THE MAIWAND DISASTER (1880).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Afghanistan," C 2,736 of

1880, p. 3.

_Telegram from Viceroy, June 27, 1880, to Secretary of State._

Telegram from Thomson at Teheran says: Ayub Khan marching against

Candahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to

defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after

communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with

security of our military position at Candahar to allow hostile

forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct

Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with

sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund....

_Telegram dated August 2, 1880, from Colonel St. John, Candahar, to

Foreign, Simla (p. 33)._

_29th._--Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows

and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted

ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this

by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on

morning 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had

occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's

cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their

camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry

engaged them at 9 a.m., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy

appeared, and formed line of battle--seven regiments, regulars in

centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right;

400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left;

other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of

guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals.

Estimated total force, 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy

being well posted. Till 1 p.m. action confined to artillery fire,

which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior

quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns.

After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but

vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the

front, caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th,

abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated

slowly; and in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally

them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 p.m.,

and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Candahar.

After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded

in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat.

Unfortunately no effort would turn fugitives from main road,

waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have

occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to

ten miles from Candahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery,

and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, forty miles from

scene of action, at 7 a.m., many not having tasted water since

previous morning. Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini,

700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed,

and missing: 66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350;

artillery, 40; sappers, 21; cavalry, 60.... Preparations being now

made for siege....

_Extract from General Burrows's Report on the Action (p. 101)._

... Between two and three o'clock the fire of the enemy's guns

slackened, and swarms of Ghazis advanced rapidly towards our

centre. Up to this time the casualties among the infantry had not

been heavy, and as the men were firing steadily, and the guns

were sweeping the ground with case shot, I felt confident as to

the result. But our fire failed to check the Ghazis; they came on

in overwhelming numbers, and, making good their rush, they seized

the two most advanced horse artillery guns. With the exception of

two companies of Jacob's Rifles, which had caused me great anxiety

by their unsteadiness early in the day, the conduct of the troops

had been splendid up to this point; but now, at the critical

moment, when a firm resistance might have achieved a victory, the

infantry gave way, and, commencing from the left, rolled up, like

a wave, to the right. After vainly endeavouring to rally them, I

went for the cavalry.... The 3rd Light Cavalry and the 3rd Sind

Horse were retiring slowly on our left, and I called upon them to

charge across our front and so give the infantry an opportunity

of reforming; but the terrible artillery fire to which they had

been exposed, and from which they had suffered so severely, had so

shaken them that General Nuttall was unable to give effect to my

order. All was now over....

_Extract from Report by Lieutenant-General Primrose, Commanding 1st

Division Southern Afghanistan Field Force (p. 156)._

I would most respectfully wish to bring to the Commander-in-Chief's

notice the gallant and determined stand made by the officers

and men of the 66th Regiment at Maiwand.... 10 officers and 275

non-commissioned officers and men were killed, and 2 officers and

30 non-commissioned officers and men wounded. These officers and

men nearly all fell fighting desperately for the honour of their

Queen and country. I have it on the authority of a Colonel of

Artillery of Ayub Khan's army that a party of the 66th Regiment,

which he estimated at one hundred officers and men, made a most

determined stand in a garden. They were surrounded by the whole

Afghan Army, and fought on until only eleven men were left,

inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy. These eleven charged out

of the garden, and died with their faces to the foe, fighting to

the death. Such was the nature of their charge and the grandeur

of their bearing that, although the whole of the Ghazis were

assembled around them, not one dared approach to cut them down.

Thus standing in the open, back to back, firing steadily and truly,

every shot telling, surrounded by thousands, these eleven officers

and men died; and it was not until the last man had been shot down

that the Ghazis dared advance upon them.

Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone (1876-1887) · 第 37 / 117 题