IX

THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE

1801-1802.

The foundations of the peace of Europe were laid down in a spirit of

rivalry that boded ill for the durability of the structure. The history

of the treaties in the making is not less significant than that of the

actual struggle which they were to terminate.

The “Preliminaries of London” were the first of the instruments by which

the general pacification of Europe was completed. They were the

consummation of the various negotiations between Britain and France

which took place in the years 1800 and 1801. Egypt, as has been shown,

proved a stumbling block in the way of peace, and it was to remove the

obstacle that Dundas urged the necessity of expelling the French from

that country by force of arms. The new ministry under Addington resumed

the negotiations just at the time when Sir Ralph Abercromby began to

act. It was on the 21st March, 1801, that the new foreign secretary,

Lord Hawkesbury, made official overtures to Otto, the French

“Commissioner for prisoners” in London.[772] Hawkesbury hinted,

according to French sources,[773] that France might keep Egypt while

Britain should retain the conquests she had made at the expense of the

Republic and her allies, Spain and Holland.[774] M. Otto, naturally,

conceived the hope that Egypt could, after all, be “saved.” A friend of

Mr. Addington even informed him that Britain had greater reason for

fearing “disorders and revolutions” than for opposing the possession of

Egypt, Belgium or Louisiana by France. The Republic, therefore, could

“settle” that “affair” by an “amicable” arrangement with the sultan.

This done, Britain could not with any “decency” raise the question.[775]

It was rather bold of the friend of the Prime Minister to assert the

disinterestedness of his country when some 15,000 British soldiers were

fighting in the Nile Valley. An interview with Hawkesbury soon convinced

Otto that Britain was not as powerless as his informant gave him to

think. The British Minister made it clear that even if France consented

to restore Egypt to her lawful sovereign, Britain would still retain

“some” of her conquests.[776] In vain did the Frenchman protest against

what he considered to be an unfair bargain and develop a plausible

system of “barrière des intérêts” between the two countries. If only

they could agree on allocating India to Britain and the Mediterranean to

France, quarrels over the “ice-fields” of Newfoundland and the “fosse”

of Chandernagor would no longer arise. Hawkesbury agreed that the

principle was excellent, but, he added, the application was

difficult.[777]

The position of the British negotiator was daily growing stronger. On

the 2nd of April, Nelson destroyed the Danish fleet in Copenhagen. Then

came the news of the murder of the Tsar Paul. The event was a _coup de

foudre_ for the “First Consul”: “Il comptait avoir trouvé dans Paul ce

que Frédéric le Grand trouva dans Pierre III.”[778] Lord Hawkesbury no

longer spoke of the possibility of the retention of Egypt by France,

and, in communicating his terms to Otto even reserved the right of

“reducing the concessions” should “good” news come from Egypt before the

“signature.”[779] It was clear to him that “en stipulant ces clauses

léonines, l’Angleterre nous signifiait nettement qu’elle se refusait à

partager l’empire colonial et maritime.”[780]

A painful suspense then ensued. All eyes were turned towards the

operations in Egypt.[781] By the end of May, it was known in London that

Abercromby had won the victory of Canopus. The news produced an outburst

of joy which Otto, in his bitterness, described as “jactance

impertinente” of a nation unaccustomed to triumphs.[782] The British

Minister pressed him to conclude. France, he pointed out, was

unmistakably losing Egypt. Further haggling, he added, would only mean a

continuation of the carnage and a “stiffening” in the British attitude;

and, he threatened, Abercromby’s victory in Egypt might herald the Third

Coalition, as Nelson’s Battle of the Nile did the second.[783]

Under the stress of the evil news from the East, the resistance of

France subsided.[784] In a draft of a note of 23rd July to be presented

by Otto, the First Consul resigned himself to the loss of Egypt.[785] On

the 1st of October the preliminaries were signed.[786]

“Egypt,” it was stipulated, “shall be restored to the Sublime Porte,

whose territories and possessions shall be preserved entire, such as

they existed previously to the present war.”[787] To Dundas this seemed

a “childish” guarantee. He was not able to see what business it was of

France to insert Egypt in the preliminaries, for the question was one

for settlement between Britain, Russia and Turkey.[788] The late consul

in Cairo, Mr. Baldwin, had written to Dundas that the reason that led to

the sending of an army to Egypt should cause it to remain there. Baldwin

refused to see in this any treachery against an ally, the Porte: Great

Britain did not make great sacrifices for the _beaux yeux_ of the Grand

Signor, but in defence of her interests, and was prepared to send him

the annual tribute which the Mamelukes were supposed to pay but never

did.[789] The First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of St. Vincent, held

a different opinion. “I am bold to assert,” he wrote, “that the peace is

the very best this country has ever made, and I consider it as the

happiest event in my life to have contributed to so great a

blessing.”[790] This, in truth, is bold, but in the sense not intended

by the veteran admiral.

It must have been obvious to the ministers that the terms did not offer

desirable security in the East. One great means of obtaining it was by

acquiring the “exclusive merit of the peace,”[791] which was to secure

the integrity of the Turkish Empire. If it were not possible—and it

could hardly have been—to treat the question of Egypt as one for

settlement between Britain and Turkey, there was still time to prevent

separate negotiations between the Sultan and the First Consul. The point

was discussed by Otto and Hawkesbury. The Frenchman pretended that the

“Preliminaries amply provided for the interests of the allies of King

George,” that the First Consul was treating separately with them, that

the presence of their plenipotentiaries in the Congress to be held at

Amiens was sure to prove a cause of delay.”[792] Hawkesbury, however,

refused to concede, and it was finally agreed that the allies of both

countries should be admitted as “contracting parties.”[793]

Two days after the conclusion, the Foreign Secretary informed Elgin that

he had been able to secure the two objects nearest the Porte’s

heart,[794] namely, the preservation of the integrity of its dominions

and the formal recognition of the Septinsular Republic by France. In

order to avoid delay, “His Majesty was induced to hope that the Porte

would find no difficulty in entrusting the management of its affairs in

the Congress of Amiens to the British Plenipotentiary, either by giving

him full powers to that effect or by a declaration that it should accede

to any stipulations into which he might enter at the Congress on its

behalf.”[795]

Hawkesbury, however, was calculating without the First Consul. There had

been living in Paris since 1797 a Turkish Ambassador, Ali Effendi.[796]

Ever since the outbreak of war between the Republic and the Sultan, he

had been instructed on more than one occasion that no grounds for

hostility would remain once Egypt was restored to her sovereign, the

Septinsular Republic recognised, the claims of war-sufferers liquidated

and the old treaties renewed.[797] These were in reality “general

instructions,” but Ali, apparently, did not “formalise” and behaved as

if they were “full powers” to make peace. “Ali can be considered in no

other light than that of an instrument of France whose subserviency was

limited only by the smallness of his mental capacity.”[798] “Il était

tout à fait livré à la France.”[799] But these estimates are rather

unfair. The truth of the matter was, as a French diplomat expressed it:

“En outre que ses (Ali’s) lumières sont peu capables de porter le jour

nulle part, il était timide comme tous les agents ottomans dans leurs

rapports dont ils ne se dissimulent jamais les dangers pour leurs têtes,

surtout lorsque se trouvant hors de portée de la scène très mobile de

leur ministère ils ne peuvent juger l’accueil qu’ils recevront.”[800]

Ali succumbed to ignorance and timidity. On the 9th October he signed

with Talleyrand preliminaries of peace, by one of whose stipulations

France undertook to evacuate and restore Egypt.[801] It was now some

months since Belliard had capitulated in Cairo and Menou in Alexandria.

The preliminaries extended to France the privileges of the most favoured

nation treatment, but did not provide for the manner of concluding a

definite treaty of peace.

This was not, however, the end of the First Consul’s trickery. On 10th

October, Talleyrand and the Russian Plenipotentiary, Morkoff, signed a

secret convention, the third article of which stipulated that peace

between France and Turkey was to be negotiated at Constantinople under

Russian mediation.[802] Did this amount to a recognition of Russian

preponderance in the Levant?[803] It was rather a platonic homage to a

young and inexperienced autocrat.

The idea of mediating between France and Turkey had been handed down

from the previous reign. It was adopted partly from the desire to “have

an ostensible share in the completion of an arrangement which interested

Russia so nearly,”[804] partly in order to use Turkish affairs as a

lever for the “restitution of Piedmont.”[805] But this was not all.

There was a sincere desire on the part of Alexander to see general peace

reign everywhere. “The set of young men” by whom he was surrounded and

whom he was pleased to describe as the “committee of public

safety”—their name was the “comité secret”—“had been almost equally

zealous in promoting the intended peace with France, it being their

professed system to endeavour to disengage the Emperor from all foreign

concerns as well as connections and induce him to direct his principal

attention to the affairs of the interior.”[806] This is why the “Comité

secret” turned down a scheme of that inveterate self-seeker, Valerian

Zouboff, for military intervention in Georgia.[807] Kotschubey, one of

the Comité, expressed his relief that the Tsar decided not to “meddle”

in “toutes ces sottises de Malte.” He was for “une ligne de conduite

entièrement passive, au moins pour quelque temps.”[808] But what of

Russia’s interests in the period of quiescence? The Minister trusted to

Britain and France “neutralising” each other. “Les Anglais seuls

balancent par leur prépondérance sur cet élément (mer) la suprématie des

Français sur terre. Que cette balance disparaisse et rien ne s’opposera

plus à ce géant.”[809] Let Britain do as she liked with Malta, let her

even occupy the Ionian Islands or annex them,[810] let her destroy

French influence in the Divan by the sending of “proper” ambassadors,

appointed by Government and not by a company of merchants, and by the

lavish use of presents;[811] but, lest Britain grew too powerful, the

same speeches were made to France. The Tsar told Duroc—sent to

congratulate him on his accession—that France should not give up Egypt

(this was in June) and that the two powers should co-operate in curbing

British ambition in the Near East.[812] The Tsar promised to use his

influence to obtain for the Republic the privilege of navigation in the

Black Sea, only asking that this might be kept secret.[813]

There were now three courses before the Turks; to invest the British

Plenipotentiary at Amiens with authority to act in their name; to ratify

the preliminaries signed by Ali and enter upon separate negotiations

with France, or to accept the Russian mediation and transfer the

negotiations to Constantinople. To take one course to the exclusion of

the others was fraught with danger. The Porte could not afford to

alienate Britain, who held Egypt and had in the Mamelukes security for

the Porte’s good conduct. Nor could it entertain the thought of

incurring the wrath of the First Consul, whose friendship would prove a

welcome check on British power and whose enmity should be dreaded. The

Tsar, moreover, might soon weary of his quiet mood and was not likely to

bear meekly the rejection of his proffered mediation. The only hope of

safety lay in exploiting the rivalries of the three powers.

The Porte ratified the Preliminaries of London[814] and endeavoured to

persuade Elgin to consent to its ratifying Ali’s act “with some

modifications.”[815] The British Ambassador refused. He pointed out that

it had an excellent opportunity of displaying its real sentiments

towards Britain, its dispositions towards the French, its sense of

dignity and adherence to engagements—and all this could be done by

granting Lord Cornwallis, the Plenipotentiary at Amiens, authority to

act in its name.[816] He gave it the benefit of a commentary on the

terms agreed to by Ali. There was no difficulty in showing that the Turk

had no powers, that the instrument was otherwise unacceptable on account

of faulty drafting and differences from the act concluded in London. To

bestow on France, he concluded, privileges granted to the Allies was a

“procedure” humiliating to the Porte, unjust to the Allies and unmerited

by the French.[817] The Turkish ministers were loud in expressions of

gratitude.[818] They informed the French Government of the intention to

ratify the Preliminaries of Paris only in so far as they did not vary

from those of London, and to invest Ali with full powers to attend the

Congress of Amiens.[819]

Their courage, however, was soon put to a severe test, for there arrived

on the scene on the 26th of November, Colonel Sebastiani with[820] a

copy of the Preliminaries and an autograph letter to the Sultan[821]

which was to be delivered in person. The mission had other aims. The

desire of the Consul—so ran the instructions to Sebastiani[822]—was to

strengthen the Turkish Empire, to use her against Britain and Russia and

to realise, in a different way, the designs, which were hoped for by the

invasion of Egypt in 1798. “Il désire avant tout étendre l’influence

française dans ces régions grâce à une augmentation du commerce et

essayer de reconquérir l’Egypte et la route des Indes par les moyens

pacifiques puisqu’il n’a pu les conserver par les armes.” Sebastiani

was, therefore, to observe “dans quelles conditions s’effectuera

l’évacuation de l’Egypte et comment se fait la remise de ce pays aux

autorités ottomanes, quels sont leurs intentions, leurs projets pour

l’avenir de ce pays.” He was also to make a special study of Russo-

British relations and to disavow rumours of French complicity with

various rebellious Pashas.

