CHAPTER V.

TO THE CAPE COLONY.

From March to December, 1901, the area of war operations was limited

exclusively to the two Republics. All the British forces were

concentrated there. Gradually the fact dawned upon us that, unless we

contrived to draw the British forces, in some way or other, off the

Republics, the latter would eventually be exhausted of all provisions,

which would necessitate their surrender. They could not for ever supply

Boer commandoes and British columns with provisions, especially when

farming pursuits were so disturbed and hampered by the enemy. It became

quite clear that, in the event of a long campaign, our whole salvation

would be in the Cape Colony. There we would be drawing on the enemy's

resources, and the British Government would indirectly be supporting us

in compensating colonists for losses sustained by Boer commandoes. An

additional advantage, should the scene of operations be transferred from

the Republics to the Cape Colony, would be that many colonists would

enlist in our ranks. There we should be constantly recruited, and our

commandoes would increase rather than decrease. That was an advantage

not to be despised, for our forces were getting daily weaker in the

states.

[Illustration: GENERAL CHRISTIAN DE WET.]

With such facts before him, General De Wet planned a second invasion of

the Cape Colony towards the close of the year 1901. By the end of

November we met him with his forces, about 1500 strong, in the district

of Bethulie. After a few days' fighting with the forces of General Knox

on the farms Goede Hoop and Willoughby, we left for the Orange River,

which we intended to ford at Odendaal's Stroom, a drift fifteen miles

below Aliwal North.

As heavy rains began to fall, we were anxious to reach the river before

it was in flood. Day and night through rain and mud we ploughed on

towards the river. When we reached the Caledon River we saw that the

water was rising rapidly, and began to fear that the Orange River, which

was still thirty miles off, would be impassable. Well, we were going to

try. We increased our speed, and left behind scores of tired horses and

mules.

The 1st of December, at sunset, we arrived on the banks of the river.

But what a disappointment! A rolling mass of water before us, so deep

and strong that there was no chance to pass through. And there we were

between two rivers in flood, with a narrow strip of country between

them, and thousands of the enemy on our track. We knew that the English

could seize the bridges, of which there are but a few, and could then be

reinforced from all parts of the country to hem us in so closely that

escape would be impossible. De Wet would at last be "cornered" and

forced to surrender--so, at least, the enemy thought. Our situation

seemed, nay was indeed, very critical.

To delay and wait for the fall of the river was out of the question. For

not only would it take at least fifteen days before the river would have

subsided to such a degree that we could hope to ford it, but De Wet's

old friend, General Knox, was at his heels. All we could do was to march

up the Caledon. That river, being much smaller than the Orange River,

would sooner fall and afford us a way of escape. Our hopes were

realised. De Wet found a ford where he and his whole commando passed

through. Once more he was a free man. We accompanied him for some

distance up the river, until we came to the farm of one Smith. Here

Captain Scheepers, Captain Fouché and myself left the main body and went

with our commando, consisting of about 300 men in all, in the direction

of Rouxville, where, on the 13th of December, we captured 150 of the 2nd

Brabants, who were sent to and _for_ us.

While in the Rouxville district we received a message from De Wet that

we should enter the Colony as soon as possible, and that he would try to

follow us up. He was, however, prevented from carrying out his

intentions. It seemed as if Providence had so ordained it that he should

not cross the Orange River, or, even crossing it, should not sojourn for

a long time in the land of the enemy. For no sooner had he passed the

Caledon, than the enemy concentrated on him and succeeded in driving him

back through Sprinkhaan Nek to the northern districts of the Orange Free

State.

This, however, afforded us a chance of slipping through on to British

soil. In the night of the 15th of December, at 2 A.M., we forded the

Orange River at a point five miles below Odendaal's Stroom. It was a

dark night, and the water was still very high, but we all reached the

opposite bank in safety. There we came upon the guard of the drift, as

they were indulging in a game of cards. One was wounded, two ran away

and eight were captured. They did not expect us to cross the river at 2

A.M., and were thus taken unawares.

We were now once more in British territory. But what a contrast between

this and our first invasion in the beginning of the war! No large

commandoes, no waggons, and no guns. We were only 300 men--a raiding

band, as some contemptuously called us--with one Maxim, and even that

proved too cumbersome, for we soon cast it into a pool. Instead of

waggons and tents we had only our horses and mackintoshes, and some were

even without the latter. No large supplies of ammunition; our bandoliers

were almost all half empty.

