THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI
1803-1806
The events which took place in the years 1803 to 1806 and which
culminated in the final confirmation of Mehemet Ali in 1806, were not
directly or purposely affected by foreign influence. France had lost all
weight with the Divan; Great Britain and Austria had succeeded in
preventing an eventual agreement on the partition of Turkey, but had to
allow Russia to secure the Ottoman Empire by a new treaty of alliance.
Napoleon, now and again, took a furtive glance at the domestic struggles
in Egypt. Great Britain took no step to interfere in these struggles and
her views did not extend beyond envisaging the possibility of a
precautional occupation of Alexandria.[1171] It is true that both powers
were duly represented in Cairo. But neither representative had the means
of influencing events: no money: no troops. Never was there a more
ludicrous spectacle of ineffective busybodies than that presented by
Major Missett and M. de Lesseps.
The first Viceroy after the expulsion of the French was Khosrev,
formerly a Georgian slave and the creature of the Capitan Pasha. “Il a
beaucoup du caractère de son maître, il aime la gloire sans la
connaître, aussi toutes ses vues se portent sur des objets futiles, tels
que des habillements des troupes, etc. Il n’a aucune connaissance sur la
guerre, la politique et l’administration; il ne sait que couper des
têtes.”[1172] The force with which he had to vanquish the Mamelukes was
comprised partly of Turks and partly of Albanians; and the Egyptians
never saw a more filthy, immoral and drunken rabble.[1173] The Turks
were only slightly better than the Albanians. “On ne leur connaissait
aucune croyance religieuse, et ils ne se livraient à aucune pratique de
piété: tout était permis à leurs yeux; la chose la plus facile pour eux
était d’assassiner, de s’emparer du bien d’autrui, et de ne pas se
soumettre à leurs chefs, qui étaient encore plus pervers qu’eux. Que
Dieu les fasse périr tous!”[1174]
The Mamelukes and their fellow-plunderers—the Bedouins—perpetrated, on
their part, similar horrors.[1175] They moved in Upper Egypt under four
chiefs: Ibrahim, the “doyen” of the Corps, but now so enfeebled in body
and mind that the “most inferior” Mameluke could disobey him with
impunity,[1176] Bardissy, the “fonds” of whose character was formed by
vanity and arrogant ignorance,[1177] Elfi, the “bête noire” of his
colleagues—an energetic barbarian, not entirely unattractive—and Osman
Hassan, the keeper of the best of the traditions of the race. It was
Bardissy and Elfi who counted for all practical purposes.
The Egyptians were the helpless and abject victims of these tyrants.
“Although they possess qualities which might, if improved, render them
capable of being a free nation, they will long be destitute of that
virtue and energy necessary to achieve their own independence.”[1178] It
is ever the trait of the Oriental to fall, under the stress of evil
times, into a state of dull apathy. The symbols of decay will be the
only things that then impress him.[1179] The tales of impossible
phenomena and the narratives of past or distant wonders will be the only
things that then rouse him.[1180] It does not seem that the French
occupation produced a general change of outlook.[1181] The rule of
France was too short, the conditions under which it was exercised were
too adverse, for it to produce profound changes. “Oriental nations in
general are so averse to the adoption of any change in their local
customs that it would require a much longer and better established
revolution than the residence of the French in Egypt to have produced
any material change in the manners or pursuits of the inhabitants. The
natives of Egypt, moreover, have been long accustomed to look with
indifference on a change of masters, and as their miserable state
authorises them to be confident that they cannot change for the worse,
there is no country where a revolution is so easy or of so little
immediate consequence to the inhabitants. But the French have here, as
in the rest of their conquests, fully succeeded in leaving behind them
an universal detestation of their name. Their system of government began
in plunder, was continued in oppression and ended with robbery.”[1182]
A longer duration of French rule would no doubt have induced the
excitable, sociable and imitative Egyptian to doubt the all-sufficiency
of his religion,[1183] and to feel the desire for change and action
grow—as it were—upon him.[1184] As things in 1803 were, his sole
recourse was to prayers from the heights of the minarets and
lamentations over the golden age of French rule.[1185] His proper
leaders, the “ulemas” or “savants,” knew of no other means. They were a
narrow, covetous and subtle class. Their learning amounted to no more
than commenting upon earlier comments,[1186] and most of their efforts
were directed to the accumulation of wealth and the cultivation of the
powers that be.
Conditions were then unfavourable to the evolution of national unity.
There had to exist, before this could take place, a highly centralised
authority, which should provide security and eliminate pretensions to
exclusive privileges. It was indispensable also to create a healthier
moral tone by the suppression of concubinage and unnatural vice, to
propagate a connection—real or fictitious did not matter—between the
Egypt of the Pharoahs and the Egypt of to-day,[1187] so as to enable the
country to cut itself loose from Pan-Islamic trammels, and to facilitate
the residence of Levantine Christians. Their _rôle_, as the first to
dream of a non-religious national organisation had not been recognised,
their morality had often been impugned. It was they and the “native”
Christians who first thought of a lay state, of tolerance and of
equality. As early as 1801, the Copts and other Christians, who did not
think themselves safe after the withdrawal of the French Army, formed
themselves into a Legation to plead the cause of Egyptian Independence
in Europe. The documents containing their views owed probably more to
the fevered brain and facile pen of Lascaris de Vintmille than to the
delegates themselves.[1188] Their leader, Yacoub, known as “le général
Jacob,” died at sea, and his colleagues were so depressed by poverty and
exile that no more was heard of them.[1189]
To foreign observers the situation in Egypt presented a stalemate. In
1803, Colonel Wilson expressed his surprise “that no adventurer endowed
with fortitude, talents and ambition had proposed to command a body of
auxiliaries to act against the Mamelukes.”[1190] An “American
gentleman”[1191] wrote from Cairo in 1804 that “Egypt has no master . .
. she must have a new master, and the first comer will be
welcome.”[1192] There could, indeed, have been no other outcome than
foreign occupation, or the coming to power of an adventurer. The
Mamelukes, with their reduced numbers, could never have regained their
old position or expelled the Turks. They could not any longer recruit in
the slave-markets of the East, for in 1802 the Porte prohibited the
exportation of young boys to Egypt.[1193] The Turks, on the other hand,
were unable to reduce the Beys.
The adventurer was already on the scene. Mehemet Ali came to Egypt with
the force under the Capitan Pasha’s orders. His part consisted rather in
availing himself of opportunities than in making them. Physically, he
was rather below the average height, was dark complexioned, with a
reddish beard.[1194] His air was defiant and his eyes were
restless.[1195] He had none of the sedateness and composure of a Turkish
grandee, but all the agility of his race; was sober in habit and simple
in attire.[1196] Power was never to him, as it was to many a Turkish
adventurer, the means of satisfying lust: he was rather impelled by the
love of it, by the desire to do great things and leave a great name.
When he first consciously began to work for himself it is impossible to
find.[1197] He was not slow, however, to take advantage of the
prevailing anarchy.
