The measures necessary for executing the design on Egypt were detailed
by Bonaparte in a despatch dated March 5th. For taking possession of
Egypt and Malta he demanded twenty to twenty-five thousand men, who were
to be stationed at Toulon, Marseilles, Genoa, Cività Vecchia, and
Corsica and to be ready for embarkation by the end of April.[157] The
Directory, on the same day, acceded to his various demands. A commission
of four was appointed to direct and supervise the complex preparations,
which included the refitting of ships of war, the collecting of
transports and the moving of troops.[158]
The proposed expedition, however, was not to be purely military.
Bonaparte contemplated nothing less than bringing back to the light of
day a civilisation long buried under the sands of the desert, and ending
the long Egyptian night. An Arabic and a Greek printing press were to be
set up for the war of propaganda.[159] Orders were given for placing at
his disposal a staff of over a hundred savants, mechanics, engineers,
architects, authors, and interpreters.[160]
He made his preparations with a zeal such as those about him had never
before seen him show, and on such a scale as would ensure success and
preserve his glory from all risk. He recruited in every quarter—thus
anticipating the brilliant period of the Consulate—officers and
soldiers, men of letters and artists. Republicans or Royalists, nobles
or Jacobins, all were the same to him, provided they served his end.
Kléber, who heartily disliked him, enlisted in order to see, as he
energetically expressed himself, “Ce que ce petit b . . . là avait dans
le ventre.”[161] Such was then his fame that he was able to enrol under
his standard his enemies as well as his friends.
Admiral Brueys, who arrived at Toulon on April 2nd, was instructed to
have his squadron ready to set sail by the 20th.[162] On March 31st, in
order to put the English on a false track, the Directory ordered
Bonaparte to proceed to Brest, and take under his command the forces
preparing for the invasion of England.[163]
By the middle of April, however, the preparations were well advanced and
the moment arrived when the expedition could be formally decreed.
Bonaparte was appointed to the command of the land as well as the sea
forces and was ordered to include the Ionian Islands within the area
under him.[164] He was, moreover, charged to take possession of Egypt,
to expel the English from such of their Eastern establishments as he
could reach, and, especially, from their Red Sea _comptoirs_, to take
all measures for securing to the Republic the exclusive navigation of
that sea, to cut a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, and to ameliorate
by all possible means the lot of the Egyptians. This wanton aggression
on the territory of a friendly power was justified by the fact that the
beys were in league with the English and were perpetrating the most
shocking cruelties on the French, “who were being daily tortured,
plundered and murdered,” by the necessity of securing this route to
India in order to destroy England’s satellites there and cut off the
source of the wealth employed by that power in corrupting the
world.[165] He was, likewise, to take possession of Malta if he could do
so, without compromising the success of the more important operations
entrusted to him. The Order of St. John—so ran the decree—had declared
its hostility to France as early as October, 1794, and since then had
not ceased to manifest it in various ways.[166] Finally, the French
frigates and the transports stationed in the Mauritius were to proceed
to Suez and be at Bonaparte’s disposal.[167] In connection with this
last decree, it may be added, letters of credence addressed to various
Oriental potentates, but in which the name of the envoy was left blank,
were prepared.[168] Nelson’s victory made them of no use.
The _Révélateur_ of September 16th and 17th, protesting against this
policy of usurpation, ironically remarked that the Porte had not
appointed the French his police-officers.[169] That was precisely the
_rôle_ which the Directory professed and diplomatic action was
determined upon to bring the Porte to view the presence of the French in
Egypt in that light.
The diplomatic preparations of the Directory consisted entirely in the
appointment of an ambassador who was to obtain the consent of the Porte
to the French occupation of Egypt or, at any rate, its acquiescence.
Talleyrand drew up the necessary instructions and submitted them to the
Directory on March 16th.[170] After a lengthy historical exposition of
Franco-Turkish relations, he emphasised the interests of the Republic in
preserving the integrity of Turkey and avoiding a rupture with that
power and pointed out that the ambassador should leave France for his
post towards the beginning of May. On hearing of the landing of the
French in Egypt—which, probably, would be in August—he was to take
measures for the protection of French residents and protract the
negotiations so as to give Bonaparte time to establish himself. For the
guidance of the plenipotentiary, Talleyrand drew up two plans. According
to the first of these, the Porte was to be represented at Cairo by a
Pasha, who should be the nominal head of the administration and whose
expenses should be defrayed from an annual tribute to the Sultan
amounting to 1500 “purses” (2¼ million francs). The French, moreover,
were to pledge themselves to respect the property and religion of the
inhabitants. In return for these “concessions,” Djezzar, the Pasha of
Acre, should be deposed. According to the second plan the Porte was to
surrender Egypt to the French and to have, in compensation, the Ionian
Islands. The Ambassador was also to declare that France was willing to
help Turkey to recover some of its lost provinces, for example, the
Crimea.
