CHAPTER XIII

THE DRAMA OF ‘96

I

Exuberant over their success in capitalizing Washington’s consent to the

treaty, the Federalists returned to Philadelphia in an ugly mood. With

celerity and _éclat_, the Senate threw down the gauntlet with the

rejection of the nomination of John Rutledge because of his hostility to

the treaty. The motive was unescapable. He was an able jurist, an

erudite lawyer, a pure patriot with a superb record of high public

services--but he had denounced the Federalist treaty. That was enough.

The leaders were delighted with their action, Senator Johnson thinking

it would have been unfortunate to have permitted Rutledge to remain upon

the Bench ‘after what had appeared.’ Of course, the opposition would

‘endeavor to impress it upon the minds of the people that the majority

were influenced by improper motives,’ but that was unavoidable.[1103]

Jefferson viewed the incident from his hilltop with the vision of a

prophet. ‘A bold thing,’ he thought, ‘because they cannot pretend any

objection to him but his disapprobation of the treaty.’ It meant that

the Federalists ‘would receive none but Tories hereafter into any

department of the government,’ and it would not be surprising were

Monroe recalled from Paris because ‘of his being of the partisans of

France.’ Monticello was remote, but its master could see a long

way.[1104]

The Senate still seemed safe to the Federalists on their return, but

there were grave misgivings as to the House. Young Livingston had caused

trouble enough and he was back to give more than Ames ‘the hypo,’ but

more ominous was the appearance there for the first time of Albert

Gallatin. He had been thrown out of the Senate as speedily as possible,

but not before he had given proof of his financial genius. There, the

Jeffersonians had been weak in leadership. It was characteristic of the

inner circle of the Federalists to hate any opponent they could not

despise--and they dare not despise this young man from Geneva. Even in

private life he had been denounced and damned in the spirit of the

pothouse, and Hamilton had ardently hoped for his indictment in

connection with the Whiskey Insurrection. When his election had seemed

probable, an effort had actually been made to disfranchise his district

as a region of sedition--but here was Gallatin. A duel between

Gallatin’s father-in-law, Admiral Nicholson, and Hamilton had been

narrowly averted in the autumn; but Gallatin, rising serenely above his

detractors, had refused to be ruffled, and had advised his wife not to

express her sentiments on the treatment accorded him too hotly lest it

‘lead to consequences you would forever regret.’[1105] Since these two

brilliant, bitterly hated, and violently abused men, Livingston and

Gallatin, were to play conspicuous parts in the drama of the House, it

is worth while to pause for a more intimate impression of them.

II

‘Edward Livingston now lives here in the style of a nabob,’ wrote

Wolcott during this session.[1106] It was a style to which he had been

accustomed from birth, for he was of the baronial aristocracy of New

York. He was but thirty-two at the time, tall, handsome, dashing and

daring, witty and eloquent, and with a luminous background of wealth,

culture, tradition, and personal achievement. Even the most inveterate

snob among his political opponents must have envied him his advantages.

Born in the mansion of the Livingstons at ‘Clermont,’ on the Hudson, he

had passed his winters in the town house in New York, which swarmed with

slave servants. From boyhood, his society had been eagerly sought. With

his fleeing mother he had witnessed from a hilltop his loved home given

to the flames by British soldiers; and to his dying day he carried a

poignant memory of the parting of his sister with her hero husband,

Richard Montgomery, when he set forth for his final fight. Lafayette had

been so captivated by the charming youth while visiting his home that he

had vainly importuned his mother for permission to take him to France;

and when the young man attended the Marquis a way on the Boston road, so

romantic was the attachment that the latter had urged the youth to make

the journey, nevertheless, with the promise to conciliate the family.

His was a unique charm, a fascinating personality.

Graduating from Princeton, in the class with Giles, he had his choice

between a life of laborious accomplishment and one of leisurely

elegance. Society, the gayest, giddiest, most entrancing, held forth its

arms to him. His mother’s drawing-room was always crowded with brilliant

and beautiful women and clever men, attracted partly by the exquisite

charms of the widow of Montgomery. He had an income, a town and country

house, slaves to do his bidding, and he turned from the enticing

prospect to bury himself in the assiduous study of the law. Now and then

he laid his books aside to flirt with Theodosia Burr, to dance with the

pretty belles, to play for stakes with women at the gambling-table

inseparable from the more fashionable houses--but only as a diversion.

Scarcely had he begun the practice of his profession when he took a

commanding position. Hard work, a noble ambition, and native talent made

him a success. But he could not have been a Livingston and indifferent

to politics. Very early his capacity and popularity swept him into the

fight. Strangely enough, he immediately became the idol of the masses.

This aristocrat was a democrat who was able to move in the crowd with a

distinction that commanded respect while compelling affection. Perhaps

the artisans, the clerks, the lowly were flattered by his smile and

condescension, perhaps captivated by his fighting mettle--whatever the

cause, they loved him, gathered about and sustained him. The Tammany of

his time marshaled its forces for him, and all the wit and wiles of

Hamilton could not harm him. But the Federalists hated him. What moral

right had a man of wealth and intellectual distinction and social

prestige to affiliate with the ‘mob’? They hated him as deserters are

hated--he was an American Égalité to Mrs. Bingham’s drawing-room, and

Wolcott hated him less because he ‘lived like a nabob’ than because he

fought like the devil.[1107]

III

Quite a different type was Albert Gallatin--and yet both were born

aristocrats. From the beginning of the republic at Geneva in the

sixteenth century, his family had been second to none in prestige and

power. The governmental system was aristocratic; his people were

uncompromising aristocrats, and five Gallatins had been, at one time or

another, head of the State. Into this reactionary atmosphere he was

born, and in it he passed his youth. At the home of his grandmother, a

domineering but clever old autocrat, who believed in the divine right of

the aristocracy to rule, he often met Voltaire. Strange couple, that old

woman worshiping tradition, and that cynical old philosopher sneering it

away. And yet in his family Gallatin was an exotic. Instinctively he

despised the system his people thought sacred. Rousseau may have

influenced him, but he was probably born with democracy in his blood.

