_Of Divine permission, providence and prescience._
There is no one thing that hath more promoted this false and wicked
Tenent of a kind of omnipotency in Devils, and the exorbitant power
ascribed to Witches, than the misunderstanding of the true and right
Doctrine of Divine Providence, and the admitting of a bare permission in
God as different and distinct from his providence. From whence it cometh
to pass that not only the vulgar, but such as tread in the steps of
_Arminius_, do hold a meer bare permission, and that God sits as a quiet
beholder by his Prescience from the event of things to see what will be
effected by Devils and wicked Men, who in the mean time run and rove
about, acting what, when and how they please, and that God hath neither
hook in their nostrils, nor bridle in their mouths, neither keeps them
in any restraint, order or government, and so we must needs have a mad
rule in this World, during this permission and naked inspection.
But that we may proceed in such order, as may be clear and intelligible
to the Readers, we shall here propose the state of the matter that we
undertake to confute, which is this: That there is not in God a nude,
passive permission, separate from the positive and active decree, order
and will of his Divine Providence and Government, but that he doth rule
all things according to the power and determination of his own positive
and actual will. And this we shall prosecute in this following order and
particulars.
Those that deny that there is in God a passive permission separate from
his decretive and actual will in his providence are accused by others,
thereby to infer the absurdity, that God is the author or efficient
cause of sin; which pretended absurdity, in truth and reason cannot be
any, because it is a simple and absolute impossibility, that God should
be the author of sin as these arguments do sufficiently testifie.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 1._]
[Sidenote: James 1. 13.]
[Sidenote: Psal. 5. 4.]
[Sidenote: Deut. 32. 3.]
1. That of necessity must be false, which the Scriptures do declare to
be so, in open and plain terms. But that God should be the author of sin
or evil, the Scriptures do deny in open and plain terms, as where the
Text saith: _God cannot be tempted with evil_: where both the act, and
the possibility of it is absolutely denied. Again: _For thou art not a
God that hast pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with
thee_. Therefore it is false that God is, or can be the author of sin;
and so by consequence the supposed absurdity is a meer impossibility;
and an absurdity urged that is impossible, is most of all absurd.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 2._]
2. He is _ens summè perfectum, & quicquid est in Deo, est Deus_; but sin
howsoever understood, or accepted, is an imperfection, defect and an
aberration from a just and perfect rule, and therefore it is simply
impossible that God can be the cause of any thing that is imperfect,
sinful or evil, if sin be considered as _malum culpæ_.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 3._]
[Sidenote: Rom. 4. 15.]
3. God is not under any binding law given to him by some other, for then
he should cease to be supream, independent and omnipotent: Now to whom
there is no law given to observe, there can be no transgression, for the
Apostle saith, _where there is no law, there is no transgression_; and
therefore it is simply impossible that God should be the author, or
causer of sin, or evil, because there is no law that he can transgress
against.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 4._]
[Sidenote: _De Civitat. Dei_, _l._ 2. _c._ 7.]
4. God prohibiteth and hateth sin, as the Scriptures do every where
testifie, but God is the cause of nothing but that which he loveth, and
therefore cannot be the cause of the evil of sin. And to speak properly
sin hath no efficient cause, but a deficient, such as is the will of
faln Angels, and wicked Men, whose irregularity of will, from the
command of God, is all the cause that sin and evil hath or can have. An
efficient cause is only of those things that are good, because every
efficient cause doth by working put something in being: But privations
(of which sort are sins) do put nothing in being, but do truly note the
absence of beings. Therefore did S. _Augustine_ say well: _Mali causa
efficiens nulla est, sed tantùm deficiens_.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 5._]
[Sidenote: Gen. 1. 3.]
[Sidenote: John 8. 44.]
[Sidenote: 1 John 3. 8.]
5. That which properly hath an efficient cause, hath also an end
properly so called: But sin hath not an end properly so called, because
the end is being, and therefore good, and the perfection of the thing.
But the Scripture doth declare that _all things that God created were
exceeding good_; and that the cause of sin was Man, and the Devil; for
the text saith, that _the Devil was a murderer from the beginning, and
abode not in the truth_: And again, _He that committeth sin, is of the
Devil, for the Devil sinneth from the beginning_. Therefore from hence
it is clear, that God neither is nor can be the author or causer of sin.
[Sidenote: _Argum. 6._]
[Sidenote: _Vid. Schar. de miser. hom. stat. sub peccato_, _c._ 3.]
