THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY AND THE SECOND BRITISH INVASION OF
EGYPT
1806-1807
“Toi,” wrote Napoleon in 1805 to the Sultan, “descendant des grands
Ottomans . . . as-tu cessé de régner? . . . Réveille-toi, Selim!”[1331]
It needed the cannon of Austerlitz to awaken the somnolent Grand
Signior. To him and his Turks, the great victory meant release from the
tight grasp of the Muscovite. They “consider Bonaparte as an instrument
in the hands of providence to punish the iniquities of an offending
world. His late almost miraculous successes have nearly induced them to
believe that by opposition to his will the vengeance of heaven might be
incurred.”[1332] Mr. Arbuthnot did not mean to be ironical; he was
quoting the actual words of the Reis Effendi. The Porte hastened to
recognise the instrument of Providence as Emperor of the French and
despatched Mouhib Effendi to Paris as Ambassador Extraordinary.[1333] It
refused to ratify the new treaty with Russia.[1334] It began to be
troublesome over the passage of Russian warships and transports through
the Straits.[1335] It aimed at cutting at the root of foreign—especially
Russian—influence by abolishing the privilege allowed to ambassadors of
granting diplomas of protection, or “Barats,” to Ottoman born
subjects.[1336] The blow threatened prestige as well as ambassadorial
pockets, and the opposition was strenuous. It was to the credit of the
British Legation that it took no great interest in the matter. It was as
a sign of refractoriness that it troubled the British Ambassador. He was
further worried by the evident disinclination of the Porte to renew its
Treaty of Alliance with Britain.[1337] Ramazan came in handy as an
excuse for delay. But, the fasting over, the Turks alleged that they
were too much occupied in devising means of defence against a probable
French attack to enter upon diplomatic negotiations: they were
fulfilling, at all events, the purpose of a formal treaty. A threat on
the part of the Ambassador to report this behaviour to his Government
and to the commanders in the Mediterranean elicited the unambiguous
answer that “the Grand Signor had taken the resolution not to renew the
treaty until the restoration of a general peace could enable him to
enter without danger into new engagements with His Majesty.”[1338] The
Reis Effendi accompanied his declaration with “a solemn oath that two
separate parts of flesh in one body should not be more united than the
two empires.”[1339]
It was evident that the “salutary” dread of Russia had ceased. The robed
dignitaries of the Divan even failed to notice the presence of the
Russian dragoman within the precincts.[1340] The new situation of
affairs revived the hope of Napoleon in creating a new source of trouble
for his enemies. His Minister for Foreign Affairs was for strengthening
Austria—naturally at the expense of Turkey—in order to stem the flow of
Russian “barbarism.”[1341] His henchman Hauterive refused to believe
that the Emperor could have any other policy.[1342] But it does not seem
that Talleyrand had taken the matter seriously; he told Lucchesini, the
Prussian Minister, that “il aimait quelquefois à faire des romans
politiques,” and that the scheme was one of them.[1343] Napoleon, at all
events, concluded his peace with Austria on totally different lines. He
obtained Dalmatia “pour donner à Sa Hautesse (the Sultan) des preuves
habituelles de son amitié et pour multiplier les relations entre les
deux puissances et ne voir aucun obstacle qui séparât leurs territoires,
leurs forces et leurs intérêts.”[1344] This marks the beginning of two
years of Napoleonic activity in the East. “Ce n’est plus comme un
territoire qui attend une invasion étrangère qu’elle doit compter en
Europe; mais c’est comme un état destiné à servir de barrière à la
Russie et à conserver le rivage de la mer Noire et le passage du
Bosphore.”[1345] “Au moment où un Empire’s affaiblit et penche vers sa
chute, une main puissante peut encore le relever et le raffermir.”[1346]
General Sebastiani was to be the imperial agent in the reconstruction of
the barrier. The new Ambassador should inspire the Turks with
confidence, work for a triple alliance of Persia, France and Turkey,
regain influence not by arrogance but by skill and “insinuation,”
declare that the Emperor had abandoned all rebels, even his “old
friends” in Egypt, make the connection with the Porte “visible” to all
the world, throw “disfavour” on Russia, and bear in mind that France did
not desire the partition of the Turkish Empire, even if she were offered
three quarters of it. The “immediate object” of Sebastiani, however,
should be to close the Straits against Russian ships of war, prevent the
Greeks from sailing under the Russian flag, fortify all military posts
against Russia and re-establish the absolute sway of the Sultan over the
Danubian Principalities.[1347]
As for Russia, it was clear that the failure of her overture to draw
Britain into an eventual agreement on the partition of Turkey had only
led her to put aside formal projects of this nature. She found out that
such acts were repugnant to the British practice. She now put forward
“practical” measures. Should the Porte show signs of adhesion to France,
she hoped that the British fleet would approach the Straits in support
of Russian “demonstrations” by land and sea.[1348] The imminent
dissolution of the coalition provided another argument. “There are no
other means of obtaining tolerable terms of peace but by occupying with
English and Russian troops certain portions of Turkey and Egypt. As long
as the war lasts, the security of these countries from the hands of
Bonaparte renders such occupation necessary and in the case of a
negotiation for peace the abandonment of them may be expected to obtain
from France the evacuation of Italy and other countries now occupied by
French troops.”[1349] But this was not the whole programme of
Czartoryski. He developed for the Tsar fully fledged schemes for the
erection of new Slav states. He insisted on the moral obligation of
supporting his Christian brethren in the Balkans, but did not forget to
set aside the Danubian Principalities for annexation.[1350] It was
decided, however, to lay aside this extensive scheme. An extraordinary
council was assembled in the early days of 1806. It was agreed that
France had acquired by the possession of Dalmatia, the means of changing
the nature of the relations between Turkey and Russia and carrying out
her designs in the East, that Russia should, therefore, maintain her
connection with Britain; secure, on the one hand, the confidence of the
Porte, and cultivate, on the other, the attachment of the Christian
subjects of the Sultan; that Russia should have her forces ready to
forestall any move on the part of France or Austria for the occupation
of Turkish territory, especially the Danubian Principalities, and,
lastly, that the Tsar should find out the real intentions of Napoleon
under some pretext or other.[1351]
These resolutions contain the germ of Russian policy in the year 1806.