The morning of the 16th of December, then, found us in the Cape Colony.

We had made up our minds to spend at least some months in the enemy's

country. Come what may, we would not return to the Orange Free State. If

the British had the right to stay in the Republics, why should we not

tarry awhile in the Colony? From the river we made a forced march to

Venterstad, a small village lower down the stream. We needed an

outfitting, and thought that that would be the most likely place where

we would get it. We only had to surprise the garrison, about 50 strong,

and we would have all we wanted. In this we were quite successful. The

garrison, or town-guard, soon hoisted the white flag.

We could now fill our bandoliers, and requisition the necessary articles

in clothing, boots, etc. But the enemy was not slow to follow us. We

were just allowed sufficient time to take all we required, and then the

columns came to remind us that we were strangers and intruders.

As we have related our experiences in other chapters, we shall not here

enter into details. For at least seven months, after we had crossed the

river, the enemy continually harassed us. We hardly enjoyed a single

day's rest. During the day we had to fight, and during the night we had

to trek. One thing was plain: the enemy was determined to silence us

completely. That they did not succeed is almost passing strange. If 300

Britishers were to have entered the two republics, would they have

proceeded very far?

General Hertzog had, at the same time, invaded the western province of

the Cape Colony, but, being far away from the railway line, the British

did not worry him very much. They all seemed to conspire against my

small band, and had the additional advantage of railways on every side

of us. Deeper and deeper into the heart of the Colony we were driven. We

marched in a southern direction. Whither? We did not know, only forward.

And so far did we push on that at length the vast expanse of the Indian

Ocean loomed in the distance, and reminded us that it was time to

retrace our steps, for we could certainly go no farther on horseback. So

we slipped through the pursuing columns, and returned to the districts

of Jansenville, Graaff-Reinet and Cradock.

In February we were not so hotly pursued. De Wet had entered the Cape

Colony from the north-west; and like a magnet he drew most of the

British forces irresistibly to him. This gave us a short rest, which

was, alas! only too short. For De Wet, as well as Hertzog, had to fall

back on the Orange Free State, and with redoubled energy the British

came upon us like a mighty avalanche. The reader can hardly realise

what we had to undergo these first eight months in the Cape Colony.

It was a bitter disappointment to learn how De Wet had fared and that

both he and Hertzog had abandoned the Cape Colony. We knew it was not

their fault and so did not blame them. Still we were resolved to hold

out as long as possible. Gradually it went better; the colonists began

to enlist and our numbers swelled. We could now form other commandos,

and despatch these in various directions, and that prevented the enemy

from concentrating all their forces on us. At last we had gained such a

strong footing in the Colony that to expel us all was simply an

impossibility.

And how did General De Wet fare when he crossed the Orange River on the

11th of February, 1901? The following account given by one who

accompanied him will give the reader some idea of the unsuccessful

attempt at invasion.

"MY DEAR K.,--We are just back from the Cape Colony, and no doubt

you will be anxious to hear all about our recent experiences. I

daresay you have followed us all the while in thought, and have

carefully studied the papers to ascertain our movements and learn

what we were doing. As we have little faith in newspaper

war-reports, I shall take the trouble to give you a full account of

our short-lived colonial invasion.

"You will be surprised, and perhaps sorely disappointed, to hear

that De Wet's and Hertzog's commandoes are all back in the Orange

Free State. This means that you are going to have now ever so much

harder times, for the enemy will certainly concentrate their forces

on your small commando, to clear you out of the Cape Colony as soon

as possible. The odds, of course, will be so great to contend

against, that, humanly speaking, you will be bound to retreat

across the Orange River. Still I trust that you will not follow our

example, but will find the Colony quite large enough to baffle the

enemy in their attempts to capture you. And as the British have

already exerted themselves in vain for over three months to oust

you, we entertain the hope that you will maintain your ground till

reinforced.

"On the 11th of February we, _i.e._, General P. Fourie's division,

crossed the Orange River at Zanddrift, west of Philippolis. De Wet

had taken possession of the drift the previous day, so our way was

open, and as the river was low it was not difficult to ford it.

