War with the French thus decided upon, the Turks set about for a plan of
operations. Returning to the palmy days of Selim the Grim, the campaign
which added Egypt to the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century was to
serve as a model for his successors in the last days of the eighteenth.
The Pasha of Damascus, the Governor and the Beys of Egypt, so the Turks
calculated in their vague way, at the head of 60,000 soldiers “on the
upper side of the Egyptian line,” and Djezzar, the powerful Pasha of
Acre, at the head of no less than 50,000 men, were to co-operate in the
reduction of Cairo. This, with the help of Allah, would inevitably lead
to the fall of Alexandria. Russian and Turkish ships would probably co-
operate and a corps of select Janissaries would act along the
coast.[382] “Firmans” inciting the Moslems to a holy war against the
French were spread far and wide.[383]
The war, in this way, would not be very costly. The various
insubordinate pashas and beys, whether victorious or not, were sure to
be ruined in the struggle with the French; and, at the right moment, the
Porte would step in to reassert its authority.
The English minister, however, could hardly be put off with such
calculations. He had, moreover, before him Nelson’s recommendations as
to what the Turks should do.[384] The Divan readily approved Nelson’s
views, for they had already had enough of the neighbourhood of the
French to the disaffected Greeks. The present opportunity of expelling
the restless Republicans from the Ionian Islands was not to be lost. In
this they were confirmed by the determination of Paul, who was, as
Nelson complained, “more intent on taking ports in the Mediterranean
than destroying Buonaparte [_sic_] in Egypt,”[385] to employ the Russian
naval contingent against the French in the Adriatic and in the
Archipelago. The Porte—with memories of the intrigues of Catherine—could
hardly prefer the Russians to the French and had to employ the major
part of its Navy to co-operate with the Russian squadron and thus avoid
giving them a free hand in those quarters. The minor part, after lengthy
arguing by Smith, were sent to co-operate with Captain Hood, commanding
the blockade of the Egyptian coast.[386]
Sixteen Turkish and two Russian sail, accordingly, arrived before
Alexandria on October 19th and 21st. Together with the English ships
they made an attempt to capture the castle and camp of Abukir, “but
having no troops to land it was impossible to do anything when the guns
were silenced and the camp put to rout,” and the allies had to content
themselves with a mere blockade.[387]
The arrival of the Turkish ship coincided with a serious rising in Cairo
against the French “liberators.” This rising cannot be understood
without careful examination of Bonaparte’s organisation of Egypt.
Already, as a young lieutenant, he had deeply interested himself in the
recorded legislative experiments of the chief nations of ancient and
modern times. Indeed, he considered history chiefly as a school for
political training. Here is one of his comments while studying ancient
history in Rollin: “I find that the writers of history give no detailed
information as to the nature of the taxes raised by the sovereign, and
as to the manner of gathering them and assessing them throughout the
country. They give no details as to how the ruler makes his will known
to his subjects.”[388] His political apprenticeship began in North Italy
in the year 1796, when the organisation of the conquest opened for him
the government of men. In Egypt, however, his energies found a new
sphere.
The young general contemplated the ancient land in the manner, not of
the poet, but of the severe observer who neglected nothing.[389]
Geography, customs, religion, problems, resources, he analysed all, he
measured all. He calculated as an engineer and pondered as a statesman.
There were, for instance, the various strata composing the inhabitants
of Egypt; how were they to be held in check? What relations would each
of them bear to the French? There was the annual inundation; how was the
water to be equitably distributed?
Unlike superficial observers from the West, Bonaparte saw that beneath
the ungainly form, beneath the misery and degradation, was real worth.
The first principle of his government was to allow the inhabitants great
latitude in the management of their affairs and, especially in the
administration of justice, which was entirely founded on their holy
books.[390] He thought, however, that the Egyptians required regular
institutions to ensure for themselves the “great benefits of an
organised community, namely, security of person and of property.”[391]
Such institutions would enable the people to give expression to their
innermost thoughts and thus enlighten the French as to what was required
for Egypt’s welfare. The class which he chose to staff these
institutions or _divans_ and to act as the intermediaries between French
and Egyptians were the “Ulema” and the notables. These were the natural
leaders of the people, they were the interpreters of the Koran (“And the
greatest obstacles proceed from religious ideas”), they could not mount
a horse and were—witness their flowing robes—unwarlike in their habits
and, as leaders of a revolt, would cut a poor figure. They were rich,
loved justice and were actuated by good principles of morality. Moreover
they hated both Turk and Mameluke and had a vision of a new Egypt.
