in any operation whatsoever,
being content with only a spiritual nodd (or motion) when he will, to
perform whatsoever he pleaseth. Therefore only that majesty of his, is
that, which neither for himself, nor for another, hath need of the help
of a Corporeal instrument, by which omnipotent will he is immediately
present at every work.” And that of _Damascen_ is full to the purpose,
which is this: “That Angels _quantum ad nos_, are said to be incorporeal
and immaterial: but compared to God, are found to be Corporeal and
material.” And of this opinion besides were _Tertullian_, S. _Augustin_,
_Nazianzen_, _Beda_, and many others, as may be seen in the learned
Writings of _Zanchy_ upon this subject: with whose words we shall shut
up this particular: _Certum enim est, ex iis quæ scripturæ tradunt de
Angelis, probabiliorem esse Patrum sententiam, quàm Scholasticorum:
utram tamen sequaris, non multum peccaveris, nec proptereà inter
Hæreticos haberi poteris_.
And on the otherside, if they be holden to be simply and absolutely
incorporeal, then these absurdities must of necessity follow.
1. If Angels be simply incorporeal, then they can cause no Physical or
local motion at all, because nothing can be moved but by contact, and
that must either be by immediate or virtual contact, for the Maxime is
certain, _Quicquid agit, agit vel mediatione suppositi_, as when ones
hand doth immediately touch a thing and so move it; _vel mediatione
virtutis_, as when a man with a rod or a line, doth draw a thing forth
of the water, both of these do require a Corporeal contact, that is,
that the superficies of the body moving or drawing, must either
mediately or immediately touch the superficies of the body to be moved
or drawn. But that which is absolutely incorporeal hath no superficies
at all, and therefore can make no contact either mediate or immediate;
and therefore Angels if simply incorporeal, can cause no Physical or
local motion at all.
[Sidenote: The Immortal. _l._ 1. _c._ 10. _p._ 72.]
[Sidenote: _Princip. Phil._ _Part._ 2. _p._ 40.]
2. If Angels be absolutely incorporeal, then they cannot be contained or
circumscribed in place, and consequently can perform no operation in
Physical things. To which if they answer with _Thomas Aquinas_: _Quod
circumscribi terminis localibus est proprium Corporum, sed circumscribi
terminis essentialibus, est commune cuilibet Creaturæ, tam corporali,
quam spirituali_; This aiery distinction might have taken place, if
_Aquinas_ had shewed us what essential terms and limitations are, but of
this we have no proof at all, and what was never proved may justly be
denied. For what a definitive place is, was never yet defined, neither
can we possibly conceive an Idea or notion of any such thing, but only
as we may make a _Chimæra_ or figment of that which never was nor is.
For though we may apprehend that they are not circumscribed in place, as
gross bodies are, yet it is not to be doubted, but that they move from
place to place, and do so consist in some place, that they occupy a
certain space of place, and this is most certain, if we believe (as we
ought) those things which the Scriptures do declare concerning the
mission and motion of Angels. And therefore notwithstanding this
frivolous and feigned distinction, we may conclude with _Theodoret_,
_Angelorum naturam esse finitam, & circumscriptam, eóq; opus habere
loco_. Neither doth that avail to solve the business, and make this a
good distinction, which is brought by D^r _Moore_, to wit, that there
are two acceptions of place, the one being imaginary space, the other
that place is the concave superficies of one body immediately environing
another body, and that therefore there being these two acceptions of
place (he concludeth) that the distinction of being there
_Circumscriptive & definitive_, is an allowable distinction. But by the
Doctors leave we must affirm, that what he saith is not allowable, and
that for these reasons. 1. Because imaginary space hath no existence in
nature, but only in the fancy of the Imaginant, _& entia rationalia, non
sunt entia naturalia ex parte rerum existentia._ 2. Because it is a
certain truth which _Des Cartes_ hath taught us, to wit: That the names
of place or space, do not signifie any thing different from a body that
is said to be in a place, but only do design the magnitude, figure and
site of it amongst other bodies. And that this site may be determined,
we ought to have respect unto some other bodies, which we may consider
as immoveable. And as we respect divers bodies, we may say that the same
thing at the same time doth change place and not change place. As when a
Ship is carried in the Sea, he who sitteth in the Ship doth alwayes
remain in one place, if respect be had to the parts of the Ship, betwixt
which parts he keepeth the same site: And the same person doth
continually change place, if respect be had to the shores, because he
continually receedeth from some shores, and cometh more near unto other.
