(“Dictionary of National Biography.” Article, J. P. Morier.)
In his note on J. P. Morier, Mr. S. Lane-Poole writes:
“According to the ‘Nouvelle Biographie,’ Morier was taken prisoner by
the French, but in spite of his character as the representative of a
hostile power, entrusted, moreover, with a secret mission to co-
operate diplomatically with the Turks with a view to the expulsion of
the French from Egypt, he was set at liberty with a warning that
should he again be found in Egypt he would meet with the fate of a
spy. _No authority, however, is adduced for this story, which is
unsupported by any public or private evidence._” This assertion is
totally false. The “story” is supported by public and private
evidence.
M. Charles-Roux in his recent study of the “Convention of El Arish”
(“Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes for 1923,” pp. 319-20, 340) notes a
“ruse de guerre,” by which the French evacuating Egypt on the faith of
a solemn convention would be “destroyed” at sea. But he does not
critically examine this curious episode, probably on the assumption
that any “horror” might be conceived by a Turk.
It was on the 30th October, 1799, that the Reis Effendi, in a
conference with Mr. Spencer Smith, alluded to the overtures made by
Kléber for the evacuation of Egypt, and, anticipating the objection
that the return of so large an army as that under Kléber to Europe
might turn the balance against the allies, stated that “means would be
found of taking them to some place where half of them are to be
massacred and the rest despoiled of everything and are even to be left
with nothing but their shirts.” (S. Smith to Grenville, 12 Nov., 1799,
F.O., Turkey, 23.) The “ruse” was enthusiastically taken up by Tamara,
the Russian envoy. (Tamara to S. Smith, undated, F.O., Turkey, 23.)
When Lord Elgin arrived in November, 1799, he at first objected.
(Elgin to Grenville, undated, F.O., Turkey, 24), but he was soon
“converted” to it and sent his secretary, J. P. Morier, to Turkish
headquarters to arrange the execution. The written instructions to
Morier, dated 22nd December, 1799, naturally do not refer to the
“ruse” (F.O., Turkey, 24). But the object of his mission is clearly
attested in a letter from Elgin to Lord Keith: “The Turks had
conceived the utility to the common cause of destroying the French
army and the benefit to ourselves of taking every degree of vengeance
for so unprovoked an aggression and of making an example of such
unprecedented atrocity of conduct: and if little less precipitancy had
been used in concluding the capitulation (i.e. Sidney Smith’s
successful conclusion of the Convention in January) _these ideas,
which were sufficiently important for me to induce me to send my
private secretary with them to Sir Sidney Smith_, would have been
carried out” (enclosed in Elgin’s despatch of 10th March, 1800, F.O.,
Turkey, 28).
Morier could not convince Sidney Smith to adopt the measure. He
entered Egypt with the Turks after the successful conclusion of the
Convention. But when the rupture occurred and the Grand Vizier was
defeated near Cairo, Morier had to make the best of his way out of the
country. He arrived at Damietta on the 23rd March, 1800 and sailed in
a small boat to join Sir Sidney Smith, but a storm forced him to take
refuge in the Lake of Bourollos. He was surrounded by the French and
could not save his incriminating papers, as there were only three feet
of water, so he buried them in the ballast sand. They were, however,
taken by the French. He, himself, was taken to Rosetta and, because he
had a “safe pass” from a French officer, he was allowed to join Sir
Sidney Smith in the “Tigre.” (This account is from Morier to Elgin,
5th April, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 28.)
The papers of Morier were published in the “Courier d’Egypte” (Nos. 70
and 73, 21 prairial an VIII and 18 messidor VIII). There is no doubt
as to their authenticity. Neither Morier nor Elgin said a word. Elgin
satisfied himself by stating that there was no “harm” in the loss of
the papers, “although the opinions expressed in them differ from those
of Sidney Smith and the persons he employs” (Elgin to Grenville, 9th
July, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 28).
The point remains: were the Turks serious in this “ruse de guerre”?
They were not. Their only interest was in the evacuation of Egypt and
whether the French were destroyed or not “en route” was of no
importance to them. As a matter of fact, Elgin states that after it
had been suggested the Porte dropped all mention of it in its
communications with the British embassy. The Grand Vizier who was to
arrange the execution “notified the Porte of his determination not to
engage in so scandalous a transaction.” (Elgin to Grenville, 9th May,
1800, F.O., Turkey, 28.) But the Russians, on the contrary, were keen.
Orders were sent from St. Petersburg to the fleet under Admiral
Ushakoff to carry out the “ruse” “if appearances could be saved.”
Italinsky, then Russian Minister in Palermo, informed Nelson of
Ushakoff’s readiness, and Tamara repeatedly urged it upon the Porte.
(Elgin to Grenville, 28th January, 1800, 9th May, 1800, F.O., Turkey,
28; Italinsky to Nelson, 7th March, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS. 34916, f.
311.)