“C’était un fibre de laquelle on pouvait un jour tout espérer.”[392] As
for the other sections; the Copts or Egyptian Christians had, by their
mastery of the intricacies of Egyptian finance, made themselves
indispensable to the new administration; the Beduins and Mamelukes were
veritable pests and were to be extirpated; the foreign residents
composed of the dregs of the Levant were to be kept under so as not to
give the Egyptians any umbrage.
On September 4th, consequently, he summoned an assembly of notables, who
were to be selected by the French generals commanding in the fourteen
provinces.[393] The mathematician Monge and the chemist Berthollet were
appointed commissioners to the Assembly and were instructed to ask it to
deliberate on the following matters: firstly, the best organisation for
provincial assemblies; secondly, the formulation of a criminal and a
civil code; thirdly, the systematising of the laws regulating
succession; and, fourthly, the improving of the laws relating to
property and taxation.[394]
Chosen under conditions which should ensure their docility, the
deliberations of the notables were slow “partly on account of the
calmness and reticence of the Oriental character and the novelty of the
affair and partly owing to the difference of usage from one province to
another.”[395] Their answers were, on the whole, marked by an
intelligent conservatism, and Bonaparte intimated his intention to carry
out as many of their suggestions as possible.[396]
But the Egyptians did not take the thing seriously. They even disliked
it, and the cause is not far to seek. The institutions under which they
had hitherto lived were mainly of the tax-collecting type. Their rulers
exercised force over them of the most violent kind for certain purposes
at certain times, but they did not impose laws as distinct from
occasional commands. The subjects had to submit when the agents of the
ruler descended on them for taxes, recruits, or forced labour, but in
the general tenor of their lives their actions and forbearances were
regulated by authorities with which the rulers never interfered.[397] An
orderly system of government and, especially, of taxation, so far from
securing to them their property, seemed to the Egyptians, on the
contrary, to close every loophole for escaping the payment of the tax,
as they might occasionally have done under the old _régime_. The
Egyptians, moreover, seemed to have considered that the destruction of
the Mamelukes meant their emancipation from any form of imposition.[398]
Bonaparte’s forced contributions soon undeceived them. He was obliged to
have recourse to these through the difficulties of collecting the taxes.
The peasants did not pay the impost till the last extremity. The tax-
collectors had to be accompanied by strong military escorts, often to
find the villages deserted.[399]
Bonaparte’s nature, moreover, was too fiery, his self-confidence too
deep-rooted, his energies too many-sided, to keep him within the bounds
of prudence. Fussy interferences such as the order that every Egyptian
should wear a tricolour cockade or that every householder should have a
lantern outside his door irritated the Moslems.[400] The advancement of
Levantines, although Bonaparte disapproved of the principle, alarmed
them as to the safety of their religion. His remarkable proclamations,
far from reassuring, probably overshot their mark,[401] nor was the pomp
with which he celebrated, for instance, the birthday of the Prophet,
more successful.[402] The drunkenness and the frivolity of the French
and the liberties they took with women, scandalised a society
punctilious on these points.[403] The Egyptians suffered all the
miseries of a military occupation. When the French took their quarters
in a village, the poor peasant would find his utensils, ploughs, doors,
roofs, “everything, in short, of a combustible nature” burnt for
cooking, his earthen pots broken, his corn consumed, his fowl and
pigeons roasted and devoured and, worst of all, his daughters
ravished.[404]
Furthermore, since the change of policy at the Porte, Turkish agents had
been reaching Egypt through Syria and were inciting the people to
revolt.[405] Inflammatory firmans from the Commander of the Faithful
were read aloud in the mosques, ascribing to the French the intention of
destroying Islam, and the faithful were called upon to resist. Rumours
were current that Djezzar of Acre was advancing on Cairo and that
Bonaparte would burn the town before evacuating it.[406] The full extent
of Nelson’s great victory was perfectly known and Captain Hood entered
into relations with the disaffected elements in the population,
especially in Alexandria. He reconciled Murad with the Porte and with
Djezzar.[407]
Passions were roused to white heat. The cessation of the exemption of
