After Brueys’ squadron had successfully escorted the convoy, the
important question as to its ulterior _rôle_ had to be settled. As long
as the conquest of Egypt was not achieved there was a good reason for
keeping the fleet near at hand. To station it, moreover, on the Egyptian
coast would facilitate the arrival of the expected second convoy. But
such a position, on the other hand, exposed the fleet to serious
risks.[289] How did Bonaparte conciliate two such conflicting interests?
The question has given rise to a wearisome controversy, but the evidence
of contemporary documents is unequivocal.
Immediately on the fall of Alexandria, Brueys was directed to anchor his
ships in the old harbour. But should careful sounding prove that there
was not enough depth and should he be unable to take a military position
in the Bay of Abukir, he was to set sail for Corfu.[290] Brueys, on the
same day, wrote that the line-of-battle ships could not enter the
harbour, and that the Bay of Abukir would provide a good shelter,
especially in summer.[291] There is evidence that the immediate
departure of the fleet to Corfu, which was certainly the original
arrangement,[292] would have materially deranged Bonaparte’s plans, for
he was counting on a speedy return to Europe. It was arranged before his
departure that on the termination of the Egyptian Expedition he should
resume the command of the combined forces for the invasion of
England.[293] There is a despatch dated April 13th and addressed to the
Directory in which he calculates that after “the termination of the
Mediterranean Expedition” the fourteen sail-of-the-line under Brueys
thus available would join the Brest squadron and so bring up the number
by October or November (when he expected the Egyptian campaign to be
over) to fifty war vessels. It would then be possible to take 40,000
troops to some point on the English coast, while other 40,000 were
preparing to embark, and the Dutch fleet with 10,000 troops could
threaten Scotland. In this way the landing in England was almost certain
to be in November or December, as the English would be obliged, by the
expedition in the East, to detach part of their Channel fleet for India
and the Red Sea.[294] Who but himself could carry out such an invasion?
At Toulon he addressed the troops, “You are a wing of the Army of
England!” and in his orders he occasionally signed himself “Commander-
in-Chief of the Army of England.” His secretary, Bourrienne, affirms
this. In letters to his brother Joseph he spoke of his intention to
return in the Autumn of 1798 and asked him to purchase for him an estate
in Burgundy.[295]
Jaubert, a naval employee, explicitly states in a confidential letter to
the Minister of Marine which was afterwards intercepted and published by
the English Government, that it was by Bonaparte’s order that the fleet
did not sail to Corfu, and adds, “Nous sommes ici sous le vent du
fatalisme, et son souffle ébranle un peu mes principes.”[296] Brueys,
accordingly, anchored his squadron in the open roadstead of Abukir.
Artillery officers were sent to strengthen his position by the
establishing of land-batteries,[297] but they were of opinion that the
fleet could not count on much support from the shore.[298]
The sounding operations were, meanwhile, in full activity. On July 13th
it was reported that the fleet could enter the old harbour.[299] Brueys,
however, was not convinced.[300]
His correspondence reveals the dearth of provisions in the fleet, which
prevented him from as much as sending a frigate to gather information on
the movements of the English forces, of whose presence he had received
various reports,[301] the unworthiness of the soldiers serving as ships’
garrisons,[302] the bad health from which he was suffering[303] and
which was, in all probability, the cause of his not taking measures to
render his position more secure, and his belief that he could not sail
from Egypt without an express order from Bonaparte.[304] Such an order
was never sent. After the battle, Bonaparte, in a long despatch to the
Directory, ignores that it was he who suggested the alternative of
anchoring in the roadstead of Abukir, and declares his surprise when he
heard, on July 27th, that the fleet was still there.[305] On July 30th,
the despatch continued, Jullien, an aide-de-camp, was sent with
instructions for Brueys to sail immediately. Jullien was, however,
murdered _en route_. But on that very July 30th Bonaparte was still
hoping that the sounding operations would prove a success, and expressed
his belief that the English, who had only an inferior force, would be
contented with the blockade of Malta.[306] Moreover, if his intention on
that day was that the fleet should sail for Corfu, nothing would have
been more natural than that he should have informed General Chabot, the
Governor of the place, of it. Writing to him on August 3rd, he speaks of
establishing trade relations, but not a word of Brueys’ fleet.[307]
The only possible conclusion, therefore, is that if he ever entertained
the idea of sending the fleet away from Egypt he preserved till the very
end the hope of finding another course of action more subservient to his
designs.