The first “call”[823] of Sebastiani was on Tamara, the Russian envoy,

who happened to be celebrating the coronation of the Tsar. The Russian

showed a great deal of curiosity. Towards the end of the dinner he lost

all self-control, condemned the convention by Morkoff, expressed his

conviction that Codrika—the dragoman of Ali—was in French pay and

“promised” that he would have him beheaded. On the next day, however,

his language—now that he had apparently recovered from the effects of

the banquet—was entirely changed. He pressed the Turks to be less

obdurate on the point of etiquette and allow Sebastiani to deliver

personally the letter to the Sultan. In return, he asked the Colonel to

persuade the Porte to accept the Russian mediation. Sebastiani,

naturally, refused to do this, for he was himself endeavouring—now by

persuasion and now by threats—to press the Porte to negotiate separately

with his country. It was finally agreed that the Sultan should meet

Sebastiani “accidentally.” The Colonel presented himself in his uniform

(not in the customary pelisse) delivered his letter and a “suitable”

speech.[824] The Sultan enquired after the health of Bonaparte, and

expressed his pleasure at Sebastiani’s speech. All this, no doubt, was

bound to make a stir in Pera; but the fact remained that Ali’s

“Preliminaries” were still unratified.

The Russian envoy now tried what he could do. M. Tamara was a

naturalised Russian of Greek origin. “Il a,” wrote Sebastiani, “toute la

finesse et, j’ose dire, toute la fausseté de ses anciens

compatriotes.”[825] He seems to have been particularly amenable to

bribery.[826] It was on the 1st of December that he officially notified

the Porte of the Russian mediation.[827] His position must have been

embarrassing, for he had been pressing the Porte—in ignorance of

Morkoff’s Convention—to disavow Ali on the grounds that what he had done

was contrary to the Preliminaries of London. The Russian mediation was

not less contrary. No wonder that Tamara could offer only “lame

explanations” and unconvincing arguments.[828] The Turks, seeing that

France was pressing one thing and the Russians another, turned towards

Britain. Elgin advised them to thank Russia for her mediation, to

observe that it would have been more “efficacious and beneficial” had it

been accepted by France when she was in possession of Egypt, and to

state that the negotiations—except for “trifling arrangements of

trade”—would be completed in Amiens.[829]

This communication infuriated Tamara. He complained that Russia had been

treated like “an old shoe”; addressed “harsh” notes to the Reis Effendi,

and warned him that any concessions granted to Britain in Egypt were

sure to provoke French jealousy and a new attack on that province.[830]

The language of his dragoman was not less violent. He used to declare

“that Russia could have conquered Egypt as well as England, that she

offered forces repeatedly, that any concession to England in Egypt must

be common to all nations in amity with Turkey, that the restitution of

Egypt by England was no favour, for Europe would not have permitted her

to remain there.”[831] Elgin became so alarmed that he believed possible

a concert between France and Russia for the partition of the Turkish

Empire. He entreated Lord Hawkesbury to probe the matter before

evacuating Egypt and Malta. In the meantime he advised the Porte to ask

for delay.[832]

These alarming reports arrived in London in the early days of the new

year. They strengthened the suspicions entertained by the British

Government with regard to the real intentions of Alexander. His language

had not been clear and his somewhat ostentatious attitude of abstention

lent itself to misrepresentation. They had hoped a great deal from the

successor of Paul. They had believed that “no connection was more

natural and more reciprocally advantageous—especially under present

circumstances—than that between Russia and Britain.”[833] But Alexander

did not respond to British advances. He refused to take part in the

arrangement concerning Malta. In May, 1801, the British Ambassador was

instructed to ascertain “whether the Russian Government was disposed to

guarantee, jointly with His Majesty, the province of Egypt to the

Turkish Government in the event of the Expulsion of the French . . . the

guarantee might include mutual stipulations to settle the proportion of

force which each party should be obliged to furnish hereafter, should

Egypt be again attacked.”[834] The overture was, at any rate, premature:

the French were still strong in Egypt. The Ambassador not only did not

receive a reply but also suspected the causes of the delay.[835] In

point of fact, the delay was due to Panin, who was trying to persuade

the Tsar to consent to the joint guarantee.[836] “Malheureusement,”

wrote Panin, “l’Empereur ne pense pas de même et j’ai vu le moment où il

aurait consenti de plein gré à ce que les Français conservaient cette

colonie”[837] The Minister was “anxious that His Imperial Majesty should

take the leading part in the affairs of Egypt.”[838] The advocates of

non-intervention defeated him and succeeded in having him dismissed. The

overture of a joint guarantee was rejected on the grounds that the

Triple Alliance between Great Britain, Russia and the Porte was still in

existence and was sufficient.[839]

The rejection of the overture, the Russian mediation and the violence of

Tamara caused a very bad impression in London. The Cabinet was

“disinclined” to believe in the “opinion” prevalent in Naples, Vienna

and Constantinople to the effect that there was “a plan agreed upon

between France and Russia for the dismemberment of the Turkish

government.”[840] George III unburdened his soul to the sympathising

Simon Vorontsoff.[841] The Ambassador found Hawkesbury “accablé de

douleur.”[842] The Minister relieved his pent-up feelings in a strong

official note.[843] The Russian mediation he described as “a most

unfriendly act.” He trusted “that the Russian ministers would not permit

the agents of His Imperial Majesty in foreign countries to become agents

under the influence of other powers for the purpose of counteracting the

just pretensions and rights of His Majesty.” Vorontsoff—a warm friend of

Britain—was opposed to the policy of his country. But, being a true

Muscovite, he attacked the policy of the Tsar in the person of Panin, to

whom he attributed all that had taken place.[844]

The ill-humour of the British Government was well-founded. The mere fact

that Russia was pressing upon the Turks a third line of action meant a

division of front that was sure to be to the profit of France. Efforts

were now directed to obtain the admission of a Turkish Plenipotentiary

into the Congress, either as an acceding or a contracting party.[845] If

these succeeded, a separate peace between France and Turkey would be

prevented, and the French Government would have failed “to obtain

greater advantages with respect to the Porte than were held out to her

by the Preliminaries.”[846] The efforts of French diplomacy, naturally,

tended to prevent the admission of the Turks.[847]

Lord Cornwallis raised the question in the sessions of 11th and 18th

February, but on both occasions the French Plenipotentiary, Joseph

Bonaparte, reserved his answer.[848] It was in the session of 21st

February that he delivered what Talleyrand had instructed him to

say.[849] Joseph declared that the Porte had ratified the Preliminaries

of Paris in so far as they conformed to those of London, and so, as they

entirely conformed, they stood ratified. The Porte was, moreover,

anxious to conclude separately with the Republic and had invested Ali

with full powers to that effect. He informed the British of this only

“par honnêteté et déférence.” Only “direct negotiations” could lead to

treaties of peace between such “great” powers as the Republic and

Turkey, otherwise a state of war would only be replaced by a truce. To

act differently was to place both powers in the second order. Both of

them were, on the contrary, first-class states. The French delegate,

however, expressed his readiness to give a pledge that nothing would be

inserted in the treaty to be concluded with the Porte contrary to the

Preliminaries of London.

The statement of Talleyrand was a mass of sophistry and falsehood. Ali

had been pressing to be allowed to proceed to Amiens since January,

1802. In the early days of January, M. d’Hauterive, of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, told him (Talleyrand being then in Lyons) that even if

he went he could not be sure that Cornwallis or Joseph would consent to

negotiate with him. He advised Ali to wait and spend the time “more

agreeably in Paris.” The Turk expostulated on his difficult position. He

even spoke in French, “with a facility and warmth that surprised M.

d’Hauterive.”[850] His efforts proved of no avail.[851] M. Morkoff spoke

to Talleyrand on the subject, but the French Minister pretended that “it

would be too great a humiliation to the Turks not to allow them to

negotiate separately.” The Russian could not help a smile.[852] The

Greek dragoman, Codrika, mysteriously disappeared, and, without him,

Ali—in spite of his warm effusions in French—could transact no

business.[853]

Lord Cornwallis pointed out the falsity of the French statements with

regard to Ali,[854] so much so that Joseph had to request that Ali

should write to the British delegate, “dans le sens des dispositions que

j’ai communiqués dans ma dernière note à ce sujet.”[855] Talleyrand,

however, could not be so easily put out. He now declared that Ali was

instructed to act with Morkoff as well as Cornwallis, that all that was

meant by this was “concert” and not “action simultanée,” otherwise the

Russian envoy would also be admitted to the Congress.[856] On the 12th

March, Joseph Bonaparte, acting on the discretion allowed to him,[857]

“consented” to the admission of the Porte “as an acceding party.” There

followed some debates on the insertion of the words “ally of Great

Britain” with respect to the Porte.[858] The Treaty was finally signed

on the 25th March.

It was a great mistake on the part of the British Government not to

insist on the admission of a Turkish delegate. By presenting an

alternative demand, namely, the accession of the Porte, Britain

facilitated the task of French diplomacy. Separate negotiations were

made thereby inevitable.

The ground had been prepared for them by a letter from Talleyrand to the

Reis Effendi, dated the 18th January, 1802. The threat in it was

unmistakable. “La Sublime Porte,” so it ran, “n’aurait à s’en prendre

qu’à elle-même et à son refus de rétablir les anciens rapports qui

subsistaient entre les deux états, si la France, justement blessée du

peu d’égards que l’on aurait eus pour ses efforts et pour son amitié,

faisait servir son influence et son immense force à faire tourner contre

la puissance qui l’aurait dédaignée tous les événements politiques qui

peuvent avoir lieu.”[859] “The principles of the Porte were staggered,”

wrote Lord Elgin;[860] he had to use threats. He pointed out that—in the

event of acquiescence in the demands of France—he would have to acquaint

the naval and military commanders in the Mediterranean and gave the

warning “that the fate of Egypt would be considered from a different

point of view.”[861] But what could the Turks do? Great Britain had

failed to obtain the admission of their delegate to the Congress. It was

Lord Elgin, himself, who advised them to send to Paris or Amiens “some

person well versed in the situation who, after examining everything

would take a decision on the spot conformable to the state of affairs as

he might find them.”[862]

The advice was highly acceptable, the more so as Tamara had now come

forward with a new Russian proposal. The protests of Great Britain and

Simon Vorontsoff had had their effect in St. Petersburg. All that

happened was laid to the account of the unfortunate Tamara. He was to be

recalled, and, in the meantime, “severely reprimanded.”[863] “There

never was a period,” wrote Lord St. Helens, “even while France and

Russia were actually in a state of professional warfare, when the

Government of this country was less disposed to place confidence in that

of France, or even to keep up with that power the ordinary relations of

amity and good correspondence.”[864] But still Russia could not forego

all share in the Turkish peace. She now proposed that the Franco-Turkish

negotiations should be transacted in Paris under the mediation and

direction of the British and Russian ministers in that capital.[865]