religious endowments from taxation, and the imposition of a tax on
houses gave the signal for revolt.[408] It broke out on October 21st,
and, by its suddenness, placed the dispersed French garrison in a
critical situation. But the first shock of surprise over, a judicious
disposition of artillery enabled the men of the 13 vendémiaire to
suppress the rising. Drastic measures were taken to prevent its
recurrence.[409]
Undaunted, nay, rather nerved to greater efforts by the disaster to the
French fleet, he had ordered[410] Desaix to open the brilliant campaign
in Upper Egypt which was to take the French to its southern confines, to
disperse the Mamelukes, to force the indefatigable Murad to take shelter
in the oases, and to destroy the Meccans impelled into the Valley of the
Nile by religious fervour and material needs,[411] and which was not to
end till the French flag flew over the solitary port of Kosseir, on the
Red Sea. Fully occupied as he was with restoring the spirit of the
army—punishing, appeasing, promising, attending to countless details of
military and civil administration—he had planned the Institute of Egypt
destined to be his lasting monument in the Valley of the Nile and to
give to modern Egypt its marked “Gallophil” tendencies. He organised it
in four sections—Mathematics, Physics, Political Economy, and the
Arts.[412] At the first session, which was held on August 23rd and in
which Monge was elected president and Bonaparte vice-president, the
latter suggested these questions for consideration. Could the baking-
ovens of the army be improved? Was there any substitute for hops in the
brewing of beer? How could the waters of the Nile be purified for
drinking purposes? Was a windmill or a watermill the more serviceable?
Could gunpowder be produced in Egypt? What was the state of law and of
education in Egypt? and how could they be improved conformably to the
notions of the inhabitants?[413] “It is doubtful whether a learned
society has ever received a more imperious impulse towards the
practical.”
His main occupation, however, was to thwart the forces generated by
Nelson’s victory. In spite of the grand self-confidence which led him to
write to Kléber, “If the English relieve this squadron by another, and
continue to overrun the Mediterranean, they will perhaps compel us to do
greater things than we intended,”[414] or to say to Marmont: “This
country was once before a mighty kingdom; in any case it is a good
starting-point for conquests when the Turkish Empire breaks up, and a
base for offensive operations against the English,”[415] and in spite of
evidence that he did not fully realise the constricting effect of sea-
power,[416] the blow had cut deeper than he cared to show. For one thing
it shattered his schemes of a speedy return to France, for another it
jeopardised the position of France in Egypt.
“It is in such moments,” he said, “that men of superior character prove
their mettle.” He rose to the occasion. Measures were taken to protect
the land communications between Alexandria and Rosetta. Naval
combinations whereby all the French, Venetian and Maltese vessels in the
Mediterranean were to be rallied and to contain at least the Turkish
fleet and escort the expected reinforcements from France were
devised.[417] Overtures for trade relations were made to Tripoli.[418]
Receiving reports of hostile preparations in Syria,[419] he attempted to
win over Djezzar. Beauvoisins, a cavalry officer, was sent to that pasha
with assurances and promises.[420] The mission, however, was a complete
failure.[421] Similar overtures were made to the Shereef of Mecca.[422]
The Grand Vizier was informed of the appointment of Talleyrand as
ambassador and of his being furnished with full powers to settle all
difficulties. Suspecting, however, that Talleyrand might not have left
France, he invited the Grand Vizier to send a trusted representative to
Cairo.[423] Staff-Captain Mailly de Chateaurenaud was sent with another
letter of the same nature.[424] Nothing came of these efforts.
He announced to the Directory that his return would not take place in
October as he had promised, suggested more naval projects and measures
whereby the Grand Turk would be frightened into acquiescence in the
accomplished fact, but hinted, however, that if the negotiations at
Rastadt proved fruitless, Egypt would be a sure means of concluding a
glorious peace with England. Other courses of action were, moreover,
still open to the Directory. It might, for instance, transfer the
theatre of the naval war to the Mediterranean and leave Ireland alone.
It was not yet too late to employ diplomatic methods. It was essential
that Talleyrand should keep his word and proceed to Constantinople.[425]
All doubts as to the attitude of Turkey should have been removed by the
arrival of the Turkish sail and their participation in the blockade.