After beating back from Egypt and “spreading the fleet over to the coast
of Asia,” Nelson anchored at Syracuse on July 19th. “Having gone,” he
wrote to Sir William Hamilton, “a round of 600 leagues at this season of
the year with an expedition incredible, here I am as ignorant of the
situation of the enemy as I was twenty-seven days ago.”[308] Persuaded,
however, that the French were somewhere in the Levant,[309] that they
were neither (so he learnt from spoken vessels) to the westward of
Sicily nor at Corfu,[310] he sailed from Syracuse on July 25th and sent
Troubridge on the 28th to look into the Gulf of Koron. The latter
rejoined with the information that the French were seen four weeks
before steering in a south-easterly direction off the coast of
Crete.[311] The fleet immediately bore up under all sail and in the
afternoon of August 1st the long-sought enemy was discovered anchored in
Abukir Bay.
Nelson, with the eye of genius, at once observed, “that where there was
room for our enemy’s ships to swing, there was room for one of ours to
anchor.”[312] His ships manœuvred with such consummate skill that some
of them were able to pass between their opponents and the shore. Caught
thus between two fires, the French were destroyed one after the other.
Two ships-of-the-line and two frigates were all that Villeneuve could
save by flight.
In considering the causes of the disaster, it is necessary to go beyond
the immediate circumstances into the more far-reaching factors, to go,
for instance, beyond the explosion of the flagship “L’Orient” and the
heroic death of Brueys, the non-participation of the rear under
Villeneuve in the action and the resolution not to fight under
sail—important as all these were—into the many deficiencies of a
disorganised service which led Brueys to exclaim: “Je trouve qu’il faut
bien du courage pour se charger de conduire des flottes aussi mal-
outillées.”[313]
As for Nelson, there now remained to gather up the spoils of the field,
and to realise the consequences of the battle, great and small, near and
remote. Little by little, he grasped the greatness of what he had
accomplished. After the victory, he announced his intention of sailing
down the Mediterranean on the 19th,[314] but batches of letters from the
French began to fall into his hands. The “Intercepted Correspondence”
thus early started playing its important—and hitherto unnoticed—_rôle_;
namely, that of influencing the opinions of British statesmen and men of
action and of shaping their decisions. These letters—written under the
stress of privation and home-sickness—showed how bitter was the
disillusionment, how widespread was the disaffection and how dispirited
were the troops. The eager enemy did not allow for the obvious
exaggeration of disenchanted warriors, but took the wailing at its full
face-value. Under these circumstances, Nelson realised how much his
victory would mean to the French. Had he possessed a few bomb-ships, he
would have destroyed the transports in the harbour of Alexandria.[315]
As it was, he hastened to inform British India. Writing to the Governor
of Bombay, he summed up briefly the events of the past few months and
the number and character of the French army in Egypt, and expressed the
hope that special care would be exercised against the departure of ships
from India, to convey this huge force thither by the Red Sea. On the
side of the Mediterranean, their fate was settled by the recent victory.
They could receive nothing from France, they could not advance freely
into Syria, as water transport was essential for much of their
equipment; even in Egypt itself they were hampered by the difficulties
of communication—on land by the guerilla hostility of the Egyptians, and
now on the water through his own presence and control. The Nile, through
its Rosetta mouth, had been heretofore the easiest communication between
Cairo and Alexandria. The garrison of the latter depended largely for
daily bread upon this route, now closed by the fleet in Abukir Bay. By
land nothing short of a regiment could pass over ground where, even
before the battle, the French watering parties from the ships had to be
protected by heavy armed bodies. He intended, therefore, to remain where
he was as long as possible.[316] On the 15th, however, most secret and
urgent orders came to him from St. Vincent, to return to the Westward
and co-operate in the reduction of Minorca.[317] By that time, several
of the lost frigates had joined him. Three of these with three ships-of-
the-line were left with Captain Hood to carry on the blockade of
Alexandria and to suppress the enemy’s communications by water along the
coasts of Egypt and Syria.[318] That, to all intents and purposes, was
to be England’s contribution. Turkey was to do the rest, and this was
not great. The Porte, according to Nelson, would have only to send a few
ships of war and the transports in the harbour of Alexandria would be
all destroyed, and 10,000 troops and the town itself would be
captured.[319] He declared himself ready, if Naples would give him the
bomb-ships, to return and do the work. The three countries, England,
Turkey and Naples, had only to exert[320] themselves for three months
and the French might be destroyed. On the 19th, he sailed for Naples.
