THE NEAR-EASTERN FACTOR IN THE RENEWAL OF THE SECOND COALITION,
1802-1805
“On me croit fou, inconséquent, mais je sais ce qu’il y a à faire mieux
que ceux qui me jugent,” once observed the First Consul to Morkoff, the
Russian envoy,[1038] and no account of his career can be true which does
not credit him with some intelligible motive for his actions. Talleyrand
at one time attributed the “incoherences” of his master to a mind
inclined to complete derangement.”[1039] But “it is impossible to
believe that the ‘most splendid genius’ that has appeared on earth, as
Acton declares him to have been, was the sport alternately of tumultuous
passions, of wild and unreasoning ambition, and of a ‘vice of nature,’
which drove him against his better judgment into disastrous
courses.”[1040] If this be so, where is the elusive “secret de
l’Empereur” to be sought? Is it to be sought in “universal dominion,” in
the consummation of the diplomacy of Richelieu and Louis XIV, or in the
Empire of the East? Napoleon has never revealed his secret. One thing is
certain: he never intended the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. It
is true that on innumerable occasions he dangled the alluring prize
before covetous eyes; but it was always done with an immediate—and
different—object in view, as a tactical move in the diplomatic game.
“Cette idée de partager la Turquie qui flotte en l’air, il s’en saisit
et la formule, non pour la réaliser . . . mais pour en faire, selon les
cas, un appât ou un épouvantail.”[1041]
It was to prevent the coalition from coming into being while he was
consolidating his power in Switzerland, Holland and Italy that he sent
“feelers” in the direction of Vienna and St. Petersburg in the years
1801 and 1802. The diplomatic reports are full of his “designs” and his
“concerts”—sometimes with Austria, sometimes with Russia, and sometimes
with both.[1042] They were never definite.[1043] When the Austrians
talked of the “paucity” of the “compensations” they had received in
Germany, Talleyrand was often in the habit of “consoling” them “en
faisant entrevoir la perspective d’acquisitions à faire sur la Turquie
au moment de sa prochaine destruction.”[1044] Both the First Consul and
his Minister broached the subject with the Russian Morkoff on many
occasions.[1045] But no definite proposals were ever made: the First
Consul only expatiated on the impending ruin of the Turkish Empire,
while Talleyrand simply expressed an ardent desire to “share with Russia
all dangers, glories and advantages.”[1046]
Neither the Court of Vienna nor that of St. Petersburg allowed itself to
be drawn into a discussion. Austrian diplomacy adopted a policy to which
it kept throughout the Napoleonic epoch. It refused to turn from the
West—Italy and Germany—to the East. The policy of Austria is well
illustrated in the instructions from Francis to Phillippe de Cobenzl,
his ambassador in Paris, dated the 31st March, 1801. The Emperor
believed that the First Consul only aimed at frightening the Turks into
a separate peace and at “embroiling” the powers so as to leave the coast
clear for himself. On the supposition of Russia, France and Austria
agreeing upon some scheme of partition, Prussia was sure to demand and
receive some compensation, probably the bishoprics of Münster and
Hildesheim. These alone “would be more useful to her than three great
Turkish provinces to Austria.” The probable share of the Hapsburgs in
the Ottoman spoils, moreover, would be in mountainous territories
inhabited by a warlike and fanatical population. The Emperor feared that
the story would prove to be a repetition of that of the partition of
Poland, into which Austria “had been forced and duped.” But, like Maria
Theresa, who “wept, but took all the same,” Francis ordered his
ambassador to try—in the impossibility of “averting the storm”—to have a
“peaceful execution of the design” and prevent Prussia from “making
mischief” while the powers were occupied.[1047] Russia also refused to
respond.[1048] Was this a French defeat? It was not, for all that
Napoleon wanted was to sow distrust; and in this he amply
succeeded.[1049] His real Eastern policy is to be found in his
instructions to the new Ambassador in Constantinople. General Brune was
chosen for his “caractère entreprenant et militaire,”[1050] qualities
which, in British eyes, “rendered him an extremely dangerous person in
the situation to which he had been appointed.”[1051] “The intention of
the government,” so he was instructed, “was that he should regain, by
every possible means, the dominance which France had been enjoying in
Constantinople for two hundred years.” He was to “fix on himself” all
regards, show great respect to Turkish usages, illuminate his palace on
the anniversary of the Prophet, acquire exclusive protection over all
the Christians of Syria, Armenia and the Holy Places, send accurate
information on the provinces, and procure every possible advantage for
French commerce. These were declared to be the present objects of French
diplomacy, as Turkey was not in a position to act against Austria as
heretofore.[1052]
Great Britain was deeply perturbed at the preponderant position acquired
by France. The Prime Minister, Addington, was, apparently, inclined to
favour the establishment of Napoleon’s rule on a hereditary basis, but
declared his opposition to the expansion of France.[1053] It would be
wrong, however, to ascribe this opposition to any particular action on
the part of France, or to mark its beginning at any particular date.
Every act of the First Consul was scrutinised with great suspicion, and
every one of his innumerable “gestures” was met by a chorus of mingled
abuse and lamentation. Never was there a more melancholy illustration of
the fragility of the most solemn covenants when the “will to peace” was
absent, and of the evils of “seeing red.”
