Tracing the attitude of the French Government towards the Army of the
East, we find that its first measure was to stop the departure of the
second expedition upon whose arrival in Egypt Bonaparte was
counting.[492] The cause was the news of the presence of a strong
English fleet in the Mediterranean. Nor were the diplomatic measures, as
arranged with the same general, carried out. Talleyrand, who had played
such an important part during the early history of the Expedition, was
among the foremost to abandon it. He did not proceed to Constantinople
as had been agreed. His attitude in this matter is not clear.[493] It
seems that his acceptance of the post of Ambassador was decided upon
only “in principle,” and that the “affair” was really one between
Bonaparte and Talleyrand. The former, for instance, spoke, in letters of
May 23rd and June 18th, of the departure of the latter to
Constantinople; but, in despatches of the same date addressed to the
Directory, he did not refer to it at all.[494] This noteworthy fact
points to another conclusion; namely, Bonaparte’s desire to exercise
direct control from his headquarters at Cairo over the negotiations.
This is further strengthened by the fact that after sailing from Toulon
he instructed Talleyrand to hold himself in readiness but not to leave
before another order and chose for him the long sea route instead of the
shorter one via Ancona and Corfu. The frigate he sent him for that
purpose was captured by the English on June 27th.[495] Talleyrand, by
that time, had changed his mind. Fear of the “Castle of Seven Towers”
has been alleged as the cause; but this explanation is hardly
satisfactory, for at that time the prospects at Constantinople were not
so gloomy for France. De la Jonquière’s conjecture, on the other hand,
that the Directory kept him to make use of his abilities in the rising
complications is not more satisfactory; for it did not set great value
on these abilities. The truth is that to Talleyrand as well as to
Bonaparte “the East seemed to offer compensation . . . and yet neither
of them dreamt of leaving the West except with great reluctance.”[496]
Finding his position more secure, the ex-bishop gave up all thought of
going to the Bosphorus, and proposed another man, Descorches, for the
post.[497]
The latter was appointed Ambassador on September 2nd, and in spite of
the despondent despatches of Ruffin and of the news of the destruction
of the French fleet which had immediately followed the joyful tidings of
the successful landing in Egypt, the hope that the Porte would not
declare war was not lost. On September 19th, for instance, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs submitted a note on the subject of the presents which
Descorches was to make to the dignitaries of the Divan.[498] The
instructions of the new Ambassador, moreover, did not differ materially
from the _projet_ which the Minister had drawn up at the outset.[499]
This hope, however, was soon destroyed by the news of Ruffin’s
imprisonment. The departure of the Ambassador was suspended[500] and
Bonaparte was plainly informed in a despatch of November 4th that he was
to rely on his own judgment and that the Directory, not being in a
position to support him, refrained from sending orders or
instructions.[501] This important despatch further stated that the
Neapolitan troops were about to take the field and that an Austrian
division had violated the neutrality of Switzerland, and, in view of
these complications, a levy of 200,000 Frenchmen had been ordered. As
for Turkey, its partition was imminent and, to secure a handsome portion
for the Republic, a march on Constantinople would be the surest means.
In the East a treaty with Tippoo had been proposed, and one, Louis
Monneron, who might be of use to Bonaparte, would be sent to that part
of the world.[502] The despatch concluded: “As it would be very
difficult for you at the present juncture to accomplish the return
voyage to France, there seem to be only three courses open to you, to
remain in Egypt, so arranging that you will be safe against all attacks
from the Turks—in which case you will not forget that there are seasons
of the year very unwholesome for Europeans; or to press on to India,
where, once you have arrived, you will be sure to find numbers of people
ready to join you in destroying the power of the English; or, lastly, to
march on Constantinople against the enemy threatening you.” From the
tenor of this despatch, which, incidentally, did not reach Bonaparte
till March 25th, 1799, the Directory evinced small desire to have him
back in Europe. Shortly afterwards, however, it was engaged in a plan of
operations, the success of which would have greatly affected the course
of events in Egypt.
The Minister of Marine, on November 19th, reported against the naval
combinations which Bonaparte had suggested, and proposed that the
vessels of war in the Western ports should be formed into efficient
fleets.[503] Barras endorsed this policy and recommended the Minister
himself as the only Admiral capable of executing it.[504] The
organisation of the fleet was, accordingly, decreed on December 19th,
and was energetically taken in hand.[505] In spite of great
difficulties, Bruix displayed such activity that a line-of-battle ship
of 74 guns, for instance, was fully equipped in three days.[506] In
three months an imposing force of twenty-four sail-of-the-line and eight
frigates was ready to set sail.