According to Miot de Melito, Talleyrand did not sincerely believe in the
efficacy of the negotiations which he proposed.[171] Although the ex-
bishop was accomplished in the art of false-witness, it is difficult to
accept Miot’s statements in face of the persistence with which the
Minister expressed his hope of avoiding a rupture with Turkey.
Bonaparte, however, proposed that the Ambassador charged with this
delicate mission should be no other than Talleyrand himself. According
to Miot, he acted in this matter in accordance with his usual practice,
which was “to implicate those men whose advice he had followed in any
risk that might arise from acting on it, thus obtaining a guarantee
against treachery or desertion.”[172] Talleyrand, in order to escape
from the persistent hostility of Rewbell, accepted the post.[173] As
will be explained later on, he did not leave Paris; and it was not till
May 11th that he wrote to Ruffin—French chargé at Constantinople—of the
Egyptian Expedition, of the intention to send an ambassador, and of his
hope that an “accommodation” would be reached, and instructed him to
take measures, in the meantime, for the protection of French
residents.[174]
While Bonaparte was still lingering in Paris, the first symptoms of the
complications upon which he was counting appeared. At Rastadt the
Austrian plenipotentiary had opposed France’s demand for the entire left
bank of the Rhine; and in Vienna the French Ambassador, Bernadotte, had
given umbrage to an etiquette-ridden Court, and, on April 13th, incited
the populace to an anti-French riot, in consequence of which he was
obliged to leave the country. The situation was critical and war seemed
imminent. Rewbell considered the affair as a “guet-apens abominable” on
the part of England and Russia, while Talleyrand and Bonaparte, on the
other hand, laid the blame on Bernadotte.[175] The Prussian envoy,
Sandoz, also employed his influence on behalf of peace; conciliatory
communications promising satisfaction, moreover, arrived from
Vienna.[176] The Directory, thereupon, decreed, on April 24th, that
Bonaparte should proceed to Rastadt and settle all outstanding
difficulties with Austria.[177] He seemed to be disposed[178] to
undertake the new task and announced to Cobenzl his intended
departure.[179] Hearing, however, that the latter had left for Vienna,
he postponed his own departure for Rastadt.[180]
His letters to some of his lieutenants spoke of the Bernadotte affair as
only delaying for a few days the great expedition on which he was
engaged.[181] Miot relates in his _Memoirs_ that the incident gave him
the position he coveted by placing “once more the fate of France and of
her government in his hands,”[182] while Mathieu Dumas asserts that his
thoughts turned anew to a _coup d’état_ and a dictatorship.[183] He
himself, at St. Helena, attributed his hesitation to patriotic anxiety
as to the safety of France.[184] The Directory, however, did not take
this view and insisted on his departure to Toulon, where he arrived on
May 9th. Immediately on his arrival, he reviewed some of the troops and,
in a proclamation, promised each of them six acres of land.[185]
While waiting for a favourable wind, the question of the presence of the
English Fleet in the Mediterranean came to the forefront. The French
Ambassador at Madrid had been already instructed to persuade the Spanish
Government to order its ships blockaded at Cadiz to manœuvre in such a
way as to prevent the English fleet under St. Vincent from leaving the
station.[186] Nothing, however, came of this. But the news at Toulon was
that, though the English were present in the Mediterranean, they were
not in such numbers as to constitute a serious menace.[187] The gigantic
armada composed of about 38,000 troops, of thirteen sail-of-the-line and
six frigates left Toulon, accordingly, on May 19th.[188]
We have now to trace the history of the most decisive move in the
history of the Expedition, namely, the decision of the English
Government to send a fleet to the Mediterranean.
The secret of the expedition had been so well kept that the English
Cabinet was not able to worm it out.[189] Certainly Pitt’s spy system
was far less efficient than had been imagined. There was even the
suspicion that two French servants of Lord Grenville’s household
communicated to their Government the names of all his visitors and, in
this way, it was alleged that all the English spies in France were
perfectly known to the Directory.[190] With ordinary activity, however,
the Oriental scheme could have been found out from one of Barras’
mistresses or from some official at Toulon. The engaging of Arabic
interpreters and the setting-up of Arabic printing presses might have
enlightened an agent of average intelligence. The Cabinet, however, was
utterly in the dark as to the destination of the armada, and its members
indulged in many wild conjectures based on all sorts of fantastic
clues.[191] Dundas seems to have been the only important member of the
Cabinet who guessed right.[192] Some other conjectures were
correct—notably that of the British Consul at Leghorn,[193] and some of
the intelligence received was such as to shed light on the destination
of the Expedition.[194] This information, however, reached the Cabinet
too late to influence its decision to send a fleet to the Mediterranean.
The grounds upon which it was based have to be sought elsewhere.
This measure, tantamount to a revolution in English military policy,
reflected the revival of the national spirit and the desire, in the
words of a Foreign Office despatch, “to reduce France within her ancient
limits” and thus secure “the future tranquillity and independence of
Europe.”[195] The fitful Paul was certain to weary of his peaceful mood.