This unfortunate state of affairs arose mainly out of anxiety for the
safety of the Turkish provinces and of the avowed determination of
Napoleon to allow Great Britain no voice in the affairs of the
Continent. By the side of these two great issues, the unworthy press
campaign; the squabble over the indemnities due to war-sufferers and the
commercial arrangements fade into insignificance.[1054]
The reports of Merry and Whitworth were never lacking in the ascribing
of some design or other on Egypt and the Morea.[1055] Sebastiani was
stated to have “regular powers” to treat with Ibrahim Bey for a rising
in Egypt that would place the country in the power of France. To gain
this object, he was accompanied by the interpreter Jaubert and “armed”
with offers of men and money.[1056] The British Cabinet would have
preferred a “union of the continental powers for the defence of the
East”[1057] to a violation of the Treaty of Amiens by keeping Malta. On
the 27th October, 1802, Hawkesbury wrote to Admiral Warren, the
Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to propose to the Russian Government an
“alliance” between the two countries, to which Austria should accede,
“to counterbalance the upsetting of the European system by
France.”[1058] The Russians at first asked for time to reflect and then
declared the overture to be “premature.”[1059] Hawkesbury, however,
returned to the charge. He asked this time if “it was possible to enter
into a Treaty or convention of a more limited nature by a formal
engagement, either public or secret, to provide for the security and
integrity of Turkey.”[1060] “One advantage of this would be that the
representatives of both countries would act at once when they scented
danger without reference to London or St. Petersburg.” The[1061]
Russians were also informed that the best security for them was in the
weakness, indolence and inactivity of the Turks.”[1062] The Government
of the Tsar again “turned down” this proposal. “Je ne vous cacherai
pas,” declared the Vice-Chancellor, A. Vorontsoff, in a “note verbale”
to Warren, “que nous ne croyons pas encore le danger si prochain et par
conséquent qu’il soit utile dans ce moment pour le bien général des
affaires d’en faire un objet de négociations particulières ou de
convenir des mesures qu’il y aurait à prendre.”[1063] Under these
circumstances, the “doctor”—as Addington was called—gathered all his
courage and decided not to evacuate Malta, in violation of the letter of
the treaty. His courage, however, did not rise to countermanding the
orders of November, 1802,[1064] for the withdrawal from Egypt.
The occasion on which this determination with regard to Malta was made
known was no other than the publication in the _Moniteur_ of the anti-
British portions of Sebastiani’s Report. The publication was the
occasion and not the cause of that determination. It was “seized upon”
in order to clear a situation which the hesitation of a weak
administration had allowed to arise. The Cabinet, therefore, “determined
to notice it and to draw from it an occasion to get at—if
possible—Bonaparte’s views and explain its own concerning Malta.”[1065]
“Le cour de Londres,” Whitworth informed Morkoff, “étant trop convaincu
des vastes projets que l’ambition insatiable de Bonaparte lui suggérait,
était déterminé à saisir le moment actuel pour y mettre des bornes
plutôt que de le différer plus longtemps.”[1066] The Government was now
satisfied that “innumerable examples had proved the insufficiency and
fragility” of “international guarantees.”[1067] When
Talleyrand—sincerely pacific[1068]—tried to explain away the
significance of the Report, Whitworth “was glad of this opportunity to
prepare the French Government for the difficulties in the accomplishment
of its wishes which he hoped and trusted it would experience.”[1069]
Napoleon proved obdurate. He refused every concession and declared he
would rather see the British encamped on the heights of Montmartre than
acquiesce in their retaining Malta. Two days after Talleyrand had tried
to “calm” the British Ambassador, the First Consul “avowed” to the
latter his designs on Egypt.[1070] His minister in London held to the
formula: “Tout le Traité d’Amiens et rien que le Traité,” to which
Hawkesbury retorted: “L’Etat du continent tel qu’il était alors et rien
que cet état!”[1071] The Prussian Minister in Paris, Lucchesini, wrote
on 13th May, 1803, “Le général Bonaparte a provoqué la guerre le jour où
il a prétendu exclure l’Angleterre des affaires du Continent.”[1072] It
would be impossible, indeed, to expect a British Government to renounce
the right to interfere in the affairs of the Continent whenever its
interests dictated such interference. “This right His Majesty possesses
in common with every other independent power; it rests upon general
principles and does not require the confirmation of any particular
treaty.”[1073] Under these circumstances, nothing but war could be the
outcome.
The outbreak of war between Britain and France coincided with a
“revival” in Russian policy. There is some exaggeration, however, in the
statement of the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikailovitch that “jusqu’à Tilsit,
tout se fait à l’aveuglette, au hasard des impressions de l’heure et
sans aucun système.”[1074] The aloofness of Russia was partly due to a
sincere desire to concentrate attention on domestic reform, to
hesitation among conflicting systems, and to consciousness of the
weakness of the Addington ministry[1075] and the incapacity of the
British Ambassador. Joseph de Maistre once observed that Warren “était
fait pour cette mission précisément comme moi pour conduire son
vaisseau. . . .”[1076] Gambling ruined the worthy admiral. “That was his
affair,” “mais . . . entièrement occupé de ses intérêts et très peu de
ceux de l’Angleterre, il jouit depuis le matin jusqu’au soir, et du soir
jusqu’au matin et laissait cheminer les affaires comme il plaisait à
Dieu.”[1077]
The advent of Prince Adam Czartoryski to power, however, marked the
commencement of a more active policy. The object of this Polish
statesman was to “reconcile the national interests of Russia and the
craving of the Tsar for glory with the interests of mankind.”[1078] The
“interests of mankind,” in this connection, mean the restoration of the
Polish nation, and the liberation of the Slavs. His “system” made
“opposition” to Napoleon inevitable. “It was useless to attempt
friendship with that potentate: his ally had either to carry out his
plans or become his enemy.”[1079] It also made inevitable the
destruction of the Turkish Empire. Czartoryski, apparently, did not
think his projects to be capable of immediate realisation, they had to
be carried out “slowly and consistently.”[1080]
It was early in 1803 that the Tsar sorrowfully recognised “qu’il ne
dépend pas de nous seuls de rester pacifiques.”[1081] This being so, it
was as well to see identity of views between Russia and Britain. But he
was anxious to find out if the latter country “did not consider the ruin
of Turkey to be impending,” and what line of action she was going to
take “in the different suppositions which could be formed on that
subject.”[1082] Towards the end of the year, the question of Turkey
occupied the attention of the Government more and more.[1083] Warren had
the time to notice that “an improvement” had taken place in the language
of Czartoryski,[1084] and that the information as to the “designs” of
France became more and more convincing.[1085] In November, 1803, the
Russian Government presented officially one item, at any rate, of its
programme; it was, this time, the concerting of measures for the defence
of Turkey.[1086] Czartoryski hoped that the British agents at Corfu
would be supplied with money to “support” the Greeks and that a frigate
would be stationed in the Adriatic. The Russians themselves were
beginning to act on these principles: the Russian garrison at Corfu was
to be reinforced and “connections” with the Christian subjects of the
Sultan[1087] were to be commenced.