Russia clearly wanted to have the principalities. She desired to
“retrieve the glory of her arms, tarnished by the disasters of the late
campaign, and to gratify the army by some important conquest.”[1352] But
the general situation imposed a line of conduct that was not straight.
She spoke to Napoleon—with whom M. D’Oubril was now “negotiating”—in one
language; to Britain in another.
M. Strogonoff was sent to London with the object of arriving at some
understanding. He had been instructed to start with the time-honoured
premise that the first duty was to defend the Turkish Empire, but to add
that this was no remedy. The remedy was to “establish a new order of
things.” Strogonoff was warned, however, to be careful not to arouse the
old British “errements.” Knowing that Fox, the new Foreign Secretary,
was anxious to conclude peace with France, Czartoryski endeavoured to
present acquisitions in Turkey under the guise of “compensations”
necessary for restoring the balance of power and facilitating the advent
of peace. He did not omit to emphasise the necessity of preventing Egypt
from falling into the hands of France.[1353]
A conference with Fox, however, deeply chagrined the Russian. When he
began to describe “the principle of compensation,” the British statesman
could not help exclaiming an “Oh!” of surprise, and added that the
application was feasible on condition that all efforts to save Turkey
had really proved to be of no avail. As to Egypt, he stated that he did
not hold the common opinion that its possession by France endangered, in
any way, British India.[1354] The British Minister did not fail to make
his policy clear. On the 29th April he wrote the British Ambassador in
St. Petersburg, “If any alliance should take place between France and
the Porte or any cession of territory be made to the former or any
permission given to her to occupy with her troops any part of the
Turkish Empire, it would certainly become the interest of the two allies
to act vigorously against the Porte as well as against France, and the
further Russia can push her conquests the more this country will be
satisfied.” The point was: could Russia at the same time carry on two
wars or not.[1355] As for the principle of compensations being applied
to bring about or to follow a peace with France it was unworkable. “If
it is to take place after a peace . . . the object of balance could not
be attained and the powers would be relatively the same as before,” if
during negotiations for peace, what would Bonaparte demand! “But this is
not the worst, a ground of suspicion will be given and we may, by those
who are ill-inclined to us, be but too plausibly represented as
acquiescing in some of the past encroachments of France—not for the
purpose of giving peace to Europe and gaining some chance of future
repose and independence for her princes and states, but for that of
taking our share in the general system of spoliation and plunder.”
Conquests were “eligible” only in the event of a war in which the Porte
had been the aggressor.[1356]
Czartoryski chafed at “the prudence of abstaining from all but measures
purely defensive . . . until the Porte had committed some open act of
aggression” and declared that the “only” points at which Russia could
come into grips with France were the Principalities and Serbia and that
a defensive war was more prejudicial to Russia than the most
unfavourable terms of peace.[1357] No agreement was reached. Russia
worked on her own account and waited for events. She obtained from
Prussia a declaration that the Prussian guarantee of the integrity of
the Turkish Empire would not be violated if the Tsar declared war on the
Sultan in order to stave off a connection between France and
Turkey.[1358] But, outwardly, the attitude of the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg was marked by hesitation. “By one messenger Italinsky was
ordered to hold the language of the days of Catherine, by another to be
conciliatory.”[1359] The Minister, “most self-controlled of men,” was so
disheartened that he thought of resigning his post.[1360] Czartoryski
complained that nothing was done one way or another.[1361] His own
position had been badly shaken by the military defeats. “Tout le monde
est persuadé qu’il est l’ennemi de la Russie et le prophète de la
liberté dont on fait peur à la noblesse.”[1362]
The Turks, very foolishly, extricated Russia out of the “impasse.” “Le
cheval amaigri,” once Napoleon said, “bondira dans la pâture et bientôt
deviendra indomptable.”[1363] They showed more inclination to France
than they really intended. Extraordinary honours were paid to the French
Ambassador.[1364] This was impolitic because it alienated
Arbuthnot,[1365] because the Turks never entertained the thought of
incurring British hostility[1366] and because they did not intend to
conclude any formal engagements with France.[1367] The conduct of
Sebastiani was, moreover, not such as to allay British anxiety. There
was no end of “Te Deums,” of “harangues” and “fanfaronnades.”[1368] He
was doing all he could to make the new relations with the Porte visible
to all who had eyes to see. The Russians professed to be alarmed. Some
military preparations intended against the Servians they took to be
meant for themselves.[1369] Italinsky made out that he would be shortly
invited to sign an instrument declaratory of his Court’s consent to
evacuate Mingrelia and that on his refusal he would be promptly immured
in the Castle of Seven Towers.[1370] The well-intentioned British
Ambassador could not but take the “suspicious” signs at their face
value. He advised his Government from the beginning that energetic
measures must be taken to save Turkey against her will.[1371] Supposing
that the Sultan were well-inclined towards Britain, the presence of a
Squadron in the Straits would give him strength to resist “venal and
ignorant ministers.”[1372] He applied on more than one occasion to Sir
Sidney Smith, then commanding a squadron in Neapolitan waters, for two
ships to cruise in the Archipelago.[1373] Lord Collingwood sent him, on
his demand, four ships of war under Sir Thomas Louis, to give him the
necessary backing.[1374] It seems that Arbuthnot sincerely believed in
the disinterestedness of Russian policy and was of opinion that Russia
would not take active measures till after having concluded an
arrangement with his own Government.[1375] He seems to have been of
opinion that once Turkey had fallen under French dominance the “barrier”
to British India was definitely destroyed. He therefore pinned his faith
on the presence of a British squadron. He represented to the Government
that the Turkish fleet could never be withdrawn into a place of safety,
that the capital would surrender should its communications with Asia be
intercepted and that the Straits could easily be forced.[1376]
It was under these circumstances that the Porte played into the hands of
Russia by deposing on the 24th August the notoriously pro-Russian
hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, Mourousi and Ipsilanti.[1377] This
was in violation of the “Règlement” of 1802, which necessitated
consultation with Russia.[1378] It was a foolish “coup de tête,” taken
under the stupid impression that the treaty, which D’Oubril had
concluded with France, guaranteed the complete independence of the