When his grandmother arranged to get him a commission in the mercenary

army of her friend the Landgrave of Hess, and he scornfully refused on

the ground that he would ‘never serve a tyrant,’ the old woman boxed his

ears--but without jarring his principles.[1108] He was a grave

disappointment in the family circle. It is a notable coincidence that

like Hamilton he was remarkably precocious. He graduated from the

Academy of Geneva in his seventeenth year, first in his class in

mathematics, natural philosophy, and Latin translation. There, too, he

had studied history under Müller, the eminent historian, and in the

facts and philosophy of world history he was to have no equal in

American public life. Nothing contributed more to his desertion of his

country than his hatred of its petty aristocracy, its autocratic rule.

He was a dreamer in his youth. Was it Rousseau who planted in him a

dislike of cities and a passion for the wilderness? Secretly he left

Geneva and came to America, landing in Boston. He carried a letter of

introduction from Benjamin Franklin to his son-in-law, the father of the

editor of ‘The Aurora’ at Philadelphia. A few dreary months in Boston, a

happier winter in a cabin in the wilderness of northern Maine, a year at

Harvard as a teacher of French, a short time in Philadelphia in a

boarding-house with Pelatiah Webster, the political philosopher, and

the lure of land speculation led him to Virginia. There, in Richmond,

some of his happiest days were passed. Society was courteous, kindly,

and there he came in contact with great minds. John Marshall invited him

into his office with the prediction that he would distinguish himself at

the Bar, and Patrick Henry advised him to go West, with the observation

that he was intended for statesmanship. At this time he was a youth of

twenty-one with a pronounced foreign accent. Washington met him, and,

impressed with his keenness, offered to make him his land agent--an

honor happily declined. Then into the wilderness of Pennsylvania; a

house on a hilltop which he called ‘Friendship Hill’; a domestic

tragedy--the death of his young wife; and soon the Whiskey Boys, keen of

vision as Marshall, Henry, or Washington, literally swept him into

public life.

He was primarily a democrat and an opponent of strong government.

Fascinated by the work of the Constitutional Convention, he thought the

Executive had been given too much power. But he was opposed to tinkering

with constitutions once adopted.[1109] As a member of the convention to

revise the Constitution of Pennsylvania, he worked as earnestly as had

Madison in the greater convention, fighting with moderation, but

persistence for a popular government, for the freedom of the press, and

popular suffrage. It is significant that when the subject of courts was

reached he sought the advice of John Marshall--and received it.[1110]

His views on the French Revolution were those of Jefferson. He

recognized the many excesses, the greed of demagogues for power, and he

did not expect ‘a very good government within a short time,’ but he knew

‘their cause to be that of mankind against tyranny’ and that ‘no foreign

nation has the right to dictate a government to them.’[1111] One glance

at Genêt revealed to him the naked man--‘totally unfit for the place he

fills,’ his abilities ‘slender.’[1112] Yet, like Jefferson, despite the

massacres in Paris and the Genêt excesses in Philadelphia, he clung to

France because, ‘if France is annihilated, as seems to be the desire of

the combined powers, sad indeed will the consequences be for

America.’[1113] If he opposed the Excise Law, as was his right, he had

a reason, and it was sane.[1114] The charge the Federalists were to

make, that he had incited the hard-pressed pioneers to violations of the

law, was maliciously false. Throughout that insurrection, his part was

hard, and he met it with sanity and courage.

This was the background of this remarkable man when, at the age of

thirty-five, he stepped forward with the confidence of a veteran to

assume the intellectual leadership of the Jeffersonians in the House. A

shy man in social relations, he was utterly fearless in debate. There

was no mind in that body so well stocked with facts, and none with a

broader vision or deeper penetration. There was no one more masterful in

logic, more clear, downright, incisive in statement, and none more

impervious to abuse. His was the dignity of a superior mentality. If his

foreign accent was still pronounced, and members, priding themselves on

their refinement and taste, sneered openly, he remained the perfect

gentleman, indifferent to such jeers. In the midst of excitement, he was

calm. When others were demoralized, he kept his head. No greater figure

ever stood upon the floor of an American Congress than when Albert

Gallatin appeared, to force notable reforms in the fiscal system, and to

challenge the Federalists to an intellectual combat that would call

forth their extreme exertions.

IV

One of the most important and brilliant debates in American history,

surpassing that on the Foote Resolutions, was precipitated early in

March when Edward Livingston threw a bomb into the complacent camp of

the Federalists with resolutions calling upon the President to lay

before the House the instructions and papers pertaining to the Jay

Treaty. There was some maneuvering in the beginning to feel out the

position of the enemy, and then the members settled down to a month of

memorable debating. On the whole, the discussion was pitched upon a high

plane, for the question was one of constitutional interpretation.

Throughout, there was scarcely a touch of personalities, albeit Tracy,

described by his admirers as the ‘Burke of Connecticut,’ and by his

enemies as the ‘Burke of Connecticut without his intelligence,’ could

not restrain a stupid sneer at the accent of Gallatin who led for the

enemies of the treaty. A Pennsylvania member denounced Tracy’s vulgar

conduct as ‘intolerable,’ and there were many cries of ‘order.’ With the

brazen effrontery of his school, Tracy asked Speaker Dayton to decide,

and that rather disreputable speculator, if not peculator, held it in

order to insult Gallatin with impunity.[1115] But this incident was

happily unique.