That this was not the whole design is clear from an interesting
memorandum of Prince Adam to the Tsar. The Minister observed “que vu
l’esprit du gouvernement anglais et sa politique fondée sur ses intérêts
. . . il pense que l’on pourra . . . sur cet objet (chute de la Turquie)
facilement s’entendre soit à present, soit plus tard . . . avec le cour
de Londres qui probablement s’y prêtera plus aisément qu’aucun autre
gouvernement quelconque et acquiescera sans peine à un arrangement
éventuel avec nous, par lequel les deux gouvernements se garantiront, en
cas de l’anéantissement de l’empire ottoman, l’exclusion de toute autre
puissance de ses domaines.”[1088] It was, no doubt, to prepare the
ground for this “eventual arrangement” that Garlike, the Secretary of
the British Legation, was approached through Mr. Eton—the author of a
hostile survey of Turkey—by a person whose name has not been disclosed.
This “person” began to talk of the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire,
when Garlike cut short the interview by declaring that his king was the
ally of the Sultan.[1089] Czartoryski, however, saw Warren and informed
him of his master’s intention to support the Turks, but, he added, “they
acted towards Russia with much distrust and would not explain themselves
clearly, and that they were in such a state of debt, insolence and
confusion that it was difficult to know how to act with them.” Of one
thing, however, the Prince was certain; he would not like to see French
influence among the Greeks, nor would he desire to provoke a French
attack from Italy. He then asked if Great Britain had any “agents” in
the Morea, and concluded by declaring that it would be better to await
the moves of Napoleon.[1090] Warren was profoundly perturbed at what he
considered to be evidence of French intrigue. His anxiety was not
allayed by a communication—again through Eton—from the same anonymous
person, above referred to. The message ran to the effect that the Tsar
was desirous of concerting measures with Britain for the emancipation of
the Greeks, that he entertained doubts of British willingness to see a
Russian prince on the throne of Constantinople, that if these doubts
were removed he would go any lengths to support her in the present war .
. . that he had “that object no less at heart than any of his
predecessors.” Warren was informed that Russia would make an explicit
overture if he “let it be discovered” that he had written to the
Government about it. The Ambassador refused to do this and assured
Hawkesbury that none of the ministers had ever expressed such sentiments
as were attributed to the Tsar.[1091] One decisive evidence of an ardent
desire of Russia to discuss the partition of Turkey was her refusal to
consent to the renewal of her Treaty of Alliance with the Porte.[1092]
That renewal had been clamoured for by the Turks and suggested by the
British.[1093] There can be no other explanation of this than her
repugnance to “tie” her hands when the interesting event should come to
pass.
In the meantime, Addington had given place to Pitt. The new
administration was bent, before everything else, on a more vigorous war
policy. The views of its predecessors in office were well summed up in
Hawkesbury’s instructions to Mr. Drummond, the successor of Elgin. “We
have no other desire than that the Porte should preserve the strictest
neutrality and that it should not depart from that system except in the
case of an aggression on the part of France or of the determination of
the Emperor of Russia to make common cause with His Majesty.”[1094] It
is clear, then, that something was left over till the attitude of Russia
became fully known. As soon, therefore, as the Government learnt the
first items of the Tsar’s programme—namely, the defence of Turkey, the
“melioration” of the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte,
and the establishing of “connections” with them, it decided to
“counteract” French intrigues by the sending of J. P. Morier[1095] as
Consul-General to the Morea, and of Lock to Egypt;[1096] but neither
received instructions to “create” what might be called a British party
in either place, Morier was particularly directed to pay attention to
Ali Pasha of Janina, to persuade him never to listen to French
incitement, to travel about in the wake of French agents, denouncing
their intrigues and strengthening the hands of the various Pashas with
counsel and money. Captain J. Martin Leake, who had been on the staff of
General Koehler during the latter’s mission to Turkey, was later sent to
assist Morier in his task.[1097] But in truth, Great Britain trusted
more—and with reason—to the vigilance of her squadrons in the
Mediterranean then under Nelson.
There were thus some points on which the two courts were in agreement.