The first of the series of events which culminated in his advent to
power was the mutiny of the Albanian troops under Tahir Pasha. It is
unwarrantable to seek the hand of Mehemet Ali in it; a rising of
undisciplined and irregularly paid soldiers was a very common occurrence
in Turkey. Khosrev, the Viceroy, had very foolishly made it clear that
he intended to repatriate them and, at the same time, refused to pay
their arrears though he had the necessary funds. In four days he was put
to flight and succeeded by Tahir.[1198] The new Pasha had started life
as a brigand, delighted in the company of dervishes and half-witted
religious enthusiasts,[1199] but had enough sense, however, to see that
the Albanians by themselves could not hold the country. He, accordingly,
invited the Beys to Cairo and thus began the Coalition of the Mamelukes
and the Albanians which ultimately turned to the profit of Mehemet Ali.
Before his new allies arrived, however, Tahir was murdered by two
Janissaries on the 25th May, 1803.[1200] The Mamelukes stepped in before
the deposed Khosrev could regain the Capital.
Mehemet Ali definitely accepted the alliance with the Beys.[1201] It was
a serious step, for they were rebels in the eyes of the Porte and the
legitimate Pasha was still in the country. He was, therefore, most
careful to shun undue prominence and take too great a share in the acts
of the new régime. This accounts for the fact that his name hardly
appears in the despatches of the foreign agents before the year 1804.
He, moreover, gave out that he was most anxious to return to his own
country and approached Major Missett, the British representative, as to
the provision of British shipping, the Albanians doubting their safety
in Turkish transports.[1202] Missett concluded that he had the Albanians
in the palm of his hand. He believed that Mehemet Ali and his followers
were no more than the mercenaries of the Beys, whose progress seemed to
him astonishing. [1203]He overlooked the fact that his remaining in
Cairo after the deposition of Khosrev was improper.[1204] At the same
time as Missett was with the Beys in Cairo, a British officer, Major
Hayes, was organising the defence of Damietta for Khosrev, and against
the Mamelukes![1205] Bardissy was flushed with arrogance. The absence of
Elfi in London had made him the chief of the Beys. He was short-sighted
enough not to see that the safest course would have been to make such
arrangements as would extricate him from the Albanian Alliance. He
should have restored the representative of the Sultan. He, on the
contrary, took Damietta on the 1st July, 1803, and led back Khosrev as
prisoner. He was soon to have another opportunity in the arrival in
Alexandria of Ali Pasha, who was sent by the Porte to succeed Khosrev
and who was instructed—overtly, at any rate—to grant the Beys pardon and
their old privileges.[1206]
Ali was a profligate Turk from Algeria. His residence in Alexandria was
marked by daily outrages on the Consuls; he frankly declared that such
things as capitulations could not apply where he ruled.[1207] He
intrigued with the Albanians,[1208] but Mehemet Ali did not respond and
succeeded in persuading the foolish Bardissy to destroy Ali. The Pasha
was, accordingly, decoyed into a trap and assassinated, and his small
army dispersed in all directions.[1209] Mehemet Ali had kept studiously
in the background and the odium fell on Bardissy. The Bey had thus burnt
his boats and put himself more and more at the mercy of his “ally.”
In the meantime there had arrived in Egypt M. de Lesseps—the father of
the famous Ferdinand de Lesseps—as commissary for commercial relations,
the word “consul” being then applied to the head of the state. The
French biographer of the Lesseps family states that . . . “il fut le
premier instrument de l’élévation de Méhemet Ali. Il avait eu pour
mission de chercher en Egypte un homme de caractère capable de rétablir
l’ordre en s’élevant au-dessus des Mamelukes contraires à la politique
française. Il avait distingué et signalé à son gouvernement Méhemet Ali
qui était Colonel.”[1210] This and similar statements have passed into
every book dealing with that period and there is ground for believing
that they were made for the express purpose of exploiting the
“gratitude” of the Viceroys. What took place was something very
different. Lesseps was informed by Talleyrand (21st March, 1803) that
“la situation précaire dans laquelle se trouve en ce moment l’Egypte
tant par la prolongation du séjour des Anglais que par l’état de guerre
qui existe entre les troupes ottomanes et les Mamelukes exige que le
citoyen Lesseps apporte dans sa conduite et ses démarches auprès du chef
délégué par la Porte toute la sagesse, la prudence et la circonspection
dont il est capable. Il s’applique à se concilier son estime et sa
confiance en évitant toutefois de s’immiscer dans les querelles des deux
partis. . . .”[1211] There is no mention of choosing a candidate for the
favour of the “grande nation.”
On his arrival in Alexandria, Lesseps was most pleasantly surprised to
find the Mamelukes warmly pro-French. Bardissy, who was then in the
Delta, aimed at drawing the French Commissary to Cairo and thus
investing his usurpation with a certain amount of legality. Lesseps was
puzzled; for there was then in Alexandria Ali Pasha, the legitimate
Viceroy. He seems to have resolved, at the beginning, to reside with
Ali, and even showed him the letters of Bardissy.[1212] This did not
last long, and he soon set out on his voyage to Cairo. En route he had a
secret conference with the Senior Bey, Ibrahim. It took place “at dawn”
on the 6th August, 1803. The Bey bitterly repented the blindness of the
Mamelukes in resisting the French Army. Their dealings with the British
and the Turks had now opened their eyes. The Beys were now ready to do
whatever Bonaparte should desire. He had only to say the word and they
would either conquer Syria and give him Egypt; remain in Cairo and
behave as good subjects of the Sultan, or give up even this and eat the
bread of exile in Upper Egypt.[1213] Lesseps was gratified, but refused
to commit himself. His reception in Cairo was a veritable triumph.[1214]
The consular procession was intentionally made to pass under the windows
of Missett.[1215] “Beaucoup de Chrétiens Syriens et Cophtes vinrent le
voir, ils tinrent des réunions et donnèrent des banquets à son honneur
et ils se pressaient devant sa porte.”[1216] The Beys had, however,
gained their point, which was to rouse Missett.
The British agent scented a plot to hand over Egypt to France. All the
evidence pointed to that. “The public and private testimonials of
regard, the extraordinary honours paid to Mr. Lesseps,” the fact that he
came to Egypt in great haste and left his family behind, his giving his
servants “Mameluke” dress.[1217] He spoke, thereupon, to Bardissy on his
impolitic conduct and endeavoured to wean the most notorious partisans
of France.[1218] But this was not enough; he had to give Bardissy
something more substantial than good advice.