3. Neither is this distinction good, because as the same Author tells
us: _Non etiam in re differunt spatium, sive locus internus, substantia
corporea in eo contenta, sed tantum in modo, quo à nobis concipi
soleat_. 4. D^r _Moore_ granteth that spirits are substances and have
extension, and we affirm that nothing can be so but what is Corporeal,
and consequently must be in place circumscriptively, and therefore the
fancy of a definitive place, is meerly a fictitious foppery, without
ground or reason.
[Sidenote: _Object. 1._]
[Sidenote: 1 Timoth. 6. 16.]
[Sidenote: Hebr. 1. 3.]
[Sidenote: 1 Tim. 6. 13.]
[Sidenote: Job 34. 14, 15.]
[Sidenote: _De Lithias._ _l._ _c._ 8. _p._ 70.]
And now let us examine the objections that are usually brought against
this opinion, the strongest of which is to this purpose; that if Angels
be Corporeal, then of necessity they must be mortal, alterable and
destructible; to which I answer. 1. Because no Creaturely nature is or
can be immortal, _per se & ab intrinsecâ & propriâ naturâ_, for God only
is so as saith the Text, ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, _Who only hath
immortality_; Therefore the Angels whether corporeal or incorporeal, are
not immortal, neither by themselves or their intrinsick nature, either
(as the Schools speak) _à parte ante, vel à parte post_, because God
only is so, exclusively considered in regard of any Creature, and so the
objection is of no force. 2. The Corporeity of Angels doth not at all
hinder their immortality _à parte post_, for as God is only immortal in
respect of Essence, Eternity, Infinity and Independency, so Angels nor
any Creatures, are immortal in that point or respect, but only in regard
of their dependency upon God, who by his conservative power doth keep
them by Christ, that for the time or duration to come, they shall not
die, perish, or be annihilated; and this he can and doth as well perform
if they be corporeal as spiritual, even as he doth preserve and conserve
the bodies of the Saints in their Graves until the general Resurrection,
and in the World to come doth keep them in immortality; though they be
changed and made spiritual bodies, yet they remain bodies still. For it
is he _that sustaineth all things by the power of his word_; And it is
he _that doth vivifie or quicken all things: and if he gather unto
himself his spirit and his breath, all flesh shall perish together, and
man shall turn again unto dust_. So that the objection is of no
validity, because no Creature is kept in perpetual duration, _à parte
post, ab intrinsecâ naturâ, sed ex causis conservantibus_, which is the
goodwill, benignity, and blessed influence of _Jehovah_, and not from
any internal creaturely power. 3. Every spiritual and incorporeal
substance that is created, is as annihilable by the prime power that
created it, as is a Corporeal created substance. And on the contrary, a
Corporeal or material substance is no more capable of annihilation by
any power or efficiency of second Causes, than an incorporeal and
spiritual substance is; and therefore whether Angels be simply
incorporeal, or that they be Corporeal, it neither maketh for nor
against their immortality, which consists only in the benign emanation
of the Divine conservative power of the Almighty: And therefore doth
profound _Bradwardine_ draw that invincible, and undeniable Corollary of
verity, _Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet Creaturam immediatiùs
quacunq; causa creata_. 4. Though the most of the bodies that are known
unto us be divisible, alterable and discerpible, or dissipable in
respect of our conceptions of them, yet actually we may find many bodies
in nature that are not, nor ever were dissipated or dissevered _secundum
totum_, though there may be alteration in their superficial parts, as
the Earth, the Sun, Moon, the rest of the Planets, and those great and
glorious bodies that we call Stars; so that for the duration of bodies
_à parte post_ we can conclude little of certainty. And as there are
bodies that _secundum suum totum_, are not severed or dissipated, so
there are some bodies that though they may suffer division and
dissipation into smaller parts, yet do those parts though most minute,
suffer no real transmutation, but remain of the same Homogeneous nature
they were before, as is most manifest in Silver dissolved in _Aqua
fortis_, wherein though it be so severed and dispersed, that it appear
not at all unto the eye, yet may it be from thence recovered and
redintegrated into its own nature as it was before. And also the Masters
of the more abstruse Philosophy affirm to us upon their own certain
experience, that though metallick _Mercury_ may be divided into
insensible and invisible Atomes, yet still it retains the nature of
metallic _Mercury_, and that thus _Helmont_ tells us: _Si non vidissem
argentum vivum eludere quamcunq; artificum operam, adeò, quod aut totum
avolet adhuc integrum, aut totum in igne permaneat, atq; utrolibet modo,
servet impermutabilem sui ac primitivam identitatem, identitatisq;
homogeneitatem anaticam: dicerem artem non esse veram, quæ vera est,
sine mendacio, atq; longè verissima_. So also there are bodies which
although they suffer division and separation by some other bodies
dissevering of them, yet by motion of coition they soon close and
redintegrate themselves, having thereby suffered no detriment at all, as
is most apparent in the pure body of the Æther, the visible species of
things, the images in a Looking-glass and in shadows, which are all
bodies. So that seeing bodies, no more than Spirits to be annihilable by
second causes, and that there are some bodies that are not dissipated
_secundum totum_, and that there are others that though they are
separable into more minute particles, yet do they remain in Analytical
and Homogeneous Identity, and that there are others that though they be
actually for a small moment divided, yet they do instantaneously
coalesce, and by coition unite themselves; yet we may therefore
rationally conclude, that corporeity, _quatenus_ such, doth not at all
take away immortality _à parte post_, because bodies as well as spirits
may be kept in immortality by the conservative concourse of Divine
Power, and so the objection utterly falls to the ground.