His chivalrous nature revolted at the depredations of France in
Switzerland and Rome. The growth of indignation at St. Petersburg begat
new hopes in Vienna. The Queen of Naples—the sister of Marie-
Antoinette—was fuming against the hated Jacobins and pestered her
nephew, the Emperor, and the English minister, Sir William Hamilton,
with appeals for protection and for help. The latter communicated these
appeals to his Government in March and to St. Vincent directly in
April.[196] These Neapolitan clamours must have weighed with the
Austrian Court, for on March 18th, Thugut, the Chancellor, instructed
the Ambassador at London, in a despatch of fifty-five pages, to find out
whether England would, among other things, send a fleet to the
Mediterranean.[197] Grenville stated in an interview with Starhemberg,
the ambassador, that the measure was greatly desired by the Cabinet, but
that they could not take it unless Naples would express her readiness to
provide the English ships with the necessary supplies.[198] Pitt
embraced the suggestion eagerly. With a friendly port in the
Mediterranean, and occasionally even without one, he could not see much
difficulty in stretching a helping hand to Naples.[199] The First Lord
of the Admiralty, Earl Spencer, however, thought differently. He
estimated the forces equipping at Toulon at no more than ten sail and
could not see his way—with a deficiency of 8000 men—to detach a
respectable force for service in the Mediterranean. He suggested,
however, that St. Vincent, with the fleet under his command, should take
a sweep round that sea and do all the mischief he could to the French
Navy.[200] Grenville, on hearing this, became despondent;[201] but Pitt,
on the contrary, was not convinced. He saw many symptoms of the spirit
of the country awakening and was determined to brave the risks of
invasion in preference to a lingering war.[202] His view, as in other
cases, prevailed.
This wise and courageous decision to resume the offensive deserves
nothing but the highest praise and marks the turn of the tide in favour
of England in Europe.[203]
On April 29th, accordingly, the Cabinet issued orders to St. Vincent to
take such measures as he deemed necessary to thwart the projects of the
Toulon armament. It was left to his judgment whether to go in person
with his whole fleet, or to send a detachment of not less than nine or
ten ships-of-the-line under a competent flag officer. If possible, the
Government wished him to maintain the blockade of Cadiz as it had been
established since the Battle of St. Vincent; but everything was to yield
to the necessity of checking the sailing of the Toulon expedition or of
defeating it if it had already started. A speedy reinforcement to supply
the ships that might be detached was promised.[204]
A private letter from Earl Spencer reflected the views and anxieties of
the Government:[205] “The circumstances in which we now find ourselves
oblige us to take a measure of a more decided and hazardous complexion
than we should otherwise have thought ourselves justified in taking; but
when you are apprized that the appearance of a British squadron in the
Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this
moment be stated to depend, you will not be surprised that we are
disposed to strain every nerve and incur considerable hazard in
effecting it.” The rest of the letter is a commentary on this almost
solemn pronouncement and emphasises the significance of the choice of
the officer who was to command. Spencer strongly recommended Nelson for
that post if St. Vincent would not command in person.
Before receiving these important orders, St. Vincent had, on May 2nd,
sent instructions to Nelson which, after reciting that he had received
intelligence that a considerable armada was preparing at Toulon and a
number of transports collecting at Marseilles and Genoa for the
embarkation of troops, directed him to proceed, with as much of his
squadron as might be at Gibraltar, up the Mediterranean and endeavour to
ascertain the destination of the Expedition which, according to some
reports, was bound for Sicily and Corfu and, according to others,
Portugal and Ireland. If Nelson found the enemy intending to go down the
Mediterranean he was not to suffer him to pass the Straits of Gibraltar
before him.[206] Upon receiving on May 10th the above despatches,
however, the Admiral’s first step was to order Nelson to return at once
to the fleet to take charge of the detachment from the beginning.[207]
More urgent instructions from the Admiralty, dated May 2nd, reached St.
Vincent on the 19th, with news that a reinforcement of eight ships-of-
the-line was on its way from England. St. Vincent, recognising the
importance of this, at once hurried off a brig (“La Mutine”) to notify
Nelson that a reinforcement of ten ships would shortly reach him. On the
21st this detachment sailed under Captain Troubridge.[208] St. Vincent,
in his new instructions, charged Nelson to use “his utmost endeavours to
take, sink, burn or destroy” the French armada and authorised him to
exact supplies, whenever needed, from the territories of the various
Mediterranean powers.[209]
The “Mutine” joined Nelson. His little squadron had had so far a
checkered career. Sailing from Gibraltar on May 8th with, in addition to
the “Vanguard,” the “Orion” and the “Alexander” and five smaller
vessels, he made his dispositions for getting information.[210] On May
17th the capture of a French corvette gave him nothing but conflicting
reports as to what was going on at Toulon.[211] On the night of the
20th, a violent gale roughly handled the “Vanguard.” Fortunately for
Nelson, the other two ships escaped without much injury and the
“Vanguard” was taken in tow and was anchored under the Isle of St.