Elgin refused to support Tamara[866] and the Porte satisfied itself by

promising to instruct its plenipotentiary in the sense of the Russian

demand.[867]

The British Cabinet was still in its ill-humour. It refused to accept

the Russian proposal—on the grounds that even if it were reasonable in

itself it came too late.[868] This was another blunder. For it enabled

the First Consul to disregard the Russian demand and have a free hand

with the Turk. Galeb, the Turkish Plenipotentiary, “was a man of much

experience and apt in business, of clear judgment and an accurate

knowledge of the views and interests of the Porte.”[869] But he received

no support from the Allies of the Porte and had to consent to the

according of the navigation of the Black Sea to France.[870]

The Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed on the 25th June, 1802, and

ratified in August of the same year.[871]

This act concluded the pacification of Europe. Commenting on what had

passed, Dr. Rose states that “Bonaparte saw that a separate treaty with

the Sublime Porte would enable him not only to extract valuable trading

concessions in the Black Sea trade, but also to cement a good

understanding with Russia on the Eastern question, which was now being

adroitly reopened by French diplomacy. Against the exclusion of Turkey

from the negotiations at Amiens, Great Britain firmly but vainly

protested. In fact, Talleyrand had bound the Porte to a separate

agreement which promised everything for France and nothing for Turkey,

and seemed to doom the Porte to certain humiliation and probable

partition.”[872] This view is hardly tenable. As has been pointed out,

the action of the First Consul was not exactly directed to “cement a

good understanding with Russia” with a view to a probable partition of

the Turkish Empire. He used Russia, on the contrary, to defeat British

diplomacy and succeeded in depriving Britain of all the advantages which

her occupation of Egypt ought to have conferred upon her. The victory of

Bonaparte did not lie in the terms of the Treaty concluded with

Galeb—for it does not contain anything contrary to the Treaty of

Amiens—but in his contriving to deprive both Russia and Britain of the

strong position in Constantinople which the Expedition to Egypt had

enabled them to occupy, and to regain for France the place which her

attempt to seize Egypt had caused her to lose. “I am anxious to declare

positively,” wrote Lord Elgin, “as a conviction stamped upon my mind by

the whole of this transaction, that Great Britain, in pursuing her

general principles of politics, can never attempt to maintain a

preponderating influence here or rely on any favour or return from hence

for supporting this country after France shall resume her position and

connection in Europe.”[873]

[Footnote 772: Rigault, _Menou_, p. 237.]

[Footnote 773: It is unfortunate that the British Archives possess very

few documents relating to this negotiation.]

[Footnote 774: Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, p.

165.]

[Footnote 775: Otto to Talleyrand, 30 March, 1801. Rigault, _Menou_, p.

237.]

[Footnote 776: Otto to Talleyrand, 3 April, 1801. Rigault, _Menou_, pp.

237-8.]

[Footnote 777: Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, pp.

167-8.]

[Footnote 778: Lucchesini to the King of Prussia, Paris, 17 April, 1801.

Bailleu, _Preussen und Frankreich_, II, p. 38.]

[Footnote 779: Hawkesbury to Otto, 12 April, 1801. F.O. France, 66.]

[Footnote 780: Otto to Talleyrand, 14 April, 1801. Rigault, _Menou_, p.

238.]

[Footnote 781: Otto to Talleyrand, 24 April, 1801. Rigault, op. cit., p.

239. Lady Malmesbury to Minto, 7 May, 1801. _Life and Letters of the

Earl of Minto_, III, p. 217.]

[Footnote 782: Driault, op. cit., p. 185.]

[Footnote 783: Driault., op. cit., pp. 185-6.]

[Footnote 784: On the 9th messidor (9 June, 1801) Reynier, just arrived

in France from Egypt, whence he had been expelled by Menou, sent in an

account of the desperate situation of the French. Rigault, _Menou_, p.

378.]

[Footnote 785: _Correspondance de Napoleon_, VII, 5649. Also Napoleon to

Talleyrand, 16 Sept., 1801. _Correspondance_, VII, 5749.]

[Footnote 786: A copy printed by A. Strahan, London, 1801, is found in

F.O. France, 59. Martens, A. Suppl., II, 543; B., VII, 377. D. Clercq,

I. p. 464.]

[Footnote 787: Article 5.]

[Footnote 788: Dundas to Grenville, 10 Oct., 1801. _Dropmore Papers_,

VII, p. 57.]

[Footnote 789: Baldwin to Dundas, 27 Sept., 1801. _Political

Recollections_, pp. 172, 173, 174. The success in Egypt did not whet the

appetite as much as would be expected. It is rare to find expressions of

opinion on the desirability of annexation. One of these was that of

Colonel Anstruther. See his letter to Brownrigg, 20 April, 1801.

_Dropmore Papers_, VII, p. 10.]

[Footnote 790: St. Vincent to Earl of Uxbridge, 12 Oct., 1801. _Letters

of St. Vincent_, I, p. 285. Navy Records Society Publications, 55.]

[Footnote 791: “. . . It appears both just and reasonable that as His

Majesty had the exclusive merit of rescuing Egypt from the hands of the

French and thereby preserving the integrity of the Turkish dominions

that he should likewise have the exclusive merit of the peace by which

the integrity of these dominions were to be stipulated . . .” Hawkesbury

to St. Helens, 30 March, 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.]

[Footnote 792: Otto to Hawkesbury, 8 vendémiaire, X (30 Sept., 1801).

F.O. France, 66.]

[Footnote 793: Hawkesbury to Otto, 30 Sept., 1801. F.O. France, 66.

Article 15 of the Preliminaries.]

[Footnote 794: The Porte had requested Elgin to inform his government

that the objects of the Porte were, (1) the restoration of Egypt; (2)

the recognition of the Septinsular Republic. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 1

June, 1801 (recd. 17 July). F.O. Turkey, 32. To these the Turks added a

third, namely, France to indemnify the Turks for public and private

property lost in Egypt. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 1 Sept., 1801, (recd. 2

Oct.). F.O. Turkey, 32.]

[Footnote 795: Hawkesbury to Elgin, 3 Oct., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 796: M. Herbette has written a charming book on the anecdotal

history of Ali Effendi’s embassy. At the end he expressed curiosity to

know the ultimate fate of Ali. Ali was beheaded in 1809 (Labour-Maubourg

to Champagny, 13 July, 1809. _Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie_, 219).]

[Footnote 797: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 22 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 798: Jackson to Hawkesbury, Paris, 20 Feb., 1802. F.O. France,

61.]

[Footnote 799: Morkoff to Kotschubey, 20 March-1 April, 1802. Sbornik,

70, p. 387.]

[Footnote 800: Descorches to Bonaparte, 29 messidor, VIII (17 July,

1800). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.]

[Footnote 801: A copy is found in F.O. Turkey, 33. Martens, A,

Supplement, II, p. 556. De Clercq, I, 473. De Testa, I, p. 495.]

[Footnote 802: Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, 13, pp. 266-7. De

Clercq, I, p. 474.]

[Footnote 803: Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, p.

211.]

[Footnote 804: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 5 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.]

[Footnote 805: Morkoff to S. Vorontsoff, 29 Dec., 1801-10 Jan., 1802.

_Archives Vorontsoff_, 20, p. 96.]

[Footnote 806: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 10 Sept., 1801. F.O. Russia,

49.]

[Footnote 807: “Conference” of 13 Aug., 1801. Nicholas Mikailovitch, _Le

Comte Paul Stroganoff_, II, pp. 49-50.]

[Footnote 808: Kotschubey to S. Vorontsoff, 9 Nov., 1801. _Archives

Vorontsoff_, 18, pp. 248-9.]

[Footnote 809: Kotschubey to S. Vorontsoff, 10 Dec., 1801. _Archives

Vorontsoff_, 18, pp. 258-9.]

[Footnote 810: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 17 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia,

50.]

[Footnote 811: Kotschubey to S. Vorontsoff, 10 Dec., 1801. _Archives

Vorontsoff_, 18, pp. 258-9.]

[Footnote 812: Duroc to Bonaparte, St. Petersburg, 16 prairial, IX (4

June, 1801). Sbornik, 70, p. 177.]

[Footnote 813: Caulaincourt to Talleyrand, 6 germinal, X (26 March,

1802). Sbornik, 70, p. 372.]

[Footnote 814: Act of Ratification, 7 radjab, 1216 (12 Nov., 1801). F.O.

Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 815: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 22 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 816: Memorandum to the Porte, 9 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 817: On the margin of the Preliminaries of Paris. F.O. Turkey,

33.]

[Footnote 818: “Memorandum of thanks,” 12 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 819: The Reis Effendi to Talleyrand, the Kaimakam to

Bonaparte, 12 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 820: In many books this mission is either omitted or confused

with the other and more famous mission of Sebastiani. Thiers omits all

mention of it. Campi, _Vie de Sebastiani_, gives a confused account.

There is an excellent account by Coquelle in the _Revue d’Histoire

Diplomatique_ for 1903, No. 3, pp. 439-53.]

[Footnote 821: Bonaparte to Selim, 19 vendémiaire, X (11 Dec., 1801).

_Correspondance_, VII, 5797.]

[Footnote 822: Coquelle, _Rev. d’His. Diplomatique_, 1903, No. 3, pp.

441-2.]

[Footnote 823: This account is based on the report of Sebastiani found

in _Arch. Nat._ AF., IV, 1688.]

[Footnote 824: Coquelle, op. cit., p. 449.]

[Footnote 825: _Corps diplomatique en Constantinople_ (by Sebastiani

(?), date (?) 1801.) Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.]

[Footnote 826: The same document states that Tamara sold his consent to

a new tariff for a sum of money, that he hushed an attack made upon him

and friends by a Turkish crowd for money.]

[Footnote 827: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 828: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 829: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 830: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec.. 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 831: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 12 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 832: Elgin to Hawkesbury 10 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 833: Hawkesbury to S. Vorontsoff, 8. Jan., 1802. F.O. Russia,

50.]

[Footnote 834: Hawkesbury to St. Helens, 19 May, 1801. F.O. Russia, 48.]

[Footnote 835: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 10 July, 1801. F.O. Russia, 48.

_Ibid._, 29 July, 1801. F.O. Russia, 48.]

[Footnote 836: Panin to Vorontsoff, 7 July, 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_,

XI, p. 145.]

[Footnote 837: Panin to Vorontsoff, July, 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_,

XI, p. 145.]

[Footnote 838: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 10 Sept., 1801. F.O. Russia,

49. Panin to Vorontsoff, 9-20 April, 1800. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, p.

113.]

[Footnote 839: Kourakim and Panin to St. Helens, 30 July, 1801. F.O.

Russia, 49.]

[Footnote 840: Hawkesbury to St. Helens, 29 Jan., 1802. F.O. Russia,

50.]

[Footnote 841: “Précis d’entretien à Weymouth,” 27 July-8 Aug., 1801.

_Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, pp. 216-23.]

[Footnote 842: S. Vorontsoff to Tsar, 27 Dec., 1801-8 Jan., 1802.

_Archives Vorontsoff_, X, p. 409.]

[Footnote 843: Hawkesbury to Vorontsoff, 8 Jan., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.]

[Footnote 844: S. Vorontsoff to A. Vorontsoff, 9 Oct., (n.s.) 1801.

_Archives Vorontsoff_, X, p. 136. 2-14 Aug., 1801, pp. 113-19. 5-17

Nov., 1801. In this he calls Panin “Traître,” p. 149. S. Vorontsoff to

Kotschubey, 5-17 Nov., 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, p. 351. 17-29

Jan., 1802, p. 357.]

[Footnote 845: Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 1 Jan., 1802. F.O. France, 59.]

[Footnote 846: Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 28 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60,

and _Correspondence of Lord Cornwallis_, III, p. 462.]

[Footnote 847: Cf. Talleyrand to Joseph, 22 Jan., 1802. Du Casse, op.

cit, 3, pp. 178-9.]