With the exception of a few mules we sustained no losses. It was

somewhat like a picnic, the burghers were as gay as could be. Being

a very hot day they spent most of the time in the water. The guns

and some other vehicles were dragged through the river by teams

composed of sprightly young men. It was a sight to see 70 or 80 men

before a gun or waggon in the stream. I could not help thinking in

what a plight these would be should the enemy suddenly appear on

the banks of the river. That, indeed, would be a surprise worth

beholding. At sunset we were all on British soil.

"After the burghers had taken supper the whistle was blown and the

oft-repeated command, 'opzaal,' sounded in their ears. That night

we did not make a long trek, for both horses and men felt equally

tired after the day's exertions. Still we had to cover at least

eight miles, for it was not quite safe so near to the river. There

were columns behind and columns in front of us, and columns on

every side. After a wearisome march over a rugged and uneven road,

if road it could be called, with intense darkness enveloping us, we

finally reached the halting-place.

"The following morning at sunrise we started for Bezuidenhoud's

farm, which was close by. There the burghers received their

instructions from De Wet. With regard to their conduct in the Cape

Colony it was pointed out to them that they should treat the

colonists in such a way as would ensure their friendship. On no

account were they to molest the peaceful neutral British subjects,

for they were not at war with the colonists. They were also

forbidden to take anything from British subjects without paying the

proper value for the thing required. There were some more

injunctions, which have escaped my memory. No wonder that one

should forget when chased as we were. I believe these orders were,

as a rule, obeyed. In fact I should say we erred in adhering so

strictly to them, for we met some ultra-loyalists who would not

give or sell us so much as a morsel of food. Now when any one is

hungry, and people will neither give nor sell, what else can he do

than help himself? If he does not, it is his own fault should he

starve. At a certain farm we offered a sovereign for one bucket of

meal, but all in vain; when we asked the woman for a glass of

water, she pointed us to a spring some distance off. Shameful, is

it not! Next time we shall, I am afraid, not be so over-polite. One

learns a lot every day.

"At 11 A.M. our scouts reported that they had sighted two columns

about 7 miles from us. And now our troubles and hardships

commenced. What we anticipated and dreaded had actually taken

place. The enemy had occupied all the passes in front of us,

preventing us thereby from crossing the railway at the intended

point between Norval's Pont and Colesberg. We had now to go in that

barren and desolate part of the Colony where one is entirely

dependent upon forage, and where, unfortunately for us, none was to

be had.

"I expected that the British would intercept us. They knew about De

Wet's intended invasion; and had every facility by rail for

mobilising and seizing all the points of consequence. Whilst we had

to ride all the way from Winburg district, they had the advantage

of being transported by rail--an advantage which can hardly be

over-estimated.

"Encumbered with guns and waggons, we could not dodge the enemy. We

either had to seize the passes or proceed in a direction which

might lead to fatal results. To do the former appeared impossible

to De Wet, and so the latter course was reluctantly adopted. If it

were not for the convoy, we would have achieved our object and

would have entered those districts where commandoes could exist.

"The enemy was engaged till dusk. We had no casualties; but

Commandant Ross and a number of his men were cut off. They managed

to reach the Orange Free State safely. How they found their way

through the various columns, I can't say--a Boer, if need be, can

retire wonderfully well! At sunset our convoy almost fell into the

hands of the enemy. What a pity it did not! It would have saved us

so much needless trouble, and we would have been far better off

without it.

"Most of the night we remained in the saddle. The General was

anxious to get as far away as possible from the columns, to rest

his horses for a few hours. But the British, so it seemed, were

resolved that neither we nor our horses should have a rest, for

early the next morning they were on our heels. We could not offer

any resistance, because we had no positions, and could not

recklessly expose ourselves to the enemy's fire without any cover

at all. On the open plain our horses would have been swept away by

the enemy's guns, and in a short time we would have been all

infantry. Hence, on their approach we withdrew, hoping to find a

place where we could make a stand. Unfortunately we failed to find

the wished-for positions. For miles and miles the country is just

one vast plain; when you get to the end of that plain you may find

a ridge, a hill or slight elevation, which, however, did not

signify much. The enemy could easily outflank and surround us, if

we did not abandon it in time. With eyelids "heavy and dim," and

bodies "weary and worn," exposed to the dazzling rays of a burning

sun, we rode on, driven occasionally as a herd of cattle. At last

night fell and we could enjoy a short rest.

"The next morning the same story was repeated: the English hot on

our track--no rest for body or soul. The country being as flat as

the part we had traversed the previous day, we had to march again

the whole day under a burning sun. Now and then we dismounted for a

few minutes, in order that our horses might snatch a few mouthfuls

of grass.