They were primarily agreed as to the necessity of excluding French
influence from the Divan. Great Britain, moreover, skilfully professed
belief in the sincerity of Russian declarations, but refused to work out
the agreed measures in their real spirit. But the British agents,
abroad, took it upon themselves so to do. Missett, in Cairo, was
actively engaged in successive and ludicrously futile intrigues.[1098]
Straton, the minister at Constantinople, concluded from communications
from Missett (!) that the Government wanted to take possession of Egypt
and that it was only waiting for a pretext. He thought the best way was
to obtain an invitation from the Porte for a British garrison and,
accordingly, spoke to the Reis Effendi. The Turk “approved” the
arguments but added that he had not the courage to lay the proposal
before the Divan.[1099] This was in February, 1804. In July of the same
year, Lock, the new Consul for Cairo, arrived in Constantinople—not
exactly in the direct route to Alexandria. In a conversation with the
dragoman of the Porte, he endeavoured to persuade him to get the Sultan
to apply to the King for a British garrison in Alexandria. Straton,
after his discomfiture early in the year, could not join in the
persuasion, so he directed his dragoman, Pisani, “to support Lock by all
means short of declaring that he was authorised by the Government to
propose such a measure.”[1100] But the Reis Effendi again proved as
obdurate as ever. He declared that he was “glad” that Lock did not
expatiate on a subject “upon which he could not even enter,” “that
nothing could be more calculated to affect the happy confidence and
cordial harmony prevailing between the two governments if a proposal of
this nature was to be insisted upon on the part of the Minister.” The
worthy Pisani “made a number of equally just and friendly observations
to him which made no more impression than if they had been offered to a
statue.”[1101] Lock, consequently, was of opinion that the best policy
would be to present the Turks with the _fait accompli_.[1102]
The Russians were equally active. There was one Panghalo—a “jail-bird.”
He was sent to Greece via London with one hundred and fifty florins from
the Russian Government and three hundred pounds from the British in his
pocket.[1103] “Major” Lambro Cazoni—“notorious” during the last Russo-
Turkish war—was endeavouring to raise a Greek corps in the Danubian
Principalities.[1104] The arrival of Sergio, _alias_ Laskaroff, and
Fazarde in Bucharest showed that “something” was going to happen.
Fazarde—who “could speak twelve languages”—was frequently closeted with
the Hospodar Ipselanti.[1105] Mocenigo, in Corfu, directed all his
energies to the destruction of Ali Pasha. But the greatest success
achieved by the Russians was in Montenegro. In August, 1804, the prince-
archbishop had a conference with Musourouski, the Russian Consul at
Cattaro, which was followed by a formal declaration that the people had
put themselves under Russian protection. General Ivelitch, who had been
residing in the neighbourhood, however, refused to be satisfied with
this, and was only “conciliated” by the decapitation of the Abbé Dolci,
the Gallophil confidant of the archbishop.[1106]
These activities were destined to produce important results. In the
first place, the agents of the various powers were at loggerheads. A
bitter feud ensued, notably, between Mocenigo, Morier and Foresti. These
jealousies, naturally, extended to the governments. The Austrians were
irritated at what took place in Montenegro, and threatened to declare
Cattaro a “military port” and, thus, expel all consuls from it.[1107]
The Russians expressed a great deal of ill-humour at the activities of
Missett, Morier and Straton.[1108] It was, now, the task of British
diplomacy to clear the situation, and to “contain” Russian action—not by
overt opposition, as in the crisis of 1790—but by “co-operation.” Pitt
was too much of a realist not to accommodate himself to the
circumstances of 1804: he was not in a position to refuse Russia a free
hand. But this is not enough to “show how completely his former fear of
Russia’s policy in the Eastern Question had been overborne by the new
and far greater danger from Napoleon’s aggression.”[1109] For, as will
be demonstrated, he won on the main question: namely, the entry of
Russia into the Coalition without a concert for the partition of Turkey.
The first pronouncement of the Cabinet on the Eastern Question took
place in June, 1804.[1110] Every confidence was expressed in the
“liberal” views of the Tsar, but it was feared that connection with the
Greeks might lead to more embarrassments than they were worth. As for
the British Government, its earnest wish and endeavour was to save the
Turkish provinces for their lawful sovereign, or at any rate “to prevent
their falling into the hands of France.” “Occasions, thus, might arise
in which the substance must be preferred to the form, and Turkey,
according to the forcible expression of the Tsar’s sentiments, should be
saved in spite of herself.” This was something different from the
“eventual agreement” hinted at by Czartoryski.
The Russian Government tried again, however, to bring about a discussion
on that subject. Czartoryski informed S. Vorontsoff that the Tsar would
not do anything without an agreement with Britain. But he added, “il
faut considérer que si Bonaparte a pris pour règle de tirer le plus
grand parti possible des pays sur lesquels son influence s’étend, on
sera réduit peut-être pour lui résister, d’en faire autant, bien entendu
avec des modifications convenables. Au reste, ce n’est pas d’opinions
déjà arrêtés dont il est question. Mais la matière est trop importante
pour qu’il ne faille chercher de la mettre au clair et de rendre sa
decision aussi sage et adaptée aux circonstances que possible. Il nous a
paru à cet effet que nous ne pouvons mieux faire que de causer, pour
ainsi dire amicalement à ce sujet avec le ministère anglais; nos deux
gouvernements peuvent se donner mutuellement de bons conseils, car leurs
intérêts sont analogues et ne se contrarient pas.”[1111] The Russian
Ambassador, however, did not fully possess the confidence of his Court.