The Livingston Resolutions were based upon the theory that the House was

a party to the treaty in that it would be asked to make appropriations

to carry it into effect, and that the facts were necessary to the

determination of its course. This was in perfect accord with the

position of Jefferson.[1116] The Federalists contended that the

President and Senate alone were officially concerned, and that the House

was obligated to carry out any financial arrangements entered into in a

treaty. Did not the Constitution specifically say that the treaty-making

power was lodged in the President and the Senate? Conceded, replied the

opposition, but the Constitution also said that money bills must

originate in the House, and in making appropriations for any purpose the

popular branch of Congress is constitutionally bound to use its own

discretion. Both sides could, and did, appeal to the Constitution. There

was nothing merely factious or obstructive in the fight of the

opposition, and it is impossible to peruse the seven hundred and nine

pages of the debates without a realization of the complete sincerity of

the participants. Into the debate dashed all the leaders of the first

order. The galleries were packed. The discussion was the sole

conversational topic in streets and coffee-houses. The newspapers

printed the leading speeches in full. Even the Federal courts injected

themselves into the controversy, and one jurist introduced a

denunciation of the enemies of the treaty into his charge to the grand

jury.[1117] Fenno stupidly stumbled into the blunder of proving the

opponents of the treaty a ‘Robespierre faction’ by quoting the London

‘Morning Chronicle,’[1118] and Cobbett, the Englishman and Federalist

pamphleteer, selected this particular time to outrage the Philadelphia

‘rabble’ by filling his windows with pictures of kings, queens,

princes, dukes, Pitt, Grenville, and George III. With studied insolence,

he added some portraits of American Revolutionary heroes, and ‘found out

fit companions for them.’ Thus he ‘coupled Franklin with Marat’ and

‘M’Kean and Ankerstrom.’[1119]

The burden of the debate was borne by Gallatin, Madison, Livingston, and

Giles for the Resolutions, and by Sedgwick and Griswold against them.

Livingston spoke with spirited eloquence and with that power of

reasoning which was afterward to compel his recognition as one of the

foremost political thinkers of his time.[1120] Giles sustained his

reputation as a fluent, forceful, slashing debater. Madison spoke with

moderation; but the honors of primacy fell to Gallatin. He was a

revelation, and the Federalists were beside themselves with rage. Tall,

and above medium size, his fine face aglow with intelligence, his black

eyes burning with earnestness, his profile resembling in its sharp

outlines that of a Frenchman, his accent foreign, his delivery slow and

a little embarrassed, he spoke with a clarity and force that made the

Federalists wince. Livingston was more showy, Giles more boisterous,

Madison more academic. This new man was another Madison with greater

punch.[1121] He did not wander a moment from his argument--the

constitutional rights of the House in the case of treaties involving

appropriations.

‘The House has a right to ask for papers,’ he said, ‘because their

coöperation and sanction is necessary to carry the Treaty into full

effect, to render it a binding instrument, and to make it, properly

speaking, a law of the land; because they have a full discretion to

either give or refuse that coöperation; because they must be guided in

the exercise of that discretion by the merits and expediency of the

Treaty itself, and therefore they have a right to ask for every

information which can assist them in deciding that question.’ Whence led

the argument of the foes of the Resolutions? ‘The Constitution says that

no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of

appropriations made by law. But treaties, whatever provisions they may

contain, are law; appropriations may therefore be made by treaties. Then

the shortest way to carry this treaty into effect would have been to

add another article appropriating the money.’ Turning to the power of

the House of Commons in the case of treaties involving an appropriation,

he found an analogy to the constitutional power of the President and the

Senate, in the power of the King to make treaties. But no one in England

challenged the right of the Commons to appropriate or not in putting the

provisions of a treaty into effect--and the speaker cited instances

where the Commons had rejected treaties by refusing appropriations. ‘Are

we in a worse situation than Great Britain?’ he asked. ‘Is the House of

Representatives ... the immediate representatives of the American people

ranked below the British House of Commons? Shall the Legislative power

be swallowed up by the Treaty-making power as contended for here, though

never claimed even in Great Britain?’ The issue raised by the opposition

to the Resolutions was clear, and their rejection would be ‘tantamount

to saying that the House abandons their share in legislation, and

consents that the whole power shall be centered in the other branches.’

Such, in general, was the tenor of the argument for the Resolutions;

while the Federalists insisted that the House possessed no power to

refuse any appropriation called for by a treaty--and thus the discussion

went round and round like a wagon wheel in motion. Sedgwick, in

justifying the Senate’s power, made a blunder on which the supporters of

the Resolutions seized and with which they played throughout the

discussion. The Senators were safer than the Representatives, he

thought, because the former were not chosen by ‘an ignorant herd, who

could be cajoled, flattered, and deceived.’

At length the vote was taken, and the Resolutions adopted by 61 to 38.

Gallatin and Livingston, chosen by the House, personally presented the

call for the papers to Washington, who promised an answer after

consideration. An answer, sneered Bache, which sounds like that which

the King of France used to give to his subjects.[1122]

V

When Livingston introduced his Resolutions, Hamilton, in New York, was

momentarily at sea. His first impression was that they were ‘of

doubtful propriety.’[1123] Within a few days, after discussions with

‘those who think,’ he was persuaded that the papers should be

refused--possibly on the ground that no purpose could be served unless

impeachment proceedings against Washington were in contemplation.[1124]

Here we have, in a flash, the political strategy outlined--to convince

the people that the Jeffersonians were planning the expulsion of

Washington from office. Again the Federalist war-cry--‘Stand by the

President!’ But a week later, Hamilton wrote King that the papers should

be refused on the ground that the House had nothing to do with treaties,

and that they were laws of the land to which the House had to

conform.[1125] Learning of the adoption of the Resolutions, Hamilton

wrote Washington to refuse compliance and to await suggestions that

would be sent the next day.[1126] Two days later, he was mortified at

his inability to send the promised papers, but he was at work upon them.

Meanwhile, the papers should not be sent because the instructions to Jay

would ‘do no credit to the Administration.’ Some would disappoint and

inflame the people.[1127] Two days after this, Washington sent his reply

to the House, following Hamilton’s instructions and using some of his

phraseology, even to the convenient suggestion of an impeachment.[1128]

The House, with equal firmness and with a dignified moderation,

responded with resolutions reaffirming its right--and the issue was

made.[1129] Almost immediately the introduction of a resolution

providing the appropriation threw the House into another month’s battle,

on the treaty itself.