[Sidenote: _Object. 2._]
[Sidenote: Psal. 104. 4.]
[Sidenote: Heb. 1. 7.]
2. There is only another argument that the persons of the other opinion
have urged, such as _Aquinas_, and the rest of the Scholastick rabble,
to wit, the Text in the Psalm, which is this: _Who maketh his Angels
spirits: his ministers a flaming fire_. From whence they would
positively conclude that they are spirits, and absolutely incorporeal;
but fail of their purpose for these clear reasons. 1. The Text there
cannot be rationally understood of their creation, or of their
creaturely nature, but of their offices and administrations, because the
word used there is not from בָּרָא to create, or form forth of
nothing, but from עָשָא _fecit_, that is by ordering them in their
offices and ministrations. And again the word רוּחַ doth not alwaies
or of necessity signifie an incorporeal thing but that which is a body,
as the winds, and so doth _Luther_ and diverse others render it, and it
is commonly attributed to beasts as well as Men, as in that of
_Solomon_, _Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the
spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?_ Where the word
spirit, which is all one in the Hebrew, is attributed to beasts as well
as to men, but no man (I suppose) will believe that the spirit of a
beast is simply incorporeal, and therefore by the word spirit in the
Psalm cannot necessarily be understood a simple incorporeal substance,
and therefore the consequence is not necessary.
[Sidenote: _Metaphys._ _l._ 2. _c._ 4. _p._ 222.]
[Sidenote: _Vid. August._]
[Sidenote: _Tom._ 2. _l. de spir. & an._ _c._ 8.]
But the Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews must needs be taken for the
best Expositor of these words of the Psalmist, who doth quote them only
for this purpose, to prove that Christ in dignity and office is far
above the Angels who are all ordered to serve and obey him, and are by
their offices all but ministring spirits, sent forth to minister for
them who shall be heirs of Salvation. By which it is manifest that this
place is to be understood of their ministration and offices, and not of
their nature or substances. 2. They can no more be meerly and literally
said to be spirits, understanding spirit to intend an absolute
incorporeal substance, than his ministers can be literally understood to
be flaming fire, they must either be both literally true, which is
absolutely absurd, or else those words must have a metaphorical
interpretation, as they may and must have, and there is no inconvenience
in that exposition. For as the winds, which is but a strong motion of
the air, and the shining or flaming fire, are two of the most quick,
agile and operative agents that are known unto us in nature, so the
Angels and Christs Ministers are strong, quick and most nimble and
powerful in performing their offices and administrations. Therefore we
shall conclude this as _Scheibler_ doth from S. _Augustine_: _Nihil enim
invisibile & incorporeum naturâ credendum est, præter solum Deum, qui ex
eo incorporeus & invisibilis dicitur, quia infinitus, & incircumscriptus
est, & simplex, & sibi omnibus modis sufficiens se ipso, & per seipsum:
omnis verò rationalis creatura corporea est, Angeli & omnes Virtutes
corporeæ sunt, licet non subsistunt in carne_.
[Sidenote: Judges 13. 20.]
[Sidenote: Dan. 3. 24, 25.]
[Sidenote: Luke 24. 39.]