Pietro, at the southern extremity of Sardinia.[212] These delays made
possible the junction of Troubridge, of whose approach—thanks to the
dispersion of the frigates during the storm—Nelson was entirely
ignorant.[213]
On the very day that Nelson took shelter at St. Pietro, the French
armada was under sail along the coast of Corsica. The convoy of Genoa
joined it on May 21st and that of Corsica on the 27th.[214] On June 1st
and 3rd, it was learnt that Nelson was in command of three ships, that
he had suffered heavily in a storm and that he had left St. Pietro on
May 28th.[215] Bonaparte decided, under these circumstances, not to wait
for the convoy of Cività-Vecchia, but to attack Malta as soon as
possible. On June 9th he arrived before the island and found that Desaix
with the convoy from Cività-Vecchia had been waiting there for a few
days.
On the arrival of Desaix, a Maltese messenger went on board his ship to
convey the Grand Master’s welcome and to announce that no more than four
ships at a time could enter the port. This was, as General Belliard
frankly states in his diary, the very declaration desired by the French;
for it would serve as an excellent pretext for the use of force.[216]
Bonaparte, on his arrival, sent Marmont on shore to fetch the French
Consul, who confirmed the declaration already made to Desaix.[217]
Orders were at once given for operations at four points.[218]
These decided upon, other methods were also to be employed to gather the
fruits of the work of Poussielgue in the island. Treacherous letters,
couched in terms to allay the anxiety of the knights, were sent from,
amongst others, Dolomieu, the mineralogist and ex-knight, who was one of
the “savants” attached to the expedition.[219] The French Consul wrote
to the Grand Master that Bonaparte had decided to obtain by force what
should have been voluntarily offered.[220]
In spite of the fact that the Order had ample warning of what was to
befall it, all was confusion and treachery.[221] Malta, nevertheless,
had her fortifications deeply embedded in the live rock. The defenders
would have only to retire behind the ramparts and weary down the
attacking force, which would be sufficiently occupied with the difficult
task of demolishing the rocky bastions and with the problem of finding
fresh water in an arid coast. A delay of a few days might have seriously
compromised the success of the expedition. There now came to the help of
the French that sapping of all discipline and of all sentiments of
loyalty which their propaganda had helped to create, and one day of
skirmishes and another of negotiations sufficed to bring about the fall
of Malta.[222]
On June 11th, the Grand Master proposed a suspension of hostilities, to
which Bonaparte readily acceded.[223] Poussielgue and Dolomieu were then
sent to “sound the intentions of De Hompesch and report on the spirit of
the inhabitants.” The verbal instructions of these agents clearly prove
that the fall of Malta was not as inevitable as has been generally
supposed. Bonaparte was ready, if necessary, to concede to the extent of
preserving the sovereignty of the Order in return for the right of the
French to control the port and garrison the town of Valetta.[224] At
midnight, however, the envoys of the Grand Master arrived on board the
“Orient.” In half an hour was concluded the “convention” for the
capitulation of the Order and the end of its sovereignty over
Malta.[225] The next day the French entered the town, took possession of
the fortresses and anchored their fleet in the harbour. The news of this
first success reached Paris on July 1st, and was the more welcome as
great anxiety had been felt for the safety of the army under Bonaparte
when the presence of an English fleet in the Mediterranean became
known.[226]
Bonaparte remained for six days in Malta, during which he demonstrated
the full capacity of his organising genius. Entrusting the
administration of the island to a commission of nine and to a
commissioner appointed by the French Government,[227] he ordered an
inventory of all the property of the Order,[228] dispersed the
knights,[229] proclaimed the right of the Maltese to equality, abolished
feudal titles and slavery, prohibited the wearing of liveries, liberated
the Mohammedan galley-slaves, put an end to the representation of
foreign powers in the island,[230] expelled the monks and nuns, and gave
the vacated livings to native Maltese and set limits to religious
endowments.[231]
The fall of the Order, moreover, was bound to impress the Muslem powers
of the Mediterranean. Capital was also to be made of the liberation of
the Muslem galley-slaves, who were, for the most part, former subjects
of the Barbary regencies of North Africa.[232] General Chabot,
commanding at Corfu, was directed to announce the news to Ruffin at
Constantinople and to Aly of Janina.[233] Other French agents were
ordered to spread the news far and wide and especially among the Greeks
of the Morea.[234] Bonaparte, moreover, thought it useful at this stage
to gain over Aly and thus, in addition to abetting the rebel Paswan
Oglou of Widdin and to lulling the anxiety of the Porte by declaring the
aim of the expedition to be the punishment of the unruly beys, he would
be able to keep Turkey quiet. He, accordingly, sent his aide-de-camp,
Lavallette, to that Pasha and instructed him to impress Aly with the
strength of the forces under his command and with his power of
increasing his glory should he be willing to take the part of the
French.[235]
Leaving General Vaubois in command, Bonaparte sailed from Malta on June
19th.