Long residence in Great Britain had filled S. Vorontsoff with admiration
for British policy and British ways. He sincerely believed that the
interests of both countries were identical; and it would be unfair to
dismiss him as a mere blind partisan. His Government well knew that he
was avowedly opposed to the emancipation of the Greeks as likely to
prove prejudicial to Russian interests,[1112] that he disapproved of
expansion at the expense of the Turk. “Nous sommes déjà très
horriblement étendus pour que le pays puisse être bien gouverné. . . .
Conservons pour voisins ces pauvres Turcs qui sont meilleurs voisins que
les Suédois, les Prussiens et les Autrichiens.”[1113] It was this avowed
hostility on the part of the Russian Ambassador to the destruction of
the Turkish Empire that led to the mission of Novosiltsoff to London in
the autumn of 1804. The desired “conversation” on the Eastern Question
was only a part of a large programme—the object of which, in the words
of Czartoryski, was to find for the Coalition a basis broader than the
“negative” one of fighting Napoleon, and a bond, not inspired only by a
common feeling of revenge but by the most elevated principles of justice
and philanthropy.”[1114] One of the proposals carried by M. Novosiltsoff
was the dismemberment of Turkey into a number of “confederated” small
states under Russian influence, the Tsar having to be declared
“Protector” and “Emperor” of the Slavs. Great Britain and France were to
receive some islands and establishments in Africa or Asia, Austria (if
it could not be helped) Croatia, Ragusa and a portion of Bosnia, and
Russia, Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, the Dardanelles and
Constantinople.[1115] M. Driault sees in all this an astounding measure
of “naïvety,” and others a satisfactory evidence of “idealism.”[1116]
The point was: how did Pitt manage to “turn” a dangerous corner; when
Vorontsoff read Czartoryski’s despatch[1117] to him and his colleague
Harrowby, both statesmen were surprised. They then, after some
hesitation, asked if he did not believe that his Government harboured
the design of seeking “compensations” in Turkey. The Ambassador was
embarrassed, for he himself believed in the existence of such a design.
He declared, however, that the words of the despatch did not bear such a
construction. This did not convince Pitt and Harrowby, for they observed
that the subject was not sufficiently developed to make an answer
possible. As far as British policy was concerned, they stated that “ils
ne porteront des troupes dans le territoire ottoman que quand il faut en
chasser les Français ou les prévenir, s’il y a des indices certains que
les Français y veulent débarquer; mais que c’est toujours dans
l’intention de restituer à la Porte les pays qu’on aurait occupés
uniquement pour les défendre pour elle.” They added that this did not
presently arise for the simple reason that there were no available
troops in the Mediterranean.[1118] Novosiltsoff could not change this
attitude. When on one occasion he tried to convince Pitt that the
aggrandisement of Russia would not be prejudicial to British interests,
the British Premier concurred, but added that it would be “très
impolitique, très nuisible à l’objet principal qu’on a en vue, de songer
à la réalisation d’un pareil dessein, qu’une pareille lésion du droit
des gens sera atroce.”[1119] The British Ambassador in St. Petersburg,
Lord Gower, was also instructed to present fully the point of view of
his Government.[1120] The Minister in Constantinople was also apprized
of the manner in which the question was envisaged. Mr. Straton was
sharply reproached for touching upon the occupation of Egypt without
“positive orders,” for “such proposals without obvious pressing
necessity would only rouse the suspicions of the Porte and strengthen
the French misrepresentation that we desire to hold that country for
ourselves.” “But should Straton receive notice from any of the British
commanders in the Mediterranean that in consequence of imminent danger
of an attack upon Egypt—‘a body of troops had landed or was about to
land’—he should do his utmost to place such a measure in ‘the fairest
light,’ to represent it as a necessity which admitted of no delay, that
its sole object was protection from France and that the province was to
be restored as soon as could be done in a ‘state of security.’”[1121]
The British Government, however, could not afford complete hostility to
Russian actions. It instructed its agents to make their peace with their
Russian colleagues,[1122] recommended Lord Gower to make no remonstrance
on the conduct of men like Mocenigo and Ivelitch, but only mild
“reflections,” and to inform the Court of St. Petersburgh that Britain
“would try to adapt herself to the attitude of Russia as far as
possible,” and that the desire of His Majesty’s Government was that the
policy of both powers “should be guided by uniform and consistent
principles.”[1123] The Government was also “disposed, in order to please
the Tsar, to ‘drag’ on the affair of the renewal of the alliance as long
as Russia wished,”[1124] and represented, to the Porte, that the delay
was due only to the necessity of “concert” with St. Petersburg.[1125]
But the victory gained was great. In the “Déclaration d’Alliance
Intime,” concluded between Austria and Russia in October, 1804, the
integrity of the Turkish Empire was solemnly stipulated.[1126] The
language of Czartoryski also bore testimony to the success of Pitt. He
wrote to S. Vorontsoff lamenting that his despatch had produced an
effect contrary to what he intended. He emphasised that he had no
“arrière pensée,” that the Tsar was disinterested—even too
disinterested—and that he was convinced that the interests of both
powers in the East could never clash. “Nous voulons,” he added,
“soutenir l’Empire Turc, mais si le corps débile et gangrené dans ses
principes vitaux croule enfin, nous ne souffrirons pas que son sort soit
réglé d’une manière qui soit contraire aux intérêts majeurs de la
Russie.” It was “painful” to him to note that “à la seule hypothèse d’un
avantage quelconque pour la Russie, c’est nos amis qui commenceront par
témoigner leur jalousie.” The last words of the letter are significant.