Turkish Empire.[1379] The Porte could not have known that D’Oubril was
disavowed by his own Government; but even so, it was a gross
miscalculation on its part to believe that any guarantee could so easily
release it from its engagements. It soon discovered that it had made a
false step, for it consented to restore the deposed hospodars with all
the _éclat_ that the Russian Minister insisted on, and drank the “cup of
humiliation” to the dregs.[1380]
The Turkish ministers and Arbuthnot believed that this was the end of
the matter.[1381] But they were reckoning without Russia. The
opportunity was too good to let slip. Italinsky was sharply rebuked for
having thought that the Tsar could unduly trouble himself over the fate
of two Greek princes. He should have borne in mind that this was not the
point at issue, that the objects of the Tsar were to secure the free
navigation of the Straits, the renewal of the Anglo-Turkish alliance and
the renunciation of all connection with France.[1382] Before these new
demands were satisfied, General Michelson marched into Moldavia.[1383]
But Russia won something more. She managed to drag Britain into hostile
measures against the Porte. Herein lay the mistake of Arbuthnot. He
identified himself as closely as ever with Russian action. His belief in
Russian disinterestedness went to the extreme extent of thinking that he
could persuade Michelson to withdraw from Moldavia![1384] He rejected
overtures from the Turks for a convention retarding the expiry of the
Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Alliance.[1385] It is true that he had been
deprived, for months, of instructions from his Government, but he should
have seen that the closer he allied himself with Italinsky, the more
complete the dependence of Turkey on France would become. Arbuthnot’s
mistakes thus brought about the result which it was Britain’s sole
desire to prevent, namely, French predominance in Turkey. And it was
this that took place. In spite of Arbuthnot’s threats and the presence
of Louis’ ships, the Porte declared war on Russia on 27th of December,
1806.[1386]
The British Government decided, in November, 1806, before it knew that
the Porte had reinstated the hospodars, to act in the way which the
Ambassador had for long been pointing out. In his valuable study of
Napoleon’s Eastern policy, M. Driault gives an utterly false account of
the British intervention. “L’occasion,” he states, “est singulièrement
tentante, Napoléon ne peut rien contre eux (the British) dans ces pays
(Levant). Les Russes ne peuvent agir vigoureusement. Constantinople est
sans défense. Quelle garantie, si elle tombe entre leurs mains! Qu’est-
ce que Austerlitz, que Jena, auprès d’un pareil fait: Les Anglais à
Constantinople? Le gouvernement de Londres eut une conscience vague de
la politique qu’il devait suivre, il tente un coup de main sur
Constantinople. Ce pouvait être un moment décisif dans l’histoire de
l’Europe.”[1387] Great Britain was delighted to see Russia and France
“neutralise” each other and leave the Mediterranean free for her
enterprises. “All the Talents” were pursuing purely British objects at
the “negligible” cost of evident selfishness.[1388] The truth of the
matter was, as Canning later put it to D’Alopeus, the Russian Ambassador
in London. “Whatever efforts Great Britain may have been induced to make
towards the side of Turkey have been made solely in compliance with the
express wishes of Russia, in support of Russian hostilities and for the
attainment of Russian objects.”[1389]
In his first instructions to Arbuthnot, Lord Howick (the future Earl
Grey of the Reform Bill) lamented what had happened, and urged the
Ambassador to do all he could to “recall the Porte to a better policy.”
The conduct of Sebastiani, he thought, “justified” the allies in
requiring his removal. He announced that a squadron would be sent to
give due weight, and, if necessary, enforce Arbuthnot’s
representations.[1390] On the arrival of the ships, the Porte should be
informed that it had “come either to attack or defend as the conduct of
the Porte should determine,” that Turkey had before it two alternatives:
“either the influence of France must cease or the friendship so long
established between the two powers, a friendship beneficial to both, but
eminently advantageous to the Porte, can no longer continue,” that
Britain only wanted the strict observance of engagements, particularly
as regards the deposition of the hospodars and the free passage of the
Straits. When these demands were satisfied, the Ambassador was to
declare that the “fleet shall remain only so long as its presence may be
necessary for the security and protection of the Porte itself.” But
should he fail to obtain satisfaction, he was to terminate his mission
and hostile action would then begin. The dismissal of Sebastiani and the
renewal of the alliance were stated to be desirable in themselves, but
their rejection should not open hostilities if the other demands were
complied with. In the event of the outbreak of war between Russia and
Turkey, Arbuthnot should offer his mediation on the basis of immediate
compliance with the two principal objects. If the mediation were
refused, he was to terminate his mission.[1391] With the termination of
the diplomatic mission, the admiral commanding the squadron should
demand the surrender of the Turkish fleet, together with a supply of
naval stores from the arsenal sufficient for its complete equipment, and
accompany his demand with a menace of immediate bombardment.[1392]
But this was not the whole. “In the event of strong measures becoming
necessary immediately on the commencement of hostilities,” the commander
of the squadron, who was to be Admiral Duckworth, should inform General
Fox, the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Fox was then to send a
force of 5,000 men to occupy Alexandria.[1393] “The object of His
Majesty’s Government is not the conquest of Egypt but merely the capture
of Alexandria for the purpose of preventing the French from regaining a
footing in that country and of enabling His Majesty’s forces there to
afford countenance and protection to such of the parties in that country
as may be best disposed to maintain at all times a friendly intercourse
with Great Britain.” The Commander of the Expedition should possess,
therefore, not only military talents, “but also those qualities which
may best suit him for a civil or political trust of very considerable
interest.” He might find it inevitable to interfere in the “contests for
power” that were agitating Egypt. The Government, however, could not
prescribe the limits of interference and recommended that the commander
should give as much attention to Major Missett’s views as they “should
appear to merit.”[1394]
The squadron under Duckworth sailed from Cadiz on the 15th of January,
1806, Lord Collingwood regaling himself with the charming picture of
“sweet little sultanas” taking refuge on board British ships.[1395] In
the meantime events were moving fast in Constantinople. The outbreak of
war with Russia had deprived Arbuthnot of his guiding principle, namely,
energetic support of Italinsky’s action.[1396] He was not sure whether
his own Government would approve of what he had been doing or not. The
Porte was also anxiously waiting for an authoritative pronouncement and