"At the hour of sunset there was something to relieve the monotony

of fleeing all day. Two burghers--bread spies as we call them--had

gone ahead to buy some bread at a farm where a party of the enemy

was stationed. Not aware of that, they rode up to the house, with

the result that one got captured, while the other returned under a

hail of bullets at a breakneck pace to relate the fate of his

comrade. De Wet immediately sent in a note asking the enemy to

surrender, since they numbered only about twenty. They answered

shortly: 'We won't.' They were then charged, and up went the white

flag without their firing a single shot.

"For the night we bivouacked at that farm. The British columns were

now scarcely four miles from us. We dreaded a night attack, but,

owing to incessant rain, both parties seemed only too glad to stay

where they were. Here we had the advantage of hills and ridges,

where we could stand and face the foe.

"At sunrise the enemy's guns and Maxim-Nordenveldt began to play on

these ridges. Our guns had been placed in position, too, and

responded sharply. We succeeded in beating off the enemy's attacks

till 11 A.M., then we were outflanked and had to evacuate our

positions. Their losses must have been great. Two of our men fell

in the action.

"From there we marched in the direction of the railway line, which

we intended to cross that night near Houtkraal station. We were

about seven miles from the line, and were very anxious to pass

over. We were afraid that the English would send on their forces by

rail to guard the line and march upon us from in front, which, if

done, could result in our complete annihilation. Besides, we

intended, as soon as we were on the other side of the line, to

divide our force into several commandoes and let these take

different courses so that the enemy would not be able to

concentrate any longer all their men on us. Thus wearily we dragged

on through mud and rain to the line.

"To prevent armoured trains from cutting off our transit, men were

sent ahead to destroy the line at two points. Here again we

committed a few blunders for which we had to suffer. In the first

instance the line was blown up at too early an hour that night,

long before we were ready to pass over. The explosions reported our

presence, and the armoured trains were despatched to restore the

line. Then again, owing to the darkness the points where the line

was destroyed were not sufficiently far apart. This we discovered

when the enemy's guns began to roar and their shells exploded in

our midst.

"Before reaching the line there was something to get through--a

swamp at least 1500 paces broad. One can hardly have an idea what

this swamp was like, and how much trouble it cost us and our poor

animals to get through it. This was a veritable 'Slough of

Despond.' It was covered with water from one side to the other, and

we had to wade through knee deep, and sometimes the water reached

to our loins. The water was no serious obstacle, but the ground was

of a morass-like nature that our animals sank in to their knees and

often to their girths. Most of the burghers had to dismount and

lead their horses. Every now and then a horse would stumble, and

down came the rider splashing in the mud and water. I led my

faithful 'Klein Booi' all the way, walking knee deep through mud

and water. Just think how we must have looked the following

morning, with clogs of mud attached to our clothes, hands and

faces, while our horses were baptised in mud! The waggons and guns

gave us most trouble. It was quite impossible to get these through

the swamp. They stuck in the mud, with draft animals and all. We

had as many as fifty oxen before one waggon, but they could not

move it an inch. Some mules sank in so deep that they could not

extricate themselves, and were left to die in the mud!

"At daybreak the guns, De Wet's waggonette and a few carts were

through the swamp; the rest of the convoy was still in it. General

Fourie and a hundred burghers were left with the waggons while the

commando proceeded to the line. At sunrise we were safely on the

other side of the line, where we waited for Fourie. Suddenly, and

very unexpectedly, a shell exploded in our midst, like a

thunderbolt from a clear sky. I looked about to see whence it came;

but before my eyes detected the armoured trains, another and yet

another shell dropped in our midst. I say _in our midst_, for we

were riding in close formation when these horrible projectiles were

hurled upon us. As our horses were very tired and the veldt soaked

through and through by the heavy rains, we could not scatter, nor

ride fast, as we usually do when exposed to cannon fire in the open

veldt. Thus slowly we rode on under this cannonade. And how

wonderful none were injured! The hand of the invisible omnipresent

God must have shielded us. At last we were out of the cannon's

reach. Meanwhile the line had been repaired, the armoured trains

moved freely up and down. Fourie, five other officers, and about a

hundred burghers were now cut off from the commando. The burghers

found their way back to the Free State; the officers followed us

up, but, alas! met us only when we were on the point of recrossing

the Orange River.