The origin of this move lay in a scheme formed by Sir Alexander Ball,
the Commissioner for Malta. Interest in Egypt was then revived by the
publication for the first time of the famous _mémoire_ of Leibnitz on
the conquest of the valley of the Nile by France.[1219] Ball’s scheme
amounted to a disguised British control of Egypt. The Government was to
appoint a “gentleman of abilities and possessed of conciliatory manners,
great liberality and firmness of character” to reside in some ostensible
capacity at Alexandria. He should be authorised to supply the Governor
of that town with the funds necessary for the pay of 4,000 soldiers, who
were to be commanded by the foreign officers then in British service and
whom the Resident could inspect. The Resident also was to advise the
Governor on all civil concerns and establish such laws and regulations
as would secure the liberty of the subject. The grateful inhabitants
would then probably form a militia and co-operate in repelling a French
attack.[1220] Ball sent one, Vincenzo Taberna—a native of Piedmont, at
one time a Mameluke and later a British captain—to “sound” the
Beys[1221]. But the arrival of Taberna coincided with the dominance of
French influence. Missett, accordingly, gave out that the Italian
adventurer was empowered by the British Government to treat on that
head[1222] and gave the Mamelukes reason to expect certain assistance
from Malta.[1223] Bardissy at once entered into the scheme. He sent an
agent to Malta to concert with Ball. Sir Alexander was embarrassed, and
his efforts tended to hush the affair as soon as possible.[1224] The
Beys lived in hope for some time, and, naturally, turned their back—in
Mameluke style—on Lesseps. The Frenchman was at a loss to explain such a
_volte-face_. He could no longer see in Bardissy anything but “un
capricieux vexateur et injuste Mamelouke.”[1225]
The Bey openly declared to the dragoman of the French Consulate that he
only recognised treaties made with himself, and added: “Vous nous avez
dépouillés et chassés, voilà nos obligations envers vous.”[1226] Lesseps
found himself in an “affreux situation” and asked: “Quel parti peut
prendre un agent du gouvernement au milieu de tels excès?”[1227] A month
after his triumph he was vehemently requesting to be recalled.[1228] The
triumph of the British agent was only superficial. Bardissy confessed he
was duping him.[1229] All the Europeans were subjected to the time-
honoured “avanies.” The French agent candidly admitted that the question
for them all was security of person and goods, not political influence.
Missett studiously kept the humiliating subject out of his despatches,
though he once reported that he had to threaten armed resistance to any
forcible entry into his own house and added that only a sense of duty
had induced him to stand such treatment long.[1230]
The problem of Egypt was being considered in other quarters. The
occasion on which it was brought forward was the visit of Elfi Bey to
London. Elfi, as has been shown in the preceding pages, left Egypt in
company with General Stuart, but without the knowledge or sanction of
His Majesty’s Government.[1231] He was detained in Malta for some months
by orders of that general, till the intentions of the Government with
regard to him were known. There he gave Ball a great deal of
trouble[1232] and kept sending inflammatory letters to his brethren on
the pretended slights shown him.[1233] He was finally allowed to proceed
to London, where he arrived in October, 1803.[1234] His presence
embarrassed the Government, for the Porte had been reported to have
evinced a great uneasiness as to the objects of the voyage.[1235] There
was even reluctance to give him a hearing,[1236] and before this was
done the Foreign Secretary hastened to instruct the Ambassador in
Constantinople to assure the Divan that the fixed determination of His
Majesty’s Government was not to listen to any proposal from him which
might affect the interest or the rights of the Ottoman Porte in
Egypt.[1237] Nor did Elfi ever make such a proposal. The Bey expressly
stated to Lieutenant-Colonel J. Moore, who had been deputed to see him,
“that his object in coming to this country was not to urge on the
British Government points which might tend to involve it in fresh
contests or disputes with foreign powers, but to clear his own and his
friends’ characters from imputations of rebellion as well as to prove
the justice of the foundation upon which they built their pretensions to
the protection and countenance of this country.”[1238] He then proceeded
to retrace the course of events from 1798. The Government turned to its
advisors. General Stuart was of opinion that nothing could be done
without a military force being present in the country, that is to say, a
British military force; that no officer could take anything on himself
in Egypt with less than 4,000 effectives, that the Porte might be
brought round to acquiesce in a British occupation, and that, if they
needed any justification before the world for precautionary measures, it
was the conduct of France with regard to Naples.[1239] The Ambassador in
Constantinople, Drummond, expressed totally different views. In a
despatch of 25th October, 1803, which was received at the Foreign Office
on 8th December, he strongly disapproved of the conduct of the British
generals in Egypt with regard to the Beys. He proceeded to state “it
never can be consistent with our policy to leave the Beys in the
independent possession of Egypt . . . any connection which we desire to
keep with that country may be more effectually and easily maintained
through the medium of the Porte than through that of the treacherous
chiefs of lawless banditti. If things were placed upon their ancient
footing, we could always be enabled by our maritime superiority to hold
the balance between the Turks and the Mamelukes. . . . While the Turkish
Empire continues to exist, the Beys can never reckon with certainty upon
the independent possession of Egypt; and it may not be lightly surmised
that upon any emergency they should invite the French to come to their
assistance. . . . Great Britain is the ally of the Porte. It never can
be to her interest to consent to the partition of the Turkish Empire,
and, therefore, she can never desire that one of the finest and most
productive provinces of the Turkish Empire shall be lost to it. While
Egypt continues to be an integral part of the dominions of the Ottoman
Empire, its invasion by a foreign power is less likely to happen than if
it were subject to the Mamelukes. This is evident, because the Porte
would naturally defend a country which belonged to it; and the greater
the state is, which is attacked, the greater is the shock given to the
general system of politics. . . . From all these considerations I am
induced to lament that measures were not taken effectually to secure the
sovereignty of Egypt to the Turks since it was deemed expedient to
recall the British troops from this country. . . .”[1240]
The Government, however, could not entirely renounce all interest in the
domestic politics of Egypt. “Our exertions and the restitution of the
province to the Porte give us a claim to interfere in the interest of
our security.” The Government was, moreover, thoroughly convinced “that
in every circumstance which regards the safety of Egypt, His Majesty’s
interests are entirely conformable to those of the Sublime Porte.” The
past exertions of the Beys entitled them to a situation not less
advantageous than that which they enjoyed in 1798. “The object of His
Majesty’s policy is to secure the country against any project on the
part of France and to preserve it under the sovereignty of the Porte.”
The following were proposed as bases of compromise: firstly, the Beys
should acknowledge the sovereignty of the Porte, and, secondly, they
should agree to pay an annual tribute equal to or exceeding the one they
were formerly supposed to pay, and should be pledged to the British
Government for this.[1241] The Government was thus loth, after the
experience of 1801, to evolve a detailed scheme. It now saw that such
schemes could not be realised without the presence of British troops;
and it had none to spare.[1242] The Consul destined for Egypt, Mr.