VI

Up to this time the congressional struggle had caused little excitement

among the people. Now the idea that the Union itself was at stake was

assiduously put out by the Federalist leaders. The Senate practically

ceased to function. When Senator Tazewell called attention to the

accumulation of business and urged action, King bluntly told him it was

purposely held back, and that if the House failed to appropriate for the

treaty, the Senate would consider all legislation at an end, and he

would assume the Union dissolved. The next day Cabot expressed something

of the same sentiment. In important commercial circles there was much

loose talk of the dissolution of the Union.

The action of Washington, on the other hand, had aroused resentment and

disgust. Jefferson, with his usual prescience, had foreseen it while

hoping against it. ‘I wish that his honesty and his political errors may

not furnish a second occasion to exclaim, “curse on his virtues, they

have undone his country,”’ he had written of Washington to Madison three

days before the refusal was sent to Congress.[1130] Madison thought the

tone and temper of the presidential letter ‘improper and indelicate,’

and suggested that Jefferson compare it with ‘one of Callimus’ last

numbers ... and the latter part of Murray’s speech.’[1131] It was

reserved to Bache, as usual, to strike the harsh note. ‘Thus though his

decision could not be influenced by the voice of the people, he could

suffer it to be moulded by the opinion of an ex-Secretary,’ he wrote.

‘Thus ... though he has apparently discharged the nurse, he is still in

leading strings.’

Meanwhile, the attacks on the Treaty were spreading consternation in all

commercial quarters and infuriating the Federalist leaders. ‘A most

important crisis ensues,’ wrote Hamilton to King a week after the debate

opened; and he outlined a plan of action in the event the appropriations

were refused. The President should send a solemn protest to the House

and a copy to the Senate. That body should pass a resolution strongly

commending the protest and advising the President to proceed with the

execution of the Treaty. Then the merchants should meet in all the

cities, adopt resolutions commendatory of the position of the President

and Senate, and invite their fellow citizens to coöperate with them.

Petitions should be circulated throughout the country. The Senate should

refuse to adjourn until the terms of the members of the House had

expired. Washington should send a confidential apology to England. ‘The

glory of the President, the safety of the Constitution depend upon it.

Nothing will be wanting here.’[1132]

Hamilton immediately set his machinery in motion, and thus, while the

debate was at high tide in the House, the political leaders were busy

with the country. King had written of the alarm of the merchants in

Philadelphia. ‘Our merchants here are not less alarmed and will do all

they can,’ Hamilton replied. Arrangements had been made for the

insurance people to meet that day; the merchants and traders would meet

the next. A petition would be put in circulation.[1133] Two days later,

he wrote jubilantly of the action of the merchants. ‘Unexampled

unanimity,’ he said. And more--‘persons to-day are going through the

different wards’--presumably with petitions.[1134] That very day he was

writing Wolcott that ‘the British Ministry are as great fools or as

great rascals as our Jacobins, else our commerce would not continue to

be distressed as it is, with their cruisers.’[1135]

The very day that Hamilton was writing of the distress of the New York

merchants, Madison was writing to Jefferson of the plans of the

Democrats. While a merchants’ petition had been circulated in

Philadelphia, he promised that ‘an adverse petition will be signed by

three or four times’ as many people. In New York and Boston similar

petitions would be put out. In Baltimore little could be expected, for

there, while originally against the treaty, they had been won over ‘by

the hope of indemnification for past losses.’[1136] Five days later, he

reported progress. The Philadelphia petition against the treaty greatly

outnumbered that for it, and petitions were being circulated in Delaware

and New Jersey. The insurance companies in Philadelphia and New York

were seeking to intimidate the people by stopping business. The banks

had been active peddlers of petitions in the cities where there was

‘scarce a trader or merchant but what depends on discounts.’ A hateful

picture, thought Madison. ‘Bank Directors soliciting subscriptions are

like highwaymen with a pistol demanding the purse.’[1137]

Boston found the Federalists triumphant in a town meeting dominated by

the eloquence of Otis, who played upon the horrors of war, and thus gave

Ames and the other party leaders their cue. It was on this occasion that

the orator, who had studied French under Gallatin at Harvard, and been

treated kindly, referred to the latter sneeringly as a nobody who had

come to America without a second shirt on his back. Later, to the

disgust of his Federalist co-workers, he had the decency to apologize to

Gallatin.[1138] Everywhere the latter was being deluged with

billingsgate. There was not contempt here--there was hate. Noah Webster,

in the ‘Minerva,’ was sneering at his foreign birth, while taking his

cue from Hamilton, born in the West Indies; attacking his position on

the excise with falsehoods and innuendoes; charging him with being an

agent of France. Adams, of the ‘Independent Chronicle,’ replied with a

parody, substituting Hamilton for Gallatin and England for France and

making as good sense.[1139] Wolcott was writing his father that it was

‘neither unreasonable nor uncandid to believe that Mr. Gallatin is

directed by foreign politics and influence.’[1140] Nothing could have

pained the sensitive Wolcott more than the feeling that he was being

uncandid.

Meanwhile, the fight in the House went on--Gallatin in the forefront.

The Federalists were thoroughly frightened over the prospect, resorting

to every device to gain votes. Dreadful pictures of war if the treaty

failed, appeals to ‘stand by Washington,’ and intimidation--these were

favorite devices. ‘I am told,’ wrote Wolcott, with evident pleasure,

‘that if Findlay and Gallatin don’t ultimately vote for their

[treaties’] execution, their lives will be scarcely spared.’[1141] But

frightened and afraid of a vote, they decided ‘to risk the consequences

of a delay, and prolong the debates in expectation of an impulse from

some of the districts on their representatives.’[1142] However, a vote

could not be indefinitely delayed. Public business was at a standstill.

Everything possible had been done. The bankers had been sent out with

petitions to their creditors. The insurance companies had stopped

business. The merchants had passed resolutions. Petitions had been

circulated. Washington’s glory had been pictured as in jeopardy. And the

horrors of war had been described. The time had come to close the

debate. The greatest orator in the country was their spokesman, and he

had been held back for the last appeal. The time had come for Fisher

Ames to make the closing plea.