fondly believed that the British Cabinet did not share the pro-Russian
proclivities of the Ambassador.[1397] Howick’s instructions of 14th
November arrived on 23rd January, 1807. Arbuthnot was in transports of
joy. In a conference of four hours on the 25th January, he had full
vengeance. “The Turkish ministers were now so amazed and dejected that
they did not utter a single word which was worth repeating.”[1398] They
endeavoured to discover whether the restoration of the hospodars was
known or not in London at the date of the “instructions.” He, naturally,
refused to gratify this inconvenient curiosity.[1399] He assumed a
harsher tone. He admitted to the Reis Effendi that the Hospodars were
reinstated, but it was done with such “bad grace” as to justify him in
demanding “security” and the removal of Sebastiani.[1400] The Porte
resorted to crude methods. Seeing that the Ambassador had no time to
refer to his Government for new instructions, consequent upon the
satisfaction of Russia’s ostensible demands, that it was he who was to
determine what conduct Admiral Duckworth should adopt, it resolved to
“isolate” Arbuthnot and prevent those communications with the fleet
which placed it in a most unenviable situation between the exigencies of
Sebastiani and his. The Porte was very anxious to avoid war with
Britain, the French Ambassador wrote on the 27th January.[1401] But
Arbuthnot took it into his head that the hindering of his free
communications was the prelude to arrest and the unpleasant sojourn in
the Castle of Seven Towers. He resolved, accordingly, to escape. On the
evening of the 29th January, he invited the British residents to a
dinner on board the “Endymion.” At nine o’clock the ship—no doubt to the
great amazement of the guests, who were not in the secret—set sail
towards Tenedos, where it arrived on the 31st January.[1402] The
“hedjira” of Mr. Arbuthnot was a foolish mistake. No one gained from it
but Sebastiani, so much so that it was alleged that it was one of the
French Ambassador’s agents who played so adroitly on Arbuthnot’s fears
as to induce him to fly the capital.[1403] The flight, as Lord Holland
wrote, made the expedition “assume the appearance of a mere military
enterprise, not of a force destined to enforce the negotiations of the
ambassador by placing before the eyes of the sultan an English fleet
ready and able to bombard his capital.”[1404] No argument could be
adduced in its defence. If it was the safety of the British merchants,
what of their wives and children who were left behind? If it was to
enable him to communicate freely with Duckworth, surely the squadron
that was deemed sufficient to capture the capital of the Turkish Empire
should have achieved the less difficult object of extricating Mr.
Arbuthnot from a Turkish prison.
On the 10th February, Duckworth arrived at Tenedos. He had already, on
hearing of the flight of the Ambassador, sent word to General Fox to
despatch the force destined for the occupation of Alexandria.[1405] This
disposes of the allegation of M. Driault that the occupation of
Alexandria was decided upon to avenge the check before Constantinople.
“Ils se décidèrent à agir pour écraser Mehemet Ali, venger l’échec
qu’ils venaient de subir à Constantinople avant qu’il se fût connu dans
la vallée du Nil, fonder au Caire, à défaut du Bosphore, leur empire sur
la Méditerranée.”[1406] To found an empire on the Bosphorus with some
ten ships of the line and not a single soldier on board!
The Admiral and the Ambassador decided not to commence hostilities till
after they had known the result of the overtures made to the Capitan
Pasha. The Turkish admiral asked the Ambassador to return to
Constantinople and negotiate with the proper ministers; the squadron, in
the meantime, to remain at anchor outside the Dardanelles. Arbuthnot
refused to comply except on condition that the ships should anchor
within the Straits and a British officer should watch in every castle to
make sure that no repairs or new works would be carried out. The Turks
refused these conditions.[1407] It seems that the presence of the
warships had made the timid landsman momentarily most bellicose. “Our
sovereign and his ally had been greatly injured. A powerful fleet had
been sent to secure those interests which had been endangered, and
though the passage of the Dardanelles in its present fortified state
cannot be undertaken without great risks, any probable loss would in my
opinion be preferable to that dishonour which would be attached to His
Majesty’s arms if a menace had been made, which, in the day of peril, we
had not dared to act upon.”[1408] He raised his demands. “If I did not
do so I should have lost the only opportunity which may perhaps ever
occur of employing with effect the wonderfully fine naval force which
has been sent to give weight to my representations.”[1409] The squadron
passed through the Dardanelles on the 19th February without any loss and
anchored near the Princes’ Islands. A curious combination of
circumstances then arose and ended in the discomfiture of the
“wonderfully fine” naval force. Mr. Arbuthnot began to weary of the
jingoistic mood. It just dawned upon him “that Russia was unwise in the
extreme” and that he was demanding what he had already obtained.[1410]
He began to be less sure of success, “for the war with Russia had opened
the eyes of the Turks,” the fortifications were repaired and the
“venture” became hazardous.[1411] He “had a secret wish to render
unnecessary the heavy blow which they would now probably be forced to
strike.”[1412] He “was in an agony of fear for his four infant children”
in Constantinople.[1413] The reaction that followed the excitement of
triumph prostrated him and he fell ill at the most critical
moment.[1414] The outcome was hesitation. Duckworth was not the man to
remedy the evil. “He was,” in the words of one of his captains,
“excellent only if acting as a second in command to a Nelson.”[1415] The
hesitation saved the Turks. They had been in such panic, Sebastiani
wrote to Talleyrand, that had the British demanded his imprisonment, let
alone his dismissal, the Porte would have acquiesced.[1416] The Turks
skilfully played for time and, when their fortifications were complete,
peremptorily demanded the withdrawal of the ships. The wind seemed to
have favoured the Turks and prevented the British from leaving their
anchorage, all the time they were before the capital, save for a few
hours.[1417] The Admiral and the Ambassador—contrary to the advice of
Sir Sidney Smith[1418]—judged it imprudent to tarry any longer. On the
return journey, the ships were somewhat roughly handled, the casualties
amounting to forty-two killed and two hundred and thirty-five
wounded.[1419]
Thus ended the first half of the scheme of the British intervention. The
conception was peculiarly British: a combination of hostility and
conciliation that had served the purpose on many an occasion but that
was not always bound to succeed. As a contemporary writer said, the
venture reminded one of what a Turk had said of a tournament in the
Court of Charles VIII. He thought that if it was done in earnest it was
not enough and if in jest it was too much.[1420] The share of Sebastiani
in the discomfiture was great. It was his ardour and skill that kept up
the spirit of the Turks and raised the means of resistance.[1421] It