As for Nelson, he proceeded on the 27th to search for the frigates which
had separated during the storm. Their absence hampered his operations
from the outset. On May 28th, for example, he learnt from a vessel out
of Marseilles of the sailing of the French armada and would have pursued
it had he possessed the frigates—indispensable for such a service.[236]
On June 5th, by the arrival of the “Mutine,” he learnt that he was to
expect the reinforcement “which converted his division into a fleet and
enlarged his mission from one of mere reconnaissance to the duty of
overtaking and destroying a great expedition.”[237] He also learnt that
the “Mutine” had fallen in with the frigates three days before on their
way to Gibraltar, persuaded that Nelson could not take the sea with his
impaired ships.[238] On June 7th, Troubridge, with the reinforcements,
effected his junction.[239] The French having had a long start, Nelson
would not delay an instant. “You may be assured,” he wrote to St.
Vincent, “I will fight them the moment I can reach their fleet, be they
at anchor, or under sail.”[240]
With this resolution, he began the wearisome chase of the French which
ended only in the victory of the Nile. He sailed towards Naples and
Sicily, points mentioned in St. Vincent’s instructions as probable, and
on June 14th learnt from a Tunisian cruiser, that ten days before the
French had been seen off the end of Sicily steering to the eastward. “If
they pass Sicily,” he wrote the next day, “I shall believe they are
going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria and getting troops to
India—a plan concerted with Tippoo Sahib, by no means so difficult as
might at first view be imagined.”[241] Sending Troubridge ahead to
Naples to communicate with Sir William Hamilton and with General Acton,
the Neapolitan Prime Minister, to gather information and to see what
help Naples would give, the squadron hove to in the Bay of Naples on
June 17th and Troubridge rejoined.[242] Naples sent assurances of good
will and promises of surreptitious help. The information gathered was
that the enemy had gone towards Malta and this gave direction to the
next move.[243] On the 22nd, however, Nelson learnt near the south-west
of Sicily, that the French had taken Malta on the 15th, and that their
fleet had sailed on the 16th for an unknown destination.[244] This was
not true, for, as we have seen, it was not till the 19th that the French
sailed from Malta. Guessing that Egypt was their destination, Nelson set
sail at once towards Alexandria. His reasons are clearly set forth in a
despatch to St. Vincent.[245] With information from Naples, so it ran,
that that kingdom was reassured by the French as to the aim of their
expedition,[246] with knowledge of the extent of the preparations, of
the presence of naturalists, astronomers and other “savants” and of the
easterly direction of the prevailing winds, he conjectured that their
aim was to establish a colony in Egypt and to use it as a basis for
operations against India. The opinion of these captains “in whom he
placed great confidence” confirmed him in his determination to sail to
Alexandria and to lose no time in frustrating the designs of the French.
On the 26th, the “Mutine” was sent ahead to deliver despatches to the
British Consul in Alexandria and to gather information.[247] Two days
later the squadron appeared off that town. Captain Hardy, of the
“Mutine,” reported that he was not able to obtain any news as to the
French.[248] Nelson was now to suffer from an excess of eagerness and
singleness of purpose. “His active and anxious mind,” wrote Captain
Berry, “would not permit him to rest a moment in the same place; he
therefore shaped his course to the northward for the coast of Caramania,
to reach as quickly as possible some quarter where information could
probably be obtained.”[249]
Only two days later the French armament appeared off the low-lying coast
of Egypt. Leaving Malta on June 19th, it did not take the direct route,
but skirted the south coast of Crete. It was off that island that its
Commander-in-chief learnt of the presence of seventeen English ships.
His anxiety as to the safety of the convoy was greatly increased. Twenty
days of navigation had demonstrated it as incapable of manœuvring for an
engagement as of effecting its escape.[250] On June 27th, the “Junon”
was sent ahead to fetch the French Consul at Alexandria. Rejoining the
fleet on the 29th, the “Junon” reported the appearance of an English
squadron of fourteen sail under Nelson.[251] This news changed
Bonaparte’s plans. His original intention was to enter the Delta by the
two mouths of the Nile. An examination of the strategic geography of
Egypt proves the soundness of this. As the possession of Cairo was the
immediate objective of the campaign, the obstacles were the desert and
the Nile. The Mamelukes could add to these natural obstacles a
formidable cavalry and a fairly strong river-flotilla. The French had,
consequently, to avoid the desert and the crossing of the river.
Damietta and Rosetta were, therefore, the proper points for the
disembarkation of the troops and the starting of the march on Cairo.
Alexandria, on the contrary, did not possess this advantage. It was then
almost completely cut off from the rest of Egypt by the encroaching of
the desert on the cultivated land.[252] The presence of the English
fleet, however, did not leave the French any other choice than land
where they were. Thus, if Nelson had failed to encounter the French
fleet, he was able—by the mere fact of his presence—to effect a not
unimportant result.