[Footnote 848: Joseph Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 12 Feb., 1802. Du Casse,

_Négociations Relatives aux Traités d’Amiens_, etc., III, pp. 226-7.

Protocol, 18 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60. Du Casse, op. cit., III, pp.

250-1.]

[Footnote 849: Talleyrand to Joseph, 18 Feb., 1802. Du Casse, op. cit.,

pp. 259-60. Protocol, 21 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60, and Du Casse, op.

cit., III, p. 274.]

[Footnote 850: D’Hauterive à Talleyrand, 19 nivôse, X (8 Jan., 1802).

_Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie_, Supplements, 23.]

[Footnote 851: Ali to Cornwallis, 27 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60.

Jackson to Hawkesbury, 10 March, 1802. F.O. France, 61.]

[Footnote 852: Morkoff to S. Vorontsoff, 8-20 March, 1802. _Archives

Vorontsoff_, XX, pp. 122-3.]

[Footnote 853: Jackson to Hawkesbury, 2 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 61, and

Hauterive to Talleyrand, 25 nivôse, X (14 Jan., 1802). _Arch. Aff. Et.

Turquie_, Supplements, 23. Codrika was held to be responsible for the

Preliminaries of Paris and was sure to have his head cut off. (This

certainly in the event of his going to Constantinople, but it is no

reason for his disappearance in Paris.)]

[Footnote 854: Protocol, 9 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit., III, pp.

311-14.]

[Footnote 855: Joseph to Talleyrand, 6 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit.,

III, p. 288.]

[Footnote 856: Talleyrand to Joseph, 8 March, 1802. Du Casse, III, p.

309.]

[Footnote 857: Talleyrand to Joseph, 10, 12 March, 1802. Du Casse, op.

cit., III, pp. 314, 318.]

[Footnote 858: Talleyrand to Joseph, 16 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit.,

III, p. 323. Joseph to Talleyrand, 24, 25 and 26 March, 1802. Du Casse,

op. cit., III, pp. 336-9. Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 17, 20 March, 1802.

F.O. France, 60.]

[Footnote 859: Talleyrand to Reis Effendi, 18 Jan., 1802. Driault, _La

Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, p. 207. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 25

Feb., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.]

[Footnote 860: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.]

[Footnote 861: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 862: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.]

[Footnote 863: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 23 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia,

50.]

[Footnote 864: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 17 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia,

50.]

[Footnote 865: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 5 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.

Tamara to Porte (no date) enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 31 March, 1802.

F.O. Turkey, 35.]

[Footnote 866: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.]

[Footnote 867: Tamara to Elgin, 6-18 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.]

[Footnote 868: Hawkesbury to St. Helens, 30 March, 1802. F.O. Russia,

50.]

[Footnote 869: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 11 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.]

[Footnote 870: Morkoff to Tsar, 18-30 April, 1802. Sbornik, 70, pp.

395-6, about his promise to Talleyrand to support claim to navigation of

Black Sea. Merry to Hawkesbury, 30 June, 1802. F.O. France, 62.]

[Footnote 871: Martens, A. Suppl., III, p. 210; B., VII, p. 416. Clercq,

I, p. 588. Testa, II, p. 146.]

[Footnote 872: J. H. Rose, _Napoleon_, New Edition, I, p. 343.]

[Footnote 873: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.]

X

THE FIRST BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT

1801-1803

The general success of British policy has misled continental writers as

to its essentially conservative trend. One searches in vain for schemes

of expansion or empire; for “it was the active far-seeing and ambitious

statecraft of France which opened up new arenas of strife and ambition,

while Britons followed doubtfully at first, but in the long run

doggedly. Dupleix, Montcalm, and Napoleon—to mention the greatest

names—precipitated a conflict which was ultimately to turn to the profit

of the Sea Power and to plant the Union Jack on many lands.” “C’est

ainsi que presque toujours nous avons ouvert les voies à des nations,

non plus ingénieuses mais plus persévérantes et plus sages que

nous.”[874] writes M. Pelissier, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and

he asks dolefully, “Serons-nous donc toujours destinés à montrer comme

Moïse le chemin de Terre Promise sans qu’il nous soit jamais donné de

nous y établir solidement?”[875]

There can be no better illustration of that characteristic of British

foreign policy than the scrupulous abstention from exploiting the Turko-

British Alliance for commercial privileges in the Levant.[876] Lord

Elgin, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, who drew part of his

appointments from the Levant Company, refrained from seeking openings

for British trade either in the Red or the Black Seas. In point of fact,

Britain did not press the demand for permission to navigate in the

latter sea till after France had obtained it by her treaty with Turkey

of 1802.[877] The far-reaching policy of Wellesley—probably the first of

British statesmen to think, as it were, in terms of imperial

geography—in establishing relations with the Shah of Persia, the Imam of

Muscat and other Arab chiefs was flatly opposed by the Directors of the

Company.[878] Enterprises were dreaded as likely to produce revolutions,

and revolutions were regarded as having no other but injurious effects.

“Egypt,” wrote Captain Blankett to Windham from the Coast of East

Africa, “must not remain in an active state or in active hands.”[879]

This well expresses the thought of the British Cabinet. There is

evidence that the ultimate fate of Egypt was discussed long before it

was decided to send an army to dislodge the French. The decision of

Pitt, Grenville and Dundas, as Lord Elgin then understood it to be, was

that it would be the wish of His Majesty’s Government to restore Egypt

to the Turks.[880]

There was no departure from this principle after the arrival of the news

of the first successes of Sir Ralph Abercromby. The Russian Ambassador,

Simon Vorontsoff, represented to Thomas Grenville, brother of Lord

Grenville, the necessity of “not entirely abandoning” the coast of

Egypt.[881] Lord Grenville, now out of office, recommended Addington,

the new Prime Minister, to adopt the policy of the provisional

occupation of Alexandria and other posts.[882] The new Cabinet “entirely

concurred,”[883] and Hutchinson and Elgin were both instructed to that

effect.[884] But, it should be remembered, the provisional occupation

had been intended from the beginning.[885]

No decision, however, was taken as to the settlement of the affairs of

the country after the expulsion of the French. The only guide the

British Commander had was a private letter from Huskisson.[886] The

Under-Secretary conveyed to Abercromby “various suggestions” which had

occurred to him in consequence of conversations he had had with a “well-

informed gentleman.” Huskisson recognised that a coalition between the

Beys and the French or even their neutrality would add to the

difficulties of the campaign, but feared that “any intercourse” with

them might arouse the “jealousy” of the Turks, the allies of Britain.

He, therefore, recommended “caution and management.” It was reasonable

also to assume that the Beys would not voluntarily declare against the

French, for the Turks had “very foolishly” made clear their intention of

destroying the power of the Mamelukes. It was probable, in consequence,

that the “Cophts,” the Greeks and the mass of the people would side with

the Beys against the Porte. It was also almost certain that none would

respond to any promises, which the Grand Vizier might with “Turkish

treachery” make, till assurances had been given by the British to see

justice done. Were they to give these assurances or not? Huskisson

observed that it was a “most delicate affair,” that Abercromby should

obtain “much information” from Sir Sidney Smith, that if he could secure

the Vizier’s concurrence in detaching the Mamelukes from France it would

be well; but should the Turk, however, “prove headstrong and blind,” the

success of the expedition should by no means be jeopardised through the

“vanity, ignorance and arrogance” of the Turkish Councils and Turkey

should be saved in spite of herself.

This letter makes it clear that the British Government was not ignorant

of the problem. The resolution of the Porte to have done with Mameluke

usurpation had been reported by Elgin and by Tamara, the Russian envoy

at Constantinople.[887] The strained relations between the Turks and the

Beys in the Grand Vizier’s camp had been described by General Koehler,

then attached to Turkish headquarters.[888] Ignorance, therefore, was no

plea for refusing to face a difficulty. It was no solution to recommend

officers not to meddle in Turkish domestic affairs, for an army

operating in a country could not very well avoid interfering in matters

affecting the success of its operations and even its very security.

Events proved this to be so.

Abercromby, before setting foot in Egypt, wrote Mourad—the Bey who had

made his peace with the French—a “general letter of friendship” without

making any specific promises.[889] Sidney Smith had been occupied all

through 1800 in establishing connections with the Beys in Egypt and

Syria.[890] His chief agents in this were the Austrian, Hammer,[891] and

his own secretary, Keith. These activities gave umbrage to the Porte.

Hammer was “banished” by the British commander and Sidney Smith was sent

back to his ship.[892] But Elgin persuaded the Porte to issue a

proclamation promising forgetfulness of the past and rewards for good

conduct.[893] This, however, could have hardly tranquillised Mourad. His

position was difficult. He aspired undoubtedly to regain his old power,

but he was weary of war and by no means certain of the ultimate triumph

of the enemies of France. He feared that the Turks might bestow their

favours on his rival, Ibrahim, who had been with them since 1798. He

feared still more that they would play false with Mouradites and

Ibrahimites alike and take vengeance for past insults and disobedience.

“The arrow,” as he put it, “that struck the eagle was an arrow made of

an eagle’s feather.”[894]

The assurances of the British, however, determined him to cast in his

lot against the French. His scheme,[895] according to Elfi, was to

propose the re-establishment, as far as possible, of things as they were

in 1798; the Beys were to pay the Porte an annual tribute of 1200

purses, besides 30,000 purses for the expenses of the war (in six annual

instalments), the British were to guarantee this settlement in return

for the possession of Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta. Mourad was

actually moving towards the scene of operations when he died of the

plague. His successor, Tambourdji, was a fine warrior but devoid of the

judgment which misfortune had ripened in his predecessor. He sent a

confidential agent to Sir John Hutchinson and deemed the assurances

received sufficient. He joined the British Army on the 15th May,

1801.[896]

It is important to enter closely into the motives of Hutchinson and to

determine, as far as is practicable, the nature of the engagements he

undertook. He himself endeavoured later to justify his conduct on

grounds of military expediency.[897] But his earlier despatches clearly

show that he looked beyond the needs of the hour and tried to settle the

affairs of Egypt for the future. Thus before he left his camp near

Alexandria on the march towards Cairo he wrote[898] Dundas that he was

in doubt as to the real attitude of Mourad, that the Bey seemed to be

the doubtful ally of the French, and certainly not the friend of the

Turks, though he had lately sent a confidential messenger to the Capitan

Pasha soliciting oblivion and pardon, which were granted—probably with

as much sincerity as they were asked. Hutchinson went on to make the

significant observations that the Turks were in a “deplorable state,”

that their Empire was falling to pieces, that he “thought no event so

unlikely as that Egypt would long continue to belong to Turkey, that it

would probably fall to the lot of some European Power.” He expressed

identical views in other reports.[899] In a letter[900] to Lord Elgin,

he made a fuller statement. His position was most difficult. “The Turks

without money, without provisions, without resources of any kind,

pillage or plunder everything that fall into their hands.” Any

interference on his part would arouse their enmity and any acquiescence

would alienate the “natives” from the British. The Sultan’s dominion had

ever been nominal “almost since the time of Selim.” Great Britain,

therefore, would probably give him “a hold of Egypt” which he never

before possessed. But that “temporary hold” would rather weaken than

strengthen the Turkish Empire. The point was that some European power,

probably France, would step in as easily as it did in 1798. How was the

danger to be averted? By the indefinite occupation of Alexandria?

Hutchinson foresaw great objections in this solution. In the first

place, it would entail no less than 7,000 or 8,000 men. In the second

place, the British force must have an unimpeded communication with the

interior and with the mouths of the Nile. The inference to be drawn from

this, but which he avoided drawing, was that Rosetta and Damietta and

posts in the interior would have to be garrisoned as well as Alexandria.

He feared that the “pride, ignorance and jealousy of the Turks would

prevent them ever agreeing to these concessions, that the problem of

Egypt would be an insoluble one and that the Porte would soon revert to

its “old and natural connection with France.”