“Laissez moi vous dire dans le plus intime de la confiance que M. Pitt
ne s’est pas montré favorable à la Russie en 88 [_sic_] et que je crains
que quelque parcelle de ce système n’aille se mêler dans des rapports où
la loyauté et la plus entière franchise doivent présider.”[1127] In the
next month, December, it was decided to renew the treaty of alliance
with Turkey, in order to “appease the alarms of Mr. Pitt, whose system,
so long ago as 1790, was based on the greatest jealousy of any new
acquisitions on the part of Russia.”[1128]
Could it be said then that Russia gained nothing from her connection
with Great Britain? Such a view is not tenable, for it was precisely
that connection which prevented Turkey from seeking doubtful salvation
in an alliance with France and enabled Russian influence to predominate
in the Divan.
While the fate of the Turkish Empire was discussed in St. Petersburg,
Vienna and London, Constantinople was the scene of a remarkable contest
between Napoleon and his enemies. Turkey presented in that year a dismal
picture.[1129] The provincial pashas showed only an outward semblance of
obedience, the Janissaries were in a mutinous state of mind and in
league with overt or secret robbers;[1130] bands of brigands carried
their depredations up to the gates of the capital; Egypt was tossed
between the Mamelukes and the Albanians, and the Holy Cities of Mecca
and Medina were in the hands of the Wahabis. Well might the friends and
the enemies of the Turks think that their downfall was near at hand.
Some contemporary observers thought that the deathblow would come from
Wahabism. “These sectarians,” wrote Straton, “strike at the root of the
constitution, the only thing which keeps the Empire from tumbling to
pieces; namely, the chief Priesthood of the Sultan in the quality of the
First Imam.”[1131] It was agreed, however, that there was no hope but in
the establishment of a “new system,” “both civil and military, which had
to be steadily pursued by those who formed the administration of the
Empire and directed the councils of the sovereign.”[1132] Selim and some
of his advisers were only too well aware of this necessity. The
remarkable Capitan Pasha, Hussein, “possessed a liberality of spirit
rarely to be met with in Turkey. Far from entertaining the absurd
notions of his countrymen respecting Christians, he, on the contrary,
fairly acknowledged their superiority and endeavoured by imitation to
appropriate to himself those improvements which the advanced state of
civilisation had given birth to in Christendom.”[1133] The reforming
policy of the Sultan was mainly, but not entirely, directed to the
fighting forces. Great success was achieved in the Navy,[1134] but the
forces of reaction prevented the establishment of the first model
army.[1135] “Old Turkey” was too strong for the reformers. Nothing could
have been done with a people whose chief method of protest was to burn
whole quarters in Constantinople.[1136]
But the Turkish Empire did not fall asunder. “Like Mehemet’s ‘coffin’ it
was suspended between powers of equal attraction.”[1137] “On a
superficial view of the different springs of the Turkish Government, it
appears all discord and confusion; but on a better acquaintance of the
subject, it will be found to contain ‘concordia discors,’ a harmony
arising out of discordant materials.”[1138] Such was the foreign policy
of the Porte. It was influenced by neither bribery nor sentiment.
Bribery, as Sir Robert Adair found out, might gain small points but
could not effect a change in principle.[1139] Sentiment was equally
ineffective: French, Austrians, Russians, British were taken in the
mass. The foreign policy of Turkey was also, so to speak, more
“impersonal” than that of any of the powers. Its springs of action lay,
as it were, in the “nature of things,” and not in the character of any
Reis Effendi or even Sultan.
Between the combatants for influence, the Porte definitely threw itself
on the side of Great Britain and Russia. “Le nom de votre Majesté,”
wrote a French agent, “est plus grand que toute la puissance russe, mais
cette puissance est voisine, le danger est présent et la terreur est à
son comble.”[1140] Russia, moreover, presented herself as the ally of
Great Britain. “She was viewed with less jealousy on account of her
connection with us,” wrote the British Ambassador,[1141] partly because
Britain was believed—and rightly—to be disinterested, and partly
because—from her command of the sea—this power could render great
service or give mortal blows. These considerations, and not the
“venality” of the “administration” or the fact that this or that
Minister was “sold” to this or that power,[1142] or the keeping of the
real state of affairs from the knowledge of the Sultan,[1143] explains
matters.