The disembarkation was effected under difficult circumstances a few
miles to the westward of Alexandria, and an immediate march on that town
was ordered.[253] The notables, alarmed by the appearance of the English
fleet, had, in the meantime, appealed to the Mameluke governor of the
neighbouring province for help.[254] A Turkish ship-of-the-line and a
few frigates anchored in the harbour had, at the appearance of the
English, begun to send their guns ashore.[255] The Beys at Cairo treated
the matter lightly. They declared their perfect readiness to trample
with their horses over all the “Franks” of the Earth.[256] The mob of
Mamelukes, ferocious Beduins and simple peasants armed with long flails
gathered for the defence of Egypt’s first port was quickly dispersed by
French advanced detachments, and before the evening of July 2nd, the
French were masters of the place. There does not seem to be any
foundation for the reports of a massacre of the inhabitants.[257]
Bonaparte now put into execution the long-matured policy of propitiating
the Egyptians; the French were to appear to them rather as liberators
than as conquerors, and as if they had come to put an end to the tyranny
of a caste recruited from the slaves of Caucasia, and to ensure to the
oppressed cultivator of the soil the fruit of his toil. They were also
to demonstrate that their presence in Egypt would not at all affect the
friendly relations between Turkey and France, for the Porte had been as
much as the French the victim of its nominal vassals. While still at
sea, the soldiers were admonished to respect the religion of the
Egyptians and the “muftis.” “The peoples,” so the soldiers were told,
“whom we are about to encounter treat women differently from us, but in
every country the man who wrongs a woman is a scoundrel. Plunder
enriches only a few and dishonours all; it destroys our resources and
makes us hated by those whom it is to our interest to have as friends.
The first town on our route was built by Alexander. Every step we take
will awaken memories of great deeds worthy of exciting the emulation of
Frenchmen.”[258] But his profound study of the Koran, which, together
with the Bible, the Vedas, and Montesquieu’s works, he grouped in his
library catalogue under the heading of “Politics,” had borne fruit in
the remarkable proclamation in Arabic addressed to the Egyptians.[259]
It must be stated, however, that the French original composed by
Bonaparte is truer to the style and spirit of the Koran than the
Levantine interpreters’ Arabic version.[260] The intermediaries between
the people and the French were to be the “Ulema,” who were the nearest
approach to a clergy and who were favoured by Bonaparte on account of
their pacific dispositions and their relative enlightenment.[261] As
regards the Sublime Porte, he was careful to preserve the symbols of its
suzerainty. Villages, for instance, were to fly the Turkish as well as
the French flag.[262] The Pasha of Egypt—as a fellow sufferer from
Mameluke violence—was requested to join Bonaparte and “curse with him
the impious race of the Beys.”[263] The commander of the Turkish ship-
of-war was not allowed to sail, but was reassured as to the friendly
intentions of the French.[264] The French envoy at Constantinople was
directed to convey similar assurances to the Porte and was informed of
the speedy arrival of an ambassador.[265]
Without absolutely convincing the Egyptians, the proclamation, at any
rate, seemed to appease them, especially that portion of it professing
friendliness to the Commander of the Faithful. Under the influence of
their religious leaders, who were sincerely opposed to any violence, and
submitting to the “right” of the strongest, they easily transferred from
Mamelukes to French the signs of an allegiance, which, at heart, they
felt for neither.
The French now began to suffer all the miseries of disenchantment. The
“town built by Alexander” of which their general spoke so eloquently was
only a twelfth part of what it had been in the days when his Macedonian
model had given it his name; the rest of the city was simply refuse and
ruins surrounded by arid stretches. The six acres promised at Toulon
well seemed to the soldier an undesirable domain. The ferocious Beduin,
ever on the alert to cut off stragglers, cured the disciples of Jean
Jacques of their admiration for the “natural man.”[266]
The disillusionment was further embittered by the sufferings of the
troops on their march towards Cairo. Breaking camp on July 7th,
Bonaparte sent the main body of his army along the desert road instead
of the more comfortable but longer one by Rosetta and the banks of the
Nile.[267] Only one division, that under Dugua, was sent by the longer
route, while a flotilla, under Perrée, was to ascend the river from
Rosetta.[268] The troops suffered all the horrors of a desert
march—hunger, thirst, and heat.[269] In the miserable villages there
were none of the appliances of civilisation; grain there was in
abundance, but neither mills nor ovens, and nothing to drink but the
slimy water of the cisterns. After tasting the delights of Capua, they
had now to content themselves with water-melons, of which they partook
so ravenously as to justify the contemporary English cartoonist who
represented the ghost of Bonaparte attributing the destruction of his
legions to the water-melon and the Arab.[270] The officers encouraged
their soldiers in expressing their discontent.[271] These murmured,
threatened to mutiny, and scoffed at the “savants” whom they believed to
have deceived their general. Stories of the indignities to which the
Beduins subjected their prisoners kept the highly strung soldiers on the