The proper interpretation of this statement is that the British

commander was convinced that the Turks would prove incapable of

defending the country against France. At the same time he was averse

from laying the burden on his own country. There was nothing for it but

to entrust the Beys with that duty. Hence his engagements to them.

To believe Hutchinson, “he never entered into any stipulations with the

Mamelukes which were not reasonable in the extreme. They had desired

nothing but protection for their lives and security for their properties

under the guarantee of the British government.”[901] But it is certain,

however, that the letter which he wrote them on the 5th May, 1801,[902]

while it is vaguely worded, “opened a large field to their

expectation.”[903] A passage like this, . . . “We have solely come to

drive out the French usurpers who have overset and ruined the country

and to establish all in those possessions and rights, which belonged to

them,” can lend itself to any interpretation. The Beys understood

British promises to mean “an ample indemnification for their losses and

the full restitution of their property, power and influence in the

country”[904] and emphatically called the letter of the 5th May “their

charter.” Elfi was right to criticise the affair as “done without union,

order, or any definite objects.”[905]

The promises were not immediately carried out. The exigencies of the

command allowed Hutchinson time for no more than a “talk” with the

Capitan Pasha. The Turk merely gave “solemn assurances.” After the

surrender of Cairo, the Mamelukes pressed for the performance of the

engagements and pointed out that the Turks were manifesting the “most

hostile intentions” against them. The British general accordingly saw

the Capitan Pasha, but only obtained “fine exclamations.”[906] On the

evening of the 9th July, 1801, he brought the subject before the Grand

Vizier. “His Excellency” expressed his satisfaction, accepted his

intercession and promised to restore the Beys to their villages and

properties. The Capitan Pasha concurred in the views of his colleague

and added a “panegyric” on Hutchinson’s character and the “honesty of

the British Government.” These excellent professions were,

unfortunately, belied by unmistakable symptoms of hostility towards the

Beys. The latter, on the 14th July, made bitter representations and

announced the intention of withdrawing to Upper Egypt, if justice were

not meted out to them. It was most important to avert this step for, it

is to be remembered, Menou was still holding out in Alexandria and

French reinforcements were in daily expectation. The British Commander,

accordingly, “determined to go through with the business and convince

the Turks that he was no longer to be trifled with.”[907]

What passed between him and the Turks is not exactly known. Colonel

Anstruther, who was employed in the business, outlined in a later

statement[908] Hutchinson’s plan as follows:—

1. That the Turks were to possess exclusively Alexandria, Rosetta and

Damietta and keep a garrison in the Citadel of Cairo. This condition,

however, is not stated so definitely in the general’s reports. “He did

not touch upon Alexandria and Rosetta for obvious reasons.”[909] The

“obvious reasons” are the instructions from the Government to occupy

them himself.[910]

2. That the Pasha should be appointed as formerly by the Porte, that he

was to decide all disputes betwixt the Beys, appoint their chiefs in the

event of a vacancy, and have the general government of the country.

3. That the “miri” or land-tax should be augmented and paid without any

deductions whatever to a Turkish receiver-general.

4. That the Beys should be reinstated in all their properties, have the

entire management of them, subject, however, to certain limitations with

regard to the rents to be levied on the peasants and under the

obligation of keeping up a certain number of men in proportion to their

respective properties.

The Beys, after some bickering, accepted these terms. The Turks,

according to British reports, assented to them, after some hesitation,

without reserve.[911] But in his reports to Constantinople, the Grand

Vizier made out that he did nothing of the sort. “En considération des

services qu’il (Hutchinson) avait rendus, le Grand Vizier n’a pas

répondu à sa note par un refus direct pour ne pas lui faire de la peine,

mais il lui adressa un billet en réponse où, sans entrer en détail, il

lui marqua en termes généraux qu’il aurait employé ses soins au sujet

des Beys . . . réponse qui ne porte point le caractère de promesse ou

d’engagement et qui l’on peut moins encore appeler du nom de condition

ou de stipulation quelconque.”[912] The Capitan Pasha disavowed any

share in the transaction.[913]

It was clear that the Turks were determined to carry out none of the

terms they seemed to accept.[914] The Beys had identical intentions. It

is curious that Hutchinson did not realise this. It is possible to

admire his sympathy with the under-dog, but it is difficult to

understand the illusion not only of Hutchinson, but also of his

colleagues as to the real character of the Mamelukes. “Que de

supériorité,” wrote a French _émigré_ in British service, “les Mamelukes

n’avaient-ils sur les Turcs! francs, loyaux, généreux et braves, tous

étaient en leur faveur. Nous les regardons pour ainsi dire comme des

nôtres.”[915] “There never was a stranger mistake than that of these

gentlemen (British officers in Egypt) who thought of reposing confidence

in the honour of the Beys, who believed them to be a highly-minded,

generous race of men, and who seemed almost to fancy in the exaltation

of their romantic enthusiasm that they had found in the Mamelukes the

courage, the sentiments and virtues of heroes.”[916]

The “atmosphere” had thus become most unsuitable for the carrying out of

a scheme long maturing in London. The Cabinet had at its disposal the

clear representations of Hutchinson, but it was not in a hurry to make a

pronouncement. It was not that “His Majesty’s confidential servants were

insensible to the magnitude of the problem, but because circumstances

had unavoidably narrowed it to their views.”[917] “Expert evidence” was

not wanting. J. P. Morier, of the embassy in Constantinople, had been

sent by the Ambassador expressly for the purpose of giving first-hand

information and advice. He examined the problem very fully in an

interesting memorandum of 7th July, 1801.[918] The question was: should

Egypt be delivered to the Turks, whose right was nominal, or to the

Mamelukes whose right was that of conquest? There was no comfort in

either solution, for neither of the two parties could well defend the

country. The failure of the French was, indeed, only due “to the want of

proportion between the means employed and the magnitude of the

enterprise.” In the opinion of Morier, the solution lay along one or

other of three lines. The first was British occupation, open and

unabashed; it was somewhat “naïve” on the part of Mr. Morier to suggest

that the Turks should give, “in return,” “certain commercial

advantages.” An _entente_ between Great Britain and Turkey might

conceivably be created. The Beys, in that event, would naturally pay the

piper. A second alternative was that “Egypt might be kept upon the

principle which the French had adopted,” namely, to take possession of

the country while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Porte and even

offering to pay a tribute. Should this be adopted, “it would be prudent

and politic to reinstate some of the most popular Beys in the

governments of districts contiguous to our own.” (Morier already uses

the possessive pronoun.) To “shuffle” them from one district to another

and to leave with everyone a British “commissary.” The idea was to avoid

the “odium attached to invaders and the difficulties arising from the

prejudices and fanaticism of the ‘natives’ before they had tasted the

sweets of a mild and regular government.” It was to be feared that

Russia and France might unite with Turkey to prevent this from taking

place. A third alternative was to destroy Egypt by inundation. It is

only fair to add that he went on to state that should this be done, his

country “would transmit to posterity a name as black as that of the

incendiary of Ephesus.” Morier was evidently bewildered by the

insolubility of the problem.

The Cabinet adopted none of his alternatives. It reaffirmed its self-

denying ordinance[919] and informed Elgin that under the circumstances

the “obvious policy” would be for Britain to act as far as possible “in

the character of mediator between the different parties.” To help her

agents to arrive at that desirable result, “a paper with the ideas of

the ministers” was sent them. The Ambassador was not to allow it to fall

into anyone’s hand and was to communicate to the Porte only extracts of

it as he thought fit.[920] The ministers were satisfied that the Porte

“appeared to have a just sense of the necessity of their acting upon a

systematic plan for the future government of Egypt,” and were hopeful

“that measures might be suggested which would cause the British name to

be hereafter as much reverenced by all descriptions of the people of

Egypt for procuring to them the blessings of security under a regular

government as they have been taught by the gallant army . . . to respect

it for distinguished valour.”[921]

What were these “ideas of the ministers”?[922] In form they offered the

greatest possible contrast to the creations of Menou’s fertile mind. The

British scheme, as was proper, bore the cachet of the practical; it

burnt no incense to liberty or to equality and omitted to theorise on

“feudal principle” or _impôt unique_. Had it been carried into effect,

however, it would have proved just as revolutionary as any of Menou’s

projects.

It was the first authoritative pronouncement on the problem of Egypt.

The second was the famous Dufferin report of 1883.[923] A slight

comparison between the two documents reveals how fast events had moved

between 1801 and 1883. During the interval, the viceroys had built up

their power, expelled the Turks, welded the heterogeneous elements into

a compact nation, accumulated a burdensome debt and attracted into the

country a powerful _clientèle_ from all lands. The plan of 1801 was

intended to make the presence of the British unnecessary; in 1883 the

British occupation was commencing its indefinite course.[924]

The British ministers summed up the “condition of Egypt” prior to 1798

in three “facts”: the sovereignty of the Porte was nominal, the

Mamelukes were masters of the situation, the people were most wretched.

Had the French been suffered to remain, there could be no doubt that

they would have effected a revolution in the social system of the

country. The same result would have taken place, had Great Britain been

in the place of France. The withdrawal of the British Army would be

followed very probably by a relapse into the anarchy and the oppression

that facilitated the French invasion in 1798. To prevent the recurrence

of the evil the Porte should carry out the following measures; Great

Britain being inclined to take part in the “arrangement.”

1. The rights, privileges and territorial jurisdiction of the Mamelukes

should be ascertained, the nature and extent of their military services

should be defined and the performance of that service should be made the

condition of their tenure.[925]

2. The revenues of the State, from all sources, should be placed under

fixed regulations, the “rates and proportions” to be paid to the State

under each head should be established and the collectors should be

severely punished if they exacted more than was due.

3. A fixed portion of the revenue should be appropriated for the pay and

disbursements of the regular military force to be formed under the

direction of British officers.

4. The “nizamia”[926] troops now serving in Egypt should remain there

and form the nucleus of the new establishment.

5. The remainder of the establishment should be recruited in Egypt,

Albania and other European dominions of the Grand Signior.

6. The chief command should be vested, if possible, in a British

officer, and no payments from the appropriated funds should be made

without his orders.

7. The commander should have the power to make “respectful

remonstrances” to the representative of the Porte in Egypt whenever the

privileges of the Mamelukes, the recognised rights of the people, the

collection or the application of the military funds were infringed.

8. The right of promotion and military administration should be entirely

his.

9. During the continuation of the war, Alexandria should be garrisoned

by troops in the British service to be paid from the appropriated funds.

There could have been no fairer and more beneficial a settlement than

this. But it had from the outset no chance. The “many clashing

interests” were too difficult “to reconcile.”[927] “The Porte refused to

acknowledge what its representatives had agreed to; the interposition of

England was delayed from day to day, in expectation of positive orders

from home, and it appeared that, from the want of a communication

sufficiently full and explicit at first and from the different lights in

which the whole business had been reviewed and represented at Alexandria

and Constantinople, the opinions which were held and acted upon at the

one place were decidedly opposite to those which were held and acted

upon at the other.”[928]

A large share of the responsibility for this unhappy state of affairs

rests with the Ambassador at Constantinople. The “Elgin marbles” have

shed lustre on a diplomat of mediocre ability and doubtful

integrity.[929] Pitt used to describe him as “the most discreet of His

Majesty’s ministers, for he never reveals what he knows even to the

Secretary of State.”[930] With all his “cant jargon,” he was not a match

for the Divan.[931] He was in the habit of delivering “as his own

private opinion” what he had been instructed to communicate to the

Porte. His object was to “commit His Majesty’s ministers as little as

possible.”[932] The mischief of this lay in the fact that what was

communicated as “private opinion” could not, naturally, have with the

Divan the weight of an authoritative statement of the views of the

Government. His desire to commit the Government as little as possible

proceeded from some vague, inarticulate ambition on his part. As early

as February, 1801, he conceived the inactivity of the Turks in the

operations in Egypt to be “a good thing,” as it would entitle Britain

“to some compensation.”[933] Three months later, alluding to the

conversations he had with Pitt, Dundas and Grenville, on the intention

to restore Egypt to the Porte, he observed that “the events . . . which

have taken place in Europe since that period . . . may lead to

combinations that were then unforeseen.”[934] The pity of it is that he

did nothing to prosecute an ambitious scheme.