On August 22nd the news of his great victory reached Constantinople,
where it helped to end the wavering of the Porte and to confirm it in
the decisions it had already taken. The Porte’s suspicions of the
intentions of the French had been aroused by Bonaparte’s intrigues with
the disaffected Greeks, the Pasha of Janina and other Albanian chiefs,
and the assurances of the French Ambassador that Bonaparte’s ardent
proclamations were only polite answers to letters he had received, could
not deceive even the Turks.[321] The extensive preparations for the
Egyptian Expedition therefore could not but greatly alarm them. The
Porte, however, did not feel itself strong enough to demand an
explanation.[322] The most disquieting rumours were spread and were
readily believed by the populace, which was greatly excited by the
symptoms of concern and anxiety observed on the faces of the members of
the Divan.[323] Turkey had to choose between three courses of action,
firstly, to oppose openly and by force of arms the French Expedition;
secondly, to enter into an alliance with the Republic; and thirdly, to
profess acquiescence in the retention of Egypt by the French, but to
throw, secretly, every impediment in their way. As for the first course
the Porte had more than one reason not to take it. For if it did it had
to contract alliances with its hereditary enemies and expose the
security of the heart of the Empire to the menace of Russian and
Austrian troops marching there ostensibly for its succour. Moreover, the
French troops stationed in the Ionian Islands could easily march on
Constantinople and punish the Porte before the arrival of its allies.
The discontent of the Greeks and the rebellion of Paswan Oglou fomented
by the French were additional obstacles. The Porte, however, could not
with any pretence to dignity take the second course. The third was more
conformable to the spirit of the Turkish Government. Its characteristic
in political affairs was indecision and a method of uniformly acting in
such a way as might subsequently be explained in accordance with its
interests. The nature of the Government was such that, in all parts of
the Empire, and more particularly in Egypt, the Porte could send orders
which it never meant should be carried out, nay, it could send orders
which were meant to be resisted. The Porte could, consequently, set
against the French in Egypt armies from Arabia and Syria as effectively
as if it had declared war and answer the protests of the French
Government by declaring its inability to control the unruly pashas and
showering imprecations on their heads. This policy would, moreover,
result in weakening the vassals to such an extent as would enable the
central Government to reassert its authority.[324]
We find, accordingly, that while the Grand Signior was solemnly
declaring that he would not give “a handful of sand of the Egyptian
territory,” calling upon the Beys not to place any belief in the
stratagems of these infidels, and promising to give them every
succour,[325] proclamations were sent to the provinces to the effect
that the French were still the friends of Turkey and should be well
treated, in spite of the fact that “a certain wretch called Bonaparte”
had invaded Egypt, for that general, being a rebel to his own
Government, had abused its confidence and attacked Egypt with troops
intended for another enterprise![326]
In this way the French had some chance of preventing a formal rupture.
Received by the Reis Effendi on June 19th, their envoy—only a _chargé
d’affaires_ whose financial embarrassments had diminished his
influence—was placed in a difficult position by his lack of official
information and instructions from his Government.[327] In this and other
audiences, however, Ruffin adopted the policy of letting the Turks infer
that an Ambassador would soon arrive at Constantinople. The Porte was
obviously pleased at this[328]; but its hesitation did not come to an
end. “There was,” wrote Spencer Smith, the English Minister, “nothing
but council upon council and conference upon conference without any
visible result.”[329] Spencer Smith was not idle in “abridging” these
deliberations, or, in his own words, he “was not backward in taking a
due share in meeting every demonstration that a palpable community of
interests can have inspired, nor in taking upon himself a due share of
responsibility in the language of his assurances and offers in
reply.”[330] Other circumstances came to his help. The populace at
Constantinople, alarmed for the safety of Islam and discontented with
the manipulation of the prices of articles imported from Egypt by
monopolists and “profiteers,”[331] began to murmur at the suspected
connivance of the Porte in the schemes of the infidels.[332] Rumours of
the presence of a formidable English squadron and even of its having
obtained a great victory over the French, of the determination of the
Beys to defend Egypt at all costs, of their having assembled as many as
50,000 men and of having embodied an Arab militia 100,000 strong, were
widely circulated, and the people were overjoyed.[333]
The Russian mission, “which naturally fixed the attention and confidence
of the preponderant connection of this Empire,” and which had hitherto
“manifested the least share in the hustle of the season,”[334] began to
show signs of activity. In spite of the fact that Paul had started his
reign with a violent fit of “burning all that his Mother, Catherine, had
adored,” Russian policy in Europe and Asia derived its springs of action
from the very nature of things and was marked by a singular continuity
under the most varying _régimes_ of insane emperors, of foreign-born
ministers, and of eccentric empresses. While declaiming against the
Revolution, “subversive of all law, of rights, of religion and of
morality,”[335] Paul remained at peace with France. The occupation of
the Ionian Islands and the formation of a Polish legion in Italy,
however, disquietened him. He feared the extension of French influence
in the Near East to the detriment of the Russian monopoly and the
contamination of Holy Russia by contact with revolutionary doctrines,
and began to declare the necessity of “taming the French in the
interests of general tranquillity and of thwarting their ambitious
designs.”[336] The conquest of Malta by the Republic decided him, and
generous offers of help were sent to Turkey. On July 24th, “the Russian
envoy had his expected conference of several hours with the Reis
Effendi.”[337]
Four days later it was the English minister’s turn.[338] In an interview
“lasting from nine till five in the afternoon and marked by extreme
cordiality on both sides,” the Turkish Minister, after giving assurances
of doing all that was possible for the English fleet in the
Mediterranean, expressed his regret that the real intentions of the
Porte were misunderstood and that its conduct was only the result of
existing circumstances and its desire to enter into an “intimate and
confidential connection with Great Britain.” The Turk expatiated—obvious
tactics—on the dangers to British India from the presence of the French
in Egypt, while Smith, on the other hand, took for his text that it was
the duty of him upon whom the storm first burst to be duly prepared.
