=Source.=--_Hansard_, Third Series, vol. 227, col. 95 (Debate on
the Address, February, 1876).
MR. DISRAELI: ... When we acceded to office two years ago an
International Commission had only just ceased its labours at
Constantinople upon the dues of the Suez Canal, and upon the means
of ascertaining and maintaining a limit of them, and it had arrived
at reasons entirely protested against by the proprietary. What was
the state of affairs there? Lord Derby had to deal with them. The
proprietary of the canal threatened, and not only threatened, but
proceeded, to stop the canal. They refused pilots; they threatened
to change the signals; they took steps which would have interrupted
that mode of intercourse with India.... From that moment it became
a matter of interest to those responsible for the government of
this country to see what could be done to remedy those relations
with the Suez Canal.... But it suddenly comes to our knowledge that
the Khedive, on whose influence we mainly depended, is going to
part with his shares. We received a telegram from Cairo informing
us that the Khedive was anxious to raise a considerable sum of
money upon his shares in the Suez Canal, and offered them to
England. We considered the question immediately, and it appeared
to us to be a complicated transaction--one to which there were
several objections; and we sent back to say that we were favourably
disposed to assist the Khedive, but that at the same time we were
only prepared to purchase the shares outright. What was the answer?
The answer was that the Khedive was resolved, if he possibly
could, to keep his shares, and that he could only therefore avail
himself of a loan. There matters seemed to end. Then suddenly
there came news to the Government of this country that a French
society--Société Générale--was prepared to offer the Khedive a
large sum of money--very little inferior to the four millions--but
on very onerous conditions. The Khedive communicated with us, and
said that the conditions were so severe that he would sooner sell
the shares outright, and--which I had forgotten to mention--that,
in deference to his promise that England should always have the
refusal of the shares if he decided to sell them, he offered them
to the English Government. It was absolutely necessary to decide at
that moment what course we should take. It was not a thing on which
we could hesitate.... To pretend that Lord Derby has treated this
business as a mere commercial speculation is idle. If he did not
act in accordance with the principles of high policy, I should like
to know what high policy is, and how a man can pursue it.
Apart from looking upon this as an investment, if the shares had
been offered, and if there had been no arrangement of paying
interest for nineteen years, so far as I am concerned, I should
have been in favour of the purchase of the shares. I should have
agreed with Lord Derby in thinking that England would never be
satisfied if all the shares of the Suez Canal were possessed by
a foreign company. Then it is said, if any obstacles had been
put in your way by the French proprietors of the canal, you
know very well that ultimately it must come to force, and you
will then obtain at once the satisfaction of your desire. Well,
if the government of the world was a mere alternation between
abstract right and overwhelming force, I agree there is a good
deal in that observation; but that is not the way in which the
world is governed. The world is governed by conciliation,
compromise, influence, varied interests, the recognition of the
rights of others, coupled with the assertion of one's own; and,
in addition, a general conviction, resulting from explanation and
good understanding, that it is for the interests of all parties
that matters should be conducted in a satisfactory and peaceful
manner.... I cannot doubt that the moral influence of England
possessing two-fifths of the shares in this great undertaking
must have made itself felt, must have a considerable influence
upon the conduct of those who manage the company.... England
is a Mediterranean Power; a great Mediterranean Power. This is
shown by the fact that in time of war always, and frequently in
time of peace, she has the greatest force upon those waters.
Furthermore, she has strongholds upon those waters which she will
never relinquish. The policy of England, however, is not one of
aggression. It is not provinces she wants. She will not interest
herself in the redistribution of territory on the shores of the
Mediterranean, as long as the redistribution does not imperil
the freedom of the seas and the dominion which she legitimately
exercises. And therefore I look upon this, that in the great
chain of fortresses which we possess, almost from the Metropolis
to India, that the Suez Canal is a means of securing the free
intercourse of the waters, is a great addition to that security,
and one we should prize.