"In what a sorry plight we now were! Some of our ablest officers

severed from us at a time when they were most needed. Their absence

caused the greatest confusion, for now there were numbers of men

without any officers. Besides, it was then impossible to carry out

the idea of splitting up the commando without officers. Hence we

were to be driven along by the overwhelming numbers at our rear.

How many there were is hard to tell, but we caught up some of their

despatches, from which we learnt that there were no fewer than

fourteen columns in pursuit of us.

"Gradually we drifted into the most deplorable and wretched

conditions. Our animals, owing to lack of fodder, began to give in.

Scores of these we had to leave behind, some of them in excellent

condition, but so starved that they could proceed no farther. The

result was that hundreds of burghers had to walk, and they suffered

most. How I felt for these unfortunates! They walked and walked

until, exhausted and footsore, many a one dropped down along the

road-side. There were those whose clothes were torn to fragments by

the brambles through which they forced their way. They presented an

appearance which evoked one's compassion.

"These men had to confront another enemy--hunger. They scarcely

found time to prepare a meal, for when they arrived at the

halting-place the first word they heard was, as a rule, "opzaal!"

Thus footsore, battered, and with empty stomachs, these fellows had

to march for miles and miles to escape the enemy's grip.

"I admired their power of endurance, patience, and determination.

But admiration was not enough. I parted with all my horses, giving

them to men who could walk no longer, and so walked on myself,

until, footsore and exhausted, I too could go no farther. It was a

pleasure to minister in this way to men who loved their country.

"If it were not for this determination on the part of De Wet's

forces to keep out of the hands of the enemy, hundreds would have

been captured, yet I believe not more than 250 prisoners were

taken. As we went on our numbers gradually diminished. Those who

were unable to keep pace with the main body broke off in small

parties and found their way back to the Orange Free State.

"By the 19th we had pushed on as far as Brak River, about twelve

miles from Prieska. Here we met with another disappointment, which

almost proved fatal to our whole commando. The river was in flood

and no transit possible. In what a dreadful plight we were! Hardly

eight miles behind us the British columns were stationed in

crescent shape; in front was the swollen Brak River, and nine miles

to our right was the Orange River, and that in flood. Here at least

it seemed as if De Wet would be caught, and though he escaped, this

certainly was one of the tightest corners in which he ever found

himself.

"About two hours before sunset we heard that the enemy was rapidly

approaching us. Anxiously we asked ourselves, Whither now? We could

not return, we could not ford the river; to proceed up-stream would

expose us to the risk of being quartered against the river. There

was but one course to follow, and that an extremely hazardous one.

We could march down the Brak River as far as the Orange River, and

then proceed along the latter. Between us and the enemy there was

then a ridge, extending parallel with the Orange River. Behind this

ridge we would be out of the enemy's view. Should they reach this

elevation before it was dark, we would be pressed, with fatal

consequences to ourselves, against a swollen river. But here

darkness proved our salvation once more. We proceeded down the Brak

River and up the Orange River. When the enemy came to the ridge

mentioned it was so dark that they could see no traces of us.

"De Wet had now decided to fall back on the Orange Free State. To

many of us this was a bitter disappointment; but we saw that

nothing else could be done under the circumstances. With tired

horses and many burghers on foot we could not hope to circumvent

the enemy. Others, especially those who had suffered most in

walking, were enraptured at the idea of going back to the Free

State. Their drooping spirits revived, and with renewed courage

they started on the homeward march.

"The whole of that night we trekked along the banks of the Orange

River, parallel to the British columns. We tried one ford after the

other, but to our dismay the stream was impassable. The following

day we were not only behind the enemy, but had outstripped them by

nine miles. To gain more on them we kept up the march almost

unbroken the whole day. And what a day it was! We had to walk from

twelve to fifteen miles without a drop of water. Once we came to a

forsaken well. The water was of a greenish hue, bitter and

stagnant--a real Marah--but we drank to quench our thirst and

moisten our parched lips.

"On the 22nd we had proceeded to a point six miles beyond the

confluence of the Vaal and Orange Rivers. Here we found a small

boat, and began at once to transport the dismounts. We knew that

these, once across the river, would be in a safer position. Day and

night we were engaged in taking these over; but the work progressed

very slowly, for the boat could only take ten or twelve men at a

time, and, besides, was so leaky that two had constantly to throw

out the water. After 250 men had been ferried across the stream the

approach of the enemy was announced, and so near were they that

some of us had to depart in an almost half-naked state. About 80

burghers had to hide in the river until the storm was over. Almost

all the vehicles were left behind while the main force retreated up

the river.