VII

Fisher Ames was not only the premier orator of his party; he was one of

its most brilliant and captivating personalities. He had a genius for

friendship and was good company. Nature had blessed him with her richest

intellectual gifts. His precocity equaled that of Hamilton or

Gallatin--he was a prodigy. At six he was studying Latin, at twelve he

had entered Harvard, and there he was conspicuous because of his

scintillation. His powers of application were equal to his natural

ability, but he found time for relaxation when his animation, wit, and

charm, combined with modesty, endeared him to his fellows and won the

affection of his instructors. Even at Harvard he was ardently

cultivating the art of oratory, and the style then formed, while

strengthened by age and experience, never greatly changed. Cicero was

his model through life. During his preparation for the Bar, his appetite

for good literature was not neglected, and he delved deeply into ancient

history and mythology, natural and civil history, and he pored over the

novelists and lived with the poets--Shakespeare, Milton, Virgil. These

were fruitful years and the Federalists were to get the harvest. At the

Bar he instantly took rank as a pleader, but he found time to write

articles on the political affairs of the time. In the convention called

to ratify the Constitution, he disclosed the political prepossessions

that were to govern his career. While not hostile to a republican

experiment, he was skeptical of republics, fearing the domination of

popular factions. These factions he considered the rabble. Democracy, he

despised. He was an aristocrat by instinct and this guided his political

conduct.

He would have distinguished himself in literature had he devoted himself

to it. He wrote, as he spoke, out of a full mind, and his first draft of

an article required no polishing or revision. This made him an amazingly

brilliant extemporaneous orator. Although the slow processes of logical

argumentation were not beyond him, he depended more on illustration. His

mind fairly teemed with images. The poets had endowed him with their

gift. There was something Shakespearean in the fertility of his fancy,

and he delighted his hearers or readers with his rapidly changing

pictures. These came spontaneously, and, leaving an indelible

impression on his audience, they were lost to him with their utterance.

He scattered gems as though they were grains of the sea, and he the

owner of the sands of the shore. Remarkably enough, this did not lead

him to rhetorical flamboyance or over-elaboration. He was a master of

the short sentence, and he possessed rare powers of condensation.

In social relations he was lovable, but he carefully selected his

intimates, having no stomach for the commonplace person. His companions

were of the élite. Among them he was simplicity itself, and generosity

and kindness, but no man had a more brutal wit or sarcasm for a foe.

Above middle height and well proportioned, he held himself erect. There

was little in his features to distinguish him, for they were not

strongly marked. His forehead was neither noticeably high nor broad; his

blue eyes were mild and without a suggestion of the fire of domination;

his mouth was well formed, but not strong; but his voice was melody

itself. One who often heard him found that ‘the silvery tones of his

voice fell upon the ear like strains of sweetest music’ and that ‘you

could not choose but hear.’[1143] There was more than a touch of

aristocratic cynicism in his nature, and his favorite weapon in attack

was sarcasm, but he was ordinarily considerate of the feelings of a foe

in combat. No other member of the House could approach him in the

eloquence of persuasion.[1144]

VIII

Happily married to a beautiful woman, Ames had built himself an elegant

home at Dedham where he lived and was to die, but in the fall of 1796 he

had little expectation of lingering long to enjoy it. Nothing had

enraged him more than the popular agitation against the Jay Treaty, and

in the midst of the fight he suffered a physical collapse. In September,

he was unable to ride thirty miles without resting for a day.[1145] He

had consulted various ‘oracles’ and found that he was bilious, nervous,

cursed with a disease of the liver, and he had been ‘forbidden and

enjoined to take almost everything’--meat--cider--a trotting horse--and

to refrain from excess of every kind.[1146] In October, with the

congressional battle approaching, he had a relapse--‘extreme weakness,

want of appetite, want of rest.’ Faint hope then of reaching

Philadelphia at the first of the session, ‘if ever.’ Still, the cool

weather might restore him. Philadelphia, perhaps, by December.[1147] But

December found him at Dedham, with King writing him of the desperate

prospects in the House and urging his presence,[1148] and in January

Ames was writing Jeremiah Smith of his resolve to go on to Philadelphia.

‘Should this snow last, I am half resolved to jingle my bells as far as

Springfield.’ At any rate, on the morrow he would go to ‘my loyal town

of Boston in my covered sleigh by way of experimenting of my

strength.’[1149]

February found him on the way. At New Haven where he lodged, the snow

grew thin, and ‘there was great wear and tear of horse flesh.’ At

Stamford it was gone and he took a coachee. At Mamaroneck, twenty-five

miles from New York, he slept, and awoke to find the snow ‘pelting the

windows.’ Back with the coach, and a wait for the sleigh. Even so, he

wrote, ‘to-morrow I expect to hear the bells ring and the light horse

blow their trumpets’ on reaching New York. ‘If Governor Jay won’t do

that for me, let him get his treaty defended by Calumus, and such

under-strappers.’ Two days in New York--three more--and Philadelphia.

‘Do not let me go down to the pit of the Indian Queen,’ he had written a

colleague. ‘It is Hades and Tartarus, and Periphlegethon, Cocytus, and

Styx where it would be a pity to bring all the piety and learning that

he must have who knows the aforesaid infernal names. Please leave word

at the said Queen, or if need be at any other Queens where I may unpack

my weary household gods.’[1150] The day before this letter was written,

Bache’s paper said that the ‘ratification is not to arrive until Mr.

Ames has recovered,’ because ‘the subaltern officers of the corps not

being supposed sufficiently skilled in tactics to be entrusted with the

principal command.’[1151] Six days later, he announced Ames’s arrival in

New York.[1152] Thus, like a warrior borne to battle on a stretcher,

Ames entered the capital.

All through March he sat in silence listening to the debate on

Livingston’s Resolutions, groaning under his physical disability. ‘I am

not a sentry, not in the ranks, not on the staff,’ he wrote in disgust.