After this dialectic, the Reis Effendi came to the point and inquired if
Smith “had any powers to meet him in such a negotiation which he was
sufficiently authorised to be able to conclude this very morning.” Smith
obviously had no such powers. He pointed out, however, that his
Government—at such a distance—“must naturally have a large measure of
confidence in his discretion,” and offered, on condition of its being
kept confidential and of its not being considered as binding on his
Court, to draw up a project of a treaty of alliance, which, after the
necessary modifications by the Divan, would be returned to him as an
overture from the Porte to His Britannic Majesty.
The project stipulated that Turkey would engage to oppose to the French
an army of 100,000 men and its whole Navy, and that Great Britain, on
the other hand, would undertake to maintain in the Levant a
“respectable” fleet and not to lay down arms till the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire had been secured.[339]
Good progress was, in this way, accomplished. But still “there was a
spoke in the wheel.” As late as August 3rd, a council of state was still
“considering the Russian business” and the “fetva” or dispensation
necessary to enable the Grand Signior to declare War.[340] The Porte
still wavered between French “friendship” and Russian alliance, and was
loth to start a veritable diplomatic revolution. “It was evident that
some high-placed Turks considered that the French solely required a
passage through Egypt and that this really interested England more than
the Porte.”[341] It was amidst this hesitation that the news of Nelson’s
victory arrived and the first batches of the gloomy correspondence of
the French Army. The Porte took courage. “Bonaparte,” wrote Prince
Ypsilanti, its dragoman, “did not believe that fortune would abandon
him. From the intercepted letters you will gather the deplorable
condition of the French Navy and the fact that their Army, too weak to
advance, has been brought to a standstill between Rosetta and
Alexandria.”[342] The people began to murmur loudly.[343] An old woman,
whose belongings were destroyed in a great fire, boldly interpellated
the Commander of the Faithful himself, and attributed the misfortune to
his hesitation to declare war on the infidels, who have violated Egypt,
the “Key to the two Holy Cities.” The effect was immediate. The Grand
Vizier and the Grand Mufti, both in the “French interest,” were deposed
and sent into exile. Another fire demolished the house of Prince
Ypsilanti himself. The Porte could hesitate no longer. “The next twenty-
four hours brought forth the solemn ‘fetva’ of the pontiff and the
indignant declaration of the Sovereign against the invaders of the
Empire.” “We go on since ‘au pas de géant’,” wrote the English
Minister.[344] At the end of September, the French envoy with his
countrymen were sent to the Castle of Seven Towers, which meant, in the
usages of Turkish “international law,” that the Porte had declared
war.[345] Early in December it issued its anti-French manifesto.
As for England, while the Cabinet was divided, as was seen, in its
conjectures as to the destination of the expedition, two reports,
without absolutely convincing it, gave weight to Dundas’ anxiety for
British India.[346] One was from the British Consul at Leghorn and the
other from an agent in Frankfurt. Dundas’ mind had already been made up.