"Fortune favoured me; I was among the lucky ones who found a seat

in the boat as she was returning for the last time. Willie Louw and

myself were appointed to supervise the boat, less the transport of

the men be retarded in some way or other. For some time we worked

together, and then Willie left me to manage alone. Though I was

anxious to cross myself, I could not then leave the boat. When the

report of the enemy reached us the burghers, eager to get through,

stormed the boat from all directions. They forgot that if all want

to get into the boat nobody will get across the river. What must be

done? As there was no time for much deliberation I jumped in and

expostulated with an excited crowd. None heeded, each pressed

forward to get a place in the boat. I was finally compelled to

threaten them with my revolver, but all in vain. No one was afraid.

I believe they knew too well that I would not pull the trigger. One

looked me straight in the face as I pointed the instrument to him

and said, 'My dear fellow, you may shoot if you wish--I am not

afraid; but I want to get through.' He completely disarmed me. I

had no more threats.

"With an overcrowded boat we were at last on the stream, and

finally reached the opposite bank, just as the enemy was beginning

to shell De Wet's forces on the other side. It was indeed a relief

to me, but we had to march another fifteen miles without water,

exposed to scorching heat. At length we found some muddy water.

Lying next to our horses we sipped up water so thick and muddy that

we could hardly swallow it.

"As to De Wet's further movements I can hardly give you full

particulars. He was followed up by the enemy, and had to abandon

his guns the following day. Trying one drift after the other he

succeeded at last in fording the river between Norval's Pont and

Zanddrift; and so after seventeen days he was back in the Free

State.

"Here you have a sketch of our attempt to invade British dominions.

I have omitted many things of less interest. I wonder what you will

think of all this. Looking back upon our adventures, it is, of

course, easy to point out all the errors and blunders we have

committed. We should, for instance, never have encumbered ourselves

with a convoy and guns, which hampered our movements and were of

very little service to us. Then again, we should not have crossed

the river in one commando, but should have divided the force into

at least twelve or fifteen commandoes, and these should have

entered the Colony at different points, all moving in different

directions, then the enemy could not have concentrated their hosts

on us as they did. Besides, our discipline and organisation was

poor, and it is a well-known fact that a thousand in disorder can

accomplish less than two hundred well-organised men. But it is

useless to dwell on these points. 'Tis easier to criticize the past

than to forecast the future. Experience costs a great deal.

"Has our attempt been a complete failure? In many respects I should

say it has. We have succeeded, however, in drawing the enemy out of

the Free State, which was our chief object. And, though it did not

cost them many lives, yet their following us in such desolate

regions must have proved very expensive, and must have been a

source of great hardship to themselves. If that be a consolation to

know that we have not suffered alone, we have, then, at least one

comfort.

"Brak River was the last nail in our coffin. If we only could have

forded that, we would not have been ousted. On the other side of

the river we would have found not only grass for our tired horses,

but would also have been able to find remounts. Hertzog's commando

was not far off, and they were strongly mounted, and could have

rendered us great assistance.

"The president, who accompanied us, remained cheerful to the last,

and, just as a common burgher, partook in all our troubles. Such a

man we may well be proud of, and, I need hardly say, that we love

and honour him all the more.

"As to the conduct of the burghers we need only remark that it was

beyond praise. One never heard them grumble or murmur either

against De Wet or any other officer. No rebellious complaints or

threats were flung at the heads of those in authority. This,

indeed, is typical of the Boer. He endures suffering and hardship

with a submissive spirit and with a dignity which is remarkable. We

do not marvel at this, for are they not formed of that stuff of

which martyrs have been made in bygone years? And does not the

blood of the French Huguenot course through the veins of many a

one, while others are animated by the dauntless spirit of that

little nation that combated the once mighty Spain for eighty years,

and so achieved that honour and distinction which has secured for

them an abiding place in the history of nations? Such men, who are

willing to suffer and sacrifice all for freedom's sake, surely

deserve to succeed at last.--Yours fondly,

"R.D. MCDONALD."

In the Shadow of Death · 第 5 / 11 章