alert all the time. The strain drove many to commit suicide, even in the
presence of the general.[272] The latter, by word and deed, did all he
could to restore the _morale_ of the troops. Passing near a group of
disaffected men, he was accosted: “Well, General, are you going to take
us to India?” “No,” was his cutting reply, “it is not with your likes
that I should undertake the journey.”[273]
On hearing of the landing of the French, the Beys and notables had
decided to write at once to Constantinople for help, and gave the
command to Murad. The latter marched with his cavalry towards the enemy
after giving orders for the construction of a thick chain across the
river.[274] The first “affair” between the Mamelukes and the French took
place on July 10th, and was described by General Belliard as a
“joke.”[275] It restored, however, the confidence of the French soldier
and showed him that his magnificently accoutred enemies who tempted his
cupidity, could effect nothing against the “square” formation adopted by
his general. Three days later there was a second engagement of a more
serious character.[276] The Mamelukes, dazzling in gold and silver,
armed with pistols and carabines of the best English make and with the
finest sabres of the East and mounted on horses of the purest breed,
dashed upon the squares, caracoled round the flanks seeking a feeble
point, but were stopped everywhere by a wall of raised bayonets, and
some of the bravest expired within the French lines. The Mamelukes at
last retired. In the meantime a lively engagement took place between the
flotillas in which the Mamelukes acquitted themselves with honour and
would have been victorious had it not been for the advance of the French
troops towards the bank of the river and the sail of one of their ships
catching fire accidentally.[277]
The news of these defeats reached Cairo on July 15th.[278] The panic of
the populace knew no bounds. The gossipmongers abandoned the bazaars and
burglars plied their nefarious trade. The proclamation of Bonaparte
spread by the liberated galley-slaves, whom the populace believed to be
as much infidel as the French, did not produce the desired effect.[279]
The Beys did not take the trouble to employ a spy or a scout to discover
the route taken by the French and showed themselves not less panic
stricken than the people. Ibrahim Bey, Murad’s rival, utterly in the
dark as to the movements of the French, decided to remain on the Cairo
side of the river. The Government of the Mamelukes had tumbled down. The
Beduins emerged from their desert retreats and began pillaging the
settled population, and villages renewed their traditional feuds. The
“Franks” and the other Christians were subjected to insults and threats.
Murad had, on the 16th, encamped at the village of Embabeh, on the left
bank of the Nile, opposite Cairo. He thus committed the fatal mistake of
not placing the river between himself and his enemies and thus imposing
upon them the necessity of finding means for crossing it. His superior
flotilla could have seriously hampered that operation and his cavalry
could have fallen upon the French detachments as they effected their
landing on the other side.[280]
It was not to be, and in the engagement which took place on July 18th
and which marked the last effort of mediæval warfare, the famous cavalry
was shattered by the world’s greatest soldier, and the most
indispensable condition for the rise of a New Egypt was realised.[281]
The “Battle of the Pyramids” delivered Cairo into the hands of the
French. Ibrahim, unable to go to the rescue of his brethren on the other
bank, had departed with his cavalry, his women and his riches towards
Syria. Others, who could, had followed his example. The “Ulema” of the
Azhar University communicated on July 21st with Bonaparte, who repeated
his former assurances and entered Cairo on July 24th.[282]
The Mamelukes, having dispersed in all directions, he hastened to extend
the dominion of the French over the chief provincial towns and to re-
establish his communications with the coast which, during the march on
Cairo, had been cut off by the Beduins and the peasants.[283] He
attempted, moreover, to open negotiations with Murad, who after his
defeat had blown up his flotilla and retreated towards Upper Egypt.
These negotiations would give Bonaparte time to destroy the other
Mameluke chief, Ibrahim, who was then lingering on the eastern frontier
of Egypt to lay hands on the richly laden caravan from Mecca.[284]
Accordingly Rosetti, the ex-Imperial consul and the confidant of the
Beys, was instructed to offer Murad the province of Girgeh up to the
cataract in return for his acknowledging the suzerainty of the French,
paying them the “miri,” or tax on land, and keeping no more than 500
cavalrymen.[285] But inklings of the great victory of Nelson seemed to
have reached Murad, who rejected Bonaparte’s terms and offered, in his
turn, to make the French a money payment if they consented to leave
Egypt.[286]
Before he knew of this answer, Bonaparte had sent his troops in movement
against Ibrahim. On August 11th the French cavalry had a lively
engagement with the Mamelukes, and Ibrahim was able, thanks to the delay
of the French infantry in coming up to battle, to effect his escape with
all his immense baggage into Syria.[287]
It was on his way back to Cairo, after making a futile overture to
Ibrahim Bey, that Bonaparte learnt of the destruction of the French
fleet in the Bay of Abukir.[288]
[Footnote 157: _Correspondance_, IV, 2426.]
[Footnote 158: _Ibid._, IV, 2427-2436.]
[Footnote 159: The Directory to the Minister of Justice, 26 March,
Jonquière, I, p. 229. To deceive the enemy the minister was ordered to
set them up in the Ionian Islands.]