‘I am thrown into the wagon as part of the baggage.’[1153] With the

debate on the treaty itself about to begin, he wrote that he was ‘not

fit for debate on the treaty and not able to attend through a whole

sitting.’[1154] Thus he watched the swaying fortunes of the fight, sick

and feeble, but expected to save the day in a pinch. When he rose that

April day to make the final effort for his party, there was drama in the

general appreciation of his condition. That Ames enjoyed it, we have no

doubt. It was so much like Chatham carried into the House of Peers

wrapped in his flannels.

IX

Ames was a consummate actor that spring day. Not without art did he

begin with a reference to his frailty. Here was a man ready to die for a

cause. Impassionedly he pleaded against passion. The treaty, he said,

had ‘raised our character as a nation.’ Its rejection would be a

‘violation of public faith.’ It had ‘more critics than readers,’ and

‘the movements of passion are quicker than those of understanding.’

Lightly he touched upon the constitutional question, and then hastened

to his purpose--to discuss the consequences of rejection, to play on

fear. With this he expected to win his fight--with this he won. Reject

the treaty and leave the posts in the hands of the British and invite

war?

‘On this theme,’ he said in his most thrilling tones, ‘my emotions are

unutterable. If I could find words for them ... I would swell my voice

to such a note of remonstrance, it would reach every log house beyond

the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, wake from your false

security, your cruel dangers, your more cruel apprehensions are soon to

be renewed; the wounds yet unhealed, are to be torn open again; in the

day time your path through the woods will be ambushed, the darkness of

midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a

father--the blood of your son shall fatten your corn field. You are a

mother--the war whoop shall waken the sleep of the cradle.... By

rejecting the posts we light the savage fires, we bind the victims. This

day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans whom our

decision will make; to the wretches who will be roasted at the stake; to

our country; and I do not deem it too serious to say, to our conscience

and God. The voice of humanity issues from the shade of the wilderness;

it exclaims that while one hand is held up to reject this treaty, the

other grasps a tomahawk. It summons our imagination to the scenes that

will open.... I can fancy that I listen to the yells of savage vengeance

and the shrieks of torture; already they seem to sigh on the western

wind; already they mingle with every echo from the mountains.’

How the frontiersmen in the gallery must have stared at this solicitude

for them from a Federalist of New England!

Then, in closing, a perfect piece of art. ‘I have perhaps as little

personal interest in the event as any one here. There is, I believe, no

member who will not believe his chance to be a witness to the

consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to

reject, and a spirit should rise as it will, with the public disorder to

make confusion worse confounded, even I, slender and almost broken as my

hold upon life is, may outlive the governments and Constitution of my

country.’ He sank into his seat. ‘My God,’ exclaimed a Federal Judge,

‘did you ever hear anything like it?’ Crusty old John Adams wiped his

eyes. Accept, said Ames, or England will turn the savages upon you;

accept, or your Constitution will be overthrown; accept, or the Republic

will be destroyed.

The Federalists were jubilant--as was Ames, none the worse for the

speech. Soon Christopher Gore was writing him from London that he knew

his speech was ‘in the hands of Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas and Lord

Grenville.’[1155] The Jeffersonians were alarmed. Madison was bitter

because of the summons to ‘follow Washington wherever he leads.’[1156]

Soon he was to find that ‘the name of the President and the alarm of

war’ had done mischief.[1157] When the roll was called, several enemies

of the treaty had been frightened from the firing line. Patton of New

Jersey had a convenient illness. Varnum was unavoidably absent. Freeman

of New Hampshire had obtained leave of absence, and a newly elected

Democrat from Maryland discreetly withheld his credentials until after

the fight was over. By a majority of three the House decided to

appropriate. Even so, it was the most expensive victory the Federalists

had won, for the majority in the country was on the other side. Out of

the struggle had emerged a new great leader to serve the Jeffersonians,

Albert Gallatin. Jefferson had been so delighted with his speech that he

wrote Madison that it deserved a place in ‘The Federalist.’[1158] During

the remainder of the session, he was to cause much mental distress with

his fiscal reform plans and his attacks on the Treasury.

X

Jefferson had followed the fight on the treaty from his mountain, making

no personal effort to influence the result. It had not been so easy as

he had hoped to forget politics in the cultivation of his peas, and when

Congress met he had subscribed for Bache’s paper.[1159] He divided the

friends of the treaty into two classes; the honest who were afraid of

England, and the dishonest who had pecuniary motives. At no time did he

question the honesty of Washington. In his letters to Madison he poured

forth his innermost thoughts, but beyond this his correspondence had not

been extensive.

It is the fashion to set down as a pose his pretended indifference to

the Presidency in 1796, but there is evidence enough that he was deeply

concerned over his health. He had begun, as he thought, ‘to feel the

effects of age,’ and was convinced that his health had ‘suddenly broken

down.’[1160] In a letter to Washington touching on political topics, he

wrote that he would ‘put aside this disgusting dish of old fragments and

talk ... of peas and clover.’[1161] In July, with the Federalist press,

in expectation of his candidacy, intemperately denouncing his letter to

Mazzei, he was writing a friend his estimate of the height of the Blue

Ridge Mountains, explaining his plan for a moulding-board, and

expressing his indignation because of the silly attacks on the memory of

Franklin.[1162]

Fenno and Webster were working themselves into a frenzy over the letter

to Philip Mazzei, the Italian, in which Jefferson had frankly discussed

American politics. It contained nothing that Jefferson had not

repeatedly said to Washington’s face. ‘An Anglican

aristocratical-monarchical party’--this the theme. But he had hinted

that Washington had been captured by the aristocrats and

monarchists--and here was treason. Webster said so with all his

vocabulary, and there was some ridiculous talk of impeaching the author

of the letter after his election to the Vice-Presidency, but throughout

it all Jefferson made no public comment, no denial, no explanation. He

was ever the consummate politician.[1163] The announced decision of

Washington to retire made Jefferson’s candidacy a certainty, whether he

willed it or not. Three years before, the Democrats had decided. All

through the summer and autumn that was the understanding.