In the early days of June, 1801, long before the relations of Hutchinson

and the Mamelukes were exactly known, a conference took place between

the Reis Effendi and Elgin on the affairs of Egypt.[935] The Turkish

Minister demanded a provisional British occupation and advice on the

internal settlement.[936] Elgin, who had kept from[937] the Porte—as was

his wont—his instructions to ask authorisation for the garrisoning of

Alexandria by British troops till the general peace, was naturally

delighted that the demand came from the Turks. He affected to see some

obstacles against this, but finally “gave way” and promised to request

Hutchinson to do what he could for the Porte. On the second point, he

“advised,” on the 20th June, the adoption of the following measures: the

separation of the administration of justice and the collection of

revenue from the military establishment, the division of the country

into a number of small pashaliks, the strengthening of the army, the

fixing of the amount of pay and salaries, the bestowal upon the

Mamelukes of the government of the territory above Girgeh in Upper

Egypt, and the conciliation of the Bedouins.[938] He followed this by

sending his secretary, William Hamilton, to Egypt for first-hand

information. But[939] he did nothing to shape the arrangement entered

into by Hutchinson into definite and workable terms. In the month of

September he was still carrying on “inconclusive discussions” on the

extent of British pledges.[940] The Turkish ministers argued that the

British General certainly went beyond the intentions of his Government

if he meant to replace the Beys in their old position and requested the

Ambassador to introduce such modifications in Hutchinson’s pledges “as

might still leave the Mamelukes an adequate compensation for their

services without endangering the government of the Porte,”[941] and to

“propose that each Bey and Kashef should individually collect and ensure

their respective properties, that they should quit Cairo and assume

distinguished situations in other parts of the Turkish Empire and that

the Mamelukes should be received, as a military corps with proper

emoluments, into the service of the Porte.”[942] Elgin admitted that

“the discussion enabled him to see how far he could start negotiating on

the plan of Hawkesbury.”[943] But he never started. His idea was to

visit Egypt himself and settle the matter on the spot,[944] though one

could not help suspecting that the motive was the collection of

antiquities. The Turks affected[945] eagerness that this should take

place soon, and M. Tamara, the Russian envoy, considered that the trip

was “beneficial.”[946] The Ambassador “hoped that if any accident

happened to him, his family might be allowed to consider it as happening

in the execution of duty.”[947] His Excellency, however, was to be

denied the renown of martyrdom. The voyage was postponed from day to

day, till the affair of the separate peace with France made his presence

at Constantinople indispensable.[948]

What passed in the capital thus added to the complications in

Egypt.[949] There was, on the one hand, the deadly rivalry between the

Capitan Pasha and the Grand Vizier and the consequent desire of each of

them to show greater zeal—or, rather, ruthlessness—in the service of the

Sultan.[950] There was, on the other, great dissension and blindness

among the Beys. Some “were little better than beggars at the gates of

the Vizier,” “supplicating indeed through form” but very distrustful:

some “pretended to act with deeper policy” and made friends with Turks

and British, while several were still attached to France.[951] Elfi was

the only one who saw clear and acted well. He advised his brethren to

withdraw from Cairo and frankly put themselves under British protection,

but they very foolishly refused to seek the mediation of

“infidels.”[952] Elfi coolly told them that the Sultan himself had

sought and benefited from the alliance with these very “infidels” and

began to act on his own account. He persuaded the Grand Vizier to let

him proceed to Upper Egypt to collect the estates of several people who

had died in the previous year’s plague without leaving issue. There he

fed the “imperial” cupidity for some time and waited in safety for

events.[953]

“It was plain” that an “explosion” was imminent, but “none ventured to

predict from what quarter it would come.”[954] Hutchinson warned the

Beys not to “enter a Turkish vessel or boat.” But they were too jealous

of each other to show suspicion. At the invitation of the Capitan Pasha,

the leading Mouradites proceeded to Alexandria. General Baird, commander

of the Indian troops in the neighbourhood, took some measures for their

protection.[955] On the 22nd October, 1801, they were embarked in two

barges, but after some time the Capitan Pasha left them on the pretext

of the arrival of important despatches. As soon as he withdrew, the

barges changed course and made towards a large gunboat. “Upon getting

alongside, before they had the opportunity of resistance or even drawing

their swords, they were fired upon from the lower part of the boat and

five of them instantly fell.” The rest were arrested and taken on

board.[956]

Hutchinson believed that the murder was premeditated. He adduced as

evidence the fact that the Pasha ordered the execution of the Greek

sailors, who had completely failed to accomplish the design.[957] The

Greeks fled and took refuge with the British, affirming “on the Gospel”

“that they were told that the Beys were brave and resolute and not

likely to surrender without resistance, that, therefore, they were

determined they should make none and fired upon them before they could

put themselves in a posture of defence.”[958] The Capitan Pasha, on the

other hand, “confessed that he disapproved the mode of attaining the

object (i.e. the arrest of the Beys), that he had at first remonstrated

and had not executed the orders till they were insisted upon by the

Grand Vizier” . . . that the intention was to send them to

Constantinople, that had their destruction been meant, they would have

been slaughtered on board.[959] The “murder” does not seem to have been

a part of the programme, for, almost at the same time, the Grand Vizier

in Cairo was able to apprehend the Ibrahamites without bloodshed.[960]

The Turks thus attempted their own “solution” of the problem. Hutchinson

was infuriated and individual soldiers and officers were even anxious

for a “scuffle.”[961] The British Commander delivered an “ultimatum” for

the delivery of the prisoners and began to march troops to enforce his

demand,[962] though he was most anxious that matters might not be pushed

to extremes.[963] The Turks very wisely liberated the Beys, but feeling

ran so high that the opportunity for a compromise was irreparably

lost.[964] The Turks could never forget that the prize was in their

grasp and had now escaped them.

Elgin awoke at last to the urgency of the problem.[965] He decided to

send Mr. Straton, the Secretary of the Embassy, to settle the quarrel.

He was now convinced “that His Majesty’s intention of not interfering in

the internal affairs of Egypt was ever distinct and positive, that no

engagement of Sir John Hutchinson’s could be right if of a nature to

endanger the authority of the Porte.”[966] Straton was, accordingly,

instructed to persuade the Beys to leave the country, and was even

authorised “to engage in his name that they should be received in

England or British-India and should enjoy pensions equal to those

offered by the Porte in return for military service.”[967]

Arrived in Egypt, Straton communicated his instructions to Lord Cavan,

the successor of Hutchinson. The new commander, however, made it clear

that “he neither could nor would use any violent means to send the Beys

out of Egypt or even to detain them at Gizeh[968] longer than they

should think proper.”[969] But he sounded the Beys secretly. They flatly

refused to consent to exile and announced their intention to withdraw to

Upper Egypt. The Turks tried to prevent this. But Cavan would neither

consent to detain them nor to issue, at the request of the Grand Vizier,

a statement denying the assertion that the Beys were under British

protection. He based his refusal on the curious plea—after all that had

passed—that such an act would constitute an interference in Turkish

domestic affairs.[970]

Cavan thus was certainly not the partisan of the Turks that he was taken

to be, nor did his command mark, as some French historians allege, a

change on the part of Great Britain from patronising the Mamelukes to

throwing them overboard.[971] It was true that neither he nor Straton

were very capable:[972] but under the circumstances the failure simply

could not be averted. The Beys left for Upper Egypt on 25th January,

1802, and a dismal chapter in the history of the country began.[973]

When the unfortunate event of October was known in London, the good

opinion entertained of the Turk received a serious setback. A British

Government could hardly refuse to approve an act of humanity on the part

of its generals.[974] The Ambassador was instructed to express

disapproval of the conduct of the Turkish officials “in a calm and

temperate manner.”[975] But the Addington Administration was weak. It

was only too conscious of the importance of settling the affairs of

Egypt, but it was lost between the clashing opinions submitted to it.

Lord Elgin, on the one hand, was sending veiled attacks on the conduct

of the generals and expatiating—rather boldly—on the “humaneness” of the

Turk.[976] Lord Hutchinson, on the other, was ruthlessly tearing into

shreds the plan, which the ministers had brought forth with exaggerated

hopefulness. Hutchinson, it is important to remember, did not receive

that plan till after the “massacre” had taken place and he himself had

left the country.[977] This naturally colours his criticism; but, still,

his comments possess more than passing interest. The question was not

the future of this or that Ottoman province: it was the prospects of

Turkish Reform.

[978]Hutchinson thought that though the Mameluke system “was certainly

not to be applauded,” it was “toleration and mildness” when compared to

that of the Turks. It had the advantage, moreover, of being the one to

which the inhabitants had become used. As to the suggested employment of

Albanians, it was, in his opinion, fraught with danger: they were too

“ferocious” to be useful, they would not serve under Christian officers,

but would only follow “some favourable officer, who had probably been a

robber,” like Tahir Pasha, their “present” commander. The Turks, also,

would only employ “renegadoes.” They were, besides, “not susceptible of

improvement”; and “he never could betray his own opinion so far as to

assert that the presence of the British officers had instilled one

single principle of military order or discipline amongst them.”

The “proposed financial arrangement” was certainly most desirable, but

it would “take years of peace, order and good government to effectuate”

and, in the end, the difficulties might prove insurmountable. The French

example was instructive. They attempted “some changes,” but ended by

giving them up and resorting to the traditional bastinado. The British,

after all was said and done, would have to take the whole arrangement

into their own hands or else the funds would be misapplied and the

troops would mutiny. He could only, therefore, give a “decided opinion”

against “entering into any permanent arrangement with the Turks for

Egypt,” “for the country that adopted them would soon repent of its

error and find that it was hanging a living body to a putrid carcass.”

“As for establishing a regular system of government in Egypt with the

Turks in the country, no man could conceive it probable. Before it could

take place, a revolution in their habits, their morals and their

government must occur. They must be taught to think as they never yet

thought and to act as they never yet had acted. It was not in the power

or competency of any foreign nation to effect such a reformation.

Inveterate habit had so confirmed their abominable system that he was

thoroughly convinced it would never change but with the downfall of

their Empire.”

There was great truth in all this, but only a Pitt would have had the

strength to “take it or leave it.” As it happened, Stuart gave the

Government different and more congenial advice and thus occasioned

another compromise.[979] In his view, the best policy would be “to

endeavour to restore in its true spirit the Mameluke Government,

increasing perhaps the tribute of the Beys under British guarantee.”

This guarantee would necessitate the presence of a British officer as

agent, who might remonstrate against infractions and even receive the

dues of the Porte. The advantage of this arrangement would be to secure

the good-will and gratitude of the Mamelukes. These were certain—when

left to themselves—to drive out the Turks, so Great Britain might as

well help them and attach them to herself. He believed that they would

prove “the most efficient barrier and now the only one within reach

against the immediate enterprises of the French,” and that they were

inclined to submit to “partial sacrifices,” and he recommended that

whatever plan might be adopted the Turks should not be left “in

dominion.”

