TILSIT TO BUCHAREST: THE STALEMATE IN THE EAST
1807-1812
There is a legend of Tilsit. The meeting of Alexander and Napoleon on a
raft in mid-stream, the scenes of fraternisation designed by two masters
of stage effects, the rumour that a British Agent lay hidden behind a
curtain and overheard the conversations between the two autocrats[1502]
are bound to stir the dullest imagination. The belief that the partition
of the Turkish Empire had been resolved upon[1503] has taken root, and
the question as to which of the two emperors duped the other has never
yet been solved.[1504] Tilsit, on the contrary, created a situation in
which the powers balanced each other so equally as to enable the Turks
to emerge from the conflict without serious loss of territory. “Les
Projets de guerre dans l’Inde, les projets de partage de l’Empire
ottoman semblent des fantômes produits sur la scène pour occuper
l’attention de la Russie,” wrote Talleyrand in his memoirs.[1505] “Au
fond,” said Metternich, “Napoléon ne songeait ni à la Porte ni à
l’Asie.”[1506] Tilsit for him and for Alexander was an expedient.
There were some important considerations which weighed with the Tsar.
Austria had left the Coalition at the beginning of 1806, Prussia had
been overrun, British help had never come.[1507] He desired to save as
much of Prussia as he could. He found an opening for the annexation of
the Principalities in an understanding with France. Friedland had
convinced him that he could gain nothing by war. His “experts” argued
that the Ionian Islands and Cattaro did not lie in the line of “natural”
advance.[1508] There is a significant letter from him to his favourite
sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, written on 17th June, 1807, “Dieu
nous a sauvé; au lieu de sacrifices, nous sortirons de la lutte avec une
sorte de lustre,” he wrote.[1509] To come to Tilsit in a gloomy mood of
despair and to return the ally of Napoleon, to make sure that France
would no longer raise trouble in Persia and the Balkans, and to keep in
his memory a mass of Napoleonic “promises” to be used or neglected as
should be necessary were no despicable gains.
For France, Tilsit meant the completion of the Continental system, the
annexation of the Ionian Islands and Cattaro, the recognition by Russia
of the vast changes Napoleon had introduced in the map of Europe and the
new thrones he had raised. The “promises” might keep Russia dependent
upon him. The dependence of Russia might enable him to browbeat Prussia
and keep Austria in hand. The West would lie at his feet.
It was on a report of the May Revolution in Constantinople and the
deposition of Sultan Selim, that Napoleon expressed himself to have been
released by the event from all obligations to Turkey. It was a “decree
of Providence,” he said.[1510] The decree was rather one of Napoleonic
expediency. The French Chancery had already examined the possibility of
considering the Turkish Empire as “le théâtre et le moyen d’une
négociation qui mettrait fin aux démêlés subsistants entre l’Empereur et
le Tsar et qui ouvrirait la carrière aux combinaisons les plus vastes et
les plus importantes.”[1511] The Prussian, Hardenberg, elaborated a
scheme of partition, the adoption of which would not only restore his
country but would also round off her frontiers.[1512] In the midst of
defeat the Prussians never lost sight of the Hohenzollern “rage
d’expansion.”[1513]
All these plans provided material for talk. The treaties were of a
totally different nature. They stipulated the conclusion of an armistice
between Russia and Turkey, the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia, the
non-entry of the Turks into them till after the ratification of a Russo-
Turkish definitive treaty of peace, the acceptance of French mediation
between the two belligerents. The eighth article of the Treaty of
Alliance laid down, however, that in the event of the Sultan refusing
the offer of mediation or of the negotiations for peace leading to no
“satisfactory result” after three months, France would make common cause
with Russia and the two “s’entendront pour soustraire tous les provinces
de l’Empire Ottoman en Europe, la ville de Constantinople et la Province
de Roumelie exceptées, au joug et aux vexations des Turcs.”[1514]
The Russians evacuated the Ionian Islands and Cattaro. A French officer,
Guilleminot, helped to bring about the conclusion of an armistice
between the Russians and the Turks. This was the armistice of Slobodzie,
which was signed on the 24th August, 1807.[1515] But the Tsar refused to
ratify it, basing his refusal on the “fact” that the Russian general had
no powers, that the terms were humiliating and that as soon as the