should also be noted that the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean
studiously kept aloof.[1422]
The failure of the enterprise led to the consummation it was intended to
prevent, namely, the predominance of France.[1423] The force destined
for Alexandria, under General Fraser, left Sicily on the 6th March,
1807. It was mainly composed of non-British units, and none of the
general officers, including the Commander, except for General Meade, had
served in the expedition of 1801.[1424] It seems that both the Porte and
Mehemet Ali were expecting a British attack, for the Viceroy tried to
introduce an Albanian garrison into Alexandria; but Major Missett,
hoping for the arrival of a British force, succeeded in thwarting the
Pasha.[1425] Mehemet Ali solemnly attested that he did all he could and
proceeded to Upper Egypt to subjugate the Beys,[1426] while Missett
endeavoured to enlist the support of several Arab tribes, and wrote
Shahine, the successor of Elfi, “to look forward with confidence to
happier days.”[1427]
On the 14th March, the force arrived off Alexandria. On the 20th the
town capitulated. “If the governor of Alexandria,” wrote Missett, “held
out for forty-eight hours after the disembarkation, he did so with a
view to screen himself from the resentment of his government, and if the
inhabitants did not immediately open the gates it must be ascribed to
their want of energy, their spirit having been broken by long
oppression.”[1428] This first success revived his hopes. He wrote to the
Beys on the 22nd March, pointing out that the present was their only
chance and demanding a “confidential” person to state their wants and
wishes.[1429] This was his interpretation of the instructions about
“assisting such parties as should be disposed to maintain a permanent
intercourse” with Great Britain. “The fact was that he was indulging in
a grand scheme and trying to draw his countrymen on to the conquest of
Egypt.”[1430] The first step was to be the occupation of Rosetta. He
made, accordingly, strong representations to Fraser that Alexandria had
only one day’s ration of wheat and that Rosetta had to be occupied if
the troops and the inhabitants were not to starve.[1431] Had the general
been in Egypt in 1801, he would have remembered that Menou stood a siege
for several months, that he was besieged by some 7,000 British soldiers
and not an Albanian rabble, that the harbour of Alexandria was blockaded
and he could not, unlike the British, obtain anything by sea. The
mistake of Fraser was in allowing himself to be deceived by Missett. His
second mistake was not to have marched with the bulk of his troops
towards Rosetta, seeing that it was so necessary.[1432] He sent General
Wauchope with some 1,400 soldiers to capture Rosetta. Under the
misrepresentations of Missett,[1433] they thought that they had nothing
to fear and marched unguardedly into the narrow streets. They were
suddenly fired upon from all directions and had to retire in great
panic, leaving 120 killed (including Wauchope) and 250 wounded. “It was
a very heavy and unexpected stroke,” Fraser sadly commented.[1434] But
Missett was nothing daunted. He “got up” a deputation of the notables of
Alexandria to represent to the General “that a famine would be certain
and immediate” if Rosetta were not taken.[1435] A second attempt was
accordingly resolved upon. General Stewart, with 2,500 men, was to
accomplish this object. In the meantime, however, the Albanians had
become full of confidence in themselves and the fortifications of the
town were repaired. Stewart could do nothing against it. He had,
moreover, to detach nearly half his force to guard his communications to
the southward. The detachment was enmeshed by Albanians arriving from
Cairo and surrendered before Stewart could come to its help.[1436] He
had, therefore, to return to Alexandria.
These two severe checks determined Fraser to confine himself to
Alexandria. He found out, at great cost, what the real game of Missett
had been.[1437] But the mischief had been done. For on the first news of
the disembarkation of the British, the Albanians were seized with great
panic. They began to make hasty preparations for a flight into Syria
with as much of the plunder of Egypt as they could carry. The sheikhs
and the inhabitants—anxious for a European occupation and bitterly
disappointed in the Viceroy whom they had elected[1438]—began to
accommodate themselves to a new order of things. The Mamelukes were
marching northward towards the scene of action. The Pasha made to them
the most liberal offers. M. Drovetti, the French Consul, sent to them M.
Mengin—the future historian—to persuade them against joining the
“perfidious” British.[1439] A deputation of eloquent sheikhs held forth
to them on the damage they would do the cause of religion should they
ally themselves with the British. “Les Français,” the deputation argued,
“ne sont soumis à aucune religion et agissent au nom de la liberté et de
l’égalité tandis que les Anglais sont des Chrétiens attachés à leur
religion et vous n’ignorez pas la haine de chaque religion pour les
autres. . . . Dieu vous ayant donné la grâce et fait connaître la
lumière pendant votre enfance . . . qu’ayant été élevés par des savants
et des juris-consultes . . . qu’ayant passé ce qui s’est écoulé de votre
vie dans le sein de la religion musulmane . . . vous ne devez pas finir
par perdre le fruit de toutes vos bonnes actions en se liant d’amitié
avec ceux qui ne suivent pas la voie tracée par Dieu et son
prophète.”[1440]
It is probable that this discourse was not lost on individual
Beys.[1441] But, taken as a whole, their conduct was determined by other
considerations. They were full of hatred for Mehemet Ali, but did not
hate each other less. M. Mengin found them without discipline and
enthusiasm. “They were followed by troops of prostitutes and passed
their time in debauchery.” The deciding factors, however, were the
reverses at Rosetta. “Les Beys,” writes Mengin, “n’avaient pas une haute
idée de la force de l’armée britannique. . . . Les revers de Rosetta
laissaient voir assez la faiblesse de ces troupes. . . . Manfoukh Bey ne
pouvait pas comprendre comment des Européens avaient pu se laisser
battre par des Turcs.”[1442] They maintained, however, their
correspondence with Missett and Fraser and endeavoured, by flimsy
excuses, to justify their dilatoriness.[1443]
It was clear to Fraser that “it appears much more their view for us to
assist them in getting possession of Cairo, than to co-operate with us
in keeping possession of Alexandria.”[1444] He left them alone. Missett
chafed at this policy and persuaded Fraser to reject an overture from
Mehemet Ali for alliance with the British on the grounds that no
“permanent benefit could be expected from an alliance with so mercenary
and faithless a set of men as the Albanians, and that such an alliance
would alienate the Mamelukes and the inhabitants.”[1445] General Fraser,
accordingly, told the agent of the Pasha that if the Viceroy would
liberate the British prisoners and promise not to intercept the supplies
of Alexandria he would not interfere with him and would “grant him every
favour in his power.”[1446] He meant by “favour” a sum of money! Things,
however, remained in that condition till the withdrawal of the British.