The Directory had, meanwhile, returned to a favourite project of the
various revolutionary governments, namely, the junction of the Spanish
and French fleets to secure superiority over those of Great
Britain.[507] The necessary negotiations with the Court of Madrid were
seriously compromised by the incapacity of Guillemardet, the French
Ambassador to that Court.[508] They suffered still more, however, from
the fact that their real purpose was never disclosed to the Spanish
Government. Knowing the repugnance of that Government to co-operate with
the Republic in the Mediterranean, the French negotiators made out that
Ireland was the goal of the operations of the combined fleets. Spain
was, accordingly, invited to hold the ships blockaded at Cadiz in
readiness and to send the squadron stationed at Ferrol to a French
oceanic naval base, and that at Carthagena to Toulon. It would be, in
this way, too much involved in the enterprise to be able to abandon it.
It is easy to see what effect such trickery was likely to have on the
efficiency of the Spanish Navy.
In one direction, however, the prospects of retrieving the situation in
the Mediterranean were for a moment brightened by the brilliant campaign
of Championnet which resulted in the expulsion of the Neapolitan
Bourbons and the establishment of the short-lived Parthenopean
Republic.[509] But the care with which Nelson destroyed what he could
not save of the Neapolitan Navy and the refractoriness of the Republican
authorities rendered illusory the plans of the Directory to relieve the
garrison of Malta from the ports of Naples.[510] France received an
additional check in the western basin of the Mediterranean. In an
illuminating memorandum dated July 10th, Talleyrand had called attention
to the friendliness of the Barbary Regencies and recommended the
Directory to wink at the depredations of the Corsairs on the commerce of
the vassal republics of Italy.[511] The disembarkation of a French army
in Egypt, however, radically changed the situation.[512] The French
Consul at Tunis, officially notified of the event, did his utmost to
allay the fears of the Bey. What rendered the situation critical,
however, was not so much religious excitement as the agitation of the
merchants trading with Egypt. In spite of reiterated orders from
Constantinople, the Bey was eager not to break with France. He had,
however, to submit to his spiritual suzerain, so on January 3rd he gave
orders to intern French subjects and authorised his corsairs to attack
French shipping. The Dey of Algeria showed himself not more eager. He
turned a deaf ear to two missives from the Grand Signior. A third
messenger, said to be authorised to resort to such violent means as the
bowstring or the poisoned cup, could not be deceived by elusive replies
and the Dey had to declare against France.[513]
The Regencies, however, did not take an active part in the struggle; and
the lot of the interned French could not have been very hard since their
Consul could, while imprisoned, take measures for revictualling the
garrison of Malta and could communicate with his Government on the
affairs of Egypt. Their hostility, however, formed a permanent menace to
French operations in the western basin of the Mediterranean and rendered
futile the attempts for the relief of Malta and for establishing
communications with Bonaparte by land.
The Directory satisfied itself with decreeing reprisals against the
Barbary Corsairs[514] and concentrated its attention on the Naval
preparations already described. Their aim was “to penetrate into the
Mediterranean and destroy the enemy fleet or expel them from that
sea.”[515] Bruix was accordingly instructed to avoid an engagement. If
he was able to enter the Mediterranean without being molested, he must
proceed first to Italy and disembark three or four thousand troops there
and then for Corfu, Malta and Alexandria, distributing among these three
places the allocated reinforcements.
Arriving at Brest, the Admiral strove to restore the impaired discipline
and instruct the different ranks in their duties.[516] Before he set
sail the Directory had received Bonaparte’s despatch of February 10th,
in which he had detailed the motives of the Syrian Campaign. The French
Government was thus in possession of definite information which disposed
of the disquieting rumours current on the Army of the East. The
situation was further changed by the defeat of Jourdan at Stockach,
which led to the evacuation of the right bank of the Rhine, by the
retirement of Scherer on the Adda after his defeat at Magnano, and by
the capitulation of Corfu to a combined force of Russians and Turks.
Under these circumstances it was suggested that Bonaparte should be
recalled to retrieve the fortunes of the Republic. De la Jonquière
attributes this to the intrigues of the Bonapartes and their political
friends.[517] Sandoz, the well-informed Prussian envoy, states that it
was Barras who made the proposal to his colleagues and was met by an
angry refusal.[518] Barras himself, in his _Memoirs_, says that the idea
was mooted by the celebrated constitution-monger, Sieyès,[519] who was
looking about for an ally to destroy the Directory. Nothing, in any
case, came of these intrigues. The instructions of Bruix were not
changed and he himself set sail on April 25th.