Now though we have sufficiently proved that they are corporeal, that is,
that they have bodies naturally united unto them, and so have an
_internum_, or moving power, and an _externum_, or a part moved, that
is, as Dr. _Moore_ confesseth, a spiritual and incorporeal part, and a
corporeal part or vehicle, yet to assign what kind of bodies they have,
or what proper difference there is betwixt their substance and other
corporeal substances is no easie matter to determine. Only we shall give
two differences whereby they are distinguished from other substances
that are corporeal, and that as the Scripture holdeth them forth unto
us. 1. The first differential distinction is, that their bodies do not
suffer, or are altered or dissipated, by the most strong, and operative
sublunary agent that is known unto us: Amongst which we have none of
greater force and activity than our culinary fire, yet it is manifest
that that Element did not work upon nor burn the Angel that appeared to
_Manoah_ and his Wife, _who ascended in the flame of the altar_, and was
not touched, or altered at all, which plainly sheweth that his body was
not to be wrought upon by the fierce flame of sublunary fire, and he is
there called the Angel of _Jehovah_. This also is confirmed by that
which _Nebuchadnezzar_ saw, and confessed, that though _there were three
men only cast into the fiery furnace_, yet he saw a fourth (which by all
the learned is judged to be an Angel) _and they had no hurt upon them_,
that is, the fire did not work upon their bodies to burn, alter, or
consume them. So that in this the bodies of Angels differ from the most
of other bodies, because they do not suffer by sublunary fire, the most
violent agent that we know. And this must needs rationally be taken to
be proper unto Angels in regard of their created natures, and not as
superadded by a Divine and Almighty Power, as in some other cases it may
be granted. 2. A second difference is, that what bodies soever spirits
or Angels have, or appear in, they have not flesh and bones such as
Christ had in his true and numerical body in which he did appear after
his resurrection, which was the same individual body which he had before
he was crucified. But though they have bodies, yet to feeling and
tangibility they have not flesh and bones as humane bodies have, which
have a renitency and resistibility to our touch, which their bodies have
not, being as it were ethereal, airy and shadowy; and yielding and
giving way to the touch, and though to be divided and separated, yet,
maybe, do as soon close by counition, and so suffer nothing at all by
that division.
[Sidenote: _Saints Everlast. rest_, _c._ 7. _part_ 2. _p._ 255.]
[Sidenote: _Sup. Cantic._ _p._ 504.]
Concerning the properties of their bodies it seems to have been the
opinion of _Tertullian_ (as I find him quoted by Mr. _Baxter_) that they
had thin pure and aereal bodies which they could dilate and expand,
condense and contract at their pleasures, and so frame them into diverse
and sundry shapes; his words are these: _Dæmones sua hæc corpora
contrahunt, & dilatant, ut volunt: sicut etiam lumbrici, & alia quædam
insecta_. So we see that some worms and insects will extend themselves
into a vast length and smallness, that they can pass through a very
small hole, or passage, and again contract themselves into a great bulk,
drawing in the length, and increasing the breadth and thickness, which
though it still be the same corporeal substance, and in general doth, in
what figure soever it be brought into, but retain the same dimensions in
respect of place, yet in regard of accidental shape or figure it may
change the dimensions in respect of one another, as one while to be more
in longitude, and less in breadth and depth, and sometimes more in
breadth and depth, and less in length. So may the bodies of Angels by
contraction and dilatation, sundry wayes alter their dimensions, and
consequently their shapes and figures, and all this according to the
motion and act of their own wills, so that still there must be limits to
these acts of distention and contraction, that they can do neither in an
infinite degree as either to become an insensible and indivisible prick,
nor to be infinitely expanded or dilated, and this opinion hath
sufficiency of rationality and intelligibility in it. Of this very point
S. _Bernard_ speaketh thus modestly: _Videntur Patres de hujusmodi
diversa sensisse, nec mihi perspicuum est undè alterutrum doceam: &
nescire me fateor_. And though we cannot punctually enumerate, nor
assign the certain properties of their bodies, yet we may rationally
conclude thus much. 1. That they being creatures ordained for high and
noble ends must needs have their bodies and organs fitted and suitably
proportioned to fulfil and accomplish those ends, as doth most
manifestly appear by the bodies and organs of all other creatures, which
are most wisely and fitly framed by the Almighty, according to the
several ends and uses they were created and ordained for. 2. It is most
probable that considering there are creatures that as their wills are
moved by their passions and affections can alter the colours and figures
of their own bodies, as is manifest in worms, and in the colours of the
Chameleon, as it is asserted by the experience of the learned Physician
_Dominicus Panarolus_, so from the less to the more, that Angels have
bodies of far more excellency to perform their ministrations in, than
those gross and terrestrial bodies have that are here below. And it is
no small wonder to observe our ordinary _Gallus Turcicus vel
Gallopavus_, how quiet and demissly sometimes he goes, and then again
upon the suddain by some emotion of spirit, how will his train be
advanced and extended, his barbles swelled and puffed up, and the
appendicle that comes over the bill or _rostrum_, be extended or
contracted at the pleasure of the animal: And much more to consider the
quick and suddain change of the colours of both those parts, as
sometimes to a whitishness, or an ash-colour, sometimes purple,
sometimes blewish, and sometimes pure red, so quick a motion that
creature can give to the spirits and blood, that they can so quickly
alter and change, not only the colours, but also the magnitude. And much
more may we rationally believe that Angels can alter and change the
figure and colour of their bodies according to the ministrations they
are imployed about.