Fraser was not attacked and the Pasha did all he could, especially by
excellent treatment of his prisoners,[1447] to be on the best of terms
with him.
The situation in the Near East, however, affected the general relations
of the Powers. Prussia had taken the place of Austria in the Coalition.
The Ministry of All the Talents had been succeeded by an administration
in which George Canning held the Foreign Office. Napoleon redoubled his
activity in the East. He concluded a Treaty of Alliance with Persia and
dispatched General Gardane with a numerous suite of officers to that
country. European nations were no longer indifferent to the affairs of
Asia. Since the expansion of Russia and British India, “L’Europe et
l’Asie sont entrées en contact par un plus grand nombre de points. La
même guerre s’étend de l’Orient à l’Occident et tous les peuples qui ont
un ennemi commun se trouvent liés par les mêmes intérêts et par le
besoin de la commune défense.”[1448] This point is emphasised in all
Napoleon’s instructions.[1449] The supreme object was to give his
enemies as much trouble as he could.
Turkey was envisaged in this light. He endeavoured by all means at his
command to revive the spirit of the Turks. He gave orders that the
bulletins of the “Grande Armée” should be translated into Turkish.[1450]
He instructed Cambacérès to compose an appeal “par un vieil ottoman”
against Russia and have thousands of copies of it printed in Turkish and
Arabic.[1451] The curious document is in the French Archives.[1452] As
early as December, 1806, he had proposed an offensive and defensive
alliance.
He made full use of the rivalries of the powers in the East in his
diplomatic transactions. For ever since the occupation of the Danubian
Principalities, Austria had kept aloof from her late allies. The
Russians did all they could to placate her by assurances of
“disinterestedness” and repeated invitations to help herself.[1453] But
she rejected all advances. Pozzo di Borgo was sent to Vienna to do all
he could, but had no success. He reported that Austria would never join
the allies till after Russia had withdrawn her troops from Moldavia and
Wallachia.[1454] Napoleon refused to make peace with Prussia except on
condition of her subscribing a guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish
Empire and an engagement to join her efforts to his to force Russia out
of the Principalities and ordered Talleyrand to declare that “Sa Majesté
ne pourra . . . rendre aucun des pays que le sort des armes a mis en sa
puissance avant que la Porte Ottomane ne soit rentrée dans la plénitude
de tous ses droits sur la Moldavie et la Valachie et que son
indépendance absolue n’ait été reconue et garantie.”[1455] The offer of
mediation on the part of Austria on the basis of the assembling of a
general congress broke down on the insistence of Napoleon that the Porte
should be admitted to it.[1456]
It was evident, therefore, to Canning[1457] and to the Russian Ministry
that neither could the war with France be vigorously prosecuted nor
could the approaches to peace be cleared till after they had taken
measures to deprive Napoleon of his advantage by making peace with
Turkey. Hence the missions of Pozzo di Borgo and Sir Arthur Paget to the
Porte.
By the first article of the Russian project of a treaty of peace with
Turkey, all previous “conventions and treaties” were to be renewed. The
second article states that as the French possession of Dalmatia was a
source of danger to Turkey, the two states should use all possible means
to drive out the French from that territory and settle among themselves
its future status. The third article stipulates for the renewal of the
Anglo-Turkish alliance and a joint guarantee on the part of Russia and
Britain of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The fourth article
authorises Russia to possess the fortresses of Choczim and Binder as
“sureties” till it concluded peace with France. By the fifth, Serbia was
to be erected into a “tributary principality” under a prince to be
elected by the people for life and to be confirmed by the Sultan. The
sixth article restores Wallachia and Moldavia into their former status,
but stipulates that Ipsilanti could maintain a force of 4,000 or 5,000
men “to protect his province against incursions from the right bank of
the Danube.”[1458]
The instructions to Pozzo di Borgo throw considerable light on these
terms. With regard to the second article, the envoy was authorised to be
satisfied “que la Porte emploie ses bons offices à contribuer à
l’évacuation de ce pays (Dalmatia) par les Français sans que pour cela
elle se constitue en état de guerre avec eux.” But in return for this
concession, Russia should be allowed free access for her troops and the
right of annexing the province or disposing of it as she might think
fit. He need not insist on the third article. As for the fourth, Pozzo
was to understand that the Tsar had no particular interest in Choczim
and Binder, that all that he desired was “pouvoir compter avec quelque
certitude sur la constance de la Porte dans la système qu’il lui
convient qu’elle suive.” He would accordingly accept any other “gages”
of equal value, for example, the expulsion of Sebastiani. The Serbians
were to be thrown overboard if the Porte offered strenuous opposition.
Pozzo, however, should find some means of doing something for them, “de
manière toutefois que nous puissions conserver avec ce peuple
intéressant un lien quelconque au moyen duquel nous puissions du nouveau
compter sur lui si jamais les circonstances le rendraient nécessaire.”
As for the number of the force to be maintained by Ipsilanti, he was
authorised to reduce it to 1,500.[1459]
There was nothing in these terms to win over Turkey from her connection
with France. Ipsilanti was to have an army intended against the “right
bank” and he was as much Russian as Michelson. Nor could the Porte have
preferred the neighbourhood of Russia in Dalmatia to that of France.