Russians began to withdraw the Turks followed on their heels and started
plundering and murdering the inhabitants.[1516]
Russia, thus, was violating the treaty. To justify his action, the Tsar
had recourse to “l’air de Tilsit.” Referring to his conversations with
Napoleon, Alexander stated that the French Emperor “m’a souvent dit
qu’il ne tenait point à cette évacuation, qu’on la traînerait en
longueur pour se dispenser et qu’il n’était pas possible de souffrir
plus longtemps les Turcs en Europe, il me laissait même entrevoir le
projet de les jeter en Asie. Ce n’est qu’ensuite qu’il est revenu à leur
laisser Constantinople, et quelques provinces environnantes.”[1517]
Russia was by no means trying to raise the question of partition. The
object in view was to keep Moldavia and Wallachia; if a secret treaty
excepted only Constantinople from the process of “liberation,” why could
not a treaty of peace extend the frontier of Russia to the Danube?[1518]
If the Ottoman Empire was to be soon “dead” and its heirs were to be
soon assembled, why should not one of them keep what he had in
hand?[1519]
The instructions and the behaviour of Count Tolstoï, the new Ambassador
in Paris, further elucidate the point. He was to insist on the
indefinite occupation of the two provinces, to present the proposals for
partition as proceeding from his “personal initiative” and to refrain
altogether from making them if he found the French Government
disinclined to listen.[1520] Tolstoï was not the man to err in this
respect. “Il est brave militaire,” so Napoleon describes him, “mais il
est rempli de préjugés et de méfiance contre la France et est bien loin
de la hauteur des évènements de Tilsit et de la nouvelle position où
l’étroite amitié qui règne entre votre Majesté et moi ont placé
l’univers.”[1521]
Napoleon, however, was not the man to let go his advantage for nothing.
If the Tsar refused to withdraw his troops from Turkish territory, he
would not evacuate Prussian Silesia.[1522] His Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Champagny, wrote to Caulaincourt, the French Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, “L’Empereur voit toujours avec peine qu’on s’attache plus à
des prétendus [_sic_] propos qu’à la lettre du traité, qu’il appelait en
donnant suite à la métaphore de M. de Roumiantsoff l’air noté et, par
conséquent, l’air véritable de Tilsit.”[1523]
But he was careful not to go far in this direction. He kept up all the
language of yore.[1524] He did not insist on mediating between Russia
and Turkey, though Mouhib Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador in Paris, had
been pressing to enter into negotiations with Tolstoï.[1525] The
complications in Spain, moreover, led him to instruct Caulaincourt to
discuss the partition of Turkey. The Tsar responded with equal
“sincerity.”[1526] Lack of response would have shown Napoleon that
Alexander was looking for some other system. It was too early yet not to
keep up appearances. The result was a series of conferences between
Caulaincourt and Roumiantsoff, known as the “entretiens of St.
Petersburg,” in which Turkey was partitioned on paper.[1527] Napoleon
did not disapprove, he merely stated that the affair was too important
to be settled by any but the two emperors.[1528] An interview was
necessary. In the meantime Russia could swallow Finland.
Turkey, the unfortunate object of ambition and abuse of power, was then
in an indescribable state of confusion. A revolution in May, 1807, cost
Selim his throne, a second in November his life and hurled down Mustafa
from power. Most of the prominent officials of the Porte had been
massacred. But the outbreaks had nothing to do with foreign
policy.[1529] They marked the beginning of the struggle between the Old
and the Young Turks. The former sought salvation in a return to the
past, the latter in innovations. “Le gouvernement,” wrote Sebastiani
after the first revolution, “sera une oligarchie ecclésiastique en
défiance de toutes les nations chrétiennes, de l’Angleterre et de la
Russie, comme de la France, à moins que les évènements n’entraînent
cette nation vieille et débile.”[1530] Their foreign Policy was not
changed. Their sound instinct convinced them that Napoleon and Alexander
could never agree on a scheme of partition. They accordingly determined
to keep to France. They threw themselves on the “benevolence” of
Napoleon and notified the intention to accede to any arrangement as to
peace.[1531] They broke off the negotiations with Paget. It was an
experiment on their part, for, it may be recalled, the Porte informed
him that it would apply within four months for a resumption of the
negotiations.