Ever since his connection with the administration of India, he wrote, he
had “been at great pains to collect information by every means and had
long made up his mind to a conviction that the possession of Egypt by
any great European power would be a fatal circumstance to the interests
of this country.”[347] Here we have one of the earliest, if not the
earliest, formulations of what has come to be one of the commonplaces of
diplomacy. He had even composed several memoranda on the subject, but
they have become dispersed. He, therefore, though expecting great
results from sending Nelson to the Mediterranean, thought that other
measures were necessary for the security of British India, for Bonaparte
might (as he actually did) give Nelson the slip and save his army. The
danger to India, moreover, would not be removed, if the French were, for
the moment, satisfied with Egypt only. “The accomplished feat would
still be a masterly stroke, nay, the most masterly stroke they have ever
yet done for their future aggrandizement.”[348] After examining the
available routes for an invasion of India, Dundas discussed the
measures. If the Turks had really consented to the invasion of their
territory, England was to set the Russians upon them. In any case, the
Government of India should be quickly apprised and a naval force should
be despatched to cruise at the “mouth of the Red Sea” or of the Persian
Gulf. The border tribesmen, moreover, could be persuaded to destroy the
French _en route_. The best measure, however, would be to reinforce the
European troops in India. Three days after he was able to announce to
Mornington—better known as Wellesley—a speedy reinforcement of 4500
troops.[349]
In face of this praiseworthy vigour, even Grenville’s scepticism had to
give way. But the landing of the French in Egypt was daily receiving
fresh confirmation. On August 20th, a despatch from Smith based on the
testimony of the Turkish harbour-master of Alexandria, left no room for
doubt. The feelings on this occasion were mixed. There was the
satisfaction at the escape of the British Isles, and especially Ireland,
from invasion;[350] there were, on the other hand, the anxiety at the
absence of news from Nelson and the fear that Turkey, even if she was to
declare war on France, would be nothing more than a burden.[351] The
Cabinet was not, under these circumstances, without the benefit of
“expert” advice.
Colonel Fullarton, who had seen service in India during the
administration of Lord Cornwallis, submitted a memorandum on the
subject.[352] Discussing the various possibilities of success and the
measures that could be taken by the presidencies, for instance, the
barring of the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits by a naval force, he considered the
steps to be taken nearer home. These almost entirely consisted in
rendering the Turkish Army more efficient by incorporating in it
regiments of Albanians under experienced British officers. Fullarton was
also one of the first to state the interest of Great Britain in
controlling Egypt. “It is taken for granted,” he wrote, “that the
possession of a permanent establishment in Egypt is essential to the
preservation of the English Empire in the East, and, when coupled with
the naval superiority of England, affords the only effectual means of
preventing the French from disturbing that Empire. . . . In a
transaction so novel and alarming as the present, if the daring and
powerfully combined projects of the French are opposed by old and
ordinary routine, as they have been by the continental powers, the
result must be such as already has disgraced every nation in Europe
except Great Britain.”
A second memorandum on the same subject was written by no other than
Warren Hastings, and was submitted directly to the King.[353] The
opening words are remarkable: “My official situation in India led me,
many years ago, to contemplate Egypt as affording, by the position of
the isthmus of Suez between the two seas, which form the communication
with the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, greater commercial advantages than
any other land upon the globe.” He stated that from the very first he
guessed that Egypt was the destination of the Expedition and believed
that France would offer Turkey in compensation for “so capital though
unprofitable a portion of the Mahomedan system, the conquest and
restitution of the Crimea and an offensive and defensive alliance
against the Emperors of Russia and Germany or either.” The measure he
suggested for defeating the French design was the occupation and
fortification of the little island of Perim and, in this way, the
Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb would be effectively guarded.
Under the influence of communications such as these and of the knowledge
of the Porte’s inclination to enter into more intimate relations with
Great Britain, Grenville drew up his programme for thwarting French
designs in the East. Of this programme it may be generally observed that
it was a middle course between Dundas’ desire for intervening in Egypt
with a British force and Spencer’s limitation of England’s _rôle_ to a
naval blockade.
Early in September, Grenville suggested to the First Lord of the
Admiralty sending a special Naval Contingent under Sir Sidney Smith—the
_protégé_ of the Grenvilles and the “expert” in Turkish affairs—to co-
operate with the Turks. Lord Spencer could not see his way to
accept.[354] He declared that the English forces in the Mediterranean
exceeded by a third his most sanguine expectations. But he passed over
in silence what was probably his real reason for rejecting the
suggestion, namely, his knowledge of the strong dislike felt by St.