To the Hamiltonians the retirement of Washington was peculiarly

distressing. On most controversial subjects he had ultimately adopted

their view. More than one of their unpopular measures had been saved

with their war-cry, ‘Stand with Washington.’ With Washington eliminated,

it was vitally important to Hamilton and his leaders to find a successor

who would be more or less subservient. Hamilton himself was out of the

question for the reason that Hamilton had given--he did not have the

confidence of the people. Jay, who would have been the second choice,

would have been a red rag to the ‘rabble’ in 1796. Few of the other

leaders, with all their brilliancy and personal charm, could have made a

popular appeal; and Adams was thoroughly distrusted and disliked by the

Hamiltonians because of his independence.

Under these circumstances, Hamilton and King, consulting, conceived the

idea of persuading Patrick Henry to be a candidate. Just what appealed

to them has never been satisfactorily explained, for Henry had been

among the most bitter and brilliant enemies of the ratification of the

Constitution. With the acquisition of wealth, great changes had occurred

in the old patriot’s manner of thinking, and he had come to lean

strongly toward the Federalists.[1164] Fear of Jefferson and a desire to

break the solidarity of Virginia’s vote may have been a determining

motive. That an effort was being made to find a candidate who would

appeal to the South and West appears in King’s letter to

Hamilton.[1165] Whatever the motive, the decision to offer Henry the

support of the Hamiltonians was reached, and John Marshall was asked to

approach him.

The old orator was living quietly and happily at ‘Red Hill,’ his home in

the country, where he liked nothing better than to drag his chair out

under the trees, tilt it against one of the trunks, and, with a can of

cool spring water beside him, look out lazily across the green valley.

There, with his family and friends about him, he asked nothing better

than to be let alone.[1166] Motives of discretion and the limitations of

a letter dissuaded the chosen emissary from writing to ‘Red Hill,’ but

Henry Lee, who knew Henry more intimately, was asked to write him an

intimation of what was in the air. No answer was forthcoming. Very soon,

however, the old patriot would be in Richmond and Marshall would then

sound him, and, discovering an indisposition to embark on the

enterprise, would ‘stop where prudence may direct.’[1167] Thus Henry was

cautiously approached, without being given any intimation of the source

of the suggestion, and was found ‘unwilling to embark in the

business.’[1168] Thus ended the flirtation with Patrick Henry, with the

friendly conspirators hidden behind the fan.

Anticipating a declination, Hamilton and King had canvassed the

availability of Thomas Pinckney, the American Minister in London. ‘It is

an idea of which I am fond in various lights,’ wrote Hamilton to King.

‘I rather wish to be rid of Patrick Henry that we may be at full liberty

to take up Pinckney.’[1169] This was due to the feeling that ‘to his

former stock of popularity he will now add the good will of those who

have been peculiarly gratified with the Spanish treaty’--which he had

negotiated.[1170] Thus the inner circle of the Hamiltonians settled the

matter for themselves without reference to the rank and file of the

party.

XI

Thomas Pinckney was one of the finest gentlemen of his time. Tall,

slender, erect, with handsome features and a princely bearing, he was a

superb figure of a man. His manners were those of the natural

aristocrat; he was courteous, dignified, and charming. A perfect

self-control was reflected in the repose of his features and the tone of

his voice. Though of ardent temper, he kept a tight rein upon it, and he

became a master of persuasion and conciliation. A man of artistic

temperament, with a touch of architectural genius, he planned his own

houses, all imposing, and his town house in Charleston was the first to

have self-supporting stairs four stories high. His library was one of

the most extensive in the country. While lacking luster, there was a

charm in his personality and a solidity in his character that appealed

to men of conservative disposition. Born of wealthy parents, he had been

educated in England, at Westminster, Oxford, and the Temple, and he had

attended the fencing and riding school of Angelo in London. He had been

trained as one destined to command. Through his English experiences he

passed without yielding one jot of his robust Americanism, and he fought

in the Revolution and was once left wounded on the field of battle.

As Governor of South Carolina, he had served with distinction; as

Minister to England, he had stubbornly maintained positions that Jay was

to yield; and as Minister to Spain he had electrified the country with a

signal triumph. Matching wits with the celebrated Godoy, he had secured

a treaty establishing our southern limits from the Atlantic to the

Mississippi, making the river our western boundary, and throwing it open

to our navigation with an outlet to the Gulf and the privileges of the

port of New Orleans. It was this achievement, hailed with enthusiasm in

sections where the Federalists were weak, that led to his selection by

Hamilton and King.

XII

The campaign of 1796 was one of scurrility, albeit both Jefferson and

Adams, favored by the rank and file of the Federalist Party, comported

themselves becomingly. The party press teemed with silly attacks and

personalities. Adams was a monarchist, an aristocrat, a panter after

titles, an enemy of the masses, the defender of the red-coated assassins

of the Boston massacre; and Jefferson was a French tool, a friend of

anarchy, the inciter of the Whiskey Insurrection, a foe to public

credit, an atheist, an enemy of the Constitution,[1171] an incompetent

in office, and a plagiarist who had stolen his essay on weights and

measures from a pamphlet with which Noah Webster was familiar.[1172]

Worse still: Adet, the French Minister, ‘better supplied with money than

Faucet,’ was distributing it liberally in an effort to elect Jefferson,

and had sent agents into the western country in his behalf. Had not

Gallatin been seen ‘in frequent conferences with Adet?’[1173] A grave

disappointment, this Adet who had such a ‘handsome wife’ and had seemed

‘mild tempered, well educated and no Jacobin.’[1174] Then came Adet’s

letter to Pickering reviewing the complaints of France against the

American Government, and mentioning Jefferson pleasantly in connection

with his official acts--and the Federalists had an issue. France was

trying to dictate a President to America. Her Minister was

electioneering. Fenno and Noah Webster were hysterical, Hamilton was

pleased, Pickering, the new Secretary of State, was frothing so

furiously as to disgust the Federalist leader in New York.[1175] Madison

was disgusted too,[1176] and the notorious Judge Chase was demanding the

jailing of editors who had dared publish the Adet letter which had been

given to the press.[1177] What though Bache did point out that the

letter was written on instructions from Paris given before the

announcement of Washington’s retirement--it was a campaign screed![1178]

Soon it was the paramount issue, and the ‘Aurora,’ accepting it, was

urging Fenno to spare some of his indignation for ‘the scourging of an

American at a British gangway as Captain Jessup was scourged,’ and the

shooting of a brother of a member of Congress trying to escape from a

British press gang.[1179] Meanwhile, strange things were happening

behind the screen in Federalist circles.