[Sidenote: _Fulgent._ _lib._ 1. _ad Monim_]
6. That which God is the author of, doth not make Man worse. but sin
doth make Man worse, therefore God is not the author of it. And all sin
is perpetrated, because thereby it receeded from the order that
respecteth God, as the ultimate end of all things; but God doth incline
all things unto himself, as to the ultimate end, neither doth he turn
them from himself, because he is _summum bonum_. And further as
_Fulgentius_ saith: _Deus non est ejus rei autor, cujus est ultor. At
Deus est peccati ultor, ergo non autor._ And therefore we conclude, that
this is a vain pretence of an absurdity, because it is impossible that
God should be the author or causer of sin.
[Sidenote: Job 13. 7.]
This plausible pretence to seem to be zealous, not to make God the
author of sin, we commend as allowable; but it is but like the zeal of
the Scribes and Pharisees, which was without knowledge, because they
pretend that for an absurdity, that is a simple impossibility. And they
ought to remember the argument of _Job_, which is this: _will ye speak
wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him?_ For as we ought not to
suppose, or imply him to be the author of sin; so we ought not to rob
him of his Glory, by detracting from his power and providence, nor in
ascribing that unto Creatures, that is only due unto the Creator; as
those do that hold a nude passive permission in him separate from his
will and decree in his providence. Neither doth the denying of this any
way imply that he is the author of sin, for a providential permission we
allow as the act of his will and decree, as we shall shew hereafter.
Now concerning permission in God, being a suspension of his efficiency
in regard of some acts permitted to the creatures, and that for just and
good ends, the definition of it and its affections or properties are so
darkly handled even by those that make most ado about it, that it would
serve rather to divert Men from the right way than to guide them in it,
or unto it. Therefore here we shall only note these three things, and
pursue it more fully hereafter. 1. There must be the person or power
permitting that hath ability, right and authority so to do. 2. There
must be the person or power permitted that hath ability to perform the
thing permitted, otherwise it would be in vain, and to no purpose. 3.
There must be the thing or action that is permitted to be done, or
brought to pass, by the person permitted to act, and that must not be
impossible.
1. Before the Creation it is meerly improper to attribute permission
unto God, because there was no person, nor power besides himself that
could act any thing, and therefore could not be permitted, and so the
correlative being awanting, both the relative and the relation betwixt
them must necessarily fall to the ground, as having no existence; and so
it is impossible that permission should be in God when there was no
Creature to be permitted, and so could not be attributed unto him before
the Creation.
[Sidenote: Heb. 1. 3.]
[Sidenote: Job 34. 14, 15.]
[Sidenote: _Vid. Chrysost. in Loc._]
[Sidenote: Psal. 104. 19.]
[Sidenote: Verse 9.]
[Sidenote: Psal. 107. 25.]
[Sidenote: Job 38. 11.]
[Sidenote: Jerem. 5. 22.]
[Sidenote: _De Caus. Dei_, _l._ 1. _c._ 2. _p._ 165.]
[Sidenote: Isai. 38. 8.]
[Sidenote: Exod. 14. 21, 22, 23.]
[Sidenote: _Id._ _v._ 17.]
[Sidenote: Jonah 1. 4.]
[Sidenote: _Id._ 2. 10.]
[Sidenote: Psal. 119. 91.]
[Sidenote: _Greg._ 16. _mor._ 4.]
[Sidenote: _Thom. de Christ. Religion._ 133.]
[Sidenote: _De Caus. Dei_, _p._ 171.]
2. It is as improper to attribute permission unto God in respect of the
Physical agency of second causes, because he not only worketh all in
all, and by his Divine concourse and conservative power _sustaineth all
things by the word of his power_, and _Job_ tells us: _If he gather unto
himself his spirit and breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man
shall turn again into dust_. Upon which place of the _Hebrews_ S.
_Chrysostome_ saith thus: _Feratq; inquit omnia, hoc est, gubernet
omnia. Siquidem cadentia, & ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim
minus est continere mundum quàm fecisse: Sed si oportet aliquid quod
admireris dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem, ex nullis
extantibus rerum essentiæ productæ sunt: in continendo verò, ea quæ
facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant continentur. Hæc ergo dum reguntur, &
ad invicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum & valdè mirabile,
plurimæq; virtutis judicium declaratur_: But also because he hath set
all natural things their bounds, and ordered, decreed and determined
their ends in acting. Now what he hath appointed, ordered and decreed to
be the agency of every creature, and determinated its end in acting,
cannot properly be called permission, but his will, ordination and
providence. As if one should say he suffereth and permitteth the Sun and
Moon to run their course, it is an improper expression and injurious to
his wisdom and power in his providential government of the creatures,
seeing that it is a certain truth, _Deus operatur in omni operante_: And
_he hath appointed the Moon for seasons, and the sun knoweth his going
down_. And it is absurd to say he suffereth the Sea to Ebb and Flow,
when he hath _set it a bound that it cannot pass over. For he
commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves
thereof. And said, hitherto shalt thou come and no further: And here
shall thy proud waves be staid._ And again, _Will ye not tremble at my
presence saith the Lord, which have placed the sand for the bound of the
sea, by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves
thereof toss themselves, yet can they not prevail; though they roar, yet
can they not pass over it_. And therefore we may conclude that the whole
Creation in respect of Physical agency is ruled according to those
orders, and not by a fortuitous chance, or a bare passive permission. 1.