The most signal result of this orientation of Turkish policy was the
daring refusal—at the behest of Russia—to recognise Napoleon as Emperor
of the French.[1144] Talleyrand had carefully prepared the ground by a
“present” of a gold box and the sum of 40,000 francs to Halet Effendi,
the Ambassador in Paris.[1145] But Halet’s “good counsel” found no echo
in Constantinople, and Brune exhausted the resources of diplomacy
without gaining his end. The Turks behaved in the usual way. They tried
pretext after pretext, without either “accepting” or “refusing.” At one
time it was that the word “Emperor” had no equivalent in Turkish, at
another—on the “Internuncio’s” advice—it was that affairs of this
“magnitude” usually needed twenty or thirty years to settle. When
Prussia and Austria finally recognised Napoleon, the Porte seemed for a
while at the end of its resources. But not so! Brune was informed that
Austria did so in return for something, namely, the erection of the
Grand Duchy of Austria into an Empire, and, therefore, the Porte had to
study its own interests and not offend Russia. The withdrawal of
Brune[1146] and the consequent rupture of diplomatic relations aroused
great anxiety but did not change the determination of the Divan. For
Italinski, the Russian envoy, had threatened war if the demand of
Napoleon was complied with, and Mr. Straton had energetically supported
the Russian’s “representations.”[1147] French influence had sunk so low
that it was considered a “victory” when M. Jaubert left Constantinople
with an answer to Napoleon written by the Sultan and not the Grand
Vizier.[1148] French merchants and French _protégés_ began to seek—the
surest sign of “decline” in the Levant—some more effective
protection.[1149] The Porte also acquiesced in the passage of Russian
warships and transports through the straits.[1150]
It was a most serious setback to a man like Napoleon, for it touched his
“amour-propre.” Was Russia satisfied with so signal a victory? She was
not. Baulked in the ardent desire to arrange the partition of Turkey,
she now aimed at dragging her—“débile et gangrène,” as she was—into the
war with France. This was the object of the new Treaty of
Alliance.[1151] The secret articles tacked on to the original Treaty of
1798 amply bears out this. The two most important of these were the ones
relating to the eventual occupation of Alexandria by a British force and
of the ex-Venetian possessions on the mainland and the Danubian
Principalities by a Russian army and to Russian intervention in favour
of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. The communication of these
terms to the British Government was accompanied by a curious piece of
advice. “Je crois,” wrote Czartoryski, “que notre cabinet entend
infiniment mieux la politique orientale (parce que cela le touche de
plus près) que celui de St. James. Nous demandons donc qu’on écoute nos
conseils, qu’on suive nos directions, qu’on ne gâte pas nos opérations
et qu’on ne fasse rien sans s’être au préalable bien entendu. . .
.”[1152] This earnest objurgation fell on willing ears. The British
Government, moreover, was informed that M. d’Italinski was allowed full
discretion on the most objectionable of the secret articles.[1153] It is
impossible to tell whether this was true or not, for Mr. Arbuthnot, the
British Ambassador at Constantinople, who had seen Italinski’s
instructions, described them as “absolutely positive.”[1154] The British
Government, however, though it recognised that the terms “pressed rather
strongly on the Ottoman government” saw “at the same time that it was
not expedient to differ with Russia upon the degrees of measures when
such great and important events depend upon union.”[1155] There was
another reason besides this; namely, the fact that it was envisaging the
possibility of the occupation of Egypt. Instructions were sent on 29th
March, 1805, to General Craig, the Commander-in-Chief in the
Mediterranean, to bear in mind that “a situation may arise in which
there may be reason to suppose that the projects of France are directed
. . . against Egypt. The occupation of Alexandria by a British force may
in that case become necessary.”[1156] The jealousy manifested by the
Porte, however, “upon a proposal of a similar nature made by Straton,”
prevented the Government from inserting a stipulation to that effect in
the _projet_ of the British act of accession to the Russo-Turkish
Treaty.[1157] But now that the Russians were pressing the matter of
“preventive occupation,” the question of the garrisoning of Alexandria
might be brought forward. “His Majesty’s government certainly is not at
this moment (September, 1805) prepared to send troops into Egypt, but
the previous consent of the Turkish government to that measure would be
of great importance if, in the course of the war, it should become
necessary to adopt it, or if such consent could be procured without
creating a discontent and jealousy, which may be of serious importance.
At all events, I think, it will be necessary to procure a provision for
the occupation of Alexandria, if the Russians should insist upon the
stipulations they have proposed for stationing their troops at Parga and
in other parts of the Ottoman dominions.”[1158] The negotiations started
in Constantinople in March, 1805.[1159] The “patent” articles were soon
agreed upon and the real battle began.[1160] The struggle centred on the
articles relating to the “preventive” occupation and the intervention in
favour of the Rayas. The Turkish ministers declared “that the nation
itself would raise its voice against them even supposing that the
sovereign’s consent had been obtained . . . if we oppose them it is
because . . . it must be the object of all governments and more
particularly of one constituted like ours not to hurt the feelings of
the people by unnecessarily entrusting their defence to other powers and
by thus debasing them in their own opinion.”[1161] The Turks argued that
from the manner and language of Italinsky “in general” it “seemed” as if
their allies intended to prescribe terms to them,[1162] and went so far
as to declare that “war would be preferable to an alliance founded on
such principles.”[1163] They did not conceal that “as the introduction
of foreign troops into Moldavia would be a general signal for rebellion
to all the Pashas, they would rather preserve the fidelity of their own
subjects than deliver up their independence to a foreign power, whose
friendship was offered to them under circumstances so suspicious and
degrading.”[1164]
The negotiations were broken off by the Turks in September. It was the
turn of Arbuthnot to intervene. He was doubtful if it was ever “good
policy” to propose such terms. But this was not the question to him. For
if Italinsky failed through lack of British support, war would ensue,
whereas if Arbuthnot helped him to succeed, British “influence would be
paramount.”[1165] He was as fully conscious as his Government that “an
unapparent want of confidence in the intentions of Russia might be of
serious detriment to His Majesty’s interests.”[1166] He had been, thus,
all through the negotiation, endeavouring “to sweeten the pill” and his
chief argument had been that resistance could be of no avail, for the
allies “might still be forced to such measures separately and for self-
defence.”[1167] Thanks to his “good offices” the negotiations were
resumed, and on the 23rd September, the Treaty was “delivered with
signatures affixed.”[1168] But the Porte gained an important victory in
persuading Italinsky to omit the two objectionable articles and have
them referred to the “magnanimity” of the Tsar.[1169] The eventual
instructions of the British Cabinet as to Egypt did not, therefore,
apply.
