=Source.=--_Hansard_, Third Series, vol. 259, C 49-74 (House of
Lords debate on the withdrawal from Candahar, March 3, 1881).
THE EARL OF LYTTON: ... And now, my Lords, allow me to recapitulate
the conclusions which appear to me established by the facts to
which I have solicited your attention. On the strength of these
facts I affirm once more that Russian influence at Cabul did
not commence with the Stolieteff mission, and that it did not
cease with the withdrawal of that mission. I affirm that for
all practical purposes the Ameer of Cabul had ceased to be the
friend and ally of England, and that he had virtually become the
friend and ally of Russia at least three years before I had any
dealings with His Highness, or any connection with the government
of India. I affirm that the sole cause of the late Afghan war was
a Russian intrigue of long duration, for purposes which it was
the imperative duty of the Government of India to oppose at any
cost. And, finally, I affirm that the establishment of Russian
influence was caused by the collapse and paralysis of British
influence at Cabul, and that this was the natural result of the
deplorable policy to which Her Majesty's Government are now so
eagerly reverting.... Surely, my Lords, prevention is better than
cure. Surely it is wiser and safer to stay at Candahar, whence we
can exclude Russian influence from Herat by peaceably extending our
own influence in that direction, than to retire to the Indus, and
there passively await an event which is to involve us in a great
European war, for the purpose of undoing what could not otherwise
have been done in a remote corner of Asia. The noble Duke, the
Lord Privy Seal, has expressed his astonishment at the prodigious
importance I now attach to the retention of Candahar, because,
he says, I did not hold that opinion till a late period of my
Viceroyalty. That is true--I did not. But in the statement which
elicited this remark I thought I had explained the reason why. I
can sincerely assure your Lordships that the late Government of
India was not an annexationist Government. As long as we had any
reasonable hope of loyalty on the part of Yakub Khan, or of the
observance of the Gandamak Treaty, which gave us moral guarantees
of adequate control over Afghanistan, our wish was not to weaken
but to strengthen the Cabul Power. But the whole situation, and
our duty concerning it, were changed irrevocably by the atrocious
crime which compelled us to occupy Cabul, and by the revelations
discovered at Cabul, and now known to your Lordships, of the
extent to which Russian influence had penetrated to the very heart
of the country. My Lords, it then seemed to my colleagues in the
Government of India, and it still seems to me, that the only
practical means of counteracting the dangerous Russian influence
at Cabul would be to assume ourselves over Western Afghanistan a
controlling and commanding position, not dependent on the good or
bad faith of any Cabul ruler. Such control can only be exercised
from Candahar. The history of the last eight years clearly shows,
not merely that the Russian Power is approaching, and must
approach, towards India, but that Russia has long sought, is still
seeking, and will continue to seek, great political influence
over Afghanistan; that this influence has already found a fulcrum
at Cabul, and that it must be a permanent source of disquiet to
the Government of India, whenever she wishes to embarrass British
policy in Europe. Therefore, for the safety of the British Power in
India, it is indispensable that the Government of India shall have
the means of preventing--at all events, of counteracting--Russian
influence in Afghanistan. It is absurd to suppose that you can have
any controlling power over a country in which you have no _locus
standi_ at all. Now amongst the arrangements contemplated by Her
Majesty's Government after the evacuation of Candahar, where do
they expect to find a _locus standi_ in Afghanistan? I do not see
where.... Great as are the undisputed strategical advantages of
Candahar, the late Government of India did not regard the retention
of it primarily, or mainly, as a military question. We felt that
it would give us a political and commercial control over Western
Afghanistan up to Herat so complete that we might contemplate
with unconcern the course of events at Cabul. If you retain
Candahar, and hold it firmly and fearlessly, then you may view with
indifference the uncertain faith and fate of Cabul rulers, and
the certain advance of the Russian Power. If you retain Candahar,
and administer it wisely, you will replace anarchy and bloodshed
and difficulty and uncertainty on your own border by peace and
prosperity; and if you connect Candahar by rail with the Valley of
the Indus, you will be able to sweep the whole commerce of Central
Asia, vastly augmented by the beneficent protection of a strong, a
settled, and a civilized Government, into the harbours of Kurrachee
and Calcutta, and thence into the ports of Liverpool and London.
But, my Lords, you cannot do all this unless you retain a garrison
in Candahar.... If you accept the conclusion admitted by the noble
Duke, and affirmed by every Indian statesman, that Afghanistan must
on no account be permitted to remain under the forbidden influence
of Russia, then, my Lords, for the enforcement of that conclusion
you must choose between the retention of Candahar and reliance on
the instructions said to have been issued to General Kauffman "not
to do it again." There is no alternative. To talk about developing
the internal resources of India is nothing to the point. There
is no reason why the continued development of India's internal
resources should not proceed _pari passu_ with the consolidation of
her external securities. But do not fatten the lamb only to feed
the wolf. My Lords, all those whose privilege it is to build up
the noble edifice of India's prosperity must be content to labour
like the builders of the second Temple--working with one hand, but
holding the sword in the other to defend their work.