The Government decided to send Stuart on a mission of reconciliation. He

was given the chief command in Egypt[980] and was instructed[981] to go

first to Constantinople and, then, in concert with the Ambassador, to

persuade the Porte “to restore the _status quo_ with an augmentation of

the tribute. Should this prove unacceptable, Stuart was to advise the

Divan to grant the Beys the Upper Egyptian provinces above Gizeh.” The

ministers expressed their anxiety that a settlement should be arrived at

before the evacuation took place, as the occupation would not be

prolonged—except from an “indispensable necessity”—beyond the month of

July (1802). They, however, passed over in silence some significant

queries raised by the General.[982] He had asked what he should do if

the Turks and the Mamelukes were in “active hostility” and one party had

acquired such advantages as should indispose it against reconciliation,

or if the Turks still adhered to their original scheme of exile and

showed an “intention” of calling in French help, or if they accepted

British mediation, but requested a guarantee for the execution of an

agreed arrangement. What should he do if the Porte “requested” him to

postpone the evacuation? Again, supposing that by the time he arrived in

Egypt, the British force had been withdrawn “by any construction of

orders,” what should be his conduct? Stuart had an “object” in all this.

He hinted at establishing a connection with the Mamelukes at the expense

of the Porte and postponing the withdrawal _sine die_. But the

Government, and this should be noted in view of French

misstatements,[983] did not gratify him.

Stuart arrived at Constantinople on the 19th July, 1802. On the 22nd, he

and Straton (Lord Elgin was then voyaging for the benefit of his health

and his collections) conferred with the Reis Effendi. The Porte refused

either to restore the Beys to their old position or to grant them Upper

Egypt, and held to the project of expulsion, but with double the

pensions originally promised. Its argument was unanswerable. The

question was not “whether the Beys should or should not be rich or

powerful subjects of the Sultan, but whether the Sultan or they should

be the sovereign of Egypt.[984] There was nothing to do; and Stuart had

to proceed to Egypt empty-handed save for “warm praise” and the “Order

of the Crescent.”[985]

The Turks were, in truth, in no mood for concessions. “The issue of the

affair had caused the deepest and most universal mortification among

them. They well knew that the claims of the Beys were claims for the

sovereignty of the country, and that under all former circumstances the

contest had ended fatally for the Porte. Even in the conferences with

Straton,[986] the Beys in demanding Upper Egypt refused at the same time

to give up their houses at Cairo, insinuating that they would soon have

occasion for them.”[987] There is a “traveller’s tale” that the Capitan

Pasha received Stuart in a room which he had taken care to “infect” with

the breath of two persons dying from the plague; he, as a good Turk,

never worrying about himself, though his dragoman, Prince Callimachi,

being in the secret, was “shivering with terror.”[988] The

disappointment at the failure of their first attempt confirmed them in

their obstinacy, and “pride as well as policy contributed an impulse to

their resolution.”[989] “They were only waiting for the evacuation of

Egypt ‘to act systematically against the Beys, being resolved on their

destruction.’”[990] “This was not only a resolution of the Divan but a

plan congenial to their ideas and suited to their mode of warfare.”[991]

They, moreover, “conceived that the evacuation was no longer at the

discretion of Britain,” and Stuart lamented that “he had no power to

refer to it as conditional upon settling the affairs of the Beys.”[992]

“It would have been a very effective argument.”[993] Elgin once, rather

naïvely, expressed his disappointment that the Reis Effendi “did not

even insinuate a wish for the continuance” of the British

occupation.[994] In the heat of discussion, the Turkish Minister once

“slipped” something about calling in the “aid” of Russia in the affairs

of Egypt, and quickly solicited Elgin to take no notice of it.[995]

One of the motives for this ardent desire to have the country evacuated

was to allow the First Consul—now that he had made his peace with the

Sultan—no pretext for bickering and interference. A man like Napoleon

could not fail to take umbrage at the continued infraction of the terms

of the Treaty of Amiens. Stuart, apparently, had no mind to evacuate. He

turned out the Turks from some forts, which Cavan had allowed them to

garrison, and put down “disorderliness” on their part with a ruthless

hand.[996] He professed to believe that the withdrawal of his army “had

become an event of great seeming uncertainty.”[997] The First Consul was

fully informed of this state of affairs. There was not yet a French

official representative in Cairo; but there was no lack of

correspondents. There was Royer, the chief “pharmacist” of the Army of

the East. He had been suspected of having poisoned some of the wounded

soldiers during the Syrian campaign and of trafficking in liquor. He,

apparently, thought it advisable to remain in Egypt after the expulsion

of the French.[998] Another correspondent was Mengin, the future

historian of Mehemet Ali.[999] Of the others mention might be made of

the monk Raphaïl and the “scribe” Mikhaïl Sabbagh,[1000] both of them

Syrians. The Beys, Ibrahim and Bardissy, had also been sending petitions

to the First Consul, abusing their British “protectors” and clamouring

for help.[1001] So much for the “loyalty and sincerity” of the “heroes”

of Hutchinson and Stuart! There were also some letters from Sheikh El

Messiry, the leading “savant” of Alexandria: they were simply

complimentary epistles.[1002]

These communications seemed to have led Napoleon to seek more

information on the real position of affairs. Hence the new mission of

Colonel Sebastiani to the Levant. The colonel was a Corsican “not

deficient in talents but a great coxcomb.”[1003] He possessed in an

ample degree the “swagger” deemed essential for service in the East, for

missions of _éclat_ and for heightening prestige.

Sebastiani was instructed[1004] to proceed first to Tripoli to obtain

the Pasha’s recognition of the flag of the new Italian Republic, and

then to Egypt. He must take note of everything of interest: the

“situation” in the harbour of Alexandria, the British and Turkish forces

there, the condition of the fortifications, the history of what had

taken place after the expulsion of the French, the condition of the

people, the views of leading men. In Cairo, Sebastiani was to do the

same thing. He must repeat to all and sundry “agreeable things on the

part of Napoleon,” for example, he could tell them “that he loved the

Egyptians, and desired their happiness, that he often talked about

them.” He was to inform Khosrev, the new Viceroy, of his intention to

send an official agent for commercial relations and to find out if the

First Consul could offer his good offices for settling the “differences”

with the Beys. Sebastiani also carried a letter from Talleyrand to

Khosrev, in which the object of the mission was declared to be the

finding out whether the country had been evacuated or not. This was held

to precede the arrival of an official agent.[1005]

Having accomplished successfully his mission in Tripoli[1006] Sebastiani

arrived in Alexandria on 10th September, 1802.[1007] On the same day he

called on Stuart and demanded the prompt execution of the Treaty. The

British general at first gave a “vague answer,” but, when pressed,

declared that he thought that neither Malta nor Egypt was to be

evacuated before a treaty of commerce between France and Britain had

been concluded. Sebastiani thought that Stuart was “excessively vain,

though of mediocre ability,” that he wanted to remain in Alexandria “to

have himself talked about,” that he, therefore, sent his Government

“alarming” reports to retard the evacuation. The Turks, on the other

hand, expressed anxiety at the apparently “interminable” occupation;

while the inhabitants, who were under the illusion that Sebastiani came

to take possession of their city, were “overjoyed” so long as the

illusion lasted. All the way to Cairo, he was met—if he can be

believed—by demonstrations of joy and attachment to France and the

“person” of Napoleon. But in the capital the Viceroy—though courteous

and lavish in flattering expressions—maintained towards him the attitude

he had invariably held towards Stuart, and rejected the proffered good

offices, remarking that Constantinople was the proper place for

them.[1008] Sebastiani, consequently, solaced himself with interviews

with various Sheikhs and leading Christians, and expatiated in his

report on their enthusiasm at seeing portraits of the First Consul. He

himself, however, admitted that “three or four” of the most eminent

savants abstained from meeting him in order not to “compromise”

themselves. One of his companions—and Sebastiani himself narrated it,

though in a diluted form—described how the party were obliged to hide

themselves, fearing a hostile demonstration on the part of the

inhabitants.[1009] Djabarti—usually very well-informed—merely notes the

arrival of a “French ambassador.”[1010] His relations with the Beys—it

should be remembered that he was not meant to establish any “connection”

with them—did not amount to more than assurances of the disposition of

Napoleon to mediate between them and the Porte to the advantage of both

parties.

This did not amount to much. But the mission[1011] and the publication

in the _Moniteur_—the official organ—of extracts from the Report were

destined to have important effects. The Porte was greatly alarmed,

although Napoleon tried to prevent this by omitting from the published

version most of the strongest assertions of Sebastiani. The new French

Ambassador, General Brune, in Constantinople, presented the Divan with a

mild translation of the document,[1012] but the enemies of France took

good care not to let the opportunity slip. Fonton, the French dragoman

of the Russian Legation—“cet homme qui a perdu sans ressource (_sic_:

retour?) tout sentiment français, dont le cœur ne s’ouvre plus qu’à la

haine et qui déteste d’autant plus son pays qu’il le trahit tous les

jours”[1013]—made an accurate translation of the report and had it

transmitted to the Sultan himself.[1014] The alarm led to a

rapprochement between the Turks and the British. “The Turkish Minister

spoke with great emotion, expressing the sincerity of the friendship of

the Porte towards Great Britain and its determination to meet every

event with firmness.”[1015]

The mission also revived the hopes of the Beys of French help. Bardissy

and Ibrahim made new appeals to the First Consul;[1016] but they did

not, however, abate anything of their professions to the British. They

even moved from Upper Egypt to the neighbourhood of Alexandria, with the

object of being close to Stuart. It seemed that they succeeded in

deceiving him, for he warmly denied that they had any relations with

France, calling this one of Sebastiani’s “inventions.”[1017]

Piqued by the conduct of the Frenchman and the continued silence of the

Government[1018] and hoping against hope that something might “turn up”

to prevent the evacuation, he took upon himself to postpone the carrying

out of the orders[1019] for withdrawal and resolved to do

something.[1020] “It was painful for him as a soldier and as a man to be

a tame spectator of carnage almost at his very gates.”[1021]

The result was the mission of Lord Blantyre[1022]—one of his aides-de-

camp—to Constantinople. That officer found Elgin on the eve of returning

to England and, therefore, most anxious to settle the long-protracted

quarrel. Reading in Stuart’s instructions “that the Beys would acquiesce

in any terms short of exile”—words which Stuart did not mean to be taken

too literally[1023]—he entered on the negotiations with a light heart.

The outcome of them was neither a treaty nor a convention, but

instructions to the Viceroy to grant the Beys the imperial pardon and

the rocky province of Aswan in the extreme south of the country.[1024]

The Reis Effendi affirmed to Brune that Elgin tried hard, but in vain,

to add a guarantee on the part of Britain.[1025] The Turks secured,

thus, the advantage of making the _rôle_ of the British the rather

modest one of “carrying the agreement to Alexandria.”[1026] They had the

impudence to ask Blantyre to sign a document in the name of Stuart to

the effect that the affair had been finally settled to his satisfaction,

and that there was nothing further to be expected or asked from the

Porte,[1027] and to vaunt the concession as an act of friendship to

Great Britain.[1028]

It was no great consolation to Stuart that the Porte had climbed down

from its old scheme of the wholesale expulsion of the Mamelukes. He

bitterly observed that “deception had been the instrument as well as the

object of the Turks in the whole of this unpleasant question and that it

was not difficult to discover that even the present concession . . . was

far less a testimony of their respect, however professed, to the wishes

of our government than of their alarm from the threatened interposition

of France.”[1029] He had, however, to evacuate the country in March,

1803.

