THE SECRET AGREEMENTS IN BEACONSFIELD'S POCKETS (1878).

=Source.=--_Hansard_, Third Series, vol. 242, col. 344 (House of

Lords: Debate on the Protocols of Berlin, August, 1878).

The Earl of Rosebery rose to call attention to a memorandum

purporting to have been signed by the Marquis of Salisbury and

Count Schouvaloff on May 30, 1878, and to ask if it was the

intention of the Government to lay it on the table of the House....

The course the Government had pursued with respect to their policy

was, he would venture to say, one of obscurity enlivened with

sarcasm. In the whole history of the negotiations there were five

cardinal points--points which became salient to everyone who had

studied the history of these transactions. First, there was the San

Stefano treaty; the second was the circular of the 1st of April;

the third, the alleged secret agreement of May 30th; the fourth,

the secret convention of June 4th with Turkey; and the fifth was

the treaty signed at Berlin on the 30th of July. As to the secret

agreement between Russia and England, it would be well to recall

how they came to have any cognizance of it at all. The substance

of it appeared in the _Globe_ within, he thought, three or four

days after it was signed, and it was on the 14th of June, he

thought, that the entire text was given in the columns of the same

journal.... They had all heard that the agreement was not to be

laid on the table, because there were documents in connection with

it which it would be necessary to present at the same time; but

other Powers would not allow us to produce them. What he gathered

from all this was that, if it had not been for the ill-advised

conduct of a very subordinate clerk in the Foreign Office, who was

entrusted with the copying of the agreement at the rate of 10d. an

hour, the English public would not at this moment have the faintest

conception of such an agreement, and the keystone of the whole

purpose of the Government would be wrapped in obscurity. This was

alarming in itself, because, if these subterranean methods were

employed as a rule, they would give the public some little dismay

in regard to the course of further negotiations.... Having signed

this agreement, and having signed another secret agreement within

two or three days with Turkey, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries

proceeded, fortified with them, to the Congress. Now came the most

extraordinary point in all the history of these negotiations, so

far as they knew it. Eight days after the signature, or alleged

signature, of this agreement, in which, if the House would

remember, we consented to the abandonment of Batoum and other

Russian conquests in Armenia, the Foreign Secretary addressed a

despatch to our Resident Plenipotentiary in Berlin, in which he

urged him to use his exertions to the utmost on behalf of Batoum.

The words were so remarkable that he might be pardoned for quoting

them to their lordships. On the 8th of June the noble Marquis wrote

to Lord Odo Russell: "There is no ground for believing that Russia

will willingly give way in respect to Batoum, Kars, or Ardahan; and

it is possible that the arguments of England urged in Congress will

receive little assistance from other Powers, and will not be able

to shake her resolution in this respect." Well, that was not likely

under the circumstances. The noble Marquis continued in this letter

of June 8th: "You will not on that account abstain from earnestly

pressing upon them and upon Russia the justice of abstaining from

annexations which are unconnected with the professed object of the

war, and profoundly distasteful to the populations concerned, and

the expediency, in regard to the future tranquillizing of Asia, of

forbearing to shake so perilously the position of the Government

of Turkey...." Now, the great point with regard to this was, was

Lord Odo Russell, when he received that communication, cognizant

of the agreement which had been signed on the 30th of May? Because

what they wanted to know was this, was Lord Odo Russell one of a

company, or was he a simple actor put up to recite the arguments

of Batoum, with a prompter by to keep him to his part?... Then,

on the same day, Mr. Secretary Cross addressed a despatch to

the Plenipotentiaries of Her Majesty, urging them to make great

exertion on behalf of Greece. He should say that the position of

a Plenipotentiary who entered the Congress to struggle on behalf

of Batoum, Kars, Ardahan, and Greece must have been a somewhat

melancholy one in the retrospect; because, when the questions

came up, the Turkish positions were abandoned, and Greece was

ignored.... He did not pretend that secret understandings were

unknown to us, but he believed this was the first time we had

called a European Congress with the view of discussing great

treaties, and standing forth on behalf of public law, we ourselves

having, at the same time, bound ourselves in private to consent to

those stipulations which we had denounced, and which we continued

to denounce.

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