Charles Lock, was instructed to be strictly neutral and to avail himself
of any influence which he might acquire for no other purpose than that
of endeavouring to remove the grounds of mutual dissatisfaction between
them (the Turks and the Beys) and of inspiring them with a just sense of
the benefits which each of them would derive from a permanent
reconciliation.[1243] Major Missett was informed of the departure of
Elfi and instructed to endeavour to promote a reconciliation.[1244] The
Bey was treated—as was proper—as “a distinguished stranger to whom the
common laws of hospitality extended.”[1245]
It has been deemed necessary to treat this point in detail, for upon it
have been made the wildest misstatements. Mengin, the historian who has
inspired all the later histories of Mehemet Ali, states that Elfi,
“séduit par les promesses des Anglais, était allé en Angleterre. Il
était depuis longtemps livré à eux sans réserve, suivit leurs impulsions
et n’écoutait que leurs conseils.”[1246] He gives an apocryphal account
of his relations with the British Government. The Bey was at first well-
received, then entirely neglected, but when the news of the entry of the
Mamelukes into Cairo reached London, Elfi suddenly returned to favour,
credits were opened to him, etc.[1247] As a matter of dates, the return
of the Beys to power took place in May and was known in London long
before Elfi reached it. As for the result of his visit, Mouriez, another
“authority,” speaks of a “traité secret qui lui (Britain) concédait
l’occupation des ports de la Méditerranée et de la mer Rouge au cas où
le Bey deviendrait chef suprême. Le ministère anglais poussait avec
vigueur la cause de son protégé auprès du Cabinet ottoman.”[1248]
Whatever might have been the excuse for these historians, none can be
pleaded for the “statement” of M. Charles Roux that “l’Angleterre
entretint les liaisons établies par ses généraux avec les Beys, parmi
lesquels elle chercha à constituer, autour d’Elfi, un parti
anglais.”[1249] The only thing that can be said is that M. Charles Roux
seems to have confined his researches in the British archives to the
years anterior to the visit of Elfi.
The conduct of the Bey on his return voyage was far from that of the
partisan which French writers make him out to have been. Sir Alexander
Ball, who saw him in Malta, reported him to be a “sad villain,” who
would prove an enemy of Britain. The Maltese interpreter of the Bey told
Ball that after King George had asked his various questions on Egypt,
the Bey observed to his followers that the “infidels” kept their eyes
always on his country and hoped that God would blind them. Elfi also
told them—among other absurdities—that the king offered to give him one
of his daughters in marriage, together with a substantial pension.[1250]
His idea was, probably, to impress them. To Hallowell, Captain of the
“Argo,” the ship that conveyed Elfi home, the Bey expressed his
determination to “fight any enemy that might attempt to possess
themselves of his country” and enforced his expressions by taking hold
of his hand between his teeth, saying thus “he would devour them.” He
did not believe that the French would make a second bid for the
possession of Egypt, and stated that he would be glad to encourage the
importation of English manufactures but never wished to see an English
soldier in the country.[1251]
British reports do not show that Elfi had greatly benefited from his
visit to London. The only net gain seemed to be his developing a
pronounced taste for milk-punch. He would order things, and then refuse
either to pay for or to receive them. He was unconsciously oblivious of
the fact that there were laws and that they had to be obeyed. “His
whims,” complained the harrassed Hallowell, “were as fickle as the wind
and he was only constant to his pipe.”[1252] Djabarti, on the other
hand, pictures an Elfi sobered by experience and struck by all that he
had seen in London—order, stability, prosperity, absence of begging, and
all this in spite of “infidelity.”[1253] The chronicler was rather
partial to Elfi, partly through detestation of Bardissy, and the
Albanians, and partly through common interest in astrology.
Elfi, at any rate, had not the chance of carrying out whatever he might
have intended. For, during his absence, his destruction had been planned
by Mehemet Ali and Bardissy. The latter could have given no greater
proof of utter blindness. He sent an agent to Ball to ask for help and
to prevent Elfi from returning to Egypt on the plea that he was secretly
corresponding with the French. Elfi met the agent in Malta and informed
him that he had a “promise” of 1500 British troops in the event of
Bardissy quarrelling with him, a statement which Hallowell denied in the
presence of both Bey and agent.[1254] It does not indicate great
enterprise that neither Missett nor Lesseps was acquainted with a plot
which was far from being a mystery.
Ball and Hallowell could not—obviously—fall in with Bardissy’s request.
Hallowell continued the voyage to Egypt, his intention being “to
conciliate the powers that be in Alexandria (whether Turk or Mameluke)
so as to put it in a posture of defence.”[1255] Arrived near Alexandria,
he advised the Bey not to land till he had heard from his people,[1256]
but Elfi refused to listen and disembarked on the 14th February, near
Abukir. Orders for putting him to death had already been despatched in
all directions. Elfi, however, managed to escape.[1257] Hearing of what
had happened to his late guest, Hallowell expressed his
satisfaction[1258]—not exactly the sentiment that should have been
entertained towards a tool in the hands of Britain.[1259]
Bardissy had thus dealt his own cause a fatal blow. He dispersed his
Mamelukes all over the country in hot pursuit of the Elfites and on
money collecting expeditions, while the Albanians were concentrated in
Cairo and even mounted guard on Bardissy’s house. Anarchy and exactions
were the order of the day. But the whole odium fell on Bardissy, for he
was the ostensible ruler and Mehemet Ali affected the _rôle_ of
moderator of Mameluke rigour. The inhabitants believed that the Bey was
solely responsible for their ills and made several hostile
demonstrations against him.[1260] In short, the Mamelukes committed
every conceivable error. Missett said that their rapacity had alienated
all hearts from them: they had, against his repeated advice, destroyed
or expelled the Janissaries of the town, whose friendship they should
have secured against the inconstancy of the Albanians, “but they
considered themselves as conducted by the hand of God to the
repossession of Egypt, and their good fortune had rendered them deaf to
the counsels of prudence and sound policy.”[1261] In March, 1804, when
the agitation had reached a climax, Mehemet Ali showed his hand. In a
few hours he was able to drive out the Mamelukes from Cairo, a city
which they were never to enter again as rulers.[1262]
Had M. Lesseps any share in this revolution?[1263] Had he discovered the
man of destiny in the person of Mehemet Ali, and, in the words of M.
Charles-Roux, “lia parti de bonne heure avec Mehemet Ali?”[1264] Here is
how the French Consul “signalled” the Albanian chief. In a despatch of 3
Ventôse XII (22nd February, 1804) he wrote, “Mehemet Ali, chef des
Arnautes, désire la protection de la France, et sa médiation auprès du
grand seigneur. Je puis vous assurer d’avance que son projet n’est plus
équivoque et qu’il veut s’emparer de l’autorité suprême; mais quoique ce
chef ne soit pas aussi féroce que ses semblables, qu’il nous paraisse
attaché, je ne crois qu’il ait le génie de concevoir un plan vaste et
les moyens pour l’exécuter.”[1265] The second point is, was Lesseps in a
position to engineer a revolution? He was not. The aim of his liaisons
with the Albanians was no other than to save himself and the Europeans.