Vincent and Nelson for Sidney Smith. A few days later, the news of
definite overtures from the Porte and of the attitude adopted by Russia
towards its old enemy led Grenville to reopen the subject of co-
operation with the Turks.[355] But all that Spencer offered to do was to
write to St. Vincent “an outline of the Cabinet’s ideas as to the
employment of the fleet in the Mediterranean.” He was, however, willing
to send officers to guide Turkish naval operations and thought that
there were many reasons for preferring Sir Sidney and that the
difficulties in the way were not insurmountable.[356]
Grenville’s view prevailed. Sidney Smith was to proceed to
Constantinople with the eighty-gun ship, “Le Tigre,” and was empowered
by his instructions to “take the command of such of His Majesty’s ships
as he may find in those seas, unless by any unforeseen accident it
should happen that there should be among them any of His Majesty’s
officers of a superior rank,” and was directed to act with such force in
conjunction with the Russian and Ottoman squadrons for the defence of
the Ottoman Empire and for the annoyance of the enemy in that
quarter.”[357] As a mark of special favour to Sir Sidney and to give him
a commanding position in the councils of the Associated Powers, he was
accredited in a diplomatic capacity[358] and was joined with his
brother, Spencer Smith, in the “full powers” instrument.[359]
After these resolutions had been taken, the news of the victory of the
Nile arrived at London (October 2nd). Lord Spencer thought that “there
is not now the occasion there appeared before for sending another ship
to the Mediterranean,” that “Nelson has taken the only measure which in
his state he could take and which appears the only one required for the
present of blocking up Alexandria and the mouth of the Nile by a good
squadron; and by that means entirely cutting off the French Army from
its supplies, of which all the intercepted letters represent them as
being in the most pressing want,” that “the Turk has decidedly taken his
part in a most magnificent declaration of war,” that the Russians have
sent supernumerary officers to guide Turkish operations, and, finally,
that “everything seems to be in so perfectly good a train in the
Levant.”[360] In accordance with this news St. Vincent was instructed
that the Mediterranean Fleet should perform four services: the
protection of the kingdom of Naples and, in the event of a war in Italy,
co-operation with the armies of Austria and Naples, the cutting off of
all communications between France and Egypt, the siege of Malta, and
lastly, co-operation with Turkish and Russian squadrons in the
Archipelago. Of these four duties, the first was declared the most
important.[361] Grenville wavered, but it was only for a moment.[362]
Thus was executed one item in his programme. The next one was calculated
to satisfy to some extent the requirements of Dundas, namely, to send
Colonel Koehler, who had distinguished himself during the siege of
Gibraltar by the Spaniards and who had been “formerly employed by
Grenville on a confidential mission” in Turkey,[363] with a staff of
officers and a present of artillery, to render the Turkish Army more
efficient. Pitt liked the idea and would have preferred Lord Mulgrave to
undertake the mission.[364] Submitting his views to Grenville, Koehler
declared that this was not the time for revolutionising the military
system of Turkey and that his work would consist in the formation of a
corps of Janissaries with a European field artillery and officered by
Europeans “which would serve as a steady and permanent defence to check
the ardour of pursuit and as a foundation and as a support to rally
upon,” and in helping the Turks “to consider every means practicable to
harass, alarm, wear out and dispirit as well as diminish by fatigues and
perpetual attacks an army devoid of every possible resource of receiving
reinforcements from their country until they are found to be reduced to
such a situation as to be fallen upon in all directions by one and
general impetuous attack and with a moral certainty of total destruction
which must sooner or later happen and most probably in a very short
time.”[365] Grenville expressed himself in full accord with these
views.[366] But the Duke of York—the Commander-in-Chief—“entirely
disapproved of the whole business.”[367] He thought that there was great
risk in giving a man like Koehler such ample discretion, that he would
disappoint the hopes he had raised, and that the officers selected were
young and raw and one of them was a lad of seventeen.[368] Shortly
after, however, the Duke withdrew his objections and here again
Grenville’s view prevailed.[369]
Koehler, who was now given the rank of Brigadier-General, was instructed
to offer every aid he could for “the defeat and destruction of the
French Army in Egypt and also of their transports and other vessels in
the port of Alexandria,” and to be “particularly solicitous to direct
the efforts of the Porte in such a manner as may destroy even the
probability of General Bonaparte’s using any part of his force to the
annoyance of the British dominions in India.”[370] His departure for
Constantinople, however, was delayed by sanguine anticipations nourished
by rumours of the assassination of Bonaparte in a tumult in Cairo.
Dundas wrote to Grenville remonstrating against the folly of accepting
mere conjecture for ascertained fact,[371] and Koehler left England in
the early days of December.