Such points as these must have been present in Canning’s mind, but he
was not disposed to complicate matters. He professed himself
satisfied[1460] and hastened to join his efforts to those of
Russia[1461] by sending Sir Arthur Paget to Constantinople.[1462]
The object of the mission was to “endeavour to accommodate the
differences which have broken out between the Porte and Russia and to
bring back the Porte to a just sense of the expediency of renewing and
maintaining its former engagements as well with Russia as with this
country and of throwing off the predominant influence which is now
exercised over the councils of the Divan by France.” Much was left to
Paget’s discretion, but he was informed that however probable the fall
of the Turkish Empire might be, it was neither the wish nor the interest
of Great Britain to be “instrumental in precipitating” this event. At a
moment when all efforts should be directed to avert the “one great
danger with which Europe and the world were threatened from the
overbearing greatness and insatiable ambition of France,” the British
Government saw with regret Russia divert a considerable portion of her
forces to “objects of aggrandizement” on the side of Turkey. Such
“objects” would probably add but little of “solid” power to the Russian
Empire and such a policy might in the end drive her to seek security in
a separate peace with France or change the “wavering neutrality” of
Austria into a close alliance with Napoleon. It was, however, expedient
that Paget should work as far as possible with his Russian colleague and
endeavour to impress moderation upon him by pointing out that “His
Majesty would not even consider the retention of recent conquests in
Egypt as to be put in competition with the advantages of a pacific
arrangement.”[1463]
As for specific points, Paget was instructed to consider “the
termination of the war as upon the whole a more desirable object than
the satisfaction of particular demands. He should not demand the
surrender of the Turkish fleet and should drop that relating to the
dismissal of Sebastiani” if he could not press it with advantage. Paget
should guide himself by circumstances, “supporting Russia on the whole,
but endeavouring rather to reconcile the Russian plenipotentiary to
terms somewhat short of those which were originally required than
countenance and encourage him in the pursuit of unattainable
stipulations.”[1464] He must not enter into touch with the Porte at once
if he found the blockade operating effectively, but was to endeavour to
make the Turks receive favourably his pacific mission.[1465]
Egypt, accordingly, was to be held as a “lever” in the
negotiations.[1466] But the possibility of a speedy evacuation was not
ignored. The Government had no knowledge then of the reverses before
Rosetta, but feared from the first reports of Fraser and Missett “that
the occupation of Alexandria, originally intended to guard more
effectually against the French acquiring a footing in that country,
might become a much heavier drain upon our military resources than was
originally anticipated.” The general commanding should not, therefore,
“frame his conduct in the expectation of reinforcements.” He should also
keep in view that “His Majesty is not prepared to look to the permanent
possession of Egypt on a peace.” “The prosecution of other military
objects of greater moment in other quarters or the result of the
discussion now pending with the Porte may possibly even during the war
determine His Majesty to withdraw his forces from Egypt, so that it will
be requisite as far as possible to avoid any measures which might render
such a step inconsistent with the honour or good faith of the King or of
those employed in His Majesty’s Service.” Fraser, therefore, was never
to give pledges to help the Beys to recover Cairo or commit the
Government “with respect to any eventual system of government to be
hereafter established in Egypt,” and was to confine himself to
assurances of “good offices.”[1467] On the news of the reverses of
Wauchope and Stewart, the Government, acting under the misrepresentation
of Missett that Alexandria could not be held without Rosetta and
believing that to enable Fraser to do so would mean the evacuation of
Sicily, ordered the evacuation of Alexandria if it had not already taken
place.[1468] The choice, it appeared to the Government, was between
Sicily and Alexandria; “it is not an alternative upon which the smallest
hesitation could exist here.”[1469]
In the meantime the Porte was doing all it could to prevent the French
from obtaining complete control over its policy. It rejected offers of a
corps of French troops. It answered the proposal for an offensive and
defensive alliance by the query whether Poland was to be first restored
or not and by expatiating on the necessity of sending a special
ambassador to French headquarters.[1470] The envoy, Emin Vehid Effendi,
was sent, but was instructed to do nothing. He seems to have been an
excellent choice. Talleyrand found him “fort désagréable dans ses
communications.”[1471] When the French Minister asked him if he had
powers to take part in a general congress, Vehid did not understand what
a “congress” meant.[1472] When the sending of French officers to
Constantinople was proposed, he said that this could be done only after
the conclusion of the treaty.[1473] But he did all he could to prevent
this. Caulaincourt and Roux were appointed to negotiate with him. Vehid
informed them at great length that his object was “constante amitié” and
that “offensive alliances” offended against Islam, and, having delivered
himself of this declaration, he fell asleep.[1474] It was evident that
Vehid was impossible to work with. M. Driault thinks that this behaviour
was due to the fact that the Turk was expecting the fall of the Sultan
and was, accordingly, acting from personal considerations.[1475] But
this is rather wide of the mark. Neither Vehid nor any Turk could have
taken upon himself to act contrary to his instructions. The truth was
that the Porte was expecting any moment a radical change in the
relations of the powers. The Reis Effendi informed Arbuthnot, as early
as December, 1806, that an alliance between Russia and France at the
Sultan’s expense was a most probable event. Mr. Arbuthnot, in his
wisdom, was not surprised; he expected any “absurdity” from a
Turk.[1476] The somnolent Vehid organised in Warsaw behind the back of
Talleyrand a bureau of secret information.[1477] Under the circumstances
the best course for the Turks was to remain as they were, decline formal
engagements with Napoleon—however dazzling his offers[1478] might be—but
keep on his side and reject the advances of Britain and Russia.
This explains the fate of the missions of Pozzo di Borgo and Paget. Sir
Arthur arrived at Sicily on the 10th July, 1807. After he had conferred
with General Moore, they took upon themselves to suspend the execution
of the orders for the evacuation of Egypt. They did so because they
thought that the orders had been sent under the false impression that
Alexandria was not tenable and with the object of not denuding Sicily of
British troops. Paget, moreover, felt the need of having a “lever” in
his negotiations. There was no other one available, for the blockade of
the coasts of Turkey was not even begun.[1479] On the 28th July he
arrived off Tenedos.[1480] Pozzo di Borgo had been there since the 24th
May, but had met with no response.[1481] The prospects of the British
did not look brighter.[1482] He found great difficulty even in entering
into touch with the Porte. The revolution that hurled down the Sultan
and the reformers, accompanied as it was by the massacre of many of the
leading officials, doubtless affected the prosecution of any important
transaction. But it had nothing to do with foreign politics, as shall be
later explained. After many delays and attempts to separate the British
and the Russian plenipotentiaries came the news of Tilsit and the
consequent arrangements for a Russo-Turkish peace under French
mediation. Pozzo’s mission was, therefore, at an end.