“Mille faits particuliers,” he wrote on the 24th February, “me prouvent
que ma lutte contre l’oppression ne sert qu’à aiguiser les poignards
dirigés contre moi. Les sacrifices que j’ai faits pour me concilier les
chefs des Albanais m’ont sauvé jusqu’ici.”[1266] What were those
sacrifices? “Malheureusement je ne puis rien donner et l’Angleterre
prodigue l’or et les présents. Je fais en sorte de suppléer par mon
activité.”[1267] If Republican poverty prevented him from scattering
gold, Republican virtue did not scruple at the use of liquor. Speaking
of his presents, Lesseps wrote, “Je les fais consister en bagatelles, en
liqueurs principalement qui ne cessent de m’être demandés, surtout par
les chefs des troupes Albanaises.”[1268] He adds the significant phrase,
“Je dois me trouver heureux de les contenter à ce prix, quand à chaque
moment la ville est menacée de pillage et qu’on ne peut sortir sans
risques d’être atteint d’une balle ou d’un coup de yatagan.”[1269] Here
is Missett’s version of a highly original means of influence: “Lesseps,
to conciliate the friendship of the Albanians, did not blush to keep a
tavern in his own house, and, taking advantage of the fact that his
goods were exempt from customs, he undersold the other tavern keepers
and so got customers.”[1270]
The distribution of liquor, at all events, did not make Cairo safer for
Europeans. Missett had already left it in February, under the pretext of
arranging with Hallowell means for the defence of Alexandria.[1271]
Before the Mamelukes were expelled, Lesseps and the principal merchants
had to retire to Alexandria on account of the violent disturbances in
Cairo.[1272] Would he have done so when he had reason to remain with his
“creature,” Mehemet Ali? As a matter of fact, when the Albanian chief
informed Lesseps that “son union avec les Mameloukes ne pourrait être
sincère et durable et qu’il faudrait nécessairement en venir à un
éclat,” the French Consul tried “de l’engager à la patience.”[1273] And
it is quite consonant with this that it was probably Mehemet Ali who
advised Lesseps “à se retirer à Alexandrie pour se mettre à l’abri des
suites qu’elle (une révolution) pouvait avoir.”[1274]
The revolution took place, but Mehemet Ali did not immediately seize
power. He was careful, before doing that, to enter on the path of
legality by working again for the Porte and its representatives. He was,
moreover, affecting the part of a man trying to do his best for the
inhabitants and the troops, and had thus to avoid all appearance of
self-seeking. There were two eligible persons at his disposal. There was
still lingering in the country the deposed Khosrev, who was very anxious
to regain his place. He tried hard to win the favour of Mehemet Ali; and
Missett spoke of an unnatural alliance[1275] between them. Khosrev went
so far as to tell Missett that if the British obtained the viceroyalty
for him, he would be ready to demand the services of a British
force.[1276] But the pashalik was not in the disposition of Missett or
Lesseps. The real disposer of it seemed to favour for the moment the
candidature of Khosrev, but threw him overboard when he found the other
Albanian chiefs dead against Khosrev, whom they held to be responsible
for the murder of their old leader, Tahir.[1277] Mehemet Ali had
perforce to call in the other candidate, Khourshid, the Governor of
Alexandria, and install him as Pasha of Egypt.[1278] Major Missett was
not displeased; the pecuniary obligations conferred upon the new viceroy
by Mr. Briggs (merchant and vice-consul in Alexandria) and Missett’s own
exertions in the days when the Beys ruled in Cairo to procure for him
from them the situation of Pasha would, he trusted, prove of some
advantage to the interests of Great Britain in Egypt.”[1279] But the
Major forgot that these exertions were by now old history. He was soon
mortified to find the new viceroy “a pageant in Mehemet Ali’s
hands.”[1280] Khourshid’s programme was to dismiss the Albanians.[1281]
But even Missett could see that “since the expulsion of the Mamelukes
the Albanians were without control and would spread devastation far and
wide; that they had amassed great wealth and might prefer the mild
climate of Egypt to the rude mountains of Albania.”[1282] The
mercenaries and their leader had now become the chief factor in the
situation. Missett resolved from the outset to have nothing to do with
them, but to pin all his faith on that shattered reed, the Mamelukes in
general and Elfi in particular. It is difficult to explain such
obstinacy in backing the wrong horse. Was it because Mehemet Ali was “a
man devoid of every principle of honour,” “that whatever government paid
him best (as he himself told Missett) should command his
services”?[1283] But surely Missett knew very well that the Beys were
neither more honourable nor more prepared to sell their services in the
cheapest market.[1284] Or was it because Mehemet Ali had sold himself to
France?[1285] But Missett was fully aware of the intrigues of French
agents with the Beys and of the desire of Bardissy to gain the chief
authority through French help.[1284] It does not seem, it is true, that
he was a capable person. His French colleague wrote of him, “l’histoire
de toutes ses intrigues passées me prouve que c’est un homme qui, avec
d’excellentes qualités de société, n’est qu’un médiocre politique. Il ne
sait ni combiner un plan avec justesse ni conduire celui qui lui serait
suggéré à son exécution.”[1286] But this is not the whole truth.
Missett’s object was to see the British occupy Egypt, and his belief
was—whether rightly or not—that this was not possible except with the
Beys in power.[1287] He endeavoured therefore to do the greatest harm he
could to Mehemet Ali. But his capacity for mischief was not great. It
did not extend beyond transmitting to Constantinople petitions from Elfi
for pardon and favour,[1288] persuading Khourshid—who hardly needed
it—to prevail on the Divan to appoint Mehemet Ali to the pashalik of
Salonika;[1289] attempting to reconcile the Viceroy with the Beys, etc.
It is thus true, that, in the words of M. Charles-Roux, “la politique
britannique (or, rather, ‘la politique Missett’) fut mal inspirée et
malheureuse.”[1290] But was it true, as the same writer alleges, that
“la France . . . voyait avec faveur monter l’étoile de Méhemet Ali et
cultivait les grâces du maître de demain.”[1291] In the first place, we
have not been able to discover that M. Brune or Sebastiani ever
made—during their embassies—any move in favour of the Albanian. In the
second place, M. Lesseps left Egypt in November, 1804, some months
before Mehemet Ali became _de facto_ Viceroy. Before he returned to
France, the Albanian rather fell than rose in his estimation. His
exactions from two French protégés led Lesseps to reflect “que sa
conduite me fait voir que l’intérêt est le principal mobile de ses
actions.”[1292] What was more important was that the first and last
pronouncement made by Napoleon was in favour of the Mamelukes and not in
that of the “maître de demain.” In June, 1804, there arrived in Egypt
one Framery, with instructions to Lesseps to sound the Beys on the
nature of the help of which they were in need.[1293] Lesseps did so
through Joseph Duclos, one of these Frenchmen who remained in Egypt
after the evacuation. Bardissy said he wanted 3,000 men, 5,000 rifles,
10 field-pieces, 5 mortars, 1,000 sabres and a loan of two millions;
Damietta was chosen for the disembarkation.[1294] No more was heard of
this affair.