But as time went on it became clear that a change was necessary.
Sebastiani could not take upon himself to assure them of the real
sentiments of Napoleon. He himself was as much in the dark and believed
that his remaining at Constantinople after Tilsit savoured of treachery.
The signs were that they could obtain peace only at the price of a
cession of territory. Mouhib Effendi received no support from Champagny
in Paris. The French Minister instructed Sebastiani to inform the Porte
that the misfortunes of Turkey were due to internal evils.[1532] This
was true, but it could have brought no comfort. Then came the query if
they were prepared to cede their two provinces, and, if not, what means
had they to carry on the war.[1533] There were, moreover, threats of
punishing the Pasha of Janina; and a disquieting association of ideas
reminded the Porte that Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798 with the object
of punishing the Mamelukes.[1534] The experiment of working with France
had led to no result. The Porte, accordingly, took two bold steps. It
consented to negotiate with Russia directly and without French
intervention,[1535] and it made overtures to Great Britain.[1536]
The occasion, for Canning, was not merely one for making peace with the
Turks. His object was to forge a weapon against France. He had already,
on the first news of Tilsit, endeavoured to dissociate Alexander from
Napoleon by the two missions of Sir Robert Wilson to St. Petersburg and
by the attack on Copenhagen.[1537] Sir Robert, “a rather sanguine,
credulous man,”[1538] brought back from his first trip a favourable
report, and Canning, “making due allowance”[1539] for the character of
the agent, sent him back again.[1540] “Nothing important, however, was
to be left to his sole discretion. If Russia were sincere, it would be
worth while to keep her up to it by showing a disposition to cultivate
and strengthen the former good understanding; if she were not sincere .
. . there would be no harm done.”[1541] On his arrival in the Russian
capital, Wilson told Roumiantsoff that Britain was desirous of seeing
the power of Russia augmented, whereas France was as anxious to see it
reduced. He proceeded to state that his country would never propose the
partition of the Turkish Empire, but would consent to the annexation of
the Danubian principalities as a result of negotiations between Russia
and Turkey—negotiations which might lead to the former “Union” between
them and would “protect the interests” of the Tsar “on the side of
Greece,” which he had to abandon by his present system.[1542] But the
Russian Government could hardly break with France on “mere verbal
affirmations” which were not officially confirmed.[1543] Wilson,
moreover, seemed to have behaved with much “swagger” and kept company
with all those who were disaffected against the French alliance.[1544]
He was told to quit, and war was soon declared on Britain.
But Canning did not lose hope. In his instructions to Sir Robert Adair,
who was to negotiate with the Porte, he states that if Russia,
“resenting the delusion” which, probably, had been practised upon her or
“taking a more enlarged view” of the dangers of French predominance,
should desire peace with Turkey, Britain would be willing to help and
would accede to a Russo-Turkish treaty stipulating the determination of
both parties to resist French designs. The continuance of the war
between Russia and Britain would make no difference with regard to
this.[1545]
There was also another project, namely, an alliance between Austria,
Britain and Turkey.[1546] The choice of Sir Robert Adair, a _persona
grata_ in Vienna and in confidential communication with Austrian
circles,[1547] pointed to this. The appointment does credit to Canning,
for Adair belonged to the Opposition and had been the subject of one of
the Minister’s witticisms.[1548] The Minister made it clear that,
whatever was to be done, there was to be neither a guarantee of
integrity nor a subsidy. “Money,” he wrote, “we have not and a