A few days after a Spanish squadron from Ferrol, composed of five sail-
of-the-line and one frigate, and with 3000 troops on board, anchored in
the roadstead of the Isle of Aix. It is not clear what was the _rôle_
assigned to that squadron. A letter from Talleyrand to the Spanish
Ambassador seems to indicate that the Ferrol ships should have joined
the forces of Bruix.[520] But other documents assign to them the
function of menacing Ireland so as to prevent the English Government
from reinforcing its Mediterranean fleet.[521]
In the meantime Bruix was able to enter the Mediterranean without
engaging the enemy and arrived at Toulon on May 14th. The situation of
the French in Italy had gone from bad to worse and it was finally
decided to evacuate Ancona, Naples, Cività Vecchia and Leghorn. Bruix
was instructed to co-operate in these operations, at the end of which he
was to do his utmost to effect his junction with the Spaniards and wrest
the supremacy of the sea from the English. A new task was soon added to
these.[522] The successes of the Allies were so rapid that the French
frontiers were now menaced and it was decided to employ the fleets in
the Mediterranean in bringing back either all or most of the Army of the
East. Bonaparte was apprised of this decision in a despatch of May 26th.
“You will judge,” so it concludes, “if you can safely leave part of your
forces behind, in which case the Directory gives you full power to hand
over the command of the troops to whomsoever you think fit. The
Directory would be gratified to see you at the head of the Republican
armies which you have commanded hitherto with such brilliant
success.”[523]
Before receiving the new orders, Bruix had set sail from Toulon and
arrived at Savona on June 4th. “The appearance of an imposing fleet,”
wrote an eye-witness, “raised the spirits of the harassed French
troops.”[524] But the Admiral, seeing that his captains were not capable
of seconding him in an engagement and knowing the nearness of enemy
forces, decided to retrace his course and joined the Spanish fleet at
Carthagena on June 22nd.[525] At that port, he was secretly informed not
to count on Spanish support, for Spain was opposed to any campaign in
the Mediterranean which did not have for its first object the reconquest
of Minorca.[526] Finding himself, moreover, indifferently supported by
the French Ambassador and hearing of the _coup d’état_ of thirty
prairial, which caused him to be uncertain as to the views of the
Government, he took the part of withdrawing from the Mediterranean with
the Spaniards, and arrived at Brest on August 8th with an imposing force
of forty-one line-of-battle ships.
Chevalier, the brilliant historian of the French Navy, thus judges this
remarkable episode: “The course of Admiral Bruix was well-conceived, but
failed through the weakness of our Allies and the inexperience of our
own Officers and crews. . . . The Spanish fleet brought to Brest, the
“gage” of an Alliance then tottering, was the only result of this
campaign. It is impossible to have any illusion as to the extent of the
services rendered by the fleet on the coast of Italy; a division of
frigates would have done as much.”[527]
Such a disappointing end could not but render the situation more
critical. In spite of the false reports published by the Directory, much
anxiety about the Army of the East was felt. Everyone who had anything
to do with the Expedition was anxious to disclaim any share of the
responsibility. “This enterprise,” observed Thibaudeau, “which found so
many enthusiasts at the beginning, came to be considered as nothing but
foolish and even wicked.”[528] The recriminations which followed
resulted in banishing all hope in the success of the venture. The
Government gave up the idea of wresting the supremacy of the seas and
had to content itself with securing the coast against an English
invasion.[529] In the diplomatic sphere, Talleyrand had already turned
his attention to persuade Turkey to release the imprisoned French
subjects. Negotiations for a cartel of exchange of prisoners were to be
conducted by the Prussian envoy at Constantinople.[530] This attempt
failed. A second one made by the Spanish envoy was not more
successful.[531] Talleyrand, however, did not despair. He thought that
the presence of the French fleet in the Mediterranean and the success of
the French invasion of Syria would finally open the eyes of the
Sultan.[532] The failure of the Syrian campaign, however, put an end to
all such hopes. On September 3rd, the Minister submitted to the
Directory a proposal for entering into negotiations with the Porte for
nothing less than the evacuation of Egypt[533]. He painted the condition
of the French Army in the most sombre colours and stated that France
could do no more than try to extricate them from their perilous
situation. Talleyrand recognised the obstacles, for though Turkey would
be delighted to see Egypt restored, its allies would not consent to see
the Republican armies reinforced by veteran troops under so famous a
commander as Bonaparte. The solution he suggested was that that general
and his troops should pledge themselves not to serve in the present war.