Mehemet Ali saw clearly that neither Missett nor Lesseps could do
anything for or against him. He had recourse to new allies, the sheikhs
and inhabitants of Cairo. It was a stroke of genius to discover a source
of strength in the “Contemptibles,” whom the Turks and the Beys agreed
in kicking and fleecing. “Il se rapprochait secrètement de Seyid
Omar—one of the most prominent of the Sheikhs of Cairo—le flattait et
allait souvent chez lui, quelquefois même au milieu de la nuit, il lui
promettait et jurait faussement que s’il était nommé à la tête du
gouvernement de l’Egypte il se conduirait avec justice, ferait respecter
les lois, exécuter les jugements, qu’il ne ferait rien sans prendre son
avis et celui des ulemas. Il ajoutait qu’il consentait à être destitué
et renvoyé du pays s’il venait à manquer à ses engagements, il insinuait
à Omar qu’il était ainsi que les autres ulemas assez puissants pour le
renverser puisqu’ils agissaient de la sorte avec le gouvernement
actuel.”[1295] This was one of his methods. The other was corruption. He
wrote his banker in Constantinople to spare no expense to get the
pashalik for himself.[1296]
It was only despair that forced the sheikhs and the inhabitants to take
up arms.[1297] “La faim fait sortir le loup du bois,” wrote a Frenchman
present on the scene.[1298] The insurrection broke out on the arrival of
a new body of troops from Syria, known as the “Delis,” or “madmen,” and
notorious even in Turkey for their misdeeds. Khourshid had called them
to his aid to crush the Albanians, but they were soon won over to the
cause of Mehemet Ali and their presence only served to exasperate the
Egyptians. The Cairenes rose under Omar and demanded the deposition of
Kourshid. The Turk contemptuously refused to abdicate, declaring that he
was Pasha by order of the Grand Signior and would not relinquish his
position at the demand of the “fellaheen.” The Pasha was promptly
declared deposed, was besieged in his palace, and Mehemet Ali allowed
himself to be elected governor pending the pleasure of the Sultan.[1299]
The scene in Cairo reminded Frenchmen of the enthusiasm which reigned in
France in the early moments of the Revolution.[1300] They saw the
Sheikhs going about in arms, “chose extraordinaire pour des ministres de
l’islamisme.”[1301] To the Spanish traveller, Ali Bey, who was in Cairo
in 1806, Egypt presented the spectacle of “Une république aristocratique
courbée sous le fer du despotisme militaire.”[1302] Seyid Omar even
expressed a theory of insurrection. An officer of the besieged Khourshid
asked him, “Comment avez-vous pu révoquer celui que le Sultan avait
nommé? Dieu n’a-t-il pas dit, ‘Obéissez à Dieu, au Prophète et à ceux
qui vous gouvernent?’” To which Omar replied, “Par ceux qui gouvernent
il faut entendre les ulemas et le sultan quand il est juste. Or, le
Pasha est injuste et depuis des temps fort anciens on a vu le peuple
déposer ses gouvernants. Il en serait également du même du Khalife et du
sultan, s’ils ne suivent pas le bon chemin.”[1303] But we should not
make too much of this. The Sheikhs would have preferred a British or a
French army to do the work for them,[1304] and as soon as Mehemet Ali
was confirmed by the Sultan (July, 1805) they declared their
intervention in politics to be at an end and resumed their teaching in
the University.[1305]
Had the foreign agents any hand in the insurrection? As for Missett, his
enmity to the new Viceroy was unquestionable. With regard to France, M.
Drovetti, the vice-consul and head of the establishment after the
departure of Lesseps, was in Alexandria all the time. He could not but
be struck with the personality of Mehemet Ali. “Toutes ses manèges,” he
wrote his agent in Cairo, Mengin, the future historian, “ressentent
l’homme machiavélique et commencent à me faire croire qu’il a réellement
plus du bon sens que les Turcs en général.”[1306] He instructed him to
probe the Pasha’s intentions and to prevent an understanding between him
and Elfi, whom he considered to be an English tool,[1307] and cautioned
him to be careful in his language till the judgment of the Porte on the
events was known.[1308] This was all the “favour” to Mehemet Ali’s
ambition! The measure of France’s influence is found in an injunction to
Mengin to place the French protégés under the protection of the sheikhs
of Cairo. “C’est avec eux,” Drovetti wrote, “mon cher, que dans les
circonstances actuelles il faut que vous cémentiez les liaisons les plus
intimes qu’il sera possible.” If Mengin should find them desirous of
restoring the Mamelukes he should recommend them to appoint Solyman Bey
and do all he could against Bardissy or Elfi.[1309] Drovetti’s
application for instructions received the reply, drafted by Napoleon
himself, that commercial agents had nothing to do with politics, that
their conduct should be governed by two rules, “ne reconnaître
d’autorité que lorsque la victoire a décidé du sort de pays, quelles que
soient les révolutions ne jamais quitter son poste.”[1310]
Drovetti obeyed and his quietness was in singular contrast to the
febrile activity of Missett. He persuaded the Turkish governor and the
notables of Alexandria to refuse the admission of an Albanian garrison
into that town. He wrote Mr. Arbuthnot in Constantinople that every
impartial man agreed with Elfi’s assertion that there could be no
tranquillity without the restoration of the Mamelukes. There were two
obstacles, the irreconcilable enmity of Bardissy to Elfi and the
presence of the Albanians. “If the Turkish government, guided by
liberality and political wisdom, would apply to His Majesty’s Government
for a few regiments to be stationed at Alexandria, and if the request
was granted, Egypt would soon rejoice in her deliverance from her
oppressors.”[1311] If the Porte did not consent, it should proclaim the
Mamelukes the lawful governors of Egypt and incite the Ulemas and people
against the Albanians.[1312] The occasion for this communication was the
mission of two agents of Elfi to Constantinople with the object of
restoring the Mamelukes through British mediation.[1313] The scheme
originated in the Porte and had no other object than setting the
Mamelukes against the new Pasha and obtaining funds from both
parties.[1314] Arbuthnot consented to mediate only if the Porte applied
to him. The Porte refused and the Ambassador washed his hands of the
whole affair.[1315] The Turkish ministers, however, agreed with Elfi’s
agents on the sum of 1,500 purses to be equally divided between Elfi,
Bardissy and Ibrahim. Mehemet Ali was to be replaced by Moussa
Pasha.[1316] The Capitan Pasha sailed to Alexandria with one sail of the
line and six frigates and corvettes to enforce the new arrangement. This
is the authentic version of the episode. Mengin writes, “On s’occupait à
Londres de rendre sa (Elfi’s) maison la souveraine de l’Egypte, on
agissait pour lui à Constantinople, l’ambassadeur britannique employait
tout son crédit pour y parvenir, il avait remis au Reis Effendi
plusieurs notes.”[1317] The eminent historian of Napoleon’s diplomacy,
M. Driault, states, “le gouvernement anglais soutenait avec d’importants
subsides l’un d’entre’eux (Beys), Elfi, il pensât en faire le maître de
l’Egypte, pour y régner sous son nom, il combattait de tout son pouvoir
l’autorité croissante de Méhemet Ali, il cherchait à exciter les
défiances de la Porte à son égard, il s’offrait au sultan pour rétablir
l’ordre en Egypte gracieusement. Il traçait en somme les premiers traits
d’une politique qui lui devait réussir quatre vingt ans plus
tard.”[1318] Elsewhere he speaks of the rivalry between Mehemet Ali and
Elfi as “une des formes de la lutte des influences françaises et
anglaises.”[1319] Even Missett did not desire any special privileges for
Elfi apart from the other Beys.[1320]
The Capitan Pasha arrived in August, 1806. His conduct immediately
proved that he was going to hold an auction for the disposal of the
pashalik. Elfi sent in his presents[1321] but could not persuade his
rival Beys to send in their quota of the price.[1322] He failed even to
impress the Turks with his military power, for he could not even carry a
miserably fortified village.[1323] Mehemet Ali displayed in the crisis
all the resources of his genius. He got up[1324] petitions from the
notables and sheikhs against his transference elsewhere. He began to
repair the fortifications and received an oath of allegiance from the
Albanians.[1325] But he knew the Turk. He outbid Elfi. The Capitan Pasha
sailed home and Mehemet Ali was reconfirmed in September, 1806. In the
same month Bardissy died and Elfi’s hopes in undisputed sway revived. He
made a new request for British mediation. Arbuthnot refused to listen
and directed Missett to take as little share as possible in the civil
dissensions in Egypt.[1326] The Ambassador laid it down as certain “that
no faith should ever be placed in Elfi or in the other Beys . . . that
the Porte would under no circumstances consent to our mediation . . .