Paget now worked on his own account. But Tilsit could hardly have
improved his position. The Turks were very anxious to be friends with
the British but feared to give the new allies any pretext for attack.
They informed Paget that there had been no declaration of war on either
side (which was true) and that, therefore, there could exist no
necessity for a formal treaty, that once Alexandria was evacuated and
the blockade raised the “former footing” would be “automatically”
renewed.[1483] Paget combated this view and pointed out that a formal
“instrument” was indispensable.[1484] The Turks, in pursuance of the
same policy, insisted on “secrecy” and pointed out that even if peace be
concluded, a British ambassador could not be immediately “received” in
Constantinople, but had to reside for some months in some island in the
Archipelago.[1485]
On the 30th of September, the British plenipotentiary received
instructions from Canning dated the 14th and 15th August.[1486] The
Minister enclosed a copy of the patent articles of the treaty of Tilsit
and informed Paget that His Majesty was willing to recognise the
Government of the Porte “in whatever part of its dominions its residence
may be established” and maintain with it “the closest friendship and
connection.”[1487] The Minister also discussed the means of averting the
ruin of Turkey. He favoured the establishment of relations with such of
the Pashas as were disposed to defend themselves—notably those of Janina
and Smyrna.[1488] Egypt would only be evacuated, if it had not already
been, if the Porte consented to strengthen its forces there and allow
the “co-operation” of a British naval force in its defence.[1489] But
these new instructions did not affect matters. The situation, as
envisaged in them, was already fully known to Paget and the Turkish
ministers. On the 18th October the Capitan Pasha declared that in view
of the critical situation with regard to Russia and France the Porte had
to break the negotiations, that Turkey was not at war with Britain and
that in four months the Sultan would propose a new negotiation.[1490]
The mission of Paget came to an end.
Before this took place, Alexandria had been evacuated. Fraser,
notwithstanding the orders suspending the withdrawal, had been preparing
for it.[1491] General Sherbrooke and Captain Fellowes arranged the
necessary convention with Mehemet Ali in person. Fraser described the
conduct of the Viceroy as “most fair and liberal,” as “truly noble and
deserving of his warmest gratitude.” The evacuation took place on the
23rd September.[1492]
The chagrin of Missett can be imagined. He had been urging his
Government to occupy Alexandria till the general peace, to drive out the
Albanians, restore the Mamelukes and enter with them into engagements
for the defence of the country in the event of an attack. The Porte
would be thankful, for it had not received a piastre since Mehemet Ali
came to power—as if the Mamelukes did not offend in this respect. It was
hopeless to make such an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, for he had
obtained the Pashalik through French intrigue and was aiming at
independence.[1493] It seems that Missett made this allegation because
he knew that the object of his Government was the preservation of the
integrity of the Sultan’s dominions. He informed Paget that “he could
with difficulty believe that His Majesty’s ministers would in time of
war have ordered the evacuation of a place so intimately connected with
our Indian possessions if the state of this country had not been
misrepresented to them,” that he was convinced that as long as Egypt was
under Mehemet Ali it would ever be “a field for French intrigue,” and
that a new effort to “retrieve British prestige” was necessary.[1494] To
correct the “misrepresentations” he sent home a mass of reports signed
by his agents, Maltese, Greeks, Syrians, etc.[1495] To do “something” he
sent the Mameluke Bey, Emin, to Paget “to solicit his good offices” with
the Porte.[1496] Emin arrived at Tenedos on the 1st of October. Paget
was well disposed, for, under the misrepresentation of Missett, he
believed that Mehemet Ali “was very much in the French interest” and was
determined that “if he got to Constantinople his first object would be
to get him removed.”[1497] But the British plenipotentiary was not in a
position to do anything even for himself. Emin was in an awkward
position. He could neither remain at Tenedos nor proceed to
Constantinople nor return to Egypt now that it had been evacuated. Malta
was his only place of retreat.[1498]
This was Missett’s last effort. He had to leave the country and retire
to Italy. The Mamelukes as a political body, he had discovered, were now
extinct.[1499] When he came back to Egypt in 1811 on a second spell of
office, it was his fate to see them literally extinct and himself a
helpless cripple.[1500]
Thus ended the second British invasion of Egypt, an event that could not
be truly represented except in connection with the situation as a whole.
Apart from the mistakes of Fraser and the responsibility of Missett, the
conception was at fault. Moore’s criticism is unanswerable: if the
expedition was decided upon to influence the Turks, Egypt was too far
away to affect the course of events in Constantinople, and if that
country was to be occupied as the British share in a “scramble” for the
Turkish spoils, it could have been taken at any convenient time and the
troops should have remained in Sicily, where they were greatly needed,
or should have been sent to the Dardanelles with the naval force.[1501]
[Footnote 1331: _Correspondance_, X, 8298, 10 pluviôse, XIII (30 Jan.,
1805).]
[Footnote 1332: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 6 Feb., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.]
[Footnote 1333: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1334: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 15 Feb., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.
The Russian ratification arrived in Constantinople in Dec., 1805.]
[Footnote 1335: Arbuthnot to Fox, 25 April, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.
_Ibid._ to _ibid._, 5 May, 1806, 29 July, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.]
[Footnote 1336: Arbuthnot to Fox, 9 April, 1806. Secret report of
Pisani. Enclosed in Arbuthnot’s despatch, 5 May, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.]
[Footnote 1337: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 20 Jan., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.
Enclosing report of Pisani.
Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot. Enclosed in the despatch of 28 Jan. F.O.
Turkey, 49.]
[Footnote 1338: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 16 March, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.]
[Footnote 1339: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1340: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 6 Feb., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.]
[Footnote 1341: A memorandum of Talleyrand, dated 17 Oct., 1805.
Bertrand, _Lettres de Talleyrand_, pp. 158-163.