As regards the project of alliance sent by Spencer Smith, Grenville
thought “that it will be better on account both of the friendship
subsisting between the Emperor of Russia and His Majesty and of the
public and ostensible union which should subsist between powers acting
in concert against the common enemy to give the treaty rather the form
of an accession on the part of England to the alliance between Turkey
and Russia than that of distinct and separate negotiations.”[372] Hence
the differences between the _projet_ and the _contre-projet_ drawn by
Grenville. While Turkey engaged to raise at least an army of 100,000
troops and to equip naval forces for co-operation with those of the
allies, England undertook to maintain such naval forces in the
Mediterranean as would suffice, with those of the allies, “to annoy the
common enemy and frustrate his designs and, above all, to prevent any
attack on the dominions of the Ottoman Porte.”[373] The “mutual
guarantee” article was so interpreted as to cover either “the
possessions of each party as they stood at the commencement of the war
or as they may stand at the conclusion of a peace made by common
consent.”[374] Fearing that Turkish activity would slacken or cease with
the defeat of Bonaparte in Egypt or with his departure for India,
Grenville instructed Spencer Smith to take all measures to procure the
expulsion of French subjects from the territories of the Sultan and thus
secure the alliance against their intrigues.[375]
On November 11th, the _contra-projet_ was communicated to the Reis
Effendi, and Smith asked to know the stage reached by the Russo-Turkish
negotiations. After a long discussion, he found out that they had come
to a standstill over the amount of the subsidy to be paid to Russia. The
dispute was referred to Paul,[376] whose answer, entirely satisfactory
to the Porte, arrived on December 29th.[377] By that time Sir Sidney
Smith had arrived at Constantinople and the treaty had been fully
discussed.[378] On January 5th, 1799, it was signed with befitting
solemnity.[379]
British interests at Constantinople had hitherto been so insignificant
as only to require a diplomatic mission of the lowest rank. But the new
alliance opened such a prospect of political influence and expanded
trade with the Levant[380] that in November, Grenville accepted the
offer of Lord Elgin, former Minister at Berlin, to proceed to
Constantinople as Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary.[381] Elgin’s departure was delayed from various causes,
and in the end he was to carry the ratifications of the concluded
treaty.
Grenville’s programme thus launched, the Cabinet became engrossed in the
hopes, anxieties and disappointments of the Second Coalition, till the
failure of most of its schemes and the Convention of El-Arish forced the
question of Egypt upon its attention.
[Footnote 289: Loir, _Revue Maritime_, April, 1900.]
[Footnote 290: 3 July. _Correspondance_, IV, 2728.]
[Footnote 291: Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 382.]
[Footnote 292: “Que faisait la flotte à Alexandrie? Pourquoi, au lieu de
se rendre à Corfou, où il était convenu qu’elle viendrait attendre les
ordres du gouvernement . . . a-t-elle oisivement attendu l’ennemi.”
Talleyrand to Sieyès. Pallain, p. 383.]
[Footnote 293: Boulay de la Meurthe, _Le Directoire et L’Expédition
d’Egypte_, p. 24.]
[Footnote 294: _Correspondance_, IV, 2502.]
[Footnote 295: Letter to Joseph, _Int. Corr._, II, p. 101.]
[Footnote 296: _Ibid._, I, p. 25.]
[Footnote 297: _Correspondance_, IV, 2771.]
[Footnote 298: Jonquière, III, p. 96.]
[Footnote 299: Jonquière, II, pp. 244-5.]
[Footnote 300: Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I. 367.]
[Footnote 301: _Ibid._, I, 365, 368.]
[Footnote 302: _Ibid._, 367.]
[Footnote 303: _Ibid._, 368.]
[Footnote 304: Jurien de la Gravière, 370.]
[Footnote 305: _Correspondance_, IV, 3045.]
[Footnote 306: _Ibid._, IV, 2878.]
[Footnote 307: _Ibid._, IV, 2962.]
[Footnote 308: 20 July, _Despatches_, III, p. 42.]
[Footnote 309: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 310: To St. Vincent, _ibid._, III, p. 45.]
[Footnote 311: _Ibid._, III, p. 48.]
[Footnote 312: Captain Berry’s narrative, Nelson’s _Despatches_ III, p.
50.]
[Footnote 313: To Bruix, 2 July, _Int. Corr._, I, p. 40.]
[Footnote 314: _Despatches_, III, p. 92.]
[Footnote 315: _Ibid._, III, p. 98.]
[Footnote 316: _Despatches_, III, p. 95.]
[Footnote 317: Mahan, _Nelson_, I, p. 366.]
[Footnote 318: _Despatches_, III, pp. 104-5.]
[Footnote 319: To British Minister at Constantinople, 27 Aug.,
_Despatches_, III, p. 109.]
[Footnote 320: To Minto, 29 Aug., _ibid._, III, pp. 111-13.]
[Footnote 321: Aubert Dubayet to Talleyrand, 24 Oct., 1797, Jonquière,
I, p. 587.]