Turkey was in the grasp of Russia. The provinces were agitated by
Russian agents, Russian squadrons were passing to and fro under the
windows of the Seraglio, the Divan was daily humiliated by arrogant
demands, and the ministers were not allowed the liberty of taking the
most ordinary measures.[1170] But the hour of delivery was at hand.
Austerlitz dissolved the coalition and emancipated the Turks.
[Footnote 1038: Morkoff to Tsar, 2-14 June, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 212.]
[Footnote 1039: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 23 Jan.-4 Feb., 1803. Sbornik,
77, p. 31.]
[Footnote 1040: O. Browning, _Despatches of Whitworth_, Preface, p. vi.]
[Footnote 1041: Vandal, _Napoléon et Alexandre_, I, p. 4.]
[Footnote 1042: Merry to Hawkesbury, 6, 6, 12 May, 2 June, 1802. Merry
to Hammond, 9 June, 1802. F.O. France, 62. Merry to Hawkesbury, 26 Aug.,
1802. F.O. France, 63.]
[Footnote 1043: The Tsar to S. Vorontsoff, 20 Jan., 1803. _Archives
Vorontsoff_, X, pp. 304-6.]
[Footnote 1044: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 5-17 March, 1803. Sbornik, 77,
p. 69.]
[Footnote 1045: e.g. Morkoff to Tsar, 27 July-8 Aug., 1802. Sbornik, 70,
p. 434, and _ibid._ to _ibid._, 1-13 Dec., 1802. _Ibid._, pp. 385-6.]
[Footnote 1046: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 22 Dec., 1802-3 Jan., 1803.
Sbornik, 70, p. 607.]
[Footnote 1047: Beer, _Die Orientalische Politik Œsterreichs_. Appendix,
pp. 771-5. The bald statement of M. Bourgeois. _Manuel de la Politique
Etrangère_, II, p. 217—that Austria assigned to herself Bosnia, etc., is
misleading.]
[Footnote 1048: Warren to Hawkesbury, 31 Dec., 1802. F.O. Russia, 51.
A. Vorontsoff to Morkoff, 20 Jan.-1 Feb., 1803. Sbornik, 77, pp. 22-4.
_Ibid._ to _ibid._, 24 Dec., 1802-5 Jan., 1803. Sbornik, 70, pp. 619-21.
Tsar to S. Vorontsoff, 20 Jan., 1803. _Archives Vorontsoff_, X, pp.
304-6.]
[Footnote 1049: Garlike to Hawkesbury, 27 Sept., 1802. F.O. Russia, 51.
He considers as “bad signs” (1) the fact that Morkoff had consented to
transmit overtures from Napoleon. (2) Some members of the administration
favour schemes against Turkey.
Garlike to Hawkesbury, 10 Sept., 1802. F.O. Russia, 51. The Austrian, De
Saurace mistrusts Russia.]
[Footnote 1050: Vernegues, Memorandum, 8-20 March, 1804. Sbornik, 82, p.
11.]
[Footnote 1051: Merry to Hawkesbury, 8 Sept., 1802. F.O. France, 64.]
[Footnote 1052: Napoleon, _Correspondance_, 26 vendémiaire, XI (18 Oct.,
1802), VIII, 6378.]
[Footnote 1053: Talleyrand to Premier Consul, 12 brumaire XI (3 Nov.,
1802). Bertrand, _Correspondance de Talleyrand_, pp. 23-4.]
[Footnote 1054: Cf. W. Ekedahl in _Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society_, New Series, VIII, pp. 196-7, and Martin Phillipson in _Revue
Historique_, 76, p. 48.]
[Footnote 1055: Note 1, p. 185 above.]
[Footnote 1056: Merry to Hawkesbury, 25 Sept., 1802. F.O. France, 64.]
[Footnote 1057: Morkoff to Tsar, 4-16 March, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 67.]
[Footnote 1058: F.O. Russia, 51.]
[Footnote 1059: Warren to Hawkesbury, 18, 27 Nov., 1802. F.O. Russia,
51.]
[Footnote 1060: Hawkesbury to Warren, 1 Feb., 1803. F.O. Russia, 52.]
[Footnote 1061: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1062: Hawkesbury to Warren, 1 Feb., 1803. F.O. Russia, 52.]
[Footnote 1063: “Note verbale,” dated 12 March, 1803. F.O. Russia, 52.]
[Footnote 1064: Hobart to Stuart, 26 Nov., 1802. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1,
346.]
[Footnote 1065: Pelham in a conversation with Malmesbury on 13 Feb.,
1803. Malmesbury, _Diaries_, IV, p. 174.
This was also the view of Pitt. Pitt to Chatham, 28 Feb., 1803.
Stanhope, _Life of Pitt_, IV, p. 7, and G. Rose, _Diaries_, II, pp.
18-19.]
[Footnote 1066: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 23 March-4 April, 1803.
Sbornik, 77, pp. 81-82.]
[Footnote 1067: Morkoff to Tsar, 4-16 March, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 67.]
[Footnote 1068: Whitworth to Hawkesbury 3 and 7 Feb., 1803. Browning,
_Despatches of Whitworth_, pp. 59, 61.]
[Footnote 1069: Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 7 Feb., 1803. _Ibid._, p. 61.]
[Footnote 1070: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 16-28 Feb., 1803. Sbornik, 77,
pp. 46-8. It is curious to note that at the same time Napoleon
disclaimed to Morkoff designs on Egypt and declared that his first
expedition was only due to personal considerations and “depuis je n’ai
plus songé à une miserable contrée où j’ai éprouvé toutes sortes de
désagréments.”