Flags of truce were sent to find out the real state of affairs.[426] The
information gathered by the French messengers about the formation of a
new coalition against the Republic was true to the hilt,[427] but it was
of so sombre a character that the Governor of Alexandria considered it a
mere English “ruse.”[428] Without abandoning the naval combinations he
had sketched, Bonaparte seemed to have entertained the idea of opening
negotiations with his enemies. This was widely believed in the
army.[429] He, accordingly, decided to release the Turkish battleship
detained in the port of Alexandria and to send on board Beauchamp, ex-
consul at Muscat, with definite overtures to the Porte. “If ever the
question is made to you,” so ran his instructions,[430] “‘Will the
French consent to evacuate Egypt?’ Why not,? provided that the two
emperors should put an end to the revolt of Paswan Oglou and give up the
project of dismembering European-Turkey; as for us, we will do
everything that may prove of utility to the Ottoman Empire and secure it
against its enemies, but the indispensable preliminary to all
negotiation as well as to all accommodation is a ‘firman’ liberating
Frenchmen wherever they have been imprisoned, especially in Syria.” If
this was refused, Beauchamp was to threaten the Porte with an invasion
of that province.
The negotiator did not leave Alexandria before February 13th. Near
Rhodes, he was captured by an English squadron under Troubridge and his
important despatches intercepted.[431]
The design to invade Syria took some time to mature. On December 17th he
announced to the Directory that hostile preparations were going on in
Syria and declared that had it not been for the seven days’ desert
journey he would have demanded an explanation.[432] But reports that the
Mamelukes of Ibrahim and the troops of Djezzar were actually moving
determined him to make the “seven days’ journey.”[433]
[Footnote 382: Minutes of a Conference, 3 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 383: F.O. Turkey, 20. The French were accused of denying the
immortality of the soul and of believing in metempsychosis.]
[Footnote 384: Minutes of a Conference, 3 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 385: To St. Vincent, 6 Dec., 1798. _Despatches_, III, p. 184.]
[Footnote 386: Minutes of a Conference, 10 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 387: Hood to Spencer Smith, 26 Oct. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 388: Fournier, I, p. 20.]
[Footnote 389: Cf. Chateaubriand on the Inundation of the Nile. Sainte-
Beuve, _Causeries de Lundi_, I, p. 187.]
[Footnote 390: To Kléber. _Correspondance_, IV, 2778.]
[Footnote 391: _Ibid._, XXXIX, 494 f.]
[Footnote 392: _Correspondance_, XXXIX, p. 495.]
[Footnote 393: _Ibid._, IV, 3238.]
[Footnote 394: _Correspondance_, V, 3423.]
[Footnote 395: _Ibid._, XXXIX, 493.]
[Footnote 396: See Djabarti for the answers and Jonquière, III, p. 273
note. _Correspondance_, V, 3492.]
[Footnote 397: Cf. what the Russian Ambassador wrote to Grenville.
_Dropmore Papers_, IV, pp. 414-15.]
[Footnote 398: Miot, _Mémoires pour servir_, etc., p. 85.]
[Footnote 399: Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XVIII-XIX.]
[Footnote 400: Djabarti. The historian does not think the wearing of the
cockade against religion, but most of his countrymen thought so.]
[Footnote 401: At St. Helena, when reading over his Egyptian
Proclamations, he exclaimed, “C’est un peu Charlatan.” Gourgaud,
_Journal_, I, p. 168.
Mme. de Stael—_Considérations_, Œuvres, II, p. 404—has shrewdly remarked
that in the composition of these proclamations he has an eye on the
French people. Because they combine two characteristics dear to the
French: “Un certain genre de grandeur et de la moquerie tout ensemble.”]
[Footnote 402: The failure of these is attested—in spite of bulletins—by
Desgenettes, _Souvenirs_, III, p. 165.
Nakoula, speaking of an obelisk raised in one of the ceremonies, said
that the Egyptians regarded it not as a “tree of liberty,” but as the
symbol of their slavery. There was great joy when it was removed.]
[Footnote 403: Nakoula says: “Cairo has become a second Paris; women go
about shamelessly with the French; intoxicating drinks are publicly sold
and things are committed of which the Lord of heaven would not approve.”
Djabarti says the same thing and remarks that the “French are greatly
fond of women, show them all sorts of consideration, listen to their
advice,” etc.