XIII

Hamilton was planning a repetition of the scheme he engineered in 1789,

to bring Adams in second, with Pinckney first. He had never cared for

the downright Puritan of Quincy, and the latter had never forgiven him

the reduction of the Adams vote far below that of Washington in the

first election. During the first Administration, Adams’s vote was

indispensable to Hamilton’s policies on several occasions, and it had

never failed. Thus there was no opposition to his reëlection. But the

Presidency--that was different. It was evident that Adams was not a man

to be led around by the nose by any man or clique, and Hamilton had

never been a god of his idolatry. Thus, during the summer and autumn of

‘96, Hamilton was busy with a subterranean plan to substitute Pinckney

for Adams in the Presidency by arranging for Federalist electors,

scattered over the country, to vote to a man for Pinckney, while

throwing a few Adams votes away on other men. As the high man was

elected President and the second Vice-President, he expected to carry

his point by management.

It does not appear, however, that all his followers were in on the

secret. His ever-faithful servitor, Oliver Wolcott’s father, either knew

nothing of it or disapproved, for he feared that the juggling would

result in the election of Jefferson, to the Vice-Presidency at

least.[1180] In the event of his election to the Presidency, Wolcott

hoped ‘the northern States would separate from the southern.’[1181] As

fate would have it, the suspicious Adams anticipated some such attempt

to trick him, and his friends decided quietly to offset any possible

Adams losses by dropping a few Pinckney votes to a third party. The

result was a Jeffersonian sweep in the West and South, with the

exception of Maryland, where Adams had a majority of three. Of the

thirty-nine New England votes, Pinckney received but twenty-two, while

all went to Adams. Such was the result of Hamilton’s strategy. Adams was

elected with 71 votes, and Jefferson, with three votes less, had eight

more than Pinckney.

Thus the hated leader of the Democrats became Vice-President.

Then, too late, the Hamiltonians realized their mistake. Wolcott groaned

that Jefferson in the Vice-Presidency ‘would be more dangerous than as

President.’[1182] His very willingness to accept the position was

‘sufficient proof of some defect of character.’ Chauncey Goodrich was in

accord. ‘We must expect him to be the nucleus of a faction,’ he wrote,

‘and if it will give him some greater advantage for mischief, it draws

him from his covert.’[1183] Ames dreaded his election as ‘a formidable

evil.’[1184] Hamilton buried his chagrin in a cynicism. ‘Our Jacobins

say they are pleased that the Lion and Lamb are to lie down together,’

he wrote King. ‘Mr. Adams’s personal friends talk a little the same

way.... Skeptics like me quietly look forward to the event, willing to

hope but not prepared to believe. If Mr. Adams has vanity ’tis plain a

plot has been laid to take hold of it.’[1185] These hints at the

possible seduction of Adams were not without some justification.

Madison had urged Jefferson to accept the Vice-Presidency on the ground

that ‘your neighborhood to Adams may have a valuable effect on his

counsels.... It is certain that his censures of our paper system, and

the intrigues at New York for setting Pinckney above him have fixed an

enmity with the British faction.’[1186] Before receiving this letter,

the incomparable strategist at Monticello had written Madison that in

the event of a tie he should ‘solicit on my behalf that Mr. Adams may be

preferred.’[1187] Could he, by any chance, have expected this admonition

to reach Adams in any way? A few days later, we find him writing

directly to Adams expressing regret that they had been put in opposition

to one another. It seemed, he said, that Adams had been chosen. Of

course he might be ‘cheated’ by ‘a trick worthy of the subtilty of your

arch-friend of New York who has been able to make of your real friends

tools to defeat their and your best wishes.’ Personally, he asked no

happier lot than to be left ‘with the society of neighbors, friends, and

fellow-laborers of the earth’ rather than with ‘spies and

sycophants.’[1188] Four days later, we find him writing Madison of his

willingness to serve under Adams. ‘He is perhaps the only sure barrier

against Hamilton’s getting in.’[1189] Other letters probably phrased for

Adams’s eye went out from Monticello, referring to their ‘ancient

friendship.’ But he wanted no place in the counsels of the

Administration--and that was significant enough.[1190]

Meanwhile, the Jefferson letter to Adams, sent to Madison to be

delivered or withheld according to his judgment, was put aside. There

was a ‘general air’ in the letter indicative of the difficulty under

which it was written. Adams might resent the reference to Hamilton.

Again he might interpret Jefferson’s expressed preference for the simple

life as a reflection on his own ambition. ‘You know the temper of Mr.

Adams better than I do,’ wrote Madison, ‘but I have always conceived it

to be a very ticklish one.’ The Jeffersonian press had begun to speak in

kindly tones of Adams to the disgust of the Federalists.

Then, one bitter cold day, the family carriage appeared at the door of

Monticello, and the master carefully supervised the packing of the bones

of a mastodon which he had recently acquired and wished to present to

the Philadelphia Philosophical Society, of which he had been elected

president. Thus he reached the capital on March 2d, to be received,

against his expressed wishes, with gun-fire and a procession flying a

flag inscribed: ‘Jefferson, Friend of the People.’ He went at once to

Francis Tavern to pay his respects to Adams.

Thus the new Administration began, Bache sending a brutal parting shot

at the old--an insult to Washington.[1191] But the star of Hamilton had

not set, for Adams had foolishly retained the Washington Cabinet,

hand-picked by his ‘arch-friend of New York,’ and the congressional

leaders were still under the magic spell of the old Federalist chief.

That was the cloud on the horizon, small that day, but destined to grow

bigger and blacker until the storm broke, leaving much wreckage behind.

Jefferson and Hamilton · 第 13 / 22 章