[Footnote 322: Ruffin to Talleyrand, 1 June, _ibid._, I, p. 594.]
[Footnote 323: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 324: Compare an interesting despatch from Harford Jones, the
East India Company agent, to Dundas, 25 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 325: Smith to Grenville, 4 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 326: A letter from Smyrna to Harford Jones, 17 Aug. F.O.
Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 327: Ruffin to Talleyrand, 20 June. Jonquière, I, p. 596.]
[Footnote 328: _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 17 July. Jonquière, I, pp. 597, 598.]
[Footnote 329: Spencer Smith to Grenville, 23 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 330: Spencer Smith to Grenville, 23 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 331: As to this, see report by an agent of the English
Minister, 23 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 332: Despatch of Harford Jones, above, p. 59, note 1.]
[Footnote 333: Prince Ypsilanti to the Dragoman of the English mission,
report signed “T.” _Ibid._]
[Footnote 334: Spencer Smith’s despatch of 23 July.]
[Footnote 335: Sorel, V, p. 354.]
[Footnote 336: Sorel, V, p. 354.]
[Footnote 337: Smith to Grenville, 25 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 338: _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 1 Aug.]
[Footnote 339: F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 340: Smith’s despatch of 3 Aug. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 341: Harford Jones’ despatch, p. 59, note 1., above.]
[Footnote 342: Ypsilanti to Smith, 19 and 21 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 343: Ruffin’s account. Jonquière, II, p. 229 f.]
[Footnote 344: Smith to Grenville, 3 Sept., 1798. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 345: Note 2.]
[Footnote 346: P. 38, note 4.]
[Footnote 347: To Grenville. _Wellesley Despatches_, I, pp. 678-81.]
[Footnote 348: To Grenville, _Wellesley Despatches_, I, 678-681.]
[Footnote 349: Dundas to Mornington, 16 June. _Ibid._, I, pp. 349-50.
“The best work recorded of Dundas.” Fortescue, IV, part II, p. 720.]
[Footnote 350: Grenville to Rufus King, 27 Aug. _Dropmore Papers_, IV,
p. 288.]
[Footnote 351: Buckingham to Grenville, 26 Aug. _Ibid._, IV, p. 388.]
[Footnote 352: 25 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.]
[Footnote 353: B.M. Add. MSS., 29234, f. 32. Covering letter dated 30
Sept.]
[Footnote 354: Spencer to Grenville, 10 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p.
303.]
[Footnote 355: Smith’s despatches of 1 Aug. (p. 60 above) arrived on 15
Sept. Vorontsoff to Grenville, 15 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 316.]
[Footnote 356: Spencer to Grenville. _Ibid._, IV, p. 320.]
[Footnote 357: Grenville to Spencer Smith, 1 Oct., 1798. F.O. Turkey,
20.]
[Footnote 358: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 359: 30 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 360: Spencer to Grenville, 3 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p.
332.]
[Footnote 361: 3 Oct. _Despatches_, III, p. 143.]
[Footnote 362: To Spencer Smith, 5 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20. On the 10th,
however, he announced the definite resolution to send Sidney Smith with
the “Tigre”. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 363: Grenville to the Duke of York, 12 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 25.]
[Footnote 364: Pitt to Grenville, 14 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p.
314.]
[Footnote 365: A memorandum by Koehler. F.O. Turkey, 25.]
[Footnote 366: To the Duke of York, 16 Oct. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 367: To the Duke of York, 16 Oct. _Ibid._
3 Canning to Grenville, 1 Nov. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 356. Duke of
York to Grenville, 2 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 25.]
[Footnote 368: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 369: Canning to Grenville, 4 Nov. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p.
359.]
[Footnote 370: Instructions, 7 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 25.]
[Footnote 371: Dundas to Grenville, 13 Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, pp.
413-14.]
[Footnote 372: To Sidney and Spencer Smith, 3 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 373: To Sidney and Spencer Smith, 3 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 374: To Spencer Smith, 1 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20.]
[Footnote 375: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 376: Minutes of a Conference. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 377: Sidney Smith to Grenville, 5 Jan., 1799. F.O. Turkey,
21.]
[Footnote 378: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 379: Sidney and Spencer Smith to Grenville, 6 Jan. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 380: Loughborough to Pitt, 30 Oct, “[The father of the present
sheriff] conceives that the opening of the trade to the Levant and to
the Turkish dominions will give a great spring to the commerce, and that
the war itself is really become popular with the merchants and
manufacturers.” _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 336.]
[Footnote 381: Elgin to Grenville, 4 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 20.