[Sidenote: Mark 12. 25.]
[Sidenote: 1 Cor. 15. 44.]
3. The Scripture informeth us that in or at _the resurrection, the
bodies of men shall be as the Angels that are in heaven_, _sicut
Angeli_: Now this Analogy, comparison, or assimilation, would be
altogether false if Angels had no bodies at all, but were meerly
incorporeal; then it would follow, that the bodies after the
resurrection were made meer Spirits, and so ceased to be bodies, which
is false according to the doctrine of S. _Paul_, who sheweth us plainly
that after the resurrection they are changed in qualities into σώματα
πνευματικὰ _spiritual bodies, for there is a natural Soul_ or Animal
_body_, and so likewise, _there is a spiritual body_. From whence we
necessarily conclude that Angels have Bodies, and that they are pure
spiritual ones.
Now we shall come to the other point intended in this Chapter, that is
to shew that the opinion of Angels assuming bodies of the Elements here
below, is a meer figment, as must of necessity follow if this be a truth
that we have proved, to wit, that they have bodies; for then assuming of
other bodies must needs be in vain and to no purpose: but we shall also
shew the weakness and folly of that Tenent by these positive reasons
following.
1. Those that maintain the assumption of bodies dare not affirm that
they are so invested with those bodies, as are humane souls with their
bodies: for then there must be vital union, which cannot be but by
Divine Ordination: But it doth not any where either by Scripture, or
sound rational consequence, appear that either God appointed, or gave
power to Angels to assume to themselves bodies of what shape they
pleased, or that he ordained a vital union, betwixt the Angels and those
bodies they are supposed to assume either by Creation, or Generation,
and therefore if they did assume any such bodies it must but be as we
put on and off our Garments, or as Players put on and off their Perukes,
Vizards and Garments according to the several things or persons they
intend to represent and personate.
2. But the great question will be, who are the Taylors that shape and
frame them these vestments? what! must it be themselves that shape and
figurate these bodies, as snails are supposed to frame and make their
shells and houses? Surely not, because if they be simply incorporeal,
then they can make no contact with corporeal matter, and without a
corporeal contact there can be no alteration nor organization of matter,
and consequently, they cannot frame or shape themselves such vestments;
neither can any other actor or agent be assigned that can frame them,
and therefore the Tenent is a most ridiculous figment. And again if they
should have such solid bodies framed of the inferior Elements, as the
body of a Serpent, as the Witchmongers do suppose the Devil assumed when
he deceived _Evah_, and such bodies as Demons are vainly supposed to
assume to carry the heavy bodies of Men and Women in the air, then those
bodies must needs be of that solidity and compactness that they cannot
suddainly be wasted and dissipated, and then doubtlesly we should find
them sometimes, as we do the sloughs, _Exuvias_, or skins of Snakes, for
they could not be consumed in a moment. And it were horrid to suppose
that God should instantaneously create them, and as suddainly dissipate
and waste them. So that in verity there is nothing of certitude, but it
may be looked at as a Chimera and a Poetical Fable.
3. And if the Angels had not such bodily organs wherein they could move,
walk, speak, and perform other such actions withal, before they assumed
or crept into such vestments, their being inclosed and invested with
them and in them would no more fit and inable them to walk or speak in
them, than would an hollow Image inable a lame Man to walk, or a dumb
Man to speak that were inclosed in them. Therefore (suppose) as the
Witchmongers hold, that the Devil should appear to a Witch in the
assumed shape of a Cat, Dog, Foal or such like, and walk and talk with
him or her, if before that assumption of such a shape, the Devil could
not walk and speak, the having crept into such a vestment would no more
inable him to speak, than a dead Cat in an empty hogshead, or wind pent
in an empty bladder.