Anticipating the weighty objection that the situation of the French was
not as desperate as he represented, he proposed that the convention for
the evacuation should reserve to Bonaparte the faculty of rejecting it.
Talleyrand resigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 20th. His
successor, Reinhard, however, took up the project. While he was occupied
with the preliminary steps of obtaining the consent of Spain to act as
mediator between the Porte and the Republic, there arrived at Paris the
news of the complete victory gained by Bonaparte at Abukir over a
Turkish army.[534] With knowledge of the extent of the Turkish defeat
and of the Porte’s desire for a separate peace, Spanish mediation was
deemed unnecessary and it was decided to place the negotiations in the
hands of Bonaparte.[535] He was to be apprised of this by a despatch
dated October 10th. The day before he had landed at Frejus!
[Footnote 492: Jonquière, II, p. 276.]
[Footnote 493: The correspondence relating to it has been destroyed by
Napoleon’s order.]
[Footnote 494: _Correspondance_, IV, 2606, 2608, 2690, 2703.]
[Footnote 495: Jonquière, I, p. 649.]
[Footnote 496: Barras’ _Memoirs_, III, pp. 239-240.]
[Footnote 497: _Ibid._, p. 258.]
[Footnote 498: Jonquière, II, p. 256 note.]
[Footnote 499: _Ibid._, p. 257 f.]
[Footnote 500: Decree of 15 Oct. _Ibid._, p. 260.]
[Footnote 501: Jonquière, II, p. 261 f.]
[Footnote 502: This man was implicated in a bankruptcy and could not
leave France. Boulay de la Meurthe, _Le Directoire et L’Expédition_, p.
61.]
[Footnote 503: 19 Nov. Jonquière, V, p. 119 note.]
[Footnote 504: _Memoirs_, III, p. 361.]
[Footnote 505: Jonquière, V, p. 121.]
[Footnote 506: Captain Moras’ account. Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres
Maritimes_, I, p. 371.]
[Footnote 507: Talleyrand described Spanish naval help as “La pierre de
la touche de l’alliance.” Pallain, p. 314.]
[Footnote 508: _Aussi mauvais diplomate qu’ignorant médecin_. Barras,
III, p. 319.]
[Footnote 509: Report, 7 Feb., 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 126.]
[Footnote 510: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 511: Pallain, p. 339 f.]
[Footnote 512: Introduction to Eugène Plantet, _Correspondance des Beys
de Tunis et des Consuls de France avec la Cour_. 3 vols., Paris, 1893-9,
XXXVIII-XXXIX.]
[Footnote 513: Eugène Plantet, _Correspondance des Deys d’Alger avec la
cour de France_, 2 vols, Paris, 1889. Introduction.]
[Footnote 514: Decree of 13 Feb. Jonquière, V, 127 note.]
[Footnote 515: Instructions, 15 March. _Ibid._, V, p. 136.]
[Footnote 516: Moras’ account. Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I, p.
372.]
[Footnote 517: Jonquière, V, pp. 147, 148.]
[Footnote 518: Despatch of 14 April, 1799, in Bailleu.]
[Footnote 519: _Mémoires_, III, p. 416.]
[Footnote 520: 16 May, 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 151.]
[Footnote 521: Jonquière, V, p. 151.]
[Footnote 522: 17 May. _Ibid._, V, p. 160.]
[Footnote 523: _Ibid._, V, p. 166; _Spectateur Militaire_, 15 May, 1840,
p. 120.
La Revellière-Lépeaux (_Mémoires_, II, p. 349) declares it a forgery, so
also Miot de Melito (_Memoirs_, I, pp. 276, 277). Jonquière refutes this
by examining the original document, V, p. 167 note.]
[Footnote 524: Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I, p. 376.]
[Footnote 525: Moras’ account in Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I, pp.
376, 377.]
[Footnote 526: _Ibid._, I, p. 377.]
[Footnote 527: _Marine française sous la République_, p. 415.]
[Footnote 528: _Histoire de la Campagne d’Egypte_, III, p. 437.]
[Footnote 529: Report of 21 July, 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 184 note.]
[Footnote 530: To Sieyès, 28 January, 1799. Pallain, p. 420.]
[Footnote 531: Memorandum dated June. _Ibid._, pp. 427, 428.]
[Footnote 532: _Ibid._, pp. 428, 429.]
[Footnote 533: 3 Sept., 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 184.]
[Footnote 534: The “Osiris” with news arrived at Marseilles on 25 Sept.,
1799. Jonquière, V, p. 439.]
[Footnote 535: _Ibid._, V, p. 624.]