guarantee, though cheap enough, is hardly honest.”[1549]
If there was to be no guarantee was there to be no help? If it came to
the worst, Britain would help the “removal” of the seat of government
and would recognise the Porte wherever it might be found. She was
disposed, in the meantime, to “utilize those local Turkish advantages”
of which the Porte was unable to make use. “In this description,” wrote
Canning, “I do not mean to point at Egypt, the occupation of which would
probably be a ground of incurable jealousy and alarm to the Turkish
government and the continued possession of which is known by experience
to require a larger army than His Majesty could appropriate for that
object.” The difficulty applied to any other “station”—the term is
significant—that would require a large garrison. An island would serve
the purpose better, Crete, for example. But it was to be made clear that
the offer of help was to be contingent upon the demand of the Turks and
upon their co-operation.[1550]
Egypt, thus, did not find place among the “local advantages.” The
position of Ali Pasha of Janina was totally different from that of
Mehemet Ali. The geographical position of his territory, the fact that
co-operation with him need be no more than naval, his avowed enmity to
the masters of the Ionian Islands—be they French or Russian—endowed Ali
with a degree of prominence which the extent of his power and resources
would not otherwise have justified. Ali had sent an envoy to London and
had made his desire to annex the ex-Venetian possessions on the mainland
abundantly clear.[1551] J. P. Morier advised the granting of Egypt to
Ali on the grounds that there were already Albanian soldiers in that
province.[1552] Leake, who had been for years with Ali, recommended that
his ambition should be gratified.[1553] The Government, however, took a
different line. The Pasha was by no means to be encouraged to expect any
aid in the realization of his schemes of independence—supposing that he
had any. Should the Porte succumb to France or abandon resistance to
that power, Ali would then receive naval “co-operation” in his defence
against France and the establishing of his independence. If the
immediate attainment of any of the “objects” desired by him would enable
him to resist France, the British fleet would help him to attain that
object.[1554] A “quantity” of artillery and munitions of war were also
to be given to him.[1555] This is not exactly the “convention” of which
M. Driault speaks as having been concluded between Ali and the British
Government.[1556]
Sir Robert Adair arrived off Tenedos in September, 1808. After three
months of arduous negotiations with Vehid Effendi—the same Turk who
proved so “disagreeable” to Talleyrand at Warsaw—the Peace of the
Dardanelles was concluded.[1557]
The Peace is in many ways a remarkable one. It was the first breach in
the wall against Britain.[1558] It was the first great act of a reign
destined to occupy a prominent place in Turkish annals. Six months
before, Sebastiani described Mahmoud as “un prince faible, doux et
valétudinaire, atteint d’une épilepsie incurable.”[1559] The peace was a
great act of wisdom and courage. The French “chargé d’affaires” had used
violent threats. Peace with Britain, he said, meant, _ipso facto_, war
with France.[1560] To withstand the threats of France and to take three
months to make peace with her mortal enemy would hardly justify Dr. Rose
in attributing the delay to “Oriental Pride and Lethargy.”[1561] The
Treaty is also notable for the article stipulating reciprocity for the
privileges enjoyed by British subjects in Turkish dominions.[1562]
Thenceforward the Porte determined to steer clear of all foreign
connections and to await the outcome of events.[1563] It is doubtful if
any but Turks could carry out successfully a policy of that nature. It
was the wisest under the circumstances and it served the purpose well.
The price they paid was by no means excessive: violent accusations by
disappointed diplomatists and abusive epithets by unsympathetic
historians.