For first all creatures have their Physical agency, and the affections
and properties thereof ordained by God in the Creation, and according to
this they constantly act, except they be turned, altered, or suspended
by the Creator himself, and he doth immediately act in them all, and
they cannot properly be said to be permitted. 2. They are upholden,
sustained and conserved in their several conditions, by the word of his
mighty power, his continual concourse and divine emanation, which if it
should but cease one minute, the whole Creation would fall into that
nothing, from whence his Eternal and Omnipotent _Fiat_ did raise and
call them forth, so that we dare affirm with profound _Bradwardine_,
_Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet Creaturam immediatiùs quacunq;
causa creata_. 3. When he pleaseth he doth suspend the effects and
agency of natural causes, as in making the Sun stand still in the
victory of _Joshua_, and of the three Children in the fiery Furnace.
Sometimes he causeth them to act contrary to their innate powers and
qualities, as in _making the shaddow go ten degrees back in Ahaz
sun-dial_: and in causing _the waters of the red sea_, contrary to their
natures, which are to tend downwards, _to be divided, and to go
backward, and to be as a wall on the right hand, and on the left, until
Moses, and the children of Israel were passed through._ And by many
other wayes and means doth he alter and change the course of natural
agents, to serve his will and good pleasure in his mercy, or in his
justice, and yet here is no bare or passive permission. 4. Besides these
he ordereth all the particular acts of natural agents, to be subservient
unto his will: So when _Jonah_ fled to _Tarshish_, _the Lord sent forth
a great wind into the sea, and raised a mighty tempest to overtake
Jonah_; and when he was cast into the Sea, _the Lord prepared a great
fish to swallow him up, and also the Lord spake unto the fish, and it
vomited up Jonah upon the dry land_. Now the wind was not carried nor
the storm raised, by a permissive power, but by the will and order of
the Lord Jehovah, who sent them, and directed them either by his
immediate power, or by the ministry of his Angels; and though they
wrought according to their natural agency, yet the special ordering as
to the particular act was not by permission, but by the will and
appointment of his providence. Neither did the great fish come by chance
or permission, but God in his merciful providence had prepared him for
the preservation of _Jonah_, and caused him to be vomited on the dry
land; so that all creatures do not only continue according to his
ordinances, but also all elementary, and irrational creatures do praise
the Lord by fulfilling his word, will and providence. And lest we be
either censured to wrest the Scriptures, or to be single in this
opinion, take the judgment of some few others. S. _Gregory_ (as he is
quoted by learned _Bradwardine_) tells us thus much: _Quis de Deo ista
vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirùm dum sit semper omnipotens, sic
intendit omnibus, ut assit singulis; sic adest singulis, ut simul
omnibus nunquam desit; sic itaq; exteriora circundat, ut interiora
impleat; sic interiora implet, ut exteriora circundet; sic summa regit,
ut ima non deserat; sic imis præsens est, ut à superioribus non
recedat_. And _Thomas Aquinas_ their great Schoolman (as the same author
cites him) saith: _Quòd Deus immediatè ordinat omnes effectus per
seipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur, sed in ipsâ executione
quodammodò immediatè se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causæ
mediæ agunt in virtute causæ primæ, ut quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere
videatur, & omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui, sicut
artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti_. Therefore we will conclude this
with that of S. _Augustine_: _Proculdubio nullus est locùs ab ejus
præsentia absens; super omnem creaturam quippè præsidet regendo, subtus
est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute,
quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab
illo sustentetur, qui eam creavit. Extra omnia est, sed non exclusus,
intra omnia, sed non conclusus._ And these places need no fiction of an
Hebraism to expound them, nor no device of a verb of an active
termination, and a permissive signification to evade the pressure of
this truth. And therefore in respect of Physical agency we are bold with
_Bradwardine_ to assert these three Corollaries.