II.

=Source.=--Holland's _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_, vol. i., p.

472 _et seq._ (Longmans.)

On 29th July Lord Hartington circulated to the Cabinet his

own final memorandum on the subject. He said: "I wish before

Parliament is prorogued, and it becomes absolutely impossible to do

anything for the relief of General Gordon, to bring the subject

once more under the consideration of the Cabinet. On the last

occasion when it was discussed, although an opinion was expressed

that the balance of probability was that no expedition would be

required to enable General Gordon and those dependent on him to

leave Khartoum, I gathered that a considerable majority were in

favour of making some preparations, and taking some steps which

would make a relief expedition to Khartoum possible. I believe

that I have already stated the grounds on which I think that if

anything is now attempted it must be by the Valley of the Nile,

and not by the Suakin-Berber line. The delay which has taken place

makes it impossible that the railway should be constructed for

any considerable distance on that line during the next autumn

and winter, the period during which military operations would be

practicable without great suffering and loss of life to the troops.

The renewed concentration of the tribes under Osman Digna, near

Suakin, and the fall of Berber, makes it inevitable that severe

fighting would have to be done at both ends of the march, and,

in consequence of the necessity of crossing the desert in small

detachments, the engagement near Berber would be fought under

great disadvantages. On the other hand, we have for the defence

of the Nile itself been compelled to send a considerable force of

British and Egyptian troops up the Nile; and the positions which

are now occupied by those troops are so many stages on the advance

by the Nile Valley.... The proposal which I make is that a brigade

should be ordered to advance as soon as possible to Dongola by

the Nile.... I have not entered into the question whether it is

or is not probable that General Gordon can leave Khartoum without

assistance. As we know absolutely nothing, any opinion on this

subject can only be guess-work. But I do not see how it is possible

to redeem the pledges which we have given, if the necessity should

be proved to exist, without some such preparations and measures as

those which I now suggest...." Mr. Chamberlain minuted that he was

"against what is called an expedition, or the preparations for an

expedition." He did not think that the information was sufficient

to justify it. He thought that more information should first be

obtained.... Mr. Gladstone minuted (July 31): "I confess it to be

my strong conviction that to send an expedition either to Dongola

or Khartoum at the present time would be to act in the teeth of

evidence as to Gordon which, however imperfect, is far from being

trivial, and would be a grave and dangerous error." Mr. Gladstone

at the same time wrote to Lord Granville a letter, which the latter

forwarded to Lord Hartington. He said: "I had intended to give much

time to-day to collecting the sum of the evidence as to Gordon's

position, which appears to me to be strangely underrated by

some.... Undoubtedly I can be no party to the proposed despatch, as

a first step, of a brigade to Dongola. I do not think the evidence

as to Gordon's position requires or justifies, in itself, military

preparations for the contingency of a military expedition. There

are, however, preparations, perhaps, of various kinds which might

be made, and which are matters simply of cost, and do not include

necessary consequences in point of policy. To these I have never

offered an insuperable objection, and the adoption of them might

be, at the worst, a smaller evil than the evils with which we are

threatened in other forms. This on what I may call my side. On

the other hand, I hope I may presume that, while we are looking

into the matters I have just indicated, nothing will be done to

accelerate a Gordon crisis until we see, in the early days of next

week, what the Conference crisis is to produce."

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