that it could not have been the desire of the Porte to see the French
remain in Egypt, but it was a choice of evils to see them driven out by
the English.”[1327] Elfi turned to Missett for mediation with the
Viceroy, but his terms were deemed unreasonable even by Missett.[1328]
The British Agent, however, thought it clever to protract the
negotiations in order to keep Elfi’s forces in Lower Egypt as long as
possible, judging that they might prove useful in the event of a British
invasion.[1329] Elfi, however, was not destined to witness it. He died
in January, 1807. “Tout est fini, l’Egypte reste à Mehemet Ali, car
personne n’osera plus la lui contester. Il commandera les Mameloukes et
le drapeau de ceux-ci ne se verra plus” were his last words.[1330]
[Footnote 1171: See Chap. XI.]
[Footnote 1172: Rapport de Sebastiani (original version). Arch. Nat.
AF., IV, 1687.]
[Footnote 1173: As to the misdeeds of the soldiers:
Djabarti, VII, pp. 43, 45, 46, 59, 63, 64, 126, 127, 155; and Hamilton,
_Ægyptiaca_, pp. 14-15, 337, 338, 371-2; and _A non-military Journal_
(Anonymous), p. 37.]
[Footnote 1174: Djabarti, VII, p. 241.]
[Footnote 1175: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 252 note. Djabarti, VII, p.
241.]
[Footnote 1176: Missett to Hobart, 25th Aug., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1177: Lesseps to Jaubert, 1 brumaire, XII (23 Oct., 1803).
Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.]
[Footnote 1178: Wilson, _History of the British Expedition_, p. 246.]
[Footnote 1179: (Il ne faut pas) “que les gens sages prennent tant de
peines à construire ce qui est destiné à être détruit.” Djabarti, VIII,
p. 61.]
[Footnote 1180: Cf. Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 31. There is a story of a
“Sheikh” being taken round the laboratories of the French Institute. He
was not evidently impressed and when he was told, in answer to his
question, that “science” could not enable him to be in two places at the
same time, remarked that it was then of no use.]
[Footnote 1181: De Noe, _Mémoires_, p. 200, and “Ali Bey,” _Travels_,
II, p. 65, among others confirm the contrary view.]
[Footnote 1182: Hamilton to Elgin, 2nd July, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36.
Extracts of this highly interesting memorandum have been published by
Dr. Rose in his _Napoleonic Studies_.]
[Footnote 1183: Djabarti thought that expulsion of the French by the
British was a proof of the “mérite de la religion musulmane,” VII, p.
109.]
[Footnote 1184: Cf. _Non-military Journal_ (Anonymous), pp. 96-7.]
[Footnote 1185: Speaking of the year 1217 H. (May, 1802, to May, 1803),
Djabarti adds, “On regrettait alors la domination des Français,” VII, p.
155.
Lesseps to Jaubert, 27 fructidor XII (13th Sept., 1804) . . . “jusqu’à
présent le ciel a été inexorable. . . .” Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.]
[Footnote 1186: The “library” of a “savant” consisted of the following
(all MSS.): 12 exemplaires du Koran — Chroniques d’Iben Isaac — Traité
de l’amour par Ali fils d’Ali Fakhreddine — Poèmes et Chansons —
“curiosités historiques” — Formules des contrats du marriage et des
divorces — “Artifices nombreuses dont usent les femmes en matière
d’amour” — faits historiques et poetiques — Style épistolaire avec des
modèles. _Courier_ [_sic_] _d’Egypte_, No. 116, 20 prairial IX.]
[Footnote 1187: Cf. the views of Elfi as to old monuments in Hamilton,
_Ægyptiaca_, p. 29.]
[Footnote 1188: Lascaris de Vintmilli was an ex-knight of Malta who
called himself secretary to the Egyptian Delegation. Their memoranda to
the British Government are found in F.O. Turkey, 33, and to Bonaparte in
Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, 203.]
[Footnote 1189: Petition of the Egyptian Refugees. Arch. Aff. Et.
Turquie, Supplements, 31.]
[Footnote 1190: Wilson, _History of the British Expedition_, p. 243.]
[Footnote 1191: As to the purpose of the visit of this American, whose
name is not disclosed, see Mengin, _L’Egypte sous Mehemet Ali_, I, pp.
140-1. It was to demand the liberation of the brother of the Bey of
Algiers, Parandier to Talleyrand, 18 pluviôse XIII (6th Feb., 1805).
Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.]
[Footnote 1192: An American Gentleman to Sir Alex. Ball, 13 Dec., 1804.
B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 86.]
[Footnote 1193: “Note Officielle,” 20 Jan., 1802, enclosed in Elgin’s
despatch, 28 Jan., F.O. Turkey, 35.]
[Footnote 1194: Viscount Valentia (Earl Mountmorris), _Travels_, III,
pp. 368, 369. “Ali Bey,” _Travels_, II, p. 236. Both of them saw Mehemet
Ali in 1806.]
[Footnote 1195: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1196: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1197: Djabarti, very hostile to Mehemet Ali, attributes the
mutiny in 1803 to his intrigues.]
[Footnote 1198: Djabarti, VII, p. 173, and Missett to Hobart, 8 May,
1803. W.O. 1, 346. The affair began on 29 April and ended on 2 May,
1803.]
[Footnote 1199: Djabarti, VII, pp. 180-1.]
[Footnote 1200: Djabarti, VII, p. 180. and Missett to Hobart 2 June,
1803. W.O. 1, Vol. 346.]
[Footnote 1201: There was in Cairo one Ahmed Pasha, who was on his way
to take the government of Medina in the Hedjaz. He attempted to succeed
Tahir and wait the confirmation of the Porte, but was set aside by
Mehemet Ali. Djabarti, VII, pp. 182-5.]
[Footnote 1202: Missett to Hobart, 18 Nov., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1203: Missett to Hobart, 8 July, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1204: He himself states, “My position was critical; I do not
know how to treat Tahir—as a rebel or as a faithful subject.” Missett to
Hobart, 8 May, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.