Napoleon had, in the meantime, become hopelessly entangled in Spanish
complications; and Austria had been showing unmistakable signs of
restiveness. He tried hard to avert the war by dangling before the eyes
of Metternich a share in the spoils of Turkey or threatening to make her
the helpless spectator of the partition.[1564] It happened that the
Turkish Ambassador was present during the conversation and the
scandalised Metternich commented, “Cette conversation est sans doute
sans exemple dans les fastes de la diplomatie.”[1565] There was nothing
for it but to proceed to Erfurt and pay the Tsar’s price. Talleyrand was
sent beforehand “to speak to the Tsar the language that suited him.” To
tell him of “l’intérêt bien entendu du continent, sept millions de Grecs
rendus à la liberté, etc.” “Voilà,” continued Napoleon, “un beau champ
pour faire de la philanthropie, je vous donne sur cela carte blanche, je
veux seulement que ce soit de la philanthropie lointaine.”[1566] But
Talleyrand had formed his own programme and went to Erfurt to execute
it. It was not certain that to thwart the Emperor’s ambition meant
treachery to France. “Talleyrand,” as M. Sorel neatly put it, “ferait la
France européenne et lui ministre européen de la France en Europe, de
l’Europe en France.”[1567] Even if he was to use the language of
seduction, Alexander would not have listened. At Tilsit, it was to his
interest to listen and to seem duped. Rightly or wrongly he did not
judge the moment opportune to break with Napoleon.[1568] But he, all the
same, exacted the price for joining forces against Austria. Napoleon
recognised the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia up to the Danube
with the sole proviso that this recognition should be kept secret.[1569]
The situation was, apparently, changed beyond recognition. The Tsar now
expatiated on the necessity of the continued existence of the Turkish
Empire for the preservation of the peace of Europe.[1570]
The war between Austria and France was to prove the extent of his
sincerity. His contribution to the common effort was beautiful phrases
and no more, “des guirlandes de lauriers et de Cyprès mêlés, mais de
Cosaques point,” says M. Sorel.[1571] There could be no mistake about
it: Alexander had become an ally only in name. Napoleon saw it but found
it necessary to simulate. “Il lui importe,” wrote Champagny to
Caulaincourt, “que cette erreur dont il est désabusé soit partagée par
toute l’Europe.”[1572] He kept up the appearances of alliance. He
refused to answer a letter from Mahmoud announcing his accession to the
throne.[1573] He openly avowed in a speech to the “Corps Législatif” his
satisfaction at the expansion of Russia to the Danube.[1574] But he
worked beneath the surface in the other direction. He seemed even to
have welcomed the Peace of the Dardanelles as strengthening the Turks,
for he disapproved of the threats used by his chargé d’affaires in
Constantinople, instructed him to remain at his post till the British
should succeed in having him dismissed and to bear always in mind that
France did not desire a war with Turkey.[1575] Latour-Maubourg was
informed that the continuance of the war in the Balkans was to the
advantage of France, that she would resist the expansion of Russia
beyond the Danube by all her forces and would be disposed to guarantee
the integrity of Turkey apart from Moldavia and Wallachia.[1576]
Napoleon, moreover, scrupulously avoided all language that might savour
of hidden designs on the territories of the Sultan or of the expectation
of the fall of his empire through decadence.[1577] His most effective
weapon, however, was his exploitation of Austrian jealousy of Russian
aggrandisement in the Balkan peninsula. To discover her views, he
invited her to join in a scheme of partition, and when she turned a deaf
ear he instigated her to do all she could against his ally.[1578]
The Tsar also, after all that had happened, was maintaining a simulation
of alliance. He demanded from the Porte the expulsion of Sir Robert
Adair, the newly-installed British Ambassador, and, on this being
rejected, he broke off the negotiations that were being carried on at
Jassy.[1579] But he secretly tried to obtain Austrian pressure on the
Porte by inviting Vienna to have an “equivalent” in Serbia and
Bosnia.[1580] Austria felt the strength of her position between
Alexander and Napoleon and rejected the overture.
It was clear, therefore, that a stalemate had arisen and that it would
only cease with the outbreak of war between Russia and France. Till that
event had taken place, diplomacy—however active or ingenious were the
diplomatists—was impotent. The activity of Sir Robert Adair and his
successor, Stratford Canning, should not, thus, deceive us as to their
influence on the course of events. The biographer of the _Great Elchi_
quotes with approval a statement that Stratford took upon himself the
task of “bearding Napoleon in his dream of universal empire . . .
without a single person’s advice and on his own responsibility.” It must
have been “downright madness,” “yet it was precisely what Canning
did.”[1581] Language like this seems rather excessive when we remember
that for some two years the Foreign Office did not send instructions
worthy of the name to Constantinople. Dr. Rose and Mr. A. Cecil seem to
be at a loss to explain this serious omission.[1582] Lord Wellesley was
Foreign Secretary and was not the man to neglect his duties. Canning was
inclined to put it down to his youth and insignificance.[1583] But this
is hardly more tenable, since the Government could have appointed some
one else in his place. The truth was that the British Government
postponed all diplomatic interference till it could be sure of the real
attitude of the Tsar. In the spring of 1811, the signs were favourable.