Before he did so, he took some important steps. He took advantage of

Khosrev’s demand for a “liaison” officer—intended naturally to reside in

Cairo during the British occupation—and for the “loan” of an officer of

the engineers, to fix Major Missett as agent for the British Government

and Major Hayes to help in the repair of the fortifications.[1030] Their

presence was considered to prove advantageous “when neither Turks nor

Mamelukes should any longer be overawed by the presence of the British

Army and when they should lose their recollection of the wholesome

counsel of the British commander, given as it had been to them from the

most upright and disinterested views and supported by a calm,

conciliatory and dignified conduct.”[1031] Missett was instructed to

send in accounts of the councils of the Viceroy, to forward the views of

the British Government, to counteract the intrigues of the French and to

avoid interfering between the Turks and the Mamelukes and in internal

concerns except on orders from the Government.[1032] At the same time he

gave the Beys secret supplies of arms and ammunition,[1033] describing

it as a price for their retirement into Upper Egypt.[1034] In truth no

price was necessary, for with the withdrawal of the British there was no

point in the Mamelukes remaining in the barren territory near

Alexandria. He, further still, revealed his policy by taking with him

Elfi Bey. That Bey had been thinking for some time of “emigrating,[1035]

and his brethren were anxious to rid themselves of a masterful colleague

by sending him to London as their official representative.”[1036]

Stuart, however, refused to accept him in that character. The point is

of no great practical importance, since he admitted that the voyage of

Elfi “suggested an opening to a chain of influences which he thought

might be cultivated” and that “as the Bey’s consideration was high with

both Mamelukes and Arabs, he might be a forcible instrument in the hands

of government in the event of those occurrences against which (the

government) had expressed such desire to be prepared, and at the same

time counteract any project of the French to build a rival interest with

those parties in their disappointment at our departure.”[1037]

Thus ended the first British occupation of Egypt, and with it the

possibility of effective interference in her domestic concerns.

[Footnote 874: Pelissier, _Histoire de la Diplomatie française dans le

Levant_. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie. _Mémoires et Documents_, 63, p. 125.]

[Footnote 875: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 876: “. . . I expected to be instructed to get some benefit

for the East India Company from the conquest of Egypt, but received none

. . .” Lord Elgin to the Directors. Castlereagh, _Memoirs and

Correspondence_, V, pp. 167, 168.]

[Footnote 877: With regard to the Red Sea, that has been invariably the

position in the latter half of the eighteenth century, e.g.:

(_a_) Lord North considered the opening of the Red Sea route as highly

prejudicial to the East India Company. Bruce, _Travels_, IV, p. 633.

(_b_) The same motive led to the rejection of Warren Hastings’ treaty

with the Beys. Taylor, _Considerations_, pp. 12-13.

Cf. on the whole question the excellent book by M. Charles-Roux, _Autour

d’une route_.

As for the Black Sea:

Spencer Smith had obtained the right in 1799, but it seemed to have been

allowed to lapse on account of the prohibition of imports from Russia.

Elgin despatch, 11 July, 1800:

Elgin, in his despatch of 11 July, 1800 (F.O. Turkey, 29), alludes to

conversations he had with Pitt and Grenville on the “inexpediency of

opening that trade.” He repeats this in despatch of 31 May, 1801 (F.O.

Turkey, 32). Before this last despatch reached London, Hawkesbury had,

on the representations of the Levant Company (Levant Company to

Hawkesbury, no date, F.O. Turkey, 31), instructed Elgin to obtain the

privilege (Hawkesbury to Elgin, 28 July, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32). But

soon, however, he changed his orders. On the 10 May, 1802, he wrote that

after weighing the advantages and disadvantages it was thought better to

leave things as they were. But if France obtained this, Great Britain

should have it (F.O. Turkey, 36). The Porte itself extended the

privilege to Great Britain after giving it to France. (Note from the

Porte to Straton, 29 July, 1802, enclosed in Straton’s despatch of 3

Aug. F.O. Turkey, 37).]

[Footnote 878: B.M. Add. MSS. 37275, f. 98. Dundas to Wellesley, 11

July, 1800.]

[Footnote 879: 16 Jan., 1799. B.M. Add. MSS. 37878, f. 78.]

[Footnote 880: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.]

[Footnote 881: Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 7 May, 1801. _Dropmore

Papers_, VII, p. 15.]

[Footnote 882: Grenville to Addington, 8 May, 1801. _Dropmore Papers_,

VII, p. 16.]

[Footnote 883: Addington to Grenville, 12 May, 1801. _Ibid._, VII, p.

18.]

[Footnote 884: Instructions to Hutchinson, 19 May, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and

W.O. 1, 345. Instructions to Elgin, 19 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.]

[Footnote 885: Instructions to Sir R. Abercromby, 6 Oct., 1800. W.O. 6,

21.]

[Footnote 886: Huskisson to Sir R. Abercromby, 23 Dec., 1800, enclosed

in Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 Sept., 1801. W.O. I, 345.]

[Footnote 887: Tamara’s despatch, 16 (28) Feb., 1800. F.O. Russia, 46.

Morier to Elgin, March [_sic_], 1800, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 22

April, 1800. F.O. Turkey, 29.

Elgin-Grenville, 22 Dec., 1800 (received 8 Feb., 1801). F.O. Turkey,

30.]

[Footnote 888: Koehler to Grenville, 15 July, 1800. F.O. Turkey, 27.]

[Footnote 889: Colonel Anstruther: a statement of what passed between

the British and the Mamelukes, 8 May, 1802. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 346.

Also a letter from Holloway, attached to Turkish headquarters, to Elfi,

assuring him of protection, 25 Jan., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 34 (military).]

[Footnote 890: A letter supposed to be from Keith to General Smith

(uncle of Sir Sidney), 30 Jan., 1801. Barrow, _Life of Sir Sidney

Smith_, I, p. 340.

Sidney Smith to Hutchinson, 6 July, 1801. _Ibid._, I, p. 432.

Sidney Smith to Mamelukes (no date), enclosed in a despatch from Koehler

to Elgin, 8 Dec., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 27 (military).]

[Footnote 891: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 26 Aug., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.

Elgin thinks Hammer to be an Austrian spy.]

[Footnote 892: Pisani to Elgin, 8 Aug., 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s

despatch of 26 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 32.

Sidney Smith to Christopher Hutchinson (brother of the general), 23

June, 1801. Barrow, op. cit., I, p. 428.

Hutchinson to Sidney Smith (no date, probably in Aug., 1801). Barrow,

op. cit., I, p. 433.

Sidney Smith to Hutchinson, 28 Aug., 1801. Barrow, op cit., I, p. 434.

He attributes his “recall” to Turkish annoyance at his preventing a

massacre at Rosetta and to “army and navy stuff” (i.e. jealousy). This

is confirmed by Wilson, _History of the Expedition_, p. 65, and by the

anonymous author of a _Journal_, p. 80 note, and by E. D. Clarke,

_Travels_, Part II, p. 272.]

[Footnote 893: Enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 24 Feb., 1801. F.O. Turkey,

31.]

[Footnote 894: Mourad to Sidney Smith, 2 April, 1801. Randolph, _Life of

Wilson_, I, p. 165.]

[Footnote 895: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 72.]

[Footnote 896: Hutchinson to Hobart, 1 June, 1801. W.O. 1, 345. He

describes them as numbering 1500 cavalry—inferior certainly to none in

the world.]

[Footnote 897: Hutchinson-Hobart, 21 September, 1801. W.O. 1, 345. The

overtures of the Mamelukes were received by him “at the most critical

period of the campaign.”]

[Footnote 898: Hutchinson to Dundas, 3 April, 1801. W.O. 1, 345.]

[Footnote 899: Hutchinson to Dundas, 20 April, 1801 (private). W.O. I,

345. He states that the Turks are “more mischievous to their friends

than to their enemies. . . .”

Hutchinson to Hobart, 2 June, 1801. W.O. 1, 345. “. . . If the Turks

were as strong as they are barbarous, they might exterminate one half of

the population and then endeavour to govern in their manner those that

remained, but I think at this moment if the British and the French were

out of the country, the Mamelukes, Arabs and Greeks would be an entire

overmatch for the Turks. . . .”

Hutchinson to Hobart, 29 June, 1801; 16 Aug., 1801; 19 Aug., 1801. W.O.

1, 345.]

[Footnote 900: Hutchinson to Elgin, 25 April, 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s

despatch, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.]

[Footnote 901: Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 Sept., 1801. W.O. 1, 345.]

[Footnote 902: Hutchinson to Osman Bey, 5 May, 1801, enclosed in

Straton’s despatch, 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 37.]

[Footnote 903: Stuart to Sullivan, 1 Dec., 1803. W.O. 1, 347.]

[Footnote 904: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 4.]

[Footnote 905: _Ibid._, p. 72.]

[Footnote 906: Hutchinson to Elgin, 25 July, 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s

despatch, 26 Aug., 1801, F.O. Turkey, 32.]

[Footnote 907: Hutchinson to Elgin, 25 July, 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s

despatch, 26 Aug., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.]

[Footnote 908: Anstruther’s statement, 8 May, 1802. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O.

1, 346.]

[Footnote 909: Hutchinson’s letter above cited, note 1.]

[Footnote 910: Page 157 above.]

[Footnote 911: Anstruther’s statement, W.O. 6, 21 and W.O. 1, 346.

Hamilton gives a similar assertion, but adds that the agreement was not

concluded with the usual solemnity and forms. _Ægyptiaca_, p. 4.

Wilson, _History of the Expedition_, pp. 173-4.

Hutchinson to Sidney Smith (no date, probably Aug., 1801). Barrow, op.

cit., I, p. 433.]

[Footnote 912: Porte to Elgin, 15 rajab, 1216 (20 Nov., 1801), enclosed

in Elgin’s despatch 5 Jan., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 913: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 19 Oct., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.]

[Footnote 914: “. . . I am sorry I cannot change the disposition of the

Turks nor trust to any promises they make. . . .” Hutchinson to Hobart,

21 Sept., 1801. W.O. 1, 345.]

[Footnote 915: De Noe, _Mémoires_, p. 244.]

[Footnote 916: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 25 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.]

[Footnote 917: Hobart to Hutchinson, 10 July, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O.

1, 345.]

[Footnote 918: Elgin-Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32,

informing the minister of the sending of Morier.

Memorandum of Morier with a covering letter to Hammond, 7 July, 1801.

F.O. Turkey, 32.]

[Footnote 919: “. . . the sole object is the expulsion of the French,

and if any garrisons in Egypt remain during the war it is to prevent a

French invasion.” Hobart to Hutchinson, 10 July, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and

W.O. 1, 345.]

[Footnote 920: Hawkesbury to Elgin, 28 July, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32. But

the “plan” is not enclosed; it may be noted that the volume contains

only “drafts” from the minister, the “originals” being in Cambridge.]

[Footnote 921: Hobart to Hutchinson, 22 July, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O.

1, 345.]

[Footnote 922: The plan was enclosed in Hobart to Hutchinson, 12 Oct.,

1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 345; in Hobart to Fox (the Commander-in-

Chief in the Mediterranean), 12 Oct., 1801. W.O. 6, 55.]

[Footnote 923: There is a good account of the mission and report of Lord

Dufferin in D. Mackenzie Wallace, _Egypt and the Egyptian Question_,

Chap. XII.]

[Footnote 924: Features of the scheme resemble the provisions in the

Treaties which were entered into by the East India Company and native

provinces and which ended virtually in British rule. Lord Hobart, the

Secretary of State for War and Colonies in the Addington Administration

had been governor of Madras for some years previously. It is possible

that he was the author of the scheme for Egypt. The evidence points to a

_bona fide_ attempt to render the presence of British troops

unnecessary.]

[Footnote 925: This reveals the common mistake that Egyptian society was

feudal. Cf. Chap. VIII.]

[Footnote 926: “Nizamia” was the name given to the new corps created by

Selim and drilled _à l’Européenne_.]

[Footnote 927: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 6.]

[Footnote 928: _Ibid._, p. 8. Cf. also pp. 336-7.]

[Footnote 929: The “financial transactions” of Lord Elgin are treated in

the Appendix.]

[Footnote 930: Lady Malmesbury to Minto, 7 May, 1801. _Letters of Lord

Minto_, III, p. 217.]

[Footnote 931: Hutchinson to Fox, 7 Jan., 1802. B.M. Add. MSS. 37053, f.

9.]

[Footnote 932: Straton to Hawkesbury, 15 April, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 37.]

[Footnote 933: Elgin to Grenville, 9 Feb., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.]

[Footnote 934: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.]

[Footnote 935: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 10 June-12 June, 1801. F.O. Turkey,

32.]

[Footnote 936: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 937: Elgin to Grenville, 21 Nov., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 30.