Ball to [_sic_], Malta, 27 Dec., 1805, referring to the action of
Missett, “Our conduct in Egypt most inconsistent.” B.M. Add. MSS. 37268,
f. 90.]
[Footnote 1205: Hayes to Hobart, 20 May, 1803. W.O. 1, 346. stating that
he thus acted on the authority of Missett.]
[Footnote 1206: The “firman” arrived on 17th Nov., 1803. Missett to
Hobart, 18 Nov., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1207: Briggs to Hawkesbury, 10th Dec., 1803. F.O. Egypt, 2.]
[Footnote 1208: Missett to Hobart, 15 Dec., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1209: Missett to Hobart, 4 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1210: Bridier, _Une Famille Française_, p. 156.]
[Footnote 1211: Instructions to Lesseps, 1 germinal X. Arch. Aff. Et.,
Corresp. Consulaire, 26, Le Caire. It may be noted that the name of
Lesseps is invariably used without the “de.”]
[Footnote 1212: Lesseps to Brune, 23 prairial XI (11 June, 1803). Arch.
Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 206. This act drew on Lesseps a sharp
reproof from Talleyrand. The Minister thought it quite unnecessary to
show the Pasha the letters of Bardissy and repeated his injunctions as
to “circumspection.” Talleyrand to Lesseps, 3 vendémiaire XII (25 Sept.,
1803). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Supplements 23.]
[Footnote 1213: Lesseps to Jaubert (“bulletin”), fructidor XI (18
Aug.,-17 Sept.), 18 thermidor XI (6 Aug., 1803). Arch. Nat. AF., IV,
1687.]
[Footnote 1214: Djabarti, VII, p. 213.]
[Footnote 1215: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1216: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1217: Missett to Hobart, 25 Aug., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1218: _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 28 Oct., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1219: The memorandum was “discovered” by Mortier in Hanover,
and sent to Napoleon. The general had thus no knowledge of it in 1798.
It was published by his orders in 1803. _The Gentleman’s Magazine_ for
October, 1803, gives long excerpts and concludes with a justification
for the retention of Malta, pp. 943-8. Sir A. Ball, in a letter to
George Penn, thanks him for the copy he had sent him and informs him
that it would be translated into Italian and circulated. 1 Nov., 1803.
B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 56.]
[Footnote 1220: Memorandum dated 27 Oct., 1803. B.M Add. MSS. 37268, f.
51.]
[Footnote 1221: Lock to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2.]
[Footnote 1222: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1223: Ball to Missett, 15 Dec., 1803. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f.
65; and Taberna to Stuart, 6 Nov., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1224: Ball to Missett, 15 Dec., 1803. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f.
65.]
[Footnote 1225: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 1 brumaire XII (23 Oct., 1803).
Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.]
[Footnote 1226: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 3 jour complémentaire XI (19
Sept. 1803). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.]
[Footnote 1227: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1228: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1229: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 10 frimaire, XII (1 Dec., 1803).
Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.]
[Footnote 1230: Missett to Hobart, 11 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1231: Hawkesbury to Drummond, 18 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.]
[Footnote 1232: Ball to Penn, 25 July, 1803. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f.
47.]
[Footnote 1233: Taberna to Ball (in Italian), 28 Feb., 1804. B.M. Add.
MSS. 37268, f. 84. Missett to Hobart, 18 Oct., 1803. W.O. 1, 34.]
[Footnote 1234: _Gentleman’s Magazine_, Oct., 1803, p. 972. It gives
this description. Elfi had a suite of 17, drank two bottles of champagne
or Burgundy after dinner, fascinated with everything, especially with
the ladies.]
[Footnote 1235: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 11 July, 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.]
[Footnote 1236: Sir G. C. Braithwaite Boughton to Sullivan, 17 Oct.,
1803. W.O. 1, 347, describing Elfi’s anxiety to meet someone in
authority.]
[Footnote 1237: Hawkesbury to Drummond, 18 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.]
[Footnote 1238: B.M. Add. MSS. 34921, f. 371. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1239: Stuart to Sullivan, 26 Oct., 1803. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1240: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 25 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.]
[Footnote 1241: Hawkesbury to Drummond, 20 Dec., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.]
[Footnote 1242: General Villetes, the Commander in Malta, so told Mr.
Lock. Lock to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2.]
[Footnote 1243: Instructions to Lock, 30 Jan., 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2. Mr.
Lock went to Constantinople to get an invitation for a British force
(Chap. XI). He died before reaching Egypt.]
[Footnote 1244: 20 Dec., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.]
[Footnote 1245: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 11 July, 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.
Cf. in _The Times_ of 9 Dec., 1803, a description of Elfi’s visit to
India House.]
[Footnote 1246: Mengin, _L’Egypte sous Mehemet Ali_, I, p. 25.]
[Footnote 1247: _Ibid._, I, p. 80.]
[Footnote 1248: Mouriez, _Histoire du Méhemet Ali_, I, p. 242.]
[Footnote 1249: _Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes_, Sept.-Oct., 1923, p.
97.]
[Footnote 1250: Ball to Penn, 23 Feb., 1804. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f.
78.]
[Footnote 1251: Hallowell to Marsden, 7 May, 1804. Enclosing copies of
letters to Nelson, 16 March, 1804. Ad. I, 1929. The originals in B.M.
Add. MSS. 34922, ff. 200, 310, 311.]
[Footnote 1252: See “copies” of letters from Hallowell transmitted to
the War Office, 20 Dec., 31 Dec., 1803, 3 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.
Hallowell to Marsden, 21 Dec., 1803. Ad. I, 1927, 25 Jan., 1804. Ad. I,
1929.]
[Footnote 1253: Djabarti, VIII, pp. 86-8.]
[Footnote 1254: Hallowell to St. Vincent, 3 Feb., 1804. Transmitted to
War Office. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1255: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1256: Hallowell to Nelson, 16 March, 1804, sent to Marsden, 7
May, 1804. Ad. I, 1929.]
[Footnote 1257: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1258: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1259: Even Missett was not perturbed for long at the fate of
Elfi. He at first protested to Bardissy (Missett to Hobart, 22 Feb.,
1804. W.O. 1, 347), but soon reported his intention to proceed to Cairo
to exploit the “friendly dispositions” of Bardissy. (Missett to Hobart,
6 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.)]
[Footnote 1260: Djabarti, VII, pp. 278 and 275.]
[Footnote 1261: Missett to Hobart, 18 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1262: _Ibid._, 16 March, 1804. W.O., 347.]
[Footnote 1263: Missett to Hobart, 29 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347. “It is
now known that Lesseps promised Mehemet Ali and Ahmed (another Albanian
chief) £30,000 to expel the Mamelukes.”
Missett to Hobart, 13 May, 1804. W.O. 1, 347. “I conveyed to Bardissy
that Lesseps had instigated the Albanians against them.” Missett to
Hobart, 21 May, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.]
[Footnote 1264: _Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes_, Sept.-Oct., 1925, p.
97.]
[Footnote 1265: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 3 ventôse, XII (22 Feb., 1804).
Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.