Mr. Robert Liston was appointed to the Constantinople Embassy and was
instructed to hold himself in readiness to depart.[1584] His
departure—the Tsar had now veered back temporarily to the alliance—was
put off till September. In that month he actually embarked his luggage,
but the orders were countermanded and the frigate was diverted to
another service.[1585] “The apprehension of embroiling Britain with
Russia or Turkey,” this was written in November, 1811, “still prevents
Wellesley from sending out Liston, to whom appeals would doubtless be
made by both, very difficult to be avoided or decided upon.”[1586] In
February, 1812, Liston gave up all hope of the embassy.[1587] It was
only in April, 1812, that he sailed. He arrived in Constantinople to
find that peace had been concluded between Russia and Turkey.[1588]
There is thus no mystery about the causes of the apparent negligence of
the embassy in Constantinople. It is difficult, in face of this, to
imagine that young Canning’s influence would carry things very far. All
that he did was to carry forward Adair’s correspondence with various
persons in Vienna and St. Petersburg.[1589] It does not seem that his
correspondents were in the secrets of their governments.
When war broke out between France and Austria, Adair was not enlightened
as to the way Russia was helping her ally and tried to “injure” the
cause of Russia by “preventing” peace between her and Turkey and even
thought of a combined Turco-British attack on “Sebastopolis.”[1590] When
Napoleon married Marie Louise, Adair turned against Austria. His
informants gave him the impression that there was a scheme on foot by
which Austria would receive the Principalities, the Porte the Crimea,
and Poland would be restored.[1591] The diplomat, accordingly,
endeavoured to “promote” peace between the Tsar and the Sultan. He sent
to his Russian friends copies of the Franco-Persian Treaty of 1807 and a
letter from Napoleon to the Shah,[1592] to convince them of the
treachery of France! This was rather dead history. The problem for
Adair’s and Canning’s diplomacy was how to bring about peace between
Russia and Turkey when neither of them was willing to give up her
pretensions. What effective arguments could they use to persuade the
Turks to cede their provinces when they were convinced that sooner or
later a war with France would force the Russians to evacuate?[1593] What
compensation could they give the Russians for renouncing their
pretensions? They had no authority to offer a British alliance. The Tsar
was sure to have it when it suited him to break with France. At one
time, Sir Robert Adair sought a solution by offering Russia a colony in
the West Indies![1594] Diplomacy was impotent, whatever biographers
might say.
Latour-Maubourg had no greater influence on the march of events. His
hands were tied by his instructions to make the most cordial professions
to the Porte but to remember always that the Tsar was still the ally of
the Emperor.[1595] He was instructed to press the Porte to send an
ambassador to Paris furnished with full powers to conclude an offensive
and defensive alliance, but to make clear that the necessity for such an
alliance might never arise.[1596] The language of the French “chargé”
was accordingly vague. The Turks perfectly understood him, but saw his
embarrassment and mercilessly demanded an explicit statement in
writing.[1597] Why should they help him out of his difficulties? But
they were not foolish enough to cut a line of possible retreat. They
assured Latour-Maubourg that they were ready to do anything, only there
was the difficulty arising out of the fact that Mahmoud’s notification
had been left without answer.[1598] When the “difficulty” was removed by
the falsehood that the answer had been sent and lost,[1599] the French
position was not improved by the nature of the overture they made. It
was to be nothing less than a mass rising of the whole Moslem world
under its personal leader—the Sultan—and against the Muscovites.[1600]
Talk like this could lead to nothing. Latour-Maubourg was blamed for
what was not his fault.[1601] “Ma diplomatie,” wrote Napoleon, “eût dû
faire pour moi la moitié de la campagne et à peine y-a-t-elle
songé.”[1602] The truth was that he gathered the fruits of a system in
which he tried to combine the opposites, “managing” Russia till the
right moment and searching for allies against her.