[Footnote 160: To the Minister of Interior, 26 March, Jonquière, I, p.
230. _Correspondance_, IV, 2454. A full list of the “Savants” has been
published as an appendix to the _Journal et Souvenirs_ of Villiers du
Tirage.]
[Footnote 161: Thibaudeau, _Mémoires_, II, pp. 346-8.]
[Footnote 162: _Correspondance_, IV, 2439.]
[Footnote 163: Jonquière, I, p. 252. Sandoz (despatch 19 April) that
Talleyrand disapproved of this.]
[Footnote 164: 12 April, _Correspondance_, IV, 2491.]
[Footnote 165: _Ibid._, 2495.]
[Footnote 166: _Ibid._, 2496, 2497.]
[Footnote 167: 12 April, _Correspondance_, IV, 2498.]
[Footnote 168: Jonquière, I, p. 368.]
[Footnote 169: Aulard, op. cit., V, pp. 86, 87. The paper was
immediately suppressed.]
[Footnote 170: Pallain, p. 336 f.]
[Footnote 171: _Memoirs_, I, p. 2498.]
[Footnote 172: Miot de Melito, _Memoirs_, I, p. 271.]
[Footnote 173: Talleyrand said to Sandoz: “I shall probably be removed
from a post in which I had nothing but annoyance. Perhaps I shall be
appointed Ambassador at Constantinople, which I would like to accept.”
Fournier, I, p. 159 note. _Memoirs of Talleyrand_, I, p. 203.]
[Footnote 174: Jonquière, I, pp. 593, 594.]
[Footnote 175: Sandoz’s despatch of 25 April, 1798.
“De vous à moi, Bernadotte a mis dans sa conduite un peu de
précipitation.” Talleyrand to Treilhard, 26 April. Pallain, p. 231.]
[Footnote 176: _Ibid._ to _ibid._ Pallain, p. 231.]
[Footnote 177: Jonquière, I, p. 386.]
[Footnote 178: Pallain, p. 232.]
[Footnote 179: 25 April. _Correspondance_, IV, 2547.]
[Footnote 180: 26 April, to Talleyrand. _Correspondance_, IV, 2548.]
[Footnote 181: To Kléber, IV, 2549; to Caffarelli, 2550; to Brueys,
2551. Dated 28 April.]
[Footnote 182: _Memoirs_, I, p. 268.]
[Footnote 183: Quoted by Sybel, V, p. 249.]
[Footnote 184: In a conversation with Montholon, _Mémoires pour servir à
l’histoire de France sous Napoleon_, 1824, IV, pp. 297, 298.]
[Footnote 185: Published in the _Moniteur_ of 21 May, 1798. Next day’s
issue stated that Bonaparte never made such a promise and published as
the true harangue No. 2570 of the _Correspondance_. A letter from
Sulkowski refutes this. Jonquière, I, p. 464.]
[Footnote 186: Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 333.]
[Footnote 187: To the Directory, 19 May, _Correspondance_, IV, 2604.]
[Footnote 188: Jonquière, I, pp. 512, 518, 519.]
[Footnote 189: “They order their matters so well in France that all is
secret.” Nelson to St. Vincent, 18 May, _Despatches_, III, p. 16.]
[Footnote 190: Crawfurd to Grenville, 26 June, 1798, _Dropmore Papers_,
IV, p. 239.]
[Footnote 191: The First Lord of the Admiralty concluded from the fact
that “casks” were being shipped that the destination was the Black Sea.
Spencer to Grenville, 4 May, 1798, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 185.]
[Footnote 192: Grenville to Buckingham, 3 June, _Memoirs of the Court
and Cabinets of George III_, II, p. 401.]
[Footnote 193: Udney to Nelson, 20 April, B.M. Add. MSS. 34906. Udney to
Grenville, 16 April, _Wellesley Despatches_, I, p. 678.]
[Footnote 194: From Sir Francis d’Ivernois, 20 April, B.M. Add. MSS.
34454. Arrived London in July.]
[Footnote 195: Rose, _Pitt and the Great War_, p. 364.]
[Footnote 196: B.M. Add. MSS. 34906, f. 384. General Acton appealed for
help in a letter to Hamilton of 3 April. B.M. Add. MSS. 34906, f. 386.]
[Footnote 197: The “fifty-five” pages are summed up in a note of 18
April, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 170.]
[Footnote 198: Grenville to Pitt, 1 April, _ibid._, IV, p. 150.]
[Footnote 199: Pitt to Grenville, 1 April, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p.
152.]
[Footnote 200: Spencer to Grenville, 6 April, Rose, _Pitt and the Great
War_, p. 366.]
[Footnote 201: Grenville to Spencer, 7 April, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p.
166.]
[Footnote 202: Pitt to Grenville, 7 April, _ibid._, p. 166.]
[Footnote 203: Cf. Fortescue, _History of the British Army_, IV, part I,
p. 586.