All through the year 1811 the Tsar had been pressed to make peace with
the Sultan.[1603] But he could not bring himself to give up all hope of
the Principalities. He tried to the last moment to wear down Turkish
resistance. But neither military disasters nor the machinations of a
strong peace-party supported by the Janissaries could weaken the grim
resolution of Mahmoud. At last, when the evil hour came, the Tsar had to
renounce the fruits of six years of efforts and sacrifice. But he
cherished the illusion of obtaining the alliance of the Porte against
France and a combined effort against Dalmatia! The project had to be
dropped.[1604]
The Treaty of Bucharest marks the end of a phase in the diplomatic
history of the Near East. The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 had
thrown the Turks into the turmoils of the wars of the Empire. The Greek
War of Independence opened another phase: the struggle of the Near
Eastern nationalities for emancipation. Never was Turkey so weak, nor
its fall so imminent as in the years 1798 to 1812. Well might the Porte
have adopted as its motto the saying of l’abbé Sieyès when asked what he
had done during the French Revolution: “I have survived.”
[Footnote 1502: A. G. Stapleton, _Canning and his Times_, pp. 124-5. Mr.
Temperley is inclined to the view that it was Talleyrand who sent
Canning the information (_Canning_, pp. 91-3). But it is not certain
that Talleyrand had started at the time of Tilsit to work against
Napoleon. It does not seem, moreover, that the hypothesis of a “secret
intelligence from Tilsit” is necessary to explain the policy of Canning.
Sound political calculation was sufficient to convince him that the
Alliance of Napoleon and Alexander would be mainly directed against
Britain, and would use every means against her. We have seen in his
instructions to Paget, of May, 1807, that he envisaged the possibility
of that alliance (above, p. 255).]
[Footnote 1503: Cf. Vandal, _Napoléon et Alexandre_, I, Chap. I.
Bourgeois, _Manuel Historique de la Politique Etrangère_, II, pp.
292-309.]
[Footnote 1504: Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 206.
“C’est le Tsar qui fut séduit, conquis à l’alliance française.”
Sorel, _L’Europe et la Révolution française_, I, p. 73, believes that
Napoleon had been deceived by the “caresses” and compliments of
Alexander.
Pozzo di Borgo later told Lady Holland that the Tsar was acting a part
throughout. Lady Holland, _Foreign Reminiscences_, p. 169 note.]
[Footnote 1505: Talleyrand, _Mémoires_, I, pp. 399-400.]
[Footnote 1506: Metternich, _Mémoires_, I, p. 59.]
[Footnote 1507: Budberg to Gower, 18 June, 1807 (?). Sbornik, 89, p. 45.
Randolph, _Life of Wilson_, II, pp. 162, 163, 170-1, 194, 196, 213-14,
225, 227. Quotations from the Journal of Wilson, who was with the
Russian Army.]
[Footnote 1508: Memorandum from Pisani, 21 June-3 July, 1807. Sbornik,
88, p. 60.]
[Footnote 1509: Nicholas Mikhailovitch. _Correspondance d’Alexandre avec
sa sœur_, p. 18.
It is clear from a document on the possibilities of negotiations with
France that all that Alexander could hope for was to keep Wallachia and
Moldavia. Sbornik, 89, pp. 33-6.]
[Footnote 1510: According to the Tsar this was what Napoleon said.
Savary to Napoleon, 4 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 83, pp. 184 and 180.]
[Footnote 1511: The memorandum is without date or signature. Arch. Nat.
AF., 1688. But from some of the ideas it seems that it was by
Talleyrand, e.g., “S’il ne conviendrait point aux intérêts de l’Empereur
de rendre au territoire occupé par les Turcs la valeur politique qui lui
appartient dans la balance européenne. . . .” “Every Nation has duties
towards Europe as a whole. Turkey has failed in hers.” These and others
are the ideas of the “good European” Talleyrand.]
[Footnote 1512: _Mémoires of Hardenberg_, III, pp. 460-2.]
[Footnote 1513: Cf. Tatistcheff, _Alexandre et Napoleon_, p. 132.]
[Footnote 1514: Martens, _Recueil des Traités de la Russie_, XIII, pp.
317, 319-20, 325.]
[Footnote 1515: Martens, A. Suppl., IV, 456. B. VIII, 689.]
[Footnote 1516: Savary’s despatches, 23 Sept., 1807. Sbornik, 83, pp.
79, 85. 15 Nov., 1807. _Ibid._, pp. 220-34.
Guilleminot to Savary, 28 Sept., 1807. _Ibid._, 192-4.